Beyond the Tower Commission
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The Thomas Jefferson Center Foundation Beyond the Tower Commission Melvin R. Laird The G. Warren Nutter Lectures in Political Economy The G. Warren Nutter Lectures in Political Economy The G. Warren Nutter Lectures in Political Economy were instituted to honor the memory of the late Professor Nutter, to encourage schol arly interest in the range of topics to which he devoted his career, and to provide his students and associates an additional contact with each other and with the rising generation of scholars. At the time of his death in January 1979, G. Warren Nutter was director of the Thomas Jefferson Center Foundation, adjunct scholar of the American Enterprise Institute, director of AEI's James Madison Center, a member of advisory groups at both the Hoover Institution and The Citadel, and Paul Goodloe Mcintire Professor of Economics at the University of Virginia. Professor Nutter made notable contributions to price theory, the assessment of monopoly and competition, the study of the Soviet economy, and the economics of defense and foreign Rolicy. He earned his Ph.D. degree at the Unjversity of Chicago. In 1957 he joined with James M. Buchanan to establish the Thomas Jefferson Center for Stud ies in Political Economy at the University of Virginia. In 1967 he established the Thomas Jefferson Center Foundation as a separate entity but with similar objectives of supporting scholarly work and graduate study in political economy and holding conferences of econ omists from the United States and both Western and Eastern Europe. He served during the 1960s as director of the Thomas Jefferson Center and chairman of the Department of Economics at the University of Virginia and, from 1969 to 1973, as assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs. Melvin R. Laird delivered the fifteenth and final G. Warren Nutter Lecture at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C., on May 5, 1987. Earlier lectures were delivered by James C. Miller III, John H. Moore, Richard A. Ware, William F. Ford, Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Roger E. Shields, Paul Craig Roberts, Yuan-Ii Wu, James M. Buchanan, Thomas H. Moorer, George J. Stig ler, R. H. Coase, Milton Friedman, and S. Herbert Frankel. The American Enterprise Institute 1150 17th Street, N.W. Washington, D. C. 20036 Beyond the Tower Coininission Melvin R. Laird MELVIN R. LAIRD is senior counsellor for national and international affairs, the Reader's Digest Association. Formerly, he was secretary of defense, 1969-1973; counsellor to the president for domestic affairs, 1973-1974; and U.S. Representative (R-Wis.), 1953-1969. ISBN 0-8447-1384-8 ©1987 by the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without permission in writing from the American Enterprise Institute except in the case of brief quotations embodied in news articles, critical articles, or reviews. The views expressed in the publications of the American Enterprise Institute are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the staff, advisory panels, officers, or trustees of AEI. "American Enterprise Institute" and � are registered service marks of the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. Printed in the United States of America American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research 1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 Introduction Lis my pleasure to introduce the fifteenth and final G. Warren Nutter Lecture in Political Economy sponsored by the Thomas Jefferson Cen ter Foundation and hosted by the American Enterprise Institute. Our speaker today, Melvin R. Laird, offers a unique perspective on issues central to our national security processes, particularly the way the National Security Council should function to serve a president. It was my privilege to serve with both Melvin Laird,when he was our nation's secretary of defense, and Warren Nutter, during his service as assistant secretary of defense. As a nine-term congressman from Wisconsin's seventh district, secretary of defense from 1969 to 1973, and counsellor to the president of the United States in 1973 and 1974, Melvin Laird played a key role in steering our nation on a steady course through some of its most turbulent times. The insight Melvin Laird offers us today is particularly timely as the executive and legislative branches are now examining the role of the National Security Council and its relationship with the Oval Office. lam certain that his unrivaled experience in these arenas, particularly in effectively formulating and implementing our nation's security pol icies, will be of lasting benefit to all of us and to the country he loves so much. A native of Nebraska and a twice-wounded Navy veteran of World War JT, he participated in five battles in the Pacific with Admiral Halsey's Third Fleet and Admiral Marc Mitsacher's Task Force 58. Today Melvin Laird is one of the most respected authorities on national security issues. JOI-IN WARNER LI .5. Senn tor Beyond the Tower Commission Melvin R. Laird Two years ago, in introducing Lawrence Eagleburger as the tenth lecturer in this series, Bill Baroody said, "G. Warren Nutter was one of the great conservative intellectuals of his time." I agree with that. Warren Nutter was, indeed, a scholar; but he was more than that. Warren understood the power of concepts and ideas. He understood, too, the importance of vision, of taking the longer view. Beyond that, Warren knew that sound ideas and policies rarely came from a single individual. To the contrary, sound ideas and policies were almost always the result of: • a process that involved an interchange among many people- leaders and subordinates, line and staff • a process that encouraged and rewarded boldness of thought • a process that elicited a wide range of views • a process that addressed and related forth1ightly the many aspects of a complex situation • a process that looked at options and measured objectively the merits and consequences of those options-to include the new prob lems that most solutions generate After teaching for a number of years at the University of Virginia, Warren Nutter took a leave of absence in 1969. He joined the Laird Packard team in the Department of Defense where he served as assis tant secretary of defense for international security affairs. For his service he was awarded the highest award of the Defense Department-the Distinguished Public Service Medal. An Earlier Era The issues we addressed during that dramatic period from 1969 to 1973 were many and varied. Among the more prominent matters were: 4 • scaling down the U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia through a program we developed and called Vietnamization • developing the Total Force Concept for our own regular and reserve military forces • ending the military manpower draft and developing the all volunteer force for the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force • focusing on the dominant threat posed by the Soviet Union • opening dialogues with nations such as the People's Republic of China • improving the stability of deterrence through arms control agreements such as the antiballistic missile (ABM) treaty • improving the quality of free-world defense by working closely with our allies in applying the Total Force Concept worldwide • focusing on appropriate means of sharing in the defense of the borders of our allies • paying heed to the economic, political, technical, and social realities, as well as to the military aspects of defense • making realistic trade-offs among the varied and sometimes con flicting goals of national security. It was not an easy period. It was a period in which the roles of individuals were significant and in which national security processes were tested. I believe we met many of the tests successfully. In others the record is Jess striking. Throughout the period, one principle was dra matically clear: a sound governmental process in national security issues leads to sound options and ultimately to effective policy; an unsound national security process spells missed opportunities at best and, at worst, deep trouble. A More Current View Recently we have had trouble with the national security process. Our government is sorting out a series of events involving overtures to Iran, hostages, and arms supplies. This series of events has become a major problem for the admin istration-and for the country. The problem was serious enough that President Reagan appointed a special review board, the so-called Tower Commission, and gave it a broad charter. It was directed to conduct "a comprehensive study of the future role and procedures of the National Security Council (NSC) staff in the development, coordi nation, oversight, and conduct of foreign and national security policy." 5 The Tower Commission has presented its findings. It is, in my judgment, a sound report. It concludes correctly "there is no magic formula which can be applied to the NSC structure and process to produce an optimal system." The Tower Commission also concluded: l. The President bears a special responsibility for the effective performance of the NSC systen1. 2. The tension between the President and the Executive Depart ments is worked out through the national security process.... It is through this process the nation obtains both the best of the creativity of the President and the training and expertise of the national security departments and agencies.(Let me add paren thetically that I felt Henry Kissinger was particularly effective in helping to generate and foster the tension to which the Tower Commission refers. J logged a lot of hours under that tension.) 3. The National Security Advisor should focus on advice and management, not implementation and execution. 4 .... no substantive change (should ) be made in the provi sions of the National Security Act deal-ing with the structure and operation of the NSC system.