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450 Syllabus Course Syllabus 01:730:450 – Topics in Moral Philosophy, spring 2010 "Reasoning from Good Consequences to Right Actions" Class: 9:15-10:35am Tu/F, HCK-211 (Douglass campus) Course Website: sakai.rutgers.edu Instructor: Evan Williams ([email protected]) Important: you are responsible for all information in this syllabus. Read it carefully. Introduction Most of us believe that some states of affairs—for example, ones in which freedom, prosperity, and justice abound—are morally better than others, and that this fact has relevance to how we ought morally to behave. Relatedly, some states of affairs—for example, ones in which ourselves and our loved ones are happy and healthy—are prudentially better for us than others, and this has relevance for how it is prudent for us to behave. So for theories of both morality and prudence, we need a principle for reasoning from beliefs about which states of affairs are good to beliefs about which actions are right. The classical formulation of Consequentialism is principle of the form: "Right actions are ones which produce consequences at least as good as any available alternative actions would produce." Hard-line Consequentialists would use this principle as their entire moral theory; Pluralists would add an "all else equal" clause and include other principles such as "Right actions are ones which do not directly violate people's rights." However, the above principle is only one of many possible ways to define "right action" in terms of "good consequences". To list just three variations: Subjective Consequentialism: "Right actions are ones which the agent believes to produce consequences at least as good as any available alternative actions would produce." Indirect Consequentialism: "Right actions are ones which would produce consequences at least as good as any available alternative actions would, if everyone in relevantly similar circumstances were to act the same way." Satisficing Consequentialism: "Right actions are ones which produce good enough consequences." Note that these represent not just three different changes to the classical formulation of Consequentialism; they represent three different kinds of changes, ones which are not incompatible with one another. There is no in-principle reason why someone could not hold the view "Right actions are ones which the agent believes would produce good enough consequences, if everyone in relevantly similar circumstances were to act the same way." The space of possible Consequentialist principles is very large indeed. 730:450 syllabus, Page 1 of 6 Goals of the Course The main goal of "Topics in Moral Philosophy" in Spring 2010 is to explore possible variations of Consequentialism—possible ways to reason from "good consequences" to "right actions". Students will become acquainted with the options that are available for formulating these different variations, and the possible motivations for formulating Consequentialism in one way rather than another. Along the way, we will also discuss possible general definitions of what counts as a Consequentialist moral theory, and common objections raised against Consequentialist moral theories. A more general goal is to give students an opportunity to develop their skills at philosophical reasoning and argument, since many of the methods we will be using—and, for that matter, many of the concepts we will be discussing—are quite general in application. But perhaps the most important and most general goal of all is to have fun, and exercise our minds for the sheer joy of doing so. Philosophers do not need reasons to think about and discuss interesting ideas; "because we can" is reason enough. Prerequisites This is an advanced course in moral philosophy, examining one particular corner of the subject. If you have never studied moral philosophy before, you might be better off in a survey course. However, the only formal prerequisite is past experience with philosophy courses in general. I expect you to be able to understand precise definitions and use precise language, to be able not just to assert your opinions but also to argue for those opinions, to able to set aside your assumptions and approach issues with an open mind, and to enjoy doing these things. I do not expect you to come to the course having already memorized particular ideas or arguments. That said, since most of you will have taken at least one moral philosophy course, I will be moving very fast over things that would have been encountered there, such as the definition of Utilitarianism. If you find yourself getting lost, you may find the materials in the "Background Readings" directory of the course Sakai site to be helpful. About the Instructor I am a fifth-year graduate student here at Rutgers, working on a doctoral dissertation on the topic of how we should act when we believe that some states of affairs are morally better than others but do have no clue which states of affairs these are. You may address me as "Evan" or as "Mr. Williams", whichever you prefer. The best way to reach me is by emailing me at "[email protected]"; I try to respond to all emails within twenty-four hours of when they are sent. Office hours by arrangement. Some of you should pause to consider whether you really want to take this course with a graduate student as an instructor. I have far less teaching experience than actual faculty do— in fact, this is the first 400-level course I have ever taught. Also, any letters of recommendation you ask me to write will have relatively low value. Professor Holly Smith's graduate seminar in Ethical Theory, which is open to outstanding undergraduates and which overlaps substantially with this course in subject matter, may be a prudentially better option. (But I hope you stay in my course. It is going to be great fun, and the more people we have for class discussions, the better.) 730:450 syllabus, Page 2 of 6 Expectations This is a discussion class. You are expected to come to every class and to participate actively. If you have a good reason for missing class, email me in advance to let me know what it is; if you do not have a good reason for missing it, be there. Since we are meeting in the morning, this will require some self-discipline on your part: do not stay up too late the night before, and make sure to set an alarm clock. If you do miss class, or part of a class, find out from another student what you missed. You are responsible for any material that comes up during class—including ideas that other students bring up during discussion—even if it did not appear in the readings. There will be one reading assigned per class day, usually one article or book chapter. Ideally you would come to class with that day's reading fresh in your mind, and ready to raise questions, comments, objections, etc. However, I know that it is easy to fall behind, and even easier to wake up in the morning having done the reading the day before but needing some prompting before you can recall it. So I will spend the first part of each class reviewing what I take to be the highlights of the day's reading, as well as raising issues related to that reading. Special Needs If you have a disability, there may be classroom or procedural accommodations which can help you to get more out of my course, or at least help you to receive a fairer grade. Discuss your needs with the Office of Disability Services (disabilityservices.rutgers.edu), and then bring me a Letter of Accommodation describing the solution they recommend. If you are missing large numbers of classes due to military obligations, athletics, other extracurricular activities, religious commitments, family issues, medical problems, etc., explain the situation to me, arrange for one of the other students in the class to take lecture notes for you, and, if necessary, bring me a letter from the appropriate authority—if you are not sure who the appropriate authority is, the Dean of Students (deanofstudents.rutgers.edu) would be a good start. Graded Assignments 10% of your course grade will be based on your attendance and participation. 15% will be based on your performance on the midterm exam, which will be held in-class on Tuesday, March 2. More information will be provided about the format of the exam as we come closer to it. 25% will be based on your performance on the final exam, scheduled for 8:00am on Tuesday, May 11. The final exam will focus on material covered after the midterm. More information will be provided about the format and scope of the exam as we come closer to it. The remaining 50% of your course grade will be based on your written work. You are required to submit papers, written especially for this course not recycled from other courses, totaling at least 15 pages (typed, double spaced, twelve point font, one inch margins) to the course Sakai site. You may submit them in any combination you like: as a single 15-page term paper, three short 5-page papers, one 6-page paper and one 9-page paper, or whatever; if you submit more than 15 total pages, your grade will be based on your best 15. Papers will be graded on the basis of interestingness, persuasiveness, sophistication, creativity, and presentation; more information on these grading criteria can be found on the course Sakai site. All essays are due by noon on Monday, May 3 at the absolute latest, but should ideally be submitted within a few weeks of when we discussed their topic.
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