Nietzsche's Ethics of the Creative Life

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2016 Creativity, Culture, and Genius: Nietzsche's Ethics of the Creative Life

Puszczalowski, Philip

Puszczalowski, P. (2016). Creativity, Culture, and Genius: Nietzsche's Ethics of the Creative Life (Unpublished doctoral thesis). University of Calgary, Calgary, AB. doi:10.11575/PRISM/25485 http://hdl.handle.net/11023/3535 doctoral thesis

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Creativity, Culture, and Genius: Nietzsche's Ethics of the Creative Life

Philip John Puszczalowski

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE

DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

GRADUATE PROGRAM IN PHILOSOPHY

CALGARY, ALBERTA

DECEMBER, 2016

Abstract In my dissertation Creativity, Culture, and Genius: Nietzsche's Ethics of the Creative Life

I aim to articulate what creativity means to Nietzsche. I present an account of Nietzsche in which creativity exemplifies the "highest potential power and splendour" (GM P: 6) of human beings. Specifically, I hope to demonstrate that what is best about us is creativity, and that to live a creative life is to have creativity as a governing principle.

Although Nietzsche does not explicitly state that people should have creativity as a governing principle for organizing lives, I will show that this thought lies within his work implicitly. To do this, I use Aristotle as a foil for Nietzsche and contrast their thinking on the question, "What characteristic exemplifies what is best about humans?" Aristotle believed that there were three potential answers to this question: pleasure, noble action and politics, and contemplation. I put Nietzsche to work philosophically, contrasting these three possible answers with Nietzsche's philosophy, and showing that none of them are viable options.

The positive portion of my project focuses on demonstrating the interconnectedness of creativity, culture, and genius for Nietzsche. The importance of these three concepts cannot be underestimated in Nietzsche's philosophy, and I show how they are vital to his thought – with creativity serving as the central focus and a governing principle for human beings.

Acknowledgements

It is impossible to express the amount of gratitude I have for all those who have helped me along the way while working on this project. And even if such expression were possible, I would lack the eloquence to adequately communicate it.

With that said, I would like to thank my supervisor Mark Migotti for his tireless and unwavering commitment to my project. His belief in my project's aim and his extensive comments and support on the numerous drafts of this thesis are profoundly appreciated. Without his help, this project may have never progressed beyond the stage of mere contemplation.

I would also like to thank the Department of Philosophy for funding me throughout the years in the form of scholarships and employment which has prevented me from being forced to live in a tub downtown. I would also like to thank Ishtiyaque Haji and Christopher Framarin for their comments on earlier drafts of the first two chapters. When you are submerged in any subject for too long, you begin to think that everyone intuitively understands what you are talking about. Their comments forced me to clearly articulate my project and it is all the better because of them. I also want to thank Shelley Ann Hulbert for organizing our weekly Nietzsche

Group during the last year of writing. Her comments and suggestions proved to be invaluable. I would also like to thank Hardeep for her support, patience, and understanding throughout this entire process. Most importantly, I would like to thank my parents. Their patronage and support throughout the years is something for which I will always be grateful.

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Table of Contents

Abstract...... ii Acknowledgments...... iii Table of Contents...... iv List of Abbreviations...... v Epigraph...... vii

Introduction...... 1

Chapter 1 – Aristotle and After...... 15 1.1 – Aristotle...... 16 1.2 – After Aristotle...... 34

Chapter 2 – Suffering and Contentment...... 39 2.1 – Nietzsche's Comrades in Suffering...... 39 2.1 – Two Kinds of Sufferers...... 44 2.3 – Greatness and Suffering...... 47 2.4 – A Meaning for Suffering...... 52 2.5 – Suffering as Stimulus...... 55 2.6 – Suffering and Hedonism...... 59

Chapter 3 – Culture and Politics...... 68 3.1 – Nobles and Higher Men...... 70 3.2 – Style...... 76 3.3 – The Vita Activa and Vis Creativa...... 84 3.4 – Solitude...... 89 3.5 – Politics...... 93

Chapter 4 – Affirmation and Contemplation...... 101 4.1 – Contemplation's Origin...... 102 4.2 – The Contemplative Type...... 106 4.3 – Reactivity and Passivity...... 107 4.4 – Passivity and History...... 111 4.5 – The Problem of the Scholar...... 118 4.6 – The Active-Contemplative: A Music Making Socrates...... 126

Chapter 5 – Creativity and Ressentiment...... 129 5.1 – Genius...... 129 5.2 – The Problem of Mass Culture...... 156 5.3 – The Task of Humanity...... 161 5.4 – The Problem of Creative Ressentiment...... 164 5.5 – The Formula for the Creative Life...... 171

Bibliography...... 175

List of Abbreviations

Works by Nietzsche

A The Antichrist

BGE Beyond Good and Evil

BT The Birth of Tragedy

CW The Case of Wagner

D Daybreak

EH Ecce Homo

GM On the Genealogy of Morality

HH Human, All Too Human

GS The Gay Science

NCW Nietzsche Contra Wagner

P The Philosopher

PCP The Philosopher as Cultural Physician

PHT Philosophy in Hard Times

PTAG Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks

TI Twilight of the Idols

TL On the Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense

UM Untimely Meditations

WP The Will to Power

WS The Wander and His Shadow

Z Thus Spoke Zarathustra

References to Nietzsche's aphoristic works will cite the abbreviated title followed by the aphorism number (GS: 370). To his other works, references will be to the part and section number (GM II: 6). In the case of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, an abbreviated section title will be given instead of a number (Z II: "The Rabble"). Passages involving prefaces to Nietzsche's works will use "P" as the part number (GM P: 6).

Works by Other Aristotle

M Metaphysics

NE Nicomachean Ethics

POL Politics

References to Aristotle will cite the abbreviated title followed by the book number, section number, and line number (NE I.1.1094a6-10).

Works by Other Authors

CJ Critique of Judgement (Kant)

WWR The World as Will and Representation (Schopenhauer)

Kant's Critique of Judgement is cited by the abbreviation followed by the section number (CJ:

47). Schopenhauer's The World as Will and Representation is cited by the abbreviation, followed by the volume number and page number (WWR I, 196). Works by Plato are cited by title and line number (Apology 69a).

Epigraph

"...even if his ideas had been as true and precious as those of Columbus or Newton, many would have counted this yearning, taking it as the sublime part for a man to say, "If not I, then another," and to hold cheap the meaning of his own life. But the fuller nature desires to be an agent, to create, and not merely to look on: strong love hungers to bless, and not merely to behold blessing. And while there is warmth enough in the sun to feed an energetic life, there will still be men to feel, "I am lord of this moment's change, and will charge it with my soul."

George Eliot, Daniel Deronda, Chapter 38.

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Introduction

In Nietzsche: Life as Literature, Alexander Nehamas claims that Nietzsche "does not believe that there exists a single proper kind of life or person" (Nehamas 1985, 8). According to

Nehamas, "any effort to attribute to Nietzsche a positive view of human conduct, consisting perhaps of a description of the right kind of life or of a set of principles for becoming the sort of person he admires, is bound to fail" (Ibid.). The problem with this claim is that it does not go deep enough and explores a somewhat superficial reading of Nietzsche. I propose that Nietzsche does provide a principle around which a life can be organized – creativity. What is significant is that Nehamas' reason for why he believes that there is no such principle is entirely compatible with my claim that Nietzsche endorses creativity as a principle which best exemplifies what is best about human beings. To see how this is the case, it is necessary to discuss Nehamas' argument.

Nehamas acknowledges that Nietzsche admires people who are artistic, such as Goethe,

Beethoven, and Shakespeare. Artists of this order of rank are deeply individual. Nietzschean individuals are those who separate themselves radically from "the herd"; they create their own values rather than following the values held by the rest of society. The problem as Nehamas sees it is that if Nietzsche's positive project is the creation of "individuals," then any set of principles or rules which describe how to become an individual are bound to fail. As Nehamas puts it:

A true individual is precisely one who is different from the rest of the world, and there is no formula, no set of rules, no code of conduct that can possibly capture in informative terms what it is to be like that. There are no principles that we can follow in order to become, as Nietzsche wants us to become, unique... The very notion of the individual makes it impossible to say in informative terms how one can ever become that (Nehamas 1985, 225).

Nehamas makes a good point here, and there is textual evidence in Nietzsche to support his conclusion. For example, Zarathustra states: ""This is my way; where is yours?" – thus I answered those who asked me "the way." For the way – that does not exist" (Z III: Spirit of

Gravity). This passage certainly affirms Nehamas' claim regarding individuals. Zarathustra makes it clear that there is no general formula to follow, and that each person must seek out their own way. Providing a formula or a set of principles will not make us unique individuals as

Nietzsche hopes we will become, but will instead produce generic copies with some slight variations.

In this thesis, I argue there is a principle which can be followed and which can produce unique individuals; the principle of creativity. Creativity as a governing principle for a life can fulfill this role because creativity itself demands uniqueness and originality. Mere imitation is not creativity. True creativity must constantly transcend its origin. How exactly that is to be accomplished must be left to the creative individuals, as Nehamas correctly points out: "[I]t is as impossible to specify in advance the rules that must be broken for the process to succeed as it is, say, to specify in advance the conventions that must be violated for a new and innovative genre in music or literature to be established" (Nehamas 1985, 225). Beethoven did not follow – or break – a set of pre-established rules in order to transcend the music of Mozart. There was no set of rules, nor could there be such a set of rules. However, reflecting upon and analyzing

Beethoven's music does reveal how it differs from Mozart. So while it may not be possible to prescribe a formula, reflection can reveal the formula that was employed by the artist. The problem is that the formula can only ever be followed once. If it is repeated by someone else, they would be imitating the artist that utilized it, and therefore, the person would not be engaged in true creativity. Truly creative activities break the mold and create a new one.

This interpretation of creativity has some virtues. First, it supports what Nietzsche puts into the mouth of Zarathustra.1 The implication is that no two people can have the same way.

Just as everyone is unique, so is everyone's way. This is the distinctive demand of creativity.

The same cannot be said for other possible governing principles, such as pleasure. Second, creativity as a governing principle supports Nehamas' argument. Creativity can produce individuals – in fact, the production of individuals is the inevitable outcome of creativity. So while Nehamas is largely correct in his reasoning and his interpretation of Nietzsche, he errs in drawing the wrong conclusion.

In keeping with these remarks, my thesis can be viewed as an interpretation and vindication of Nietzsche's positive project. It is widely thought that Nietzsche's critical project – or one of his critical projects concerning truth, or metaphysics, or morality – is very effective, but the same commendation is often lacking when it comes to the positive project. What I hope to show is that Nietzsche's ethics of creativity – to use Bernard Reginster's phrase – is both philosophically interesting and viable.

At the outset, it is important to realize that when Nietzsche speaks of creativity, he does not mean anything mysterious. By "creation," Nietzsche simply means making something. For example, carving a table out of wood would be a form of creation, as would composing a poem or painting a portrait. "Creativity" is the ability to make new things.2 This is not to be understood as simply making a new table, or writing a new poem, but as making something new and original. For Nietzsche, the value he places on creativity is connected to the values of

"originality" and of "culture." Imitation may be the sincerest form of flattery, but mere imitation

1 ""This is my way; where is yours?" – thus I answered those who asked me "the way." For the way – that does not exist" (Z III: Spirit of Gravity). 2 Bernard Reginster defines creativity as "a special skill or ability possessed by some individuals, something like the inventiveness they display in resolving problems or overcoming difficulties" (Reginster 2009, 43). 3 is a declaration of creative bankruptcy. What Nietzsche finds valuable in creativity is its constant push beyond current achievement. As we have seen, something truly creative must be original. So it is not enough that an individual simply creates, rather, the individual must also employ creativity with their creation. After all, a machine can produce products, but it is not capable of creativity; that is, so far as we know, a distinctly human ability.

A deeper understanding of Nietzschean creativity requires us to connect it to "culture."

Nietzsche defines culture as a "unity of artistic style in all the expressions of the life of a people"

(UM I: 1). Briefly, culture is the manifestation of a society's artistic drives.3 These drives are all aimed in a single direction, with the intention of furthering human excellence. Culture is a kind of progression in that it organizes the previous forms of culture into new forms, rather than starting from chaos – or barbarism – each time.4

Within this important connection between culture and creativity lies the thesis of this study: that Nietzsche's ethical thinking culminates in the idea that humanity's "highest potential power and splendour" (GM P: 6), is found in their most successful efforts of creative creation.

For Nietzsche, the most successful creative individuals are exemplified by the genius or "great man." This emphasis on creative individuals is a recurring theme throughout Nietzsche's entire corpus of published and unpublished writings. For example, in an unpublished passage:

The highest individuals are the creative persons – be they morally the best, or else useful in some larger sense. Thus they are the purest models and are the improvers of mankind (PHT: 78).5

3 I will examine Nietzsche's conception of "culture" further in chapter three. 4 "Nothing would be sillier than to claim an autochthonous development for the Greeks. On the contrary, they invariably absorbed other living cultures. The very reason they got so far is that they knew how to pick up the spear and throw it onward from the point where others had left it. Their skill in the art of fruitful learning was admirable. We ought to be learning from our neighbors precisely as the Greeks learned from theirs, not for the sake of learned pedantry but rather using everything we learn as a foothold which will take us up as high, and higher than our neighbor... What matters in all things is the higher levels..." (PTAG: 1). 5 This passage is from Notebook 30, autumn 1873 – winter 1873/1874. 4

Nietzsche clearly believes that creative individuals are the highest human exemplars and humanity should be organized in such a way that promotes and is conducive to their existence, since it is these creative individuals that are the "improvers of mankind" and whom will construct and direct culture. Therefore, Nietzsche thinks that "the production of great works is the aim of culture" (P: 46) and further, that "the task of culture is to see to it that what is great in a people does not appear among them as a hermit or exile" (P: 42). When Nietzsche says that culture aims at producing great works, he means in the first instance, great works of art.6 In addition, creativity – specifically great creativity – should be promoted by culture so geniuses do not appear as "strokes of luck," (GM III: 14) but as deliberate, purposeful occurrences. So not only are creative individuals important for culture, but culture is important for creative individuals; each feeds off the other. Creative individuals exemplify human excellence and enhance and promote culture through their great works, which in turn makes culture more conducive to the emergence of creative individuals. This may seem to give rise to a chicken or egg type question – "What came first, the genius or the culture?" – however, Nietzsche is clear that genius is what gives rise to culture. Without a creative individual, a true culture will not arise: "A culture is the consequence of every great art world, but it often happens that – due to hostile countercurrents – this final resonance of a work of art remains unachieved" (P: 33).

Creativity can be a governing principle of lives or cultures for Nietzsche. By "governing principle" I mean a unifying goal or focal point of a life. Hedonists use pleasure as a governing principle, while Aristotle argues that contemplation should serve this purpose. All this means is that the individual uses pleasure as a general principle when determining what actions to perform. Actions which produce pleasure will receive precedence over actions which do not

6 "Culture can emanate only from the centralizing significance of an art or work of art..." (PCP: 175). 5 produce pleasure.7 Another person may decide to use "chess" as their governing principle. This person devotes and organizes their life around the game of chess, so actions which are chess- related (playing it, reading about it, studying it, etc.) will be given precedence over actions which do not involve chess.8 For Nietzsche, "creativity" is such a principle. However, Nietzsche goes a step further and believes that creativity exemplifies what is best about humans. Of all the possible governing principles, Nietzsche thinks that creativity is the one that demonstrates what is best about us – or in other words, creativity is what exemplifies the "highest potential power and splendour" (GM P: 6) of human beings. To live a creative life is simply to have creativity as one's governing principle.

This passage from the Genealogy can further support my claim that creativity is the core value for Nietzsche and his main philosophical concern. It is made in reference to Nietzsche's speculation that morality may be to blame if humanity does not reach their highest potential. So what Nietzsche is primarily concerned about is creativity, and his philosophical concern with the dangers of morality is because of the effect it can have on creativity. If morality were his main concern, Nietzsche would be investigating how creativity affects morality, but this is clearly not the case. Consequently, creativity is the ability to generate more and varied forms of power and splendour, and this is Nietzsche's primary philosophical concern. Anything which enhances or impedes this ability will be important, but only because of the relation it has to creativity.

7 This does not mean that the person will always, or must always choose their subject of their governing principle. Someone may decide to organize their life around pleasure as a governing principle, but that does not mean they will always perform the action which produces pleasure. 8 I use the example of chess simply to demonstrate what I mean by a governing principle. Chess could be considered a first-order activity, whereas pleasure would be a second-order activity. I am not arguing that second- order activities are superior to first-order activities (or vice versa). Second-order activities that are used as a governing principle for lives may allow for a broader range of actions, and may be superior to first-order activities in this regard, but whether second-order activities are therefore of greater value than first-order activities is not what I am concerned with here. 6

To make this more specific, I am assigning creativity the role that Aristotle assigns to contemplation. With this in mind, I approach my topic by contrasting Nietzsche's thinking on the question, "What characteristic exemplifies what is best about humans?" with Aristotle's, who thought the discussible answers to this question reduced to three: pleasure, noble action and politics, and contemplation – of which only the latter two are taken seriously, and the last, contemplation, taken to be what is best about humans. This theme from Aristotle gives rise to his three kinds of lives: a life of pleasure (bios hedonikos), a life of noble action and politics

(bios politikos), and a contemplative life (bios theōrētikos). The bios politikos and the bios theōrētikos becomes enshrined in a traditional opposition between the vita activa and the vita contemplativa, and my chief aim is to show that in valuing what I will call the vita creativa (a life governed by creativity), Nietzsche both responds to and transcends these traditional

Aristotelian possibilities. While Aristotle prized speculative theorizing, Nietzsche prizes creative creating, and in fact, I hope this very project is a demonstration of this, as Nietzsche himself urged. In trying to understand a major theme in his thought, I will also be going beyond him somewhat; I am to present a reading of Nietzsche that he would endorse, and that helps make sense of his work despite the fact that he may never explicitly state it within his writings.

*****

Turning to questions of method and interpretive principle, I believe that fruitful engagement with Nietzsche's philosophy requires a balance of scholarship, interpretation, and mindful philosophical thinking, and of these; it is these last two that are important in this project.

While the accent in this project is not on scholarship, this is not because I will not be scholarly, but because the accent is on putting Nietzsche to work philosophically.

Moreover, although I am certainly concerned with what Nietzsche means, I take this interpretation and attempt to draw out certain conclusions that his thought generates. Nietzsche is often accused of not making arguments and merely making claims. Although he does not present his arguments in a formal structure like Thomas Aquinas or Spinoza, they are there if one is willing to piece them together. So while not all of what I attribute to Nietzsche may be fully explicit in his work, it lies within his work implicitly. This is not to say that I am putting words into Nietzsche's mouth. I simply plan to argue that, "If this is what Nietzsche means when he states 'A,' then we can conclude he would favour 'B.'" This methodology is recognized by Lester

H. Hunt in Nietzsche and the Origin of Virtue:

Before one has read very far into his [Nietzsche's] works, one realizes that, although arguments are seldom given in the text, many are latent within it and must be sought and found rather than passively received... To find the premises which lead to a given idea, we often find that we have to go to books other than the one in which the idea appears, and not seldom we find that we cannot find enough premises to make a complete argument. In that case, we must have enough imagination to think of what premises would complete the argument, consistent with the other things the author says.(Hunt 1991, 4).9

Projects of the sort I am to undertake are not new, and I take my work to belong to the broad tradition of writing on Nietzsche in the manner of John Richardson in Nietzsche's System,

Nietzsche: Life as Literature, by Alexander Nehamas, and Lawrence J. Hatab's A Nietzschean

Defense of Democracy.10 Each approaches Nietzsche with a different reading of his philosophy

9 Daniel Breazeale makes a similar remark stating: "It seems to have been one of Nietzsche's stylistic aims to obscure the close connections between his various themes, to present his thoughts on various subjects as if they were independent of each other, for the purpose of forcing the reader to make the connections – and thus to do the thinking – for himself" (Breazeale 1979, xlvi). 10 Richardson's book argues that Nietzsche has a metaphysics, which seems to contradict Nietzsche's explicit denial and opposition to metaphysical systems. He demonstrates that despite Nietzsche's criticism, a Nietzschean metaphysical system can be constructed "that both fits and clarifies what he [Nietzsche] says (writes)" (Richardson 1996, 3). Hatab attempts to demonstrate that although Nietzsche is a harsh opponent of democracy - and many Nietzschean concepts disparage democratic ideals - the apparent incompatibility of democracy and Nietzsche is not so cut and dry; it is possible to reconcile democracy with Nietzsche's philosophy without distorting his writings. Nehamas claims that Nietzsche "looks at the world in general as if it were a sort of artwork; in particular ... as if it were a literary text" (Nehamas 1985, 3), and "create[s] what we may call a literary product..." (Ibid., 4). Again, Nietzsche never makes such claims, but Nehamas draws them out of what Nietzsche's writing suggests. 8 and draws inferences consistent with it, yet they present conclusions that Nietzsche never explicitly states.

It is also important to note that while I will be making extensive use of Nietzsche's published writings, I will also utilize many of his unpublished writings. One must always be wary when doing so since a philosopher's unpublished writings do not signify their final thoughts on a matter. There may be a very good reason for why the philosopher was reluctant to publish them. However, I believe that Nietzsche's unpublished writings are just as valuable and revealing as his published works. That does not mean I will be using his unpublished writings willy-nilly, rather, I will use them in conjunction with what he did publish. Nietzsche often sums up his thoughts on a particular subject in these unpublished notebooks, and while the same thoughts can usually be found in his published books, they are often scattered throughout and must be searched for, which can give rise to the claim that Nietzsche does not provide arguments. Therefore, I employ his notebooks for the ease with which the concept is presented but support the unpublished passage with corroborating material from his sanctioned publications.

*****

I begin by providing the conceptual background for the project in chapter one with an account of Aristotle's three possible lives. I examine Aristotle's reasons for why a life governed by pleasure does not exemplify what is best about humans, why a life governed by noble action and politics would be a good principle but not what is best about human beings, and finally, why contemplation as a governing principle exemplifies what is best about us. I then turn to Hannah

Arendt's account of how Aristotle's life of noble action and politics is transformed by medieval

Christian philosophers into the active life.

The purpose of establishing this background is so I can use Aristotle – and to a lesser extent – Arendt, as a foil for Nietzsche. While this chapter is mainly focused on Aristotle, this is so I can devote the rest of the project to Nietzsche. This is not to say that Aristotle does not reappear throughout the following chapters, he certainly does, but his appearances are to underscore and further Nietzsche's position.

Since I will be arguing that Nietzsche believes creativity is the governing principle that exemplifies what is best about human beings, I will need to explain why he would be dismissive of the three options Aristotle proposes. Therefore, engaging with Aristotle will be beneficial for bringing forth Nietzsche's position.

The next three chapters belong together and constitute the negative portion of my project.

Each of them begins with a Nietzschean value which is contrasted with the relevant competitor and it is crucial that creativity involves all three. When Michael Tanner says: "Nietzsche's fundamental concern throughout his life was to plot the relationship between suffering and culture, or cultures" (Tanner 1994, 27), there is mostly a difference of emphasis between us.

While he is correct to single out suffering and culture, I argue that creativity will underlie these notions.

The same can be said for Bernard Reginster who provides a more recent take on the importance of creativity in Nietzsche.11 He argues that creativity is an important aspect of the will to power, and any interpretation of the will to power which neglects the importance of creativity is missing an essential element. He then constructs an ethics around this new interpretation of the will to power showing the relationship between it, creativity, and suffering.

I agree with much of what Reginster has to say on this topic, but I believe his interpretation also neglects how central creativity is to Nietzsche's philosophy.

11 See Reginster (2009) "The Will to Power and the Ethics of Creativity." 10

In chapter two, I present an account of why Nietzsche would dismiss a life governed by pleasure as exemplifying what is best about human beings. Although he is in agreement with

Aristotle on this point, Nietzsche's reasons are quite different from those of Aristotle. The main reason why Nietzsche would dismiss pleasure as a governing principle which exemplifies what is best about us is due to his belief that suffering is necessary for creativity. While a life governed by pleasure would undoubtedly contain some degree of suffering, its goal would be to attain as much pleasure as possible. Nietzsche believes that such a goal is anti-creative and fails to generate human excellence. He believes that all human excellence is the result of great suffering, and this excellence is exemplified in a life organized around creativity. Individuals should seek out suffering and hardship, rather than a life of pleasure and happiness because suffering is a stimulus for creative enhancement.

Although Nietzsche advocates suffering and thinks attempts to abolish it are foolish, he does recognize that suffering is not beneficial for everyone. Only certain types of people will gain an advantage from suffering; for everyone else, suffering is detrimental. However, he is only concerned with those individuals that can endure and profit from suffering. These individuals have the greatest potential for great creativity, so any effort to extinguish suffering wholesale is viewed with contempt by Nietzsche. Therefore, a life in which pleasure is the governing principle will be in opposition to suffering and creativity and cannot be what exemplifies what is best about humans.

Chapter three is an examination regarding why Nietzsche would dismiss noble action and politics as a governing principle. Aristotle believes that human beings are political animals, and it is part of our nature to organize ourselves into communities. In addition, he argues that noble action is a good governing principle despite it not being the best governing principle.

Hannah Arendt claims that Nietzsche prioritizes the vita activa, believing it to be superior to the vita contemplativa. Many of the active life's features are things that Nietzsche believes are to be valued. As a result, Arendt will argue that Nietzsche believes the vita activa to possess a higher value than the life of contemplation.

To demonstrate why Nietzsche would disagree with both Aristotle and Arendt, I contrast their claims against his virtue of solitude and his value of culture, as they relate to the "higher men." Nietzsche refers to his highest human exemplars as "higher men." They are flesh and blood individuals that human beings should strive to emulate and surpass because they possess creative power and are highly creative people. The creative type includes Goethe, Beethoven, and Shakespeare, to name a few.

Nietzsche speaks highly about the nobles and masters who exemplify the active life, however, Nietzsche will argue that while these individuals are good, they are not the best; they are not "higher men." The reason, according to Nietzsche is because they lack creative power.

This lack sets them firmly within the active life and separates them from being "higher men."

Since the "higher men" are Nietzsche's creative exemplars, it stands to reason they will exemplify what is best about us, namely, their creativity.

For Nietzsche, creativity is intertwined with culture; each feeds off and enhances the other. Since the active types lack creative power, they will also lack the ability to enhance and promote culture.

In addition, solitude is a crucial value for Nietzsche and is a value that is in conflict with politics. For example, if an individual is to engage properly in politics they must associate and interact with others on a daily basis. They must participate in matters that are essential to the running of the state, which is clearly at odds with Nietzschean solitude. Since it is not possible

12 to engage in politics while separating oneself from society, noble action and politics as a governing principle for one's life will not be an option for Nietzsche.

In chapter four, I examine contemplation as a governing principle and discuss why it will not exemplify what is best about humans. This chapter is to be understood in conjunction with chapter three. In chapter three I demonstrate that the highest human exemplars for Nietzsche –

"higher men" – are not of the active type, despite possessing many of the active type's characteristics. Instead, the "higher men" are closely associated with the contemplative types – artists, philosophers, saints, and scientists, providing a reason for why they do not have noble action and politics as governing principles. Due to the "higher men" all being of the contemplative type, it would seem that contemplation would be their governing principle, implying that contemplation exemplifies what is best about humans. However, this is not the case. The "higher men" share certain characteristics with the active type, and they also share certain characteristics with the contemplative type. But just as the similarities between the

"higher men" and the active type are not enough to justify noble action and politics as their governing principle, the similarities between the "higher men" and the contemplative type are not enough to justify contemplation as their governing principle.

The main reason supporting this claim is that contemplation possesses reactivity and passivity as characteristics – both of which Nietzsche views with contempt. I demonstrate why contemplation does not exemplify what is best about us, by explaining why reactivity and passivity are undesirable features for Nietzsche. In particular, I engage with the scholar and the historiographer to show that these types have contemplation as their governing principle, and

Nietzsche regards them with nothing but scorn. If the "higher men" are truly Nietzsche's exemplars, then they must have some other governing principle.

Chapter five begins the positive portion of my project. While the first four chapters explain why Nietzsche would be dismissive of Aristotle's three governing principles, chapter five constructs a general outline of what Nietzsche thinks best exemplifies human beings – namely, creativity.

I begin by constructing Nietzsche's notion of genius and explaining its connection to creativity and culture. In doing so, it will be clear that Nietzsche will endorse creativity as a governing principle and that it exemplifies what is best about us.

With that framework in place, I address two significant issues: 1) Why is genius so rare? and 2) The problem of creative ressentiment.

The first problem arises due to Nietzsche's assertion that genius is the result of hard work rather than inborn talent. He claims that many people have the potential to become a genius, but if this is true, why are they so rare?

Regarding the problem of creative ressentiment, if Nietzsche believes that a life of creation and creativity is the best kind of life for humans to live, then why does he regard individuals such as the ascetic priest as decadent and life-denying, and consequently, of little value? For example, the ascetic priest seems to live a very creative life, creating an entire metaphysics. If Nietzsche values creativity, shouldn't he regard the ascetic priest as a highly creative individual and a "higher man"? In short, the answer is: No.

Chapter 1

Aristotle and After

I begin by briefly discussing Aristotle's reasoning that there is a governing principle for humans and that it will help promote the best kind of life for humans to live. I then examine each of the three lives, their corresponding governing principle, and Aristotle's reasons for accepting or dismissing them as the case may be. The first section concludes with a discussion of Aristotle's reasons for why he thinks the contemplative life is the best life.

The second section focuses on the evolution of the political life into the active life as related by Hannah Arendt in The Human Condition. Arendt explains how Aristotle's life of politics (bios politikos) gains additional characteristics due to the poor translation of medieval philosophers. As a result, the political life is transformed into the active life (vita activa), and therefore, into something that incorporates and goes beyond Aristotle's political life. The active life not only includes political activity but any activity that is not considered to be part of contemplation. The scope of the life of activity increases as a result, and yet, priority is still assigned to the contemplative/philosophical life. In this transformed shape the contrast between the vita contemplativa and the vita activa has become standard lore by Nietzsche's time.

It is worthwhile to note that my interpretation of Aristotle is not undertaken for its own sake. The point is to use Aristotle as a foil for Nietzsche. I do not consider every interpretation of the notion of the best sort of life to lead, rather, I am organizing my comparison between

Nietzsche and Aristotle around the idea of which governing principle exemplifies what is best about human beings. I do not think that I am radically departing from Aristotle, rather, I am using an interpretation that will help to illuminate what I believe Nietzsche thinks is best about human beings.

1.1 – Aristotle

After his trial for the crimes of impiety and corrupting the youth of Athens, Socrates must suggest a penalty to impose on himself. It is during this speech that Socrates declares that "the unexamined life is not worth living for men [human beings]..." (Apology 38a) – i.e. a life which lacks reflection and philosophy is not a truly human life. Although this claim is strong enough, it is distinct from the even stronger claim that the deeply examined life is better than any other. In fact, this stronger claim that a life of contemplation is superior soon took hold in ancient Greece and would influence the rest of Western philosophy.12

Plato plays a crucial role in this bias by reserving a special place for the philosopher in

The Republic, not only making his way of life superior but also making the philosopher a king.13

The Republic attempts to answer the question, "What is just and why is it beneficial to be just?", by raising the question of why we have politics at all. By using an analogy between the city and the soul, he develops an account of the need for justice. Significantly, Plato sketches an ideal polis ruled by the Philosopher King, who is within the political sphere, yet is not of the political sphere. The actual purpose of the state according to Plato is to ensure justice through the rule of the philosopher since philosophers would govern more wisely than politicians due to the philosophers' knowledge of the Forms. For Plato, a life of philosophical inquiry is the highest and best kind of life for a human being to live, while a life of politics is secondary.14

12 The significance and impact of this Socratic dictum was not lost on Nietzsche, who remarks in The Birth of Tragedy: "Once we see clearly how after Socrates, the mystagogue of science, one philosophical school succeeds another, wave upon wave; how the hunger for knowledge reached a never-suspected universality in the widest domain of the educated world, became the real task for every person of higher gifts, and led science onto the high seas from which it has never again been driven altogether; how this universality first spread a common net of thought over the whole globe, actually holding out the prospect of the lawfulness of an entire solar system; once we see all this clearly, along with the amazingly high pyramid of knowledge in our own time - we cannot fail to see in Socrates the one turning point and vortex of so-called world history" (BT: 15). 13 See The Republic Part VII 471d-521c. 14 This bias against politics is probably rooted with Socrates. In many of Plato's dialogues, Socrates mentions how he has avoided a life of politics, despite the encouragement of many. For Socrates, politics and contemplation are 16

Plato famously illustrates this conviction in the Allegory of the Cave. Although the philosopher would like to remain in the contemplative realm, justice motivates him to return to the state and politics. In fact, Plato argues that what makes the Philosopher King qualified to rule is the Philosopher King's disinclination to rule. If the Philosopher King were truly of the political sphere, he would relish ruling his subjects, but this is not the case. He would much rather contemplate the Forms and engage in philosophical discussion. It is only out of pity and a desire to educate the citizens of the state that the philosopher returns to them, leaving the splendour of the Forms and the contemplative realm. However, he does not completely abandon contemplation but puts it to use in the political sphere.15

In keeping with his more commonsensical convictions, Aristotle does not think it is philosophically useful to ground the divisions for the kinds of lives in the classes of an ideal state. Instead, he presents an argument for what is the best kind of life for humans – or more specifically, what is best about human beings – that does not depend on the Platonic Forms.

Despite this disagreement, Aristotle sides with Plato in the belief that a political life is only second best.16

Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics begins by asserting that everything seeks out some good.

This good is the thing's end (telos) and differs according to what that thing is. Different

not compatible bed-fellows. For example: "It may seem strange that while I go around and give this advice privately and interfere in private affairs, I do not venture to go to the assembly and there advise the city. You have heard me give the reason for this in many places. I have a divine or spiritual sign which Meletus has ridiculed in his deposition... it turns me away from something I am about to do, but it never encourages me to do anything. This is what has prevented me from taking part in public affairs, and I think it was quite right to prevent me. Be sure, gentlemen of the jury, that if I had long ago attempted to take part in politics, I should have died long ago, and benefited neither you nor myself... A man who really fights for justice must lead a private, not a public, life if he is to survive for even a short time" (Apology 31c-32a). 15 It could be argued that Plato brings the contemplative realm into the political realm in much the same way that Socrates brought philosophy into the agora. In fact, Socrates might have regarded cities as the best places for contemplation and philosophizing: "I am, you see, a lover of learning. Now the people in the city have something to teach me, but the fields and trees won't teach me anything" (Phaedrus 230d) 16 One cannot help but recall Zarathustra's words to his students: "One repays a teacher badly if one always remains nothing but a pupil" (Z I, "Gift-Giving Virtue"). 17 activities and crafts will have different ends, for example, the end of medicine is health, while the end of house building is a house (NE I.1.1094a6-10). Further, some ends are aimed at because they lead to other goods, while others are targeted for their own sake. An instance of the former would be money. Money is the end of money-making, and money is sought after not for its own sake, but for what it can purchase. An end that is aimed at for its own sake (one does not want it for the sake of some other good) is an "ultimate end."

Aristotle observes further that crafts and sciences form hierarchies. Certain crafts and sciences have ends that belong in the higher-order sciences. In other words, certain crafts and sciences have ends outside of themselves, for example, the crafts of sail-making and ship- building. There is no point of making sails if there are no ships, and there is no sense in making ships without naval warfare and navigation. However, what Aristotle wants to know is: "Is there an ultimate end of all human craft and action?" Aristotle believes eudaimonia or human flourishing fulfills this role.17 While it seems evident that all human activity aims at attaining human flourishing, it is less apparent what constitutes human flourishing. Different people have different ideas about how to flourish, and this will dictate what they take to be the superior governing principle for humans.

To determine how human flourishing can be realized, Aristotle appeals to the so-called

Function Argument, which states that all things have a function (ergon).18 For example, the function of a knife is to cut, and the function of the eye is to see. However, there is an important difference between these two objects. A knife is a human artifact; it is made by us to provide a

17 The Greek word eudaimonia is notoriously difficult to translate, since there is no corresponding word in English. The most popular translation is "happiness," but it can also be translated as "human flourishing," "character building," "fulfillment," "worthwhile," "doing well," among others. None of these English words encompasses the entire meaning of the Greek, however, I will translate eudaimonia as human flourishing since this translation best encapsulates the conceptual link concerning governing principles of an individual's life between Aristotle and Nietzsche. 18 For Aristotle's Function Argument, see NE I.7.1097b23-1098a20. 18 particular function. An eye is an organ of a living being and has the function of enabling the organism to help us see and navigate our world. Also, it has a larger role to play in the function of the organism which in the case of humans is helping us to flourish. So just as we design a knife to fulfill a particular function, nature has designed us in a way that helps us achieve our function. This implies that human beings have a set function or activity, but what exactly is the function of a human being? What activity distinguishes human beings from other kinds of life?

The first possible function Aristotle considers is growth and nutrition. Humans grow and require sustenance, but plants and animals also possess this function. Since all living things share this potential function, Aristotle thinks that this cannot be the function of human beings because humans are much more complex than plants and because it is not a distinctly human activity.

The next function Aristotle mentions is sense perception. Sense perception is not something that plants engage in; however, it is shared with all animals including humans.

Therefore, Aristotle thinks this also fails as an activity distinct to humans and does not qualify as the function of human beings.

Aristotle's last suggestion regarding the possible function of humans is reason (logos).

Human beings are capable of acting rationally, thinking and reasoning. While it is true that animals can also think (to a degree), they mostly act based on instinct. The lion attacks the gazelle because it is hungry, not because it realizes it will be easy prey and provide sustenance to ensure its survival. Reason is what separates humans from other living beings,19 with Aristotle concluding that "the function of man is an activity of soul in accordance with, or not without,

19 "... and the things men have done from reason are thought most properly their own acts and voluntary acts. That this is the man himself, then, or is so more than anything else, is plain, and also that the good man loves most this part of him" (NE IX.8.1168b34-1169a3). 19 rational principle [reason]" (NE I.7.1098a6-7). To be a human being is to have our distinctive function of reason.

Living a good life then, will be different for different living things. The qualities which consist of a good life for a plant will be different from the qualities which consist of a good life for a lion.20 Aristotle thinks the same applies to human beings. It is important to note that while reason is the distinctive ergon of human beings, reason alone does not guarantee human flourishing, for just as the function of a knife is to cut well, the function of human beings is to reason well. The ability to reason well is what human flourishing for humans will consist of according to Aristotle. By reasoning well – i.e. performing our function well – human beings will be on the right track for living a good life.21

If the proper function of human beings is to reason well, what does that amount to? In particular, what ultimate end is specific enough to guide our reasoning? Aristotle considers three possible candidates for this role: pleasure, the fostering of noble action, and contemplation. Each of these governing principles corresponds to one of three possible lives: a life of pleasure (bios hedonikos), a life of noble action (bios politikos), and a contemplative life (bios theōrētikos).22

Although Aristotle will conclude that using one's reason for contemplation is essential for the best kind of human excellence since it is a distinctly human function, various claims have been made that pleasure or noble action can serve as the anchor for eudaimonia. If Aristotle is to make his case for the priority of contemplation successfully, he must explain why pleasure and

20 In other words, since the function of a plant is very different from the function of an animal, what qualifies as a good life for a plant would not qualify as a good life for an animal, and vice versa. Furthermore, what qualifies as a good life for human beings will be very different from that of plants and animals. 21 If a human is performing their function well – reasoning well – then they might be living a good life. As Aristotle argues however, someone could be reasoning well but not be living a good life due to various factors that are beyond their control. 22 While Aristotle's discussion of the three possible lives is probably the most well known, Plato presents a similar discussion in The Republic, distinguishing between a life of understanding, a life of ambition, and a life of pleasure. See The Republic Part IX 580d-583a. 20 noble action are not adequate governing principles to organize one's life around, and why a life organized around reason and contemplation exemplifies – to use Nietzsche's words – "the highest power and splendor" (GM P: 6) of human beings.

Aristotle quickly dismisses the life of pleasure on the grounds that only "the most vulgar type" (NE I.5.1095b15) follow it, and it is "a life suitable to beasts" (NE I.5.1095b20). This last point is more than mere snobbery. The capacity for pleasure is widespread, shared by animals and humans and so does not signify anything particularly unique to humans. So while pleasure may suffice as a governing principle for animals (perhaps this is the only principle they are capable of possessing), Aristotle believes that humans are made for better things. A life organized around sensual pleasures as the sole aim lacks other important aspects which make up the best kind of life.

Human beings are distinguished from the rest of nature since they possess reason according to Aristotle. By not exercising our reason, we are failing to perform our function as human beings, and therefore, pleasure cannot be what is best about human beings. Reason is an essential component regarding what is best about humans for Aristotle, and a life of organized around pleasure seems to abandon rationality in favour of sensuality. Aristotle is not rejecting pleasure per se, rather, he is rejecting hedonism.23 So while Aristotle thinks that the best life is not lived for the sake of pleasure, the best life does give pleasure; pleasure is a by-product but not the purpose.24

23 Although Aristotle believes organizing one's life around pleasure as the governing principle is not the best principle for human beings, he is not arguing against experiencing pleasure. In fact, Aristotle concedes that pleasure is necessary for a well-lived life; however, indiscriminate pleasure is not a suitable principle for exemplifying what is best about humans. 24 A life organized around contemplation as the governing principle is the best life for human-flourishing according to Aristotle. While such a life produces pleasure in conjunction with contemplation, pleasure is not the purpose of such a life. 21

Therefore, a life organized around pleasure as the end is beneath the dignity of human beings for Aristotle. To lower oneself to the level of the animals is to forsake what separates us from them – the ability to reason, think and contemplate. A more subtle point can be derived from this as well in that if you are devoting your life to pleasure, then you are prostituting your reason for pleasure. One's reason is being misused and directed for an inferior purpose. Pleasure as a life distinguishing principle is indiscriminate. It is not concerned with which actions provide pleasure, only that these actions generate pleasure.25

Aristotle thinks that human flourishing must be a human activity, so the next principle that he considers is the life focused on noble action. For Aristotle, moral development is inseparable from politics. He believes that ethics not only concerns what is good for individuals but the rest of society as well. While the life devoted to pleasure takes human flourishing to consist simply in attaining pleasure, the political life takes it to be virtuous activity in accord with reason. As mentioned, Aristotle concludes that the function of humans is to exercise reason.

While the hedonist focuses on attaining pleasure, the political life focuses on self- governance. For Aristotle, there are two main reasons for an individual to devote themselves to the life of a statesman. The first, (as mentioned already), is to arrange the state in such a way that maximizes leisure and therefore, makes the contemplative life possible. The second reason is to aid others in leading lives according to virtue, resulting in an ethical life. He points out that

"it is difficult to get from youth up a right training for excellence if one has not been brought up under right laws... This is why some think that legislators ought to stimulate men to excellence

25 This is reminiscent of the original Socratic idea that the unexamined life is not worth living. A life of indiscriminate pleasure would be a life not worth living according to Aristotle. Presumably, Aristotle would agree with Nozick that living your life in an "Experience Machine" would not be an appealing existence. See Nozick 2013, 42-45. 22 and urge them forward by the motive of the noble..." (NE X.9.1179b31-1180a6). While the topic of what exactly constitutes correct laws is not addressed in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle does spend the majority of the text discussing virtue, how to properly train oneself according to it, and how to determine what counts as virtue through the use of the Doctrine of the Mean.

Noble action, or acting according to virtue has a better claim as a governing principle of a human's life according to Aristotle. While pleasure is beneath human nature as a guiding principle, noble action is not, since it is concerned with the type of individual one is – i.e. a virtuous individual – and not what it produces. In other words, a life of pleasure is concerned with producing pleasure for the individual. It is irrelevant whether the individual is a virtuous person or not, so long as he achieves pleasure. A life of politics or noble action is especially concerned with the kind of individual one is; it is focused on promoting the dignity of humans through the cultivation of the virtues which is what elevates humans above the beasts. Animals have no concern about things like bravery, justice, or temperance; such concerns are solely human concerns. For example, an animal may defend its territory against intruders, but its actions are not a demonstration of bravery; it is simply acting based on instinct. However, a human being who stands and defends the city against a larger army is acting bravely. He knows that he may die as a result of his actions, but virtue dictates that he not flee. The animal defending its territory is not frightened at the prospect of death because it does not understand the consequences of its action. Such understanding belongs only to human beings, so engaging in noble actions despite knowledge of the dangers of doing so upholds the dignity of humans and serves as a worthy governing principle.

Notwithstanding the merits of a political life or engaging in noble action, Aristotle argues that such a life does not bring out what is really best about human beings. This governing

23 principle can certainly result in a life of human flourishing, but only to a lesser degree; it is not

"perfect" human flourishing. Aristotle thinks that exercising practical wisdom – making good decisions that best realize good aims – is a noble way to live. However, this kind of life lacks certain characteristics that the best ultimate end must possess. For Aristotle, an ultimate end must be intrinsically good, pleasurable (in some form), self-sufficient, and sought for its own sake and not for some other good. A life governed by practical excellence is intrinsically good, pleasurable, and self-sufficient, but not supremely so. Further, such a life is sought only because it can be completed by another good, namely, contemplation. Like Plato, Aristotle believes that politics and the state should be directed at promoting philosophy and because politics aims at something beyond itself, it is not an ultimate end, despite such a life being worthwhile.

Therefore, Aristotle would conclude that the life organized around practical excellence as a governing principle – while certainly a choice-worthy life – is only the second best kind of life one can live. One can achieve human flourishing by living a life of noble action, but it is a secondary human flourishing and not perfect. This perfect form of eudaimonia is reserved solely for a life organized around contemplation, that is, the life of a philosopher.

Recall that Aristotle determines in Book I that the function of humans is to exercise reason, and that a life of eudaimonia will be a life in which the individual reasons well. While a life of politics requires practical reason and activity, a life of contemplation requires the individual to exercise theoretical wisdom excellently. According to Aristotle, virtue, along with every other good is sought for the sake of contemplation. Richard Kraut provides an illuminating diagram illustrating how Aristotle's hierarchy of goods relate to the life of politics and the life of contemplation.26 Kraut illustrates the political life as follows:

26 There is much debate among Aristotle scholars concerning two possible ways of interpreting the Nicomachean Ethics, specifically regarding Books I and X. The first possibility is what is called the 'inclusive' interpretation. 24

M N

X Y Z

In this diagram, "B" represents practical excellence. Correctly exercising the virtues, such as courage, justice, and temperance would be included at the pinnacle of the hierarchy, and furthermore, these virtues are intrinsically desirable.

The second level of the hierarchy, "M" and "N" represent goods that are desirable for their own sake, but which are not sufficient for human flourishing. Kraut gives the example of honour. While a life of human flourishing may require the individual to act honourably, it is possible that someone could live an honourable life, and yet suffer extreme misfortunes. In such a case, the individual would not be living a life of eudaimonia.27

The last level ("X", "Y", "Z") represent goods which are conditionally desirable. Kraut provides wealth as an example. Wealth is not intrinsically good, rather, people seek wealth because it can be used to acquire other goods.

This interpretation argues that Aristotle believes that there is not one single activity that we do for the sake of everything else. A person's life is considered worthwhile due to a variety of activities. For example, "we might want to go for a walk just for its own sake, we might want to learn philosophy just for the sake of it, and wish to have friends just because we value having them, without there being any one further thing for which ultimately we value all of these things..." (Hughes 2001, 28) The second possibility is known as the 'dominant' interpretation, and it argues "that there is just one ultimate answer to the chain of 'Why do we do X?' questions. There is just one type of activity for the sake of which we do everything else, and which makes one's life worthwhile" (Hughes 2001, 27). Kraut argues for the 'dominant' interpretation, and I believe his account provides the best explanation of Aristotle's thinking, hence my appeal to him. However, regardless of which interpretation is ultimately correct, my argument does not rely on either one, and therefore, my dissertation's conclusion will be unaffected by the two interpretations. For more on the 'inclusive' interpretation, see Ackrill (1980); for the 'dominant' interpretation, see Kraut (1989). 27 "For there is required, as we said, not only complete excellence but also a complete life, since many changes occur in life, and all manner of chances, and the most prosperous may fall into great misfortunes in old age, as is told of Priam in the Trojan Cycle; and one who has experienced such chances and has ended wretchedly no one calls happy" (NE I.9.1100a4-10). Aristotle's point seems to be that external circumstances can affect an individual's flourishing. The virtues may be necessary for eudaimonia, but they are not sufficient. An easy way to see this is to interpret eudaimonia as happiness. An individual may exercise all the virtues and lead a noble life, but Aristotle thinks that if circumstances are such that everyone hates the individual, his children are struck with illness, and his wife dies, this unfortunate individual is not living a happy life. 25

The contemplative life according to Kraut conforms to the structure of the political life; however, it contains one additional good:

M N

X Y Z

Contemplation ("A"), is the additional, and ultimate good of the contemplative life since one wants all other goods in the hierarchy for their ability to promote contemplation and since contemplation itself leads to no higher good.28

Since one does not seek contemplation for the sake of other goods, contemplation would seem to lack a practical purpose. Aristotle argues that while all the lower goods are sought because they can lead to other goods, contemplation is essentially unproductive in this sense.29

While contemplation can produce further contemplation, it does not lead to any other good apart from itself. This is why Aristotle will regard contemplation as "useless" or as lacking a practical purpose, and this "uselessness" suggests for Aristotle that it is the ultimate end for human beings.

28 The diagrams and hierarchy they illustrate can be found in Kraut (1989). Kraut sees Aristotle as setting up a competition between the life of politics and the life of contemplation. Individuals are required to choose between the two. In Aristotle's estimation, the contemplative life will be the best, and result in the highest eudaimonia, but he is aware that not everyone will be capable of living a contemplative life. For those who are unable to live the highest kind of life, the political life can be very fulfilling and result in a secondary type of eudaimonia. See Kraut's (1989) excellent book: Aristotle on the Human Good. 29 The belief that contemplation and philosophy lack a practical purpose is a bias that continues to today. Many a philosophy major have been asked the somewhat insulting question: "Philosophy? What do you plan on doing with that? Why not study something practical?" Perhaps the best answer I have come across was given by Bertrand Russell: "Philosophy is to be studied, not for the sake of any definite answers to its questions, since no definite answers can, as a rule, be known to be true, but rather for the sake of the questions themselves; because these questions enlarge our conception of what is possible, enrich our intellectual imagination and diminish the dogmatic assurance which closes the mind against speculation; but above all because, through the greatness of the universe which philosophy contemplates, the mind also is rendered great, and becomes capable of that union with the universe which constitutes its highest good" (Russell 1959, 161). 26

If theōria is aimed at because it leads to another good (or other goods), then it would not be final, and therefore, would not be the ultimate end that Aristotle is seeking.30

Kraut's framework is particularly useful for demonstrating this point between a life organized around practical excellence and a life organized around contemplation. Contemplation is at the top because it does not lead to any other good. It is the highest good and serves as the governing principle for all the goods below it. Furthermore, the lower goods are required (in varying degrees) for contemplation. A life in which contemplation is the governing principle will have to possess practical excellence ("B") and all the goods below it ("M", "N", "X", "Y",

"Z"). In short, contemplation exemplifies what is best about humans.

Furthermore, although practical excellence ("B"), is a good principle around which to organize one's life, it is not the best principle. Human flourishing will certainly occur, but it will not be as good as possible; it will not best exemplify human flourishing.

It seems necessary at this point to explain what Aristotle means by "contemplation."

Kraut provides a helpful definition: "...[T]o contemplate is to bring to mind the truths of some theoretical discipline. It is not the activity of searching for the truth within some field, but rather a process of reflection on a system of truths already discovered" (Kraut 1989, 73).

"Contemplation" then, must first be distinguished from "inquiry." When an individual engages in inquiry, they are searching for particular truths, within a particular field; they are attempting to derive knowledge or facts about that subject through inquiry. In short, inquiry is actively generating. On the other hand, contemplation is reflecting upon a system of knowledge or facts.

The individual knows various facts about a particular topic and reflects upon them. Kraut

30 To say that contemplation is "useless" or that it lacks a practical purpose does not entail that it is not valuable. Aristotle would agree that contemplation has value for its own sake, but his point is that contemplation does not lead to some other good beyond contemplation. Contemplation just generates further contemplation, and in that sense is "useless." So while contemplation has value, this value does not consist in leading to some other good. 27 understands Aristotle's conception of contemplation as "the activation of the understanding one has achieved when one has acquired ... theoretical wisdom" (Kraut 1989, 73). The process is a kind of hierarchy in which one stage leads to another: inquiry → knowledge/facts/truth → contemplation; where contemplation is the highest level of wisdom.31 Although inquiry is beneath contemplation, that does not imply that Aristotle does not value inquiry; he would certainly regard inquiry as valuable. However, he would view inquiry as subordinate to contemplation, and therefore, not as valuable as contemplation.

So while pleasure fails as a governing principle around which one can organize their life since it is beneath the dignity of man and is no better than the life of a beast, a life organized around noble action elevates man above the beasts. However, if noble action seems capable of being a governing principle, why does Aristotle assert that contemplation is the best activity around which to organize one's life? To be fair, Aristotle never says that noble action fails to serve as such a principle; however, he does think that contemplation works as a governing principle to an eminent and distinctive degree.32

Based on the function argument, Aristotle claims that contemplative "activity is the best

(since not only is intellect [reason] the best thing in us, but the objects of intellect [reason] are the best of knowable objects)" (NE X.7.1177a19-21). Since the mind is the highest part of human beings, the activity of the mind will be the best activity, and therefore, the best life is the one in which individuals can engage in the best activity. According to Aristotle, the best activity

31 Aristotle clearly seems to think that contemplation is the highest activity, but the process does not seem quite as linear as he believes. A more accurate account might be a kind of 'cyclical hierarchy': inquiry → knowledge/facts/truth → contemplation → inquiry.... Contemplation might be the highest kind of activity on the hierarchy, but it seems that one could engage in it, bring various truths to mind, and these truths may reveal new possibilities causing one to start the process of inquiry all over, bringing deeper knowledge/truths. 32 As I mentioned, this is aptly demonstrated by Kraut's diagrams. Not only is contemplation the highest level of the pyramid to which all actions are ultimately directed, it is the only activity that holds this distinction. 28 is contemplation, and a life in which contemplation acts as the governing principle will exemplify what is best about human beings.

It will be worth spelling out in further detail considerations that Aristotle's brings to bear for holding contemplation to be superior to noble action. For example, when a soldier merely acts as a physical being, he is not doing something distinctly human since animals can act as physical beings as well. However, when the soldier contemplates the universe, he is doing something that animals cannot and therefore, contemplation serves as an additional way in which humans are distinct from animals; it further demonstrates that the best life for humans will be a life that is not possible for beasts.33

Furthermore, a soldier defending the city may be exemplifying noble action, but he can only do so if the city is under attack. Noble action is not continuous since in the case of the soldier he can only demonstrate bravery if his life is in danger. Without an enemy to face, his ability to engage in certain kinds of noble actions is diminished, but this is not the case for contemplation. There is always the universe to be contemplated, whereas exemplifying bravery in defence of the city can only occur if an enemy is attacking.

One reason given by Aristotle for the superiority of contemplation over noble action is that "we can contemplate truth more continuously than we can do anything" (NE X.7.1177a21-

22). This claim is based on Aristotle's belief that contemplation is continuous in nature.34 In

X.8, he argues that contemplation is the activity which is perfect human flourishing, basing this claim upon an argument concerning the gods. He assumes that of all beings, the gods are the happiest. However, why are they the happiest? The first possible answer he considers is that the

33 The first way that humans are separated from animals is that humans can engage in practical excellence, whereas animals cannot. 34 By stating that contemplation is more continuous than any other activity, Aristotle means that it is indefinitely uninterrupted. His thought seems to be that the intellect may not be physical. Although your body gets tired, it is possible that your mind does not get tired. 29 gods are happiest because they are virtuous: they engage in activity that is in accordance with the ethical virtues, and doing so makes them the happiest beings. Aristotle rejects this possibility, ridiculing the notion that the activity the gods engage in would be ethical virtue. Such activity is human in nature, and therefore, beneath the gods. So if the activity they engage in is not virtuous activity, in what activity do they engage? The answer Aristotle arrives at is contemplation.35

Since contemplation is the activity the gods engage in, any being which also participates in this activity will be capable of eudaimonia since it is sharing an activity with the gods.36

Based on this implication a hierarchy of flourishing can be created, with the gods at the top (able to achieve perfect flourishing), humans beneath them (able to achieve flourishing but to a lesser degree), and all other things at the bottom (incapable of achieving eudaimonia).

However, this seems to create a problem regarding humans and practical excellence as a governing principle. Aristotle argues that contemplation is the activity which permits individuals to achieve human flourishing, and therefore, a life governed by contemplation would exemplify what is best about humans since it achieves human flourishing to an eminent degree. However,

Aristotle also argues that while practical excellence as a governing principle does not exemplify what is best about humans, it is still a worthwhile principle and will bring individuals a secondary kind of human flourishing. However, how is this possible? How can a life which does not engage in contemplation – i.e. the highest and best activity – still result in eudaimonia?

35 "But that complete happiness is a contemplative activity will appear from the following consideration as well. We assume the gods to be above all other beings blessed and happy; but what sort of actions must we assign to them? Acts of justice? Will not the gods seem absurd if they make contracts and return deposits, and so on? ... If we were to run through them all, the circumstances of action would be found trivial and unworthy of gods. Still, every one supposes that they live and therefore that they are active; we cannot suppose them to sleep like Endymion. Now if you take away from a living being action, and still more production, what is left but contemplation? Therefore the activity of God, which surpasses all others in blessedness, must be contemplative; and of human activities, therefore, that which is most akin to this must be most of the nature of happiness" (NE X.8.1178b8-24). 36 This results in Aristotle arguing that while human beings can achieve eudaimonia, animals cannot since they do not contemplate. 30

Kraut argues that Aristotle's solution lies in the fact that reason is essential for a life organized around practical excellence and a life organized around contemplation but in different ways. When an individual engages in practical reason, they are not also performing theoretical reasoning, rather, due to both being a form of reason, there is a similarity between them.37 In fact, Aristotle draws a comparison between the politician and his political life with that of the gods near the very beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics: "For even if the end is the same for a single man and for a state, that of the state seems at all events something greater and more complete both to attain and to preserve; for though it is worthwhile to attain the end merely for one man, it is finer and more godlike to attain it for a nation or for city-states" (NE I.2.1094b7-

11). Therefore, just as the gods are the standard of good for all individuals, the statesman is the standard of good for his state. So while the individual who lives a philosophical life most closely resembles the gods because he engages in contemplation, the individual who lives a political life resembles the gods as well, but further removed.

With that said, this argument favoring a life governed by contemplation can be explained like this: Contemplation is the most continuous action that human beings can engage in (although it is not infinitely continuous).38 Since only the gods are capable of continuous activity, and since contemplation is the activity that is most continuous for humans, it is divine in nature.

Because it is the only human activity that shares in the divine, it will also be the best activity, and therefore, contemplation exemplifies what is best about humans.

The claim that contemplation as a governing principle for life fulfills its job to an eminent and distinctive degree is clearly demonstrated. Not only does it exemplify what is the best

37 See Kraut (1989), 58-60. 38 By "continuous", Aristotle just means that it can be engaged in without interruption. So an individual can constantly contemplate. For example, you can sit in a chair and contemplate the cosmos from the time you awake until you fall asleep; no supplies are required. 31 activity in human beings, but it shares in the divine. While a life of politics and noble action raises humans above the animals, a life of contemplation – in a sense – raises humans into the realm of the gods. A life focused on pleasure may be beneath the dignity of human beings for

Aristotle, but a life of contemplation raises the dignity of humans into the heavens.

A further consideration that Aristotle provides in favour of contemplation as a governing principle is that contemplation is the most self-sufficient of activities. To return to the example of the soldier, he can only engage in noble acts of bravery if he has the opportunity. He requires an enemy against which he can be brave. Similarly, a generous person will require money or possessions to perform generous actions. In fact, almost all the virtues require some external thing to exercise them properly. The only virtue this does not apply to according to Aristotle is wisdom. While the wise person may contemplate better, or more efficiently with other individuals, the wise person is capable of contemplation by himself, and therefore, contemplation is the most self-sufficient activity.39

By contrast, self-sufficiency is not a characteristic of politics and noble action. As

Aristotle mentions, the virtues often require an external thing to perform them. An individual cannot act generously if there is not anyone with whom one can be generous and aside from wisdom, all of the virtues possess this deficiency. A life organized around practical excellence requires the individual to act in accordance with practical virtue, which means that there must be other people in order to live such a life. After all, it would be tough to practice politics alone and by oneself.40 Therefore, a life governed by practical excellence is dependent in a twofold way:

39 "And the self-sufficiency that is spoken of must belong most to the contemplative activity. For while a wise man, as well as a just man and the rest, needs the necessaries of life, when they are sufficiently equipped with things of that sort the just man needs people towards whom and with whom he shall act justly, and the temperate man, the brave man, and each of the others is in the same case, but the wise man, even when by himself, can contemplate truth, and the better the wiser he is; he can perhaps do so better if he has fellow-workers, but still he is the most self- sufficient" (NE X.7.1177a27-1177b1). 40 Or perhaps it would make politics much easier! 32 first, it is dependent upon there being other people to practice the virtues properly, and second, the life itself only makes sense if there are other people. If politics is concerned with how to organize the community best, it would be useless in a "community of one." Therefore, a life governed by contemplation will be better than others since it does not require any external relationships, and is the most self-sufficient activity in which humans can participate.41

The final consideration that Aristotle gives in favour of contemplation is that contemplation is the most leisure worthy activity. Aristotle argues that "happiness [human- flourishing] is thought to depend on leisure; for we are busy that we may have leisure, and make war that we may live in peace" (NE X.7.1177b4-6). No one fights a war, just for the sake of fighting a war according to Aristotle. Rather, wars are fought to secure peace; they are fought for some other end. Similarly, a life of politics or noble action is not lived for its own sake, but some other end.

With that said, an individual that lives a political life in accord with virtue would certainly be living a worthwhile life. However, such lives "are unleisurely and aim at an end and are not desirable for their own sake" (NE X.7.1177b16-17). Although a political life of noble action in accord with virtue would be a good life for Aristotle, it does not exemplify what is best about humans since it would diminish the amount of leisure the individual had for contemplation. Therefore, Aristotle states that a life of contemplation

seems both to be superior in worth and to aim at no end beyond itself, and to have its pleasure proper to itself (and this augments the activity), and the self- sufficiency, leisureliness, unweariedness (so far as this is possible for man), and all the other attributes ascribed to the blessed man are evidently those connected

41 This does not mean that the contemplative life does not require any external things. There are external goods which are necessary for any life, such as food, water, and the basic requirements of survival: "But, being a man, one will also need external prosperity; for our nature is not self-sufficient for the purpose of contemplation, but our body also must be healthy and must have food and other attention" (NE X.8.1178b32-35). Aristotle's point seems to be that aside from these basic necessities, one can live a contemplative life apart from anything else. The hermit living in the cave requires nothing aside from his mind to engage in contemplation, while the soldier requires some external struggle in which to exercise bravery. 33

with this activity, it follows that this will be the complete happiness of man, if it be allowed a complete term of life (for none of the attributes of happiness is incomplete) (NE X.7.1177b19-26).

Such a life will result in complete eudaimonia for the person who lives it according to Aristotle, and therefore, contemplation as a governing principle exemplifies what is best about human beings.

Aristotle's arguments favouring contemplation as a governing principle may have their flaws, but it is undeniable that his conclusion has had a profound influence on Western philosophy. While this bias toward contemplation begins with the ancient Greeks, the Medieval

Christian philosophers will perpetuate the belief.

1.2 – After Aristotle

Just as Socrates influenced Plato, and Plato influenced Aristotle, Aristotle had a tremendous influence on Medieval Christian philosophy, particularly Saint Augustine and

Thomas Aquinas. As was standard at the time, most "intellectual" writing in Europe was done in

Latin since it allowed the educated to communicate with each other through a common tongue.

While a scientific treatise written in French could only be understood by those who could read

French, writing in Latin allowed one's ideas to reach a much larger audience. The drawback to this method is that when one attempts to translate one language into another, the translator will encounter difficulties in conveying proper meanings of words. If language A and language B both contain words with the same meanings, translating a sentence from one to the other is relatively simple. However, if language A contains words that lack a corresponding word in language B, meaning is often lost in the translation. As a result, a sentence translated into language B may have a very different meaning than its original intent in language A. It is this

34 precise problem that occurred when medieval Christian philosophers translated Aristotle's ancient Greek texts into Latin.

Although the contemplative life has remained relatively unchanged in its characteristics, the political life has experienced a transformation over the course of its philosophical existence, due in large part to the aforementioned translation issues which Hannah Arendt explains in her book, The Human Condition. She begins by setting out the three kinds of lives as distinguished by Aristotle: the bios hedonikos, the bios politikos, and the bios theōrētikos. Arendt explains that the bios politikos of Aristotle referred strictly to a life devoted to political matters. It was concerned solely with the relationship between individuals in society and the state. It was with medieval philosophy that the bios politikos began to lose its original meaning. Arendt points out that although Augustine translates bios politikos as vita negotiosa42 or vita actuosa, which retains its original Greek meaning, later medieval philosophers such as Thomas Aquinas translated

Aristotle's bios politikos (political life) as vita activa (active life). It is at this point historically that the ancient Greek notion of the political life evolved to the active life. While the vita activa still involved political matters as per the Greek notion, it now encompassed a larger range of various active relationships in the world – i.e. commerce, physical labour.43 So while the meaning of one word is often lost in translation, here is a case where an additional meaning is erroneously attached.

Despite this inaccurate translation, in all essentials the Aristotelian categorization survived intact and the medieval philosophers followed Aristotle's lead holding the

42 The latin word negotiosa comes from the latin neg (not) and otium (leisure), so negotiosa literally means a "lack of leisure". Since the bios theōrētikos requires leisure according to Aristotle, and this is retained in the vita contemplativa, it is easy to see how the vita activa, understood as the vita negotiosa, came to be associated with action and activity since its etymology associates it with a lack of leisure. See the "Online Etymology Dictionary", www.etymonline.com. 43 See Arendt 1959, 13-15. 35 contemplative life (translated as vita contemplativa) as superior to the active life (vita activa).

The reason was grounded in the belief put forth by Aristotle that action was secondary to contemplation. Arendt explains that some ancient Greek philosophers such as Aristotle thought this "primacy of contemplation over activity rests on the conviction that no work of human hands can equal in beauty and truth the physical kosmos, which swings in itself in changeless eternity without any interference or assistance from outside, from man or god" (Arendt 1959, 16).

The underlying thought is that a contemplative life is capable of grasping such beauty and truth, and in a way, participating in existence with these attributes. As a result, it is superior to activity since such beauty and truth cannot be reproduced through human endeavours. The existence of things that are in themselves is superior to the existence of things that are through the activity of human beings. The medieval philosophers would largely agree with this assessment by the Greeks, but while the Greeks viewed contemplation of the kosmos apart from any god, the medieval Christians would argue that to contemplate the universe (kosmos) is to contemplate God, providing a further endorsement for the priority of the contemplative life.

This bias toward the vita contemplativa is hardly surprising, since as Arendt points out, it was philosophers who declared the superiority of a contemplative life.44 As a result, priority is given to contemplation, while activity is a secondary consideration, and therefore, the vita activa is defined in terms of the vita contemplativa:

Seen from that perspective [contemplative life], the active way of life is "laborious," the contemplative way is sheer quietness; the active one goes on in public, the contemplative one in the "desert"; the active one is devoted to "the necessity of one's neighbor," the contemplative one to the "vision of God"... [T]hinking aims at and ends in contemplation, and contemplation is not an

44 "However, the enormous superiority of contemplation over activity of any kind, action not excluded, is not Christian in origin. We find it in Plato's political philosophy, where the whole utopian reorganization of polis life is not only directed by the superior insight of the philosopher but has no aim other than to make possible the philosopher's way of life. Aristotle's very articulation of the different ways of life, in whose order the life of pleasure plays a minor role, is clearly guided by the ideal of contemplation" (Arendt 1959, 15). 36

activity but a passivity; it is the point where mental activity comes to rest (Arendt 1971, 6).

The traits associated with each life become their fundamental characteristics, and to interpret the vita activa or vita contemplativa differently is to misunderstand them at their most basic level.

As a result, the priority given to the contemplative life over a life of activity in Western philosophy remained largely unchallenged, until as Arendt thinks, this hierarchical order is reversed by Nietzsche.45 She attempts to re-evaluate the vita activa in The Human Condition, and while she is persuasive, her work seems to have unfortunately failed to ignite an overall re- evaluation of philosophy.

Although Arendt's attempt at a re-evaluation does not appear to have had an impact at the time, it does appear that her idea has percolated down into the present age. Living the life of a thinker is often met with derision while living the life of a laborer is "honest" work. However, one is often encouraged to seek out higher education at universities, despite the fact that the skills learned at higher educational institutions often have little place in laborious, practical,

"honest" work, and are usually more suited to a contemplative life. Further, the line between the active life and the contemplative life is often blurred, with individuals often appearing to participate in both. Although a clear distinction may have been the norm in ancient Greece, the modern world has resulted in the conflation of the two, resulting in new difficulties concerning the characteristics of each classification.46

45 "...the eventual reversal of its hierarchical order in Marx and Nietzsche" (Arendt 1959, 17). By this, Arendt means that the vita activa is viewed as the superior life, followed by the vita contemplativa. While Marx will certainly emphasize the importance of the vita activa, and make it something of an equal to the vita contemplativa (perhaps even superior), I disagree with Arendt's assertion regarding Nietzsche and will return to this in chapter three. Nietzsche certainly thinks that the vita activa is valuable, but he will not place it at the apex of the hierarchy. That position, I argue, will be reserved for the vita creativa. 46 For a life of pleasure, the main goal is pleasure, so a life in which priority is given to pleasure would be a life of pleasure. If the governing principle of a life is knowledge, then it could be classified as a vita contemplativa, even if it also contains laborious activity. The governing principle of the vita activa would perhaps be something like "physical achievement"? 37

With the historical background provided and Aristotle's three possible lives and the reasons why he favours a life of contemplation discussed, I will turn my focus to Nietzsche.47

The next three chapters of this dissertation will examine each of Aristotle's three possible governing principles from the standpoint of Nietzsche's philosophy. Each chapter will show why that particular principle does not exemplify what is best about humans from a Nietzschean perspective. This Nietzschean critique will be two-fold in the sense that I will appeal to what

Nietzsche explicitly writes, and what can be drawn out from his philosophy, for as Nietzsche points out, what a philosopher does not say, can be just as important as what he does say.48

47 Aristotle's argument also seems to allow for a subtle distinction between: "What is the best kind of life for a human being in general?" vs. "What is the best kind of life for a particular human being?" Aristotle seems to acknowledge that not everyone can live a life of contemplation and philosophy – hence the political life being an alternate option. However, he still thinks contemplation (in some form) is required for human flourishing. This distinction will be important to keep in mind, as it will recur in my later discussion of Nietzsche. 48 "The dying Socrates. – I admire the courage and wisdom of Socrates in everything he did, said – and did not say..." (GS: 340). 38

Chapter 2

Suffering and Contentment

In this chapter, I aim to highlight Nietzsche's account of suffering in the stimulus of creative activity. While Aristotle is dismissive of a life governed by pleasure, believing it is beneath human dignity, Nietzsche will dismiss pleasure because it impedes creativity. For

Nietzsche, a life governed by pleasure presupposes an attitude to suffering that is opposed to creativity and creation. Nietzsche thinks there is an integral relationship between creativity and suffering. Not all suffering results in creativity, but Nietzsche asserts that all creativity requires suffering, and as a matter of fact, Nietzsche thinks that we cannot emphasize what is best about us without suffering.

The reason why this is the case is that according to Nietzsche, suffering provides a motivation for human excellence and is the only thing (so far) that stimulates individuals to improve themselves.49 Therefore, people who do not experience and embrace a certain sort of suffering will never achieve anything outstanding. Their lives may be a continuous stream of happiness and contentment, but their existence will be unremarkable. Nietzsche is aware that the vast majority of people will lead unexceptional lives which is why he believes that those individuals who are capable of doing extraordinary things are so valuable. They have the potential to greatly enhance humanity by contributing to culture and civilization. However, to accomplish this, suffering is necessary.

2.1 – Nietzsche's Comrades in Suffering

Nietzsche presents a very radical and paradoxical claim in asserting that suffering is a crucial ingredient concerning what is best about human beings. However, what exactly does he

49 "The discipline of suffering, of great suffering – do you not know that only this discipline has created all enhancements of man so far" (BGE: 225)? 39 mean by "suffering?" One objection to this unusual assertion is that perhaps Nietzsche intends something different from the layman's definition of suffering. Philosophers often develop a new vocabulary for their philosophy and employ common terms with new, original definitions. Is

Nietzsche simply repurposing the word "suffering" in such a manner? Surprisingly, despite the significance of suffering for Nietzsche, he does not provide a definition of what he conceives suffering to consist of in his published writings. However, it is possible to obtain an idea of what

Nietzsche meant, based on certain aphorisms from both the published and unpublished pieces of his corpus. For example, one of his unpublished notes from The Will to Power states:

Type of my disciples. – To those human beings who are of any concern to me I wish suffering, desolation, sickness, ill-treatment, indignities – I wish that they should not remain unfamiliar with profound self-contempt, the torture of self- mistrust, the wretchedness of the vanquished: I have no pity for them, because I wish them the only thing that can prove today whether one is worth anything or not – that one endures (WP: 910, Written between the Spring and Fall of 1887).

This aphorism contains some relevant insights which will prove to be important. The first is that

Nietzsche is not saying that all human beings should suffer. He begins the aphorism by addressing only those individuals who would choose to be a "disciple."50 In his writings,

Nietzsche often acknowledges that there would be few of such individuals, and it is these few whom Nietzsche is addressing. Although all humans experience suffering to some degree in their lives, Nietzsche believes that anyone who wants to be his "disciple" is required to experience suffering in a profound manner.

Secondly, for these few "disciples," he wishes both pains like "suffering, desolation, sickness, ill-treatment, indignities", and distresses such as "self-contempt, ... [and] self-mistrust"

(WP: 910). Based on this passage, there is no reason to think that Nietzsche means anything

50 By "disciple," I just mean those individuals who would be important to Nietzsche; namely, those who understand and affirm his philosophy. I do not mean "disciple" in the sense that those individuals would be devoted to Nietzsche, blindly following his teachings. A "disciple" in this sense would represent the kind of follower Nietzsche would not want. 40 radically different from the standard definition of "suffering." When he discusses "suffering," it is to be interpreted in the common parlance – as the experience of pain and distress – which includes physical suffering, and what could be considered mental suffering.51 So Nietzsche does not interpret suffering in a new, conceptually different way.

The third insight concerning suffering is that individuals demonstrate their value by their capacity to endure suffering. Resilience is a crucial quality for Nietzsche since profound suffering has the potential to break people. Minor suffering, while uncomfortable, usually does not possess the same threat, but it also does not provide the same opportunity for excellence.

According to Nietzsche, an individual's resilience in the face of great suffering demonstrates their potential for creativity and great works of creation.52 It also signals their value. However, just because an individual is of high value does not guarantee that they will actualize their creative potential and provide an enduring contribution to culture.53 The majority of individuals will fail to achieve any work of great creativity, so those who do are exceedingly rare as

Nietzsche acknowledges, and therefore, tremendously valuable.54

51 Nietzsche does not consider mental suffering to be a type different from physical suffering. He believes that all mental suffering is reducible to a physical cause. If someone is experiencing some manner of mental distress, not only is the distress grounded in a physiological root, but the inability to cope with the "psychic distress" is also physiological: "...[E]ven 'psychic suffering' does not seem to be a fact to me at all, but simply an interpretation (causal interpretation) of facts that could not be formulated exactly up till now... If someone cannot cope with his 'psychic suffering', this does not stem from his psyche, to speak crudely; more probably from his stomach... If he 'cannot cope' with an experience, this sort of indigestion is as much physiological as any other..." (GM III: 16). 52 In speaking about great pain, Nietzsche states: "I doubt that such pain makes us "better"; but I know that it makes us more profound" (GS P: 3). 53 There does seem to be a problem with this final point, namely, if Nietzsche believes that the ability to endure great suffering is a sign of high value, why does he regard the religious ascetic with such disdain? Religious ascetics often subject themselves to large amounts of mortification, so should not Nietzsche praise the religious ascetic? This is a problem that will have to wait to be addressed until the final chapter, but its shadow will loom large until then. The short answer to this problem is that the religious ascetic is dangerous to humanity. His project is detrimental to human excellence – it prevents human excellence and encourages mediocrity. Although the ascetic demonstrates high value in his ability to suffer, he misdirects his creative ability and therefore, is dangerous. 54 "...the higher the type of man that a man represents, the greater the improbability that he will turn out well. The accidental, the law of absurdity in the whole economy of mankind, manifests itself most horribly in its destructive effect on the higher men whose complicated conditions of life can only be calculated with great subtlety and difficulty" (BGE: 62). 41

Suffering seems to be at times a kind of good for Nietzsche. It is certainly dubious that suffering is intrinsically good; however, sometimes it does appear to be instrumentally good since it can generate creative potential and motivate human excellence as we will soon see in greater detail.55 Needless to say, this is quite a radical notion. One often views suffering as something to be avoided or at least curtailed, but Nietzsche rejects this common perspective. He values suffering as a psychological tool and as a way of diagnosing someone's type, specifically whether they are life-affirming or life-denying.56 Therefore, Nietzsche's notion of suffering is more complex, interesting, and nuanced.

With that said, a qualification needs to be made regarding suffering. Although Nietzsche famously wrote: "What does not destroy me, makes me stronger" (TI I: 8), this is certainly not true in all cases. While suffering can lead to human enhancement as I will argue, it does seem that certain kinds of suffering may be more valuable than others. To provide a crude example, the pain experienced in one's muscles while lifting weights could be an illustration of suffering leading to human enhancement. The pain experienced while lifting the heavy weight is a sign of impending physical enhancement, however, dealing with the feeling of the pain on a mental level

55 In a soon to be published paper by Christopher Janaway entitled: "Attitudes to Suffering: Parfit and Nietzsche," Janaway argues that suffering is not merely an instrumental good for Nietzsche. It can certainly be instrumentally good at times since it can enhance our well-being, but if the suffering is part of a sequence in which the suffering is meaningless, then we would have reason to not want it and the suffering in this case would be bad. I find Janaway's argument very persuasive in that suffering can be good or bad depending upon the context in which it occurs, and which is why I qualify my remarks by stating that suffering "sometimes appears to be instrumentally good." This is not to say that since suffering is not intrinsically good, it is therefore instrumentally good. That is a much stronger claim than the claim I am putting forward. 56 Nietzsche thinks that people can be classified as one of two possible types: ascending or descending. Ascending individuals are those who hold what Nietzsche would consider to be positive or desirable values. For example, they affirm life (they think this life is worthwhile), they are "yes-saying", and they value suffering. Descending individuals are those who hold what Nietzsche would consider to be negative or undesirable values. For example, they deny life (they believe this life is of little value but assign great value to a transcendent existence), they are "no- saying", and they value contentment and happiness. Nietzsche values ascending individuals, and a quick way to determine if someone is an ascending type is to ask whether they value suffering. Individuals who welcome suffering have a good chance of being ascending, while those who want to avoid suffering and abolish it are descending. Although this method does have some exceptions such as the ascetic priest, Nietzsche thinks it is mostly successful. See TI IX: 33. 42 can also lead to enhancement. Not quitting despite the difficulty of lifting the weight and the pain being experienced trains one to have mental or emotional resilience.

Although such examples do seem to support Nietzsche's assertion, there are plenty of others which appear to undermine his belief. It is unclear how agonizing physical pain, such as

Parfit's example of gripping a red-hot iron would lead to human enhancement (Parfit 2011b,

459). Instances of sadistic torture would inflict extreme suffering upon the individual, but would it be true that the individual is enhanced as a result? It seems doubtful, and it is hard to see how

Nietzsche could defend such instances of extreme suffering as generating human enhancement.

Even if we accept Nietzsche's claim that suffering is a good for some individuals, that does not entail that these individuals would benefit from extreme agony.

A plausible Nietzschean response to this problem seems to be that suffering can lead to enhancement, as long as the suffering is related to an individual's goals. Experiencing sadistic torture does not appear to be suffering that would align with the majority of people's goals, so for these individuals, such instances would probably not make them stronger. However, such an experience could lead to a person's enhancement if it were part of their training for an elite military outfit.

To conclude, based on the earlier aphorism from The Will to Power, Nietzsche believes that suffering is a good for certain individuals. Assuming this is true, how can it be determined if someone will benefit from suffering? What is the litmus test that separates individuals that will endure, from individuals that will perish? Does Nietzsche provide any insight to aid in this taxonomy of types?

2.2 – Two Kinds of Sufferers

In §270 of Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche states that an individual's capability to endure great suffering helps to determine his order or rank.57 Individuals that can tolerate great suffering will be ranked higher than those individuals who are unable to withstand it, and that an individual's ability to endure suffering depends on their attitude toward it. In short, "Profound suffering makes noble; it separates" (BGE: 270). These published remarks support the unpublished aphorism from The Will to Power in the previous section. Again, Nietzsche believes that suffering helps to reveal an important fact about people; specifically, he thinks that an individual's capacity for suffering reflects the individual's type. There are two significant passages which justly support this thought. One occurs in The Gay Science where Nietzsche states:

But there are two kinds of sufferers: first, those who suffer from the over-fullness of life – they want a Dionysian art and likewise a tragic view of life, a tragic insight – and then those who suffer from the impoverishment of life and seek rest, stillness, calm seas, redemption from themselves through art and knowledge, or intoxication, convulsions, anaesthesia, and madness... He that is richest in the fullness of life, the Dionysian god and man, cannot only afford the sight of the terrible and questionable but even the terrible deed and any luxury of destruction, decomposition, and negation. In his case, what is evil, absurd, and ugly seems, as it were, permissible, owing to an excess of procreating, fertilizing energies that can still turn any desert into lush farmland. Conversely, those who suffer most and are poorest in life would need above all mildness, peacefulness, and goodness in thought as well as deed – if possible, also a god who would be truly a god for the sick, a healer and savior... (GS: 370).

The critically important point in this passage is that while Nietzsche believes that all humans suffer, their suffering can be classified as one of two types: suffering from the over-fullness of

57 I say "helps to determine," because it seems that this is not the only characteristic which determines an individual's rank. The full quotation is: "The spiritual haughtiness and nausea of every man who has suffered profoundly – it almost determines the order of rank how profoundly human beings can suffer..." (BGE: 270). Nietzsche makes it clear in the quotation that suffering "almost determines" the ranking, which implies that while the ability to suffer profoundly means the individual is of a high rank, it is not the sole determining factor. It is possible – as the ascetic priest demonstrates – to endure great suffering, and yet not be a high rank. 44 life, and suffering from the impoverishment of life.58 To be clear, Nietzsche does not think that there are two different kinds of suffering in the way that apples and oranges are two distinct kinds of fruit. To reiterate, all suffering is physiologically grounded for Nietzsche – even mental suffering – so there is just suffering. What Nietzsche is describing with this distinction between

"suffering from the over-fullness of life" and "suffering from the impoverishment of life" is the attitude and capacity an individual possesses toward life and suffering. It is not that there are two types of suffering, rather, there are two types of sufferer which he makes clear at the beginning of the passage. The way an individual reacts to suffering will reveal the type of sufferer they happen to be.

Individuals who suffer from over-fullness are depicted as having an excess of strength.

They are resilient since they can withstand terrible sights and deeds and not crumble under their weight. Nietzsche is not clear about whether these terrible deeds are done to the individual, or done by the individual, and whether they are done to himself or others, but it is likely that he is implying all of these possible interpretations. Further, while individuals suffering from an impoverishment of life may cover or avert their eyes from these evil things as a way of demonstrating their inability to deal with these things, individuals with an over-fullness of life can absorb these evils unflinchingly since their "procreating, fertilizing energies" – their creative energies – can be called into action to transform these evils into something beneficial.59

58 For Nietzsche, suffering is necessary, but it is not primary as it is with Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer bases his entire metaphysics on suffering, whereas Nietzsche dismisses that metaphysical framework and grounds suffering as a stimulus for creativity. 59 This quotation provides another reason why Nietzsche values suffering from an over-fullness of life, namely, it generates creation and creativity. His use of the words "procreating" and "fertilizing" weigh heavily toward such an interpretation, as does the imagery of transforming a desert into a lush farmland. Nietzsche's assertion that suffering from over-fullness is valuable because it is not only a demonstration of strength and activity, but also because it has the potential for creation. Those who suffer from an impoverishment of life lack the energy necessary to engage in creative activity. 45

In other words, it is the attitude an individual has toward suffering that reveals their type.

The individual that can endure great suffering and persevere despite it sublimates their suffering into productive, creative endeavours. Their suffering is akin to birth pangs in the sense that it is a sign that the individual needs to bring something forth.60 I will return to this point later in the chapter.

On the other hand, individuals who suffer from an impoverishment of life are depicted as lacking strength and resilience. While sufferers from over-fullness can endure what is evil, absurd, and ugly, sufferers from impoverishment require goodness in thought and deed, the implication being that anything other than goodness would be too much for them to endure.

These individuals find a passive existence a necessity. Further, their goal seems to be merely to preserve life, while their counterparts seek to enhance it.

Nietzsche's remarks in Gay Science §370 agree with those quoted above from The Will to

Power. In both passages, both types of sufferers suffer, but only sufferers from over-fullness react to suffering in a constructive manner. These types of sufferers are the ones who Nietzsche is most concerned about since they are the ones who will employ their creative energies in a positive and generative way. Their capacity to endure great suffering and not shrink from it distinguishes them as noble and demonstrates their high value.

In On the Genealogy of Morals Nietzsche famously discusses ressentiment, the nobles, and the slaves. In describing slaves and slave morality, he writes that 'happiness' "manifests itself as essentially a narcotic, an anaesthetic, rest, peace, 'sabbath', relaxation of the mind and stretching of the limbs, in short as something passive" (GM I: 10). Comparing this passage to

Nietzsche's characterization of those who suffer from an impoverishment of life, makes it easy to

60 "But that the creator may be, suffering is needed and much change. Indeed, there must be much bitter dying in your life, you creators. Thus are you advocates and justifiers of all impermanence. To be the child who is newly born, the creator must also want to be the mother who gives birth and the pangs of the birth-giver" (Z II: "Blessed"). 46 see the similarities. Nietzsche uses many of the same words to describe those who possess a slavish disposition, with those who suffer from an impoverishment of life.

A further parallel can be drawn regarding those who suffer from over-fullness. In

Geneology, Nietzsche describes the nobles as "mad, absurd, ... unpredictab[le], ... [having] unconcern and scorn for safety, body, life, comfort, their shocking cheerfulness and depth of delight in all destruction, in all the debauches of victory and cruelty..." (GM I: 11). Again,

Nietzsche uses similar language and imagery in his description of the nobles as with those who suffer from over-fullness. So while Nietzsche may have replaced the terms describing the two types of "sufferers", their characteristics are the same. 61

To conclude, Nietzsche regards those who suffer from an impoverishment of life as being of little value and detrimental to humanity and human excellence due to their inability to endure profound suffering. Further, those who suffer from an over-fullness of life demonstrate their capacity to withstand great suffering and are therefore highly valued by Nietzsche since suffering can be beneficial for them by enhancing their generative, creative energies.

2.3 – Greatness and Suffering

While experienced by everyone, suffering is only beneficial for some, specifically those who suffer as a result from an over-fullness of life. Their disposition allows them to endure in the face of difficulties, and to positively affect the world. For Nietzsche, this capability is a sign

61 In the 1886 "Attempt at a Self-Criticism" in The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche makes a few references to suffering from over-fullness: "...Is there a pessimism of strength? An intellectual predilection for the hard, gruesome, evil, problematic aspect of existence, prompted by well-being, by overflowing health, by the fullness of existence? Is it perhaps possible to suffer precisely from overfullness? The sharp-eyed courage that tempts and attempts, that craves the frightful as the enemy, the worthy enemy, against whom one can test one's strength" (BT ASC: 1)?; "...What, then, would be the origin of tragedy? Perhaps joy, strength, overflowing health, overgreat fullness" (BT ASC: 4)?; "Indeed, the whole book knows only an artistic meaning and crypto-meaning behind all events – a "god," if you please, but certainly only an entirely reckless and amoral artist-god who wants to experience, whether he is building or destroying, in the good and in the bad, his own joy and glory – one who, creating worlds, frees himself from the distress of fullness and overfullness and from the affliction of the contradictions compressed in his soul" (BT ASC: 5). All of these descriptions sound very similar to that from The Gay Science. 47 of strength, and the greater an individual's ability to endure suffering – and inflict it – the greater their strength. However, what is so important about a person's capacity to endure great suffering? Why does Nietzsche believe the ability to endure great suffering is an important characteristic? As I briefly mentioned, Nietzsche thinks that suffering can help stimulate human excellence. He writes in Beyond Good and Evil §225:

The discipline of suffering, of great suffering – do you not know that only this discipline has created all enhancements of man so far? That tension of the soul in unhappiness which cultivates its strength, its shudders face to face with great ruin, its inventiveness and courage in enduring, persevering, interpreting, and exploiting suffering, and whatever has been granted to it of profundity, secret, mask, spirit, cunning, greatness – was it not granted to it through suffering, through the discipline of great suffering? In man creature and creator are united... (BGE: 225).

As we have seen, Nietzsche draws a connection between suffering and creation. When an individual suffers, this suffering generates creative potential. All enhancements of humanity are acts of creation, and so far have only resulted from suffering. An individual can improve himself and make himself into something greater, but it comes at the cost of great suffering. I will explain exactly how this process takes place later in the chapter, but for now, I simply want to acknowledge that Nietzsche believes suffering can help motivate excellence in human beings.

With the significant connection between human suffering and human enhancement introduced, it is important to note that Nietzsche does not think that human excellence is merely a by-product of suffering. Just because a given individual suffers, that does not mean they will become better. Nietzsche emphasizes that great suffering is required at both the beginning and end of the previous quotation. It is only this kind of suffering that possesses the creative potential for human enhancement. An aphorism from The Gay Science supports this notion:

What belongs to greatness. – Who will attain anything great if he does not find in himself the strength and the will to inflict great suffering? Being able to suffer is the least thing; weak women and even slaves often achieve virtuosity in that. But

not to perish of internal distress and uncertainty when one inflicts great suffering and hears the cry of this suffering – that is great, that belongs to greatness (GS: 325).

Again, Nietzsche is making a distinction between suffering and great suffering, and he is chiefly concerned with great suffering, not just the ability to suffer. Everyone suffers, but not everyone can greatly suffer. Few individuals can endure such a state, but it is precisely this state which can breed enhancements in man and produce greatness.

It is important to note that based on The Gay Science §325, it may appear that Nietzsche is advocating the infliction of suffering on others, and such a barbaric notion should provide pause, causing us to carefully consider the implications of such a position. Scholars are often critical of Nietzsche's philosophy for seeming to promote subjugation and oppression, and his remarks regarding the infliction of suffering do little to discourage such an interpretation.62

However, does Nietzsche believe that individuals should purposely hurt and inflict pain upon one another? Such a proposition seems repulsive, and Nietzsche would concur. While Nietzsche does endorse the infliction of suffering, he does not state that one must inflict it upon other people. What Nietzsche does endorse is the infliction of suffering upon one's self. He makes it quite clear that "the state in which we hurt others is rarely as agreeable, in an unadulterated way, as that in which we benefit others; it is a sign that we are still lacking power, or it shows a sense of frustration in the face of this poverty..." (GS: 13). Purposely harming others and making them suffer is contemptible for Nietzsche. It is quite easy to inflict suffering on others, but inflicting it upon ourselves requires great strength. One must have a strong will and ample fortitude to seek out and purposely inflict harm upon themselves, and further, not to perish or surrender to this

62 For example, "If there is anything in the recent "Nietzschean" era that comes close to an embodiment of "the will to power", it is Hitler's life and political career" (Stern 1979, 120). 49 self-directed cruelty. However, if one is to promote human enhancement and excellence, one must be willing to endure the infliction of suffering upon one's self.

Three points have come to the fore that need to be addressed: the first is that Nietzsche associates great suffering with the attainment of something great. Second, merely possessing the capacity to suffer – and suffer greatly – is not sufficient for greatness. Lastly, Nietzsche once again reinforces his belief that being able to withstand and inflict suffering, to be resilient in its presence, is something valuable.

Regarding the first point, Nietzsche often ascribes the quality of "greatness" to works, deeds, and individuals. What exactly does he mean by "greatness?" In an unpublished note from

The Philosopher, he writes: "We admire what is great, which is, of course, also what is not normal... We have the impression of greatness only when we add together a great many effects and view them as a unity; i.e. by means of this unity we produce greatness" (P: 65). Years later he states: "...the concept of greatness entails being noble... Precisely this shall be called greatness: being capable of being as manifold as whole, as ample as full" (BGE: 212). Nietzsche associates greatness with rareness and nobility which implies that it is something excellent, valuable, desirable.63 "Greatness" is something that humans should seek and admire, but as

Nietzsche points out, so far greatness is only attainable through the infliction of great suffering.

What this seems to suggest is that all greatness requires great suffering. An achievement is only considered great, if it is the result of great suffering. This claim presents an interesting question:

If an individual attains something "great" without suffering, is the achievement still considered

"great?" To put it another way, must an individual experience great suffering in order to produce a great achievement? Is it possible to produce a great work of art without great suffering? Based

63 Nietzsche's concept of "greatness" will be particularly important when discussing the higher types and genius in chapter five. 50 on Nietzsche's writings, the answer is no. Great suffering seems to be necessary for greatness, and the greater the suffering one endures, the greater the achievement.64 The connection between suffering and greatness will be explored more in chapter five, but for now, it is only necessary to point out the link between great suffering and greatness.

The second point – that the individual's capacity for suffering does not guarantee greatness – is important because Nietzsche wants to clarify that just because a person suffers greatly, that does not necessarily mean what they achieve is great. He aptly uses the example of a slave to demonstrate his point.65 Nietzsche seems to be arguing that the capacity to suffer is a rather insignificant ability, and even those people of "lowest" status in society can achieve a high level of competency in it. However, just because someone is highly practiced in the art of suffering, that does not mean they will produce anything great. As I have mentioned, merely suffering is not enough to produce greatness, rather, greatness is only produced through great suffering. However, even if an individual greatly suffers, that does not necessarily mean they will produce anything of greatness. Greatness is only achieved when an individual can inflict great suffering and endure.

Resilience in the face of suffering is paramount for Nietzsche, as I have hopefully demonstrated by now. An individual's ability to remain unbroken and defiant when experiencing great suffering is an important characteristic since it signifies that such individuals suffer from an over-fullness of life – i.e. they are noble. Such individuals must be preserved and providing

64 An analogy can be made between Nietzsche's conceptions of greatness and great health. For Nietzsche, great health is the overcoming of sickness. Possessing great health does not mean that you are not sick or do not get sick, rather, it is the overcoming of sickness. It is the same with greatness; greatness is the overcoming of great suffering. For example, "...the great health – that one does not merely have but also acquires continually, and must acquire because one gives it up again and again, and must give it up" (GS: 382); "...Illness is the answer every time we begin to doubt our right to our task – every time we begin to make things easier for ourselves. Strange and at the same time terrible! It is our alleviations for which we have to atone the most! And if we afterwards want to return to health, we have no choice: we have to burden ourselves more heavily than we have ever been burdened before..." (HH II.P: 4). 65 While unfortunately being rather chauvinistic and including weak women... 51 them with the optimal conditions for enhancing life is extremely important. Since they suffer from an over-fullness of life, they can change the world for the better. Therefore, the ability to endure great suffering and not perish is considered highly valuable for Nietzsche.66

2.4 – A Meaning for Suffering

As we have seen, Nietzsche does not mean anything different from suffering; it is simply the feeling of pain or distress, and uncontroversially, it is experienced by everyone. But why?

What is the meaning of suffering? Buddhism posits that suffering is just a part of existence. It is something that everyone experiences, but there is a path that leads to its cessation. Christianity teaches that suffering is the result of original sin, and there is salvation to be found in a transcendent world. Both religions explain that we suffer for a reason and that we can escape suffering by following a particular path. Of course, such promises are made by many faiths.

Nietzsche presents a very different answer to the question of suffering, writing:

but suffering itself was not his [man's] problem, instead, the fact that there was no answer to the question he screamed, 'Suffering for what?' Man, the bravest animal and most prone to suffer, does not deny suffering as such: he wills it, he even seeks it out, provided he is shown a meaning for it, a purpose of suffering. The meaninglessness of suffering, not the suffering, was the curse that has so far blanketed mankind... (GM III: 28).

Nietzsche gives what can be interpreted as a very nihilistic view in this short passage from

Genealogy. He proposes that there is no, absolute meaning or purpose for suffering. Due to this lack of justification, humanity sought out any reason it could to explain why it suffers. The most

66 Again, the capacity to endure in the face of great suffering is an outstanding quality, and The Gay Science §325 and §370, and Beyond Good and Evil §225 support and validate the unpublished aphorism from The Will to Power §910. It is always dangerous to rely on an unpublished writing to support an argument since the writing could be unpublished by the author for a variety of reasons, the most significant being that the author changed his mind. However, it seems that in this case there is support among the published aphorisms that lend credence to The Will to Power §910, and dismissing it as unreliable seems foolish. 52 successful meaning took the form of the ascetic ideal.67 Because human beings are unable to live up to the strict demands of the ascetic ideal as dictated by the divine, humans will suffer as a consequence. However, even those individuals who do manage to follow successfully the ascetic ideal will suffer, since following the ideal also requires one to suffer. Christianity would eventually equate the amount of suffering with our reward: the more an individual suffers in this life, the greater his reward in the next.68

For a long time, this Christian metaphysical explanation was extremely successful since it asserted that the justification for an individual's suffering is due to God. However, such an explanation is inadequate for Nietzsche since it is grounded on the existence of a divine being.

Nietzsche's succinct declaration: "God is dead" (GS: 125) removed this metaphysical justification for suffering, and by doing so, it again raised the problem concerning the purpose of suffering. If belief in the existence of God is no longer an acceptable tenet, then the meaning and purpose it supplied to suffering is also no longer acceptable since it was grounded in God and the ascetic ideal. Once again, the question of suffering arises. How can suffering be justified if there is no absolute meaning or purpose for suffering?69

Nietzsche believes that the death of God allows for two possible responses to this question: either there is nothing that justifies human suffering, or a new reason must be put forth to ascribe meaning and purpose to suffering. The first possibility is detrimental for humanity according to Nietzsche. If human suffering is indeed meaningless, it leads to nihilism – particularly passive nihilism – which is an outcome that Nietzsche thinks we must avoid.

67 "Allow me to present the real state of affairs in contrast to this: the ascetic ideal springs from the protective and healing instincts of a degenerating life, which uses every means to maintain itself and struggles for its existence..." (GM III: 13). 68 "When Jesus heard this, he said to him, “One thing you still lack. Sell all that you have and distribute to the poor, and you will have treasure in heaven; and come, follow me”" (Luke 18:22). 69 As Heidegger puts it: "If God as the suprasensory ground and goal of all reality is dead, if the suprasensory world of the Ideas has suffered the loss of its obligatory and above it its vitalizing and upbuilding power, then nothing more remains to which man can cling and by which he can orient himself" (Heidegger 1977, 61). 53

Therefore, the only way to prevent this suicidal nihilism is to provide human suffering with a new meaning and purpose. However, what is this new meaning? The answer Nietzsche endorses is creation and creativity. He presents this new meaning in Zarathustra:

Creation – that is the great redemption from suffering, and life's growing light. But that the creator may be, suffering is needed and much change. Indeed, there must be much bitter dying in your life, you creators. Thus are you advocates and justifiers of all impermanence. To be the child who is newly born, the creator must also want to be the mother who gives birth and the pangs of the birth-giver (Z II: "Blessed").

By making creation and creativity the new meaning of humanity's suffering, Nietzsche accomplishes two goals. First, he is preventing passive nihilism by providing a new meaning and purpose for suffering. Second, this new meaning establishes the creation of life-enhancing and life-affirming characteristics as the new goal for humanity. Organizing one's life around creativity as the governing principle justifies suffering and grounds the meaning of suffering regarding "this world," instead of "other-worldly" metaphysical terms.

As I have demonstrated, suffering is necessary for Nietzsche, since it allows for the enhancement of life – particularly suffering from an over-fullness of life. However, how exactly can suffering improve people and contribute to human excellence? Many situations can demonstrate how suffering may be required to improve someone's condition.70 However, there are plenty of counterexamples which show that suffering can be detrimental and produce such a deleterious effect to the individual that it outweighs any possible enhancement. Nietzsche does not seem particularly interested in such counterexamples. He is much more interested in those exceptional individuals that not only excel despite their suffering but excel because of their suffering. Some people experience an event that causes them tremendous suffering, but rather

70 The thought that "suffering is beneficial" is not too difficult to imagine. For example, various medical treatments produce intense suffering but are beneficial since they help cure diseases – i.e. radiation and chemotherapy for the treatment of cancer. 54 than allowing that incident to cripple themselves, they use it as motivation to achieve their goals.71 They sublimate their suffering into something positive instead of permitting it to dictate their life negatively. In other words, the individual justifies their suffering by creating something out of it. It is this sublimation of suffering that Nietzsche believes can result in greatness since it leads to human enhancement, and it cannot be achieved without suffering.72 If this is the case, how might this process work?

2.5 – Suffering as Stimulus

Nietzsche does not provide a recipe of how suffering can be used to promote human excellence; such a thing would be ridiculous, but it is possible to create a general framework based on what he does state. A plausible way of explaining the process is as follows: When we are suffering, we are in a state of pain, discomfort, and unhappiness. This state is not something that we want to persist, so we look for a way to escape it since being unhappy and in pain is not a desirable state. This unhappiness makes us susceptible to what Nietzsche calls a "tension of the soul" (BGE: 225), wherein we devise means of extricating ourselves from these states of suffering. The methods we invent increase our capabilities and enable us to overcome the limitations contributing to our unhappiness by enhancing ourselves.

Discontent illuminates our weaknesses and inadequacies by bringing them to conscious awareness, providing us with the opportunity to improve ourselves. When we are in a state of contentment and satisfaction, these deficiencies do not trouble us; they are "things we can live with" so to speak. Human beings often gravitate toward complacency – or as Nietzsche will put it, "people are lazy" – which results in them abstaining from improvement and furthermore, fails

71 In other words, such individuals experience suffering from an overabundance, and this overabundance provides them with the capacity to accomplish things that those who lack an abundance cannot. See GS §370. 72 As we will see, suffering does not guarantee enhancement, but merely allows for the possibility. It must be the correct type of suffering. 55 to benefit humanity. To avoid these unhelpful outcomes, Nietzsche believes that we must learn to seek out and exploit our suffering, sublimating it into something beneficial – not only for ourselves but all humanity. This sublimation of suffering is an act of creation and creativity since we invent a means by which we can escape our state of discontent.

Therefore, suffering is the stimulus that provides the necessary motivation for self- overcoming and explains why Nietzsche regards happiness, contentment, and pleasure as possessing little value. Since suffering can motivate us to improve ourselves through self- overcoming, the absence of suffering would fail to provide the necessary stimulus for self- improvement. If we are happy and content, there is no reason to improve ourselves or our situation, and we remain in a state of stasis. We certainly do not want to lose these pleasant states, so making ourselves suffer is not desirable. Because states like happiness and contentment fail to generate the necessary motivation to improve ourselves, Nietzsche argues that they lead to the degeneration and decadence of the individual, and ultimately, humanity.73

The Nietzschean process I have described of suffering-discontentment-overcoming, finds a parallel with Charles Sanders Peirce's process of doubt-inquiry-belief. In "The Fixation of

Belief," Peirce argues for the scientific method as the best way of settling differences of opinion.

He begins by stating that everyone has a set of various beliefs, and these beliefs produce accompanying habits or ways of acting. However, a belief can be challenged when it encounters a differing belief. This conflict between beliefs produces a state of doubt in which the person is unsure which belief is correct. When this happens, the individual will attempt to determine which belief is true through inquiry. This inquiry may involve experimentation and research. If

73 ""Alas, the time is coming when man will no longer give birth to a star. Alas, the time of the most despicable man is coming, he that is no longer able to despise himself. Behold, I show you the last man. 'What is love? What is creation? What is longing? What is a star?' thus asks the last man, and he blinks" (Z P: 5). 56 this inquiry produces new information, it may be enough to cause the individual to accept a new belief (or reject the proposed new belief).

According to Peirce: "The irritation of doubt is the only immediate motive for the struggle to attain belief" (Peirce 1877, 114). If there is doubt concerning a particular belief, then the struggle to discover if the belief is true is motivated by doubt. If there is no doubt, then there is no inquiry or struggle and the individual remains in their current state of belief.

Similarly, for Nietzsche, an individual's current state of contentment, happiness, or well- being may be interrupted by suffering. This suffering causes the individual to experience discontentment in their situation. They desire to escape this suffering since it is not a desirable state, so the individual will attempt to find ways to change their circumstances due to this discontent. In doing so, the individual is seeking a way to overcome their undesirable state; they are attempting to overcome resistance. If a way is discovered, discontentment and suffering cease for the time being and the individual enters a new state of contentment, happiness, or well- being, and the individual is enhanced as a result of discovering this new way. So according to

Nietzsche's process, suffering causes the individual to become discontent with their state of being, and it is suffering that provides the necessary motivation for self-overcoming which can result in the promotion of human excellence. When we are free from suffering, the desire for self-overcoming ceases, just as when an individual is free from doubt in Peirce's process, there is no motivation to attain a state of belief.74

74 The process I just described for Nietzsche finds an analog from an aphorism in Twilight of the Idols. While not exactly what I describe, it sounds remarkably similar: "...To derive something unknown from something familiar relieves, comforts, and satisfies, besides giving a feeling of power. With the unknown, one is confronted with danger, discomfort, and care; the first instinct is to abolish these painful states. First principle: any explanation is better than none. Since at bottom it is merely a matter of wishing to be rid of oppressive representations, one is not too particular about the means of getting rid of them: the first representation that explains the unknown as familiar feels so good that one "considers it true"" (TI VI: 5). 57

Although there are surely differences between Peirce's process and the process that I believe Nietzsche envisions, the basic structure is the same. The most important difference is that while Peirce's process attempts to fix a set of beliefs and achieve a stable permanency of ideas (ideally, there will be a point where doubt concerning a particular belief is unlikely),

Nietzsche's process is continuous and unending.75 Unlike doubt, suffering will always intrude upon an individual, and so it must be continuously overcome. As long as it is overcome, the individual will be enhanced; however, it is possible that someone will be unable to overcome a state of suffering. Even the strongest and cleverest individuals will eventually encounter resistance which they fail to overcome.76

To say that suffering is important for Nietzsche's philosophy would be an understatement.

By now it should be evident that it is a crucial component to his philosophy. Not only is it a motivating stimulus for human enhancement and excellence, but it is also closely linked to creation and creativity, in that these things give meaning and purpose to suffering. If Nietzsche believes that creativity is the governing principle that should organize one's life, then one must accept the necessity of suffering. Accepting creativity as one's governing principle would entail that one's life would be incompatible with a life devoted to pleasure. If one's life is organized around pleasure, suffering would be minimized and avoided. Since Nietzsche believes human enhancement is only possible (so far), as a result of suffering, then a life devoted to pleasure would be a life of little or no enhancement. Nietzsche would abhor such an outcome. Based on what I have said so far, it is clearly implied that Nietzsche would dismiss the capacity for pleasure as what is best about humans, and a life organized around and devoted to pleasure is a life of little value.

75 "Whoever reaches his ideal transcends it eo ipso" (BGE: 73). 76 When this occurs, what happens to the individual? The obvious answer is that they perish. 58

Regardless, I will spend the rest of the chapter examining what Nietzsche explicitly states about pleasure and a life devoted to it, to further strengthen my claim that he would dismiss pleasure as a governing principle for humanity.

2.6 – Suffering and Hedonism

So far I have said a lot about suffering, but very little about pleasure and this seems like an imbalance that must be corrected if a life governed by pleasure is to be dismissed by

Nietzsche as exemplifying what is best about human beings.

The first problem that presents itself has to do with the very concept of "pleasure". What do we mean when we speak about "pleasure?" While the answer may seem obvious, G.E.M.

Anscombe points out that:

[t]he ancients found this concept pretty baffling. It reduced Aristotle to sheer babble about "the bloom on the cheek of youth" because, for good reasons, he wanted to make it out both identical with and different from the pleasurable activity. Generations of modern philosophers found this concept quite unperplexing, and it reappeared in the literature as a problematic one only a year or two ago when Ryle wrote about it (Anscombe 1958, 3).

Everyone claims to know what pleasure is, but when they are pressed to explain, they often discover that it is more difficult than they thought. Unfortunately, Nietzsche does not provide a definition of "pleasure," so any Nietzschean conception of pleasure has to be constructed around what he alludes to in his writings.

A life organized around pleasure as a governing principle can take a variety of forms.

For the purpose of this dissertation, I will first deal with psychological hedonism and then deal with ethical hedonism (in the form of hedonistic utilitarianism) as presented by Bentham and

Mill as the model on which to demonstrate the implications that Nietzsche's conception of suffering has upon the value of a life of pleasure. My reason for using hedonic utilitarianism and focusing on sensory pleasure is quite simple: this was the form of hedonism that Nietzsche was

59 familiar with, and it is the form that he explicitly critiques. While I could engage with other forms such as attitudinal hedonism, that would take me too far beyond the scope of my project. I am certain that Nietzsche would have ways of answering these other forms, but that is a project for another time.77

I will demonstrate the impact that Nietzsche's conception of suffering will have on a life governed by pleasure in two ways: first, I will apply Nietzsche's notion of suffering to the life of pleasure to show how Nietzsche could critique such a life. Second, I will examine what

Nietzsche writes regarding pleasure as a governing principle by examining what he writes about hedonism. In doing so, I will show that Nietzsche implicitly, and explicitly dismisses a life governed by pleasure as exemplifying what is best about humans.

According to Bentham's hedonistic utilitarianism, an action is morally right if the action produces the most utility (when compared to other possible actions). He defines utility as "that property in any object, whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness, (all this in the present case comes to the same thing) or (what comes again to the same thing) to prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness to the party whose interest is considered..." (Bentham 1965, 2). For Bentham, utility, benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, and happiness are all the same thing; when we speak about one, we are speaking about all. The same applies to disutility, pain, mischief, evil, and unhappiness.78 Therefore, pleasure for

Bentham is anything that is good, profitable, produces happiness, benefit, and advantage, while

77 It is important to keep in mind that I am not arguing for what makes a life intrinsically good or what is a Good Life, rather, my argument is concerned with what governing principle exemplifies what is best about humans. All forms of hedonism would argue that pleasure is that governing principle. 78 Bentham makes this clear in Chapter IV, writing: "The same process is alike applicable to pleasure and pain, in whatever shape they appear: and by whatever denomination they are distinguished: to pleasure, whether it be called good (which is properly the cause or instrument of pleasure) or profit (which is distant pleasure, or the cause or instrument of distant pleasure,) or convenience, or advantage, benefit, emolument, happiness, and so forth: to pain, whether it be called evil, (which corresponds to good) or mischief, or inconvenience, or disadvantage, or loss, or unhappiness, and so forth" (Bentham 1965, 31-32). 60 pain is evil and produces unhappiness, loss, and disadvantage. The association of utility and pleasure is made even more apparent by Mill, who writes:

Those who know anything about the matter are aware that every writer, from Epicurus to Bentham, who maintained the theory of utility, meant by it, not something to be contradistinguished from pleasure, but pleasure itself, together with exemption from pain; and instead of opposing the useful to the agreeable or the ornamental, have always declared that the useful means these, among other things (Mill 1965, 256).79

Again, pleasure is regarded as useful and a requirement for happiness by hedonistic utilitarianism.

So while Bentham and Mill fail to provide a precise definition of "pleasure," they seem to define it through other concepts in much the same way that Nietzsche defines "suffering" in The

Will To Power. While this definition of pleasure may not be the most satisfying, it does provide a starting point from which we can begin a Nietzschean critique.

Jeremy Bentham famously begins The Principles of Morals and Legislation by stating that: "Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do" (Bentham 1965, 1). In other words, it is the total utility value (total net pleasure) of an act's consequences that determine if an act is morally right. Although hedonistic utilitarianism has its fair share of philosophical problems, Bentham's assertion that we seek out pleasure and avoid pain appears self-evident and incontrovertible.

Bentham's assertion also commits him to psychological hedonism – that all human behaviour is motivated by the pursuit of pleasure or the avoidance of pain. Is psychological hedonism correct? Are human beings motivated to seek out pleasure and avoid pain? Does pleasure and pain "govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think..." (Ibid.) as Bentham

79 Mill elaborates further stating: "By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure" (Mill 1965, 257). 61 asserts? While the popular answer may be "yes," this is not a demonstration of proof. Nietzsche certainly does not agree with psychological hedonism, stating in Twilight of the Idols: "If we have our own why of life, we shall get along with almost any how. Man does not strive for pleasure; only the Englishman does" (TI I: 12). Nietzsche's point is that people will accept whatever circumstances are required if they have a purpose in their life. If circumstances necessitate that the individual experience pleasure to achieve their goal, then the individual will accept that requirement; if the situation entails the individual to suffer greatly to fulfill their purpose, then the individual will accept that condition. People will often inflict great suffering upon themselves to accomplish their goals, doing anything that is required. If people strive for pleasure as Bentham and psychological hedonism asserts, their existence would be no better than an animal, since their purpose in life would fail to aim for anything more transcendent.80

Nietzsche's remark that only the Englishman strives for pleasure is an attack on this form of psychological hedonism and those who believe it is correct. He is calling into question the value placed on pleasure and the disvalue put on pain. In two sentences, Nietzsche casts doubt on

Bentham's claim regarding psychological hedonism, making what seemed like a self-evident and incontrovertible fact, into a dubious proposition.81

Further support for this critique of psychological hedonism is given by Ivan Soll's reading of the first essay of the Genealogy. According to Soll, Nietzsche begins the Genealogy by providing a genealogy of psychological hedonism to contrast it with his own psychological

80 Mill attempts to counter the argument that a life of pleasure "is worthy only of swine" (Mill 1965, 258) by distinguishing between higher and lower pleasures, and that while beasts may only be capable of lower pleasures, humans are capable of both, meaning that happiness for a human is quite distinct from the happiness of an animal. Nietzsche's critique aims to show that even if Mill is correct regarding differences in the quality of pleasure, there is no fundamental difference between pursuing higher or lower pleasures. The individual is still merely seeking pleasure, as a pig seeking truffles. At bottom, both the human and the pig want pleasure for its own sake. 81 Fyodor Dostoevsky makes a similar observation through his "Underground Man" in Notes from Underground, writing: "Maybe man does not love well-being only? Maybe he loves suffering just as much? Maybe suffering is just as profitable for him as well-being? For man sometimes loves suffering terribly much, to the point of passion, and that is a fact" (Dostoevsky 1994, 34). 62 theory – the will to power.82 Soll argues that Nietzsche believes that the will to power better explains human behaviour. The reason for this belief is that while psychological hedonism is unable to provide an adequate account for problematic cases such as cruelty and asceticism, the will to power not only can account for everything that psychological hedonism accounts for, but also for these difficult cases.83

This is a persuasive claim. If psychological hedonism is correct, how does it account for cases of masochism and self-inflicted cruelty? In these cases, the individual is inflicting pain upon himself; he is seeking out pain instead of pleasure. Religious ascetics often avoid pleasure and engage in self-mortification. For psychological hedonism to be true, such cases would either not exist, or they would have to explain how the individual's desire for pain is actually a form of pleasure. This would result in the paradoxical claim that pain is pleasure, which would only generate more questions than answers.84

I have already shown that Nietzsche rejects the claim made by psychological hedonism, and Soll argues that Nietzsche believes that the will to power provides a better explanation for human behaviour. Since the will to power seeks to increase the feeling of power, all human behaviour is motivated to increase this feeling. Instances of masochism and self-inflicted cruelty are explainable as attempts to increase one's power. The individual inflicts suffering upon themselves in order to overcome themselves and increase their power. If Soll is correct, then the concept of the will to power can be used to generate an implicit argument against pleasure as a governing principle.

82 Soll acknowledges that "though the Genealogy neither directly nor explicitly advocates the underlying psychological thesis of the will to power, ... the book contains Nietzsche's fullest treatment of the issues that are crucial to his case for it" (Soll 1994, 169). 83 Note that cruelty, punishment, etc., are specifically dealt with in Essay II of the Genealogy, and asceticism is the topic of Essay III. For a full account of Soll's reasoning, see his paper, "Nietzsche on Cruelty, Asceticism, and the Failure of Hedonism" in Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality: Essays on Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals. 84 Attitudinal hedonism could account for things like masochism, but masochism creates problems for sensory based forms of hedonism. 63

Nietzsche believes that suffering is, so far, the only motivating factor for human enhancement and it creates new means through which the individual can overcome their state of suffering and discontent. So it is not surprising that Nietzsche is critical of the idea that suffering should be avoided, as he makes clear in Beyond Good and Evil: "You want, if possible – and there is no more insane "if possible" – to abolish suffering. And we? It really seems that we would rather have it higher and worse than ever" (BGE: 225). If suffering is necessary for human enhancement and excellence as Nietzsche believes, then the abolishment of suffering will eventually result in human mediocrity since suffering is required for exercising creativity to its maximum capacity.

Once again, Nietzsche posits that suffering can be a good; it is not intrinsically good, but does seem instrumentally good at times due to its effects – particularly how it has enhanced humanity.85 As Nietzsche argues, human beings improve themselves when they are suffering.

This suffering motivates them to find ways to alleviate it and improve their situation. If everyone were content and in a state of well-being, there would be no reason to improve ourselves. It is strife, suffering, and hardship that forces individuals to overcome their circumstances and by doing so, improve themselves. In other words, it compels people to be creative in how they accomplish this feat. Thus, suffering helps to birth creative potential, and further, a life organized around creativity and creation (vita creativa) requires suffering to achieve its potential.86 In this way, suffering is beneficial, and Nietzsche's assertion that it

85 See fn55. 86 As I argued in section 2.5, Nietzsche thinks suffering is a way of motivating human enhancement. Human enhancement is a form of self-creativity and creation for Nietzsche, so suffering aids creative potential. 64 should not be avoided is a drastic difference from psychological hedonism and hedonistic utilitarianism.87

Although Nietzsche scorns attempts to abolish suffering, like Aristotle he is against hedonism – making pleasure the central focus of life. Nevertheless, the overcoming of obstacles and resistances are pleasurable.88 For example, the process of overcoming obstacles and resistance provides pleasure to the individual. Everyone has experienced how pleasant conquering some obstacle can be, whether it is something trivial like solving a crossword or more substantial like obtaining a Ph.D. Successfully overcoming a difficult challenge often drives people to look for other challenges so they can attempt to overcome those as well.

So Nietzsche does not think that pleasure should be avoided. If given the choice between a delicious meal and a meal that is spoiled, Nietzsche would not say you should eat the spoiled meal since the suffering it creates will lead to your enhancement. Selecting such poor taste in food would be in bad taste for Nietzsche. In fact, he often espouses experiencing pleasure, such as listening to good music, and dancing.89 Nietzsche's critique of hedonic utilitarianism is not to reverse their valuations by flipping them on their head, but to show that suffering is not an intrinsic evil and something to be avoided.

Nietzsche and Aristotle are not against pleasure per se. Aristotle thinks the life governed by pleasure fails because it is vulgar and little more than passive consumption which is not what

87 For example: "... This type of inference smells of the rabble that sees nothing in bad actions but the unpleasant consequences and really judges, "it is stupid to do what is bad," while "good" is taken without further ado to be identical with "useful and agreeable." In the case of every moral utilitarianism one may immediately infer the same origin..." (BGE: 190); "Ultimately they all want English morality to be proved right—because this serves humanity best, or "the general utility," or "the happiness of the greatest number"—no, the happiness of England. With all their powers they want to prove to themselves that the striving for English happiness—I mean for comfort and fashion (and at best a seat in Parliament)—is at the same time also the right way to virtue; indeed that whatever virtue has existed in the world so far must have consisted in such striving" (BGE: 228). 88 "What is happiness? The feeling that power is growing, that resistance is overcome" (A: 2). 89 "And we should consider every day lost on which we have not danced at least once. And we should call every truth false which was not accompanied by at least one laugh" (Z IV: "Old and New Tablets"). 65 is best about human beings. For Nietzsche, pleasure is the antithesis of suffering and the enemy of creativity. While a life organized around pleasure may be the most desirable as Sardanapallus and the masses seem to think, it is not a very productive life.

Nevertheless, it seems true in both Aristotle's and Nietzsche's time that most people when given the opportunity seem to pursue a life organized around pleasure. This brings out an important point: the best life may not be for everyone. Aristotle's discussion in the Nicomachean

Ethics ranks contemplation as the superior principle, but his acknowledgement of noble action and politics as worthwhile principles show that the best governing principle may not be for everyone. An individual's dispositions and talents may make them better suited to a life governed by noble action and politics. In such a case, a life organized around contemplation is not a plausible option, but a life governed by noble action and politics is possible and still worthwhile.

The same cannot be said about a life governed by pleasure. As I have shown, Aristotle is quite dismissive of such a life. Ironically, of all three possible governing principles, the life organized around pleasure seems to be the only one that is available to everyone and yet,

Aristotle insists it is not a worthwhile governing principle for anyone. The problem for Aristotle is that he must explain why pleasure does not exemplify what is best about humans. His solution is to argue that it fails to fulfill a human's function properly. A life governed by pleasure for

Aristotle is at worst akin to a bestial life, and at best, a life that falls short of exercising virtue.

Nietzsche takes a similar stance, directing the majority of his writing to a few individuals, realizing that much of what he says will be incomprehensible to the masses. Further, what may be best for the masses may not be the best for everyone; what may be good for the masses, may

66 not be good for everyone.90 Bentham and Mill certainly believe that pleasure is an intrinsic good and that it motivates the actions of human beings, but Nietzsche asserts otherwise: human beings do not strive for pleasure, rather "[m]an, the bravest animal and most prone to suffer, does not deny suffering as such: he wills it, he even seeks it out..." (GM III: 28). Nietzsche argues that instead of pleasure, it is suffering that motivates the actions of humans. This also distinguishes

Nietzsche's critique of pleasure as a governing principle from that of Aristotle. While Aristotle and Nietzsche are both critical of a life organized around pleasure, Aristotle does not therefore view suffering as beneficial for human beings. In fact, Aristotle thinks that a life plagued by pains and sufferings would not be capable of eudaimonia.91 However, Nietzsche believes that pain and suffering are essential for human flourishing; they are what breed human excellence.

We have begun to see the role that Nietzsche thinks suffering plays in relation to creativity and creation. Suffering puts us in an undesirable state, and we seek ways to escape it, creating new means to accomplish this task and generating human excellence. Further, creation and creativity serve as a way of redeeming suffering. The collapse of the old metaphysical framework which justified suffering as God's will puts humanity on the path of nihilism. To avoid this disastrous result, Nietzsche ties creativity and creation to suffering. He provides suffering with a new meaning. This link between suffering and a life governed by creativity and creation will reappear throughout the following chapters.

90 "...None of these ponderous herd animals with their unquiet consciences (who undertake to advocate the cause of egoism as the cause of the general welfare) wants to know or even sense that "the general welfare" is no ideal, no goal, no remotely intelligible concept, but only an emetic—that what is fair for one cannot by any means for that reason alone also be fair for others; that the demand of one morality for all is detrimental for the higher men; in short, that there is an order of rank between man and man, hence also between morality and morality. They are a modest and thoroughly mediocre type of man, these utilitarian Englishmen, and, as said above, insofar as they are boring one cannot think highly enough of their utility" (BGE: 228). 91 See NE I.9.1100a4-10. 67

Chapter 3

Culture and Politics

At the end of chapter one, I noted Hannah Arendt's claim that Nietzsche reverses the priority given to the contemplative life over the active life. Rather than championing a life of contemplation, she believes Nietzsche favours a life of action. While it is true that Nietzsche is no champion of the vita contemplativa, he is no advocate of the vita activa. A possible reason for Arendt's hasty reading may be based on a superficial reading of the first essay of On the

Genealogy of Morality, where Nietzsche spends much time discussing the nobles and slaves, in clear invidious terms. Since the nobles exemplify action and activity (among other things), it is easy to conclude as Arendt does, that Nietzsche favours a life of action and activity over contemplation.

It is true that many of the characteristics Nietzsche thinks are valuable are possessed by the nobles responsible for developing noble values in Genealogy I. These features distinguish those who possess a noble disposition from the lower types suggesting that noble action is their governing principle. So it is understandable that one might mistake Nietzsche's endorsement of these noble characteristics as an endorsement for the superiority of the vita activa.

I also explained in chapter one Aristotle's account of a life governed by noble action, the political life (bios politikos),92 in which citizens work together to govern themselves and foster noble action. This is a difficult task in itself and is made even more challenging if the laws are not conducive to excellence. In addition, a life governed by noble action must see to it that the laws of the polis help to stimulate and encourage individuals to live noble lives.93 For Aristotle,

92 Recall that the bios politikos will be translated as the vita activa by Christian medieval philosophers. 93 "But it is difficult to get from youth up a right training for excellence if one has not been brought up under right laws; for to live temperately and hardily is not pleasant to most people, especially when they are young. For this reason their nurture and occupations should be fixed by law; for they will not be painful when they have become 68 noble action and politics are intertwined, so any critique of noble action will also require a critique of politics.

If Arendt were correct in claiming that Nietzsche favours the vita activa over the vita contemplativa, it would suggest that Nietzsche is also favouring Aristotle's life organized around noble action and politics since the vita activa is just an extension of Aristotle's bios politikos.

But this is not the case.

Nietzsche is often simply dismissive of politics and it is easy to think he turns his back on the entire enterprise but to say that Nietzsche would hold a similar disregard for noble action would meet with a greater amount of resistance.94 Nietzsche's philosophy seems to suggest that he favours noble action, especially since the kinds of individuals he appears to value are those who organize their life around noble action as a governing principle. However, it is possible to value noble action and activity over passiveness and reactivity, while still being critical of the former. One need not endorse values without reserve, a fact which did not escape Nietzsche's notice.95 By making Nietzsche's critical attitude to both politics and noble action evident, it will be clear that he would not endorse a life governed by these principles since they do not exemplify what is best about humans.

In the previous chapter, I argued that Nietzsche dismisses pleasure as what is best about humans because pleasure is anti-creative and not a stimulus for creativity. And Nietzsche will be customary. But it is surely not enough that when they are young they should get the right nurture and attention; since they must, even when they are grown up, practise and be habituated to them, we shall need laws for this as well, and generally speaking to cover the whole of life; for most people obey necessity rather than argument, and punishments rather than what is noble. This is why some think that legislators ought to stimulate men to excellence and urge them forward by the motive of the noble..." (NE X.91179b31-1180a6). 94 There are some scholars who argue that Nietzsche does have his own political philosophy. See Hunt (1991), Nietzsche and the Origin of Virtue. 95 "A very popular error: having the courage of one's convictions; rather it is a matter of having the courage for an attack on one's convictions!!!" (Werke, Musarion edition, Munich, 1920-29, XVI, p. 318); "Men of conviction are not worthy of the least consideration in fundamental questions of value and disvalue. Convictions are prisons. Such men do not look far enough, they do not look beneath themselves: but to be permitted to join in the discussion of value and disvalue, one must see five hundred convictions beneath oneself – behind oneself... Freedom from all kinds of convictions, to be able to see freely, is part of strength" (A:54); See also GS: 307. 69 critical of noble action and politics as governing principles for similar reasons. For example, one aspect of politics is that it aims at maintaining stasis. The state is to remain in a stable equilibrium to allow its citizens to go about their daily lives without fear of radical changes.

Aristotle's Politics aims at determining the best form of state government, and Plato's Republic and Rawl's A Theory of Justice aim at establishing a stable state. Once this is achieved, all that is needed is to maintain the "status quo" so the state can function smoothly.

The problem with such a goal according to Nietzsche is that it prevents the enhancement and promotion of culture. Since the state aims for stability, it is not interested in things which could endanger the existing conditions, but this is just what culture does. Culture constantly attempts to progress in one direction and is driven by creative individuals. For Nietzsche, creativity and culture interlock and mutually define each other, whereas politics has no such relation. While Nietzsche would agree with Plato and Aristotle that human beings need politics, just as we need to eat, Nietzsche denies Aristotle's claim that "man is by nature a political animal" (POL I: 1253.a2), stating that "the task of the state is to make it generally possible for one to live well and beautifully therein. Its task is to furnish the basis of a culture. In short, a nobler humanity is the goal of the state. Its goal lies outside of itself. The state is the means"

(PHT: 78). Politics and the state are merely the means, while culture and creativity are the ends.

For Nietzsche, man is a cultural animal, and as such, culture helps to bring forth what is best about humans and humanity.

3.1 – Nobles and Higher Men

Arendt's claim that Nietzsche values the active life over contemplation requires some context. Nietzsche has much to say about individuals with noble dispositions, characterizing them as "yes-saying" (they have a positive disposition toward life); they determine their own

70 values based upon their self-judgment (they create their own values); are spontaneous and aristocratic; have power over themselves; and are "necessarily active" thereby embodying happiness.96

In contrast to the noble, the slave is primarily reactive and passive (condemns the values of the noble, thereby creating new values as a reaction); "no-saying" (he has a negative disposition toward life); values weakness and is engulfed by ressentiment for those of noble natures; endorses egalitarianism as a means to make everyone level; paradoxically wishes to abolish suffering yet preserve it as an argument against life; and must convince himself that happiness is a passive endeavour.97 Clearly, the characteristics of the slave are a direct contrast to those of the noble.

Based on these descriptions, it would seem that Nietzsche favours the nobles and disfavours the slaves, however, that is much too simplistic. Nietzsche states that it is due to these slavish characteristics that "man first became an interesting animal" and "the human soul became deep in the higher sense and turned evil for the first time..." (GM I: 6).98 According to Nietzsche, it is the characteristics of the slave that have separated and made man superior to animals.

Humanity's potential was unlocked as a result of these particular slavish features, and Nietzsche views this as a beneficial consequence since they allow for the enhancement of humans.99

The characteristics of the noble conjure up in the mind the Homeric heroes that Nietzsche avidly admires such as Achilles and Odysseus who exemplify the archaic noble for Nietzsche.

However, these heroes of Greek antiquity are not the only figures that Nietzsche would classify

96 While this is not an exhaustive list of noble attributes, see BGE: 39, 41, 44, 49, 61, 212, 213, 227, 230, 257, 260, 261, 262, 265, 272, 287; GM I: 10, 11; GS: 3, 55, 283, 294. 97 While this is not an exhaustive list of slavish attributes, see BGE: 44, 46, 62, 228, 260; GS: 3, 359; GM I: 10, 11; TI IX: 33, 34, 35. 98 By "evil," Nietzsche means man adopted values that were at odds with the herd morality. 99 "A race of such men of ressentiment will inevitably end up cleverer than any noble race, and will respect cleverness to a quite different degree as well" (GM I: 10); "The species do not grow in perfection: the weak prevail over the strong again and again, for they are the great majority—and they are also more intelligent" (TI IX: 14). 71 as possessing a noble disposition. He often mentions individuals like Napoleon and Julius

Caesar with approval and admiration, and they certainly demonstrate many of the noble qualities that Nietzsche values. Based on what I have said so far, it is no surprise that Arendt will claim that Nietzsche prioritizes action over contemplation since he praises individuals who exemplify action and activity. However, despite Nietzsche's appreciation of the laudable heroes of the

Homeric epics, Caesar and Napoleon, Nietzsche does not consider any of them as paragons which we should strive to emulate. This claim may seem surprising given that Nietzsche values action and individuals like Napoleon, Caesar, and Achilles exemplify noble characteristics. So why are Napoleon, Caesar, and Achilles not Nietzsche's exemplars? More importantly, who would be an exemplar for Nietzsche?

I will begin by explaining the special connection of what Nietzsche calls "higher men" to creativity and culture. "Higher men" are individuals that Nietzsche regards as the greatest manifestations of humanity so far. Although they possess the characteristics of a noble nature, they are quite different from Achilles, Napoleon, and Caesar. What is it that excludes these individuals from being "higher men?" The answer to this problem is not to be found in the characteristics these people possess, but in the characteristics they lack. While Napoleon,

Achilles, and Caesar have many characteristics of a noble nature, it is the aspects that are missing which reveal what Nietzsche believes to be of the highest value and essential to life, namely, solitude, creativity and an enduring contribution to culture.100

100 One thing that might come to mind when discussing Nietzsche's "higher men" is the Übermensch, but it is important not to conflate these two concepts. While there are similarities between them both, the Übermensch appears to be an idealized and perhaps unattainable evolution of humanity. The portrait that Nietzsche paints of the Übermensch in Thus Spoke Zarathustra is of a being that has moved beyond being human: "What is the ape to man? A laughingstock or a painful embarrassment. And man shall be just that for the Übermensch: a laughingstock or a painful embarrassment" (Z P: 3); "Man is a rope, tied between beast and Übermensch—a rope over an abyss" (Z P: 4). What exactly this entails is unclear, maybe because Nietzsche himself did not quite know. It could also help to explain why the Übermensch is mostly absent from the writings that follow Zarathustra. (Nietzsche does use the term Übermensch in some of his later writings, but not to the same extent as in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Additional 72

Brian Leiter identifies five characteristics that Nietzsche's "higher men" possess; features which will be helpful in determining who could be a "higher man." Of the five qualities, two are of particular interest for the present discussion: 1) The higher type is solitary and deals with others only instrumentally; and 2) The higher type seeks burdens and responsibilities, as he is driven towards the completion of a unifying project.101 I will begin by expanding upon the second characteristic, but it will be useful to keep both in mind throughout the discussion.

As I mentioned, Nietzsche often praises individuals such as Alexander the Great, Caesar, and Napoleon, but he does not refer to them as "higher men." Although they may be close to embodying Nietzsche's paragons of humanity, that distinction is given to individuals like

Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Goethe. However, why does Nietzsche exclude individuals like

Napoleon and Caesar? What is it that separates a Shakespeare from a Caesar? The answer appears in what Nietzsche writes about "great men":

Law-giving moralities are the principal means of fashioning man according to the pleasure of a creative and profound will, provided that such an artist's will of the first rank has the power in its hands and can make its creative will prevail through long periods of time, in the form of laws, religions, and customs. Such men of great creativity, the really great men according to my understanding, will be

references to "Übermensch" appear in: GM I: 16; TI IX: 37; A: 4.) On the other hand, references to the "higher men" appear quite frequently throughout Nietzsche's writings, and rather than being some abstract, idealized version of a human being, Nietzsche regards them as our highest human exemplars, providing flesh and blood examples. 101 The remaining three characteristics are: 3) The higher type is essentially healthy and resilient; 4) The higher type affirms life, meaning that he is prepared to will the eternal return of his life; 5) The higher man has a distinctive bearing towards others and especially towards himself: he has self-reverence. See Leiter (2002), Nietzsche on Morality, 116-120. Nietzsche himself provides three characteristics that constitute great men – i.e. higher men, in The Will to Power: "A great man—a man whom nature has constructed and invented in the grand style—what is he? First: there is a long logic in all of his activity, hard to survey because of its length, and consequently misleading; he has the ability to extend his will across great stretches of his life and to despise and reject everything petty about him, including even the fairest, "divinest" things in the world. Secondly: he is colder, harder, less hesitating, and without fear of "opinion"; he lacks the virtues that accompany respect and "respectability," and altogether everything that is part of the "virtue of the herd." If he cannot lead, he goes alone; then it can happen that he may snarl at some things he meets on his way. Third: he wants no "sympathetic" heart, but servants, tools; in his intercourse with men his is always intent on making something out of them. He knows he is incommunicable: he finds it tasteless to be familiar; and when one thinks he is, he usually is not. When not speaking to himself, he wears a mask. He rather lies than tells the truth: it requires more spirit and will. There is a solitude within him that is inaccessible to praise or blame, his own justice that is beyond appeal" (WP: 962; 1885). 73

sought in vain today and probably for a long time to come: they are lacking... (WP: 957; emphasis mine).

This passage reveals some things concerning Nietzsche's "higher men," and why individuals like

Napoleon and Caesar are excluded from this status. First, Nietzsche associates great creativity with "great men." Second, these "great men" have an artist's will of the first rank. Thirdly, their creative will endures in the form of laws, religions, and customs, over a vast period.

Regarding the first point – that "great men" are men of great creativity – it is important to note that merely being creative is not enough to make someone a "great man." Nietzsche is very specific in stating that "great men" possess "great creativity." If mere creativity was sufficient, then most individuals could be considered "great men," but this is clearly not what Nietzsche has in mind. Creativity comes in degrees, and therefore, some people are more creative than others.

For example, Leonardo Da Vinci, Raphael, and Beethoven were all creative individuals, but they demonstrated a level of creativity that exceeded – and still exceeds – the majority of people.

They were in command of abilities than most people are unable to equal, and this is why they are so highly regarded by society.

The second point that Nietzsche raises concerning "great men" refers to their will. He states that "great men" have an "artist's will of the first rank" (WP: 957). What exactly does

Nietzsche mean by this? In particular, what does he mean by "artist's will," and what does he mean when he says that it is a "will of the first rank?"

The phrase "artist's will" can be interpreted two ways: the first is a narrow interpretation while the second is broader. If interpreted narrowly, Nietzsche seems to be saying that "great men" have the will of a painter, musician, etc., which implies that "great men" are artists. If this is correct, it entails that individuals that are not artists cannot be "great men." If the phrase is interpreted in a broad manner, then Nietzsche seems to be suggesting that "great men" are artists

74 in that they create simpliciter. It is not necessary for a "great man" to be a painter, musician, etc., rather, what is required is that the "great man" creates, just as an artist creates.

So which of these two interpretations is correct? Based on the entire aphorism, Nietzsche seems to have the second interpretation in mind. A "great man" has the will of an artist in that he creates, just like an artist. It is not necessary for the "great man" to be an artist – i.e. poet, musician, painter, etc. When Nietzsche refers to specific individuals that are "higher men," and when he discusses "higher men" in general terms, they are often artists, but Nietzsche also includes saints and philosophers. These two latter types can possess an artist's will in the sense that they create new values and systems of thought. For Nietzsche, the creation of new values is the highest form of creation, and people that engage in this kind of creation are the ultimate artists. It would seem then that both interpretations are correct and not mutually exclusive.

Therefore, Nietzsche's notion of the "higher men" involves artistry – or specifically, artistic creation. While his flesh and blood examples are often artists – Goethe, Beethoven,

Raphael – he also includes philosophers (such as Nietzsche himself), and saints as examples of

"higher men." Such individuals are exemplars in their art-form and are also individuals of great creativity. Each progresses beyond the limits of his predecessors (all of whom were great artists in their own right).102 Their works are creative due to their originality and their unique skill, and to refer to their artistic products as anything other than "masterpieces" is to do them a disservice.

Now that the question concerning the meaning of an "artist's will" has been addressed, I turn to the reference Nietzsche makes about a "will of the first rank." Throughout his writings,

Nietzsche often refers to an "order of rank," in which individuals are valued based on whether they are "higher" or "lower" types. Individuals that are "higher types" are ranked higher than and valued more than those that are of the "lower type." For example, Nietzsche writes: "a society

102 Reginster (2009) argues this point in "The Will to Power and the Ethics of Creativity." 75 that believes in the long ladder of an order of rank and differences in value between man and man, and that needs slavery in some sense or other" (BGE: 257), is a society which produces enhancements in humanity, and is aristocratic in nature. In other words, society is arranged based on the abilities of individuals. Those who possess exceptional abilities are highly ranked, while those whose abilities are found to be lacking rank low; or as Nietzsche puts it: "[the philosopher determines] value and rank in accordance with how much and how many things one

[can] bear and take upon himself, how far one could extend his responsibility" (BGE: 212). The greater the challenges an individual decides to face, and the number he chooses to face, are proportional to how valuable – and how highly – the individual is ranked. The greater the responsibilities he assumes, the greater his ranking. An individual that demonstrates a "will of the first rank" would be someone that burdens himself with daunting challenges and responsibilities, and since his will is artistic, they will be difficulties and responsibilities which call for creativity. However, what exactly are these artistic challenges and responsibilities? The answer can be found in the third point: The "creative will prevail[s] through long periods of time, in the form of laws, religions, and customs" (WP: 957), or in other words, the creative will has an enduring influence on culture.

3.2 – Style

Nietzsche defines "culture" in David Strauss, the Confessor and the Writer in the following manner:

Culture is, above all, unity of artistic style in all the expressions of the life of a people (UM I: 1).103

103 Nietzsche gives a similar definition of culture in Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, defining it as that "which is characterized by unity of style" (PTAG: 1); and in his unpublished notebooks he states: "Redefinition of culture: a single temperament and key composed of many originally hostile forces, which now enable a melody to be played" (PHT: 48). 76

What does Nietzsche mean by this definition? What exactly is a "unity of artistic style?" To obtain a clearer picture regarding culture, the definition must be unpacked. Therefore, three questions must be answered:

1) What does Nietzsche mean by style?

2) What does Nietzsche mean by unity?

3) What does Nietzsche mean by artistic?

Concerning the first question, an aphorism from The Gay Science elaborates on the concept of style:

To 'give style' to one's character – a great and rare art! It is practiced by those who survey all the strengths and weaknesses of their nature and then fit them into an artistic plan until every one of them appears as art and reason and even weaknesses delight the eye... In the end, when the work is finished, it becomes evident how the constraint of a single taste governed and formed everything large and small. Whether this taste was good or bad is less important than one might suppose, if only it was a single taste (GS: 290)!104

Although Nietzsche refers to an individual's style in The Gay Science and not the style of a people as in David Strauss, his remarks are no less applicable. To illustrate, the examination of style can benefit from the method Plato uses in The Republic when attempting to determine the nature of justice. Plato tries to define justice in terms of a city, and once that is accomplished, he thinks justice can then be defined regarding the individual. A similar strategy can be used regarding Nietzsche's notion of style, but while Plato progresses from society to the individual, I will start with the individual and progress to society.

Style involves the character of a person. Nietzsche implies that style of character is not something that one is born possessing, but something that one acquires. It is a process that the individual voluntarily undertakes, arranging their strengths and weaknesses in a particular

104 Nietzsche will also refer to style as following a "lawfulness" (CW: 8). 77 manner. Instead of passively allowing one's character to develop in a random manner, one actively engages in its formation.

Another important characteristic of style is that it demands constraint. Rather than permitting complete freedom in the arrangement of one's character, style requires a single governing law that underlies and directs its configuration. One orders their character according to this single law. Nietzsche elaborates this point writing:

It will be the strong and domineering natures that enjoy their finest gaiety in such constraint and perfection under a law of their own; the passion of their tremendous will relents in the face of all stylized nature, of all conquered and serving nature. Even when they have to build palaces and design gardens they demur at giving nature freedom. Conversely, it is the weak characters without power over themselves that hate the constraint of style. They feel that if this bitter and evil constraint were imposed upon them they would be demeaned; they become slaves as soon as they serve; they hate to serve. Such spirits—and they may be of the first rank—are always out to shape and interpret their environment as free nature... (GS: 290).

This passage reveals an important connection between style and power, namely, the possibility of attaining style of character depends on an individual's power. People that lack power will avoid giving their characters' style, whereas those who possess power will freely allow the constraint of their freedom. It may seem counter-intuitive, but it is consistent with Nietzsche's philosophy. A sign that an individual has power according to Nietzsche is that he willingly gives it away, even if doing so could affect him adversely.105 Conversely, people that lack power refrain from surrendering what little they possess and try to preserve it at all costs.106 They will not be eager to capitulate the little power that is in their possession because they regard

105 "Physiologists should think before putting down the instinct of self-preservation as the cardinal instinct of an organic being. A living thing seeks above all to discharge its strength – life itself is will to power; self-preservation is only one of the indirect and most frequent results" (BGE: 13). See also GS: 283, 303, 375, 377; TI IX: 14. 106 "What, then, is the attitude of the above-mentioned two greatest religions [Christianity and Buddhism] toward this excess of cases that did not turn out right? They seek to preserve, to preserve alive whatever can possibly be preserved; indeed, as a matter of principle, they side with these cases as religions for sufferers; they agree with all those who suffer life like a sickness and would like to make sure that every other feeling about life should be considered false and should become impossible" (BGE: 62). See also GS: 3, 13, 28, 349; BGE: 259. 78 constraint as a further attack on their power. Therefore, those who are without power will not attempt to attain style, since it is viewed as a threat to their freedom.107 On the other hand, individuals with power will not object to limiting their freedom, since it provides them with a challenge to overcome. By imposing restrictions on how to arrange their character, they demonstrate the extent of their power by moulding it to fit the constraint of style.108

It seems that style requires a kind of self-control or self-mastery. Rather than someone exercising power over others, he exercises power over himself making self-control vital to the process. To "give style" to one's character is to treat one's character as a kind of "unconfigured" jigsaw puzzle. The individual fits each piece of their nature together in the most optimum manner; their strengths made stronger as a result, and even their weaknesses exhibit a kind of charm and necessity.109 In the end, the seemingly random puzzle pieces are arranged to construct a whole that is more than just the sum of its parts. Each piece is precisely placed where it will contribute to the greatest overall effect. Further, this character is designed with a single taste, purpose, or law in mind, which acts as a guiding constraint to prevent a haphazard arrangement.110

107 "One last fundamental difference: the longing for freedom, the instinct for happiness and the subtleties of the feeling of freedom belong just as necessarily to slave morality and morals..." (BGE: 260). See also TI IX: 41. 108 A concrete example of what Nietzsche seems to have in mind with the "constraint of style" is the novel Gadsby by Ernest Vincent Wright. The novel does not use the letter "e" and was written as a response to the challenge that such a feat was impossible. Just as the author places an intentional constraint on his writing, Nietzsche's concept of style requires an intentional constraint on the formation of the individual's character. 109 Nietzsche makes this point earlier in The Gay Science: "Finding motives for our poverty. – There is no trick that enables us to turn a poor virtue into a rich and overflowing one; but we can reinterpret its poverty into a necessity so that it no longer offends us when we see it and we no longer sulk at fate on its account. That is what a wise gardener does when he places the poor little stream in his garden in the arms of a nymph and thus finds a motive for its poverty; and who does not need nymphs as he does" (GS: 17)? 110 "Giving style" supports the influential view that the will to power is a kind of self-control or self-mastery that is exercised by the individual. Instead of many drives engaged in combat with each other in a massive inner free-for- all that often affects those with weak characters – and hence their hatred of constraint – those individuals with natures that are robust and domineering can align their drives under the constraint of a single drive; i.e. a single taste. "But anyone who considers the basic drives of man to see to what extent they may have been at play just here as inspiring spirits (or demons and kobolds) will find that all of them have done philosophy at some time—and that every single one of them would like only too well to represent just itself as the ultimate purpose of existence and the 79

The final point concerning style is the difficulty of its actualization. Nietzsche points out at the very beginning of the aphorism that giving style to one's character is "a great and rare art,"

(GS: 290) implying that few people accomplish this difficult feat. Successfully giving style to one's character is not something that everyone can achieve, even if it is something they crave.

For example, something can be "rare" for two reasons; it is regarded with disfavour, so few people want it. In such a case, it could be easily achieved, but it is rare because no one wants it.

Alternatively, it is wanted, but it is very difficult to achieve which is why it is rare. Nietzsche seems to have this second reason in mind regarding the rarity of style since he also refers to it as a great art, meaning it is difficult to achieve but very valuable.111 Great achievements for

Nietzsche – whether they are works of art or giving style to one's character – are not easily accomplished as we shall later see but for now, I will simply assert this point.112

Therefore, due to the difficulty of giving style to one's character, it is not something that everyone can achieve. Only people with strong natures have the ability to give style to their character since this nature is already part of their character. If a person has a weak nature, they lack the capacity to give themselves style. Moreover, although individuals with strong natures are capable of giving themselves style, that does not mean that every individual with a strong nature will give their character style. Not only is giving style to one's character "a great and rare art," but those individuals with the strength and motivation to do so are equally as great and rare.

Few are capable of arranging their various, discordant characteristics into a harmonious whole.113

legitimate master of all the other drives. For every drive wants to be master—and it attempts to philosophize in that spirit" (BGE: 6). This notion of being formed by a single taste will also be evident in Nietzsche's remarks on genius. 111 "In the end it must be as it is and always has been: great things remain for the great, abysses for the profound, nuances and shudders for the refined, and, in brief, all that is rare for the rare" (BGE: 243). 112 See chapter five for the discussion of Nietzsche and great achievements. 113 Nietzsche provides Goethe as an example of a person who is not only a "higher man," but also someone who creates himself by giving style to his character: "Goethe – not a German event, but a European one: a magnificent attempt to overcome the eighteenth century by a return to nature, by an ascent to the naturalness of the Renaissance—a kind of self-overcoming on the part of that century. He bore its strongest instincts within himself: 80

With the problem of style dealt with, the second question can now be addressed: 2) What does Nietzsche mean by "unity?" Simply put, a unity is the joining of various characteristics, but the manner in which they are joined is crucial for Nietzsche and can occur in three ways. First, they can be combined in a haphazard or motley manner, for example, as one might patch together a cloak from various mismatching pieces of cloth; there is no rhyme or reason provided for where each is placed. One is only concerned with its function and pays no heed to its aesthetic sensibilities. I will call this Functional unity.114

Secondly, they can be combined so that only aesthetics are relevant. In this case, the function gives way to flair. If there are tears and holes in the cloak which detract from its function, that is allowable since what is important is that the cloak looks good and not that it functions properly. This form I will call Aesthetic unity.

Thirdly, there can be a unity of disparate pieces in which thoughtfulness is administered to how each scrap accords with the whole. Colours are arranged so as not to jolt, but please the eye. Attention is paid to the size and shape of each fragment to minimize or even negate waste.

the sensibility, the idolatry of nature, the anti-historic, the idealistic, the unreal and revolutionary (the latter being merely a form of the unreal). He sought help from history, natural science, antiquity, and also Spinoza, but, above all, from practical activity; he surrounded himself with limited horizons; he did not retire from life but put himself into the midst of it he was not fainthearted but took as much as possible upon himself, over himself, into himself. What he wanted was totality; he fought the mutual extraneousness of reason, senses, feeling, and will (preached with the most abhorrent scholasticism by Kant, the antipode of Goethe); he disciplined himself to wholeness, he created himself. In the middle of an age with an unreal outlook, Goethe was a convinced realist: he said Yes to everything that was related to him in this respect—and he had no greater experience than that ens realissimum [most real being] called Napoleon. Goethe conceived a human being who would be strong, highly educated, skillful in all bodily matters, self-controlled, reverent toward himself, and who might dare to afford the whole range and wealth of being natural, being strong enough for such freedom; the man of tolerance, not from weakness but from strength, because he knows how to use to his advantage, even that from which the average nature would perish; the man for whom there is no longer anything that is forbidden—unless it be weakness, whether called vice or virtue. Such a spirit who has become free stands amid the cosmos with a joyous and trusting fatalism, in the faith that only the particular is loathsome, and that all is redeemed and affirmed in the whole—he does not negate any more. Such a faith, however, is the highest of all possible faiths: I have baptized it with the name of Dionysus" (TI IX:49). This depiction of Goethe is not only highly flattering, but demonstrates what Nietzsche means by "giving style to one's character." 114 Functional unity, unity as a motley, desultory hodgepodge of pieces, is what Nietzsche terms barbarism – the antithesis of culture. He defines barbarism as a "lack of style or a chaotic jumble of all styles" (UM I: 1). Contrary to culture, such a unity is aesthetically displeasing, even though it fulfills its function. 81

In the end, the patchwork appears as if it was originally part of the intended design of the cloak, and not something added later. This third way is concerned with both function and aesthetics, with priority given to aesthetics. It is not enough that the cloak functions like a good cloak, nor that it looks good, rather it must both look good and fulfill its function. This third way I will refer to as Stylistic unity.

Stylistic unity seems more important to Nietzsche than functional or aesthetic unity, and this is especially apparent when compared against the backdrop of "style." Recall that giving style "is practiced by those who survey all the strengths and weaknesses of their nature and fit them into an artistic plan until every one of them appears as art and reason and even weaknesses delight the eye" (GS: 290). Not only does giving style require the individual to arrange their various characteristics in a way that aids in their function – such as making them stronger – but ideally, they are arranged in an aesthetically pleasing manner. Both aspects must be fulfilled for one to achieve style of character.

It is no accident then that "unity" and "style" are used by Nietzsche in his definition of culture. Both concepts appear intertwined. However, what about the third concept in the definition: artistic? What does Nietzsche mean by "artistic" and why is it relevant for culture?

For Nietzsche, art can be expressed in a variety of ways such as music, theatre, paintings, novels and poems (HH II: 175). Although Nietzsche does not explain what makes all these forms art,115 he does address a much more interesting question: "What is the purpose of art?"

Regarding this query, Nietzsche writes:

[W]hat does all art do? does it not praise? glorify? choose? prefer? With all this it strengthens or weakens certain valuations. Is this merely a "moreover"? an

115 The question: "How does one classify something as art?" is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Nietzsche makes many references to art, but does not provide a way of classifying what is to be considered art. Instead, he simply takes up the common interpretation that music, paintings, novels and poems, etc. are all forms of art. I shall follow Nietzsche's lead and do the same. 82

accident? something in which the artist's instinct had no share? Or is it not the very presupposition of the artist's ability? Does his basic instinct aim at art, or rather at the sense of art, at life? at a desirability of life? Art is the great stimulus to life: how could one understand it as purposeless, as aimless, as l'art pour l'art (TI IX: 24)?

The conclusion of this aphorism reveals the object of Nietzsche's critique: art for the sake of art.

He rejects the belief that art has no purpose – that it is useless. For Nietzsche, the purpose of art is to stimulate life.116 Idly staring at a painting, listening to a composition, reading a poem, or watching a play, all fail to fulfill the purpose of the work of art. It is a mistake to consider art as something to be passively contemplated, and we commit a grave insult to the artist and his work if we treat it in such a manner. The purpose of art is to stimulate life; it is active. For example,

Beethoven's symphonies are meant to evoke feeling and emotion; they are supposed to stimulate us and elicit a reaction.117 The same applies to reading Shakespeare's poetry or viewing

Raphael's paintings. It seems impossible to experience these works of art and be divorced from any reaction, yet this view is argued by both Kant and Schopenhauer who believe that aesthetic experiences should be disinterested.118 They regard art as something to be passively

116 "If there is to be art, if there is to be any aesthetic doing and seeing, one physiological condition is indispensable: frenzy. Frenzy must first have enhanced the excitability of the whole machine; else there is no art. All kinds of frenzy, however diversely conditioned, have the strength to accomplish this: above all, the frenzy of sexual excitement, this most ancient and original form of frenzy" (TI IX: 8); "In this state one enriches everything out of one's own fullness: whatever one sees, whatever one wills, is seen swelled, taut, strong, overloaded with strength. A man in this state transforms things until they mirror his power—until they are reflections of his perfection. This having to transform into perfection is—art" (TI IX: 9). 117 "Music, as we understand it today, is also a total excitement and a total discharge of the affects, but even so only the remnant of a much fuller world of expression of the affects, a mere residue of the Dionysian histrionicism. To make music possible as a separate art, a number of the senses, especially the muscle sense, have been immobilized (at least relatively, for to a certain degree all rhythm still appeals to our muscles); so that a man no longer bodily imitates and represents everything he feels" (TI IX: 10). Nietzsche's point is that while we may have trained ourselves to sit still in the theatre and not move to the music, music still compels us to dance to it. It stimulates us. "...the whole morality of self-denial must be questioned mercilessly and taken to court – no less than the aesthetics of "contemplation devoid of all interest" which is used to day as a seductive guise for the emasculation of art, to give it a good conscience" (BGE: 33). See also BGE: 220. 118 "Of all these three kinds of delight, that of taste in the beautiful may be said to be the one and only disinterested and free delight; for, with it, no interest, whether of sense or reason, extorts approval... Taste is the faculty of judging an object or a mode of representation by means of a delight or an aversion apart from any interest. The object of such a delight is called beautiful" (CJ: §5); "When, however, an external cause or inward disposition suddenly raises us out of the endless stream of willing, and snatches knowledge from the thraldom of the will, the 83 contemplated.119 However, Nietzsche's assertion that aesthetic experiences actively stimulate life seems more accurate and believable. It appears impossible – perhaps even inhuman – to objectively contemplate art without subjectivity.

Now that the three questions regarding style, unity, and art have been addressed, we can return to Nietzsche's definition of culture: "Culture is, above all, unity of artistic style in all the expressions of the life of a people" (UM I: 1). Based on the preceding discussion, it is now possible to unpack this definition and provide a more informative one:

Culture is the deliberate arrangement of a society's characteristics under a single purpose to actively stimulate and promote life.120

Culture is similar to style, but on a societal scale instead of an individual scale. Just as a strong nature is required for an individual to give style to their character, a strong nature is needed for a society to generate culture. However, for this to be accomplished by a strong society, it requires individuals of a strong nature – "higher men" – or in other words, great men who can direct society through the production of their great works and exert upon society, and all civilization, an enduring cultural influence.

3.3 – The Vita Activa and Vis Creativa

Recall that Nietzsche asserts that great men – "higher men" – make their "creative will prevail through long periods of time" (WP: 957), a point also noted by Brian Leiter who states attention is now no longer directed to the motives of willing, but comprehends things free from their relation to the will. Thus it considers things without interest, without subjectivity, purely objectively; it is entirely given up to them in so far as they are merely representations, and not motives" (WWR I, 196). 119 The notion that aesthetic experience should be disinterested smacks of nihilism, so it is no surprise that Nietzsche rejects Kant's and Schopenhauer's view regarding it. By interpreting aesthetic experience as a stimulus for life, Nietzsche treats art as a way to overcome nihilism. Instead of creating art for its own sake, art is created to stimulate life. "As an aesthetic phenomenon existence is still bearable for us..." (GS: 107). 120 Nietzsche describes the Greeks in a similar manner in Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks: "Nothing would be sillier than to claim an autochthonous development for the Greeks. On the contrary, they invariably absorbed other living cultures. The very reason they got so far is that they knew how to pick up the spear and throw it onward from the point where others had left it. Their skill in the art of fruitful learning was admirable. We ought to be learning from our neighbors precisely as the Greeks learned from theirs, not for the sake of learned pedantry but rather using everything we learn as a foothold which will take us up as high, and higher than our neighbor (PTAG: 1). 84 that "higher men" are "driven towards the completion of a unifying project" (Leiter 2002, 117).

It should be clear that both of those points are similar to the just given definition of culture.

Culture is a "unifying project" since it directs society toward a single purpose, namely, to stimulate and promote life. Further, it is future-directed and intended to affect society far into the future in the form of laws, customs, and religions. This project is only possible through the creative will of "higher men" according to Nietzsche because only the "higher men" possess the necessary characteristics and disposition to see its actualization. Having a creative will – or having creativity as a governing principle – is required for the successful instantiation of culture, so it should be no surprise that Nietzsche considers Goethe, Beethoven, and Raphael as "higher men" due to their creativity. It also shows why Nietzsche does not believe active, noble types like Napoleon and Caesar to be "higher men," namely, they lack creativity. This distinction is emphasized by Nietzsche in a section from The Gay Science entitled "The delusion [Wahn] of the contemplatives." Although the aphorism focuses on those of the contemplative life, he makes some telling remarks concerning the active type. He writes:

The higher human being always becomes at the same time happier and unhappier. But he can never shake off a delusion: He fancies that he is a spectator and listener who has been placed before the great visual and acoustic spectacle that is life; he calls his own nature contemplative and overlooks that he himself is really the poet who keeps creating this life. Of course, he is different from the actor of this drama, the so-called active type; but he is even less like a mere spectator and festival guest in front of the stage. As a poet, he certainly has vis contemplativa [contemplative power] and the ability to look back upon his work, but at the same time also and above all vis creativa [creative power], which the active human being lacks, whatever visual appearances and the faith of all the world may say. We who think and feel at the same time are those who really continually fashion something that had not been there before: the whole eternally growing world of valuations, colors, accents, perspectives, scales, affirmations, and negations. This poem that we have invented is continually studied by the so-called practical human beings (our actors) who learn their roles and translate everything into flesh and actuality, into the every day. Whatever has value in our world now does not have value in itself, according to its nature – nature is always value-less, but has

been given value at some time, as a present – and it was we who gave and bestowed it. Only we have created the world that concerns man (GS: 301)!

Nietzsche's remarks concerning his "higher types" and their relation to contemplation will be examined in the following chapter, but for now, will be set aside. Regarding the active type,

Nietzsche makes a crucial statement, namely, that individuals of the vita activa or the man of action lacks vis creativa – creative power. Nietzsche is consistently espousing the necessity and importance of creativity and creating values so creativity will be a necessary characteristic for

Nietzsche. After all, how could he argue for, and constantly stress the importance of creating new values for oneself – and society – but think that what is best about human beings does not involve creativity? If the man of action – the active type – lacks creative power, it seems clear that such individuals would not be the highest kind of human being for Nietzsche. Lacking such an important characteristic would exclude them from "higher men" status.

Although it is a fact that everyone is creative to some degree, not everyone is capable of creativity in the manner of Goethe or Shakespeare. However, it could be argued that Napoleon and Caesar are extremely creative as well. For example, they both created vast empires, and this is not something that everyone is capable of doing. The reason why we often cite Napoleon,

Caesar, and Alexander the Great when discussing great historical figures is that they all accomplished something that very few individuals have ever done – they created vast empires.

Should not such a rare feat place them among individuals of great creation and creativity?

Should they not be the equals of Goethe, Beethoven, and Shakespeare? Nietzsche did not think so. While Napoleon and Caesar did create impressive empires, their creations are an inferior kind of creation for Nietzsche. Why? The answer can be found in the earlier aphorism from The

Will to Power where Nietzsche writes about "great men" and their will, stating they "can make

[their] creative will prevail through long periods of time, in the form of laws, religions, and

86 customs" (WP: 957). Caesar, Napoleon, and Alexander created great empires, but after they died, their empires crumbled; nothing (or very little) remains of their splendour.121 They may have possessed creative wills, but their will vanished upon their death; it did not persist. The feats of Goethe, Beethoven, and Shakespeare continue to not only abide, but to become stronger.

Their achievements have had and continue to exhibit a greater cultural influence than those of

Caesar and Alexander. It is this lack of a prevailing cultural influence that will further incite

Nietzsche to dispense with a life governed by noble action and politics. While it certainly possesses appealing characteristics that are congruent with Nietzsche's philosophy, these features cannot make up for the lack of a lasting cultural influence that the profound and creative artistic will imposes upon civilization.122

One possible objection to this is that Alexander the Great, Napoleon, etc., have indeed had a profound effect upon culture. Their lives are still studied, as are their battles and the tactics used to defeat their enemies. The life and battles of Alexander are studied just as much as the

121 Percy Bysshe Shelley recognizes the point in his poem Ozymandias: "I met a traveller from an antique land Who said: Two vast and trunkless legs of stone Stand in the desert. Near them, on the sand, Half sunk, a shattered visage lies, whose frown, And wrinkled lip, and sneer of cold command, Tell that its sculptor well those passions read Which yet survive, stamped on these lifeless things, The hand that mocked them and the heart that fed: And on the pedestal these words appear: 'My name is Ozymandias, king of kings: Look on my works, ye Mighty, and despair!' Nothing beside remains. Round the decay Of that colossal wreck, boundless and bare The lone and level sands stretch far away" (Shelley 1826, 100). 122 One might argue that Napoleon was more creative than I give him credit for, and I admit, he is a difficult case. He is credited with the creation of the Napoleonic Code, which was extremely influential in Europe and still survives in some form today. Should not the creation of such a code of values elevate Napoleon to "higher man" status, especially since Nietzsche believes the creation of values is the highest form of creation and creativity? The problem with this is that Napoleon did not create the values of the Napoleonic Code – the French Revolution did. Napoleon signed those values into law, but he did not create them. Napoleon simply internalized and actualized the values within France. In this way, Napoleon lacks creative power, but since he is of the vita activa, he served the practical purpose of actualizing the values in society. As such, he falls short of "higher man" status. 87 works of Shakespeare, so why do I attribute a greater cultural influence to Shakespeare. Did not

Alexander, Caesar, and Napoleon have just as great an effect upon the world? While this may be difficult to dispute, there is one important characteristic that separates these men of action from

Shakespeare and Beethoven, namely, that while Shakespeare’s plays and Beethoven’s symphonies are individual achievements, the conquests of Napoleon and Caesar are collective achievements. In other words, Napoleon and Caesar did not conquer the world single-handedly.

They were able to accomplish these achievements due to the bravery and skill of their soldiers and generals. The creation of an empire was not achieved solely through Napoleons efforts; he had a lot of help. On the other hand, the creative works of Shakespeare or Beethoven are solely their own. They did not depend on others to help write their plays or compose their music.

With that said, it does not seem that Nietzsche would be entirely dismissive of the active type and noble action since this type constantly forces society to internalize the new values that have been created by others. Although the active, noble type is not able to generate new values due to their lack of creative power, they can ensure that the new values become internalized and actualized in reality. So such a life would serve a practical purpose as Nietzsche points out.

Just as with Aristotle, who thought a life governed by noble action and politics was best for those who were incapable of the rigours of contemplation, Nietzsche might allow such a life the same role. Nietzsche clearly endorses the characteristics of the active type since it is typically associated with those of noble disposition. However, it is evident based on this passage from The Gay Science that a life organized around noble action is not what is best about human beings. Noble action may be considered a worthwhile principle by Nietzsche due to its practical implications of actualizing new values, but its lack of generative, creative power removes it from contention as what is best exemplified about humans.

3.4 – Solitude

The second concept of importance for Nietzsche's "higher men" according to Leiter (and

Nietzsche) is that of "solitude."123 Nietzsche places a high value on solitude, referring to it as a kind of virtue. For example, in the section "What is Noble" in Beyond Good and Evil he writes:

And to remain master to one's four virtues: of courage, insight, sympathy, and solitude. For solitude is a virtue for us, as a sublime bent and urge for cleanliness which guesses how all contact between man and man—"in society"—involves inevitable uncleanliness. All community makes men—somehow, somewhere, sometime "common" (BGE: 284).124

Further, Nietzsche often links solitude with his higher types, for example:

today the concept of greatness entails being noble, wanting to be by oneself, being able to be different, standing alone and having to live independently. And the philosopher will betray something of his own ideal when he posits: "He shall be greatest who can be loneliest, the most concealed, the most deviant, the human being beyond good and evil, the master of his virtues, he that is overrich in will. Precisely this shall be called greatness: being capable of being as manifold as whole, as ample as full" (BGE: 212).

This second aphorism is of particular interest since it highlights many concepts already discussed.

First, those individuals whom Nietzsche regards as great individuals are necessarily of noble disposition. However, the reverse is not true; one can be noble, yet lack greatness as is the case with Napoleon and Caesar. A further example would be the nobles that Nietzsche mentions in Genealogy who epitomize nobility but do not demonstrate greatness. So while greatness necessarily entails nobility, being of noble disposition does not necessarily entail greatness which supports my previous remarks concerning why the active types like Napoleon are not great men – i.e. "higher men."

123 "The higher type is solitary and deals with others only instrumentally" (Leiter 2002, 116). 124 Nietzsche gives a similar account of one's four virtues in Daybreak: "The good four. – Honest towards ourselves and whoever else is a friend to us; brave towards the enemy; magnanimous towards the defeated; polite – always: this is what the four cardinal virtues want us to be" (D: 556). 89

The second important point is that Nietzsche clearly associates greatness with solitude.

His talk of "wanting to be by oneself," "he shall be greatest who can be loneliest," etc., makes this link quite apparent. Further, the characteristics he ascribes to those individuals who "shall be greatest," are all features that he ascribes to the "higher men" – i.e. being beyond good and evil, overrich in will, etc. Again, such characteristics are only possessed by the "higher men," so there is a clear connection between Nietzsche's "higher men," "greatness," and "solitude."

The third point is that Nietzsche states that: "He shall be greatest who can be... the master of his virtues..." (BGE: 212; emphasis mine), and when discussing his higher types in the section:

"What is Noble" in Beyond Good and Evil he uses the same phrase: "And to remain master to one's four virtues: of courage, insight, sympathy, and solitude" (BGE: 284; emphasis mine).

Great individuals – "higher men" – require solitude. However, why is this the case? Why does

Nietzsche think that greatness requires solitude? The answer occurs at the end of the previously mentioned Beyond Good and Evil §284, in which Nietzsche states that society makes men

"common."125 It is a theme that runs throughout all of Nietzsche's writings: great individuals risk squandering their greatness if they associate too much with the "common" masses. Nietzsche believes that society's desire to make everyone equal (such as through democracy and "equality of rights"126) is detrimental to great individuals and the higher types because it opposes human excellence in favour of mediocrity. Therefore, to minimize one's exposure to the "common," one

125 Nietzsche treats "common" as a derogatory concept. For example: "One must shed the bad taste of wanting to agree with many. "Good" is no longer good when one's neighbor mouths it. And how should there be a "common good"! The term contradicts itself: whatever can be common always has little value" (BGE: 43); See also BGE: 26, 268; GS P: 1, GS: 10; TI VIII: 5, TI IX: 33. 126 For example: "Today, conversely, when only the herd animal receives and dispenses honors in Europe, when "equality of rights" could all to easily be changed into equality in violating rights—I mean, into a common war on all that is rare, strange, privileged, the higher man, the higher soul, the higher duty, the higher responsibility, and the abundance of creative power and masterfulness..." (BGE: 212). 90 must either associate solely with one's equals or retreat into solitude.127 The problem is that neither option is a viable, permanent solution. Inevitably, one must associate with the masses if only to survive – a point which I will elaborate on in the next section.

It would appear then that solitude is an important characteristic and something that should be coveted. Echoing the distinction he makes between two kinds of sufferers in chapter two, Nietzsche makes a distinction between two kinds of solitude. Nietzsche writes in Beyond

Good and Evil:

Choose the good solitude, the free, playful, light solitude that gives you, too, the right to remain good in some sense. How poisonous, how crafty, how bad, does every long war make one, that cannot be waged openly by means of force! How personal does a long fear make one, a long watching of enemies, of possible enemies! These outcasts of society, these long-pursued, wickedly persecuted ones – also the compulsory recluses, the Spinozas or Giordano Brunos – always become in the end, even under the most spiritual masquerade, and perhaps without being themselves aware of it, sophisticated vengeance-seekers and poison-brewers... (BGE: 25). Just as Nietzsche associates suffering from an over-fullness of life with the strong and noble

"yes-saying" individuals, and suffering from an impoverishment of life with the weak and slavish man of ressentiment, Nietzsche makes a similar distinction regarding solitude. He distinguishes between "good" solitude and what can be called "poisonous" solitude.128 Again, the language used to describe good solitude is similar to the language Nietzsche uses to describe the noble type and the "higher men,"129 while the language he uses to describe poisonous solitude is very

127 This theme is aptly demonstrated in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, in which Zarathustra begins the book in the solitude of his mountain cave. His task of bringing a new teaching to society – the Übermensch – is what makes him leave his solitude and return to the masses. However, Zarathustra still returns to the solitude of his mountain cave numerous times throughout the book. "My whole Zarathustra is a dithyramb on solitude or, if I have been understood, on cleanliness..." (EH I: 8); "What separates two people most profoundly is a different sense and degree of cleanliness... The highest instinct of cleanliness places those possessed of it in the oddest and most dangerous lonesomeness, as saints..." (BGE: 271). 128 Poisonous solitude is usually associated with religion and the religious ascetic: "Wherever on earth the religious neurosis has appeared we find it tied to three dangerous dietary demands: solitude, fasting, and sexual abstinence" (BGE: 47). 129 Nietzsche uses the same words in Ecce Homo when discussing his need for solitude: "But I need solitude—which is to say, recovery, return to myself, the breath of a free, light, playful air" (EH I: 8). 91 reminiscent of how he describes men of ressentiment. In fact, there is a clear connection between these lower types and poisonous solitude. In The Gay Science, while discussing morality, Nietzsche writes:

There is a human being who has turned out badly, who does not have enough spirit to be able to enjoy it but just enough education to realize this; he is bored, disgusted, and despises himself... such a human being who has become poisoned through and through – for spirit becomes poison, education becomes poison, possessions become poison, solitude becomes poison for those who have turned out badly in this way – eventually ends up in the state of habitual revenge, will to revenge (GS: 359).

Individuals that have "turned out badly" are those sickly, lower types, and what is usually considered good, becomes poison for these men of ressentiment. For them, solitude breeds nothing but vengeance and decadence.130

Similar to suffering, solitude is not always a good but depends on the type of person one is. Those who are of the ascending type – the higher type – will choose the good solitude in order to avoid polluting their greatness with what is "common," while those who have turned out badly – the descending, lower types – poison solitude due to their lack of power.

One might suggest that avoiding solitude might be preferable to choosing poisonous solitude, but that is not a viable option for Nietzsche. Lacking solitude is also associated with the lower types: "They belong, briefly and sadly, among the levelers...being eloquent and prolifically scribbling slaves of the democratic taste and its "modern ideas"; they are all human beings without solitude, without their own solitude..." (BGE: 44). Once again, solitude – the good solitude – seems to be a necessary characteristic of the "higher men." Individuals that lack the capacity for solitude, or who become poisoned by it – or poison solitude themselves – are all individuals of the lower type, and therefore, are incapable of greatness. Therefore, "good"

130 "What serves the higher type of men as nourishment or delectation must almost be poison for a very different and inferior type. The virtues of the common man might perhaps signify vices and weaknesses in a philosopher" (BGE: 30). 92 solitude is an essential characteristic of the "higher men." However, this emphasis on "good" solitude will undermine noble action and politics, making it evident that a governing principle of noble action and politics is not what Nietzsche thinks exemplifies what is best about human beings.131

3.5 – Politics

What then are Nietzsche's reasons for rejecting noble action and politics as what is best about human beings? Aristotle famously said that "...man is by nature a political animal" (POL

I: 1253.a2), and further, "...he who is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god: he is no part of a state" (POL I:1253.a27).

Being part of a community was necessary for living a life governed by noble action since being part of a society is in man's nature. If a human can live separately from the community, then the individual is not human in Aristotle's view, being either a beast or a god. Nietzsche gives a response to this claim stating: "To live alone one must be a beast or a god, says Aristotle.

Leaving out the third case: one must be both – a philosopher" (TI I: 3). Nietzsche's claim is that humans can live apart from society, so long as they are a particular type of human. It will not be something that everyone can do successfully, but this should not come as a surprise since as I have made clear, Nietzsche claims his philosophy is not for the masses, but for the few.

The most vivid example of this claim can be found in his character Zarathustra, who lives in his mountain cave, away from the community, and with only his eagle and snake for company.

He has a solitary existence. However, for Zarathustra to spread his new teaching of the

131 The majority of references that Nietzsche makes to "solitude" are positive. For example: "Every choice human being strives instinctively for a citadel and a secrecy where he is saved from the crowd, the many, the great majority – where he may forget "men who are the rule," being their exception..." (BGE: 26); "Independence is for the very few; it is a privilege of the strong. And whoever attempts it even with the best right but without inner constraint proves that he is probably not only strong, but also daring to the point of recklessness..." (BGE: 29); "...and today it is necessary; namely, insofar as we are born, sworn, jealous friends of solitude, of our own most profound, most midnightly, most middaily solitude: that is the type of man we are, we free spirits" (BGE: 44)! 93

Übermensch, he must abandon his solitude and return to society so he must associate with the rabble out of necessity.132 In this way, Zarathustra exemplifies Nietzsche's conception of a

"philosopher." As I will show in the next chapter, Nietzsche expresses contempt for the

"academic philosopher" who passively sits among his books but endorses a "philosopher of the future" – a philosopher who will actively attempt to spread his new values throughout the world.

Although these philosophers of the future will also value their solitude, they will have to abandon it at times to spread their new values among society.

With that said, it does seem necessary on a practical level to be part of a community.

Living a life of a hermit seems idealistic. One must rely on others to fulfill their daily needs since it would be quite difficult to do so on one's own. The individual would have to be a jack- of-all-trades to ensure their basic needs are fulfilled. However, if a person is busy spending their days satisfying their basic needs, they will not have time to engage in the creative pursuits necessary for enhancing and promoting culture. Aristotle recognizes a similar problem regarding a life governed by contemplation, asserting that it requires leisure to allow the individual time to contemplate. If someone spends their day working a trade to support themselves, that leaves little time and energy for philosophical contemplation.133 The same problem seems to plague

Nietzsche's virtue of solitude since solitude would drive the individual away from the community

132 Interestingly, Zarathustra is characterized as someone who is on his way to being more than human, yet, somewhat beastly as well. He brings his new teaching of the Übermensch to humanity, and in doing so, seems to progress toward this ideal. There is much debate about whether Zarathustra actually becomes an Übermensch, but what is generally agreed upon is that Zarathustra is on a path toward this ideal. Further, Zarathustra is something of a beast in that he lives and communicates with animals. He is not a wretched individual in the way that Aristotle is perhaps hinting at, but he could certainly be considered "beastly" due to his close association with his animals. In fact, the company of animals seems to be the only kind that Zarathustra finds acceptable. 133 Nietzsche laments in a section from The Gay Science entitled "Leisure and idleness" that being active has come to be valued over contemplation and leisure: "Even now one is ashamed of resting, and prolonged reflection almost gives people a bad conscience. One thinks with a watch in one's hand, even as one eats one's midday meal while reading the latest news of the stock market; one lives as if one always "might miss out on something." "Rather do anything than nothing": this principle, too, is merely a string to throttle all culture and good taste... Virtue has come to consist of doing something in less time than someone else... More and more, work enlists all good conscience to its side... Soon we may well reach the point where people can no longer give in to the desire for a vita contemplativa (that is, taking a walk with ideas and friends) without self-contempt and a bad conscience" (GS: 329). 94 and therefore, a life organized around noble action and politics. It would require the individual to rely mostly upon himself for meeting his basic needs, but it seems that this would be counter- productive for a life governed by the principle of creativity.

It appears then that a life organized around creativity is not possible if one lacks the basic necessities for it. If this is the case, how is solitude compatible with a life governed by creativity and creation? Wouldn't the emphasis on solitude make a life governed by creativity impossible?

It might certainly be the case if dealing in absolutes, but there is no reason to think that solitude is incompatible with a life governed by creativity in practice. For example, if an individual lives like a hermit, it will be extremely difficult – perhaps impossible – to live the kind of life that

Nietzsche has in mind. However, it does seem possible to live a life of relative solitude in which one minimizes the amount of contact they have with other people, while still fulfilling one's needs. Further, solitude need not only refer to one's spatial relation to a community; for example, one can live among one's peers, and yet be apart from them intellectually. Harbouring thoughts, feelings, and values that run contrary to one's community is a kind of intellectual solitude which entails that even when surrounded by the masses one is still alone – a thought that is often expressed by Zarathustra.134 I am inclined to think that Nietzsche has both forms of solitude in mind. Spatial solitude is certainly necessary to some degree based on what Nietzsche says, but possessing values that separate one from the rest of the community also seems important. After all, what good is it to live apart from society if still harbouring shared values?

Nietzsche would view such an action as meaningless.

If an individual is to seek solitude from the community, then it does not seem possible that the person could live a life governed by noble action and politics. To have any success in

134 "They do not understand me: I am not the mouth for these ears. I seem to have lived too long in the mountains; I listened too much to brooks and trees; now I talk to them as to goatherds" (Z P: 5). 95 the politics of a community, one needs to be a recognizable part of it, and further, one must share similar values with the community. Someone who lives in solitude, away from the community would have little impact on their political doctrines since they would be viewed as an outsider and an interloper upon the community. Further, if one has values that differ greatly from the majority of society, then the chances of having those values enacted in some manner is also unlikely. "Solitude," as endorsed by Nietzsche would seem to lead one to the conclusion that it is incompatible with politics. Any individual who hopes to be successful in politics needs to be embedded within the community and endorsing their shared values. Isolating oneself physically and mentally from society as Nietzsche's conception of solitude espouses, is not conducive to a life governed by noble and politics. After all, no hermit has ever ruled a kingdom.

Nietzsche's philosophy certainly implies that it is not compatible with politics, and therefore, a life governed by noble action and politics does not exemplify what is best about humans. Nietzsche does make some explicit comments regarding politics, none of which advocate the adoption of such a life. For example, in the Preface to The Antichrist, Nietzsche states that the book is only for certain individuals and then provides a list of characteristics that the individual must possess in under to understand it. Of particular interest is the following:

"One must be skilled in living on mountains – seeing the wretched ephemeral babble of politics and national self-seeking beneath oneself" (A: P). The remark about "living on mountains" is another reference to living in solitude and separating one's self from the masses, but it can also mean that one should raise themselves up to a place where it is possible to look down upon everything – another frequent theme in Nietzsche's philosophy. In all likelihood, Nietzsche has both meanings in mind. Not only should his select few value and live in solitude, but they

96 should also view the masses and the rabble from a great distance and height, and as something that is of little concern to one's self.

The passage also makes it quite clear that Nietzsche does not place much value in politics. Although politics may be necessary for society, Nietzsche believes that politics is not something to engage in for his select few, rather it is something that should be viewed with contempt.

A similar critique appears in an aphorism from The Gay Science in which Nietzsche is discussing the relationship between his higher types and Europe. In a paragraph critiquing the

"Germans," Nietzsche writes:

No, we do not love humanity; but on the other hand we are not nearly "German" enough, in the sense in which the word "German" is constantly being used nowadays, to advocate nationalism and race hatred and to be able to take pleasure in the national scabies of the heart and blood poisoning that now leads the nations of Europe to delimit and barricade themselves against each other... we far prefer to live on mountains, apart, "untimely," in past or future centuries, merely in order to keep ourselves from experiencing the silent rage to which we know we should be condemned as eyewitnesses of politics that are decimating the German spirit by making it vain and that is, moreover, petty politics... (GS: 377).

Once again Nietzsche's disdain for nationalism and politics, in general, is apparent. While this passage focuses on German politics and the German state, in particular, it is no less applicable to politics as a whole and reinforces Nietzsche's critique. Further, his insistence on solitude and living apart from the rest of society is again presented as an antipode to politics, reinforcing the value that Nietzsche places on solitude and his aversion to politics.

The last aphorism of importance concerns the relationship between culture and politics.

Nietzsche writes in The Twilight of the Idols:

In the end, no one can spend more than he has: that is true of the individual, it is true of a people. If one spends oneself for power, for power politics, for economics, world trade, parliamentarianism, and military interests – if one spends

in this direction the quantum of understanding, seriousnessness, will, and self- overcoming which one represents, then it will be lacking for the other direction. Culture and the state – one should not deceive oneself about this – are antagonists: "Kultur-Staat" is merely a modern idea. One lives off the other, one thrives at the expense of the other. All great ages of culture are ages of political decline: what is great culturally has always been unpolitical, even anti-political" (TI VIII: 4).135

Nietzsche's point is clear: culture and politics are at odds with each other. If the state is a great world power, then it is culturally poor, but if it is a great cultural power, then it is not a great world power.136 The state can only flourish culturally, or as a political power, but not both. It is especially significant since Nietzsche believes that the aim of humanity should be to enhance and promote culture (a point which I will demonstrate in chapter five). Therefore, anything which supports that goal should be endorsed, while anything that opposes or impedes it should be abandoned.

Since the aim of politics is not the enhancement of culture, it does not seem like

Nietzsche would advocate a life governed by politics and noble action as what is best about humans. This is particularly the case since culture and creativity are intertwined as I mentioned earlier. Anything that impedes or opposes culture will also impede and oppose creativity, and therefore, should be avoided. Also, Nietzsche's continuous emphasis on solitude and separating one's self from the masses makes the very notion of politics untenable for him. Politics requires

135 "I, the last anti-political German" (EH I: 3). 136 This idea can be traced back to the first section of Nietzsche's David Straus, the Confessor and the Writer. Nietzsche is extremely critical of the public's opinion concerning Germany's victorious war against France, which assumes that not only is Germany politically superior to France, but is therefore culturally superior as well. Nietzsche's assessment is that Germany may have won the political war is being soundly beaten in the cultural war with France. "On the other hand, in the present case there can be no question of a victory of German culture, for the simple reason that French culture continues to exist as heretofore, and we are dependent upon it as heretofore. Our culture played no part even in our success in arms. Stern discipline, natural bravery and endurance, superior generalship, unity and obedience in the ranks, in short, elements that have nothing to do with culture... If we had in fact ceased to copy it we would not thereby have triumphed over it, but only have liberated ourselves from it: only if we had imposed upon the French an original German culture. In the meantime, we should not forget that we are still dependent on Paris in all matters of form, just as before – and that we have to go on being dependent, for up to now there has been no original German culture" (UM I: 1). 98 immersing one's self in the activities of the state; working with, and within the society is unavoidable if the individual is to be successful. As Aristotle makes clear, it is not optional.

With that said, it does not seem like Nietzsche would always fight against politics per se.

Nietzsche believes that individuals – and society – need to focus their efforts on the enhancement and promotion of culture. If the politics of the state sought out this goal, then Nietzsche would gladly endorse the effort. However, the current trajectory of politics is unconcerned with this aim – and in certain political forms, seems entirely opposed to it.137 Great ages of culture require great individuals – "higher men." Rather than providing the optimum conditions for the generation of such individuals, Nietzsche view politics as the endorsement of mediocrity. It focuses on making everyone equal, at the expense of the great. As a result, a life governed by noble action and politics as envisioned by Aristotle is not a life that Nietzsche would think exemplifies what is best about humans.

Arendt's assertion that Nietzsche prioritizes the vita activa over the vita contemplativa is also demonstrably false. The crucial point demonstrating this is Nietzsche's belief that the active type lacks creative power. Their inability to engage in creativity is a serious problem for

Nietzsche, and if creativity exemplifies what is best about humans, that means the active type cannot be an exemplary individual. If Nietzsche endorses creative individuals, people who lack creative power will also lack his endorsement.

It should be clear that a life governed by noble action and politics does not exemplify what is best about humans according to Nietzsche. Although such a governing principle shares many of the same characteristics that Nietzsche praises in those of noble disposition, it is what the principle lacks – creative power – that disqualifies it. The absence of creative power means that any achievements by those governed by noble action and politics will not have the lasting

137 Democracy for example. 99 cultural influence that great individuals accomplish. Since Nietzsche believes that the enhancement and promotion of culture should be the aim of humanity, any governing principle which fails to do this will not exemplify what is best about humans.

100

Chapter 4

Affirmation and Contemplation

In chapter one, I explained why Aristotle thinks contemplation exemplifies what is best about us. In doing so, I also provided an account about what is meant by contemplation. Recall that Kraut interprets Aristotle's notion of contemplation as: "bring[ing] to mind the truths of some theoretical discipline. It is not the activity of searching for the truth within some field, but rather a process of reflection on a system of truths already discovered" (Kraut 1989, 73). In describing the vita contemplativa, Hannah Arendt states that "the contemplative way is sheer quietness... [it goes on] in the "desert"... [and] is devoted... to the "vision of God"... [T]hinking aims at and ends in contemplation, and contemplation is not an activity but a passivity; it is the point where mental activity comes to rest" (Arendt 1971, 6). Both accounts interpret contemplation as an end point. It is not a process of inquiry where one attempts to actively discern some truth, rather, contemplation is what occurs when one already possesses the truth.

Further, contemplation is passive and objective. To reflect on some truth is merely to mirror it or gaze on it like a spectator; there is no active, subjective process at work.

It is this framework of contemplation that Nietzsche will be critical of since by his time, passivity, reactivity, and objectivity are entrenched within contemplation and the vita contemplativa.138 The issue at hand is that Nietzsche values noble characteristics like activity and action, and disvalues reactivity and passivity which he associates with the slave. If

Nietzsche asserts that this framework of contemplation exemplifies what is best about humans, then it seems he will also have to endorse its slavish characteristics. I think this is an outcome that Nietzsche would want to avoid.

138 It is important to keep in mind that the form of contemplation Nietzsche is critiquing in this chapter is contemplation of the vita contemplativa. (The form discussed by Hannah Arendt.) 101

Further complicating matters is that Aristotle's metaphysical picture of contemplation exemplifying what is best about us is not an option for Nietzsche. Aristotle links contemplative activity with the divine concluding that contemplation is what is best about us because it is the part of us that is closest to the divine and is a way to access the kosmos.

Finally, it will be remembered that in The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche holds that

"knowledge kills action" (BT: 7). In light of this, it might seem there is a very short route to the life of contemplation since the life of contemplation is the life of knowledge, and as we have seen, a life of action is problematic. The key point is that the knowledge that kills action is pessimistic knowledge, and by his middle period Nietzsche has rejected it. As we will see,

Nietzsche's account of contemplation is more nuanced and complicated.

4.1 – Contemplation's Origin

Aristotle states that: "All men by nature desire to know" (M I.980a21). The implicit suggestion is that the beginning of humanity's existence is inseparable from the origin of contemplation. There was never a time where humans existed without it. Even the most primitive human was capable of contemplating and reflecting on the world.

Nietzsche provides an alternative account concerning the origin of contemplation in

Daybreak:

Origin of the vita contemplativa. – In rude ages, where pessimistic judgments as to the nature of man and world prevail, the individual in the feeling of possessing all his powers is always intent upon acting in accordance with these judgments and thus translating idea into action through hunting, robbing, attacking, mistreatment and murder, including the paler reflections of these actions such as are alone tolerated within the community. But if his powers decline, if he feels weary or ill or melancholy or satiated and as a consequence for the time being devoid of desires and wishes, he is then a relatively better, that is to say less harmful man, and his pessimistic ideas discharge themselves only in words and thoughts, for example about the value of his comrades or his wife or his life or his gods – his judgments will be unfavourable judgments. In this condition he becomes thinker and prophet, or he expands imaginatively on his superstition and

102

devises new usages, or he mocks his enemies – but whatever he may think about, all the products of his thinking are bound to reflect the condition he is in, which is one in which fear and weariness are on the increase and his valuation of action and active enjoyment on the decrease; the content of these products of his thinking must correspond to the content of these poetical, thoughtful, priestly moods; unfavourable judgment is bound to predominate. Later on, all those who continually acted as the single individual had formerly acted while in this condition, and who thus judged unfavourably and whose lives were melancholy and poor in deeds, came to be called poets or thinkers or priests or medicine-men – because they were so inactive one would have liked to have despised such men and ejected them from the community; but there was some danger attached to that – they were versed in superstition and on the scent of divine forces, one never doubted that they commanded unknown sources of power. This is the estimation under which the oldest race of contemplative natures lived – despised to just the extent they were not dreaded! In this muffled shape, in this ambiguous guise, with an evil heart and often an anguished head, did contemplation first appear on earth, at once weak and fearsome, secretly despised and publicly loaded with superstitious reference! Here, as always, it is a case of pudenda orgio [shameful origin] (D: 42)!139

The story Nietzsche presents is that primitive societies valued action and activity since they aided the community's survival. Each member was expected to contribute to the society to ensure its continuation. Contemplation was not a luxury that could be afforded in these primitive communities, so the judgements and ideas of its members had to be expressed through actions which were sometimes intentionally harmful to other people. For example, if one member of the community was ill-disposed toward another member, this unfavourable judgement or idea was

139 Nietzsche echoes his thoughts on contemplation six years later in Genealogy, where he writes: "Without a doubt: contemplation first appeared in the world in disguise, with an ambiguous appearance, an evil heart and often with an anxiety-filled head. All that was inactive, brooding and unwar-like in the instincts of contemplative men surrounded them with a deep mistrust for a long time: against which they had no other remedy than to conceive a pronounced fear of themselves" (GM III: 10). A germ of this genealogy can be found as far back as On Truth and Lies In a Nonmoral Sense from 1873: "As a means for the preserving of the individual, the intellect unfolds its principle powers in dissimulation, which is the means by which weaker, less robust individuals preserve themselves – since they have been denied the chance to wage the battle for existence with horns or with the sharp teeth of beasts of prey. This art of dissimulation reaches its peak in man. Deception, flattering, lying, deluding, talking behind the back, putting up a false front, living in borrowed splendor, wearing a mask, hiding behind convention, playing a role for others and for oneself – in short, a continuous fluttering around the solitary flame of vanity... Insofar as the individual wants to maintain himself against other individuals, he will under natural circumstances employ the intellect mainly for dissimulation. But at the same time, from boredom and necessity, man wishes to exist socially and with the herd; therefore, he needs to make peace and strives accordingly..." (TL, 80-81). Much of what Nietzsche writes here is remarkably similar to Daybreak §42 in terms of language and the underlying point being made. 103 often discharged through actions such as robbery, mistreatment, or even murder. These actions presume that the individual possesses the power to potentially accomplish them; whether they are successful in carrying out the action is another matter. By releasing their unfavourable judgements through physical expression, it prevented these pessimistic ideas from festering and consuming the person. But what happens if a community member is incapable of expressing their unfavourable judgements in a physical manner due to a lack of power?

Nietzsche suggests that if someone experiences a loss of power due to illness or injury

(physical or mental), their ability to successfully discharge their pessimistic ideas through action is drastically impaired. Take, for example, a powerful hunter who directed and discharged his blood-lust toward the animals he hunted who becomes injured and is unable to hunt. His unfavourable judgements persist, but now lack a way to be successfully discharged through physical expression. Since he cannot physically discharge these ideas, he attempts to discharge them through thoughts and words. The hunter's loss of power forces him to retreat from a world of action to a world of thought and is a reaction to his predicament. It is not an action he freely chooses, rather, it is a reaction based on the circumstances.

This reactive retreat has various consequences, not only for the affected member but also for the community. As I mentioned, primitive societies required its members to be as active as possible to aid in the community's survival. Members of the community that were not contributing in a tangible way were seen as a danger. Nietzsche points out that these individuals

"whose lives were melancholy and poor in deeds... were so inactive..." (D: 42) that they were under constant threat of being ejected from the community. Ensuring the community had ample resources was of paramount importance, so it was vital that every member worked for their keep.

If someone was not providing something to the community, the community had a mouth to feed

104 that was not contributing its survival. The easy solution was to kick this person out of the society since he was now a liability. However, the inactive individual was aware of this danger.

Being ostracized from the society guaranteed their death. Therefore, these inactive members had to find a way to remain useful to the community and the way they accomplished this was by making themselves appear useful by linking contemplation with the supernatural.

Superstition played a large role in primitive society according to Nietzsche. If someone was able to convince others that he possessed the ability to command supernatural forces, that person would not only be considered extremely useful by the community but feared as well.

This fear would prevent the community from exiling this inactive individual lest they incur his wrath. According to Nietzsche, it was these inactive individuals who came to be called priests, medicine-men, and prophets; they became contemplative. These thinkers substituted a decline in

"natural" power, with the clever illusion of an increase in "supernatural" power. For example, the contemplative individual would discover signs in the environment which would allow him to make predictions about the weather, animal migratory patterns, etc. Since he was no longer engaged in strenuous physical activity, he had time for leisure, allowing him to make inductive connections about the world that the community failed to realize because of a lack of leisure.

The contemplative individual would claim this information was conveyed by supernatural forces, despite it being grounded in observation and reflection.

The psychological and social origins of contemplative activity are marked by elements that are not life-affirming according to Nietzsche – at least not in the spontaneous, noble way that Nietzsche values. The individual's loss of power, inactivity, and his decreased valuation of activity are not signs of a higher type, but the signs of a lower, life-preserving type. Therefore, it

105 seems that contemplation as a governing principle appears unattractive and does not exemplify what is best about humans for Nietzsche. But as I have said, it is more complicated.

4.2 – The Contemplative Type

As the vita contemplativa gets going, it divides into various "contemplative types" according to Nietzsche. He separates thinkers into four kinds: the religious, the artist, the philosopher, and the scientist.140 These four contemplative types are examples of people who employ contemplation as a governing principle. A cursory glance at those individuals whom

Nietzsche considers to be examples of "higher men," reveals the problem – the "higher men" can all be categorized according to at least one of these contemplative types. Beethoven and

Shakespeare can be classified as artists, Nietzsche as a philosopher, and Goethe can be included in both of those, as well as the scientist.141 The "higher men" all spring from the vita contemplativa; they all use contemplation as their governing principle.142

Further, Nietzsche endorses the production of these contemplative types in Schopenhauer as Educator writing: "[i]t is the fundamental idea of culture, insofar as it sets for each one of us but one task: to promote the production of the philosopher, the artist and the saint within us and without us and thereby to work at the perfecting of nature" (UM III: 5). According to Nietzsche,

140 See Daybreak §41. In an early note from 1872, Nietzsche writes: "Result: it is only a question of degrees and quantities. All men are artistic, philosophical, scientific, etc" (P: 65). His point is that everyone possesses these characteristics in varying degrees. The contemplative type would be individuals who possess one or more of these characteristics to a high degree. This seems to corroborate Nietzsche's account concerning the origin of contemplation and the contemplative life. When the individual experiences a loss of power, these contemplative characteristics increase in degree and quantity. If these characteristics were absent from certain individuals, then when they experience of a loss of power there would be no possibility for contemplation to arise, nor would the individual be able to live a contemplative life. Since the active life and now the contemplative life are no longer accessible, it would seem they would be resigned to a life of pleasure. But this does not seem to be the case according to Nietzsche. So this early note from 1872 parallels what he writes in Daybreak (1881). 141 Interestingly, Goethe also seems to fall under the vita activa as he was a statesman and involved in German politics. This could be another reason why Nietzsche regards him as an exemplar of "higher men" but the majority of his endeavours fall under the life of contemplation. 142 Individuals like Napoleon and Caesar are examples of warriors and statesman – individuals who fit squarely in the active life. As Nietzsche makes clear in Daybreak §41, the contemplative types have often had a negative impact on those of the active life. This means that the contemplative types are not of the vita activa, and further solidifies the point that the active life fails to make an enduring contribution to culture. 106 the task of culture is to produce the contemplative types both within us – so culture should aim at making existing individuals like the saint, philosopher, and artist – and without us – so culture should also aim at producing these contemplative types in society. Since the "higher men" are all instances of contemplative types, this entails that culture should be directed toward the creation of "higher men," and further, that the "higher men" should also focus on producing more of their kind. If the "higher men" are contemplative men, and Nietzsche considers them to be humanity's highest exemplars, why does he dismiss contemplation as exemplifying what is best about human beings? Aren't the "higher men" proof that Nietzsche does endorse contemplation as a governing principle? This seems like a reasonable conclusion to make.

However, it is not correct. To show why Nietzsche does not think contemplation exemplifies what is best about us, further attention must be given to two concepts which he associates with contemplation: reactivity and passivity.

4.3 – Reactivity and Passivity

According to Nietzsche, drives can be of two types: active or reactive. Moreover, as we saw in the previous chapter, he values action and activity over reaction and passivity. Active drives are superior, and Nietzsche often describes them as healthy, ascending, "yes-saying," noble, affirmative and active. Reactive drives are defined in contrast to the active drives; they presuppose the active, so Nietzsche considers reactive drives as deficient or defective. While active drives are properly operating according to their nature, reactive drives have become defective and are aiming for goals that are a perversion of their natural inclination. It is for this reason that Nietzsche often refers to reactive drives as sick, descending, "no-saying," base, vile, slavish, negative, and passive. Based on the terminology, drives which are primarily reactive or passive will be of less value for Nietzsche than those which are active.

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Nietzsche first gives an account of active and reactive drives in the Geneology during his discussion of the noble and the slave:

The beginning of the slaves' revolt in morality occurs when ressentiment itself turns creative and gives birth to values: the ressentiment of those beings who, denied the proper response of action, compensate for it only with imaginary revenge. Whereas all noble morality grows out of a triumphant saying 'yes' to itself, slave morality says 'no' on principle to everything that is 'outside', 'other', 'non-self': and this 'no' is its creative deed. This reversal of the evaluating glance – this essential orientation to the outside instead of back onto itself – is a feature of ressentiment: in order to come about, slave morality first has to have an opposing, external world, it needs, physiologically speaking, external stimuli in order to act at all, – its action is basically a reaction (GM I: 10)

Nietzsche ties reactivity to the slave, while activity is associated with the noble. Given

Nietzsche's contempt for people possessing a slavish nature, it is not a surprise that he attributes little value to reactivity. Later in the same section, he associates passivity with slavish natures, while those who have strong, noble characters are associated with activity:

The ‘well-born’ [nobles] felt they were ‘the happy’; they did not need first of all to construct their happiness artificially by looking at their enemies, or in some cases by talking themselves into it, lying themselves into it (as all men of ressentiment are wont to do); and also, as complete men bursting with strength and therefore necessarily active, they knew they must not separate happiness from action, - being active is by necessity counted as part of happiness (this is the etymological derivation of εύπράττειν [To do well in the sense of faring well]) – all very much the opposite of ‘happiness’ at the level of the powerless, the oppressed, and those rankled with poisonous and hostile feelings, for whom it manifests itself as essentially a narcotic, an anaesthetic, rest, peace, ‘sabbath’, relaxation of the mind and stretching of the limbs, in short as something passive (GM I: 10).

Individuals possessing noble natures view happiness and action as interrelated; one can only be happy if they are active. On the other hand, slavish natures are reactive and passive. They attempt to distance themselves from action and activity, seeking a more "relaxing" and "restful" existence. From the noble point of view, the slave becomes incapable of happiness as a result of this reaction. So while the noble is constantly trying to increase their power through action and

108 activity, the slave is constantly trying to preserve what little power they possess through reaction and passivity.143

So what is the significance of reactivity and passivity as they relate to the overall discussion about contemplation? As I mentioned, Nietzsche associates contemplation with these life-stultifying features. If Nietzsche believes they have little worth since they fail to enhance life, then any life possessing these life-stultifying characteristics would not be endorsed by

Nietzsche, and therefore, Nietzsche would not endorse contemplation as a governing principle.

Recall that Nietzsche suggests in Daybreak §42 that contemplation first arose in primitive society due to a member's loss of power. The person is unable to discharge their pessimistic thoughts through physical actions, so he finds other ways to purge these thoughts. One form that this discharge can manifest as is by mocking his enemies through words and thoughts.

This is echoed in Nietzsche's discussion of the slave revolt in Genealogy I §10, when he states that the slaves "who, denied the proper response to action, compensate for it only with imaginary revenge" (GM I: 10). The slave is unable to respond appropriately through action, so they exact their revenge in an imaginary manner. The slaves' inability to respond appropriately is due to their lack of power. If the slave had power, not only would he be able to take action, but he would not be a slave. Since the slave cannot physically affect the world through action, he attempts to accomplish the same goal through imaginary means – i.e. through words and ideas. From the perspective of the noble and those possessing power, the slaves' revenge is merely imaginary since these substitutes do not generate the same immediate effect on the world.

Based upon Nietzsche's description of the origin of contemplation, it appears that the

143 "The wish to preserve oneself is the symptom of a condition of distress, of a limitation of the really fundamental instinctive life which aims at the expansion of power and, wishing for that, frequently risks and even sacrifices self- preservation... The struggle for existence is only an exception, a temporary restriction of the will to life. The great and small struggle always revolves around superiority, around growth and expansion, around power – in accordance with the will to power which is the will to life" (GS: 349). 109 contemplative individual and the slave both experience a lack of power that forces them to discharge their pessimistic ideas in similar ways.

A further correspondence between the contemplative individual from Daybreak and the slave can be demonstrated through the notions of activity and passivity. Nietzsche states in

Daybreak §42 that the contemplative individual's condition "is one in which fear and weariness are on the increase and his valuation of action and active enjoyment [are] on the decrease" (D:

42). In addition, the individual becomes quite inactive – so much so in fact, that the community would banish them due to their lack of contribution to the community's survival.

Nietzsche's description of the slave from Genealogy again sounds very similar to these contemplative individuals. Recall that the nobles "felt they were 'the happy' ... [were] complete men bursting with strength and therefore necessarily active... all very much the opposite of

'happiness' at the level of the powerless [slave], the oppressed, and those rankled with poisonous and hostile feelings..." (GM I: 10). While the nobles view action and activity as extremely valuable since it is necessary for happiness, this implies that members within that community that lack the ability for action and activity cannot be happy, so they seek out "rest, peace,

'sabbath'" and define their happiness, not as something necessarily active, but "as something passive" (GM I: 10). The slave is passive due to a lack of power, and he values passivity because he is unable to physically affect the world through action. Rather than be denied happiness because of his inability to act, the slave redefines happiness, associating it with a lack of power and equating it with passivity.

So the community member Nietzsche describes at the beginning of Daybreak §42 is presented as active and "happy," but when his power declines, he is not able to express himself through activity, and he becomes inactive – or passive. These are two major similarities between

110 the contemplative individual and the slave: both lack power and both are passive – which they regard as more valuable than action and activity. My claim that the slave and the contemplative individual are closely related (if not the same) seems correct based on Nietzsche's writings and at any rate, the similarities between them are difficult to ignore.

4.4 – Passivity and History

Against this backdrop, we can begin to deepen our understanding about why Nietzsche would reject the traditional standing of the vita contemplativa.

Nietzsche attacks passivity and reactivity quite early in his writings. At the very beginning of On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life, he provides a very telling quotation from Goethe: "'In any case, I hate everything that merely instructs me without augmenting or directly invigorating my activity'" (UM II: Foreword). Having set the stage for the rest of his essay, Nietzsche continues:

[I]ts [our meditation's] intention is to show why instructions without invigoration, why knowledge not attended by action, why history as a costly superfluity and luxury, must, to use Goethe's word, be seriously hated by us – hated because we still lack the things we need and the superfluous is the enemy of the necessary. We need history, certainly, but we need it for reasons different from those for which the idler in the garden of knowledge needs it, even though he may look nobly down on our rough and charmless needs and requirements. We need it, that is to say, for the sake of life and action, not so as to turn comfortably away from life and action, let alone for the purpose of extenuating the self-seeking life and the base and cowardly action. We want to serve history only to the extent that history serves life: for it is possible to value the study of history to such a degree that life becomes stunted and degenerate... (UM II: Foreword).

Although Nietzsche is focusing his attention on history and the role that it is thought to serve, his remarks can be extrapolated to provide a more general outlook, namely: If the purpose of something is only to instruct and not generate action, then it lacks value according to Nietzsche and should be avoided; however, it does not follow that anything that increases or stimulates

111 activity is valuable and should be pursed.144 Regardless, there will be some things which should be pursed because they do stimulate activity. It is evident that the target of Nietzsche's critical eye in this passage is passivity and reactivity. The attack on history is not an attack on history per se, rather, it is an attack on how we view the purpose of history. We usually regard history as facts about the distant past; as a story that educates us and provides us with knowledge, but which serves no practical purpose. It is a kind of luxury to be studied when we require a break from more practical pursuits. It is this view of history that Nietzsche criticizes. Traditionally, it is thought that the acquisition of knowledge is valuable and worthwhile, as is the case with history. While I do not think Nietzsche would disagree, it does seem that he would argue that the acquisition of knowledge is only valuable if we make use of it. Knowing when the

Peloponnesian War occurred, who was involved, and the major battles is valuable, not because of the quantity of knowledge, but because of how we can apply the knowledge for our benefit.

History should actively serve life, instead of life serving history. If we view history only as knowledge about particular facts, it ultimately fails as knowledge since knowledge should promote and stimulate life according to Nietzsche. Looking back on the past is only useful if we can project its lessons into the future.

The same practice can be applied to any knowledge. If the purpose of knowledge is to only accumulate facts and figures – to passively receive an imprint of the world – then knowledge is of little value. However, if one can apply this knowledge in a way that promotes and stimulates activity, and therefore life, then it very valuable. For example, consider two individuals (A and B) whom both pursue knowledge. They acquire various facts about various subjects. Individual A continuously increases his knowledge but does nothing with it. It simply

144 For example, an ascetic practice could increase and stimulate activity, but not in the life-affirming manner that would be valuable for Nietzsche. 112 exists within the encyclopedia of his mind. Individual B also continuously increases his knowledge but applies it to his life. He uses it for various purposes such as business, art, and relationships. Of these two individuals, it would seem that individual B is illustrating

Nietzsche's point. Individual B is using his knowledge to stimulate activity and life, whereas individual A is in a position where his knowledge is life-stultifying. Although individual A may have a great wealth of knowledge, his failure to apply it in a meaningful way robs it of any value it could possess.145

In other words, Nietzsche seems to be criticizing the idea that knowledge is intrinsically valuable, and therefore, its mere accumulation is valuable.146 Philosophy often argues for the intrinsic value of knowledge and often treats its practicality as second-rate. Aristotle enforces this bias in a story concerning Thales of Miletus:

He [Thales] was reproached for his poverty, which was supposed to show that philosophy was of no use. According to the story, he knew by his skill in the stars while it was yet winter that there would be a great harvest of olives in the coming year; so, having a little money, he gave deposits for the use of all the olive-presses in Chios and Miletus, which he hired at a low price because no one bid against him. When the harvest-time came, and many were wanted all at once and of a sudden, he let them out at any rate which he pleased, and made a quantity of money. Thus he showed the world that philosophers can easily be rich if they like, but that their ambition is of another sort (POL 1259a9-18).

Instead of pursuing knowledge and applying it for practical purposes, contemplation as a governing principle pursues knowledge for its own sake – which seems to be the other sort of ambition that Aristotle refers to at the end of the passage. Nietzsche would disagree with this sentiment. While he might consider the accumulation of wealth through knowledge as banal (he might disagree with the purpose or goal), he would not disagree with the method itself. One

145 It is important to distinguish between "important knowledge" and "trivial knowledge." Some knowledge is clearly "trivial knowledge," but this is not the kind of knowledge Nietzsche is concerned about. 146 ""Knowledge for its own sake" – that is the last snare of morality: with that one becomes completely entangled in it once more" (BGE: 64). 113 must utilize their knowledge – provide it with a task – instead of simply collecting it. The application of knowledge to a worthy end seems to be what Nietzsche has in mind, but this cannot be accomplished passively. One needs to actively apply the knowledge.

The view that knowledge (and in this case, history), must be actively future directed is held by Nietzsche in his later writings as well. He makes this clear in Genealogy:

[historiography's] noblest claim nowadays is that it is a mirror, it rejects all teleology, it does not want to 'prove' anything any more; it scorns playing the judge, and shows good taste there, - it affirms as little as it denies, it asserts and 'describes' ... All this is ascetic to a high degree; but to an even higher degree it is nihilistic, make no mistake about it (GM III: 26)!

Again, Nietzsche attacks the practice of history that merely "mirrors" and "describes." The belief that history is something to be passively learned is reflected by those who study it. Not only does it lack a purpose and goal, but it outright rejects such notions since it is only concerned with truth and facts. It describes how the world was, how events unfolded, and why they unfolded the way they did. It does not attempt to make judgements about the past, rather, it simply accepts past events. The supposition is that the construction of history is supposed to be a passive reflection of various facts or truth – and this is a premise which Nietzsche rejects. As he states in On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life, if the purpose of history is only to instruct and provide knowledge, then it is something we should avoid since it does not help humanity in any meaningful way.

Nietzsche's critical attitude toward history and its method culminates later in the section, with Nietzsche directing his remarks toward people he refers to as "contemplatives":

The 'contemplatives' are a hundred times worse –: I know of nothing as nauseating as this type of 'objective' armchair scholar and perfumed sensualist towards history, half-priest, half-satyr, Renan-scented, who reveals, by the mere falsetto of his approval, all that he lacks, where he lacks it, where the fates in his case have been, alas! rather too surgical with their cruel scissors! I have neither taste nor patience for this: the person with nothing to lose by doing so can keep

114

patient at such sights, - I become angry at them, such 'spectators' make me more embittered towards the 'play' than the play itself does (history itself, you understand), anacreontic moods seize me unexpectedly ... To kick, by holy Anacreon! not just to run away: to kick to pieces the rotten armchairs, this cowardly contemplativeness, this lewd eunuchism towards history, this flirting with ascetic ideals, this tartuffery of fairness that results from impotence (GM III: 26)!

Nietzsche associates the "contemplative" with objectivity, being a spectator, and impotence – i.e. lacking power. As we saw, the loss of power is what gives rise to the contemplative individual, and therefore, the vita contemplativa. The fact that Nietzsche still associates these two things with each other reinforces the idea that he first presented in Daybreak and demonstrates that he has not changed his mind. This is important since it helps to support my claim that Nietzsche would dismiss contemplation as exemplifying what is best about humans. By keeping his view consistent, it rules out the possibility that he might have changed his mind in his later writings.

The other two concepts that Nietzsche associates with the "contemplative," is that this person is a spectator and is objective. These characteristics are just synonyms for "mirrors" and

"describes." The contemplative is objective because he attempts to remove human subjectivity from the equation and view things from a perspectiveless-perspective.147 The problem, however, is that this is not possible. Any "objective" interpretation is always an interpretation from a subjective perspective. Although the "contemplative" may attempt to be objective, this is simply not possible for Nietzsche. Further, the contemplative is a "spectator." He only passively watches and does not actively participate. He contributes nothing to the final product, merely observing without influencing.

147 This is impossible according to Nietzsche: "We behold all things through the human head and cannot cut off this head..." (HH I.I: 9); "My eyes, however strong or weak they may be, can see only a certain distance, and it is within the space encompassed by this distance that I live and move, the line of this horizon constitutes my immediate fate, in great things and small, from which I cannot escape. Around every being there is described a similar concentric circle, which has a mid-point and is peculiar to him. Our ears enclose us within a comparable circle, and so does our sense of touch..." (D: 117). 115

As I mentioned, while Nietzsche's critique is explicitly focused on history and historiography, it not only applies to these subjects. Any form of knowledge which possesses these characteristics is open to attack from the same criticisms. This is perhaps most evident regarding Nietzsche's view of science and truth. In Nietzsche's System, John Richardson succinctly summarizes Nietzsche's critique:

Moreover, it's not just that what happens to be true is harmful, but it's harmful as the truth. That is, even the bare logical structure of truth imparts a reactive and damaging aspect to the project and possession of it. The goal of truth is a certain passive state: to 'mirror', or correspond to, how things already are, and not to make them a particular way. Instead of creating one's own viewpoint, one has it prescribed from outside. (So, too, the search for 'objective values' is an abdication of one's responsibility to create one's own values; one has them otherwise determined.) To renounce all that is idiosyncratically one's own, to better allow the status quo to appear to oneself, stifles precisely what we most ought to cultivate (Richardson 1996, 235-236).148

Recall that for Nietzsche, the highest type of creation is the creation of values. Such creation will be subjective and based upon the individual's own goals. Truth (or science), however, attempts to uncover "objective values"; it removes human beings from the equation, and instructs us in what we should consider valuable. It wants us to passively accept values rather than create values.149 The problem with "truth" is that it provides us with a particular viewpoint that is to be accepted as fact, and therefore, static. Truth takes on a Parmenidean aspect of being eternal and unchanging, as opposed to one that is Heraclitean. Nietzsche's criticism that science

148 In an aphorism entitled "Science" as a prejudice, Nietzsche writes: "A "scientific" interpretation of the world, as you understand it, might therefore still be one of the most stupid of all possible interpretations of the world, meaning that it would be one of the poorest in meaning. This thought is intended for the ears and consciences of our mechanists who nowadays like to pass as philosophers and insist that mechanics is the doctrine of the first and last laws on which all existence must be based as on a ground-floor. But an essentially mechanical world would be an essentially meaningless world. Assuming that one estimated the value of a piece of music according to how much of it could be counted, calculated, and expressed in formulas: how absurd would such a "scientific" estimation of music be! What would one have comprehended, understood, grasped of it? Nothing, really nothing of what is "music" in it" (GS: 373)! 149 "Science is not nearly independent enough for that, in every respect it first needs a value-ideal, a value-creating power, in whose service it can believe in itself, – science itself never creates values" (GM III: 25). 116 dispassionately reflects the world is not only a criticism of the practice but a criticism of truth itself.

Nietzsche's dismissal of contemplation as a governing principle becomes more apparent if we examine the traditional goal of philosophy. Aristotle stated that the purpose of philosophy is "knowledge of the truth" (M II.1.993b20). Aristotle associates contemplation with philosophy, so contemplation as a governing principle will want truth. It wants to obtain "objective values," but as Richardson mentions, Nietzsche would view the procurement of objective values as shirking one's responsibility to creation their own, subjective values. Instead of actively creating values, one would be passively accepting them. Richardson rightly points out: truth has an aspect that is reactive and damaging for Nietzsche. It is reactive in the sense that we are merely responding to truth, and it is damaging because it causes us to refrain from creating and cultivating individual values.

This is the same criticism that Nietzsche levies against history and historiography. Just as science and truth attempt to passively "mirror" the world and present "objective values," so too does history and historiography. The human element is removed from each, and the world is given in a sterilized form – it is to be viewed dispassionately. Since truth is deeply entangled with reactivity and passivity, any subject which relies on discovering the truth will be in danger of becoming too "contemplative," and this is precisely the problem with history and science.150

150 This critique against science, contemplation and objectivity is echoed in Zarathustra: ""This would be the highest to my mind" – thus says your lying spirit to itself – "to look at life without desire and not, like a dog, with my tongue hanging out. To be happy in looking, with a will that has died and without the grasping and greed of selfishness, the whole body cold and ashen, but with drunken moon eyes. This I should like best" – thus the seduced seduces himself – "to love the earth as the moon loves her, and to touch her beauty only with my eyes. And this is what the immaculate perception of all things shall mean to me: that I want nothing from them, except to be allowed to lie prostrated before them like a mirror with a hundred eyes." ... But now your emasculated leers wish to be called "contemplation." And that which permits itself to be touched by cowardly glances you would baptize "beautiful." How you soil noble names! But this shall be your curse, you who are immaculate, you pure perceivers, that you shall never give birth, even if you lie broad and pregnant on the horizon... Verily, you deceive with your "contemplation." Zarathustra too was once fooled by your godlike skins and did not realize that they were stuffed 117

What this implies is that contemplation rejects generative activity in favour of being a mere spectator – it provides sheer description instead of alteration.151 Nietzsche believes that it is our responsibility to create our own valuations – subjective valuations – but this kind of creation cannot occur passively or as a reaction; we must actively engage in it. Unfortunately, this is not possible for a life governed by contemplation and is the main reason why Nietzsche will dismiss contemplation as exemplifying what is best about humans.152

4.5 – The Problem of the Scholar

Nietzsche's criticism of science and history is not only a critique of all forms of knowledge that merely describe and passively mirror the world but also a critique of the individual who practices and engages in this kind of knowledge – the scholar.

References to the "scholar" are numerous throughout Nietzsche's corpus and wholly negative. His scorn for scholars is evident in the earlier aphorism from Genealogy where

Nietzsche refers to them as "half-priest, half-satyr"(GM III: 26), but why does Nietzsche harbour such disdain toward them? The most direct answer can be found in Beyond Good and Evil in the section entitled: "We Scholars."153 The section is rather short, encompassing only nine

with snakes' coils. I once fancied that I saw a god's soul at play in your play, you pure perceivers. No better art I once fancied than your arts. Snakes' filth and bad odors were concealed from me by the distance, and that the cunning of a lizard was crawling around lecherously" (Z II: "Immaculate Perception"). 151 "The other sciences (natural science, history) are only capable of explaining, not of commanding" (PHT: 46). 152 "Philosophy reduced to "theory of knowledge," in fact no more than a timid epochism and doctrine of abstinence – a philosophy that never gets beyond the threshold and takes pains to deny itself the right to enter – that is philosophy in its last throes, an end, an agony, something inspiring pity. How could such a philosophy – dominate" (BGE: 204)! 153 The German is: Wir Gelehrten, which Kaufmann notes can only mean "Scholars" (BGE, p.309). The title of this section seems to be a classic case of Nietzschean irony and humour. The philosopher is often thought of as a scholar by the masses, and academic philosophy has done little to dissuade this association. Nietzsche's inclusion of himself and his readers as scholars is not to be taken literally, as even a cursory reading of the section demonstrates. For example: "It is especially the sight of those hodgepodge philosophers who call themselves "philosophers of reality" or "positivists" that is capable of injecting a dangerous mistrust into the soul of an ambitious young scholar: these are at best scholars and specialists themselves – that is palpable – they are all losers who have been brought back under the hegemony of science, after having desired more of themselves at some time without having had the right to this "more" and its responsibilities – and who now represent, in word and deed, honorably, resentfully, and vengefully, the unbelief in the masterly task and masterfulness of philosophy" (BGE: 204). 118 aphorisms,154 and distinguishes between scholars and scientific men, and philosophers – particularly Nietzsche's conception of what it means to be a philosopher.

It becomes clear in the first aphorism of the section that Nietzsche does not consider scholars and philosophers to be the same. A philosopher according to Nietzsche, is to be of a different, higher breed than that of the scholar or scientific man. While scholars and philosophers were usually regarded as the same, Nietzsche disputes this conflation. So what exactly does Nietzsche say about the scholar? In short, nothing polite:

Compared to a genius – that is, to one who either begets or gives birth, taking both terms in their most elevated sense – the scholar, the scientific average man, always rather resembles an old maid: like her he is not conversant with the two most valuable functions of man. Indeed, one even concedes to both, to the scholars and to old maids, as it were by way of a compensation, that they are respectable – one stresses their respectability – and yet feels annoyed all over at having to make this concession... The scholar also has, as is only fair, the diseases and bad manners of a type that is not noble: he is rich in petty envy and has lynx eyes for what is base in natures to whose heights he cannot attain. He is familiar, but only like those who let themselves go, not flow; and just before those who flow like great currents he freezes and becomes doubly reserved: his eye becomes like a smooth and reluctant lake with not a ripple of delight or sympathy. The worst and most dangerous thing of which scholars are capable comes from their sense of the mediocrity of their own type – from that Jesuitism of mediocrity which instinctively works at the annihilation of the uncommon man and tries to break every bent bow or, preferably, to unbend it (BGE: 206).155

The passage begins with Nietzsche comparing the scholar to the genius and revealing the important distinction between the two; the genius gives birth – he creates – whereas the scholar does not.156 The scholar is likened to an old maid; both fail to procreate and give birth.157 This failure is the result of the scholar's passive and reactive nature. He simply accumulates facts and

154 Beyond Good and Evil §204-§213. 155 For the sake of brevity, I excluded what Nietzsche writes about the scientific man, but it is no more complimentary than what Nietzsche later writes about scholars. 156 I will discuss Nietzsche's conception of "genius" and its importance in the next chapter. 157 Zarathustra states something similar to his "higher men": "Beware of the scholars! They hate you, for they are sterile. They have cold, dried-up eyes; before them every bird lies unplumed" (Z IV: "Higher Man": 9). 119 figures, describing the world instead of affecting it, because he lacks a noble nature.158 What

Nietzsche implies is that the scholar has a slavish nature, meaning the scholar lacks the characteristics of the noble such as being active, "yes-saying," etc. Since Nietzsche values noble natures and the characteristics that they possess, to refer to something as slavish – or in this case,

"not noble" – is to view it as contemptible. In fact, Nietzsche's description of the scholar as someone who is "rich in petty envy... [and] has lynx eyes for what is base in natures to whose heights he cannot attain" (BGE: 206) sounds much like his account of those who have slavish natures.159

If Nietzsche's comparison of the scholar to the slave, and his failure to create was not damning enough, Nietzsche's third criticism is that the scholar aims at producing mediocrity.

Instead of promoting the production of genius, the scholar seeks to prevent it and therefore, attacks the cultivation of human excellence. As I have mentioned, Nietzsche's philosophy seeks to promote human excellence, so anything which attempts to prevent this goal will be condemned. Since individuals with a slavish nature are not capable of becoming "higher men" or promoting human excellence, Nietzsche will be critical of anyone with this type of nature.

The attack on scholars continues in §207 with Nietzsche again associating them with objectivity and referring to them as a "mirror": "He is only an instrument; let us say, he is a mirror – he is no "end in himself"" (BGE: 207). This comment is echoed again at the end of the section, with Nietzsche stating of the ideal objective scholar:

Neither is he a model man; he does not go before anyone, nor behind; altogether he places himself too far apart to have any reason to take sides for good or evil.

158 "It follows from the laws of the order of rank that scholars, in so far as they belong to the spiritual middle class, can never catch sight of the really great problems and question marks; moreover, their courage and their eyes simply do not reach that far – and above all, their needs which led them to become scholars in the first place, their inmost assumptions and desires that things might be such and such, their fears and hopes all come to rest and are satisfied too soon" (GS: 373). 159 Nietzsche also refers to the scholar as "that presumptuous little dwarf and rabble man, the assiduous and speedy head and handiworker of "ideas," of "modern ideas"" (BGE: 58)! 120

When confusing him for so long with the philosopher, with the Caesarian cultivator and cultural dynamo, one accorded him far too high honors and overlooked his most essential characteristics: he is an instrument, something of a slave though certainly the most sublime type of slave, but in himself nothing – presque rien [almost nothing]! The objective man is an instrument, a precious, easily injured and clouded instrument for measuring and, as an arrangement of mirrors, an artistic triumph that deserves care and honor; but he is no goal, no conclusion and sunrise, no complementary man in whom the rest of existence is justified, no termination – and still less a beginning, a begetting and first cause, nothing tough, powerful, self-reliant that wants to be master – rather only a delicate, carefully dusted, fine, mobile pot for forms that still has to wait for some content and substance in order to "shape" itself accordingly – for the most part, a man without substance and content, a "selfless" man" (BGE: 207).

Nietzsche's primary criticism in this section is that the scholar is only an instrument. But what does Nietzsche mean by this? Instruments are tools that are used to accomplish some purpose.

For example, a compass is an instrument that points to magnetic north and tells an individual what direction they are heading. Someone uses it to fulfill that their goal. The compass has no goal itself, and apart from its use, it is useless. It only exists to serve another. The same can be said for the objective scholar. The scholar does not have a purpose of his own – "he is no "end in himself"" (BGE: 207). Instead, the scholar is someone to be put to use by others. He is commanded and obeys, rather than commanding. Again, Nietzsche emphasizes the slavish nature of the scholar. While the noble commands and is himself something, the scholar obeys and is himself nothing. His value only exists in being used by others.160

This passage also distinguishes the scholar from the philosopher whom Nietzsche refers to as "...the Caesarian cultivator and cultural dynamo..." (BGE: 207). The implication is that the philosopher has a positive impact upon culture, while the scholar does not. Nietzsche elaborates on this a few sections later:

I insist that people should finally stop confounding philosophical laborers, and scientific men generally, with philosophers... [Philosophers have a different task

160 "His mirror soul, eternally smoothing itself out, no longer knows how to affirm or negate; he does not command, neither does he destroy" (BGE: 207). 121

from philosophical laborers and scientific men]: this task itself demands something different – it demands that he create values... Genuine philosophers, however, are commanders and legislators: they say, "thus it shall be!" ... With a creative hand they reach for the future, and all that is and has been becomes a means for them, an instrument, a hammer. Their "knowing" is creating, their creating is a legislation, their will to truth is – will to power. Are there such philosophers today? Have there been such philosophers yet? Must there not be such philosophers? (BGE: 211).

Interestingly, while Nietzsche distinguishes between philosophers and scholars (scientific men), he also draws a distinction between philosophers and philosophical laborers. Of the latter, he includes Kant and Hegel. Nietzsche's point is that philosophical laborers are just like scholars in that they describe the world objectively; they attempt to mirror how the world is, describing values and "truths." Philosophers – genuine philosophers – on the other hand, create values.

They do not mirror and describe the world and its values, rather, they create and prescribe values into the world. Further, they use past philosophical laborers as their instruments, employing them as tools by the philosopher in the creation of new values. The philosopher commands, legislates, creates and destroys – all things which the scholar (and philosophical laborer) is incapable of doing. This is why Nietzsche regards philosophers as a higher and different breed than the scholar; the former is of a noble nature, while the latter is slavish.161

While Beyond Good and Evil provides Nietzsche's longest explication regarding the difference between scholars and philosophers, it is not the only place that it occurs. For example, in The Gay Science, he writes: "We are something different from scholars, although it is unavoidable for us to be also, among other things, scholarly. We have different needs, grow differently, and also have a different digestion: we need more, we also need less" (GS: 381).162

161 One thought that comes to mind is Karl Marx's assertion that, "The philosophers have only interpreted the world differently, the point is, to change it" (Marx and Engels 1947, 199). I think Nietzsche would agree with this to a degree. 162 "As I lay asleep, a sheep ate of the ivy wreath on my brow – ate and said, "Zarathustra is no longer a scholar." Said it and strutted away proudly. A child told it to me... I am still a scholar to the children, and also to the thistles 122

Addressing his readers, Nietzsche asserts that they (Nietzsche included) are not the same as scholars. While his conception of philosophers is scholarly in the sense that they read, write, use history, philosophy, and science regarding their projects, philosophers and scholars belong to different types.163 What works for one, does not work for the other. Zarathustra makes the same point in the section entitled "On Scholars": "We are alien to each other, and their virtues are even more distasteful to me than their falseness and their loaded dice" (Z II: "On Scholars").

Zarathustra represents Nietzsche's conception of the philosopher – he creates new values and destroys the old. The things that the scholar values are not what Zarathustra and philosopher values.164

To be a scholar, philosophical laborer, or scientific man is not a mark of distinction for

Nietzsche, and yet, these kinds of individuals are often considered contemplative – contemplation is their governing principle – which Aristotle argued exemplifies what is best about human beings. If Nietzsche endorses the pursuit of philosophy and believes that the production of philosophers must be encouraged, isn't he in a way endorsing contemplation?

Might it not be argued that contemplation as a governing principle can consist of various

and red poppies. They are innocent even in their malice. But to the sheep I am no longer a scholar; thus my lot decrees it – bless it! For this is the truth: I have moved from the house of the scholars and I even banged the door behind me. My soul sat hungry at their table too long; I am not, like them, trained to pursue knowledge as if it were nut-cracking. I love freedom and the air over the fresh earth; rather would I sleep on ox hides than on their decorums and respectabilities" (Z II: "On Scholars"). 163 "Faced with a scholarly book. – We do not belong to those who have ideas only among books, when stimulated by books. It is our habit to think outdoors – walking, leaping, climbing, dancing, preferably on lonely mountains or near the sea where even the trails become thoughtful. Our first questions about the value of a book, of a human being, or a musical composition are: Can they walk? Even more, can they dance? ... Almost always the books of scholars are somehow oppressive, oppressed; the "specialist" emerges somewhere – his zeal, his seriousness, his fury, his overestimation of the nook in which he sits and spins, his hunched back; every specialist has his hunched back. Every scholarly book also mirrors a soul that has become crooked; every craft makes crooked" (GS: 366). 164 "Now, if such thinkers are dangerous, it is of course clear why our academic thinkers are not dangerous; for their thoughts grow as peacefully out of tradition as any tree ever bore its apples: they cause no alarm, they remove nothing from its hinges; and of all their art and aims there could be said what Diogenes said when someone praised a philosopher in his presence: 'How can he be considered great, since he has been a philosopher for so long and has never yet disturbed anybody?' That, indeed, ought to be the epitaph of university philosophy: 'it disturbed nobody'" (UM III: 8). 123 manifestations – i.e. the scholar, philosophical laborer, scientific man, the philosopher, etc. – and that Nietzsche is only endorsing one particular manifestation? He is not rejecting contemplation, rather, he is only rejecting certain forms that it might take? And, therefore, he agrees with

Aristotle's conclusion that contemplation as a governing principle exemplifies what is best about humans?

The problem with this possibility is that as I have shown, Nietzsche associates contemplation with a decrease in power, and therefore, a decrease in action and activity.

Passivity (in the sense of inaction) dominates and defines scholars, philosophical laborers, and scientific men. The portrait that Nietzsche paints of philosophers and philosophy is the opposite of these characteristics! Although Nietzsche's philosophers are of the contemplative type, they seem to be something separate and distinct from the vita contemplativa. This is made evident by

Nietzsche in The Gay Science §301, which I discussed in the previous chapter. While I used the aphorism in that chapter to show why Nietzsche would dismiss noble action and politics as exemplifying what is best about us, it is also an important piece of evidence for the indictment of contemplation as a governing principle.165

165 The aphorism can be found in section 3.4, but I have included it here as well. "The delusion [Wahn] of the contemplatives. – What distinguishes the higher human beings from the lower is that the former see and hear immeasurable more, and see and hear thoughtfully – and precisely this distinguishes human beings from animals, and the higher animals from the lower. For anyone who grows up into the heights of humanity the world becomes ever fuller; ever more fishhooks are cast in his direction to capture his interest; the number of things that stimulate him grows constantly, as does the number of different kinds of pleasure and displeasure: The higher human being always becomes at the same time happier and unhappier. But he can never shake off a delusion: He fancies that he is a spectator and listener who has been placed before the great visual and acoustic spectacle that is life; he calls his own nature contemplative and overlooks that he himself is really the poet who keeps creating this life. Of course, he is different from the actor of this drama, the so-called active type; but he is even less like a mere spectator and festive guest in front of the stage. As a poet, he certainly has vis contemplativa [contemplative power] and the ability to look back upon his work, but at the same time also and above all vis creativa [creative power], which the active human being lacks, whatever visual appearances and the faith of all the world may say. We who think and feel at the same time are those who really continually fashion something that had not been there before: the whole eternally growing world of valuations, colors, accents, perspectives, scales, affirmations, and negations. This poem that we have invented is continually studied by the so-called practical human beings (our actors) who learn their roles and translate everything into the flesh and actuality, into the everyday. Whatever has value in our world now does not have value in itself, according to its nature – nature is always value-less, but has been given value at some time, as a present – and it was we who gave and bestowed it. Only we have created the world that concerns man! – 124

The aphorism begins with a short discussion of the "higher human beings" who are the contemplative ones mentioned in the title. Nietzsche then says that they live under a delusion in which they view themselves as a spectator and listener, and therefore as contemplative. The reality however is that these higher human beings are very different from individuals of the vita contemplativa. While they do possess contemplative power in the sense that they are reflective thinkers, they also possess creative power which Nietzsche suggests is even more important.

These higher human beings create their lives and fashion something new, particularly in the form of values. Since nature is valueless according to Nietzsche, any value we attribute to nature is something that has been ascribed to it by higher human beings. This knowledge is something that is continually overlooked or forgotten, and as a result, these higher human beings – who consider themselves contemplative – underestimate themselves. Instead of seeing themselves as creators and lawgivers, they view themselves as spectators and listeners. They believe they belong to the vita contemplativa when in reality, they are something much higher than a mere contemplative individual.

Again, Nietzsche is emphasizing the dichotomy between the objective spectator embodied by the scholar and scientific man, and the creative artistic philosopher. The "higher human being" belongs to the latter according to Nietzsche. If these supreme individuals had contemplation as a governing principle, why would Nietzsche go to such pains to draw a distinction between them (Nietzsche's philosophers), and scholars and scientific men? Why would Nietzsche emphasize that these higher human beings possess creative power and lament about the sterility of the scholar? The fact that Nietzsche draws this distinction, again and again, demonstrates that he does not associate contemplation as a governing principle with "higher

But precisely this knowledge we lack, and when we occasionally catch it for a fleeting moment we always forget it again immediately; we fail to recognize our best power and underestimate ourselves, the contemplatives, just a little. We are neither as proud nor as happy as we might be" (GS: 301). 125 men." Further, it suggests that contemplation is not what is best about human beings. If

Nietzsche's "higher men" – the epitome of humanity – do not employ contemplation as a governing principle, then contemplation cannot be what is best about us; there must be some greater governing principle that exemplifies what is best about humans.

4.6 – The Active-Contemplative: A Music Making Socrates

Contemplation arises because of lack of power and the incapacity for action and is intertwined with reactivity and passivity. Based on Nietzsche's view that reactivity and passivity possess little value, it does not seem like Nietzsche could endorse contemplation as a governing principle. However, as we saw, Nietzsche does endorse the contemplative types: the priest, artist, philosopher, and scientist. In fact, he promotes their production! Further, his "higher men" can all be classified as belonging to one of these four types. But if he encourages the generation of these contemplative types, is not he endorsing contemplation as a governing principle? Although it may be tempting to think so, it must be remembered that Nietzsche's

"higher men," while of the contemplative types, are certainly not reactive and passive. They exhibit characteristics of the active type, but their creativity and contribution to culture separates them from the active life as well. So where does that leave us? Nietzsche's philosophy results in the dismissal of Aristotle's three viable options for what exemplifies what is best about humans, so what is the alternative? If all three possibilities are found to be lacking based on Nietzsche's philosophy, what governing principle would Nietzsche endorse? What governing principle exemplifies what is best about humans? Nietzsche clearly values action and activity, but he also seems to value the contemplative types. Based on this, it appears that an active-contemplative type would be the best type to cultivate human excellence, since this type would not merely

"spectate," "mirror," and "describe" the world passively, but would actively create.

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Whom would these active-contemplative types be? Once again, we can find the answer by looking to Nietzsche's "higher men": Goethe, Beethoven, Shakespeare, and Raphael. As stated earlier, all of Nietzsche's "higher men" are of the contemplative type, however, they are certainly not reactive and passive. They exhibit a character that is more akin to the active type.

They are driven in a similar manner like Caesar and Napoleon, but while Caesar and Napoleon falter regarding creativity and an enduring contribution to culture, Nietzsche's "higher men" exhibit it in spades. Further, since activity is required for creation, then these "higher men" must be active since action and activity is a prerequisite for creation.

Therefore, the "higher men" seem to be a combination of the active type and the contemplative type. Although they possess characteristics of a life governed by contemplation, they are superior to it since they can actively create. In addition, the "higher men" are superior to the active type due to their creative power and enduring contribution to culture. This synthesis of the vita activa and vita contemplativa can be considered to generate a fourth kind of life – a vita creativa or creative life.

Is this a possibility for Nietzsche? Can people be active and contemplative as the "higher men" appear to be? In true Nietzschean style, we can say "yes" to this possibility:

Impatience. – People both active and contemplative may be subject to a degree of impatience which, when they experience a failure, at once bids them go over to an antithetical domain of endeavour, take a passionate interest in it and pursue new undertakings – until a delay in achieving success drives them out of this new domain too: thus they wander, reckless and adventurous, through the practices of many domains and natures and, through the knowledge of man and things they have accumulated on their tremendous travels and with a little amelioration of their impatient drive, at last become mighty practitioners. Thus a defect of character becomes a school of genius (D: 452).

According to this aphorism, an active-contemplative type is possible, and it seems that they would be different from the vita activa and the vita contemplativa. However, are these active-

127 contemplatives "higher men?" Nietzsche is silent regarding this question, but he does provide a clue to the identity of these active-contemplatives by associating them with genius. Perhaps an examination of Nietzsche's conception of genius will provide further illumination.

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Chapter 5

Creativity and Ressentiment

In chapter four, I showed why Nietzsche would be dismissive of a life governed by contemplation. The main issue surrounding contemplation is that Nietzsche thinks it is too closely connected with low-value characteristics like passivity, reactivity, and objectivity.

Contemplative types do not encourage activity or the creation of new values, settling instead for the role of a passive spectator. They are more interested in describing the world and its values than in creating the world and its values; they tell us how the world is, not how it could be. A life governed by contemplation is not a life concerned with unlocking humanity's potential power and splendour, rather, it merely wishes to reflect its current state.

The chapter concluded with the suggestion that the "higher men" are actively contemplative. They are not reactive and passive to the same extent as contemplative individuals, nor do they lack the creative power [vis creativa] that is absent in the active type.

The "higher men" are of the contemplative type, yet they actively create, so they are both active and contemplative at the same time, qualities Nietzsche attributes to genius.

5.1 – Genius

To understand Nietzsche’s conception of genius, it will be useful to look at the history of the term and its use in Kant and Schopenhauer.

The word "genius" was first used by the Roman playwright Plautus.166 However, the notion of "genius" for the ancient Greeks and Romans was very different from its modern usage.

While the modern notion of genius evokes the visage of individuals like Einstein, Newton, and

Leonardo Da Vinci, and associates creativity, originality, and imagination as essential characteristics of genius, the ancient’s conception of genius possessed none of these traits. In

166 See McMahon 2013, 20. The word appears in Plautus' Aulularia. 129 fact, originality – the ability to create something entirely new which is perhaps an essential component of modern genius – was considered an impossibility not only for mortals but even for the gods. Both must be satisfied with imitating and reproducing the world around them.

The ancients recognized the problem with this claim because if originality is impossible for human beings, how do we account for the likes of Homer, Socrates, Alexander the Great, and

Julius Caesar to name a few? Such individuals, while considered great in our time, were also recognized as great in their time. The question that naturally arose was: “What made great men great?” What was it that these individual’s possessed that set them apart from the rest of humanity? The solution presented by the ancients was that great individuals were “divinely inspired.” The poetry of Homer was not the work of a man, rather, it was the work of a man possessed by a god.

The thought that great individuals were “divinely chosen” was first given credence by the poet Pindar, who believed that the gods bestowed certain abilities on everyone in varying amounts.167 Those who possessed exceptional abilities were simply favoured by the gods. An individual who was an exceptional poet, musician, or playwright did not learn that talent, rather, they possessed it from birth as an innate ability. Their genius was inborn.

It is not until the seventeenth century that the concept of genius begins to assume its more modern form. The ancient’s belief that it is impossible to create something original – even for the gods – is revised with Christianity. Christianity removes this impossibility from their conception of God, with Thomas Aquinas declaring in his Summa Theologica: "Solus desu creat" – “God alone creates.”168 Making the impossible possible has a tremendous effect on the

167 "Suggesting that the gods endowed "different men with different skills," and that each should strive to live "according to his nature" (physis), Pindar contrasted inborn capacities with learning, art, or craft and came down decidedly on the side of the former" (McMahon 2013, 16). 168 See Thomas Aquinas 2012, in particular Summa Theologiae, I, Q. 45, Art. 2, ad. 2 and 3. 130 concept of genius; if original creation is no longer impossible for God, what prevents humans from attaining the same ability?

The instantiation of genius into the human being finally occurs in the eighteenth century.

Until this point, genius was regarded as something metaphysical, but individuals such as Mozart and Isaac Newton demonstrated that genius could become substantiated in flesh and blood. But what made them geniuses, and not inspired by genius [God]? The answer according to Darrin

McMahon is it has to do with a deteriorating belief in metaphysical beings such as angels, demons, and gods, and this had an effect on the conception of genius in two important ways.

First, it made genius something tangible. If it was not caused by some metaphysical spirit, it must have some basis in the natural world. Secondly, this deteriorating belief resulted in a progression away from religion and God, which left people with a lonesome existence. The absence of God meant that his powers were free for the taking, so it was natural that they would be assumed by humans, in particular, by the genius. The metaphysical void that was left from the loss of a divine being would be filled by the flesh and blood genius. As McMahon puts it:

“Geniuses offered assurance that special beings still animated the universe, that someone stood between the ordinary and the unknown, the sacred and the profane, that a privileged few could see where the many were blind” (McMahon 2013, 74).169

This is the pedigree that would influence philosophers like Immanuel Kant and Arthur

Schopenhauer, and who in turn, would influence Nietzsche’s conception of genius. As we will see, Nietzsche’s notion of genius will be quite different from his predecessors concerning important characteristics. But first, close attention needs to be paid to Kant and Schopenhauer's thoughts about genius.

169 I highly recommend McMahon's book Divine Fury: A History of Genius. He provides an excellent account of the conception of genius throughout history in a very readable format. 131

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According to Kant, genius “is the innate mental aptitude (ingenium) through which nature gives the rule to art” (CJ: 46). In other words, genius is inborn, just as someone may be born with blue eyes. It cannot be taught or acquired, which means that an individual can only be born a genius. Kant's phrase that: "nature gives the rule to art" is simply a rather opaque way of saying that an individual cannot learn to create artistic works of genius by learning a set of rules or following guidelines, rather, these rules are bestowed by nature and exist innately within the genius. In addition, genius applies only to art.

Kant attributes four important properties to genius. The first is originality. Since rules cannot be learned which when followed will produce works of genius, this entails that genius will demonstrate originality.170 If specific rules existed and could be learned by others, then anyone could create a work of genius simply by following particular rules. However, if everyone did that, all works of genius would be similar since they were the production of a repeatable rule. Genius is recognized by its originality; it demonstrates a quality that has not been expressed before.

The second property of genius is closely related to the first. A work of genius must be exemplary. It must serve as a model by which all other works will be judged.171 As Kant points out, it is possible to create asinine works that are original, but they do not serve as exemplary models. This also means that a work of genius cannot be an imitation, rather, it often serves as an ideal for imitation.

170 “... [G]enius is a talent for producing that for which no definite rule can be given: and not an aptitude in the way of cleverness for what can be learned according to some rule; and that consequently originality must be its primary property” (CJ: 46). 171 “Since there may also be original nonsense, its products must at the same time be models, i.e. be exemplary; and, consequently, though not themselves derived from imitation, they must serve that purpose for others, i.e. as a standard or rule of judging” (CJ: 46). 132

Kant’s assertion that imitation cannot be genius resides within his claim that genius is innate. According to Kant, all learning is mere imitation. When an individual is learning mathematics, a language, etc., all they are doing is imitating particular concepts within that subject. However, this does not apply to genius. Since genius is innate, it cannot be learned. If all learning is the imitation of rules or concepts, this would seem to imply that genius could be learned if it could be reduced to a set of rules to follow.

Unfortunately, this is not possible since Kant’s third property of genius insists that genius cannot be reduced to rules and precepts.172 The genius cannot describe how he comes about his ideas. They do not arise by following rules but come unbidden. Further, since the genius does not know where his ideas come from or how to generate them, he cannot teach others how to create works of genius. To illustrate this point, Kant provides Newton and Homer as examples.

Kant argues that it is possible to learn all of Newton’s work in his Principles of Natural

Philosophy because Newton was able to explain all the steps in his reasoning. By following these steps, anyone can understand demonstrated conclusions. Newton was able to scientifically demonstrate his reasoning; however, Homer is unable to do the same to explain how he produces his poetry. Since Homer is unaware of how he is able to create his works, he is also unable to explain the process to others, whereas Newton can explain the Principles of Natural Philosophy to others because Newton himself is able to understand his process of reasoning.

Kant's final property of genius is that it applies only to art and not to science.173 Since

“[artistic] skill cannot be communicated” (CJ: 47), it remains within the realm of genius.

172 “It cannot indicate scientifically how it brings about its product, but rather gives the rule as nature. Hence, where an author owes a product to his genius, he does not himself know how the ideas for it have entered into his head, nor has he it in his power to invent the like at pleasure, or methodically, and communicate the same to others in such precepts as would enable them to produce similar products” (CJ: 47). 173 “Nature prescribes the rule through genius not to science but to art, and this also only in so far as it is to be fine art” (CJ: 47). 133

Science can be communicated which implies that works of science cannot be works of genius because genius is innate and cannot be learned. As Kant puts it: “In matters of science, therefore, the greatest inventor differs only in degree from the most laborious imitator and apprentice...” (CJ: 47). In Kant’s eyes, Newton may be exceptionally intelligent, but he is no genius.

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Schopenhauer defines genius as: “the predominant capacity for the kind of knowledge described in the two previous chapters [ideas and pure knowledge], from which all genuine works of the arts, of poetry, and even of philosophy spring” (WWR II, 376). Genius is closely related to the arts according to Schopenhauer because of perception. He views perception as the foundation of genius since when something is classified as a work of genius, the work appeals to our perceptions. Therefore, paintings, sculptures, musical compositions, and poetry174 require and excite our perceptions, and it is on account of this that we can consider them to be, or not to be, a work of genius.

Taking a step beyond Kant, Schopenhauer argues that only works of art and philosophy are to be considered works of genius. Once again, this means that while an artist or a philosopher may be considered a genius, this distinction does not apply to a scientist or mathematician. Although this may be good news for Plato and Aristotle, Einstein and Newton are still out of luck. So what is Schopenhauer’s reasoning? Why is genius only applicable to the arts and philosophy, but not the sciences?

According to Schopenhauer, genius possesses a claim of nobility. By "nobility," he means that genius is something that distinguishes itself from mere intelligence; therefore,

174 According to Schopenhauer, poetry brings about perceptions through the imagination. While we may not actually see the poem’s subject, our imagination is able to conjure it as a perception in our mind. 134 anything that is useful or profitable aids in maintaining humanity and is practical rather than noble. For Schopenhauer, the nobility of genius lies in the fact that works of genius are useless and unprofitable, and yet, the genius continues to produce works regardless of their uselessness.175 It is the familiar refrain: “Art for the sake of art.” True genius does not seek out fame or profit in the production of his works (although fame and profit may indeed be a consequence of their production). Instead, the genius produces works of genius for their own sake since "genius is its own reward" (WWR II, 386).

Schopenhauer believes that science and those who make important scientific discoveries lie outside the realm of genius, not because the discoveries are insignificant, but because the discoveries are useful for humanity. So while Schopenhauer and Kant agree that science lies outside the realm of genius, their reasons differ. For Kant, the communicability of science is what excludes it from genius, whereas Schopenhauer cites the usefulness of science as the exclusionary factor.

Schopenhauer attributes a number of characteristics to the genius that set him apart from the ordinary person. Ironically, these characteristics are disadvantages for the genius because they do not make his life easy. For Schopenhauer, "genius is an intellect that has become unfaithful to its destiny" (Ibid.), in that genius is not concerned with the preservation of the individual.

The first two characteristics that Schopenhauer thinks genius possesses are that genius often lives in miserable conditions because the genius disregards self-interest and seeks an

175 “... the productions of genius serve no useful purpose. The work of genius may be music, philosophy, painting, or poetry; it is nothing for use or profit. To be useless and unprofitable is one of the characteristics of the works of genius; it is their patent of nobility. All other human works exist only for the maintenance or relief of our existence; only those here discussed do not; they alone exist for their own sake...” (WWR II, 388). 135 objective end.176 According to Schopenhauer, the genius utilizes his intellect for the good of humanity. He goes against his own interests to attain the interests of all. Due to the genius’ lack of self-interest, the conditions in which they live are often terrible. They spend their resources to benefit humanity, which often results in deplorable living conditions for themselves. This sacrifice of the genius' self-interest for the interest of humanity prescribes the genius with greatness.177

Due to the genius’ unique disposition, they are often solitary. As Schopenhauer puts it, the genius “is too rare to be capable of easily coming across his like, and too different from the rest to be their companion” (WWR II, 390). This solitude is encouraged due to the differing values between the genius and the common man; each acquires happiness and pleasure from different things which result in conflict between the genius and the common man.

The last thing to be said about Schopenhauer’s conception of genius is that he distinguishes genius from talent. Talent for Schopenhauer “is a merit to be found in the greater versatility and acuteness of discursive rather than of intuitive knowledge. The person endowed with talent thinks more rapidly and accurately than do the rest...” (WWR II, 376) and later,

"Talent is able to achieve what is beyond other people's capacity to achieve, yet not what is beyond their capacity of apprehension; therefore it at once finds its appreciators" (WWR II, 391).

An individual may possess a talent that is far beyond the capabilities of their peers, but talented individuals are easy to come by and easily recognized. For example, a talented piano player can be replaced by another talented piano player. While there might be some difference between them, the piano concertos will sound more or less the same. This is not true for the genius.

176 "...whereas the genius often exists under very wretched conditions. For he sacrifices his personal welfare to the objective end" (WWR II, 385). 177 "Accordingly, that sublime predicate [greatness] belongs by right only to the true hero in any sense and to the genius; it signifies that, contrary to human nature, they have not sought their own interest, and have lived not for themselves, but for all" (WWR II, 385). Nietzsche will also associate genius with greatness. 136

While the genius certainly possesses ability that is beyond his contemporaries (and is therefore talented), the genius is also able to apprehend the world in a way that is beyond the understanding of others.178 Schopenhauer sums up this distinction by stating: “Talent is like the marksman who hits a target which others cannot reach; genius is like the marksman who hits a target, as far as which others cannot even see” (WWR II, 391). This is why genius is such a rare phenomenon according to Schopenhauer, and why it is important to not confuse a talented individual with an individual of genius.

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We have already seen Nietzsche's connection of genius to creativity in Beyond Good and

Evil §206: "Compared to a genius – that is, to one who either begets or gives birth, taking both terms in their most elevated sense..." (BGE: 206). This relationship between genius and creativity is nothing new, and Nietzsche does not depart from this traditional association.

However, his notion of genius will be unique compared to his contemporaries.

The first distinction Nietzsche contributes is the main distinction between talent and genius. As we have seen, genius is usually thought of as a rare skill or talent that one is born possessing, which allows them to excel above others:

Do not talk about giftedness, inborn talents! One can name great men of all kinds who were very little gifted. They acquired greatness, became ‘geniuses’ (as we put it), through qualities the lack of which no one who knew what they were would boast of: they all possessed that seriousness of the efficient workman which first learns to construct the parts properly before it ventures to fashion a great whole; they allowed themselves time for it, because they took more pleasure in making the little, secondary things well than in the effect of a dazzling whole (HH I: 163).

In other words, Nietzsche believes that no one is born a genius. There is no such thing as inborn talents or inherent giftedness. Rather, people become talented and gifted through hard work, and

178 "The achievement of genius, on the other hand, transcends not only others' capacity of achievement, but also their capacity of apprehension; therefore they do not become immediately aware of it" (WWR II, 391). 137 their own individual effort. A great author does not appear ex nihilo; he develops his skill slowly, mastering the basics over a long period. What eventually spills forth from his pen is not a “dazzling whole,” but an arrangement of individual words thoughtfully placed and selected, so when read in combination they create an effect that resembles effortless skill, but in actuality is borne from a tremendous amount of time, effort, and practice. This implies that genius is not something that is randomly bestowed on a select few but is something that can be achieved if one puts in the necessary effort and work. If this is indeed Nietzsche's conception of genius, the question that naturally arises is: "Why do the majority of individuals fail to become geniuses?"

Further, "if genius is not confined to a select few but achievable by many, why is it treated as some special, inborn gift?" Before these questions can be answered, we need to get a better grasp of Nietzsche’s conception of genius. He thinks genius is the result of hard work and learning rather than something that one is born with, but what other characteristics does it possess?

In Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche gives the following definition of genius: “What is genius? – To will an exalted end and the means to it” (HH II: 378). Later, in Twilight of the

Idols, he writes:

My conception of genius. Great men, like great ages, are explosives in which a tremendous force is stored up; their precondition is always, historically and physiologically, that for a long time much has been gathered, stored up, saved up, and conserved for them – that there has been no explosion for a long time. Once the tension in the mass has become too great, then the most accidental stimulus suffices to summon into the world the “genius,” the “deed,” the great destiny. What does the environment matter then, or the age, or the “spirit of the age,” or “public opinion” (TI VIII: 44)!

Regarding the quotation from Twilight, a few important points can be made. First, Nietzsche associates genius with greatness. This connection is evident in Nietzsche’s later works such as

Twilight, but it also appears in his early works as the previous quotation from Human

138 demonstrates: “They acquired greatness, became ‘geniuses’...” (HH I: 163). The association of greatness and genius is not solely the view of Nietzsche, but Schopenhauer’s as well. In Volume

II of The World as Will and Representation, Schopenhauer states the following about genius:

In general, he alone is great who in his work, be it practical or theoretical, seeks not his own interest, but pursues only an objective end... What makes him great in all circumstances is the fact that he does not seek himself and his own interest... On account of this extension of his sphere, he is called great. Accordingly, that sublime predicate belongs by right only to the true hero in any sense and to the genius; it signifies that, contrary to human nature, they have not sought their own interest, and have lived not for themselves, but for all (WWR II, 385).

As Schopenhauer makes clear, greatness is not something that can be bestowed up just anyone.

Only a special and remarkable individual can be called great – namely, the genius. As I explained, Schopenhauer believes that genius is relegated to the realm of the artist and the philosopher because their works of genius are useless. But here lies another difference between

Nietzsche and the views of Schopenhauer and Kant. Both Schopenhauer and Kant believe science is excluded from the realm of genius, but Nietzsche extends it to include scientists.179

Although Newton and Einstein fail to be geniuses according to Schopenhauer and Kant,

Nietzsche would grant Newton and Einstein that esteemed predicate. How can their inclusion be justified? What would support Nietzsche’s reasoning?

As it turns out, Schopenhauer’s words can make a convincing argument for Nietzsche’s position. An individual is great when “he does not seek himself and his own interest... and have lived not for themselves, but for all” (WWR II, 385). Great scientific minds like Newton and

Einstein seem to fall under this umbrella of selflessness. Their discoveries have certainly benefited all of humanity, and although Newton and Einstein did benefit as a result of their genius, they did not pursue their achievements to attain fame. Instead, they pursued science in order to understand the world better. For Schopenhauer, the works of genius must be useless and

179 The priest can be considered to be a kind of philosopher. 139 unprofitable, and this is most likely why he does not include science within the realm of genius.

Although science can be profitable, it is not often pursued with money in mind, and further, the achievements of science are certainly not useless since they are beneficial for humanity. If greatness belongs to genius, and genius seeks out the interests of all rather than the self, then it would seem that great scientific minds like Newton and Einstein should be included.180

While this may be an effective argument against Schopenhauer, it does not work for

Kant. Recall that Kant rejects science and mathematics as expressions of genius because they can be taught and learned, whereas one cannot communicate how to create a work of art that would be considered genius. How would Nietzsche respond to Kant's reasoning?

One possibility is that although Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity and Newton's calculus181 can be taught and learned, the discovery (or perhaps invention?) of these things radically changed how the world was viewed and allowed for the creation of entirely new subjects. Not only did these discoveries explain how the world works, but they overturned scientific paradigms that had existed for hundreds of years. Further, these individuals cannot explain how they arrived at their discoveries. There was no formula that Einstein or Newton followed to arrive at their discoveries, just as there was no formula that Homer or Michelangelo used to create their works of art. It is certainly possible for someone to imitate or reproduce the works of Homer and Michelangelo, just as someone can imitate or reproduce the works of

Newton and Einstein; however, the initial creation/discovery applies to one person in particular, and that is why scientists can be called geniuses.

180 Another argument that can be made in favour of including scientists within the realm of genius is that according to Schopenhauer, genius comprehends the objective nature of things, and this is also seems to be the goal of science. Science is not concerned with subjective opinions or facts, but rather, objective facts. If this is what science attempts to achieve, and the genius is someone who comprehends the objective nature of things, then it seems to follow that a scientist – someone who attempts to discover the objective nature of things – could certain be a genius under Schopenhauer's definition. 181 Or Leibniz's calculus. 140

Regardless of whether one might agree with Nietzsche’s inclusion of science in the realm of genius, or Kant's and Schopenhauer’s exclusion from it, it is indisputable that greatness is considered inseparable from genius. So when Nietzsche refers to individuals as geniuses, he also means they are great men (and vice versa). With that connection addressed, we can turn to a second important point regarding Nietzsche’s conception of genius.

According to Nietzsche's comments in Twilight, geniuses have a tremendous, “explosive” impact on their age. They make their mark on it, so to speak, altering their age in a way that it is now defined by their very existence. In other words, they have an enduring impact upon culture.

Individuals like Beethoven, Mozart, and Shakespeare, not only impacted their age during their lifetime but their works have continued to enhance and promoted culture long after their deaths.

Even now, hundreds of years after their deaths, these individuals are benchmarks to which all composers, poets, and artists are judged. Their explosive impact defined their time, and the ripples of the shockwave are still being felt.

Schopenhauer’s influence on Nietzsche regarding genius can once again be recognized. I mentioned that part of what makes a genius great for Schopenhauer is the fact that the genius does not live for themselves, but for all of humanity. Rather than seeking their own self-interest, they seek the interest of all or an “objective end.” What exactly Schopenhauer means by this is unclear; however, his point seems to be that the genius is unconcerned with himself; his concern lies with all of mankind. Instead of doing what will benefit himself, the genius does what is beneficial for all. Although Schopenhauer remains cryptic regarding what this “objective end” might be (and perhaps Schopenhauer himself did not know), Nietzsche does provide an answer with the notion of culture.

141

Recall that Nietzsche defines "culture" as "unity of artistic style in all the expressions of the life of a people" (UM I: 1). What this means according to Nietzsche is that all of society acts as a single organism, directing all of their energies in a common direction and for a common, higher purpose. When successful, it results in great cultural achievements. The problem is that society needs to be guided in this pursuit. Individuals who can intentionally direct society's energies make great cultural achievements more likely. According to Nietzsche, this is the purpose of the genius. For example, in On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life,

Nietzsche writes:

Supposing someone believed that it would require no more than a hundred men educated and actively working in a new spirit to do away with the bogus form of culture which has just now become the fashion in Germany, how greatly it would strengthen him to realize that the culture of the Renaissance was raised on the shoulders of just such a band of a hundred men (UM II: 2).

The Renaissance in Europe (14th-17th century) was the result of a small group of educated individuals. These individuals not only influence all of Europe in their age but all of Europe for hundreds of years later. By now, billions of people have been influenced by these few individuals, which leads to the second point. Regarding these few genius individuals, Nietzsche writes:

These individuals do not carry forward any kind of process but live contemporaneously with one another; thanks to history, which permits such a collaboration, they live as that republic of genius of which Schopenhauer once spoke; one giant calls to another across the desert intervals of time and, undisturbed by the excited chattering dwarfs who creep about beneath them, the exalted spirit-dialogue goes on. It is the task of history to be the mediator between them and thus again and again to inspire and lend the strength for the production of the great man. No, the goal of humanity cannot lie in its end but only in its highest exemplars. (UM II: 9)

Nietzsche believes the task or goal of humanity is the production of geniuses (Great men, "higher men"). So far, the occurrence of genius has been a rare, and accidental thing and Nietzsche

142 thinks this needs to be remedied. Rather than stumbling around blindfolded in the dark with a lit match, hoping to serendipitously light a candle wick, humanity must focus on lighting as many wicks as possible through a direct and concerted effort. Relying upon chance for the production of humanity's highest exemplars is to risk sacrificing humanity to eternal mediocrity, which brings us to Nietzsche's next point:

Where we discover talent devoid of that longing, in the world of scholars or that of the so-called cultivated, we are repelled and disgusted by it; for we sense that, with all their intellect, such people do not promote an evolving culture and the procreation of genius – which is the goal of all culture – but hinder it. (UM III: 3)

Nietzsche is quite clear: the goal of culture is to evolve and enhance it, and to produce genius. In other words, the “objective end” of the genius is to enhance and promote culture, as well as, the production of genius.

The next point to be made is that the great man (or genius) is a vessel in which many things have been stored. He is filled up with knowledge and ideas in a combination that has yet to make their mark upon the world. Again, Schopenhauer’s influence on Nietzsche is unmistakeable:

For in this period of predominant intelligence, man gathers a great store of knowledge for future needs that at the time are still foreign to him. Now incessantly active, his intellect therefore eagerly apprehends all phenomena, broods over them, and carefully stores them up for the coming time, like the bee which gathers far more honey than it can consume, in anticipation of future needs (WWR II, 394).

Both Nietzsche and Schopenhauer view genius as something different from innate knowledge.

Genius does not possess inborn knowledge; rather, it gathers various kinds of knowledge until it is ready to make use of it.182

182 It is important to note that although the genius does not possess inborn knowledge, this is different from asserting that genius is inborn. Schopenhauer seems to think that genius is inborn, but the content of genius (knowledge) is not. Nietzsche differs from Schopenhauer in that while he agrees that there is no such thing as innate knowledge, 143

Finally, the most “accidental stimulus” can cause the explosion, transforming the individual who was a mere vessel, into a genius who moulds the world in their image.183 The stimulus can be almost anything, such as hearing a particular composition, reading a particular poem, or viewing a certain piece of art. Whatever this accidental stimulus is, it compels the individual to produce their own works. The individual becomes inspired, and the tension that has been building up within them is unleashed as works of genius.184 For Nietzsche, the genius lies dormant for a long while accumulating much and only emerges when triggered by a particular stimulus.

Schopenhauer stays silent on this point about whether or not the genius requires a stimulus to begin his works. He does think that while the genius has an impact on their age, their works are not appreciated until much later since they often conflict with the current tastes of the time.185 While Nietzsche agrees with this assertion,186 he disagrees with Schopenhauer’s and

Kant's claim that geniuses are born. For Nietzsche, circumstances and the environment play an important role concerning whether someone becomes a genius. An individual may have the potential to be a genius, but if their circumstances conspire against this potentiality, than the

there is also no such thing as inborn genius. Regardless, the output which results from this accumulation of knowledge is something original which will greatly influence society. 183 “As soon as his creative power takes hold on him history becomes malleable clay in his hands; his relationship towards it suddenly becomes quite different from that of any scholar, it becomes similar to that of the Greek towards his myths, that is to say towards something which offers material for plastic and poetic invention, performed with love and a certain shy devotion, to be sure, but nonetheless also with the magisterial right of the creator. And precisely because it is to him even more flexible and changeable than any dream, he can transform a single event into something that typifies whole ages and thus achieve a truth of representation such as the historian can never attain to” (UM IV: 3). 184 It is not the work per se that stimulates, but the suffering/discontent produced in the individual by the work. 185 "The genius, on the other hand, lights on his age like a comet into the paths of the planets, to whose well- regulated and comprehensible arrangement its wholly eccentric course is foreign. Accordingly, he cannot go hand in hand with the regular course of the culture of the times as found; on the contrary, he casts his works far out on to the path in front (just as the emperor, giving himself up to death, flings his spear among the enemy), on which time has first to overtake them" (WWR II, 390-391). 186 "The time for me hasn't come yet: some are born posthumously" (EH III: 1). 144 actualization of genius is greatly hindered and the stimulus which is needed to bring forth the genius may never be encountered.187

To summarize, Nietzsche’s conception of genius consists of the following four characteristics: 1) Genius is a product of great men; 2) Genius produces an enduring impact on the world (it produces an enduring contribution to culture); 3) Genius produces originality; 4)

Genius is the result of circumstance, not birthright. These four characteristics will be important to keep in mind.

Returning to the definition of genius given in Human, All Too Human, we can note that it possesses two distinct parts. First, genius is “willing an exalted end,” and secondly, genius

“wills the means to its exalted end.” What does Nietzsche mean when he says that genius is willing an exalted end?

To answer that question, we first have to address what Nietzsche means by "exalted end?" The language seems to suggest that it is a great achievement, but if so, how do we distinguish a great achievement from mere achievement? What characteristics does a great achievement possess? Bernard Reginster provides a helpful discussion in his paper, “The Will to

Power and the Ethics of Creativity.”

The first characteristic of importance according to Reginster is difficulty. The value of an achievement depends on how difficult it is to accomplish; so the greater the difficulty in

187 "The problem of those who are waiting. – It requires strokes of luck and much that is incalculable if a higher man in whom the solution of a problem lies dormant is to get around to action in time – to "eruption," one might say. In the average case it does not happen, and in nooks all over the earth sit men who are waiting, scarcely knowing in what way they are waiting, much less that they are waiting in vain. Occasionally the call that awakens – that accident which gives the "permission" to act – comes too late, when the best youth and strength for action has already been used up by sitting still; and many have found to their horror when they "leaped up" that their limbs had gone to sleep and their spirit had become too heavy. "It is too late," they said to themselves, having lost their faith in themselves and henceforth forever useless. Could it be that in the realm of the spirit "Raphael without hands," taking this phrase in the widest sense, is perhaps not the exception but the rule? Genius is perhaps not so rare after all – but the five hundred hands it requires to tyrannize the kairos, "the right time," seizing chance by its forelock" (BGE: 274). 145 manifesting the creation, the more valuable the achievement. Reginster points out that while

Nietzsche does not explicitly explain the role of difficulty in evaluating an achievement, there is support for this interpretation188 and attributes the following view to Nietzsche:

the difficulty of an achievement gives it a special and conditional value, which he calls ‘greatness.’ An achievement cannot be great unless it was also challenging. To say that greatness is a special value is to say that an achievement could fail to be great, insofar as it was not particularly challenging, but still be valuable in respect to its determinate content. And to say that greatness is a conditional value is to say that an achievement can be great only if it is valuable in respect to its determinate content (Reginster 2009, 42).

If Reginster is correct, then there are four possible types of achievements. There are: 1)

Achievements that are difficult and valuable; 2) Achievements that are not difficult but valuable;

3) Achievements that are difficult but not valuable; and 4) Achievements that are neither difficult nor valuable. Great achievements are those that are difficult and valuable – i.e. the end is exalted. By requiring a great achievement to be both difficult and valuable, Nietzsche can exclude accomplishments that are banal or reprehensible. For example, the genocide of a race of people might be a difficult thing to accomplish, but it would not be considered valuable regardless of how difficult it was to achieve. Further, doing laundry would not be a difficult action to accomplish, and therefore, it would not be particularly valuable.189

For Reginster, a great achievement must be difficult, and further, that its “determinate content” is valuable. By "determinate content" Reginster means that the goal is a valuable goal.

But how do we determine if the goal is valuable? As I mentioned, an achievement may be difficult to accomplish, but difficulty alone does not make the achievement valuable. The

188 “A tablet of the good hangs over every people. Behold, it is the tablet of their overcomings; behold, it is the voice of their will to power. Praiseworthy is whatever seems difficult to a people; whatever seems indispensable and difficult is called good; and whatever liberates even out of the deepest need, the rarest, the most difficult – that they call holy” (Z, I: "Thousand and One Goals"). 189 It is difficult to see what would be an achievement that is valuable yet easy to accomplish for Nietzsche. Based on Nietzsche's qualifications, an easily accomplished achievement would not be particularly valuable, so perhaps it could not be considered an achievement for Nietzsche? 146 achievement itself seems to possess a separate criterion which contributes to its status as a great achievement. Otherwise, reprehensible but difficult actions could be deemed valuable. So what is this separate criterion? Reginster is silent on what it may be, but I believe Nietzsche provides an answer to this question.

When Nietzsche states that genius wills an "exalted end," he seems to mean that it wills a great achievement. As I mentioned, Reginster thinks "difficulty" is a characteristic of a great achievement and I concur. However, he misses the second characteristic of importance – greatness must have an enduring contribution to culture. Nietzsche makes this point in Richard

Wagner in Bayreuth:

For an event to possess greatness two things must come together: greatness of spirit in those who accomplish it and greatness of spirit in those who experience it. No event possesses greatness in itself, though it involve the disappearance of whole constellations, the destruction of entire peoples, the foundation of vast states or the prosecution of wars involving tremendous forces and tremendous losses: the breath of history has blown away many things of that kind as though they were flakes of snow. It can also happen that a man of force accomplishes a deed which strikes a reef and sinks from sight having produced no impression; a brief, sharp echo, and all is over. History has virtually nothing to report about such as it were truncated and neutralized events. And so whenever we see an event approaching we are overcome with the fear that those who will experience it will be unworthy of it. Whenever one acts, in small things as in great, one always has in view this correspondence between deed and receptivity; and he who gives must see to it that he finds recipients adequate to the meaning of his gift. This is why even the individual deed of a man great in himself lacks greatness if it is brief and without resonance or effect; for at the moment he performed it he must have been in error as to its necessity at precisely that time: he failed to take correct aim and chance became master over him – whereas to be great and to possess a clear grasp of necessity have always belonged strictly together (UM IV: 1).

According to this passage, Nietzsche thinks greatness consists of two things: 1) Greatness of spirit in those who accomplish it; and 2) Greatness of spirit in those who experience it. In other words, not only must the achievement be significant, but it must also be recognized by others as significant. Witnesses to the achievement are necessary. Regardless of how difficult and

147 important an achievement might be, if it is not recognized by others as such, then it is not a great achievement. Nietzsche's point is that an enduring contribution to culture is also necessary for an achievement to be great.

To illustrate this point, and show why difficulty and high value are insufficient for determining if something is a great achievement, consider John Milton and his masterpiece

Paradise Lost. The epic poem certainly seems valuable as a work of art (so for Reginster, its

"determinate content" is valuable), and its composition was difficult and challenging regarding its use of language, but because of Milton’s blindness. However, the fact that its "determinate content" is valuable, and its composition was challenging does not seem to make it a great achievement. For example, suppose Milton composed it and hid it away in a desk drawer, never to be read by anyone. Would it still be considered a great achievement, even though no one has ever read it, or is aware of its existence? While Milton might think it qualifies as a great achievement, that does not seem adequate. A poet that composes a poem in a private diary may think the poem is a great achievement, but unless it is subjected to the public domain, it does not seem like it can be considered a great achievement based on the poet's own endorsement. It seems very strange to say that an unknown and unread poem is a great achievement.

Further, a work does not seem to be a great achievement either, just because it was difficult to create, is valuable, and is extremely well known.190 So this additional characteristic must be something more than just popularity or the quantity of people that are aware of its existence.

190 For example, consider the most popular song at the moment. Surely there was some difficulty involved in writing the lyrics and composing the music, and further, it might even have value as a work of art. But the fact that millions of people know the song and can sing along with it, does not make it a great achievement. There are plenty of pop songs that fit these characteristics, but are by no means great achievements. 148

Based on what Nietzsche says and implies in Richard Wagner in Bayreuth, this additional characteristic involves culture. A great achievement is not only difficult and valuable, it also requires an enduring, generative quality that continues to affect culture long after its creator’s demise. We can see this integral aspect of a great achievement when we examine great works such as Paradise Lost, Shakespeare’s tragedies, and Beethoven’s symphonies. Not only were they influential in their own time – i.e. they were recognized as great achievements back then – but they are just as influential today. They are prime examples of achievements that have had an enduring, generative effect on culture. An individual may write the world’s greatest novel, but it cannot enhance and contribute to culture tucked away in a desk drawer unread, regardless of how difficult it was to write, or how valuable it is as an end. Rather, the book must be read and recognized as great by others, and therefore it will have a large enduring influence upon culture.

Elaborating on the idea that only certain kinds of goals can be considered exalted or noble,191 Nietzsche tells his readers to do the following:

...[A]sk yourself why you, the individual, exist, and if you can get no other answer try for once to justify the meaning of your existence as it were a posteriori by setting before yourself an aim, a goal, a 'to this end', an exalted and noble 'to this end'. Perish in pursuit of this and only this – I know of no better aim of life than that of perishing, animae magnae prodigus [prodigal of a great soul], in pursuit of the great and the impossible (UM II: 9).

An exalted and noble end is great and difficult to achieve.192 This corresponds with what

Nietzsche has said regarding genius, and a deeper understanding can be attained by appealing to two of his four characteristics of genius, in particular: Genius produces originality, and genius has an enduring impact on the world.

191 Nietzsche’s specification that the goal be exalted, would rule out goals that are banal or ignoble. Cleverly bring about the genocide of a people would not be a demonstration of genius, nor would doing your laundry count. 192 By "impossible," Nietzsche does not mean that it cannot be accomplished, rather, it is very difficult to accomplish. 149

The assertion that genius produces originality implies that genius is connected to creativity since, in order to produce something original, the individual requires great creativity.

The capacity to create new ideas that transcend old ideas is not an easy task. When an individual can create new things that are distinctive and original, we hold his ability in the highest regard.

Further, when these original creations can promote and enhance culture, we value them even more. For example, Shakespeare's works were very distinctive and original for his time, and for that they are valuable. However, the fact that we still enjoy his works four-hundred years later demonstrates their enduring cultural impact. So for Nietzsche, creations that endure across time are truly exalted and noble.

Based upon the above criteria, it is possible to get a good idea of what would count as an exalted end. Producing a great work of art or philosophy, and scientific discoveries could be considered an exalted end since they fit the required attributes: they will be original and have cultural endurance. However, this only fulfills half of Nietzsche’s definition of genius. The creation of an exalted end is necessary for someone to be considered a genius, but they also need to will the means to their exalted end. In other words, Nietzsche believes that the end of genius does not just materialize out of nothing, rather, it requires the individual to direct their energies into accomplishing its realization. The ends of genius require work, and the individual must devote themselves to attaining their goal. While this seems self-evident, it is a point that is often disregarded for genius. Geniuses are often credited with generating their works easily and out of thin air; what is difficult for the majority of people, is effortless for the genius. The point that

Nietzsche is making is that this is not true:

In reality, the imagination of a good artist or thinker is productive continually, of good, mediocre, and bad things, but his power of judgement, sharpened and practised to the highest degree, rejects, selects, knots together; as we can now see

150

from Beethoven’s notebooks how the most glorious melodies were put together gradually and as it were culled out of many beginnings (HH I: 155).

Genius certainly requires the creation of something exalted and noble, but it also requires hard work. The production of an exalted end requires the devotion of time and energy. Beethoven is a genius, not only because he produced great symphonies, but because he devoted himself to their creation; they did not spring up ex nihilo but were created and evolved over time.

There are two other important characteristics that we can glean from Nietzsche’s remarks on Beethoven and genius. The first is the fact that genius constantly produces good, mediocre, and bad ideas. Again, this common sense assertion is often overlooked. Genius is usually not associated with mediocre and bad ideas, yet the reality is that even genius produces ideas that are not always good. Assuming that a genius produces nothing but good ideas is extremely naive.

An artist or thinker that is constantly productive will inevitably create things that are not sufficient of "genius" status, but part of what distinguishes genius is the individual’s ability to exercise their “power of judgement.” This "power of judgement" is extremely important for genius and is perhaps even the foundation for genius as can be demonstrated by a simple thought experiment.

Suppose you were given one of Beethoven’s symphonies but were not told which one.

All the musical notes were presented to you, but in no particular order. (You are told there are X number of A-sharps, B-flats, etc., so you know the total number of notes and how many of each.)

You are then given the task of putting the symphony back together. Could you do so? This would surely be an impossible task if you lacked any musical knowledge, or even the most basic musical aptitude. However, even if you possessed an vast amount of musical knowledge, the task would still be extremely difficult. Now suppose that in addition to all the required musical notes in the symphony, you were given extra notes that are not part of that particular symphony

151 by Beethoven. Could you distinguish which notes were extraneous? This may seem like a

Herculean trial, but for Nietzsche, this ability is what distinguishes genius from the majority.

Beethoven had an endless number of musical combinations to choose from, but he was able to recognize which combinations were good and would work together, from those that were mediocre and bad. It was his power of judgement that separated him from other composers, and this power of judgement required practice through hard work; it was not an inborn talent.

As we can see, Nietzsche is painting a very different portrait of the genius. Instead of genius being the result of some mysterious quality that the person is born possessing, genius is producing something exalted through hard work. It is not the result of divine inspiration, or an inborn ability. Instead, genius, despite being rare, is rather ordinary and not out of reach. The

“banality of genius” is elaborated on by Nietzsche in Human, All Too Human:

Because we think well of ourselves, but nonetheless never suppose ourselves capable of producing a painting like one of Raphael’s or a dramatic scene like one of Shakespeare’s, we convince ourselves that the capacity to do so is quite extraordinarily marvellous, a wholly uncommon accident, or, if we are still religiously inclined, a mercy from on high. Thus our vanity, our self-love, promotes the cult of genius: for only if we think of him as being very remote from us, as a miraculum, does he not aggrieve us... (HH I: 162).

Genius is not a creature of fortuitousness. The capability of creating a great work of art does not belong to a select view, yet, this is the idea that is often promulgated in society. People believe that such achievements are beyond themselves, and justify this belief through the notion of genius. By referring to those who produce great creations as geniuses, it allows us to place these individuals above ourselves. But why do people do this? Why is the genius held in such high esteem?

The answer Nietzsche posits is that people do it as a protective mechanism out of vanity and self-love. At first glance this seems like a contradiction; we believe that genius belongs to a

152 small minority and is something unavailable to ourselves – yet we hold this belief because we are vain and narcissistic. Should not our vanity and self-love make us believe that we too are capable of the genius exhibited by Raphael and Shakespeare? Nietzsche's point is that while some people may believe they are the equal of Raphael or Shakespeare, this is not true of the majority because the majority of people have not created or achieved anything great. People like to think they are capable of doing great things, but fail to accomplish them because they lack some intellectual or physical advantage that Raphael and Shakespeare possessed. However, justifying their lack of achievement as a lack of “genius” is just a form of self-protection. The reality according to Nietzsche is that so-called “geniuses” are no more gifted than ourselves. Our vanity and self-love make us believe in genius to provide us with an excuse for why we have not achieved anything extraordinary. Raphael did not stumble into the creation of his paintings, nor did Shakespeare create dramatic scenes by chance; rather, they willed their works into existence.

They devoted themselves to realizing an ideal. Their ability to do this was not predicated on the possession of some divine trait, or by random happenstance, but as a result of their will, and yet the majority of people want to believe otherwise because it provides them with an excuse for embracing mediocrity.

If genius is not a rare and special attribute that only certain people possess, how does one accomplish great works that rival those of Beethoven, Shakespeare, and Raphael according to

Nietzsche? He has already stated that “genius wills the means to its goal,” but what does that mean? We can answer this question by turning to two previously discussed concepts: the will to power, and style.

As mentioned, human beings consist of various wills to power, or drives. These drives are described by Nietzsche as a “ball of snakes,” each snake – or drive – wrestling with the

153 others for dominance. As a result, the individual is constantly being pulled in multiple directions. The problem with this conflict between drives is that if a person’s drives are constantly battling with each other, the individual has no clear purpose. An apt example is a person who is trying to decide what to do. He has homework to finish, but he would rather play video games or watch television; however, the bathroom needs to be cleaned as well, and the dog should be taken for a walk. Instead of making a choice, the individual hesitates, unable to decide on a course of action. As a result, the homework does not get done, the bathroom does not get cleaned, the dog is not walked, and no video games are played. The individual is pulled in so many different directions that nothing is accomplished since the individual becomes stuck in a state of indecision. He is unable to will the means to his goal, and this can be detrimental according to Nietzsche since it prevents us from achieving genius.

What we should strive to achieve is mastery over our various drives and subsume them under a single commanding drive. Only by subsuming these conflicting drives under a single drive, and focusing them in a single direction, is the individual able to manifest his creation.

This is not easily accomplished, however. The focusing of one’s drives does not occur naturally, rather, one must continually will them into this state. Therefore, the individual creates the means to their goal, by organizing and directing their drives to a single purpose. This single, driving purpose is what Nietzsche thinks is required for genius. It is not the fortuitous possession of some innate skill or ability, rather, it is the capacity to direct one’s entire energy into a single purpose.193 To illustrate, Nietzsche uses Goethe as a model of such an individual:

193 All these activities [inventor of machines, the scholar of astronomy or history, the master of tactics] are explicable if one pictures to oneself people whose thinking is active in one direction, who employ everything as material, who always zealously observe their own inner life and that of others, who perceive everywhere models and incentives, who never tire of combining together the means available to them. Genius too does nothing except learn first how to lay bricks then how to build, except continually seek for material and continually form itself around it. Every activity of man is amazingly complicated, not only that of the genius: but none is a ‘miracle’ (HH I: 162). 154

[Goethe] sought help from history, natural science, antiquity, and also Spinoza, but, above all, from practical activity; he surrounded himself with limited horizons; he did not retire from life but put himself into the midst of it; he was not fainthearted but took as much as possible upon himself, over himself, into himself. What he wanted was totality; he fought the mutual extraneousness of reason, senses, feeling, and will ... [H]e disciplined himself to wholeness, he created himself (TI IX: 49).194

Goethe was considered a genius, even in his own time, and while Nietzsche would agree with this assessment, it is not because Goethe had been blessed with divine providence, or due to a stroke of luck. Instead, Nietzsche considers Goethe a genius due to Goethe’s self-actualization.

His genius was the result of his diligence and self-mastery. In other words, Goethe gave himself style. He arranged his strengths and weaknesses under a single taste and organized his drives in such a way that they augmented each other, allowing Goethe to achieve his goals. Composing oneself under a single taste – or a single drive – is what Nietzsche thinks is crucial for genius.195

To summarize, Nietzsche attributes the following views to "genius": 1) Genius is not an inborn talent, nor is it a talent. No one is born a genius, rather, people become geniuses through hard work and determination; 2) Genius is associated with greatness and great individuals; 3)

Genius results in an enduring impact on the world – i.e. it makes an enduring contribution to culture; 4) Genius produces originality.

The genius, great men, "higher men" are all concerned with actualizing creative potential.

For Nietzsche, they are the highest exemplars of humanity. They demonstrate what human beings are capable of achieving and affirm life in the process by driving it forward.

194 The view Nietzsche has of genius in his early and middle period persists to his late period as this quotation from Twilight of the Idols demonstrates. 195 “Whether this taste was good or bad is less important than one might suppose, if only it was a single taste” (GS: 290)! 155

5.2 – The Problem of Mass Culture

So far, a general account of Nietzsche’s conception of genius has been given, but there is a lingering question concerning why the majority of people fail to become geniuses. If genius is not an inborn talent or blessing from the gods but is rooted in hard work and self-mastery, how do we account for the fact that so few people achieve their genius? Why are geniuses like

Goethe, Beethoven, and Shakespeare so rare throughout history? Nietzsche’s answer is quite blunt: The majority of people never accomplish anything great and achieve their genius, because human beings are lazy. The "cult of genius" is an invention that allows us to justify to ourselves

(and others), why we have not achieved anything extraordinary. It hurts our vanity and narcissism less when we believe that someone is a "genius," rather than admitting to our laziness.

Nietzsche claims that laziness is universal among humanity in the powerful introductory section of Schopenhauer as Educator:

A traveller who had seen many lands and peoples and several of the earth’s continents was asked what quality in men he had discovered everywhere he had gone. He replied: ‘They have a tendency to laziness...’ [M]en are even lazier than they are timid, and fear most of all the inconveniences with which unconditional honesty and nakedness would burden them... When the great thinker despises mankind, he despises its laziness: for it is on account of their laziness that men seem like factory products, things of no consequence and unworthy to be associated with or instructed... There exists no more repulsive and desolate creature in the world than the man who has evaded his genius and who now looks furtively to left and right, behind him and all about him (UM III: 1).196

196 Hume has a similar opinion about humanity and laziness; a point he makes in Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion: "In order to cure most of the ills of human life... I am contented to take an increase in one single power or faculty of his soul. Let him be endowed with a greater propensity to industry and labour; a more vigorous spring and activity of mind; a more constant bent to business and application. Let the whole species possess naturally an equal diligence with that which many individuals are able to attain by habit and reflection; and the most beneficial consequences, without any allay of ill, is the immediate and necessary result of this endowment. Almost all the moral, as well as natural evils of human life arise from idleness; and were our species, by the original constitution of their frame, exempt from this vice or infirmity, the perfect cultivation of land, the improvement of arts and manufactures, the exact execution of every office and duty, immediately follow; and men at once may fully reach that state of society, which is so imperfectly attained by the best regulated government" (Hume 2007 , 83-84). 156

Genius is usually contrasted with moronism, but Nietzsche contrasts genius with laziness. While genius and moronism is concerned with differing quantities of intelligence, Nietzsche's comparison of genius and laziness focuses on differing quantities of industriousness. He is providing a novel way of interpreting genius by separating it from an inborn, intellectual superiority, and associating it with discipline and hard work. It is no longer some esoteric quality that someone possesses or lacks as a result of chance, but a distinction that must be earned. Although this may conflict with the traditional conception of genius, Nietzsche is making an important point, specifically, that a person makes themselves into a genius, rather than being born a genius.197

Nietzsche’s point can be further developed with a counter-intuitive example. Mozart, by all accounts, is considered a musical genius. In addition, he began composing music at a very young age. But why do we consider him a genius? As an adult, Mozart’s musical ability was certainly beyond his contemporaries, and he produced many symphonies that helped establish him as a musical genius. The fact that he was writing music at such a young age seems to increase our esteem of him. Many would argue that Mozart’s aptitude for music and musical composition at a young age demonstrates that he was a genius, and further, that genius is an inborn quality. Mozart was not taught how to compose complex symphonies at a young age, but did it through some natural talent. However, if we try to name any of the symphonies Mozart wrote as a child, we come up empty. We only consider Mozart a genius because of the work he produced later in life. He did not produce masterpieces a few years out of the womb; rather, he

197 One might argue that geniuses are born by appealing to child prodigies. It certainly seems that some children have exceptional abilities that are not only beyond their peers, but beyond the majority of adults as well. Are they not instances of born geniuses? Nietzsche would disagree as I will show by arguing that "talent" and "ability" is simply a form of learning. No child is born knowing how to play the piano; they must learn how to play it. Whether they then excel at it depends on various factors affecting the child. Whether this successfully accounts for child prodigies is up for debate, but I do think that Nietzsche blunts the argument supporting them. 157 composed his masterpieces later in life. As a child, Mozart was certainly intelligent, but that is not enough to consider him a genius based on Nietzsche’s definition, especially since Nietzsche also redefines "talent."

"Talent" is usually understood as a special ability that a person possesses which allows them to excel at an activity. When we say that someone has a musical talent, we mean the person possesses a musical ability that is extraordinarily greater than the musical ability of others. Again, it is viewed as some inborn, esoteric characteristic. When Nietzsche uses the world "talent," he has a very different idea in mind. He writes in Daybreak:

Learning. – Michelangelo saw in Raphael study, in himself nature: there learning, here talent. This, with all deference to the great pedant, is pedantic. For what is talent but a name for an older piece of learning, experience, practice, appropriation, incorporation, whether at the stage of our fathers or an even earlier stage! And again: he who learns bestows talent upon himself – only it is not so easy to learn, and not only a matter of having the will to do so; one has to be able to learn (D: 540).

For Nietzsche, "talent" is simply "an older piece of learning, experience, practice, appropriation, incorporation..." (D: 540). It is not an ability a person is born possessing, but a form of knowledge that is acquired and mastered. To say that as a child, Mozart was talented at music means that he acquired musical knowledge through being taught, practicing, and focusing his energies on learning the intricacies of the art, just like anyone else. While he may have had a greater opportunity because of his circumstances, he did not possess an inborn ability for music that others lack. Mozart threw himself into his passion for music and directed all his energy in a single direction. Based on Nietzsche’s definition of genius, we can say that Mozart willed the means to his goals. He may have harnessed his power at an early age; however, this is only half of what is required for genius. Nietzsche makes it clear that an exalted goal is also needed – i.e.

158 to be a genius, a great work is required. Imagining that Mozart was inclined to laziness can help further the point.

Suppose Mozart demonstrated exceptional musical ability as a child, had a passion for music, and possessed original and revolutionary ideas about it, but never produced a musical work. Would he still be considered a genius? Is the mere possession of exceptional ability sufficient for genius even if the person never produces anything? Nietzsche does not think so, and I am inclined to think that the majority of people would agree. Mozart is considered a genius on account of his musical works. He may have been extremely talented, but that is not enough to classify him as genius. Instead, it is the creation of masterful symphonies that make him a genius. Producing something great requires ambition and hard work; it does not materialize from talent alone.

The is also the conclusion Nietzsche draws about Beethoven. Beethoven’s symphonies did not spring from the ether, fully formed, rather, they are the product of many successes and failures. They arose gradually, through hard work, focus, and determination. Beethoven may not have exhibited the same musical ability at an early age like Mozart, but that does not make

Beethoven any less of a musical genius, or Mozart any more of a musical genius. It is only by creating something unique and original that we consider people to be geniuses, but these creations are due to hard work, not a miracle of creation ex nihilo.

For Nietzsche, laziness is the adversary of genius. A lazy Mozart or Beethoven would never have created the musical masterpieces they did because they would not have put in the work required. As a result, they would not be considered musical geniuses because they never produced anything worthy. So Nietzsche’s definition of genius is concerned with results. A person has to produce something that can be regarded as a great work to be considered a genius.

159

The common definition of genius is based on a characteristic, and that simply possessing that characteristic (exceptional intelligence or ability) is enough to qualify as a genius. In a way, the common definition of genius ignores laziness. Someone can be a genius as long as they have a particular quality, regardless of whether they produce anything with it. Nietzsche wants to excise this notion and emphasize that genius must be earned. One must produce something great which demonstrates that the individual is a genius. If great accomplishments are not required for genius, then anyone can be considered a genius and the term loses all significance. The musical virtuoso who never composes a symphony becomes an equal of Mozart and Beethoven, and this seems intuitively unacceptable. There are plenty of people who squander their abilities and intelligence, but we do not consider them to be the equals of geniuses. In fact, we often say things like: “He could have been as good as X, if only he had applied himself.” We often view this abandonment of potential as a tragedy. This is why Nietzsche believes genius requires hard work as well as the creation of something great. It is bad enough that laziness stifles and thwarts genius, but it is even worse if laziness becomes mistaken for genius.198

With that said, we can now turn to the first issue affecting creativity as a governing principle. What if someone is unable to achieve greatness? Not everyone will be a Goethe or a

Shakespeare, regardless of how determined they are and how hard they work. What is the purpose of these individuals? This is the problem I will turn to next.

198 This contrast between laziness and genius is supported by Nietzsche’s notions of reactivity/passivity, and activity. Nietzsche’s definition of genius – that it requires us to will a noble end and the means to it – suggests that genius is something that we must actively pursue. One cannot be a passive genius, and it would seem that “passive genius” would be an oxymoron for Nietzsche. Genius requires us to create things; it requires action. A “passive genius” would be the logical equivalent of p and ~p. Conversely, laziness has the notion of passivity engrained within it. If someone is “actively lazy” then it seems to imply that they are doing things in order to not do things. They are working hard at being lazy. But this seems to contradict the very definition of laziness. To say then that someone is “actively lazy” is as nonsensical for Nietzsche as “passive genius.” 160

5.3 – The Task of Humanity

While only a few individuals may actualize their greatness and achieve their genius, what about those who cannot through no fault of their own? What should the purpose of humanity be if the majority are unable to actualize their genius and enhance and promote culture through creativity and creation? Nietzsche provides an answer to this question in Schopenhauer as

Educator:

‘Mankind must work continually at the production of individual great men – that and nothing else is its task.’ How much one would like to apply to society and its goals something that can be learned from observation of any species of the animal or plant world: that its only concern is the individual higher exemplar, the more uncommon, more powerful, more complex, more fruitful – how much one would like to do this if inculcated fancies as to the goal of society did not offer such tough resistance! We ought really to have no difficulty in seeing that, when a species has arrived at its limits and is about to go over into a higher species, the goal of its evolution lies, not in the mass of its exemplars and their wellbeing, let alone in those exemplars who happen to come last in point of time, but rather in those apparently scattered and chance existences which favourable conditions have here and there produced; and it ought to be just as easy to understand the demand that, because it can arrive at a conscious awareness of its goal, mankind ought to seek out and create the favourable conditions under which those great redemptive men can come into existence (UM III: 6; emphasis mine).

So according to Nietzsche, humanity’s purpose is to create the most favourable conditions possible to increase the probability of producing great individuals – geniuses. Nietzsche is fully aware that not everyone becomes a genius. The scarcity of individuals throughout history such as Goethe, Beethoven, and Shakespeare attest to that. While the creation of great individuals does depend on their type, Nietzsche's point is that the person's environment plays a vital factor.

If the environment is not conducive to greatness, the creation of a Beethoven will be improbable, if not impossible. For example, while Beethoven possessed the internal characteristics necessary for greatness, if his external circumstances had differed significantly (maybe even slightly), he may never have become a musical genius. If this is the case, then one cannot help but wonder

161 how many geniuses have failed to come into existence because of their environment. Therefore,

Nietzsche believes that it should be the purpose of humanity to generate the proper conditions so that great individuals do not perish without actualizing their greatness. This means that if an individual is incapable of attaining genius – for whatever reason – that does not excuse them from attempting to create or improve the conditions that will be conducive to the existence of other geniuses. Lacking the ability to fully actualize one’s own potential does not permit them to be selfish and ignore or prevent the actualization of another’s potential. As Nietzsche says, we need “to promote the production of the philosopher, the artist and the saint within us and without us...” (UM III: 5; emphasis mine). So even if someone is not a contemplative type, they should still work toward providing the proper environment to ensure the production of genius. In other words, an individual may not be able to directly enhance and promote culture, but they can do so indirectly by helping to produce people that can directly enhance and promote culture. By doing so, one gives their life profound value and significance. Nietzsche makes this point by asking:

[H]ow can your life, the individual life, receive the highest value, the deepest significance? How can it be least squandered? Certainly only by your living for the good of the rarest and most valuable exemplars, and not for the good of the majority, that is to say those who, taken individually, are the least valuable exemplars. And the young person should be taught to regard himself as a failed work of nature but at the same time as a witness to the grandiose and marvellous intentions of this artist (UM III: 6).

We must direct history and circumstance by consciously living to create great individuals, instead of waiting for them to arise through “strokes of luck” (GM III: 14). Since mankind "can arrive at a conscious awareness of its goal [the production of genius], mankind ought to seek out and create the favourable conditions under which those great redemptive men can come into existence" (UM III: 6). The existence of great individuals does not have to be accidental. For

Nietzsche, the person who is capable of devoting their life to the production of great individuals

162 is saying: “‘I see above me something higher and more human than I am; let everyone help me to attain it, as I will help everyone who knows and suffers as I do...’” (UM III: 6). This self- sacrificial devotion is the acknowledgment that one is not bound for greatness and will never produce great achievements like Goethe and Shakespeare, but they can help to produce favourable conditions for the existence of great individuals and in doing so, that is their great achievement – it is their creativity.

This self-sacrificial attitude that Nietzsche describes presents a difficulty with what he has said regarding genius, particularly, that we call someone a genius to justify our lack of ambition. Doing so allows us to exonerate our prevalence to laziness; otherwise, not only would we resent ourselves, but we would also resent the genius. If humanity is to consciously direct history through our own individual efforts to bring forth great individuals, it will be necessary to realize that they are not the result of luck or divine providence. Doing so will remove the illusion that the genius is a miracle, and force us to recognize our negligence toward ourselves.

But how are we to do this? How do we accept that genius is not miraculous but only the product of ambition and the unmasker of our laziness? Nietzsche urges that the individual

who has attached his heart to some great man receives thereby the first consecration to culture; the sign of that consecration is that one is ashamed of oneself without any accompanying feeling of distress, that one comes to hate one’s own narrowness and shrivelled nature, that one has a feeling of sympathy for the genius who again and again drags himself up out of our dryness and apathy and the same feeling in anticipation for all those who are still struggling and evolving ... [S]o that the men we live among resemble a field over which is scattered the most precious fragments of sculpture where everything calls to us: come, assist, complete, bring together what belongs together, we have an immeasurable longing to become whole (UM III: 6).

In this way, everyone can achieve their own kind of greatness. While we may never become a

Goethe or Beethoven, we can aid in the generation of such individuals. Our great achievement – our great act of creativity – can be the production of favourable conditions for the creation of

163 even greater creative types. How and what we contribute to their production will vary depending on each person. According to Nietzsche, part of the way to accomplish this conscious direction of history is by changing our view of morality. As long as our morality continues to sacrifice the greater for the less, and the individual for the masses, great individuals will remain the exception instead of the rule.199 However, accomplishing this great achievement is not out of our reach.

While it may be necessary to actualize great achievements in order to be a great individual, it is not necessary to be a great individual to accomplish great achievements. In this way, creativity exemplifies what is best about us, and is a governing principle that can apply to everyone.

5.4 – The Problem of Creative Ressentiment

By now it should be clear how important creation and creativity are for Nietzsche. Not only are they important values, but they are essential to the kind of life Nietzsche thinks is valuable. However, there seems to be an underlying problem with this claim as I mentioned earlier, a problem which has not gone unnoticed in the secondary literature. Robert Solomon raises the problem but does not address it: "If creativity is one of the highest virtues – and it certainly seems to be for [Nietzsche] – then ressentiment would seem to be one of the most virtuous emotions; for it is certainly the most creative..." (Solomon 1994, 104). To fully grasp the difficulty this problem poses, a few things must be said – and re-said – regarding ressentiment.

In the Genealogy, Nietzsche writes that:

The beginning of the slave's revolt in morality occurs when ressentiment itself turns creative and gives birth to values: the ressentiment of those beings who, denied the proper response to action, compensate for it only with imaginary revenge. Whereas all noble morality grows out of a triumphant saying 'yes' to itself, slave morality says 'no' on principle to everything that is 'outside', 'other', 'non-self': and this 'no' is its creative deed (GM I: 10).

199 Nietzsche's view of morality plays a role in this process, but a discussion of its role will take me beyond the scope of this dissertation. 164

According to Nietzsche, ressentiment is a negative emotion and is closely connected with slave morality. While individuals of a noble disposition can still experience ressentiment, they discharge it through action immediately, whereas those of a slavish disposition allow ressentiment to fester and putrefy due to their inability to physically discharge the emotion.

Ressentiment is very similar to the emotion resentment.200 Both are a kind of displeasure about the state of the external world. They both imply a reaction to some offense, whether it be real or imagined. This reaction takes the form of a desire for revenge against those who have wronged the individual. While ressentiment tends to be directed against individuals, it can also be directed against the external world. The problem that usually accompanies ressentiment is that although the individual has been wronged in some manner, he is incapable of remedying his situation. The individual wants to change their circumstances, but their inability to discharge their discontent properly results in its internalization.201 What would normally be revenge manifested, becomes revenge imagined. The individual lacks the power to physically will change on the external world, so he attempts to satisfy his desire for revenge by taking imaginary action against those who have wronged him.

Furthermore, not only is the action imaginary, so is the target of the action. Nietzsche tells us that

we should bear in mind that the distortion which results from the feeling of contempt, disdain and superciliousness, always assuming that the image of the despised person is distorted, remains far behind the distortion with which the

200 If ressentiment and resentment are the same, then why does Nietzsche use the French term? It seems there could be two possibilities: "Arthur Danto suggests that the French "ressentiment," although it covers a broad range of feelings and sensibilities, encourages the distinction between vulnerability and merely imagined vengeance on the one hand and an aristocratic sense of honor on the other. The resentful man has deep feelings; the noble man acts. Then again, Danto suggests, "It may have been one of those expressions that civilized people simply used," and in any case both the origin and meaning of the word in French seems close enough to both the English and the German" (Solomon 1994, 103). 201 As Solomon puts it, "frustration lies at the heart of resentment..." (Solomon 1994, 103). 165

entrenched hatred and revenge of the powerless man attacks his opponent – in effigy of course (GM I: 10).

Ressentiment perverts the appearance of the world and those it vilifies. While both the nobles and the slaves misrepresent the object of their contempt, ressentiment does so to a much greater level than the mere disdain expressed by the nobles. It purports an imaginary revenge upon an imaginary foe as if such an act will actually have an effect; imaginary revenge against an imaginary monster is more satisfying than no revenge.

So far, the pictured painted of ressentiment seems wholly negative. Part of Nietzsche's aversion to ressentiment appears to stem from his critique of the priestly class of which he states:

"From the very beginning there has been something unhealthy about these priestly aristocracies..." (GM I: 6), and "priests make the most evil enemies – but why? Because they are the most powerless" (GM I: 7). However, while Nietzsche greatly despises the ascetic priest and their ressentiment, he does concede that humanity has benefited in various ways from their existence:

[I]n any case, with some justification one could add that man first became an interesting animal on the foundation of this essentially dangerous form of human existence, the priest, and that the human soul became deep in the higher sense and turned evil for the first time – and of course, these are the two basic forms of man's superiority, hitherto, over other animals (GM: 6)!

The priests are not only the greatest haters among humanity but also the most intelligent and

"nobody else's intelligence stands a chance against the intelligence of priestly revenge. The history of mankind would be far too stupid a thing if it had not had the intellect of the powerless injected into it" (GM I:7). Further, "[a] race of such men of ressentiment will inevitably end up cleverer than any noble race, and will respect cleverness to a quite different degree as well" (GM

I: 10). Consequently, Nietzsche thinks ressentiment has made humanity clever and more

166 intelligent, interesting, and given depth to the human soul, thereby separating us and making us superior to other animals. In a sense, ressentiment has made us more human.

Interestingly, the benefits of ressentiment are closely connected to creativity, although this should not be too surprising since "the beginning of the slave's revolt in morality occurs when ressentiment itself turns creative and gives birth to values... and this 'no' is its creative deed" (GM I: 10). The creative individual is often regarded as clever and intelligent, interesting, and possessing a depth to their soul. Nietzsche's great creative men, Goethe, Beethoven, and

Shakespeare, were certainly not dense, dull-witted, or stupid. In fact, it seems impossible to imagine them possessing these characteristics and still being the authors of their creations.

Further, we often regard creative individuals as interesting and want to know everything we can about them as if knowledge of their lives will somehow make us as great as them. In most cases, these creative individuals do live interesting lives. Not only do their works separate them from the masses, but the lives they live are rarely ordinary. They seem to pine for something more than a regular, humdrum life, going against the current of their time and succeeding in spite of it. Their works express something that reaches down into the depths of our souls and reveals things that the masses cannot articulate. We cannot explain why

Beethoven's symphonies or Shakespeare's plays and sonnets speak to us as they do, but we do know that they touch us and resonate in a manner that is not achieved by the majority of people.

Creativity – that is, works that are truly original and creative only seem possible if the author has these attributes. When we read Paradise Lost or appreciate the Sistine Chapel, we picture their creators as being superior to most people, not as dull-witted, stupid, and boring buffoons. We not only view the creations as grand but also their authors. Creativity then is largely possible – and may even owe its potentiality – due to ressentiment. If this is the case, then perhaps

167 ressentiment is not entirely negative as most interpretations of it suggest. However, this also results in the problem of creative ressentiment which Solomon alludes to at the beginning of the chapter.

The problem of creative ressentiment is this: If creativity exemplifies what is best about human beings, and if ressentiment is one of the most creative human emotions, then shouldn't ressentiment be a desirable emotion for Nietzsche? Would it not result in generating the greatest amount of creation and creativity? If ressentiment is the most creative human emotion, why is

Nietzsche opposed to it?

It would seem that if Nietzsche values creation and creativity, ressentiment would be an ideal emotion for him to value, but this is clearly not the case. Not only is Nietzsche opposed to ressentiment, but he is also very critical of the ascetic priest who is a paragon of ressentiment.

As Nietzsche makes clear in Genealogy, the ascetic priest is very creative; he invents entire religions and systems of value. Based on Nietzsche's characterization, the ascetic priest lives a very creative life, is full of creative emotion, and yet Nietzsche wholeheartedly rejects the ascetic priest as a "higher man." For Nietzsche, Saint Paul is the polar opposite of a Goethe or

Beethoven. Why? What is it about the ascetic priest that differentiates and devalues his creativity from the creativity of a great artist or philosopher? The answer is that although the ascetic priest is creative, he is creative in a drastically different way from Goethe or Beethoven, and it is this difference that defines the creativity of the ascetic priest as wretched.

Recall that "the slave's revolt in morality occurs when ressentiment itself turns creative and gives birth to values" (GM I: 10). Further, "slave morality says 'no' on principle to everything that is 'outside', 'other', 'non-self': and this 'no' is its creative deed... its action is basically a reaction" (GM I: 10). The creativity of the ascetic priest – and ressentiment – is

168 entirely negative, rejecting the outside world due to its inability to respond with appropriate actions. On the other hand, "noble morality grows out of a triumphant saying 'yes' to itself" (GM

I: 10). So while noble morality is "yes-saying," slave morality is "no-saying." The former is life-affirming, whereas the latter is life-denying.

Creativity can be a life-affirming "yes," or a life-denying "no." Although both are creative acts, the motivation behind each are vastly different. It is true that the ascetic priest is creative, but he creates values that are life-denying and consequently of little value. He resents the life-affirming values of the nobles because his impotence prevents him from being able to express his thoughts and ideas through action. Since the "happiness" of the nobles is no longer achievable for the ascetic priest through action, he has to redefine it, and the only way to do so is through the creation of new values that are diametrically opposed to those of noble morality.

The ascetic priest turns his impotence and deficiencies into virtues. Characteristics that the ascetic priest lacks such as strength, power, and action become "evil," while characteristics the ascetic priest possesses such as weakness and passivity become "good." In doing so, the ascetic priest rejects this life and creates another, other-worldly life. Therefore, the ascetic priest is incredibly creative, but his creativity is only a creative reaction.

The creativity of the "higher men" is different because it affirms life. They do not view this world as something to be rejected, rather, they see it as something to be celebrated. This does not mean that the "higher men" think the world is perfect as is, and need not be improved.

The world is certainly imperfect, but if we are to accept and affirm it, we must also affirm its imperfections.202

202 "I do not want to wage war against what is ugly. I do not want to accuse; I do not even want to accuse those who accuse. Looking away shall be my only negation. And all in all and on the whole: some day I wish to be only a Yes-sayer" (GS: 276). 169

This is a direct contrast to the ascetic priest who denies this world due to its imperfections, needing to create another "perfect" world. The ascetic priest is incapable of improving his life, so he invents an imaginary world that is perfect and beyond improvement, whereas the "higher men" accept that this life is imperfect, but that is not an argument for rejecting it or refraining from attempts to improve it. For example, just imagine how much poorer this world would be without the creative works of Beethoven, Shakespeare, and Goethe.

Although Milton's Paradise Lost may not improve the world quantitatively, it does seem to improve it qualitatively. The world appears to be a better or richer place due to the existence of these creative works.

In a sense, Nietzsche's view of creativity is structurally similar to Mill's view of pleasure.

Mill separates pleasure into higher and lower types, so while the quantity of pleasure experienced is significant, so is the quality of the pleasure. However, it would seem that

Nietzsche would place a much greater emphasis on the quality of creativity. An individual may be highly creative in a quantitative sense, but if the creativity is of the wrong quality – life- denying, no-saying – then Nietzsche would assign little value to this creativity. On the other hand, an individual may produce little regarding quantitative creativity, but if it is the right quality of creativity, it would be highly valued. For Nietzsche, a single act of great, affirmative creativity would be more valuable than many acts of reactive, life-denying creativity.

So although it may be true that the ascetic priest is a creative individual, the problem is that the values he creates are the wrong type according to Nietzsche. For a value to have worth for Nietzsche, it must be life-affirming, "yes-saying," and an example of ascending life. The values that the ascetic priest creates are the opposite: life-denying, "no-saying" and examples of descending life. For Nietzsche, it is not enough that an individual is creative, they must also be

170 creative in the right way – i.e. create the right kind of values. Since the ascetic priest is creative in a "negative" sense, a life with creativity as a governing principle and which creates "negative" values will not exemplify what is best about us, despite it being organized around creativity.

Only creativity which creates "positive" values will exemplify what is best about us.

5.5 – The Formula for the Creative Life

Based on what Nietzsche has explicitly written and what he implies, it is evident that creativity exemplifies what is best about human beings. While creativity is usually associated with artists, it can also be attributed to philosophers, scientists, or saints since each can exemplify creativity, and the works they produce can generate cultural enhancement, resulting in human excellence. People that fully embody Nietzsche's conception of creativity are classified as "great men." – i.e. geniuses, "higher men." These "great men" are people who have harnessed their genius through their efforts to give "style" to their character. Self-mastery and self-discipline, have harnessed their various drives and focused them toward a single goal – i.e. music, philosophy, scientific discovery, etc., and their resulting achievements have a positive and enduring impact on culture.

Suppose then that someone decided that pleasure, noble action and politics, and contemplation were not attractive governing principles, but he thinks creativity as a governing principle is attractive? How would someone go about living a creative life? In other words, if creativity is Nietzsche's ethics, what does it tell me to do?

The answer to this question seems to be something like: cultivate your abilities ("talents") and your genius (work hard). Focus on producing great achievements like great works of art. If that is not an option, then focus on helping others to produce great achievements by either doing so directly or indirectly through enhancing and promoting culture – that is, by helping cultivate

171 the conditions for future geniuses. In a way, it is similar to Kant's imperative to cultivate your talents and make yourself a useful person.

The person would have to be a in some sense of the word, "thoughtful" – i.e. artist, philosopher, saint, or scientist. Nietzsche's examples of "higher men" can all be classified as one of these types. This does not mean the individual has contemplation as their governing principle, rather, they have certain characteristics which predispose them as being a contemplative type.

If the person possesses the disposition of a contemplative type, then they must also have creative power. Possessing vis creativa and not simply vis contemplativa is what distinguishes

"higher men," geniuses, etc., from scholars, academic philosophers, and scientific men.

However, merely possessing creative power is not sufficient; it must also be exercised.

The individual's creativity must be put to use and employed. Nietzsche thinks the creation of new values is the highest form of creativity and creation, so people who create new values like the philosopher or the saint would be our highest exemplars. The next best would be the creation of art works, and finally, scientific creations based on scientific discoveries. Although Nietzsche is quite vague concerning a hierarchy of creativity, it seems that as long as creativity positively enhances and contributes to culture, it would be the kind of creativity that Nietzsche would endorse.

But how does someone create a work that will result in the enduring cultural impact that

Nietzsche envisions? How does someone create awe-inspiring works like Shakespeare's plays or

Beethoven's symphonies which will stand the test of time? While Nietzsche concedes that such achievements are not easy – hence the reason why they are great achievements – he thinks that the "cult of genius" needs to be abolished. Great achievements are often attributed to geniuses, and a "cult of genius" arises among society as a protection mechanism to shield the vanity of lazy

172 people. Calling someone a genius implies that they possess abilities and talents that tower above everyone else, and gives the rest of society an excuse for languishing in mediocrity. Nietzsche's claim is that there is no such thing as "innate genius." What we call "genius" is simply the result of hard work and determination. It is something that many people are capable of achieving, but the sad reality is that very few have the ambition to actualize their genius. Therefore, to create a work of enduring cultural impact, individuals need to work hard and focus on their goal. They need to realize that genius is not the result of divine inspiration or innate ability, but hard work.

The underlying problem that genius must contend with is that people are lazy. It is an issue which afflicts the majority of people. Most people would rather relax and spend their days in frivolous recreational pursuits than working at a difficult goal. Nietzsche is aware that an individual's drives are often in constant conflict, each trying to dominate the others. He thinks that these competing drives must be harnessed and focused toward the individual's goal; the person must give their character "style." "Style" for Nietzsche is a kind of self-mastery. Despite having various competing drives, the person learns to master them and employ them all to achieve his goal. This is the process by which the genius is created. Beethoven was not born a genius, rather, Beethoven created his genius. He harnessed his drives and focused them on the goal of musical composition. By successfully giving "style" to himself, Beethoven became a genius, became a great man, and accomplished great achievements. He gave "style" to himself, which in turn, gave "style" to society – i.e. enhanced and promoted culture.

Unfortunately, not everyone will be successful like Beethoven. There are innumerable reasons for why someone fails to give himself "style," actualize his genius, and accomplish great things. This failure could be due to physiological deficiencies or environmental constraints.

However, this is not a reason for abandoning humanity's task – the creation of great individuals –

173 according to Nietzsche. If someone is unable to achieve the greatness of a Goethe or Beethoven, then they should devote themselves to ensuring the creation of future geniuses. By promoting the production of the contemplative types, and making the environment conducive to genius, then these "failures" are in a sense, achieving their own kind of greatness. While they may never impact culture directly like Shakespeare, they can impact culture indirectly by ensuring the creation of future Shakespeares. In this way, they exemplify creativity.

Nietzsche would regard creativity as the governing principle that exemplifies what is best about us. Human excellence would be demonstrated by those individuals who accomplish great achievements, but it would also be demonstrated by those individuals who work to ensure the creation of great individuals.

If Nietzsche is sincere in stating that the task of humanity is the production of great individuals in order to promote and enhance culture, while also cultivating human excellence, then creativity as a governing principle seems to be the only viable option.

174

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