An Overview of British Constitutional History: the Medieval Parliament and Popular

Abstract. This chapter provides an overview of the United Kingdom's constitutional development over the past eight hundred years. As in the other chapters, the narrative reflects the focus on opportunities for constitutional exchanges and the rational choice approach, but it is not otherwise meant to produce new historical facts. The chapter is somewhat longer than the others because of the United Kingdom's very long and gradual path of constitutional development.

Providing an overview of the constitutional history of the United Kingdom is complicated by the fact that England has never had a formal constitution or fundamental law.1 The written constitution of the United Kingdom consists of dozens of acts of parliament that define, and redefine: the basic architecture of the government, how the persons who come to hold power are chosen, and the constraints under which they may lawfully operate. In addition to the written constitution is an elaborate unwritten body of procedures and norms that fills the spaces of constitutional legislation. For example the crown continues to have the power to call and dismiss parliament, to appoint ministers, and to veto legislation, but informally the Crown has deferred to Commons on these matters for more than a century. Neither the mutli-document character of the English constitution, nor the complexity of its unwritten informal constitution is unusual among the countries analyzed in the present study. What is unusual about the English constitution is its longevity and the fact that none of its written documents describe formal procedures of constitutional amendment that are more stringent than for changes in ordinary legislation. The relative ease of amendment has allowed more constitutional legislation to be passed and, thus, a 1 It could be argued that Cromwell's Instrument of Government (IG) was a written constitution. It was written, however it was not a constitution. It was adopted by Cromwell in 1653, but never really described the fundamental procedures and constraints of English governance. Cromwell clearly had more power in practice than described by the IG--as for example when he rejected a more than a fourth of the first parliament elected under its rules. Moreover, the IG was substantially revised in 1657, and governance under the amended "constitution" disintegrated shortly after Cromwell's death in 1658 (Morgan, 375-7; Field 122-5). 1 more gradual path of constitutional development than in the other modern kingdoms of northern Europe, but its constitutional core has remained extraordinarily stable. The medieval constitution remained substantially in place for 400 hundred years, except for two decades in the seventeenth century. The modern constitution emerged during the period between 1828 and 1928, and has been in place for nearly a century. Instead of a cumbersome amendment process, the stability of the English constitution is the consequence of the natural institutional conservatism of existing parliamentary bodies who tend to be well served by the rules that bring them to power, and by informal norms that regard fundamental features of British governance to be sancrosanct. Although, it has been the case since 1911, that the written constitution can be modified at any time by a simple majority of the House of Commons, no major structural changes were adopted until 1999, when the hereditary basis of membership the was substantially reduced--although not eliminated.2 It is well-recognized by both politicians and voters that some changes in law may have unanticipated long term effects on the subsequent balance of political power. Thus, risk aversion as well as ongoing political interests make changing the English constitution more difficult than its amendment rules imply. For this reason, a surprising amount of the medieval template of English governance remains in place. Table 1 lists four dozen significant reforms of the procedures of British governance spread unevenly over the course of eight centuries. Episodes of reforms of the written constitution are concentrated for the most part in four periods (i) in the mid-fourteenth century during which parliament took its medieval bicameral form: a house of commons representing county and town governments and a house of lords representing nobles and senior church adminstrators, each with veto power over taxes and legislation, (ii) in the early sixteenth century during when time the Church and church courts were brought under the control of the crown via acts of parliament, (iii) in the 2 The rules for membership in the Lords have been revised several times in the past half century. Lifetime memberships in Lords (non-heriditary peers) were created in 1958 and the number of heriditary peers eligible for voting in Lords was reduced to 92 in 1999. The possibility of eliminating the House of Lords all together has recently been seriously debated, and various altermatives to hereditary membership voted on in Commons (McLean, xxxx). Of course, debate over the role of Lords in a democratic country has long been considered. Indeed the House of Lords was eliminated for about a decade, along with the crown, during the English civil war (1649-1660). 2 period between 1825 and 1835 when the medieval electoral practices for selecting members of the House of Commons and local governments were radically reformed, partly at the behest of organized reform groups outside parliament, (iv) in the period from 1910-1928, when was adopted and the House of Lords lost its absolute veto power. This is not to say that no other significant constitutional legislation has taken place in the course of the past eight centuries. The suffrage reforms of 1430, 1867, and 1884 were clearly significant. The unwritten contitution also underwent substantial reform during the late 18th century as royal deference to Parliament increased, the use of the royal veto declined, the House of Lords increasingly deferred to commons on money bills, and cabinet governance emerged. Recent membership in the European Union and modifications of the House of Lords are likely to affect the procedures and constraints of contemporary English governance for decades to come. It is to say, however, that the basic architecture, procedures, and constraints of British governance have been stable for centuries at a time, despite of the absense of stringent rules for constitutional amendment.3

Table 1: Major Constitutional Developments in English Constitutional History

Date Event Description

1215 Establishes Right to Jury Trial, and Council of Barons (including Bishops and Abbots) with veto power of new taxes

3 Perhaps the most striking example of this occurs in the seventeenth century, during which the medieval English constitution was stretched to the breaking point, and then rebounds to its old medieval forms. The great "reforms" of 1660 (the restoration) and 1689 (the glorious revolution) can best be understood as reversions to the long-standing medieval constitution. 3 1265 Montefort Parliaments Invites four knights from each shire (county) to his first par- liament. Two burgesses from every major town are also in- cluded in his second parliament. 1414 Equality of Commons Proclamation of Henry V that laws be adopted with the as- and Lords sent of both Commons and Lords 1429 Election Law Statute 40 shilling franchise established in the Shires (counties), al- lowing 5 percent of adult males to vote for shire representa- tives to Commons. 1445 Election Law Statute Boroughs to have two elected representaties each, who must be residents and possess the wealth of a Knight (or Squire). 1489 Court decision holds that legislation requires the assent of both Lords and Commons. 1533 Act of Appeals Appeals by ecclesiastical courts to the Pope eliminated (makes the crown the final level of appeal in both secular and religious courts). 1534 Act of Supremacy Crown as head of English Church (rather than Pope), Cre- ation of Anglican Church 1534 First Act of Secession Parliament passes and the King accepts rules for future ac- cession to the crown. (The rules were suggested by the King.) 1536 Bill for the Dissolution of Dissolution of smaller monasteries with all their assets the Lessor Houses turned over to the Crown. Abbots and Priors are subsequent- ly removed from the House of Lords, ending the majority of the "Lords Spiritual." 1536 Union of Wales and English law extended to Wales, 24 Welsh MPs join England parliament. 1641 First Triennial Act Parliament to be called at least once every 3 years, will be "self calling" if the Crown fails to issue writs 1641 Act Against Dissolution Forbade the King from unilaterally dissolving parliament 1642-1660 Civil War and Period of parliamentary rule (by a subset of the 1641 Parla- Commonwealth ment) followed by the Authoritarian Rule of Cromwell 1660 Breda Proclamation Restoration of Parliamentary Monarchy: England returns to constitution of August 1641 (prior to Act Against Dissolution) 1664 Second Triennial Act Requires parliaments to be called at least once every three years, but eliminates the self-calling provision. 1673 The Test Act Forbade Catholics and dissenters (mostly Presbyterians and puritans) from holding public office 1689 Bill of Rights William and Mary offered joint sovereignty, right to jury trial affirmed, right of free speech in Parliament affirmed, forbids a standing army in peace time, and excludes Catho- lics from the crown. 1694 Third Triennial Act Modifies the previous trienneal act. A meeting of parliement is required at least once every three years, and the maximal duration of parliament is set at 3 years 1689-1702 Precedents of William III Annual tax bills, ear-marked taxes, ear-marked budgets, au- dit of crown accounts, parliamentary consultation on mili- tary and foreign affairs, Bank of England is established. 1698 Civil List Act Provides William III with additional tax sources for life, but caps the new revenues at £700,000/year, beyond which ap- proval of parliament is required.

4 1701 Act of Settlement Advances the Hannovers in the line of seccession (as the nearest Protestants), future crowns can only leave Great Britain with permission from Parliament, MPs are forbidden from being on the royal payroll. 1706 Regency Act Provides for a regent council after Queen Anne's death, natu- ralized all protestant Hannoverian successors. It also weak- ens the 1701 provision regarding MPs on the Royal payroll. MPs may now take paid positions, but must stand for reelec- tion after taking a new position. 1707 Union of and Scottish Parliament abolished, 45 Scottish members join the England "English" Commons and 9 elected peers join the Lords. 1711 Property Qualification County representatives to Commons (knights) required to Act have 600 pounds of income per year, and town representa- tives (burgesses) 300 pounds per year. 1716 Septennial Act Modifies the Third Triennial Act, by setting the maximal duration of parliament at 7 years. 1801 Union with The Irish parliament is abolished, 100 Irish MPs join the "English" Commons, and 32 new Peers join the House of Lords. 1828 Repeal of the Test Act Allows Catholics and dissenting protestants to run for office and hold appointed positions in government 1829 Catholic Emancipation Allows Catholics to sit in Parliament. Act 1832 Great Reform Bill Major reform of Commons: the Borough franchise is made uniform, which doubles the franchise form 10 to 20% of male voters; and seats are redistributed from very small bor- oughs to the new industrial centers and counties. 1833 Slavery Outlawed in the British Empire 1835 Municipal Corporations Replaces 178 unelected corporate borough goverments with Act elected town councils. Extends local franchise to all male tax payers with a three year residency, mandates poor relief. 1859 Repeal of wealth qualification for members of parliaments. 1867 Second Approximately doubles franchise for parliamentary elections by extending the vote to all male property owners. Redis- tribution of seats, expansion of borough boundaries. Ends requirement of new elections for MPs who take or change posts in the government. 1869 Municipal Franchise Act Extends right to vote in municipal elections to women taxpayers. 1872 Ballot Act Secret ballot introduced for parliamentary elections 1883 Corrupt Practices Act Places limits on election expenditures by candidates accord- ing to a schedule that varies by size of electorate. 1884 Third Reform Act Extends the franchise to occupants (renters) of properties worth more than 10 pounds per annum. 1885 Redistribution of Seats Reallocates seats, and divides most of the remaining 2-seat Act boroughs to establishe single member districts. 1911 Parliamentary Act Eliminates the House of Lords' veto power, (Lords can only delay legislation for two years). It also revises the Septennial Act so that the maximum term of parliament is now limited to 5 year terms. MPs receive salaries for the first time.

5 1918 Fourth Reform Act: Re- Universal Suffrage for men over age 21 and for women over presentation of the Peo- age 30 (with some minor residency restrictions). Polls to be ple Act held on the same day. Free postage for candidate mail asso- ciated with elections. 1918 Redistribution Act Increases the size of Commons and formally adopts principle of equal sized districts, and redistributes seats accordingly. 1922 Irish Free State Act Irish Parliament reestablished, Irish MPs no longer called, except those from . 1928 Equal Franchise Act Woman's suffrage put on same basis as men's suffrage (21 years of age). 1948 Representation of the The remaining two member constituencies are eliminated People Act (12), as are the University seats. Redistribution of seats. 1949 Parliament Act Delaying ability of House of Lords further reduced to one year for legislation 1958 Life Peerage Act Provides for the creation of life peers and allows women to sit in the House of Lords. 1973 UK joins the European Union, confirmed by national refer- endum in 1975 (67.2% yea). 1981 Representation of the Disqualifies those serving prison sentences of more than 12 People Act months in the UK from serving in the House of Commons. 1998 Registration of Political Political parties are required to register names (to prevent at- Parties Act tempts to confuse the electorate). 1999 Devolution of Powers Substantial decentralization of policy making to Wales and Scotland. First elections to the "new" Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly. 1999 House of Lords Act Restricts the number of hereditary memberships in the House of Lords to ninety two. Sources: Morgan (2001), Field (2002), Rallings and Thrasher (2000), and Sephenson and Marcham (1938). See also A Brief Chronology of the House of Commons, House of Commons, 2002.

A. Emergence of the Medieval Parliament in Catholic England: 1200-1500 In the thirteenth century, a number of agreements were negotiated between the barons and the English king, the most famous being the Magna Carta signed in Runnymede in 1215. As often the case in English constitutional history, the immediate problem underlying constitutional reform was money. In exchange for an agreement by the barons to pay more taxes in the present, a variety of terms, including the right of a jury trial by one's peers and the right of a council of barons to reject future increases in taxation were negotiated and accepted in writing by King John in 1215. The medieval baronial council characterized in the Magna Carta and its veto power over new taxes established the legal foundation of the medieval parliament. The agreement was not entirely self-enforcing and the authority of the baronial council had to be reaffirmed many times, occassionally after a civil war as in the mid-thirteenth century. For example,

6 the provision of Oxford in 1258 made the council of Barons permanent and allowed the council to make certain appointments in government.4 During a subsequent military confrontation of the baronial council and the King, representitives of counties and towns were invited to baronial council meetings, and the name "parliament" came into use. Simon de Monfort (the Earl of Leicester) invited four knights from each county to join the barons in a parliament 1264. Two representatives from the major towns (boroughs) were invited to the second Montford parliament in 1265. King Henry III eventually won the civil war between the king and the barons. He regained the crown, after being Montford's prisoner for a short period of time (Field, 48). However, the authority of baronial councils on tax matters was accepted, and parliaments continued to be called by Henry's son Edward I. It also became routine to invite prominent commoners to meetings of the baronial councils, "knights of the shire and burgesses." These parliaments voted on tax matters, heard petitions from the public, petitioned the king to address various grievances, and occasionally impeached senior government officials (Lyons, ch. 34). Although burgesses and knights were not always called to meetings of the barony, they were routinely called to the meetings that considered tax increases after 1265. Edward I called 46 parliaments in 35 years.5 The familiar bicameral architectdure of the English parliament emerged in the fourteenth century. After 1341, nobles and church leaders began meeting separately from the town and county representatives. The barons of the upper chamber normally met

4 The council of barrons include both senior church officials and nobles with very large land holdings. Even before the Magna Carta, the Constitutions of Clarendon had accorded baronial status to the catholic church's archbishop and bishops in 1164. The Constitutions of Clarendon, essentially, described procedures for establishing jurisdiction over legal matters and for appeal. According to Clarendon, the top appeal from both the ecclesiastical and the king's courts (which both considered criminal matters, murder and the like) were to end with the king rather than with the pope in Rome. (Appeals to Rome, however, were restored in relatively short order, although revised again four centuries later uner Henry VIII.) 5 The tax authority of the baronial council and subsequent parliamentary control of taxation was essentially self-enforcing because taxes were general and affected the entire group; thus it was more difficult for the king to divide the baronial council over taxation than for over other issues where interests varied. This was less the case on the other powers of parliament. For example, there was never complete freedom of speech by members within parliament, although it was often asked for and given. Both kings and queens would occasionally suppress an outspoken radical group in commons--often to the satisfaction of their opponents within the chamber. 7 with the king directly, and consequently had the power to initiate legislation of various kinds as well as to negotion with the king regarding his requests for new taxes (subsidies). The lower chamber was the inferior body at this point, and was not routinely consulted regarding new legislation, although it was routinely consulted on tax matters (Field, 50-54, Lyon, 52-3). The dominance of the Lords continued well into the eighteenth century, although Henry V granted the Commons veto power over legislation as well as taxation in 1414, at a time when war with France was pending and new taxes of some important (Lyon, 605; Field, 65; Morgan, 228). During the early fifteenth century, the Commons petitioned the King for a more uniform (and less corrupt) method of choosing local representatives. Three long-standing election statutes were subsequently adopted in 1413, 1429, and 1445 (Stephanson and Marham, 276-7). These laws established procedures and qualifications for the House of Commons are of particular interest, because they remained essentially unchanged for 400 years. The 1413 law required that all county and borough representatives be residents of the communities that they represent. The 1429 law characterized suffrage rules for electing county representatives to Commons. County suffrage was based on "a freeholding to the value of 40 shillings by the year at least above all charges." This enfranchised approximately 5% of the male population of the time, which tended to increase slowly through time with inflation and economic growth.6 The 1445 law required that borough representatives have a similar status (suffient wealth to be a knight), and specified that two representatives should be selected from each borough. Representation was by no means equal, because no effort was made to construct boroughs of equal size, but this was a very broad national suffrage and representation by the standards of its time--indeed by European standards until well into the nineteenth century. Representatives of the towns continued to be selected by town governments that

6 The very gradual doubling of male suffrage over the next four hundred years is a testimony to the power of Malthus' model of population dynamic prior to the industrial revolution. In century prior to the Great Reform, the county electorates under the forty shilling rule for parliamentary elections still entitled just 5% of the population (Fields, 62, 141, and 167). This suggests that the distribution of wealth remained as concentrated at the start of industrial revolution as it had been four hundred years earlier, although it had shifts somewhat among elite families. 8 under a wide variety of local election rules until the 1832 reforms (Stephanson and Marham, 276-7; Lyon, 542-3; Field, 62). For the most part, the medieval English parliament was a consultative body on matters other than taxation, a sounding board for national policy and a source of information about regional problems. English kings had the power to overrule parliament on essentially all matters of law other than new taxes. Parliament met when called by the king and was dismissed when the king thought it had met long enough, or when the king accepted the parliamentary petitions for redress (which ever came first). Parliamentary sessions were, thus, normally relatively short and infrequent meetings lasting two or three weeks. The longest session in the fourteenth century was the Good Parliament of 1376, which lasted for ten weeks. The power of the early parliaments, however, varied considerably. During time of peace, it was more difficult to persuade Parliament to provide new subsidies, because other sources of royal income were usually sufficient to run the King's government. Consequently, fewer parliaments were called, and fewer parliamentary petitions were submitted to the crown. Indeed, parliaments were often completely ignored between wars, as kings and queens chose their own advisory councils (great councils or privy councils) from the nobility, church, and elite commoners; and used royal income sources to avoid unpleasant discussions with the parliament over "proper" parliamentary deference and matters of sovereignty. During times of war, the kings needed subsidies, and the crown would call parliaments to obtain additional tax revenues. These were not always freely given. The extent to which parliamentary privileges and petitions were accepted by the crown depended on the immediacy of the crown's need for baronial contributions and community taxes. When the demand for revenue was great, medieval English parliament would meet often and could affect policies on trade, religion, and industrial regulations--as well as taxes. At occassional peaks of power, parliaments might have significant oversight responsibility or be instrumental in replacing an errant king or in confirming a new dynasty. For example, in 1310, parliament appointed a committee of twenty bishops and lords to over see the finances of the kingdom. In 1399, the English

9 parliament sentenced former King Richard II to lifetime imprisonment in the Tower of London. Such peaks were rare, and normally medieval parliaments were of secondary importance. For example, neither the House of Lords nor the House of Commons had its own permanent meeting place until 1512 and 1549 respectively. Prior to that time, space for meetings was made available by the king, usually in his palace at Westminster, the site of the present Parliament.7 Indeed the term "House of Lords" was not used until 1544 (Field, p.69). During the Catholic period, the kings were clearly the primary, if not the only, locus of power within the governments of England. The crown could influence elections to commons and determine the membership in the lords (in the long run) through elevation. The English kings and queens also controlled appointments to a large several hundred relatively well-paid positions of authority throughout the kingdom. (Members of parliament, were normally wealthy individuals, but were not paid a salary for serving in parliament until 1911.) Between patronage and occasional threats, the crown could often "manufacture" a compliant parliament. Although members of parliament did not serve at the pleasure of the crown, the royal family was the wealthiest in the kingdom, which together with its power to appoint persons to government positions and its control of the largest military force in England, meant that an ambitious king could nearly always be the dominant policy maker on matters of royal interest.8 Indeed, the second most powerful organization in England during this period was the Catholic Church rather than parliament. The Church controlled very large land

7 It was also not until the sixteenth century that the respective chambers began keeping careful records of their meetings. Parliamentary records begin in 1510 for the Lords and 1542 for the Commons, respectively (Fields, 69). 8 During the fifteenth and sixteenth century, about a fourth of noble families were replaced each generation. In some cases, replacement was necessary because a family lacked legitimate heirs in others replacement was a consequences of punishments that stripped families of privilege. Clearly both, but especially the later, gives the king considerable power over the house of lords. The total number of peers, perhaps surprisingly, was fairly stable, 55-57, during this period (Field p.67). With respect to commons, the king would occasionally threaten or pack the commons. For example, in 1398, Richard II once surrounded the meeting place of parliament with archers, with bows drawn and ready to shoot. The power of appointment was used by Henry VI who added 53 persons (of the 277) to the 1447 house of commons. 10 holdings, had its own court system, and was directly represented at court and within the parliament. The Bishops, Abbots and Priors often formed a majority of the House of Lords and senior church officials were often among the king's most important ministers.9 The church hierarchy could use the power of the pulpit to mobilize public opinion througout England, and could also negotiate for new privileges and protect those that it had discreetly at court behind closed doors. The Catholic church was essentially the only large organization within England that was largely beyond the control of the crown, although that was soon to change.

B. Parliament and the Protestant Reformation: 1500-1625 The next two centuries were turbulent times, intellectually, socially, and politically as the Catholic universe underwent major revisions. With the discovery of the new world shortly after 1500, the physical world that Europeans had "known" for centuries had to be revised substantially. The new continents of North and South America, as well as the new southern sea routes to the East, became new domains of European economic and political conflict for centuries to come.10 There were also revolutions of the spiritual and intellectual world at about the same time. The movable type printing press developed by Gutenburg in the previous century brought the thoughts of Aristotle, Luther (1507) and Calvin (1534) to all who could read, and their interpreters brought their ideas to all who would listen.11 The Protestant reformation produced new theology, new church 9 By the end of the fourteenth century, the House of Lords had become largely heriditary, and consisted of the "Lords Temporal" composed of the top five ranks of the nobility (Duke, Marquess, Earl, Viscount, and Baron) and the "Lords Spiritual" from the top three ranks of the church (Biship, Abbot and Prior). See the "History of the House of Lords," http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld199798/ldbrief/ldhist.htm 10 At first, the new discoveries were simply interpreted within the existing frame of reference. Columbus (1492) insisted that he had found a new Western route to the far East. However, his discoveries were reinterpreted by oter explorers in the years following his famous voyages. And his new route to the far East became the new Western continents. Perhaps the most famous of these revisionists was the Medici bank representative Vespucci, who declared the western lands to be a "new world" (mudus novus) after several voyages. In honor of his controversial conclusion, and perhaps because of his control over the substantial Medici financial assets, his first name, Americus, began showing up on maps of the new world shortly thereafter. 11 Criticism of catholic doctrines and church behavior had, of course, long existed in Europe both within educated elites and among illiterate peasant church goers. However, the grumbling of a few intellectuals and nonconformists over doctrine and various critical assessments of the behavior of church leaders did not produce a powerful mass movement until shortly after 1500. 11 organizations, and new political alignments throughout Europe, eventually separating northern from southern Europe. By mid-century, there was no longer a single church in Europe, and no longer were European political and economic interests concentrated within the Northwestern corner of the great Euro-Asian land mass, and no longer were intellectuals focused narrowly on infallible church doctrine.12 All this lead to a good deal of conflict, which was often good for parliaments throughout Europe, if it was not good for Europe itself. Conflict is expensive, and the winner take all nature of warfare tends to induce escalation in the resources committed to individual battles and to wars as a whole. The kings and queens of Europe were, consequently, increasingly in need of additional income. Economic growth increased royal incomes from tariffs and royal properties, but parliamentary subsidies remained significant sources of revenue in times of war, but, as before, were not always freely given. In England and in much of the rest of Europe, the reluctance of parliaments to tax themselves in order to provide royal subsidies without receiving something in exchange induced the crown to seek additional revenues elsewhere. Both kings and queens could collect customs fees and tariffs. They could also rent and sell royal properties, appointments, and monopoly privileges. An entrepreurial crown might also sponser business ventures and engage in piracy at sea and, ocassionally, confiscate the wealth of others in the kingdom. In times of peace, these nontax income sources often allowed the crown to rule without calling parliament for years at a time.13 However, in the end, the English kings always called new parliaments to vote on tax proposals and to affirm royal successions. In exchange for new subsidies, parliaments often asked for and received assurances of their privileges (free speech and freedom from arrest during parliament sessions), petitioned and obtained royal interventions and regulations, and occassionally also sought improved quarters.14

12 By century's end the work of Copernicus (1473-1543), Galileo (1564-1642), and Keplar (1571-1630) had also begun to literally produce a new universe, and perhaps more importantly in the long run a new scientific method that would subsequently produce the technology for an new civiliation, Margolis (2002). 13 Indeed, in other parts of Europe, these revenue sources were sufficient to allow the crown to dispense with parliaments, as in Denmark and France. 14 The lords and commons received permanent space in Westminster Palace in 1512 and 12 Parliament, thus, occassionally received expanded authority to intervene more broadly on various public policy matters in exchange for tax revenues. The latter was also freely acceded by the crown in policy areas where royal and parliamentary interests were closely aligned, and parliamentary acts could help legitimize royal policies. For example, the parliament's authority over religious matters was greatly expanded by Henry VIII who used acts of parliament to secure control over the both the Church and the Church's resources in England. The Act of Appeal (1533) made the crown the highest court in the land, ending appeals to Rome by ecclesiastical courts.15 The Act of Supremacy (1534) made the crown the "supreme head in earth of the called Anglicana Ecclesia." The Bill for Dissolution of the Lower Houses (1536) closed the smallest monasteries and confiscated their assets for the crown. In 1539, a similar bill closed the larger monasteries and allowed Henry to confiscate their assets as well. The Statue of Six Articles (1539) codified Henry's theological dicta for the new Anglican church. Henry VIII's interest in church reform was partly personal, a desire for divorce that could not be easily approved by the Catholic church. It was also partly economic, his government needed resources for wars being fought and the church had enormous assets within England--perhaps more than Henry's. Taking over the Church would also advance his constitutional interests, insofar as it provided the Crown with far more complete control over England governance. The church, its properties, its doctrines, its courts, and its pulpits had previously been largely beyond his grasp. The parliament's interests were less than perfectly aligned with those of the crown, because the Catholic bishops and senior abbots had long been members of the Lords.16

1550 respectively, albeit after a fire induced the crown to move to other quarters (Field, p. 69). 15 This jurisdictional dispute was a long standing bone of contention for the crown vis i vi the church. For example, similar authority had been sought long ago in the Constitutions of Clarendon adopted in 1164. The power of the church in 1164 allowed it to negotiate with King Henry II on this matter for many years, eventually inducing the king to reverse on this matter over the course of a decade (Morgan, 144-5, see also the Catholic Encyclopedia). The rapid spread of descent throughout Europe evidently prevented the church from obtaining similar results in the sixteenth century. 16 In at least a few cases, Henry evidently threatened pivotal members to bring the into line on important votes (Morton, 283). For example, in a private meeting with a prominent member of commons, Edward Montague, King Henry reportedly took Edward by the ear and said "Get my bill passed by tomorrow, or else tomorrow this head of yours will be off.." 13 However, it is clear that the "temporal" members of parliament had an interest in expanding the domain of parliamentary authority, in finding tax sources other than their own property and income, and in reforming the church.17 The latter is is not to say that a majority in the commons or the lords were Protestants in the modern sense of the word, but rather that the problem of corruption and doctrinal inconsistencies within the church was widely acknowledged if not widely discussed in England, as elsewhere (for fear of being punished for heresy). Moreover, many of the temporal members of parliament would have anticipated their subsequent acquisition of monastic lands from the king and thier relatively advantaged position in subsequent parliaments. After 1539, only the Bishops and ArchBishops remained members of the House of Lords, and the "Lords Temporal" obtained a secure majority in the Lords for the first time.18 Most of the members of the commons and the temporal lords, thus, had economic and political interests in "clerical reform" that paralleled those of king Henry.19 In fact, parliament probably obtained advantages in the long run that Henry VIII did not fully anticipate. By using the Parliament to reform the church, Henry had not only expanded the scope of parliamentary authority, but he had elevated statute law above other all others. That is to say, the English church was reformed by formal acts of parliament rather than divine revelation. That precedent clearly changed the fundamental relationship between church and state, but also changed the perceived importance of parliament and its rulings, within

The threat was not entirely credible, insofar as laws and courts might have decided otherwise, but it was not an idle threat. The King often induced parliament to pass bills of attainder against unpopular political opponents and reluctant public servants, who forfeited their life and property to the crown as penalty for treason (e.g. disloyalty to the crown). The bill was passed the next day (Field, 70). 17 The first recorded majority vote in the House of Lords occurred in its consideration of the 1532 Act in Conditional Restraint of Annates, which ended payments to Rome by clergy appointed to public offices (benefices). 18 With the closing of the monasteries, the abbots and priors ceased being longer members of the House of Lords. The lords spiritual had in the past often been a majority, depending on the issues and attendance. http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld199798/ldbrief/ldhist.htm 19 Two thirds of the monastic lands acquired had been dispensed by 1547 and three quarters by 1558. Much of the crown's newfound wealth was devoted to military ventures, however much was also dispensed as patronage to Henry's supporters. (Morgan, 285; Field, 68) 14 parliament and in the courts, and also in the country at large. Parliament expected to play a significant role in religious controversies from that point on.20 In the short run, however, the post-reformation parliament was still essentially the same medieval parliament as it had been in Catholic times. It remained selected by medieval procedures and with powers determined by medival documents and precedents. Although the membership of the house of lords became less clerical and its domain of authority expanded somewhat, the parliament's main area of authority remained taxes. The Crown continued to determine when parliaments would be called and when they would end, and these tended to reflect the state of government finances. The crown continued to be largely "self funded" in times of peace, relying on income from royal lands, sales of monopoly privilege and tariffs.21 Parliamentary approved tax receipts accounted for less then ten percent of crown income during this period. Not all royal income sources were, however, uncontroversial, inside or outside of parliament. The first recorded public demonstration before parliament occurred in Queen Elizabeth's reign during the 1601 session. The demonstrators objected to the Queen's excessive use of monopolies as a source of revenues (Field, 89). Monopolies in Elizabeth's time included: currants, iron, transport of leather, ashes, vinegar pots, lead, whale oil, and brushes. Monopoly privileges were often sold by the crown in what would other wise have been competitive markets, which, of course, made the monopolized goods and services more expensive than they otherwise would have been. In this case, the public demonstration and the "anti trust" petitions submitted by parliament were successful, and the Queen eliminated several of her most burdensome monopoly grants.

20 For example, Edward VI induced parliament to pass the first (1548) and second uniformity (1552) acts which replaced made English rather than Latin the language of the Anglican church, and required church attendance. Queen Mary, in turn, induced the parliament to reinstate the links to the Papacy, reinstating laws against heresy and repealing much of the reformation law--with the parliamentary proviso that the monastic lands not be restored. The latter suggests that parliament was not at this point entirely motivated by religious interests. Mary's heresy laws were rigorously enforced with at least 287 persons burned at the stake (Morgan, 298-9). Elizabeth I subsequently reestablished the royal supremacy and full Protestant worship through acts of parliament in 1559. 21 Economic growth raised royal revenues while reduced conflict reduced its costs. New agricultural techniques of crop rotation were adopted, specialized production and distribution increased, and foreign trade expanded. 15 There were also ongoing theological disputes and tensions during this time. A variety of doctrinal disputes arose because of the, now smaller separation between church and states. Questions arose, consequently, over what types of services would be permitted within England. Initially the English church was relatively tolerant and allowed a broad range of services to be held, including those by "non-conforming" protestants and catholics.22 However in the short run, none of these religious disputes, minor tax revolts, nor economic growth lead to significant reforms of the medieval English constitution.23 The medieval procedures for selecting members of parliament and its areas of authority remained intact. As had long been the case, the Crown governed with its own hand picked great councils and the privy councils. Most of the Crown's adversors were members of parliament, but these were important or clever men whose interests were well aligned with those of the crown. Other MPs whose interests were less important or less well aligned with the crown's could be ignored. Kings and Queens dispensed with parliaments when they could, but called them as necessary to request new taxation and to affirm the accession of new kings and queens. Overall, the fundamental routines of English medieval governance were remarkably stable, although they would soon be challenged by intense fiscal and religious conflicts that arose during the seventeenth century.24

22 The church of England was relatively tolerant during this time, as, perhaps indicated by its official name, "the Catholic and Reformed Church of England"(Morgan, 352). 23 Economic growth favored those with special skills or land. A new "middle class" of merchants, professionals, and successful farmers developed below the nobility. The age of the shopkeeper emerged as village stores augmented the ancient market places as places of local commerce. A small leisure industry emerged, which allowed playwrights such as Shakespeare to take up the theater as a full time occupation. The largest manufacturing industry was engaged in the decentralized production in homesteads and sheds. Population, however, grew more rapidly than economic output, with the result that real wages fell. Food price increased about twice as fast as wage rates (Morgan, 329). 24 It bears noting that day-to-day governance was principly a local matter, as it remained until the twentieth century. The crown controlled a thousand or so senior appointments, but the local county gentry, who largely determined local services and implemented parliamentary tax and regulatory policy. There were neither a standing army nor an organized police force outside major cities. Many local public services were provided by volunteers marshaled by local leaders rather than salaried civil servants. The importance of local governance meant that the interests represented in Parliament had to be accounted for even in cases where parliaments were not called. 16 C. Collapse of the Medieval English Constitution and its Restoration: 1625-1660 In the early seventeenth century, the medieval constitution of England was stretched to the breaking point by the Stuart Kings. The proximate cause of fiscal distress was money, as usual, but this time negotiation failed to find a mutually agreeable solution. James I and his successor Charles I greatly expanded the practice of selling public offices (benefices) and monopoly privileges, and also increased customs duties and tariffs. In addition, the Stuarts made extensive use of forced loans and ship's money as sources of royal income. The Duke of , acting on Charles's behalf, also attempted to pack the Lords by selling peerages to his supporters.25 The numbers of peers increased from 55 in 1603 to 126 in 1628. The Stuarts also applied harsh, and somewhat arbitrary, punishment of those who refused them using royal courts, violating long-standing rights of due process. Many of these practices appeared to be taxes in disguise, and others violated long-standing constitutional law and precedent. As Charles I came to office in 1625, he wanted to finance a war with Spain and France. This required expanded government revenues, which induced him to call parliament three times during his first five years. In exchange for more tax revenues, the Parliament demanded a return to the medieval constitution. Parliament wanted the fiscal and judicial practices of his father stopped, and refused to provide subsidies of the magnitude that Charles requested. In 1628, the parliament submitted the , which formally listed grievances against the Crown, and sought to have Charles affirm long-standing constitutional practices that parliament had argued had been in place since the Magna Charta. Charles refused to accept the petition, and after 1629 did not call another parliament for more than a decade. Instead, he raised money from other sources, and, indeed, was able to balance the budget without parliamentary subsidies after the war was over. None the less, questions about the constitutionality of some of the royal "income sources" as well as the burden of the royal charges, continued to undermine support within the elites represented in Parliament. His religious policies further reduced support among its puritans, both inside and outside parliament. Archbishop Laud tightened

25 Buckingham was impeached in 1627, but Charles dismissed parliament to end the proceedings (Field, 99). Buckingham was subsequently murdered 1628 (Morgan, 349). 17 control of church practices and doctrine and forbade some of the practices used by non-conforming Puritan churches. Puritan suspicions of papisty were reinforced by Charles' marriage with Henrietta Maria of France (a catholic) and also by his alliances with Irish and Scottish Catholics to suppress the rebellion of Presbyterian Scotts. Together his neglect of parliament and his fiscal and religious policies caused legal, economic, and religious opposition to mount throughout the country. When Parliament was finally called again in 1640 to help finance and ratify the settlement with the Scotts, not only was Parliament's bargaining position unusually strong, but its opposition to royal policies was unusually strong as well. The Stuart neglect of the longstanding English constitution had created a major political crisis. The 1640 parliament met in mid-April. A clear majority was willing to finance the war in Scotland, but insisted on a return to the constitution, as had its predessor a decade before. The Commons complained about religious innovations, the sale of monopolies, ships duties, the expansion of forests, military charges, and the violation of the liberties and normal procedures of parliament.26 Commons petitioned Lords for a joint meeting (a joint conference), which was agreed to by the Lords. Constitutional grievances were again voiced, but no actions taken. The king argued that all his policies were necessary for the safety of the nation, and dismissed the "short" parliament on May 5. The two "all or nothing" offers were tabled rather than resolved through negotiation and constitutional exchange. In November 1640, parliament was again summoned, partly at the insistence of the Scots, who refused to accept a peace settlement unless it was ratified by parliament. This time, parliament was able to press for and to obtain formal agreements with Charles that affirmed the power of parliament. Much of the new legislation simply formalized long-standing medieval practices, but some was substantially new. New provisions included the Triennial Act ( no. 27, p. 144), which required parliament to be called at least once every three years, and allowed parliament to be self-calling, if no royal writs were forthcoming after three years. A subsequent act (no. 30, p. 158) prevented the king from unilaterally dissolving parliament without its approval. These two Acts made sessions of

26 Journal of the Commons, II, 10f. Excerpts from the proceedings of the Short Parliament can be found at http://www.constitution.org/sech/sech_095.htm. 18 parliament autonomous of the crown for the first time in English history, and the latter was the constitutional basis under which parliament continued to meet throughout the civil war. (The "long" Parliament did not formally dissolve itself until 1660.) In exchange, parliament passed and the King accepted the Act (no. 31, p. 159), which legitimated retroactively many of the charges used to finance governance by the James and Charles, and extended them in to the future, but only for two months. This freed James from various legal challenges to his revenue sources, but also made his continued solvency completely dependent on parliamentary good will (Gardiner, 1906, part III). The crown's authority to intervene directly on legal matters, both in the secular and religious courts, was eliminated by acts which eliminated the Star Chamber and High Commission (no. 34 and 35). The consequent reduction in prosecutions for treasonous matter unleashed a torrent of popular pamphlets (Field, 106). Finally, ships money, the charges used to finance the expansion of the Navy, was declared illegal (no. 36, p. 189). To this point, it is fair to say that the new legislation had simply reclaimed authority that paliament had had, or at least claimed to have, at its various peaks of power during the previous four hundred years, formalized the longstanding practice of summoning parliaments every few years, and reestablished a more independent court system. And, as it turned out, after the civil war had run its course and the crown was "restored" to Charles' son Charles II, this is approximately where English governance found itself again in 1660, and also again in 1689 at the accession of William III.27 The robustness of the medieval constitution, however, was not obvious at the time. Tensions between parliament and king escalated, rather than returning to the long term balance of the previous three centuries. The "" and the Charles I continued to maneuver for control of public policy and subsequently for control over the army. Their mutual (and very creditable) suspicions of "coup" rapidly escalated to warfare in 1642 and twenty years of constitutional experimentation by the parliament. The details of the civil war, and much of the parliamentary politics during the war are beyond the scope of this book insofar as they clearly violated long standing constitutional practices

27 At the time of the reformation, the Triennial Act was revised to eliminate the "self-calling" of parliament, but the crown remained legally obligated to call parliament at least once every three years (Gardiner, 1906, part III). 19 and failed to have lasting institutional effects on English governance. The period from 1642-1660 were truly revolutionary times. What is relevent for the present overview of English governance, is that after two decades of constitutional turmoil, a return to constitutional monarchy was legislated by the very next elected parliament selected under the old rules. In 1660, the long parliament finally dissolved itself, and called for a new parliament. The newly elected parliament turned the constitutional clock back to August 1641, and the next Stuart in the line of sessesion, Charles II, was "restored" to power. In the end, after two decades without the medieval English constitution, it was restored. The civil war and commonwealth, thus, indirectly demonstrated the amazing robustness of England's medieval parliamentary institutions. Neither kings nor parliaments could rule England alone.

A. A Digression on Cromwell's Republic

Some of the institutional debates and developments of the parliament during the civil war, and by the commonwealth are of interest, because they presage constitutional debates that would take place in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and also indirectly demonstrate how a majoritian government can self-destruct. There were evidently supermajorities favoring the first series of reforms in 1641; however, as Parliament attempted to reduce the crown's authority below its traditional medieval levels, support, especially in the Lords, dwindled, and the Parliament as a whole split into "royalist" and "parliamentary" camps. The royalist minority withdrew (and was subsequently excluded) from the parliamentary sessions in Westminster during the military phase of the civil war.28 Eight years later, the remaining members of parliament subsequently split over the treason and execution of Charles I. Parliament consequently exluded the moderate MPs who opposed sentencing Charles I to death for treason.29

28 Departure of the royalist members, chiefly from the House of lords, had reduced the parliament by approximately half its original numbers. Many of these joined the King's parliament that met in Oxford in 1644 (The King's "mongrel parliament" met only once, Field, 110.) Constitutional negotiations between Charles and the Westminster parliament continued throughout the civil war, but little could be agreed to. 29 The exluded group could well have been the majority of the "anti-Charles" parliament, given the reduced attendence at parliamentary sessions. In December 1648, Colonel Pride reduced parliament by excluding110 members (arresting 40 and barring 70 others). The resulting "Rump" parliament was essentially purged of moderates and included only 20 Later in 1649, this "rump" of the original long parliament sentenced Charles to death, eliminated the House of Lords, and declared England a commonwealth. The remaining members of parliament then attempted to draft a republican constitution. Their diliberations were reportedly influenced by the "Peoples Agreement," a surprisingly modern social contract (1647) proposed by one of the first ideological interest groups, a group known as the Levelers. However, none of the Agreement's most radical ideas--free trade, univeral male suffrage, equality before the law, religious toleration, and frequent elections--were adopted by the Rump.30 Instead of placing such procedual and policy constraints on itself, the parliament gradually transferred all remaining political authority to itself and to its new executive council of state through a series of acts adopted over the next four years. Oliver Cromwell, the Lord General of the Parliament's army evidently decided that this process of constitutional reform was too slow and corrupt--or perhaps, not suffiently responsive to his advice--and dismissed the rump parliament (by force) in April 1653. He called a new parliament composed of a hundred and forty worthy persons selected by local protestant church congregations. (Field, 122). Eight months later, in December 1953, Cromwell announced that he would rule via a new written Instrument of Government (IG: no. 97, p. 405). Cromwell's constitution did not break with the long-standing structure of the English medieval parliaments in all respects, but it did change many of its core procedures. The government of the "commonwealth" was to be composed of three major branches: (1) the lord protector (a lifetime position to be held by Cromwell), (2) an advisory privy council, and (3) a unicameral parliament. A four hundred man Parliament was to be elected and meet every three years and would remain in session for at least five months, with male suffrage based on wealth greater than 200 pounds (e.g. to the landed about a sixth of the original 1940 parliament. A majority of this radical tail voted for the king's execution. This Rump majority included less than a tenth of the original 1640 parliament (Morgan, 370,2). In 1649, Charles was beheaded for constitution crimes (treason). The execution of Charles I, of course, made it impossible for the excluded parliamentary majority to surrender to Charles and restore the monarchy. This, at least, must have seemed to be an irreversible reform to the republican members of the Rump. 30 A copy of this very early and surprisingly liberal social contract, which predates both Hobbes and Locke, can be found at: http://www.constitution.org/lev/eng_lev_07.htm 21 gentry). Parliament would initiate all legislation (subject to protector veto) and would be called upon in times of emergency to vote new taxes. When parliament was not in session, the council and lord protector would rule. During times of peace, taxes would be sufficient to maintain a 30,000 man army and a fleet, plus 200,000 pounds per year for administrative purpose.31 There was to be freedom of worship for Protestants. Members of the privy council would hold their seats for life. As vacancies arose on the privy council the parliament would send the protector a list of six names from which the lord protector would choose a replacement. All acts of government could be challenged in court to determine whether they violated the Instrument of Government. The disposition of troops would be jointly controlled by the lord protector and the parliament, if parliament was in session, or with the council if not. Evidently, the constitution could be amended by new acts of legislation (no amendment process was mentioned). Of course, the problem with such a "constitution" is that if the lord protector is sufficiently powerful to impose it unilaterally, he cannot be bound by its rules. This was evident even before procedures of the new IG could be implemented. In 1653, after the very first election to parliament under the new suffrage rules, Cromwell excluded 120 members who he considered hostile to his regime (Gardiner, 1906, part V; Field, 123). Those allowed to take their seats petitioned Cromwell for additional constitutional reforms. These attempted to make the new IG even more closely resemble the old English constitution. Parliament proposed reinstatement of the office of King (to be held by Cromwell), which Cromwell refused. They also proposed that the Lord Protector be able to appoint his successor, which Cromwell accepted, and recommended the creations of a second chamber of parliament (of lifetime peers) to be appointed by the Lord Protector. Cromwell named his son, Richard, to be his successor, and began filling the new chamber with loyal Puritan supporters. (Subsequent peers would have to be approved by the existing members of the new house of peers, which would limit somewhat the opportunities of future lord protectors.) The process of replacing members of the privy council was also changed to give the lord protector, rather than parliament,

31 Cromwell's proposed 30,000 man army as approximately ten times that normally supported in times of peace. Charles II kept a standing army of just 3,000 (Morgan, 378) 22 control over the initial proposal, with veto power in the council and parliament. Although the elected chamber also gained the right to accept or reject its own members, it is clear that the amendments enhanced Cromwell's already considerable power under the original Instrument of Government. It also is clear that Instrument of Government, both before and after amendment, was never a constitution--a document that describes durable procedures for making rules. Its procedures were never fully implemented and did not survive Cromwell's death in 1658. Cromwell's son did inherit the lord protectorship, and did call for a new parliament. It met in 1659 for just three months before being (unconstitutionally) dismissed. The authority of the commonwealth subsequently disintegrated in the face of a widespread tax revolt. The old rump parliament was reassembled and then dismissed by the army. Finally, the members of the long parliament were resummoned. They met, lawfully dissolved themselves, and called for new elections--under the rules adopted in 1641. The subsequent parliament called for the restoration of the monarchy in the person of Charles II, and thereby restored the principle of heriditary succession. In the negotiations between parliament and Charles II, it was agreed to turn back the legislative clock to August 1641--the date at which the last constitutional provisions were passed by the long parliament and accepted by Charles I. By the end of 1660, English governance had clearly returned to its medieval constitution.32

D. From Restoration to Glorious Revolution 1660 - 1689. Charles II's Breda declaration described his intentions should he return to the throne, was adhered to. Only those who signed his father's death warrant were punished (Morgan, 178). The annulment of the parliamentary acts after August 1641 implied that

32 The 1660 "Declaration of Breda" is Charles II's account of the conditions under which he desired to "return" to the throne. It includes a clear statement of divine right of kings: "we can never over the hope, in good time, to obtain the possession of that right which god and nature hath made our due," a "free and general pardon" (with exceptions to be determined by parliament), "restoration of King, Peers, and people to their just, ancient and fundamental rights," religious tolerance (to be enacted by parliament), and a promise to provide for the "arrears" due the military. (Breda also dates the beginning of the reign of Charles II from the death of his father twelve years before.) 23 all the crown properties sold off during the civil war were returned to the crown and his supporters. This together with the crown's traditional access to customs duties, which were affirmed by the 1661 parliament, meant that Charles could rule without summoning parliament to raise taxes during time of peace. A modest extension of freedom of religious was proclaimed by Charles and subsequently promoted by him, although he subsequently accepted parliament's Test Act in 1673 restricting government offices to Anglican Protestants. Legislation adopted prior to August 1641 had limited some royal revenue sources and the eliminated the royal high courts (star chamber and high commission), which meant that Charles was somewhat less autonomous than his father had been, or at least claimed to be, but his powers were not substantially different from those of kings and queens prior to 1600. He could still call and dismiss parliament at his convenience, subject to the three year constraint, and could still rule by fiat in policy areas other than taxation and those determined by common law. Consequently, Charles was soon pursuing the usual political interests of kings, power and wealth. Elections were avoided altogether for much of Charles' regime by keeping the very royalist 1661 parliament in session for fifteen years without calling for new elections (Morgan, 381). Patronage was extensively used at all levels of government and across all groups to elicit broad support (Morgan, 379). The long standing election laws of 1430 were undermined by transforming many borough charters into corporations, which allowed borough MPs to be appointed by a handful of town officials, often replacing broader election processes. Less favorable but malleable members of parliament were bribed (Field, 128). The search for new revenues beyond the control of parliament continued unabated.33 It was during Charles' reign that the first nationwide political campaign took place. The length of Charles' first parliament was unprecidented, and allowed more stable political coalitions and opposition leadership to emerge in Parliament. The Earl of Shaftesbury, a a poponent of parliamentary supremacy, formed a political alliance that

33 In return for French subsidies, Charles promised in the secret Treaty of Dover to abolish parliament and to provide King Louis XIV the English crown after his death (Field, 127). Evidently, King Louis was unfamiliar with recent English history.

24 attempted to pass legislation to block the accession of Charles' catholic brother James to the crown. The proposed exclusion act would have broken the lond-standing English practice of hereditary succession by incorporating religious requirements for the thrown. Shaftesbury and his allies were unsuccessful in passing an Exclusion Act during the reign of Charles II (Morgan, 383) although they did demonstrate that an organized group of MPs could affect national elections, a lesson that was not forgotten. Their campaign also produced durable party labels. The opponents of exclusion came to be called Tories. The Tories supported Charles II, the rule of law, and established religion. They, consequently, supported the long-standing rules of secession.34 The proponents of exclusion came to be called Whigs. The Whigs generally opposed Charles II, supporting religious toleration for Protestants only, and sought to increase the power of parliament relative to the crown.35 In spite of the efforts of Shaftesbury, who eventually fled to the Netherlands, James II inherited the crown upon his brother's death in 1685. Like his brother, James received customs duties for life by an . But unlike his brother, James II proceeded to rule without parliament, violating the modified Triennial Act (Field, 128). He also exacerbated religious tensions by promoting a more tolerant, but anti-Anglican policy agenda. He called in town charters and rewrote them to advance the cause of Protestant nonconformists and Catholics. Three quarters of the local justices of the peace were sacked and replaced with Protestant dissenters beholden to the King (Morgan, 385). A large standing army was organized in which catholic officers were prominent. Full religious liberty was declared (for Catholics and Protestants), and Anglican clergy were instructed to read his declaration at their services.

34 The exclusion act would have undermined the "devine right of kings" doctrine. If passed, sovereignty would have depended on criteria adopted by parliament as well as birth, which would have increased the power of parliament. These constitutional arguments also partly determined the language rationalizing William and Mary's accession to the thrown in 1689. 35 The "party" labels for the pro and anti-exclusion voting blocks were coined as insults by their respective opponents. The term Whig was slang for a group of crazy Scotish Presbyterian rebels, and Tory was slang for the papist outlaws of Ireland. (Field, 128). A few Whigs were, in fact, Presbyterians, although they could not yet be Scottish. The union with Scotland did not take place for half a century (1707). Tory MPs were, of course, Anglican Englishmen rather than Catholics. MPs could not be Irish until the union in 1801, and could not be Catholic until the Test Acts were repealed and the Act of Catholic Emancipation was adopted in 1829. 25 Whether James' policies were a benevolent effort to increase religious tolerance, a campaign on behalf of Jame's fellow believers, or a Papist conspiracy; they were clearly policies that made the both local elites and dominant religious communities worried about worse to come. The local gentry and nobles were well-organized, as were mainstream protestants. And although neither group had an army at their disposal on this occassion, they did have contacts with someone who could potentially raise an army and who had an indirect claim to the throne, namely, William III, stadthoulder of the Netherlands.36 William's wife, Mary, was next in the line of succession to the thrown after James II, being the Protestant daughter of the present king, James II, during his first marriage.37 In 1688, seven prominent Protestant leaders (including five members of the house of lords, both Whigs and Tories) invited William to drive James II from the thrown in order to protect Protestantism and Mary's claim to the thrown.38

E. William III and the Rise of Parliament 1689 - 1702 In order to do so, William III had to persuade the Dutch Estates General that an invasion of England would advance Dutch interests. Britain had taken the French side in the previous war during the reign of Charles II, which had nearly ended Dutch independence. Another war with France was clearly likely in the near future, which again would threaten the survival of the Dutch republic. William argued that if he could secure the English throne, English resources would support the Dutch rather than the French side in the next war.This would greatly improve prospects for the Netherlands. The States General were persuaded, and agreed to fund William's English strategy. A Dutch armada carrying 20,000 troops arrived in England on November 5 (Claydon, 28).

36 William III had previously published a letter disapproving of James II's religious policies, but promised not to intervene in England unless he were invited to do so by leading Englishmen. The letter was published in 1687 and evidently was well received within Protestant circles in England. 37 William III also had family ties to the English crown, being the grandson of Charles I. He and Mary were Cousins. The soon to deposed James II was his uncle (Morgan, table of descendants, appendix). 38 A copy of the letter is available at: http://www.jacobite.ca/documents/16880630.htm. (All were subsequently rewarded with elevated titles.) 26 A much larger, if much less experienced, British army marched to meet the Dutch invasion. However, the 40,000 man British army folded in disarray after several high level defections lead James II to reconsider his plans, retreat, and subsequently to flee to France. William and the Dutch army marched, essentially without opposition to London, arriving on December 18. The London members of the House of Lords met on Christmas day and asked William to take charge of government (Field, 130). They also authorized him to call a "convention" parliament (Claydon, 63). A convention parliament, composed in the usual medieval manner, met in early January. On January 27, the parliament resolved that James II had broken the contract between king and people and had vacated his office (Field, 130). Parliament subsequently, after more internal negotiation and a private threat by William to return to the Netherlands with the Dutch army if not offered the crown (Claydon, 63), offered the crown to both William and Mary on February 13 1689 in an act of parliament that has come to be known as the English Bill of Rights. Clearly, both the offer of the crown and the conditions under which the crown would be accepted were negotiated within parliament and between parliament and William and Mary. The reign of William and Mary is the only time in which England had two sovereigns. The Bill of Rights, clearly, addresses several issues simultaneously. The first part describes why James II was no longer king, even though he was alive and well in France. In short, he had violated the constitution, and, moreover, had "abdicated the government and the throne [is] thereby vacant." The second part lists powers which the previous kings had "pretended" to have, including the power to impose taxes without parliamentary assent and to create their own courts, but which had no basis in long-standing constitutional law.39 (Many of these grievances had been claimed about previous kings as well.) The second part also lists various rights: the right of free speech in parliament, the right to bear arms for self defense, the right to a fair and speedy trial by jury, and suggests that "for redress of all grievances, and for amending, strengthening and preserving the laws, Parliament ought to be held frequently." (Most of these rights had been claimed by Parliaments since the fourteenth century. It could, thus, be said

39 Essentially all of these powers and prohibitions had long been claimed by Parliament. Thus the bill also states that parliament "do pray that it may be declared and enacted that all and singular the rights and liberties asserted and claimed in said declaration are the true ancient and indubitable rights and liberties of the people of this kingdom." A complete copy of the English bill of rights can be found at: http://www.constitution.org/eng/eng_bor.txt. 27 that section two simply reset the constitutional clock back to August 1641-- this time, by negating the innovations of the Charles II and James II.) The third part offers William and Mary jointly the crown (of England, France and Ireland) and provided for the order of succession. (Although this was the only time in history that England has had two sovereigns, a rationale for this exceptional provision is not provided by the text.) The fourth part reaffirms the Test Act and essentially extends the Test Act to the crown for the first time. From hence forward, Catholics and those married to Catholics are excluded from the throne, and moreover cannot sit in the Parliament. This rules out the lawful return of James II to the throne (which parliamentary Whigs had previously tried to block with their proposed Exclusion Acts) and also reduced Protestant fears about papist conspiracies.

Overall, the Bill of Rights reasserts Parliament's long-standing rights and only very moderatly extends them. Indeed, the striking thing about the Bill of Rights is how few new powers are listed. Apart from ruling out future catholic kings and providing for a dual monarchy, very little new is adopted. The conservative nature of the Bill of Rights was evidently necessary to secure broad support within Commons and Lords for the act as a whole. Parliamentary records indicate that many members still supported Jame's claim to the Crown, and many others were concerned that long-standing constitutional practices be continued. Only a minority of the recorded debates seem interested in a "glorious revolution." Most favored continuation of as much of the medieval constitution as possible under the circumstances. Consequently, most of the provisions in the Bill of Rights cover familiar ground--fundamental laws which had been accepted by parliaments and kings for much of the previous four centuries. To obtain the protection of the Dutch army, the crown is offered to both William and Mary, not to Mary or William alone. To obtain the crown, William and Mary agree to rule in accordance to the laws of the land, including those enacted by parliament and accepted by the crown--as had been promised many times before in British history at times of accession. Although the medieval English constitution remained in place, both the parties in power and their circumstances were substantially different than they had been in the past.

28 This, more than the bill of rights affected the course of public policy during the next several decades. William III was not the usual English heir to the throne. He was not a young Stuart raised in a royal and sovereign English household, but rather an experienced middle-aged man from the most distinguished family in the Netherlands. It is important to recall that in the Dutch republic, sovereignty rested with the states rather than with the House of Orange. The Netherlands was organized as a confederation of provincial governments, which themselves were often organized as confederations of local governments. The stadholdership was a regional office rather than a national one, and the provincial governments could create and eliminate stadtholderships, as Holland had recently done.40 The office of stadtholder was usually combined with the office of captain general, and rose in importance during wars and was diminished (and sometime eliminated) during times of peace. This, of course, is the opposite of the English Crown's historical relationship with parliament. Essentially unanimous support within the States General was necessary to obtain resources for the Dutch military.41 From an early age, William had been educated in the fields most useful for a future Stadholder: in military matters and in strategies for negotiating with a sovereign republican government (Claydon, 15). During his adult life, William had become very adept at building support both within the provincial governments and in the States General in order to reclaim the stadtholdership and to secure the monies he desired for national defense--national security being the primary charge of the Dutch stadtholders. (Claydon, 25). As King of England, William continued to have conflict with France and the security of the Netherlands very much on his mind, and he was very interested in raising

40 The office of stadtholder was usually combined with the office of captain general, and rose in importance during wars and diminished during times of peace. For example, Holland, the most important of Province, had eliminated the office of Stadholdership in 1654, partly at the behest of Cromwell (Israel, 722-3). Holland's stadholdership remained defunct until the French invasion of 1672 (Israel, 802). 41 The confederal structure of the Netherlands indirectly gave the city of Amsterdam a veto over national tax requests. Amsterdam have the largest tax base of any community in both Holland and the Netherlands. The province of Holland generally used unanimous agreement to pass on major tax and military bills (Claydon, 24-5). The province of Holland had similar veto power in the national States General. 29 English support and money for war with France. This is not to say that William was less interested in power and wealth than previous kings, nor that war with France was not in England's long term interests, but it is to say that William, as opposed to Charles II and James II, was very concerned about French power, and was used to working within constitutional constraints to advance his interests in a manner that they were not.42 It is also bears noting that William's crown was more dependent on parliamentary support than had previously been the case, insofar as James II continued to have the more legitimate hereditary claim to the throne. William, consequently, was more interested in parliamentary good will and more willing to trade royal prerogatives for tax revenues than most previous English kings. The parliament, in contrast, was more self-assured and independent than the one that restored the Stuart monarchy, and also more interested in shoring up its own authority. The announcemnt of French support for James II's effort to recapture the English and Scottish thrones, increased parliament's own interest in supporting William's campaign against France. James II might not be as generous as his brother had been after the civil war. Opportunities for constitutional exchange between king and parliament were, consequently, the strongest they had been since the Magna Carta was signed four and a half centuries earlier. A deferential, rule following, and resource hungry king with urgent duties abroad confronted a parliament anxious to expand its control over the crown. The constitutional bargains struck over the next dozen years were pivotal events in both English and Dutch history. William's success with the parliament is evident in the enormous funding that Parliament provided him for his war with France. The tax base was expanded and tax

42 For example, in 1672, William refused King Charles II's (his uncle) offer to press for his elevation to the King of Holland as part of a peace settlement with France. He refused, in part because the offer involved a smaller Netherlands, and in part because "his countryman were more attached to their liberties than they would be to any royal ruler." (Claydon, 19) Shortly thereafter, in gratitude for its liberation from the French, the elites of the province of Gelderland offered William III the sovereign office of duke, rather than the appointed office of stadtholder, which would have ended that province's republican form of government. Several other provinces complained that a Gelderland Dukedom would undermine the Dutch Constitution. William, perhaps with greater aims in mind, refused the elevation to Duke and accepted the lesser post of Stadtholder (Claydon, 23). 30 rates were increased. Tax receipts more than doubled over those of James II, rising from 2 million to over 5 million pounds in 1694 (Claydon, 125-6). Expenditures rose even more rapidly, with the consequence that British debt expanded to unprecedented levels (North and Weingast, 1989), accomplished in part via the Dutch method of ear-marking some taxes for debt service and repayment.43 Central government employment tripled in size from 4000 under James II to 12,000 under William, while the British army and navy approximately doubled in size during the nine years war (Claydon, 126). The long term geopolitical success of the William's long-standing "English strategy" is also obvious.44 The British had been inclined to intervene on the French side under Charles II and James II, but after William III, the English efforts to contain French influence continued for three centuries (Morgan, 402). The Netherlands survived as an independent country. On the other hand, the price paid for parliament's support in the nine year war with France (1688-1697) was also clear. The Coronation Act of 1689 required the sovereign to "solemnly promise and swear to govern the people of this ,..., according to the statutes in Parliament agreed on, and the laws and customs of the same." Parliaments advanced William the traditional customs duties for life, which as ever were too little to support large-scale military campaigns, but all other taxes were extended for short periods between one and four years. In 1694, a second Triennial Act was passed which (again) required parliaments to be called at least once every three years, but this time limited the terms of parliaments to three years. The Triennial Act together with the parliament's new short term tax policies required more frequent elections to the commons, which made the house of commons, more independent of the crown. No longer, could a King "lock in" an especially amiable parliament by keeping it in session for more than a decade as Charles II had done immediately after the restoration. The precedent of parliamentary audit and increased parliamentary control over expenditures were partly a consequence of William's effort to win the trust of parliament on military matters, and thus more resources for his French campaigns. Parliament's

43 Interest paid on foreign debt fell significantly over the period of William's reign, evidently in large part because of the adoption of Dutch practices (Stasavage, 74-8) , which facilitated the large scale borrowing necessary to fund a good deal of the great military expansion. 44 His interest in bringing England over to the Dutch side in its contests with France dates at least back to 1677 when he arranged to marry Princess Mary, who was at that time second in the line of secession, after her father (Claydon, 23-4). 31 power of the purse, ceded early in his administration, when William relinquished several of the revenue sources used by kings and queen over the past century. Resistance, at this point, might have undermined his efforts to fund military campaigns (e.g. to pay the Dutch army) and to build a more powerful British military to confront France on the continent and abroad. The power of the purse allowed parliament substantial control of the military. This is perhaps most apparent, when following the peace of Ryswick in 1697, the British army was reduced to less than a third of William's request, approximately an eighth of its peak during the nine years war. In 1699, parliament induced William to disband his trusted Dutch guards (Claydon, 146-51). In 1698 the civil list act increased William's allotment of tax revenues for life with the caveat that the new tax revenues only up to £700,000 per year could be used for his royal expenses. Revenues beyond that could only be used with parliamentary permission. The latter prevented William (and his successors) from unilaterally increasing rates on the royal income sources in order to secure independence from the parliament as the Charles' and James' had done. Had government expenditures not increase so much, the income from royal properties together with the customs revenues for life might have been sufficient to fund peacetime governance, as £2,000,000 had been sufficient a decade or two before. In the present environment royal incomes were evidently far below that required for peacetime government finace, which made William and his successors, whether at peace or a war, more dependent on Parliamentary subsidies. Finally, in 1701, William accepted the Act of Settlement. This act was not binding on William, but was to bind his successors. The first part of the act affirms Princess Anne's position and greatly elevated the German Electors of Hanover in the line of secession. The second part of the act is of greater constitutional interest, because it attempts to constrain future sovereigns, especially those born outside of Great Britain. It requires future sovereigns to "join in communion with the Church of England." This new Anglican requirement was more restrictive than required under the 1689 Bill of Rights. Mary, who had died in 1694, would have been eligible for the crown under the new rules, but not William. William was himself Protestant, and, thus, satisfied the 1689 requirements, but he was brought up in the Dutch reform church, which was more

32 Presbyterian than Anglican (Claydon, 99). The Act of Settlement also forbade future kings (from other lands) from engaging in war outside England without the permission of parliament, and prevented all future sovereigns from leaving "the domains of England, Scotland, or Ireland without the consent of Parliament." The act of settlement also elevated the privy council somewhat and specified that, "no persons born out of the Kingdoms of England, Scotland, or Ireland, ... , shall be capable to be of the Privy Council, or a member of either House of Parliament." The latter ended the centuries old custom by which the King was automatically a member of the House of Lords, which reduced the Hannoverian kings' ability to directly monitor and negotiate with members of the Lords. The Settlement also reduced royal opportunities for influencing the parliament by declaring that "no person who has an office or place of profit under the King, or receives a pension from the crown, shall be capable of serving as a member of the House of Commons." (This last provision was, subsequently, weakened by the Regency Act of 1706, which required new elections for MPs who became crown employees. This was a much milder restriction, because elections at the time were rarely contested.) Finally, the settlement increased judicial independence by making senior judges life time appoints during good behavior, "judges commissions be made quam diu se bene gesseint," subject only to parliamentary impeachment. By the time of William's unexpected death in 1702, both the formal and informal constitutions of England had been rewritten to increase Parliamentary independence and control over governance.45 Parliaments could meet regularly--with or without royal invitation, representatives could be routinely judged by their electorates, however small and elite they might have been, at least once every three years. The power of the purse had been increased by ceding control of many revenue sources to the parliament that had previously been used by kings at the same time that the size of and cost of governance expanded to well beyond the royal household's remaining revenues. The precedent of audit and earmarked budgets reduced the sovereign's discretion to use tax receipts as they might desire, and further reduced opportunities for a king to buy support in parliament.

45 William, the heroic military leader of many campaigns, died from injuries sustained after falling off a horse. 33 Freedom of speech and petition opened up the domain of public discussion on a variety of matters that previously might have been deemed treasonous and punished accordingly. However, it was not necessarily the case that these precedents and Acts of parliament would continue to bind future queens and kings. All English constitutional changes are entirely reversible, because the written constitution is not protected by a formal amendment process. A clever king who constructed an amiable parliament could, in principle, repeal or amend all these acts by simple majority votes. Precedent is to a significant extent in the eye of the beholder. Fiscal precedents could be ignored or reinterpreted by congenial parliaments or by kings, as they had been for hundreds of years. Just as many routine disputes under common law are based on disagreements about what the "the law" is, so were many of the long-standing disputes between parliaments and kings in previous centuries. Moreover, then as now, there is no formal procedure by which constitutional violations can be set aside. However, the center of policy making power did not shift back to the Crown as it had on previous occassions. Instead, parliament continued to strengthen its grip on governance during the following century.46 Formal and informal institutional reforms made the parliament increasingly independent, and the next several Kings and Queens were for various reasons were less adept at using patronage and royal innovation to influence parliament or to go round it.47 Political parties evolved into more disciplined organizations that made the parliament more difficult for kings to manipulate, while the bargaining power of the various persons holding the crown declined. As a consequence,

46 In this, it could be argued that William achieved his stated goal, announced on October 10 1688 just before the invasion in his Declaration of Reasons: "a free and lawful parliament ... and securing to the whole nation the free enjoyment of all their laws, rights and liberties under a just and legal government." The complete text of William's declaration is available at http://www.jacobite.ca/documents/16881010.htm. 47 William, himself, spent the summers of the Eight Year war on the continent leading military campaigns against the French. Queen Anne (1702-14), whose succession was a consequence of the 1689 Bill of Rights which elevated her above her father and brother, had lived in Denmark with her husband for many years before inheriting the crown, was not trained for leadership, and often suffered from ill-health. The first two Hanovian Kings, King George I and II (1714-1760) were, like William, foreign born. George I spoke German rather than English at court. And, finally, although George III had clear effects on the course of policy on many occasions, he was mentally ill for much of his long reign (1760-1820). 34 the next century saw a gradual but steady and substantial shift of power from the crown to the parliament, although not the end of the crown's role in British politics. Although it is often written that the glorious revolution created parliamentary governance in England, Royal power did not disappear with the Bill of Rights, nor with the death of William. The last sovereign to veto a parliamentary decision after it was passed by majorities in both houses was William's successor, Queen Anne, who vetoed the Scottish militia bill in 1707. However, she was not the last to affect the course of public policy in the small, or in the large. The division of power between king and parliament had clearly shifted from king toward parliament between 1689 and 1702, but to an intermediate point rather than from one extreme to the other. The Crown continued to have and to exercise the power to appoint and dismiss ministers, to call and dismiss parliament, and to directly affect the composition of parliament by through town charters and elevation. The power of royal patronage, although reduced after the budgetary and audit practices implemented during William's reign, was still a potent method of influencing the behavior of members of parliament. Although there were many patrons, the Crown was by far the largest. Queen Anne had a hundred "placemen" in parliament (Field, 141). A third of the house of commons was on the executive payroll during George I and II.48 Indeed, the most important of the constitutional reforms of the 19th and 20th century, the election reform of 1832 and the Parliament Act of 1911, occurred in large part because of threatened interventions by the Crown. More or less stable political blocks of MPs had formed in both chambers towards the end of the 17th century (Hayton, 2002; Hill, Ch. 2), however these blocks did not account for the whole of parliament, nor were the blocks organized in the modern sense. Being a member of parliament was not a full-time salaried position. Relatively few elections were contested, and MP's attended parliament, more or less at their convenience. The lack of party discipline and professionalism, along with the 48 Walpole (1721-1742) is often regard to be the first Prime Minister, had the ear of both George I and George II, and used both parliamentary and royal patronage to his and the crown's mutual advantage. They essentially excluded Tories from government positions. On the other hand, it was the Whigs superior access to foreign credit as well as the latent Jacobism of many Tories, that initially predisposed George I to favor Whig ministers (Field, 146; Hill, 59, 77). 35 preponderance of uncontested elections, allowed patronage to affect the balance of power (Field, 140-1). For example the Whigs took power shortly after George I's accession to the crown, in part, because George only appointed Whigs to senior positions in government. The Whigs remained largely in control until George III's accession in 1760, who was less favorably disposed toward partisan politics, in general, and to Whigs in particular than his grand father and great grand father had been. Under George III, the Tories assumed power for the first time in 50 years.49 Neither the party system nor cabinet governance had yet emerged. On the other hand, although the crown could appoint and remove ministers, kings and queens now routinely needed parliament in a way that they had rarely needed parliaments before. The year-to-year tax policy adopted by parliament during William's reign, necessitated annual meetings of parliament, and implied that the King needed ministers who could pass annual tax legislation. This was new. Shifts in the composition of the House of Commons generated by party campaigns and external events, limited the Crown's choice of ministers and affected the ordinary course of public policy, because the King needed ministers who could deliver majorities in both chambers can could only influence rather than control the membership of parliament. The Crown's personal revenue sources were far more circumscribed than they had been, and the size of government was far larger than it had been in the centuries before William III's reign. A man like Walpole who deliver majorities in parliament (and the King's patronage for parliament) was clearly a powerful and influential statesman.50

49 In his words, George III wanted to "put an end to those unhappy distinctions of party called Whigs and Tories by declaring that I would countenance every man that supported my Administration." Quoted in Hill, p. 105-6. He proceeded to appoint his nonpartisan tutor, the Earl of Brute to be his chief minister. The king, true to his word, subsequently appoint men who would put king over party, both Tories and Whigs, to posts in his administration (Hill, 106). 50 Robert Walpole is often regarded to be the first Prime Minister of Great Britain. He lead the majority in Commons from 1721-1742. The term "prime minister" was coined with him in mind; however, this title was not meant as a complement, but as an insult composed by Walpole's enemies (Field 145). Perhaps, Walpole appeared to be too deferential to George I and II? Walpole was not, of course, the first minister in English history to have had a great effect on English public policy, but he was the first to do so in the post William III era when ongoing parliamentary majorities played an important role in policy formation. 36 A new intermediate form of government had emerged, with neither parliament nor crown fully dominant. Although the power of the crown gradually diminished through time, as formal and informal changes in the British constitution were adopted, the crown remained a significant determinant of parliamentary policy well into the 19th century.

F. The Power of the Purse and the Emergence of Parliamentary Governance: 1702-1832 Several significant reforms of the written constitution were adopted during the first decades of the eighteenth century. Two of these demonstrate the easy reversability of the English constitutional law of this time. The 1701 Act of Settlement included a major impediment to using patronage to influence parliament by forbidding those on the royal payroll from sitting in the parliament. This separation of the executive and parliament was weakened substantially by the Regency Act of 1706, which required MPs obtaining royal jobs to stand for new elections--elections which were often uncontested. The Scottish Union Act of 1707 bought Scotland firmly into the England sphere by abolishing the Scottish parliament, linking the crowns of Scotland and England. Forty five new seats were created in Commons for Scottish town and county representatives and 9 new peers for the Lords. A revised property qualification for the Commons was adopted in 1711. County representatives (knights) had to have 600 pounds of income per year and Burgesses 300 pounds per year. The Septennial Act of 1716 revised the Trienial Act and extended the maximal length of parliament from 3 to 7 years, reducing what little electoral competition there was, and by most accounts increase corruption by further strengthening patronage. To some extent, these constitutional reforms can be interpreted as "ordinary" partisan majoritarian politics, insofar as the reforms were intended to advance Tory or Whig political objectives. For example, the Scottish Union was adopted by a Whig majority, and the new Scottish members subsequently voted with the Whigs. The Tories adopted a property qualification in 1711 to reduce part of the Whig support in the commons, the Tory base of support being in the upper middle gentry (Field, 143; Hill, 51). The Septennial Act of 1716 allowed an existing Whig parliament to be extended

37 without an intervening election and provided them (and George I) with four more years to use patronage to cement the Whig control of parliament. After the Septennial Act, the written rules of the political game remained stable for more than a century, but the unwritten procedures of governance continued to be revised to take account of the rising cost of governance and a century-long sequence of foreign kings.51 Many of these informal revisions were indirect consequences of the new budgetary circumstances of the Crown. As the size of governance increased well beyond the crown's own revenues, parliamentary "subsidies" became essential for governance (Mathias, 39). The short term tax bills passed by parliament, in turn, necessitated both annual meetings of parliament and royal ministers who could easily deliver majorities in both Lords and Commons. As a consequence, it became commonplace for the Crown's leading minister to be a leading member of the majority coalition in parliament. Once selected, such a leader would generally be allowed to dispense the crown's patronage (jobs) in a manner that would cement his authority in the parliament. This reliance on a single parliamentary leader to craft majority support through policies and royal patronage, as with Walpole and Pitt, helped established organizational patterns and norms that allowed the modern office of prime minister to emerge. The "prime minister's" team, his elite councils of compatriots and advisors, gradually became more involved in major policy decisions and in setting the legislative agenda in parliament, especially on policy matters that the crown had no obvious interest. As the scope of government increased and royal interests focused on foreign polices of the expanding empire, more and more of routine domestic policies were turned over to the council of ministers. The use of ministerial councils was, of course, an ancient royal management technique, but in the present case the need for ongoing parliamentary majorities substantially reduced the range of ministers who could be hired (or fired) by the Crown. The King or Queen remained the principal, but more and more authority was delegated to his or her ministers. The ministers, in turn, support, became increasingly independent

51 William III (1689-1702), George I (1714-27) and George II (1727-60) were foreign by birth. Anne (1702-1714) had lived in Denmark with her husband for nearly 20 years prior to her assention. George III (1760-1820) was born in Britain, but evidently spoke English with a German accent, possibly because he had a Germon speaking mother, father, and wife. 38 of the sovereign, because of the requirement for continuing parliamentary majorities on taxations. In this way, the use of a parliamentary "prime minister" to manage majorities in the Commons and Lords gradually lead to cabinet governance. Cabinet governance in its modern sense, however, did not emerge until well into the nineteenth century. It should be remembered that British politics in the 18th century was not characterized by the competitive elections and intense electioneering that are the trademarks of modern democracies. Parties were loose coalitions of members with common interets rather than disciplined national organizations that crafted platforms and provided substantial electoral support. Many borough elections and most county elections were uncontested and were substantially controlled by local elites (O'Gorman, 334). In 1761 only four of forty county elections were contested, and only forty two of two hundred three borough elections (Field, 143). During the eighteenth century it became increasingly common for borough seats to be controled by local elites as the number of "nomination" boroughs increased from approximately 60 to more than 200 during the course of the century. Indeed, it became increasingly common to purchase nominations. The price of a seat in Commons was bid up from 1000 pounds to 5000 pounds over the course of the century. (O'Gorman, 1989, p. 13, 21). Local elites who sold "their seats" would deliver the necessary votes and/or prevent opposition. The Crown could not fully determine the composition of parliament anymore than it could in previous centuries, but the sovereign could and evidently did significantly influence its composition throughout the eighteenth century. Together, traditions of royal deference and the large number of nomination seats allowed the Crown to influenced the composition of Commons. Elevation and patronage allowed the Crown to influence the composition of the Lords. Consequently, both kings and queens were normally "blessed" with parliamentary majorities whose interests were compatible with their own interests. George I and George II preferred Whigs to Tories, in part because of tory support for James II and James III's claim to the throne--and Whigs majorities George I and II had. George III was less partisan and less pedisposed toward Whigs, and the Whig dynasty fell (Field, 136-7. 146,149). This royal influence over the composition of parliament continues well into the nineteenth century. Although the role of "placemen" declined somewhat during Pitt's term as prime minister and ministerial power increased

39 somewhat, King George III's implicit veto of catholic emancipation was sufficient to induce Pitt and his talented cabinet to resign in 1801. George IV (1820-30) was known to favor Tories, and, subsequently, had a Tory majority in parliament--partly because he expanded Lords from 339 to 400 members (Field, 164). William IV (1930-37) was known to favor Whigs, and the Tory majority was replaced by a Whig majority in the election that followed his accession to the crown (Pugh, 48; Lee, 58-9). Political speech had not yet become free outside the Parliament. Thomas Paine had to flee the country for France in 1792 after Pitt condemned his "monstrous doctrine" (Pugh, 1999). The long-standing Test Act of 1673 prevented dissenters and Catholics from seeking parliamentary office until 1829. The 1711 property qualifcations for Commons prevented non-wealthy Anglicans from sitting in commons until 1859. Population shifts had greatly reduced the representativeness of borough governments, to the extent that it had ever existed. The great new industrial centers of , , , and Sheffield, 4 of the 7 largest cities in England, had only county representation (2 MPs). There were 49 two member districts with fewer than 50 eligible voters (Field, 142). By 1800, Parliament had far more political power than it had ever had before--indeed dominant policy making power--but British governance was by no means democratic or representative in the modern sense. Royal and Aristocratic interests largely ruled the day, although that day was gradually coming to an end.

G. Ideological Interests and Interest Groups in the Late Eighteenth Century Towards the end of the eighteenth century, a series of economic, technological, political and ideological shocks began to transform the largely medieval lifestyles and political outlooks of the British commonor and elite. Both International and intranational trade expanded rapidly during the eighteenth century, reflecting agricultural innovation, declining transportation costs, and population growth (Mathias, 88, 66-7). English turnpike and canal systems expanded dramatically during the mid to late eighteenth century generated a more integrated domestic economic market (Morgan 428-9,483), while the expanding empire and prosperity in northern Europe increased international trade worldwide (Mathias, 87-8). New large scale

40 techniques for spinning thread and weaving cloth lead to major new manufacturing centers (Mathias, 243-5), and the industrial revolution began to gather steam with the Watt's modifications of Newcombe's steam engine in the 1774 and 1781 (Morgan, 480). Population expanded, and thanks to with large scale manufacturing and expanded commerce new urban centers emerged and older commercial centers grew larger . Reduced transportation costs also allowed a boader and more rapid dissemination of news and opinion which lead to a more integrated political market. Newspapers became commonplace during the early 18th century, which greatly increased political literacy, or at least increased the breath of political scandals disseminated. A number of influential books were published in the late 18th century by thoughtful men interested in major economic and political reform. Adam Smith's (1776) thoughtful defense of free trade and specialization helped to energize economic liberals for the next two century. Jeremy Bentham's (1789) Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation challenged the customary foundation of law and suggests that both laws and institutions should promote the greatest happiness to the greatest number. His utilitarian arguments continue to affect modern policy debates. Burke's Reflections on the French Revolution was published in 1990 suggests that institutional design, particularly revolutionary design is unlikely to improve long-standing institutions, thereby establishing a rational foundation for institutional conservatism. Paine's rebuttal, the Rights of Man elevated the concept of individual rights in English constitutional debates. His book immediately sold 200,000 copies in 1793 (Field, 156). Petitions and mass demonstrations became increasingly common events. The new middle and upper middle class were largely excluded from political life by the wealth requirements for suffrage and membership in the Commons, many joined or supported groups that lobbied for expansion of suffrage. Industrialists organized groups such as the General Chamber of Manufactures and petitioned parliament for favorable policies and reforms of parliament (Morgan, 482) Groups of working men and women organized to improve their own wealth through collective bargaining, and also to achieve political ends (Pugh, 22; Mathias, 334). Interest in parliamentary reform was not a new phenomena. Parliamentary reform had been seriously debated in the public domain at least since the Leveler's "Aggreement" of 1647. However, the late eighteenth century revolutions in

41 American and in France renewed interest in suffrage reform, and the growth of large scale textile firms in Northern England lead to the development of major new urban centers that were not accounted for under the current apportionment of seats in Commons. Consequently, a variety of groups took up the cause of parliamentary reform at the end of the century: Society for Constitutional Information (1791), the Friends of Univesal Peace and Rights of Man (1791), the London Correspondence Society (1792), Friends of the People (1792), and Sheffield Association (1792). These were, by in large, middle class groups, but membership in such organizations extended both into parliamentary elites and into the working class (Lee, 16; Hill, 150-1,Pugh, 22-3). These groups organized large scale, and more or less peaceful, demonstrations and petition drives that promoted reform rather than revolution. In 1797, Earl Grey, who was a member of Friends of the People and became Prime Minister in 1830, sponsored a parliamentary reform bill that received only 94 votes in commons (Hill, 233).52 Not all reform demonstrations were peaceful, and the reform movement induced the formation of anti-reform groups, which lead to more violent conflicts. Rumours of revolt and revolutionary plots were abundent during those days and France declared war in 1793. England shifted to a war footing and curtailed civil liberties to quell demonstrations. The Habeas Corpus Act was suspended in 1794. The Treasonable and Seditious Practices Act and the Sedititious Meeting Act were passed in 1793 by large supper majorities. Treasonable practices included the transport and publication of writing opposed to the constitution. Paines publisher was sentenced to a year and half in jail for selling the Rights of Man. Meetings of more than 50 persons were allowed only with magistrate approval. Thence forth, large demonstrations in opposition to the Seditious Meetings acts were themselves seditious and broken up. In 1799, correspondance

52 Some three decades later, Grey became prime minister in more favorable circumstances, and finally passed a bill very similar to his first. Grey's 1797 bill, however, was not the first effort at reforming the rotten boroughs. had been offerred even before the French Revolution. For example, in 1785, Pitt had attempted to move seats from the smaller boroughs to the larger ones in Reform bill that included compensation for the "owners" of the small borough seats. In this case, as in 1797, George III was opposed to reform and helped marshal opposition to the bill (Hill, 145). Indeed, Grey's 1797 effort was largely opposed by his own party as well, as Pitt's interest in reform had disappeared after the French Revolution (Hill, 50-1). 42 societies and trade unions were banned under the Corresponding and Combination Acts (Lee, 19;Field, 157). These "gag acts" as well as medieval laws defining treason were used to prosecute and harras reform, peace and labor organizers, which essentially postponed large scale efforts to promote reform until well after the war with Napolean ended in 1814.53 Both industrialization and democratic revolutions abroad, in the United States and in France, focused attention on the economic and political interests of a rapidly growing and increasingly organized middle class. The language of politics often tends to be intense and emotional, and although there was no counterpart to the American or French revolutions in the United Kingdom, there were outspoken demonstrations, riots, and petition drives which did affect policy indirectly.54 The American and French revolutions also brought constitutional issues directly to the literate public.

H. The "Great Reform" English Governance: 1800 - 1835. Not all organizations were affected by these acts, or the subsequent restrictions passed in 1819 (the Six Acts). For example, "friendly societies" continued to flourish as did local reform oriented newspapers. In 1801, approximately 700,000 people belonged to such local service clubs. By 1815, membership approached a million and by 1830 approximatly, one in four males were members (Gerrard, 2002, p. 169). The Masons continued to expand their membership and influence. With the repeal of the 1799

53 See Field, 156-62; Pugh, 22-24; Hill, 155; Lee, 54; Morgan, 486-8; and Holmberg, 2002. After the war, reform groups sprung up again and organized large scale demonstrations and petition drives. For example, in 1816 more than 400 petitions favoring the abolition of the income tax arrived in parliament (Hill, 176). Although the anti-tax efforts were successful, the reform movements were not. Again parliament reponded to large scale demonstrations with legislation curtaling those groups, the Six Acts of 1819, rather than reform. Juriy trials lessoned the impact of these laws insofar as they did not routinely convict those charged or apply maximal sentences. The treason act of 1351 defined seven offences as high treason, including various assaults upon the royal family and "levying war against the king within his realm or adhering to his enemies." (Holmberg, 2002) 54 Not all of these demonstrations were peaceful, but no coordinated uprisings or attacks on government buildings or persons took place. Indeed it was often quite the reverse as in the Peterloo "massacre" in 1819 when eleven persons at a parliamentary reform meeting were killed by a cavalry charge during a very large but, evidently, peaceful meeting at St. Peters Field in Manchester. The speakers were arrested, as were the newspaper reporters who wrote up accounts of the meeting and cavalry charge. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peterloo_massacre ) 43 combination act in 1824, local trade associations and unions became freer to organize. It also became easier to establish networks between existing clubs, and correspondence societies provided links between the clubs with broader interests, including public policy (Lee, 54; O'Gorman, 312). Well over a hundred politically active groups organized mass meetings, petition drives, and demonstrations, issued pamphlets, and lobbied ministers behinds the scenes (Hamer, 8; Lopatin, 1999, appendix). There were, of course, many objections to the current rules for selecting members of Commons, and proposal for reform varied widely. However, it was widely agreed that seats in Commons were disproportionately allocated to the south, that many of the existing seats were controlled by small local elites, and that many others were not only uncontested. There were some 270 seats from "nomination boroughs" out of the 658 members of Commons (Lee, 57-9; O'Gorman, 26). Moreover, the northern industrial centers were essentially unrepresented in Commons. The county of Lancastershire had a population of over 1.3 million and returned just two members, while Cornwall with a population of three hundred thousand returned 42 members. This did not mean that all elections to commons were simply empty rituals, but it did mean that few seats were selected by broad electorates.55 Niether of the mainstream parties favored a wholesale redistribution of seats nor universal suffrage, but many Whigs had favored a reallocation of seats and for revisions of borough suffrage rules for decades. Parliamentary reform, of course, was politically easier for the Whigs to do for two reasons. First, the preponderance of the reallocated seats would come from Tory districts. Of the 270 nomination districts most likely to be affected by reform, only 70 routinely

55 The borrough electorates at that time varied widely. At the least represtative boroughs had suffrage rights that were attached to particular peices of property, "burgages," which could be assembled under a single ownership; this allowed a single person to select an MP. Many others were selected by very small electorates, as with the "rotten" borough of Sarum. At the other extreme were boroughs in which all free holders or all taxpayers were entitled to vote (O'Gorman, 1989, p. 21-33). In these more liberal boroughs, the suffrage reforms of 1832 actually reduced suffrage! The composition of the electorate for Commons varied widely; however, on average, the electorate was surprisingly middle class, with skilled craftsmen being the largest group. Recall that the electorate for selecting county and borough representatives to Commons incuded approximately 10-12% of the adult male population. Garrard (2002, p. 26) reports that the electorate in 1830 was composed as follows: 13.6% were landed gentry, 5.8% were merchants and manufacturers, 20% were retailers, 39.5% were skilled craftmen, 19.2% were semiskilled workman, and 6.4% were employed in agricultural. 44 returned Whigs (Lee, 57). Second, the Whigs had long been a reform coalition by the standards of the early 19th century (Hill, 178). For example the Whig coalition had long opposed restrictions on freedom of the press, pressed for free trade, including repeal of the corn law act of 1815, opposed laws forbidding catholics and dissenters from holding public office, and had proposed several parliamentary reform bills. Public pressure eventually persuaded a majority of the prereform electorate that reform was inevitable, and even, perhaps, influenced a future king. (George IV's brother William IV had served in the Lords, and generally supported the Whigs during his time there.) George IV died in 1830 and the election associated with William IV's accession returned a pro-reform Whig government later in the year, thanks in part to William IV's support (Phillips, 1992, p. 18-21). A flood of 1200 petitions was presented to parliament mostly favoring reform (O'Gorman, 310). The new Whig government proposed a reform bill that called for a major reallocation of seats, uniform rules for the election of burough MPs, and a substantial expansion of suffrage. The Whig proposal was defeated narrowly in the Common at the second reading. Earl Grey asked William IV to call for new elections, and parliament was dismissed. The ensuing campaign focused largely on reform, and returned a large Whig majority to Commons. Grey's coalition received 71.1% of the votes cast in Great Britain (Rallings and Thrasher, 2000, p.3). In thirty five of the forty county elections, the Whigs took both seats. Of the 187 Tories elected, 90 percent came from districts that would lose their seats if the Whig reforms were adopted (Hill, 1996, p.193). This time the reform easily passed Commons, but a majority of the Lords disagreed, and the reform was vetoed, 199 to 158. The rejection of reform by the Lords lead to scattered riots, some of which were targeted at peers and bishops who had opposed reform. It also induced a middle class tax revolt and bank boycott. The middle class widely witheld taxes and withdraw funds from the banks. As a consequence, the Bank of England's reserves fell by 40% (Hill, 195). After the defeat in Lords, Grey's ministry resigned, and King William encouraged the formation of a minority Tory government. When this failed, he invited Grey to return to government and agreed to create 41 pro-reform peers, if necessary, to assure passage of the reform act (LeMay, 32). A third reform bill, modified slightly to please the Lords,

45 again easily passed commons.56 The changes, the external pressure, and the royal threat induced a majority of the Lords to accept the reform. The King accepted the bill and the first substantial reform of election laws in 400 years took effect. The great reform approximately doubled the electorate to approximatly 20% of adult males by broadening the franchise in most boroughs to include all households rated at 10 pounds per year, and by increasing the county roles to include 50 pound renters as well as 40 shilling householder enfranchised under the medieval suffrage law of 1430. One hundred and forty three seats were taken from the smaller boroughs, includindg 112 from boroughs with populations under 1000. Sixty five seats went to the new industrial centers, sixty five more to county representatives, and the remainder were redistributed to London, Scotland, and Ireland. The great reform did not fully solve the disprotionate representation of the south relative to the north, radically expand suffrage, eliminate all small electoral districts, or fully end patronage, but it did make patronage less decisive in future elections and political competition more so (Lee, 61).57 It also changed the representative basis of the house of commons from a more or less equal representation of boroughs and counties to a system more based on electorate size (Jennings, 13). The redistribution of seats change the distribution of economic interests represented in parliament, as the new industrial interests became better represented. The expansion of suffrage induced changes in the technology of securing majorities in Commons. Both these effects had substantial political and, thereby, constitutional effects in the long run.

I. The Gradual Expansion of Suffrage During the Nineteenth Century: The creation of a more competitive environment for elections to Commons made majorities in commons more difficult to engineer than they had under the previous regime. Although nomination boroughs still existed after 1832, there were far fewer of them than before. More opinions, consequently, had to be influenced after the reform than before in order to obtain a seat in the house of commons, which induced a change

56 The modifications implied that fewer seats would be shifted from England to Scotland (6) and Ireland (5). 57 Suffrage in local elections was more extended in 1835 by the Municipal Corporation Act. It replaced 178 unelected corporate municipalities in Wales and England with elected town councils, and extended the vote to all property owners, subject to 30 month residency. 46 in electoral technology. In economic terms, the reforms reduced the effectiveness of targetted patronage relative to organized campaigns to disseminate information. Economics implies that poltically active individual and groups would therefore refine their electoral strategies accordingly. In the short run, the effectiveness of existing local and national interest groups increased relative to the Crown and local potentates, who could still dispense favors and jobs but no longer as decisively. In the long run, the change in the relative effectiveness of patronage relative to informational campaigns (and substantial local public progects) would induce local potentates and the Crown to support existing politically active groups that advanced their interests, to promote the formation of new groups and alliances that might also advance their policy and political aims, and to dispense local "pork barrel" projects favored by local electorates in addition to patronage to local political leaders. Granting more seats to the industrial districts made the center of gravity in Commons more interested in industrial development than before. Trade policies were liberalized, monopolies reduced, and the free trade zone of the empire expanded to make up for losses in North America. Innovations in manufacturing gave British manufactures a cost advantage in several markets which generated large trade surpluses and capital inflows. Although those elected to office were often from the landed elite (Pugh, 82), they were, none the less, responsive to local economic and political interests (Schonhardt- Bailey, xxxx). Economic policies changed, and per capita income grew four times as fast in the 1830-50 period as it had in the previous century (Pugh, 36). The two reforms of 1832, thus, indirectly encouraged the development of modern economic and political organizations in nineteenth century Britain: large firms and political parties, and political and economic unions such as the Chartest and Anti-Corn Law Leagues. It can, thus, be said that constitutional reforms lead to prosperity, mass politics, and petition drives. The increasing importance of the increasingly disciplined political parties and interest groups also made elections less subject to royal manipulation and ministers more dependent on their support, both of which further reduced the influence of the Crown over public policy in the United Kingdom. However, that these reforms would inevitably lead to further constitutional reforms was not clear.

47 The Chartist movement of the 1840s pressed for universal male sufferage as well as the secret ballot, free trade, and the reform of the poor laws. Petitions with over a million signatures were submitted to and ignored by parliament. The Chartist's failed to obtain significant constitutional reform, in part because some prominent members of the movement threatened law and order, which induced a conservative back lash against their proposed constitutional reforms. Interest in suffrage reform, however, did not wane with the decline of the Chartist movement, as reform activists continued to press for reform. Reform bills were introduced by "advanced liberals" in the 1852 and 1854 sessions of parliament, but defeated by overwelming, albeit diminishing majorities (Smith, 29). Electoral support for reform among was evidenty sufficient to induce the conservatives to take up the reform issue, and in 1859 the conservatives introduced a reform bill (Smith, 41), partly with the aim of protecting conservative interests in the face of "inevitable" reform.58 The Second Reform Act, 1867 New regional reform organizations, with roots in the Chartist and anti-Corn Law leagues, added to the pressure in the 1860s (Smith, 29, 39-40). The Reform Union was formed in the northern industrial centers by "radical" politicians, merchants, and prominent reformer in 1864 to press for liberal reforms including the secret ballot, a return to triennial parliaments, redistributing seats in Commons in proportion to borough and county populations, and a very broad franchise to include all males not on poor relief. They emphasized the universality of the interests advanced by their programs, citing Mill and Gladstone rather than class-based arguments (Cowling, 243-2). The was founded in London during 1864, by middle class and working class activists. Its funding came from lessor lords and industrialists, and from the Trade Council. It promoted a similar constitutional agenda, but used somewhat more agressive and radical language to promote reform (Cowling, 246, 248). In 1865, the London 58 In May of 1859, Disraeli argued in Commons that parliamentary reform had become a pressing matter of public policy. "Thus Parliamentary Reform becames a public question, a public question in due cousre of time becomes a Parliamentary question; and then, as it were, shedding its last skin becomes a Ministerial question. Reform has been for 15 years a Parliamentary question and for 10 years it has been a Ministerial question" (Quoted in LeMay, 180). Disraeli's remarks clearly imply that interest groups may directly establish an issue as a "public question" and indirectly establish an issue as a ministerial issue. 48 Working Men's Association was formed largely from members of the trade unions to campaign for a broad franchise including lodgers not on poor relief (Cowling, 247). These three groups organized numerous talks in medium sized towns and cities throughout England, and partly because their members included journalists as well as elected politicians, their views were widely reported in the press throughout the country. Constitutional reform was again on the mainstream political agenda. In the 1865 elections, there was a changing of the guard as a new generation of members entered Commons for the first time and as the baton of leadership was passed on to new leaders. Earl Russell with the assistance of Gladstone formed a Liberal reform government, with the support of Liberals, Whigs, and (advanced liberals). Early in 1866, Russell proposed a major reform expanding the national suffrage laws substantially beyond that of 1832, although short of that advocated by the reform groups.59 The Russell-Gladstone reform bill obtained a slim majority in Commons on its first reading--one that was much smaller than anticipated because of large scale defections among whig MPs--but the bill failed in second reading (after ammendment) in the face of conservative and Whig opposition. Parliament was recessed, and during the recess, the Reform League and Working Men's Association organized large scale demonstrations in favor or expanding the sufferage throughout the country, including several large and occasionally disorderly demonstrations within London itself (Cowling, 11-12; Smith, 135, 160).60

59 Gladstone, for example argued in Commons on May 1864 for a limited expansion of suffrage, to include those "fit" to participate in national politics: "every man who is not presumably incapacitated by some consideration of personal unfitness of of political danger is morally entitled to come within the pale of the constitution. [That is to say,] fitness for the franchise, when it shown to exist--as I say that it is shown to exist in the case of a select portion of the working class--is not repelled on sufficient grounds from the portals of the Constitution by the allegation that things are well as they are (quoted in LeMay, 184)" 60 One of the demonstrations is often referred to as the Hyde Park Riot. The riot began as a peaceful march, but involved an unlawful tresspass in Hyde park and some distruction of park property. The police tried to disburse the 20,000 person crowd, at which point a riot ensued. The police were rebuffed with sticks and stones. Several dozen demonstrators and policement were injured in the fray. One policeman subsequently died from injuries. The Calvalry was called out, and the crowd peacefully disbursed. The demonstrators were not entirely political, nor were they surly revolutionists, as games were played throughout the park and trees were climbed. All this took place within sight of Disraeli's apartment, which may have contributed to their influence. The queen evidently took the demonstrations seriously. Mrs. Disreali reported that "the people in general seem to be thoroughly enjoying themselves" (Smith, 129-131, 135). 49 The Russell cabinet resigned without requesting new elections, and the Queen asked the leader of the opposition, Derby, to form a new government. A new conservative cabinet was formed in 1867 with the able assistance of Disraeli. It relied on the support of conservatives, conservative whigs (the "Cave" faction) and some radicals in the Commons. As in 1832, there was again royal support for suffrage reform. In her speech to parliament and in subsequent letters to the Derby, the Queen insisted that should be addressed by the new government (Smith, 135). Three suffrage issues were quickly linked in the Derby-Disraeli government: suffrage extension for national elections, a modest redistribution of seats in commons, and suffrage extention in the boroughs for local elections. The Disraeli reform proposals were more radical than those rejected in the previous year, but were subtly crafted at the margins to benefit conservative electoral interests in light of careful demographic research. The boundaries of boroughs were expanded to remove liberals from county electorates, which remained subject to a higher property restriction, while the borough franchise was expanded beyond the level sought by the Liberals to include renters who might be influenced by their Tory landlords. After a good deal of debate and ammendment, the bill was passed by a coalition of pro-reform liberals and conservatives over the opposition of mainstream liberals who objected to the conservative biases of the new bill.61 The new electorate was nearly doubled, increasing from just over a million in 1866 to just under two million in 1668 in England, and from 1.35 million to 2.48 million in the United Kingdom as a whole. However, the expansion was disproportionately focused on the boroughs where electorates rose from 600 thousand to 1.43 million while that in the counties rose from 758 thousand to just over a million (Smith, 236). The suffrage rules were now significantly tighter in the countryside than in the towns. Although the borough seats became more representative in the modern sense, they did not have proportionately more representatives in Commons. Only thirty seats from the smallest districts were redistributed, and only about half went to boroughs. The rural south remained over-represented relative to the industrial midlands, and the countryside overrepresented

61 One of the many proposed amendments was sponsored by J. S. Mill who attempted to replace the work "man" with the word "person," which would have expanded suffrage to women. Mill's woman's suffrage proposal received only 73 votes in support (Smith, 204). 50 relative to the cities. The nineteen largest boroughs with a combined population of 5 million returned 46 MPs, while the sixty eight smallest boroughs with an aggregate population of four hundred twenty thousand returned 68 MPs (Smith, 240). The conservative advantage was evident in the next elections. For example, in 1874 the conservatives received 38.32 percent of the votes cast in England and Wales, which elected 154 MPs. The Liberals recieved only slight fewer votes, 37.39 percent, but returned only 101 MPs (Smith, 225). In effect, the "advanced liberals" from the industrial midland and northern boroughs got increased suffrage, but not increased representation, while the country gentry were protected from a substantial increase in electoral competition. About 1 in 8 persons living in boroughs were eligible to vote after the reforms but only about 1 in 15 persons residing in counties.62 Individuals who lived in cities, but owned property in the county continued to be able vote in both places (Porritt, 1911, p. 6-7). The Second Reform combined modest suffrage reform and modest redistricting which increased the breadth of politics increased significantly, although the net effect was far from universal male suffrage or equal representation. None the less, the expansion of suffrage was sufficient to induce a further expansion of partisan organizations, mass politics, and consequently party discipline. This encouraged the evolution of British politics and parliamentary voting patterns to their modern forms. In 1860, only about 58.9 percent of liberals voted with their government and 63.0 percent of conservatives routinely opposed it. By 1881, 83.2 percent of the liberals supported their party leaders on critical votes and 87.9 percent of conservatives. Party line voting reached the ninety percent levels in both parties in the following decade after the 1884 electoral reforms were adopted (LeMay, 178). As in the previous case, further reforms for local elections were adopted. In 1869, new electoral laws were adopted that well beyond the national rules and naturally encouraged thoughts of further reform in national suffrage rules. The new local rules enfranchised all compound rate payers who had been in residence for a year, and also enfranchised unmarried women on the same basis (Machin, 2001:72-3). Partisan operations expanded to solicit the attention of the newly enfranchised upper middel class 62 The expansion of suffrage in Scotland and Irish counties were passed in separate bills in 1868 and were more substantial, although the final fraction of voters was smaller than in England and Wales, 1 in 24 and 1 in 26 respectively (Smith, 239). 51 and middle class voters. The National Union of Conservative and Constitutional Associations was formed in 1867, shortly after the Birmingham Liberal Association (1865). In 1877 the National Liberal Federation was created of more radical liberal groups, and in 1883 the Conservative and very influential Primrose League was formed with the aim of encouraging support from middle class and eventually working class voters. The nature of representation also changed as more seats were contested within generally broader electorates and more private bills were introduced (Cox and Ingram, 1992). The new electorate demanded new services. In 1870 and 1872, compulsory education bills were adopted by the Liberal parliament elected under the new suffrage rules. The new electorate clearly had reason to be more interested politics, and increased demand together with reduced printing costs lead to an increase in the production of newspapers and books. The number of newspapers increased from about 800 in 1856 to nearly 2100 in 1886 (Machin, 2001:72-3). Among the new books were dozens advocating further suffrage reform, independence, and free trade. The intellectual and political climate were changing, as continued suffrage expansion became more widely regarded as "inevitable" by the liberal political associations, suffrage groups, the labor movement, and many conservatives. Rising incomes meant that suffrage increased for economic reasons as well as political reforms. The Third Reform Acts, 1884-5 In 1884, a new Franchise Bill was passed followed by a Parliamentary Reform Act in 1885. Both were negotiated among party elites form both parties, as required for success when Commons is controlled by liberals and the Lords is controlled by conservatives, as is normally the case. Both reforms were approved by parliamentary majorities from both parties, and both were in response to percieved failings of the previous reforms. Although, the franchise and redistricting acts simply continued the trend of the first and second acts, they were in many respects more radical reforms than the previous two acts, because of their aim was more explicitly democratic. The Franchise Bill made residency, rather than property, the requirement for the privilege of household suffrage. The Parliamentary Reform Act divided most multiple member districts into

52 single member districts, reapportioned seats on the basis of population, and equalized suffrage rules for the town and countryside. The redistricting act of 1885 was at least as important as the Franchise Act of 1884. Borroughs with populations less than 15,000 lost all of their seats and were merged into county districts. Borroughs with between 50 and 15 thousand lost one of their two seats, these were transfered to county and urban electoral districts. A total of 154 seats, about a quarter of the total, were redistributed. London borroughs received 39 new seats and 34 went to other towns. 64 seats went to populous counties, five to Wales and a dozen to Scotland (Machin, 2001:98-9). These were important reforms. The suffrage reform expanded the electorate from about 3.5 million to 5.5 million, about two thirds of the adult males in the UK. Residency was a significant barrior, because not all adults maintained residences, as many lived in extended families, and many others moved across district lines within the year and half required. Moreover, not all eligible voters registered to vote. The new electoral districts were not equal in population, but the ration of the smallest to the largest shrank from 150:1 to 8:1 (Machin, 2001:94-102). It was after these reforms that the House of Commons became a representative body in the modern electoral sense of the word.

J. Modern Parliamentary Democracy Emerges 1906-1928 In 1906 the liberals swept the parliamentary elections to an extent not seen since 1832. 400 liberals were elected, which along with the support of 40 members of labor and 83 Irish nationalists gave them a large supermajority of the 670 members of parliament. Yet the Lords, with a large conservative heriditary majority, ignored public sentiment, and continued to oppose liberal legislation, includingin 1909 the budget for national government. Another constitutional crisis was at hand, as Lords had violated the norm that clear messages from the electorate be taken seriously (LeMay, 189-192). In response, the House leadership embarked on another series of major constitutional reforms, the first of which adopted in 1911 changed for the five century old equality of Commons and Lords over legislation, and replaced it with a new constitution that formalized the dominance of Commons.

53 K. Contemporary Reforms

L. Summary The medieval English parliament emerged in the fourteenth and fifteenth century from earlier councils that emerged about about the same time that national government in England. In the fourteenth century, meetings of a bicameral parliament to consider tax proposal and suggest laws to the crown had become routine. The upper chamber of the parliament included the nobility and senior church officials and the lower chamber included leaders from towns and counties. Although occassionally referred to as the Commons, the lower chamber was explicitly reserved for knights and squires for most of its history, and was consequently peopled with successful businessmen and farmers, and the children of nobles who were not in line for the family title and seat in the Lords. Although parliamentary power ebbed and flowed with the king's need for new tax revenues, the power of the medieval English parliament remained modest by modern standards. For most of the next two hundred centuries, parliaments met irregularly and for relatively short periods of time. Only the veto power the Parliament over new taxes continued essentially uninterrupted. Other protections and powers were obtained by various parliaments and then lost or ignored according to the interests and ambitions of the king or queen of the day. Parliaments were called and dismissed by the crown, and consequently, were often called only when the crown needed additional revenues (subsidies). Other councils whose members were hand picked by the crown played an ongoing role in governance, rather than parliament. A permanent shift of power from the King to the Parliament did not occur until the end of the Seventeenth century, during the reign of William III. This is nearly a century earlier than for the other countries in this study, and reflects unusual opportunities for constitutional exchange between William and the parliament at the time of William and Mary's accession. The English eighteenth century, like the Swedish one, demonstrates that it is possibile to have parliamentary governance without highly contested elections or broad suffrage. The democratization of British politics took place during essentialy at the same time as in the other northern kingdoms, largely in the period

54 between 1825 and 1925--a period in which large scale liberal and labor movements arose that favored suffrage expansion.

55 REFERENCES Claydon, T. (2002) William III. London: Pearson Education. Cox, G. and J. W. Ingram (1992) "Suffrage Expansion and Legislative Behavior in Nineteenth-Century Britain," Social Science History 16: 539-560. Cowling, M. (1967) 1867 Disraeli, Gladstone and Revolution: The Passing of the Second Reform Bill. Cambridge: Cambrdge University Press. Field, J. (2002) The Story of Parliament in the Palace of Westminster. London: Politico's Publishing. Gardiner, S. R. Ed. (1906) The Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution 1625-1660, 3rd Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Also available on the world wide web at: www.constitution.org/eng/conpur_.htm) Garrard, J. (2002) Democratization in Britain, Elites, Civil Society, and Reform since 1800. New Yorki: Palgrave. Hamer, D. A. (1977) The Politics of Electoral Pressure: A Study of Victorian Reform Agitation. New Jersey: Humanitarian Press. Hayton, D. (2002) The History of Parliament: The House of Commons 1690-1715. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hill, B. (1996) The Early Parties and Politics in Britain, 1688-1832. New York: Macmillan Press. Holmberg, T. (2002) "Great Britain: The Treasonable and Seditious Practices and Seditious Meetings Acts of 1795," Website: the Napoleanonic Series. http://www.napoleon-series.org/research/government/british/c_gagging.html Jennings, I. (1961) The British Constitution, 4th Ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lee, S. J. (1994) British Political History, 1815-1914. London: Routledge. LeMay, G. H. L. (1979) The Victorian Constitution: Conventions Usages and Contingencies. London: Duckworth. Lopatin, N. D. (1999) Political Unions, Popular Politics, and the Great Reform Act of 1832. London: Macmillan. Lyon, B. (1980) A Constitutional and Legal History of Medieval England, 2nd Ed. Toronto: G.J. McLeod. Margolis, M. (2002) Mathias, P. (2001) The First Industsrial Nation: the Economic History of Britain 1700-1914, 2nd Ed. London: Routledge. McLean, I. (2001) Rational Choice and British Politics, An Analysis of Rhetoric and manipulation from Peel to Blair. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Machin, I. (2001) The Rise of Democracy in Britain, 1830-1918. New York: St. Martin's Press. Morgan, K. O. (2001) The Oxford History of Britain. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

56 North, D. and Weingast B (1989) "Constitutions and Commitment: the Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth Century England," Journal of Economic History 49:803-1815. North, D. O'Gorman, F. (1989) Voters, Patrons and Parties: the Unreformed Electoral System of Hanoverian England: 1734-1832. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Pugh, M. (1999) Britain Since 1789, a Concise History. New York: Palgrave. Phillips, J. A. (1992) The Great Reform BIll in the Boroughs: English Electoral Behavior, 1818-1841. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Porritt, E. (1911) "Barriers Against Democracy in the British Electoral System," Political Science Quarterly 26: 1-31. Smith, F. B. (1966) The Making of the Second Reform Bill. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Stasavage, D. (2003) Public Debt and the Birth of the Democratic State: France and Great Britain 1688-1789. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Stephenson, C. and F. G. Marcham (1938) Sources of Constitutional History London. Harrop.

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