Guyana at the Cross Roads: Beyond Ethnic Paramountcy

Home , Desmond Hoyte, Forbes Burnham, Guyanese people, Hamilton Green, Ptolemy Reid, Sam Hinds

GUYANA AT THE CROSS ROADS: BEYOND ETHNIC PARAMOUNTCY

SELWYN RYAN

Guyana today stands poised at the cross roads and might well be on the brink of a political disaster of enormous magnitude. Whether that disaster occurs or not depends very much on the outcome of the impending general elections which all agree is the most critical in the country's history. Given the plural nature of Guyanese society, every election has in a sense been a critical election. This is so because elections in Guyana are not merely about which party, which programme, or which ideology prevails. More fundamentally, elections determine which racial group enjoys hegemony, which one is "on topw. The race issue has always dominated Guyana's politics, but more so since 1953 when Guyana's first election under universal suffrage was held. The salience of the race factor has continued to give to politics in Guyana its peculiar quality of violence and ethnic confrontation. The demographic pattern has also helped to aggravate Guyana's political predicament. According to 1970 Census data, the ethnic distribution of the population was Indo-Guyanese 51.8 percent, Afro-Guyanese 31.2 percent, Mixed 10.3 percent, Chinese 0.5 percent and Amerindi- an 4.9 percent.

The 1980 Census figures were not very different except that, the Chinese and the European population had declined by 45 and 65 percent respectively due largely to migration. Indians accounted for 51.4 percent, Africans for 30.5 percent, mixed 11 percent, Europeans 0.1 percent, Chinese 0.2 percent, Amerindians 5.3 percent, and "not statedw 1.1 percent. The population in 1989 was officially estimated to be 754,844, but given the state of vital statistics records, it is not clear what the size of the population and its distribution by ethnicity really is, especially since migration is known to be quite substantial. Data from the 1991 Census is not yet available.

TABLE 1. DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION OF GUYANA BY ETHNICITY - 1960-1980

Race 1960 1970 1980

No. % No. % No. %

Negro/black East Indian Chinese Amerindian White Mixed race Others Not stated

-- -- TOTAL 560,330 100 699,844 100 758,619 100

Sources: (1) British ~uianaPopulation Census of 1960, Central statistical Office, Trinidad and Tobago, 1968.

(2) 1970 Population Census of the Commonwealth Caribbean, Census Research Programme, University of the West Indies, Kingston, Jamaica, 1976.

(3). 1980-81 Population Census of the Commonwealth Caribbean, Published For The Caricom Secretariat, by the statistical Institute of Jamaica, 1984. TABLE 2. POPULATION BY RELIGION, 1960, 1970 AND 1980 Religion Numbers Percent

Roman Catholic Seventh Day Advent ist Anglican Presbyterian1 Congregation Pentecostalist Methodiet Other Christian* Hindu Muslim Other None Not Stated TOTAL

NOTE: *Includes Baptists, Church of God, Moravian, Jehovah's Witneesee, Brethren, Salvation Army, Mennonite, and A.M.E. (Zion).

An examination of the areal distribution of the population Guyana reveals that the various ethnic groups are not evenly spread through its vast expanse. The bulk of the Afro-Guyanese and mixed "creolettpopulation is in the city of Georgetown and its suburbs, in New Amsterdam and in Upper Demerara while the bulk of the Indo Guyanese population is in West Demerara, Pomeroon East and West Berbice, Eccles Seosdykes and Industry/La Reconnaissance. TABLE 3

Major Total % % Mixed & Divisions Population Indian Black Other

City of Georgetown Suburbs of Georgetown New Amsterdam Eccles/Soesdyke Industry/ La Reconnaissance West Berbice East Berbice Upper Demerara West Demerara Pomeroon, Somerset, Berks North West District

The Indian majority, concentrated as it is in the plantation sector (rice and sugar) is essentially a rural population while the African, European, mixed and oriental elements are concentrated in the services sector in the two urban centers of Georgetown and New Amsterdam. The rural-urban dichotomy has helped to intensify the intransigence of party politics in Guyana. It meant that any government dominated by Indians would be rurally based and would have to seek to maintain its power in the l1jawsl1 of the African heartland so to speak. The fact that the latter group, for historical reasons, was dominant in the public service and the protective services also meant that any government which had its power base in the Indo-Guyanese community as did the Peoples Progressive Party (PPP) between 1957 and 1964 would encounter resistance, if not outright sabotage, from Afro-Guyanese, especially if the latter was of the view that resources were not being allocated fairly. A similar difficulty emerged when the Peoples National Congress (PNC), a party which had its centre of gravity in the Afro-Guyanese, came to power in 1964. Such a party could expect and did encounter resistance from the farming community which produced a considerable proportion of Guyana's agricultural income and which provided a great deal of its commercial services.

Both ethnic communities were and remain in a position to inflict a great deal of damage on the national community, making effective governance difficult. One expression of this problem is the frequency with which strikes take place in Guyana. Indeed some sort of strike activity is a daily feature of life in Guyana. Some of these strikes are genuine industrial disputes and in some cases benign. Others have clearly been politically motivated and have involved considerable loss of life and economic productivity. In the 1963-64 period, strikes in fact assumed the character of civil war.

In his Ethnic Conflict and Political Control: The Guyana Case, Perry Mars notes that strike actively increased dramatically from 34 in 1947-50 period to 130 in the 1963-1966 period and to 143 in the 1967-70 period when the PNC was in control of the Government of Guyana (Table 4) .' TABLE 4. FREQUENCY OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE EVENT8 - 1947-1970

Average No. Events Per Year Anti-~overnment Insurrectionary Period Demonstrations Strikes Events/~iots,etc.

Annual Average for Period 1947-70 4 70 1 Source: Quantitative content analysis of several Guyana Newspa- pers: Agrosy, Chronicle, Graphic and Mirror between 1947-70; Annual Report, Ministry of Labour, 1947-70 (c) Annual Report, Commissioner of Police, 1947-70. Table compiled by Perry Mars.

Mars sees the increase in strike activity as part of the strategy used by the two competing political parties to use economic warfare to determine which would succeed the departing colonial power. As Mars writes; Clearly, the most violent and conflictual period was that between 1963-1966 when there was the most desperate struggle between the two main political organizations (PPP and PNC) to lead Guyana to independence and to inherit totally the mantle of political power from the British colonial authorities. Inter-group and political violence between 1962 and 1964, for example, reached the extreme levels of organized armed conflict and arson leading to several hundreds of deaths and millions of dollars in property damage on an insurrectionary scale embracing the entire country. Also of tremendous significance is the destructive consequence of these activities in regard to inter-ethnic relations. Hither- to,multi-ethnic villages became steeply segmented into distinctly separate ethnic c~rnmunitiee.~ It is worth noting that between January and June 1964, 136 persons were killed and 779 injured. Strikes continued to be used as a political weapon in the post independence era. Most of these strikes took place in the sugar industry. Between 1971 and 1976, there were at least 770 strikes in that industry compared to 124 in the manufacturing sector, 39 in the mining sector and 117 in the commercial and service sectors.

TABLE 5. STRIKE FREQUENCIES IN MAJOR INDUSTRIE8 - 1971-76 Manu- Minina/-. Commercial Year facturing Sugar Quarrying Service Sector Other

1971 30 118 10 23 5 1972 26 112 2 26 4 1973 19 N.A. 8 15 - 1974 24 95 7 13 1 1975 N.A. 99 6 9 2 1976 15 346 6 31 -

N.A. = Not Available. Source: Annual Reports, Ministry of Labour 1971 through 1976.

In reflecting on the possible motivation for these strikes, Mars notes that sugar workers are extensively organised by the Guyana Agricultural and General Workers Union which was itself affiliated to the PPP which was responsible for calling the strikes. The GAWU was and is in fact still led by Cheddi Jagan, Political leader of the PPP.3

Figures provided by Clinton Collymore of the Peoples Progres- sive Party indicate that the frequency of strikes increased during the eighties. According to Collymore, there were 333 strikes in 1980, 718 in 1985, 453 in 1986, 497 in 1987 and 349 in 1988. Wage and production losses were substantial. In 1989, production losses were estimated to be G$924m. Collymore and other pro PPP spokesmen attribute the strikes to Ifaggressive anti-working class policies and legi~lation~~and management incompetence and not to any desire on the part of the PPP to sabotage the PNC government. The PNC argues otherwise.

The PNC complains that the opposition objects to everything the Government does since its aim was to deligitimise and prevent it from performing creditably. To quote the PNC:

The most important concern in the minds and moods of all Guyanese is the state of the Guyana economy and their own economic well-being. Any other issue is peripheral to this essential concern, and must be treated as such. Opposition political groups in the country, however, do not share this concern. Their philosophy, in the word of Kwame Nkrumah, is: "Seek ye firet the political kingdom and all things shall be added unto you". Put different- ly, the opposition insists on ballots before bread1 As a consequence, their every action is oriented towards obtaining power at all cost. The position adopted by the opposition is wholly incorrect, dangerous to Guyana's well-being, and unpatriotic. It stems from a misinterpretation of the role of a political opposition in our emergent political culture. For the opposition groups in this country to oppose the government in office is to undermine, discredit and destroy everything the government advo- cates. Efforts by the government to bring about and sustain development, racial unity, peace and economic betterment for all must be blocked, countered or frustrated. The opposition does not distinguish between opposing a government and destroying the nation. This is sad for our ~ociety.~

The temptation on the part'of a government which believes that it is being deliberately harassed is to use force and authoritarian measures to cow the opposition. This strategy is however counter productive in that it merely gives rise to a new round of strikes and extra-legal boycotts. As one commentator noted, "state repression by one and demonstrations by the other were the means of managing conflict. The political institutions lacked cross communal legitimacy however effectively they governed or even handedly they formulated politics and administered the

While the plural nature of the society and the areal distribution of its population explains a great deal about the character of contemporary politics in Guyana, it does not tell all. Of equal deferential in order to avoid violence to their person and property or discrimination in the allocation of resources or services which are dispensed by officialdom. Many Indo-Guyanese are also of the view that they are the main victims of the "vampire culturen which has grown up in the public and protective services. One is referring here to the system which now requires the travelling public to bribe police officers to overlook traffic offenses (real or trumped up) or citizens needing state services to make under- the-counter payments for services which should be free (e.g. application forms) or available at nominal cost. Some members of the Indian business community in particular have chosen to associate openly with the PNC, an association which some consider vital to the success of their business operations. They calculate that if they refuse to make donations to the party or to individuals who are strategically located within its ranks - whether clandestinely, openly or both - the resources which they need to survive - licences, utility services, tax concessions, supply contracts, market and other forms of protection etc. may not be forthcoming. Some also trade their support for appointments to public office or for the enhancement of the goals of the organisations to which they belong. Many also became visibly involved in establishing and mobilising funds for the PNC or for CREEP, the Committee for the Re-election of President Hoyte.

There are others who are not willing to accept this posture of subservience, accommodation or opportunism. They argue that the Afro-Guyanese have had their turn and that it is now their time #@to get pon top". They are critical of Indian religious and political leaders who have established clientelistic relationships with the PNC, relationships which they see as cosmetic and which only serve to provide the PNC with the decoration which allows it to claim to be multi-racial.

The silent war between Guyanats two dominant communities has been fought on many fronts. The main areas of controversy are the allocation of resources to various sectors of the economy, the allocation of jobs in the public sector, the ranking given to the various religious communities, the manner in which the various ethnic groups are hierarchised in the social system and in the manner in which the electoral system is organised. Commenting on the strategy of ~fricanisationof the economy pursued by the PNC and the consequences of that strategy, V.S. Naipaul had the following to say:

Everything became rotten in this state; everything began to lose money. More and more money was printed; in the racist state, the Guyana currency, once on par with the currency of a place like Trinidad, became almost worthless. Imports were regulated, many items banned. Guyanese of all races began to pine for certain simple and cheap foods they had grown up on. Guyanese began to leave legally and illegally, Indians at first, and then others; they went to Trinidad and Canada and the United States. More than a third of the Guyanese population now lives abroad7.

The collapse of Guyana's economic system has served to sharpen the debate between the two major ethnic groups as to who are the principal gainers and losers in the struggle for resource shares as Guyana seeks to reconstruct its economy under the tutelage of the IMF, the World Bank and other multilateral and bilateral funding agencies. The Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) has caused severe dislocations in an already ailing economy. Massive devaluations have given rise to dramatic price increases for food, utilities, transportation and all services. It is estimated that while the real value of wages increased by 28 per cent between 1960 and 1979, it decreased by 52 per cent between 1980 and 1989. While the real wage (minimum) was $42.88 in 1960, in 1989 it was $2.11. The decline was accelerated even more dramatically in 1990 as a result of further crawling devaluations. The Guyana dollar, which was worth US 0.50 cents in 1990 was worth less than US 1 cent in 1991. US$^ is now worth approximately G$125). The minimum wage was increased in 1991 to G$76 (USS0.60 cents). Public sector unions however demanded that the minimum wage should be increased to G$307 per day. GAWU has also called for a $300 minimum wage for sugar workers, demands which the government said it could not afford without generating inflation and in other ways disrupting the recovery programme that it has sought to put in train.

The ERP has not impacted uniformly on the two major ethnic communities. This issue was in fact raised by a Commonwealth Advisory Group, chaired by Alister McIntyre, Vice Chancellor of the University of the West Indies, which reported in August 1989. According to that Report:

Another myth that has to be dispelled concerna the unequal distribution of the benefita of growth among particular ethnic groups. The opinion is still held in some quarters, that agricultural developmentia likely to benefit disproportionately the East Indian membera of the population because of the alleged distaste of Afro-Guyanese for agricultural employment and for rural life. This perception runs counter to both local and regional experience. There is no reliable evidence of the existence of this phenomenon in Guyana, and there is substantial involvement by people of African descent in the agricultural sector of moat Caribbean countries. We suggest that the policies regarding investment in agriculture be reviewed, and that special measures be adopted to ensure that no individ- ual or group is left at a disadvantage in terma of the availability of land, credit and extension servicea. One of the benefits of economic growth ie that it widens the options for the exercise of occupational preferences. There is in principle, nothing disadvan- tageous about finding a high concentration of East Indians or any other racial group in a particular sector if it is the case that other groups have freely elected to work and run businesses in other eectorm deemed to be more prof itable, and more conaonant with their lifestyles. Restricting the participation of particular racial groups in certain aectora ia a recipe for economic stagnation and decline which in turn would negatively affect the opportunities for the participation by other groups in business activity and employment in the rest of the economy. Those who voice concern about racial predomi- nance in certain lines of activity do not fully understand the inter-relationships which develop routinely in an economy between individuals, groups and sectors. Indeed, one of the benefits of a aociety comprised of individuals with different ethnic backgrounds and historical endowmenta of akilla, is However, the plight of that group can be extended to all low income heads of households, both male and female. It is recognised, however, that the female is more affected, as they so often fall prey to the exploitative efforts of the new rich, devoid of a conscience. Here again, the group more affected is from one ethnic group although it is recogniaed that the cancerous evil is spreading to other ethnic groups .. . the entire Programme is premised on wage restraint and the determination of prices by the market forces. It follows therefore, that it is the Afro-Guyanese that will be making most of the sacrificee and receiv- ing the least of the gains. It is here where I disagree with the Report, forthe unequal distribution of the benefits that is sure to follow is no myth but a grim reality, and is of serious concern to the Federation for which I speak.''

Other spokesmen for the Afro-Guyanese community claim that the Indians have several strings to their bow, so to speak. They are better unionised and thus better paid. Those in the informal sector also pay less tax. It is also said that Indo-Guyanese rely more on the collective income of their extended family system than the Afro-Guyanese whose family system is more nucleated. Being primarily a rural people, they can also fall back on subsistence or commercial farming, the produce from which they sell at market prices. They are thus less affected by the official policy of wage restraint which is the hallmark of the ERP.

Indo-Guyanese spokesmen do not agree with these views. They note that while it is true that a few Indian businessmen have done very well economically and are visibly affluent, the bulk of the Indo-Guyanese community suffers as much as their African counter- parts. They constitute the rural poor and are deprived of many of the amenities available to those living in the urban areas. Those in rice cultivation are unable to find the wherewithal to buy jute bags, twine, fuel, fertilisers and many have had to abandon rice cultivation. In 1980, 182,000 tonnes of rice were produced. In 1989 only 142,000 tonnes were produced. The problem was said to have been made more acute because of the fact that the PNC controlled Rice Marketing Board does not pay rice farmers a fair price for their produce, nor are farmers paid promptly for their deliveries. There is thus no incentive or profit in growing rice and many Indians have stopped cultivating it. According to the PPP, whereas in 1964 some 266,000 acres were under rice cultivation, by 1984 this had fallen by 50 percent. Reports are that many others who continue to produce sell their product across the border rather than through official channels. Many farmers are said to find it cheaper and more convenient to market their goods across the border than in Georgetown.

The same demotivation applies to sugar cultivation and this has expressed itself in declining tonnages produced by the industry. Whereas Guyana once produced in excess of 311,000 tonnes of sugar in 1970, it produced only 169,000 tonnes in 1989. In 1990, Guyana was in fact unable to meet its quota of 167,000 tonnes in the European Community market. Only 118,000 tonnes were exported. The price payable per tonne in this preferential market was USS650. The short-fall thus cost Guyana close to USS31.8m.

Many Indo-Guyanese have reacted to the crisis by increased migration. Some 50,000 are said to have crossed the border into Suriname or Venezuela or to have decamped legally or illegally to Trinidad and Tobago, Canada and the United States of America. Many have migrated to urban centres of Georgetown and New Amsterdam, and some have turned to drug trafficking, prostitution and petty huckstering. The extended Indian family has also come under tremendous pressure as both females and males have left parents, spouses and children behind in search of the wherewithal to survive. It is evident that both groups are being battered by Guyana's economic crisis and it is difficult to say which group is suffering more economically. Both groups are embittered by the collapse of Guyana's educational system which has been a casualty of the growing tendency to migrate or huckster. Among the migrants are to be found large numbers of teachers. Many children of both ethnic groups also find it more attractive to engage in petty trade than to go to school." Both groups also depend on llbarrelsl@and financial remittances to survive, a dependence which has done a great deal to destroy the work ethnic.12 It can however be argued that Indians are worse off in the sense that in status and symbolic terms, they feel a greater sense of alienation and marginalisation. They know that they are in the majority that it is electoral fraud and the coercive activities of 'the state apparatus which has contrived to relegate them to the cellar position in Guyanese society. Many Indo-Guyanese are now making it clear that unless steps are taken to ensure that they are brought fully into the mainstream of Guyanese society and are permitted to function as political equals in a democratic Guyana, overt and covert resistance to the system will increase. This will have deleterious effects on the economy and Guyanese of all ethnic affiliations will suffer. In their view, the ERP is certain to fail unless the democratic imperative is understood and addressed.

All observers agree that a settlement of the political crisis is the sine qua non for achieving success with the ERP. As. the McIntyre Report phrased it, "we emphasize the need.. . for a political system which encourages the participation of all Guyanese in the recovery programme and a restoration of confidence in the ability of the government to manage the economy and share its benefits widely1#. The need for new political values and institutions has been emphasised by many groups. The Anglican Bishop of Guyana Randolph George, has expressed the view that elections in Guyana, even if honest, would not resolve much since the country's moral, political and economic fabric had been badly ruptured over the past decades. Thus, unless a new political culture was put in place, "civic institutions revitalised, the cost of indebtedness properly assessed and the cost of recovery more accurately worked out, there could be no true reconstructiontt. Guyana also needed spiritual regeneration and new political arrangements that would recognize the fact that the country was ethnically divided. George believes that there should be an interim national government for about two years during which time a new constitution should be drafted to replace the "illegaltt1980 constitution, an acceptable development plan formulated, and breathing space provided for the society to rehabilitate itself before entering a normal five year political term. l3

Similar calls for new form of democratic participation have also come from the working Peoples Alliance. In a submission to a Pastoral Mission to Guyana mounted by the Caribbean Council of Churches in September 1990, the WPA urged the creation of an "exemplary multi-racial democracytt to counter the uni-ethnic inward-looking cultures or the creole miscegenated option, "all of which are insensitive to the presence and interests of cultural streams other than their ownu. The WPA considers itself to be the "only consistently multi-racial party in Guyanattand its presiden- tial candidate, Prof. Clive Thomas, boasts that "there is no way in which any Guyanese elector would conceive it as possible to have a multi-racial government in Guyana if the WPA did not play a parttt. The WPA is critical of those Indian Itmenof talentu who have chosen to link themselves opportunistically to the PNC, elites which they claim have no constituency since the bulk of the Indo-Guyanese massesIa "are working people cut off by class lines from the commercial directoratell. l4

The WPA believes that unity among the opposition is a historical necessity. As Thomas put it:

It is a tragedy that the leadership of Guyana at thio historic juncture could do nothing better than generate 14 to 15 opposition parties to the PNC. I think history will rule on us harshly for this degeneration of the opportunity to seize the leadership and go forward. ... If this election is conceived and portrayed as a conflict between the PPP and the PNC, nobody will be a victor .. . 1, 16

The WPA did not think that the GUARD grouping constituted an appropriate response to the need for a multi-racial coalition to stop the PNC. It saw the group as representing a certain type of Guyanese - the white collar business and professional type of all races, but not the masses. In the WPA' s view, the bulk of the Afro- Guyanese masses and moreso the Amerindians have been marginalised politically and economically by the PNC and coerced into trading their support for an illusory mirage of ethnic security. To quote the WPA:

The masses of Afro-Guyanese [now] realise that the political directorship belonged to the few and offered them little security. It created for many numerous job opportunities in the security forces and in the services. This material security was for an unwritten contract by which they were in turn expected to give unswerving loyalty and political support and surrender personal choice. In its coarser refinements, part of the doctrine of Paramountcy of the Party was the creation of all sorts of methods and processes for exacting obedience, the demand for which was a symptom of the insecurity of the political directorate. From its point of view, Afro- Guyanese obedience to it was mandatory and essential to its survival. The directorate did not resent obedience from other groups, but the obedience and unquestioning loyalty of the Afro-Guyanese was its bottom line.''

The WPA was particularly critical of the Paramountcy Doctrine which the PNC enunciated in the Sophia Declaration of 1974 and which was formalised in the 1980 constitution. "The Declaration was meant to pre-empt radical movements and treat other political parties as prohibited organisations while permitting their existencef1. The National Security Act, which gave the State and its military arms extensive vigilante powers, was also viewed as a weapon to coerce opposition groups. Thomas argued that no political system or arrangement which seeks to impose unity would work in Guyana. The WPA, he asserts, Ifhasnever flirted with notions of paramountcy. We have never flirted with any belief that any approach to transformation was possible without democracy at its corew.

The WPA was equally critical of the PPP for not recognising that Jagan was a fetter on the process of ethnic healing in Guyana. Jagan, they argue, believes that his bid for the leadership of Guyana in the sixties and seventies was thwarted by external forces which in turn inspired groups in Guyana to oppose him. Now that the Cold War was over, those obstacles were assumed to be no longer relevant. This however ignored the fact that elements in Guyana had reasons of their own to oppose him. These elements are still there with their fears intact. The PPP should recognise this and give way to a "consensus candidateftwho would function as a more effective pole around which the forces opposed to the ItPNC dictatorshipw could rally.

In the opinion of the WPA, unless a moderate Indo-Guyanese candidate who did not provoke the built-in resistance of the creole community was found, or unless another candidate who though not Indo-Guyanese could be found to rally a consensus for a domestic assault on the dictatorship and its possible removal, Ifthe prior aim of defeating the dictatorship might not be well served. It is our view that regardless of resistance in pockets, the majority of people can be won over to support a moderate candidate of any race whose choice promises to rally diverse forces against the dictator- shipff.l7 Jagan and the PPP disagree with the WPA thesis. The PPP leader at one point appeared to be giving active consideration to the WPAs views, but unity talks collapsed in 1991. The critical issue was the question of which compromise candidate would lead the Patriotic Coalition for Democracy which was formed in 1986 and which brought together most of the groups opposed to the PNC. Jagan clearly felt that since he was the leader of the largest grouping, he should be the consensus candidate. (Jagan might well have been aware that Basdeo Panday had given way to ANR Robinson in Trinidad and Tobago when the National Alliance for Reconstruction was formed in 1985 only to find himself marginalised once victory was achieved in 1986). His preferred alternative was to build a multi-racial coalition in which the PPP would be the lead but not the ggdominant partyu. In response to fears which have been expressed that a PPP victory would mean that Indo-Guyanese hegemony would replace Afro- Guyanese hegemony, Dr. Jagan assured Afro-Guyanese workers that any government headed by him or in which he participated would not tolerate racial or political discrimination against either Indo- Guyanese or Afro-Guyanese. A PPP government would include blacks. In his view, there were in fact more blacks in the PPP than in the ostensibly multi-racial Working People's Alliance.

Jagan insists that the PPP is not an Indo-Guyanese party ("the fact that the majority of Indo-Guyanese support it does not make it such a partyn) and does not support a winner take all political formula. The PPP, he asserts, is committed to power sharing at both the national and grass roots levels and would seek to engineer "a multi-party, multi-racial and multi-class government which would transcend racial, ethnic, class and ideological barriers". Indeed, the PPP is of the view that the racial issue, while important, is not the dominant factor in Guyana's political life and that preoccupation with race should not blind people to questions of class and ideology.18 Dr. Jagan's running mate, Mr. Sam Hinds, an Afro- Guyanese engineer, indicated that he was aware of the arguments against Jagan as the consensus candidate, but nevertheless endorsed the PPP leader because the "majority of the Indo-Guyanese still see him as their championw. He felt that his own involvement with the PPP might help to bridge the gap between the two main races, classes and regions. 19

A worrying factor to many in Guyana is that Jagan has not fully abandoned the class based Marxist Leninist approach which he adopted in the forties. When asked whether the PPP was still a communist party, he indicated that he could not say that it was not. To quote him:

We are a party of the working class, we must protect the working class. we would not state that we are not a communist party [but] at this stage and for the next decade, socialist programmes for Guyana are out of the question. What we will have is a National Democratic pattern of development. We want the country to be developed as a multi-party democracy, [with] the powers of the President reduced [and] a mixed economy...20

At the 24th Congress of the PPP held on July 7th, 1991, Jagan again addressed the problem o.f the party's ideological orientation. He noted that while communism and even socialism was discredited in Eastern Europe and Guyana, Itthe old Thomas More and ~arxistUtopias are still alive. We should choose the positive side of the market economy as well as the socialist utopia in which the people are at the centre of politics .... Our embrace of Marxism-Leninison lies in our commitment to build a society free from exploitation and governed by those who produced the wealthN. Jagan acknowledged that the socialist system had failed in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union because of bureaucratic over-centralisation, corruption and lack of accountability and promised that the PPP would "do every thing to avoid those methods which had led to failure in those countries. 21

Jagan however noted that even if he wished to take Guyana along a socialist path, the United States would not allow him to do so. The U.S., he admitted, was not worried about Guyana as it once was and knew that if "anyone [went] too far out of line ... they can bring them back ... as was the case with Grenada, Panama Nicaragua and ~uriname".22

Jagan promised that if he did win power, his cabinet would include capitalists and right wing individuals from capitalist "organisations and political parties such as Democratic Labour Movement and the Working People's Alliance which he said was regarded by many as being to the left of him. He also pledged that he would include on his list a I8civicNgroup of talented individuals who were not members of the PPP.23

In response to all the comments and criticisms that were levelled at it by its critics over the years, the PNC sought to deny that it was responsible for the economic, political and spiritual misfortunes that Guyana has experienced over the past three decades as alleged. The party leadership in fact villanised the opposition in general and the PPP in particular. It also argued that Guyana's economic collapse was largely the result of the oil crisis of the seventies and other developments in the global economy. The party however could not avoid admitting that some of the criticisms levelled against it were valid and President Hoyte, who succeeded Forbes Burnham in 1985, has progressively been jettisoning many of the political and economic policies that his predecessor had put in place. Under sustained pressure from domestic, regional and international critics and well wishers, Hoyte also committed his government to dismantling the statist economic system that was a corner-stone of the Burnham regime and to replace it by a free market system. He also abandoned many of the electoral arrangements which had fuelled opposition charges that elections in Guyana were neither free nor fair.

By October 1990, the PNC Government was claiming that it had met every objection which opposition elements had raised against the electoral system which had been put in place in the seventies and eighties as part of its strategy to win elections whatever the cost. And to a considerable extent, the ruling PNC in fact did so. It abandoned the old system of automatic registration which all now agree was padded with the names of persons who were either dead (e.g. Forbes Burnham) , who had migrated, who were too young to vote or who did not exist and replaced it with an electoral list based on a house to house enumeration. In response to opposition allega- tions that the arrangement which allowed ballot boxes to be transported by the army to central counting places in Georgetown provided ample opportunity for ballot box stuffing, the PNC also agreed to have the ballots counted at the places where the votes were cast. They had earlier agreed to abandon overseas voting, to limit proxy and postal voting and had likewise agreed to constitute a new Elections omm missions in which Government and opposition elements would have equal representation with a Chairman selected from a list of names supplied by the opposition. These were major concessions all of which the PNC had vowed never to concede.

The Council of Freely Elected Heads of Governmentfs Mission to Observe the ~egistration and Electoral Process in Guyana which visited Guyana between March 25 and ~pril8, 1991 under the chairmanship of ~elizeprime Minister, George Price was satisfied that the Government had met all the major objections raised by the opposition about Guyana's electoral system and that Guyanese were now assured of free and fair Elections, To quote the Executive Summary of that Report:

The willingness of President Hoyte and leaders of the opposition to contribute to free, transparent, and fair elections was illustrated again by their readineee to compromise and reconstitute a new Electoral Comrnieeion (Ec). Both sides accepted a proposal that emerged from the discussions, whereby the PNC and the oppoeition would each appoint two additional members to the EC, and the President would appoint a new Chairman baeed on a list of names provided by the oppoeition. As thie wae the last of the major concerns rained by the oppoeition, they indicated that they would have no further policy objections about the registration or electoral lawe or procedures. appears to have three factions, the Burnhamites, the "Hammie loyalists11 (supporters of Prime Minister Hamilton Green) and the more moderate followers of President Hoyte. The more radical urnh ha mite faction reportedly not only wished to hold on to power at all costs, but was opposed to the liberalisation and privatisa- tion policies which President Hoyte put in place under the aegis of the IMFIWorld Bank driven Economic Recovery Plan. Their view is that Guyana was being recolonised and that the concessions being made were not in the interest of the economic and political sovereignty of the Cooperative Republic of Guyana. There is even some evidence that this group had held secret talks with Jagan with an eye to forming a left wing bi-racial coalition.

The other faction was less opposed to the economic programmes being pursued, but insisted on ensuring the political hegemony of the PNC which it regards as the only institution which would guarantee Afro-Guyanese a fair share of the resources available. Their view was that Hoyte (who was nicknamed Desmond Persad by some) had made too many concessions to the opposition on the question of electoral reform. Their fear was that if political power and economic power were to be concentrated in the hands of the Indo-Guyanese, Afro-Guyanese would pay a heavy price. Indians businessmen were warned that they have "had it goodt1under the PNC and should therefore put their class interest above their communal interest.

The third faction, the supporters of President Hoyte argue that he, like they were always uncomfortable with some of the more extreme political and economic policies of Burnham but felt constrained to remain silent. On becoming President in 1985 - almost by accident one might say - Hoyte encouraged those who shared his more moderate views and sought to build a power base of his own before moving against his main political rival, Prime Minister Hamilton Greene and those who were committed to maintain- ing Burnham's economic policies. as PNC Deputy Prime Minister Winston Murray observed:

Some believe, and indeed have expressed the view, that President Hoyte'e vieion of Guyana is of relatively recent adoption; but I wish to put to you the propoei- tion that Mr. Desmond Hoyte came to the Presidency of Guyana with that vision. All of you present here today know of the circumstancee under which Mr. Hoyte origi- nally acceded to the Presidency. It must therefore have been a priority for him, in the beginning, to consoli- date and strengthen hie leaderehip position within the party which formed the Government. Even as he warn engaged in that exercise however, some eignals of policy changes Were coming through and by the time of the holding of the ruling party congress in 1987, it became pretty clear that Guyana had a head of State and of Government who was going to bring about fundamental changes in the society.

Some PNC spokesmen have nevertheless sought to deny that there was any division in the party on the question of the economic direction that Guyana should take on the question of free and fair elections.25 They also deny that there was any question as to who should lead the party. But the evidence suggests that the cleavages do exist but that they have been down played because of the imminence of the elections. Festus Brotherson, who has connections to PNC insiders, analysed the activities of the various factions prior to and following the party's biennial Congress which was held in August 1991 and concluded that even though Prime Minister Hamilton Green was persuaded not to challenge Hoyte for the leadership as he had threatened to do, the rivalry between Burnhamite holdovers and the supporters of Hoyte which followedthe latterrs succession in to the presidency 1985 was far from over. To quote Brotherson:

The President has consistently curbed Green's power over the years, marginalizing his functions and importance. Thus it was that Green was made minister of sports and reduced to presenting sports equipment to needy teams while the president moved dexterously to control institutional power where it mattered - the military, the police, foreign affairs, and economic recovery, Today, Mr. Hoyte's institutional clout is undeniable as was confirmed in the recent cabinet re-organization which was the final firing of many Burnhamite holdovers, the further shrinkage of Green's governmental power-base, and the accelerated lessening of hie importance in the go~ernment.~~

Brotherson argues that Green was persuaded to mute his challenge so as not to split the PNC on the eve of the critical election on the promise that he would be named as Hoyte's running mate, something Hoyte had not done by the end of October inviting speculation that he did not plan to do so. Brotherson believes that the problem is more systemic than personal and that "the always fragile political system has never been able to accommodate two dominant political leaders". He also believes that PNC as a whole, and not merely sections thereof, is opposed to a free and fair election which it fears it would lose if the elections were in fact fair. To quote Brotherson:

To expect the PNC to be fully honest in its efforts to restore democratic rule in Guyana when it is solely responsible for plunging the country into unparalleled levels of despair, poverty, and moral and social decay over a twenty-seven year period, is as ridiculoue as inviting Dracula to replenish a depleted blood bank. The leadership crisis in the PNC is far from over. But what should be over is its ruling ~tatue.~'

As Guyana seeks to jettison some of the political and economic structures and procedures that were put in place in the post colonial era, four political paradigms are in contest. One, articulated by President Hoyte and his supporters, seeks to decompress and downsize the state sector to the extent that is required to gain regional and international economic acceptance, and IMF and World Bank financial support. At the political level it has disavowed all "idle chatterttabout socialism and has committed itself formally to a regime of free and fair elections which it believes will give it the legitimacy it so badly needs. President Hoyte in fact claims that he is "ushering in a new dispensation in the political life of our countryM. However, no other major commitments have been made to alter the existing constitutional system which would remain highly centralised and allow the President to retain the virtual "imperialI1 power which is allowed him under the 1980 Constitution. Among these powers is the authority to dissolve and suspend Parliament, the right to veto legislation and the right to declare laws in the interest of national security. As Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, the President also has the exclusive power to appoint and dismiss the heads of all branches of the security services. The Chief Executive would likewise retain control of all the other levers of political power which would allow it to coerce opposition elements - whether religious, social or political - should this be required in the interest of regime survival even though the PNC has signalled that it intends to be more economical in the use of coercion than was the case in the past when economic and political violence was used to silence opposition from all quarters.

On the question of race and politics, the PNC has not proposed any basic shift in policy. It has reiterated its claim that it is the only well organised party in Guyana and that it deserves to be given the chance to finish the job of economic recovery which it has begun. It also asserts that its ranks are open to peoples of all races and that it will continue to allocate political offices and economic resources to all groups even-handedly. In sum, the PNCts plan is to keep the old political system basically intact, only making such changes that are required to purchase the legitimacy it needs.

The second paradigm is that of the PPP which sees itself as the lead (but not the dominant) party in a multi-party, multi- ethnic, multi-class, multi-regional power sharing coalition which would seek to transcend racial, ethnic, class and ideological barriers. The PPP model also calls for the organisation of inter- ethnic citizen committees and the democratisation of existing local qualifications to compete for jobs. That would be an intolerable situation, best prevented by early implementation of open education as a buffer against expl~itation~~.

The third alternative is that proposed by the civic group turned political party GUARD (Guyana Action for Reform and Democracy) which believes that Guyana's political institutions and procedures have atrophied and decayed to such an extent that they require radical restructuring. It holds that whoever wins the election must govern for only two years on an interim basis during which time a new constitution would be put in place and steps towards the creation of a new political culture attempted. the GUARD leadership says that it would scrap the regionally based proportional representation system and appoint parliamentarians strictly on a constituency basis.

GUARD has expressed regret that the unity movement has collapsed in 1990 as it did in 1980 over the question of leadership and is critical of both dominant parties which it claims has given "inept and inefficient leadership to the Guyanese people over the past 20 years1#.Like the other parties, GUARD agrees that Guyana can only develop through multi-racial politics which deemphasises personalities. "We must be Guyanese first, last and always, not Negro, Indian, Portuguese, Amerindian or any race, but GuyaneseN. The principal difference which seems to characterise GUARD is that it is a middle class civic reform movement and not a party of seasoned political professionals. Its weakness may be that it has no standard bearer with strong emotional connection to the masses.

The fourth alternative to the Guyana problematique is provided by the WPA, which, as we have seen, has rejected both the PNC model of the dominant expansionist uni-ethnic party which co-opts other groups to give the impression that it is multi-racial and the PPP model which, while it might be more genuine in its commitment to multi-racialism, carries an immense ideological and ethnic overburden which the WPA believes would endanger the first goal of the struggle, the removal of the PNC l*dictationship**.The WPA argues that having a few executive members of ethnic organisations decorating one or the other of the dominant political parties does not constitute integral multi-racialism. "The simple test of multi- racialism or non-racial politics is not how many executives of one group or another an organisation can present. The test is whether the party is equally acceptable in Amerindian, Afro-Guyanese and Indo-Guyanese majority districts~~.~~The WPA believes that it is the only political party which is integrally multi-racial and seen by all and sundry to be so. The WPA feels that while it is important to restructure the state and society so as to ensure that all ethnic groups can interact productively and constructively at all levels of the society, the problems of Guyana cannot really be resolved without a frontal attack on the problem of social inequality. As Dr. Mars argued; the problem requires:

a prior resolution of the problem of class inequality which ensures the maximal participation of working class elements within the state and a consequent reduction of the exclusive control of political power of the arnbiva- lent and fractional middle classes. In short, drastic structural transformation is a necessary pre-condition for facilitating a more harmonious relationship between ethnic groups in countries such as G~yana.~'

Important too is the need to restructure the educational system to facilitate cross cultural learning and a fostering of a more egalitarian type of consciousness. The question which the WPA has to face is however similar to that confronting GUARD, viz. the fact that it has not been able to find a leader with strong emotional links to the masses since the death of Walter Rodney.

Yet another voice calling for unity is that of Paul Tenassee of the Democratic Liberation Movement. Jagants political strategy, like that of the WPA is critised by Tennasse for its alleged reliance on the politics of crowd mobilisation, a reliance which he believes is not appropriate when dealing with the PNC as it had been when the l1enemy1Iwas the colonial establishment. As he argued:

Large crowds were mobilized by Walter Rodney and the WPA. However, those crowds did not effect change. Thim wae because we were no longer dealing with Britimh Governors but with the PNC "SAVAGES". The Rabbi, the House of Ierael and the para military were ueed effectively against the leadership of the crowd. The crowd attended many meetings, enjoyed the jokee, clappedtheir hands and returned home. As soon as Rodney was aeeaemi- nated, the large crowds evaporated. Then we had the GUARD crowds. No one was assassinated but the QUARD crowds evaporated. The PPP then mobilieed their crowde to show that they had larger numbere. The irony about these crowd mobilieations is that they never confront the PNC dictatorship. The dictatorehip remain8 intact while crowds are mobilieed to ehow numbere.. . any political analysis and action which overemphasize numbers is incorrect and leade to an incorrect prescription. Guyanese politics is more complex. The politics of numbers must be revised. We are not dealing with the British Governors but PNC HSAVAGESH. Remember that Kings and Queens ruled without NUNBERSI For the DLM, the United Front continues to be the anewer.

Having considered some of the alternatives that have -been offered by some of Guyana's political parties, what is striking is the extent to which so many of the key players agree on what needs to be done politically. Equally striking is their inability to come together to give effect to that understanding. All the opposition parties agree that it is important to go beyond ethnic paramountcy and to fashion political institutions which allow for a significant measure of power sharing at all levels of the system. Even the PNC accepts this in principle as its commitment to consultative democracy suggests. The crucial element that seems to be missing in the Guyana equation, however, is trust. No party seems willing to trust the bonafides of the other to do what is right for Guyana. Until that quality is restored, none of the alternatives purposed will yield positive returns. Unless civility returns, no one will really win in Guyana whatever the electoral outcome. In the final analysis, the people of Guyana and by extension the people of the 33 region who help to sustain Guyana, will lose.

FOOTNOTES

1. Social and Economic Studies, Vol. 39, No. 3, September 1990, pp. 65-94.

2. Ibid, p. 79. 3. Jagan says he does not anticipate any conflict between the GAWU and the PPP even if the latter were to regain power since "both are expressions of working class concerns and will pursue working class interestsM. The relationships which developed between the PNC and the Guyana Labour Union and the Trade Union Congress and the problems workers in Guyana are likely to face in the new free market system should however give Jagan reason to reassess the validity of that belief. Cf. F. Kisson "Jagan and the Dangers of Marriage: Catholic Standard, May 12, 1991. 4. Stabroek News, September 30, 1990.

5. Ralph Premdas, Guyana: Violence and Democracy in a Communal State, Plural Societies, AutumnIWinter 1991, Vol 12, No. 314, p. 41.

6. The paramountcy doctrine, enumerated in 1974 was formalised constitutionally in 1980. The 1980 Constitution, adopted after a controversial referendum, provided for a popularly elected executive president who had virtually unlimited powers, including the right to veto all legislative enactments. 7. Naipaulls essay on Guyana appeared in the New York Review and was carried in The Mirror, May 12, 1991.

8. Guyana: The Economic Recovery Programme and Beyond, Report of a Commonwealth Advisory Group, Commonwealth Secretariat, pp. 15-16. 9. University of Guyana: Contribution to the Mc Intyre Report, p. 41.

10. Ibid., p. 20. For a fuller discussion of the impact of the economic collapse on Guyana's health and educational system and the quality of life in general. Cf. ~issionto Guyana, op. cit. pp. 22-26. The desire to escape through migration has become a dominant preoccupation in Guyana. As Prof. C.Y. Thomas laments,

"People are now seeing Guyana as a way station, a place to endure until you can get out. You begin to cease thinking that you are a citizen and that you have a contribution to make. This attitude affects a lot of things. There is a tremendous loss of skills and this ie as traumatic for the society as anything else". Trinidad Daily Express, November 20, 1990. Given the excessive migration, Guyana registered negative population growth of minus 0.1 percent between 1981-89. Guyanese are not able to live off their official wages especially since the cost of transport often exceeds the daily wage. Many go to work intermittently or live off remittances in order to survive. Many sell the contents of the barrels. The informal economy has in fact now become more important than the formal sector as a provider of "jobsw. Bishop Randolph George was a leading figure in GUARD, Guyana Action Reform of Democracy which was formed in January, 1990 to break down the "isolation of different religions, separate parties and diverse racesn. George was once touted as a compromise opposition candidate for President at the head of a single list of candidates. George declined the offer, but remains an outspoken critic of the PNC as well as the Churches which he claims I1winkedl1at the excesses of the PNC. Stabroek News, May 12, 1990. Stabroek News, September 15, 1991. The Inter-racial Dynamic and the Search for Consensus Back- ground Notes Prepared for the CCC Pastoral Mission. p. 4. Ibid., p. 1.

Ibid., p. 6. Mirror, Sunday Stabroek, October 21, 1990. Hinds was the Chairman of GUARD before becoming First vice President of the PPP. He broke with GUARD over the question of the choice of consensus candidate. Daily Express, May 20, 1990. Stabroek News, August 18, 1991. 22. ~ailyExpress, May 20, 1990. 23. A civic list of 13 such persons was in fact named on October 27th, 1991. 24. The opposition was critical of the decision of the Election Commissioner to add names from the flawed 1985 list to that compiled in the enumeration process. According to an editorial in the Stabroek News, the computers rejected 53,000 ID numbers shown in the application for voter registration forms as previously registered because they could not be found in the 1985 list of voters. These persons allegedly told enumerators that they had been previously registered. The enumerators did not check the 1985 amended list to verify this as they had been advised to do. The question to be answered was why the flawed 1985 list was used at all. "The result was that the old list had contaminated the newn. August 25, 1991. 25. Mr. Robert Corbin, a Deputy Prime Minister who was said to be one of the hard liners denied that he believes a party should maintain power at all costs. "1 believe a party has a respon- sibility, if it believes it is doing the correct thing, to win the minds and the support of people1#.Corbin endorsed Hoyte's economic strategy as being necessary ##ifGuyana was to stop plunging economicallyN. He also endorsed the electoral changes that were made which he said allowed the party to prove once and for all its competence in the area of elections because the opposition now had nothing to complain about. Corbin also denied that there was any leadership crisis in the party or any division between an old guard and a new guard. Stabroek News, May 12, 1991. Cf. also Percy Hintzenrs analysis of the struggle for influence following Burnham's death:

"In a series of moves that undoubtedly pleased the conservative Reagan administration, Hoyte began efforts aimed at significantly reducing the influence of radicals in the party and government. In February 1986, the radical deputy leader of the party, Ptolemy Reid, resigned his post. At the same time, the power and authority of Viola Burnham, the former President's wife and his recognized standard bearer, was "miniaturized" within the party and government despite her position as vice president and Minister of Education. Burnham's son- in-law, health minister Richard Van Weet, suffered a similar fate. The country's foreign minister, Raeleigh Jackson, well respected as an outspoken supporter of radical and progressive third world causes, also suffered a loss of influence. Two former radical party activists, Elvin McDavid and Malcolm Parris, were removed from their posts. McDavid, who was Burnham'e chief political adviser, was given a diplomatic post in Zambia while Parris, who had formerly held a ministerial portfolio, was appointed ambassador tothe Soviet Union. Cf. "Guyana", in Latin America and Caribbean Contemporary Record. Abraham Lowenthal, Holmea and Meier, N.Y., 1989.

26. Stabroek News.

27. Ibid.

28. The Inter-racial Dynamic, op. cit., p. 4.

29. ItEthnic Conflict and Control: The Guyana Casew op. cit., pp. 91-2.