Inequality: Inequality: a Piketty Et Al
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Interests, Preferences, and Center-Left Party Politics in Corporate Governance Reform
Interests, Preferences, and Center-Left Party Politics in Corporate Governance Reform John W. Cioffi* and Martin Höpner** (Published in: Politics & Society 34, 4, 463-502. Page numbers of the orginal text are marked with (here starts p. xxx)) John W. Cioffi ([email protected]), J.D., Ph.D., is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Riverside. His research explores the relationships between law and political economy and focuses on the politics of corporate governance reform in Europe and the United States from the 1980s to the present. His publications include: “Revenge of the Law?: Securities Litigation Reform and Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Regulation of Corporate Governance,” in Martin Levin, Martin Shapiro, and Mark Landy (eds.), Creating Competitive Markets: The Politics and Economics of Regulatory Reform (Brookings Institution Press, 2006); “Building Finance Capitalism: The Regulatory Politics of Corporate Governance Reform in the United States and Germany,” in Jonah D. Levy (ed.), The State After Statism: New State Activities in the Age of Globalization and Liberalization (Harvard University Press, 2006); “Corporate Governance Reform, Regulatory Politics, and the Foundations of Finance Capitalism in the United States and Germany,” German Law Journal (2006); “The State of the Corporation: State Power, Politics, Policymaking and Corporate Governance in the United States, Germany, and France,” in Martin Shapiro and Martin Levin (eds.), Transatlantic Policymaking in an Age of Austerity (Georgetown University Press, 2004); “Restructuring ‘Germany, Inc.’: The Corporate Governance Debate and the Politics of Company Law Reform,” Law & Policy, (2002). Martin Höpner ([email protected]), Ph.D., is a political scientists and researcher at the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies in Cologne, Germany. -
Economic Patriotism and the Paris Stock Exchange Helen Callaghan & Paul Lagneau-Ymonet Published Online: 08 Feb 2012
This article was downloaded by: [MPI Max-Planck-institute Fur Gesellschaftsforschung] On: 01 August 2013, At: 04:43 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Journal of European Public Policy Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rjpp20 The phantom of Palais Brongniart: economic patriotism and the Paris Stock Exchange Helen Callaghan & Paul Lagneau-Ymonet Published online: 08 Feb 2012. To cite this article: Helen Callaghan & Paul Lagneau-Ymonet (2012) The phantom of Palais Brongniart: economic patriotism and the Paris Stock Exchange, Journal of European Public Policy, 19:3, 388-404, DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2011.640788 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2011.640788 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content. -
Sarkozysme Et Populisme. Approche Logométrique Du Discours De Nicolas Sarkozy (2007-2012) Sarkozysm and Populism
Mots. Les langages du politique 103 | 2013 Le silence en politique Sarkozysme et populisme. Approche logométrique du discours de Nicolas Sarkozy (2007-2012) Sarkozysm and populism. A Logometric approach to Nicolas Sarkozy’s discourse (2007-2012) Sarkozysme et populisme. Approche logométrique du discours de Nicolas Sarkozy (2007-2012) Damon Mayaffre Édition électronique URL : http://journals.openedition.org/mots/21489 DOI : 10.4000/mots.21489 ISSN : 1960-6001 Éditeur ENS Éditions Édition imprimée Date de publication : 16 décembre 2013 Pagination : 73-87 ISBN : 978-2-84788-527-9 ISSN : 0243-6450 Référence électronique Damon Mayaffre, « Sarkozysme et populisme. Approche logométrique du discours de Nicolas Sarkozy (2007-2012) », Mots. Les langages du politique [En ligne], 103 | 2013, mis en ligne le 16 décembre 2015, consulté le 19 avril 2019. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/mots/21489 ; DOI : 10.4000/ mots.21489 © ENS Éditions Damon Mayaffre Sarkozysme et populisme. Approche logométrique du discours de Nicolas Sarkozy (2007-2012) Nicolas Sarkozy et le sarkozysme ne sont pas des épiphénomènes de la vie poli- tique française contemporaine. D’abord parce que l’accession d’un homme à l’Élysée sous une république présidentielle comme l’est devenue la Ve Répu- blique ne peut être tenue pour une manifestation politique mineure. Ensuite parce que N. Sarkozy ne domina pas la vie française, de manière éphémère, durant seulement un quinquennat, mais pendant une décennie entière si l’on veut bien considérer le poids politique et médiatique que le ministre de l’In- térieur, le ministre de l’Économie et d’État, le président de l’UMP eut face à un Jacques Chirac sénescent dès 2002. -
An Analysis of French and Iranian Political Cartoons on Trump's
An Analysis of French and Iranian Political Cartoons on Trump's Withdrawal from the JCPOA Zeinab Ghasemi Tari Assistant Professor, Faculty of World Studies, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran Hadi Dolatabadi Corresponding Author, Assistant Professor, Faculty of World Studies, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran Abstract The present study was conducted to investigate how Trump’s unilateral withdrawal from Iran’s nuclear deal on May 8, 2018 has been framed in political cartoons published in French and Iranian media. In this paper, a thematic analysis of published cartoons available on Google images from May 8, 2018 to June 8, 2018 was conducted in both French and Farsi. Five categories of news frames identified by Semetko and Valkenburg (2002) were applied on selected cartoons to observe how these frames are used on political cartoons in French and Iranian news outlets. Findings of the study showed that withdrawal of Trump from Iran’s nuclear deal has been framed mostly as a threat for France and has been considered in a bilateral perspective between USA and France. For the Iranian press the withdrawal is mostly considered as a result of Trump’s mental instability and P5+1 inaction. Keywords: Political Cartoons, JCPOA, France, Iran, Donald Trump, Framing Received: 2020-12-03 Review: 2021-01-04 Accepted: 2021-01-09 Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 1, Winter- Spring 2020, pp. 33-58 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Introduction While scholarly attention has been paid mostly to investigate textual or verbal discourse, visual news discourse is still a relatively under-studied realm of political discourse. -
“Economic Patriotism” and the Paris Stock Exchange
MPIfG Discussion Paper 10/ 14 The Phantom of Palais Brongniart “Economic Patriotism” and the Paris Stock Exchange Helen Callaghan and Paul Lagneau-Ymonet Helen Callaghan and Paul Lagneau-Ymonet The Phantom of Palais Brongniart: “Economic Patriotism” and the Paris Stock Exchange MPIfG Discussion Paper 10 /14 Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung, Köln Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Cologne December 2010 MPIfG Discussion Paper ISSN 0944-2073 (Print) ISSN 1864-4325 (Internet) © 2010 by the author(s) Helen Callaghan is a researcher at the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Cologne. [email protected] Paul Lagneau-Ymonet is an assistant professor at IRISSO, University Paris-Dauphine. [email protected] MPIfG Discussion Papers are refereed scholarly papers of the kind that are publishable in a peer-reviewed disciplinary journal. Their objective is to contribute to the cumulative improvement of theoretical knowl- edge. The papers can be ordered from the institute for a small fee (hard copies) or downloaded free of charge (PDF). Downloads www.mpifg.de Go to Publications / Discussion Papers Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies Paulstr. 3 | 50676 Cologne | Germany Tel. +49 221 2767-0 Fax +49 221 2767-555 www.mpifg.de [email protected] Abstract French governments are famous for promoting national champions, notably by prevent- ing foreign takeovers, but in 2005–2006, the Villepin administration allowed the New York Stock Exchange to take control -
Politics & Society
Politics & Society http://pas.sagepub.com/ The Political Paradox of Finance Capitalism: Interests, Preferences, and Center-Left Party Politics in Corporate Governance Reform John W. Cioffi and Martin Höpner Politics Society 2006 34: 463 DOI: 10.1177/0032329206293642 The online version of this article can be found at: http://pas.sagepub.com/content/34/4/463 Published by: http://www.sagepublications.com Additional services and information for Politics & Society can be found at: Email Alerts: http://pas.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts Subscriptions: http://pas.sagepub.com/subscriptions Reprints: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav Permissions: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav Citations: http://pas.sagepub.com/content/34/4/463.refs.html >> Version of Record - Oct 31, 2006 What is This? Downloaded from pas.sagepub.com at Max Planck Society on August 6, 2013 The Political Paradox of Finance Capitalism: Interests, Preferences, and Center-Left Party Politics in Corporate Governance Reform JOHN W. CIOFFI AND MARTIN HÖPNER A striking paradox underlies corporate governance reform during the past fifteen years: center-left political parties have pushed for pro-shareholder corporate gov- ernance reforms, while the historically pro-business right has generally resisted them to protect established forms of organized capitalism, concentrated corporate stock ownership, and managerialism. Case studies of Germany, France, Italy, and the United States reveal that center-left parties used corporate governance reform to attack the legitimacy of existing political economic elites, present themselves as pro-growth and pro-modernization, strike political alliances with segments of the financial sector, and appeal to middle-class voters. Conservative parties’ estab- lished alliances with managers constrained them from endorsing corporate gov- ernance reform. -
Friday, October 15 - Vendredi 15 Octobre Welcome Cocktail - Cocktail D’Accueil Dinner Debate - Dîner-Débat : Christophe De Margerie (Chairman & CEO, Total)
Oct.15 - Oct.18, 2010 Marrakech – Morocco Draft Agenda (as of October 8, 2010 - à la date du 8 octobre 2010) Friday, October 15 - Vendredi 15 octobre Welcome cocktail - Cocktail d’accueil Dinner debate - Dîner-débat : Christophe de Margerie (Chairman & CEO, Total) Saturday, October 16 - Samedi 16 octobre Opening session - Ouverture : Thierry de Montbrial, Ban Ki-Moon (Secretary-General of the United Nations) Plenary session 1: “Population, Climate, Health: What Global Governance?” Session plénière 1 : « Population, climat, santé : quelle gouvernance mondiale ? » Intervenants : José Angel Cordova Villalobos (Health Minister of the United States of Mexico), William Reilly (Chairman of the ClimateWorks Foundation; former Administrator of the United States Environmental Protection Agency), Chris Viehbacher (Chairman & CEO, Sanofi Aventis), Christian Bréchot (Vice President for Medical Scientific Affairs, Institut Mérieux) Modérateurs : Jean-Pierre Elkabbach (President, Lagardère News), Narendra Taneja (Energy Commentator and Chairman) Coffee break - Pause-café Plenary session 2: “Global Monetary and Financial Governance” Session plénière 2 : « Gouvernance monétaire et financière mondiale » Intervenants : Jean-Claude Trichet (President, European Central Bank), Haruhiko Kuroda (President, Asian Development Bank; former Special Advisor to the Cabinet of Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi), Kemal Dervis (Vice President, Global Economy and Development, Brookings Institution) Modérateurs : Xavier Vidal-Folch (El Pais, President of the World -
Beyond France's 2005 Referendum on the European Constitutional Treaty
Beyond France’s 2005 Referendum on the European Constitutional Treaty Gilles Ivaldi To cite this version: Gilles Ivaldi. Beyond France’s 2005 Referendum on the European Constitutional Treaty: Second- Order Model, Anti-Establishment Attitudes and the End of the Alternative European Utopia. West European Politics, Taylor & Francis (Routledge), 2006, Vol. 29 (n°1), pp.47-69. halshs-00090233 HAL Id: halshs-00090233 https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00090233 Submitted on 29 Aug 2006 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents entific research documents, whether they are pub- scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, lished or not. The documents may come from émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de teaching and research institutions in France or recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires abroad, or from public or private research centers. publics ou privés. Beyond France’s 2005 referendum on the European Constitutional Treaty Second-order model, anti-Establishment attitudes and the end of the alternative European utopia Last updated: Monday, 11 July 2005 Gilles Ivaldi i URMIS, University of Nice-Sophia Antipolis Abstract The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview and characterisation of the rejection of the European Constitutional Treaty by a majority of voters in France’s referendum held on 29 May 2005. Whilst pointing to the salience of political discontent with