CHAPTER 1 0 THE LAST PHASE IN THE PACIFI C

1—DEATH OF A LEADE R OHN CURTIN had been seriously ill during the last quarter of 1944 . J He was absent from most of the October and all of the Novembe r meetings of the War Cabinet and the Advisory War Council, and fro m 13th November to 22nd January Forde was officially Acting Prime Minister. Curtin recovered, and in February, March and April attended all Cabine t meetings, but when he again became ill, Forde now being overseas, Chifley became Acting Prime Minister from 30th April . The public was given an indication of the serious state of Curtin's healt h on 13th June when, in the course of a speech in the Senate, Senator Armstrong) said that the Prime Minister had been "in and out of hospita l with a strained heart that offers little hope of his complete restoratio n to health".2 When Forde returned from San Francisco on 2nd July, ahead of hi s colleague, the Minister for External Affairs, he became Acting Prim e Minister again and announced that there had been unsatisfactory progres s in Curtin's health and in fact deterioration had occurred. Curtin died at the Prime Minister's Lodge in Canberra at 4 a .m. on the 5th. He had been Prime Minister for three years and 303 days . After announcing the Prime Minister's death in the House of Representa- tives that day Forde said: "Today, the Australian nation mourns an d offers to this common man, this son of the people, a tribute of affection , gratitude and honour. . . . For this man was truly one with the masses wh o populate our country . He had striven and struggled among them, and when he came to the highest place in the land he was still one of them . " Forde recalled that Curtin's leadership of the Federal Parliamentary Labou r Party extending over the record term of nine years and nine months ha d begun "at a time of trouble in the party's fortunes" . Curtin's "untirin g work, shining example, and high ideals" had raised the party to its zenith . Menzies said : As a Prime Minister, I owed very much to his friendship and understanding, always freely and informally extended . As an Opposition Leader, I have long admired his political skill, his capacity for securing unity of purpose and direction , his unflagging industry, his willingness to put upon a far from robust constitutio n burdens which most men would have been glad to avoid, his selfless devotion t o the Australian people . . . one who sought nothing in politics except the good o f all others, as he understood it ; who followed his lights with unswerving fidelity ; who really believed in justice ; who saw politics clearly as a conflict of ideas and no t as a sordid battle of personal hostilities and ignoble ambitions . It was possible, and from my point of view necessary, to attack on political r Hon J . 1. Armstrong . Senator 1938-62 ; Minister for Munitions 194648, for Supply and Develop- ment 1948-49 . B . Sydney, 5 Jul 1908 . .Commonwealth Debates, Vol 182, p . 2913 .

590 THE LAST PHASE IN THE PACIFI C grounds John Curtin's politics or his public administration ; it was impossible an d unthinkable to attack his probity, his honesty of purpose, the man himself . 3 Some of those who were close to Curtin believed that his sensitivenes s to criticism and the worry caused by brooding over his problems had se t up an inner strain which had impaired his physical strength . His feeling s were often deeply hurt . At times he revealed the hurt ; at other time s he covered it. He may have been tormented, too, by doubt about hi s own capacity and questioning whether he had done enough . Towards the end of his service he practised and preached austerity to an increasing extent and in private was reported to have groped for religious consolation . When among his friends he was an engaging and often amusing com- panion, and he suffered from loneliness even when he sought it . He laid on himself heavier burdens than he asked others to bear . The Prime Minister's body lay in state in the King's Hall in Parliamen t House from 11 a .m. on the 6th . A memorial service was held there a t 2 p.m. and then the casket was borne on a gun-carriage to the airpor t and flown to Perth, where the funeral took place on the 8th . The House adjourned until 18th July and the Labour Party, whic h owed so much to the former Prime Minister's capacity to keep it united , set about deciding who should succeed him. As early as 4th May Lang's paper the Century had named three likely candidates : Forde, Evatt and Chifley, and later added Rosevear . 4 On 6th July the Governor-General commissioned Forde to form a Ministry to carry on the Government. The portfolios allotted were thos e previously held by Ministers except that Beasley became Minister fo r Defence in addition to Vice-President of the Executive Council . The newspapers reported that on 10th July Chifley told Forde tha t he would stand for election as leader of the Federal Parliamentary Labou r Party. The party met on the afternoon of 13th July. Williams 5 urged that the election be postponed until Evatt, then at sea, and Pollard and Senator Nash,° then in the United States, had returned, but this was not agreed to . Forde, Chifley and Makin indicated that they were candidates for electio n but Evatt's name was placed in the ballot under a rule that absent member s had to be regarded as candidates unless they had stated that they did not wish to stand. Chifley was selected on the first count . The newspaper s reported that the voting was : Chifley, 45 ; Forde, 16; Makin, 7 ; Evatt, 2. The caucus then decided that the present Ministers should continue in the Cabinet. Johnson, a veteran official of the Australian Workers' Union , who had represented Kalgoorlie since 1940, was chosen to fill the vacancy caused by Curtin's death . That day Chifley was commissioned to form a new Ministry. Chifley retained the portfolio of Treasurer, Senator Collings became Vice-Presiden t

s Commonwealth Debates, Vol 183, pp. 4112-15 . •The century ran a campaign which presumed Curtin's resignation on the grounds of ill-health- see 4th, 11th, 18th, 25th May, 1st June. 8 T. F . Williams . MI-IR 1943-49. B. Young, NSW. s R . H . Nash . Senator 1943-51 . B . Ascot Vale, Vic, 2 Jul 1890 . Died 12 Dec 1951 .

THE SURRENDER OF JAPAN 59 1 of the Executive Council and was succeeded in Interior by Johnson . Other re-allocations were made necessary by changes in the structure of th e administration introduced that day : the Department of War Organisation of Industry was abolished ; it had ceased to have a Minister in February . The Department of Works became Works and Housing, Lazzarini, wh o had been Minister for Works, retaining the new portfolio . A Department of Immigration was established with Calwell, who retained Information , as Minister . Indeed, the principal change was perhaps the one introduced by Forde, whereby the Defence portfolio ceased to be held by the Prim e Minister. The end of the war was near and the main tasks now concerne d reconstruction .

2-THE SURRENDER OF JAPA N

It is now known that an influential group in Japan had begun i n February 1943 to seek a means of bringing the war to an end but it wa s not until two years later that rumours that the Japanese Governmen t was seeking peace began to circulate. The Australian External Affair s officer in London advised on 23rd March 1945 that there were reports that peace offers were being made in Berne, but they should be discounted . Early in April the Japanese Cabinet resigned ; the former Prime Minister , General Koiso, was replaced by an aged admiral, Baron Suzuki . On 20th April the Dominions Office informed Dominion Governments that the Swedish Minister at Tokyo had reported to his government that the ne w Prime Minister was in favour of making peace, but what kind of peac e was not indicated .? In May a message from the Dominions Office reporte d a United States State Department memorandum as saying that in Lisbo n the Japanese were "anxious to know exactly what the Americans planne d to do in the Far East . There could be no question of unconditional surrende r as the Emperor would never agree to it . . . ."s Then on 10th July the United States Secretary of State made a statement the purpose of which , said the Dominions Office, "was to end current speculation by the publi c that a bona fide peace offer had been received from Japan" . Any offers which had come had been "from sources which had given no satisfactor y evidence that they spoke with authority" . The leaders of the three great powers met at Potsdam from 17th Jul y to 2nd August, Mr Churchill representing Great Britain until the defea t of his Government on 25th July, and subsequently Mr Attlee, who becam e the new British Prime Minister . At that stage the Australian Government did not know that on 12t h July the Japanese Emperor had sent a proposal to Moscow that Princ e Konoye should visit that city as a special envoy . The Russians found th e Japanese request too vague and on the 21st the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow was informed that it was desired that, through the good office s of the Soviet Government, the war be brought to an end . On the 17th, th e

4 External Affairs file P45/10/1 ; Message D644, 20 Apr . 'External Affairs file P45/10/I ; Message D872 19 May, received 20 May .

592 THE LAST PHASE IN THE PACIFI C opening day of the conference at Potsdam, Stalin mentioned the Japanes e approach to Churchill, who passed the news on to President Truman next day . The Allies had clear indications, however, that Japan would fight o n rather than accept unconditional surrender.° The Americans thereupon drafted a declaration which "departed significantly from the bare formul a of unconditional surrender which had apparently proved the main obstacl e to peace" . r This was approved by the British and Chinese leaders and was broadcast on the evening of 26th July . After warning the Japanes e that the application of Allied power would mean the destruction of the Japanese armed forces and the devastation of the Japanese homeland th e declaration said :

Following are our terms . We will not deviate from them . There are no alternatives. We shall brook no delay . There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those wh o have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest , for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible unti l irresponsible militarism is driven from the world . Until such a new order is established and until there is convincing proof tha t Japan's war-making power is destroyed, points in Japanese territory to be designate d by the Allies shall be occupied to secure the achievement of the basic objectives w e are here setting forth . The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and suc h minor islands as we determine . The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitte d to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives . We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed a s a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including thos e who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners . The Japanese Government shal l remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencie s among the Japanese people . Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as wel l as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established . Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her econom y and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind, but not those which woul d enable her to re-arm for war . To this end, access to, as distinguished from control of, raw materials shall be permitted. Eventual Japanese participation in world trad e relations shall be permitted . The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon a s these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established in accordanc e with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined an d responsible Government . We call upon the Government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditiona l surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequat e assurances of their good faith in such action . The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction .

°See J . Ehrman, Grand Strategy, Vol VI, pp . 299-300 . r Ehrman, p . 305. .The Cairo Declaration of December 1943 said that the Allies were resolved that Japan shoul d be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific that she had occupied since the beginning of th e First World War, that all territories "stolen" from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formos a and the Pescadores should be restored to China, that she would be expelled from "all othe r territories which she has taken by violence and greed", and that "in due course" Korea should become free and independent. A uslrulin+i If 'nr 1lrnxiriu ! The Memorial Service for the Prime Minister, Mr John Curtin, held in King's Hall, Parliamen t House, Canberra . Mr . Curtin died on 5th July 1945, seven weeks before the war ended .

Australian I47ar Memoria l Leaving Parliament House, Canberra after the Memorial Service on 6th .Iuly 1945 . Dr Earl e Page, Mr Hughes. Mr Menzies, Mr Rosevear and Mr Forde (reading from front to hack ) are shown on the left of the picture . A u .s tralian War Memoria l The funeral procession for Mr John Curtin arrives at Karrakatta cemetery, Perth, on 8th July 1945 . A crowd of about 30,000 peopl e gathered to pay their last respects . I rraliarr War Meirruria l Mr J . B . Chifley was appointed Prime Minister After the death of Mr Curtin . The new Ministry is shown here after heing sworn in a t Government House on 13th July 1945 : (sitting) Mr Beasley, Mr Chifley, the Duke of Gloucester, Mr Forde . Mr Makin : (.tnndirrg ) Mr Johnson, Mr Scully, Mr Holloway . Mr Drakeford . Mr Frost, Senator Keane, Mr Dedman . Senator Collings, Senator Ashley, M r Colwell, Senator Fraser, Mr Ward, Mr Iazzarini . (Dr Evatt, who was overseas . and Senator Cameron are not in the picture.) -6 4

Australian Wa r News of Japan's surrender reached Australia early on 15th August 1945 . Everywhere jubilan t crowds gathered in the streets . The top pictures are of Sydney and Melbourne, the lower one s of Perth and Brisbane .

THE SURRENDER OF JAPAN 593 On 28th July the Japanese Prime Minister announced to the press that his Government had decided to ignore the declaration . In Australia there was a sharp reaction on the part of Evatt as Ministe r for External Affairs, newly returned from his role of champion of the smaller nations at San Francisco . In a statement issued on 29th Jul y he said : Ever since 1941 it has been the declared and accepted policy of the Australia n Government that in all matters relative to the peace settlement, both in Europe an d the Pacific, Australia, being an active belligerent, possesses the right to the status of a party principal to every armistice and peace arrangement . The validity of thi s policy has been accorded widespread recognition, and very recently assurances o f its general acceptance were received from the United Kingdom Government . The recent Potsdam ultimatum to Japan makes it necessary to restate this funda- mental policy . Although that ultimatum declared certain terms or principles of th e peace settlement with Japan, it was published without prior reference to, still les s the concurrence of, the Australian Government . . All that need be said about the actual terms of peace foreshadowed in th e ultimatum is that they appear to treat Japan more leniently than Germany, in spite of the fact that the slightest sign of any tenderness towards Japanese imperialis m is entirely misplaced, having regard to the outrageous cruelties and barbaritie s systematically practised under the imperialist regime, detailed evidence of whic h was obtained by the Australian Government and placed before the War Crime s Commission. There were protests too from New Zealand ; and Evatt cabled to Frase r that he fully shared Fraser's views and feelings regarding the manner i n which the Potsdam ultimatum was issued and his remarks on the framin g of peace terms covering both Europe and the Far East theatres of war .' The Dominions Office in a message to both Australia and New Zealand said it was "unfortunate" that the declaration "should have been issue d without previous communication with dominion governments . . . . Actually the proposed text was not available in London before issue nor was i t known here what time issue would take place ." Amendments suggested by Truman had been accepted on the 25th and he had "pressed fo r publication at the earliest possible moment" .° The Potsdam Conference ended on 2nd August and on that day th e Australian Government learned that at Potsdam Stalin, as mentioned above, had revealed a proposal from the Japanese Government that Russi a should act as mediator between Japan and Britain and the United State s with a view to ending the war . The proposal had been refused.° On 6th August the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima . President Truman had issued the necessary order to the United States Air Force on 24th Jul y to be ready to "deliver its first special bomb as soon as weather will permi t visual bombing after about 3rd August" . On 8th August Molotov informed the United Kingdom and United States Ambassadors that the Soviet Government would consider itself a t

r External Affairs file P45/10/1/1 ; Evatt to Fraser 4 Aug. 6 External Affairs file P45/10/1/1 ; DO 197 to New Zealand, repeated to Australia 277 . ^External Affairs file P45/10/1 ; telegram DI357, 1 .25017, 2 Aug 1945 .

594 THE LAST PHASE IN THE PACIFI C war with Japan from 9th August' Molotov had been reported in high spirits when he handed a copy of the declaration to the United Kingdom Ambassador . The Japanese Ambassador had received the communicatio n calmly and remarked that in the circumstances he did not think war in the Far East would last long. 8 At 6 p.m. on the 9th the Japanese Imperial Headquarters communique announced an "unwarranted" Russian advance into Manchuria . 9 On the morning of 9th August another atomic bomb was dropped— on Nagasaki. On the 10th the Australian Government's views on polic y towards Japan were cabled to the Dominions Office : in its opinion the Emperor should have no immunity from responsibility for Japan's act o f aggression and proved war crimes . On the 10th (Australia 1 a .m. 11th August) the Tokyo radio announce d that a communication had been addressed through the Swedish and Swiss Governments to the United States, British, Chinese and Soviet Government s accepting the terms of the Potsdam Declaration on the understanding th e "said declaration did not comprise any demand which prejudiced the prerogatives of the Emperor as a sovereign ruler" . 1 The British Cabinet considered this broadcast which was the only intimation received of Japan' s desire to surrender. China and Russia were asked for their views . 2 In replying to a request for her views Australia indicated that she desired ful l responsibility on the part of the Emperor . If he were retained in this instanc e it should carry no commitment whatever by the Allies . It appeared, sai d the Australian message, that Japan was trying to impose a condition o r obtain a peace by negotiations. 3 The British announcement pointed ou t that so far no official communications had been received from the Japanese ? The text of the Japanese message, dated 10th August, was received i n Australia on the 12th and throughout that day Dominions Office message s concerning the proposed reply arrived . The United States had demanded that the Emperor and the Japanese High Command sign the surrende r terms; the United Kingdom suggested an amendment that the Emperor should authorise and ensure the signature of the Japanese Government and the Imperial Headquarters; Molotov had said that the offensive i n Manchuria would continue and Russia had accepted the United State s draft reply ; the United States Ambassador had called on the Chines e President and he had concurred in the terms of the reply . Finally came the text of the note of reply which went to Japan via the Swiss Government . 5 It was assumed, said a message from the Dominions Office, that the United States would take a lead in all general matters regarding surrender , and in view of the urgency they had arranged that the Joint Staff Missio n

+External Affairs file P45/5/2 ; telegram G102 from Secretary of State, I .25648, 8 Aug 1945 . 'External Affairs file P45/10/1 ; from Bruce 91A, I .25819, 9 Aug 1945 . 'External Affairs file P45/10/1 . r External Affairs file P45/10/1 ; short wave 1945/8/10 ; Sydney Morning Herald, 11 Aug 1945 . • External Affarsi files P45/10/1 and P45/10/32 ; telegram D1408 from Dominions Office . • External Affairs files P45/10/I and P45/10/32 ; telegram 229 to Secretary of State for Dominio n Affairs . "External Affairs file P45/10/1 ; message D1409 from Dominions Office . 'External Affairs file P45/10/1 ; messages DI412, D1415, D1421, D1422, DI423, D1429 .

THE SURRENDER OF JAPAN 595 in Washington would keep in close touch with the Dominions who, i n turn, were to keep Washington informed of their views and comments .° The reply of the Prime Minister to the Australian comments'' indicated the situation overseas . Hours were of importance now, Attlee said, thu s often precluding consultation.° On the 13th the United Kingdom's draft of the act of surrender wa s received with the request that Australian comments go direct to Washington . The United Kingdom had emphasised to the State Department that the y considered details of the formal act of surrender of such importance tha t both text and procedure should be settled by agreement, and opportunit y should be given to the United Kingdom and the Dominions to agree on it before publication by the United States .° The Australian Government emphasised the need for a general instrument of surrender and specifi c requirements on war criminals .] On the 11th, however, the American Government had already decide d on the terms of surrender . These required that the authority of the Japanese Emperor and Government would be subject to the Supreme Com- mander of the Allied Powers . The Emperor would be required to authoris e and ensure the signature by the Goverment of Japan and Japanese Imperial General Headquarters of the surrender terms necessary to carry out th e provisions of the Potsdam Declaration. At an Imperial Conference on the morning of the 14th the Japanes e Emperor resolved differences among his advisers by accepting the Ameri- cans' terms. The news reached Washington about 4 p .m. that day. On the 15th the Emperor broadcast the decision to the people of Japan . That day (the 15th) a message to Australia from the Dominions Office announced that the United States Government had completed a draft ac t of surrender. The State Department had said they were not in a positio n to consult their allies . The United Kingdom Minister in Washington ha d stressed the importance to his Government and the Dominions and ha d been shown the draft, but the State Department had explained they were unwilling to enter into formal consultation with the United Kingdom Government as they did not intend to invite comments from the Sovie t Union or China .° Soon after the news reached Australia, Chifley spoke to the people ove r the national radio network :

Fellow citizens, the war is over. The Japanese Government has accepted the terms of surrender imposed by th e Allied Nations and hostilities will now cease . The reply by the Japanese Governmen t to the Note sent by Britain, the United States, the U.S.S.R. and China has been received and accepted by the Allied Nations . At this moment, let us offer thanks to God .

B Extemal Affairs file P45/10/1 ; telegram D1420 from Dominions Office . +Australian messages 225, 226, 229 . 9 Attlee to Chifley ; No . 289. 0 Telegram D1434 from Dominions Office. ', Australian message 233, replying to Dominions Office D1430, D1431, D1433, D1434 . 9 Message from Dominions Office, DI444 .

596 THE LAST PHASE IN THE PACIFI C Let us remember those whose lives were given that we may enjoy this gloriou s moment and may look forward to a peace which they have won for us . Let u s remember those whose thoughts, with proud sorrow, turn towards gallant, loved ones who will not come back . On behalf of the people and Government of Australia , I offer humble thanks to the fighting men of the United Nations, whose gallantry, sacrifice and devotion to duty have brought us the victory. Nothing can fully repa y the debt we owe them, nor can history record in adequate terms their deeds from the black days that followed September 1939 and December 1941 until this moment. We owe, too, a great debt to those men and women who performed miracles o f production, in secondary and primary industries, so that the battle of supply coul d be won and a massive effort achieved . Materials, money and resources have bee n poured out so that the fighting men would not go short . Australia's part, compara- tively, in terms of fighting forces and supplies, ranks high and the Australian people may be justly proud of everything they have done . I am sure that you would like me to convey to the commanders of the fightin g forces the warmest thanks for their skill, efficiency and great devotion . Especiall y do I mention General Douglas MacArthur, with whom we had so much in commo n and with whom we shared the dangers when Australia was threatened with invasion . In your name, I offer to the leaders of the United Nations our congratulation s and thanks . We join with the United States in a common regret that their inspirin g leader, the late Mr Roosevelt, did not live to see this day . We thank his successor, President Truman, for the work he has done . Australians, too, will feel thei r happiness tinged with sorrow that another man, who gave his all, was not spare d to be with us today . That man was John Curtin . To Mr Churchill, Generalissimo Stalin and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek go the unstinted thanks of free people everywhere for what they have done for the common cause . Especially do we honou r Mr Churchill, with whom in the dark days—to use his own words—we had the honour to stand alone against aggression . And now our men and women will come home ; our fighting men with battle honours thick upon them from every theatre of war. Australians stopped the Japanese in their drive south, just as they helped start the first march toward s ultimate victory in North Africa . Australians fought in the battles of the air everywhere and Australian seamen covered every ocean . They are coming hom e to a peace which has to be won. The United Nations Charter for a World Organiza- tion is the hope of the world and Australia has pledged the same activity in makin g it successful as she showed in the framing of it . Here in Australia, there is much to be done . The Australian Government, which stood steadfast during the drea d days of war, will give all that it has to working and planning to ensure that th e peace will be a real thing. I ask that the State governments and all sections of the community should cooperate in facing the tasks and solving the problems tha t are ahead . Let us join together in the march of our nation to future greatness . You are aware of what has been arranged for the celebration of this grea t victory and deliverance . In the name of the Commonwealth Government, I invit e you to join in the thanksgiving services arranged for, truly, this is a time to give thanks to God and to those men against whose sacrifice for us there is no comparison .;

The Dominions Office had informed Mr Chifley on 12th August that President Truman had proposed that General MacArthur should b e designated Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to accept, coordinat e and carry into effect the general surrender of the Japanese forces . Truman asked Churchill to name an officer to represent him at the surrender an d Churchill had designated Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser . The United Kingdo m Government hoped that Australia, New Zealand, Canada and South Afric a

A Digest of Decisions and Announcements, No . 106, pp . 4-5 .

THE SURRENDER OF JAPAN 597 would each arrange for a senior service representative to be attached t o Admiral Fraser for this occasion. Next day the Prime Minister of New Zealand informed the Australia n Prime Minister that he was sending a representative . On the 14th, how- ever, Dr Evatt sent a note to Sir Frederick Shedden to say that he thought that Australia's representative "should go in his own right and not as a n appendage of Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser", and on the same day Mr Beasle y telephoned to Shedden to say that after consultation with Evatt he agree d that Blamey should represent Australia in his own right and not be attache d to Fraser. The Dominions Office and MacArthur were promptly informed . On 16th August the Australian Government learnt through the Dominions Office that the American Government did not see its way clea r to grant independent status to Dominion officers . It contemplated that the act of surrender would be signed by General MacArthur and his signatur e endorsed below by Admiral Fraser, Admiral Nimitz, a Chinese general and a Soviet general . Blamey had moved to Manila at MacArthur's invitation on 17th August and there he told MacArthur that, in view of the size of the other delega- tions preparing to go to Japan, he would like the Australian one to b e increased. MacArthur agreed and specifically mentioned Air Vice-Marsha l Bostock and Major-General F . H. Berryman (Chief of Staff, Advanced Land Headquarters) . The Government signalled to Blamey its approva l of the attachment of these two and of the addition of Commodore Collins and Captain R. R. Dowling, of H .M.A.S. Hobart; if time had allowed it would have nominated the Chief of the Air Staff, Air Vice-Marshal Jones . The same day the War Cabinet added the name of Air Commodore R . J. Brownell to the Tokyo delegation.' (Later he was replaced by Air Vice- Marshal Jones as there proved to be time for him to make the journey ; and Dowling was replaced by the Acting Chief of the Naval Staff, Rear - Admiral G . D. Moore. ) On 17th August the War Cabinet had approved the dispatch to th e Secretary of State for the Dominions of a long cablegram describing th e proposed Australian contribution to the occupation force for Japan, men- tioned earlier, agreeing to other British proposals and adding : We feel we must point out that, in making these contributions, Australia i s doing so not as a subsidiary but as a principal Pacific Power which has for s o long borne the heat and burden of the struggle against Japan . We cannot bu t help feeling that this has not had sufficient recognition in the Armistice arrange - ments and this view is reinforced by the advice of your cablegram 302 of 16th August regarding our representation in our own right at the acceptance of th e surrender of Japan. Dr Evatt sent a telegram to Blamey on the 18th stating that the repor t received through the Dominions Office that the State Department objected to Blarney's representing Australia separately at the surrender was contra-

•War Cabinet also approved that Australian service representatives at the surrender in South-Eas t Asia Command should be Air Vice-Marshal A . T . Cole, Brigadier J . D. Rogers and Acting Captain A . E. Buchanan .

598 THE LAST PHASE IN THE PACIFI C dieted by the State Department, which was taking steps to ask MacArthu r to meet Australia's wishes to the maximum possible extent . On the 20th Blamey replied that MacArthur had recommended that Australia, Canada, Holland and France should also sign ; and next da y added that the State Department had now informed MacArthur that representatives of those Powers and also New Zealand would sign th e Instrument of Surrender . General MacArthur had been informed from Washington on 15t h August of the Japanese capitulation and his own appointment as Suprem e Commander, Allied Powers, who would accept the general surrender . At 2.30 p.m. that day G .H.Q. issued its final communique—No . 1228 . It announced the capitulation and added that no further communiques woul d be issued from that headquarters. In response to signals from MacArthu r a delegation of 16 Japanese reached Manila by air on 19th August to receive the requirements for carrying the terms of surrender into effect . The delegation departed on the afternoon of the 20th . It was arranged that the Instrument of Surrender would be signed on 31st August aboard the battleship Missouri in Tokyo Bay. Because of a typhoon the date was later altered to 2nd September .° On 28th August a small party of American engineers and others wer e landed at Atsugi airfield near Yokohama to prepare for the arrival of th e 11th U.S . Airborne Division, the main body of which began to land o n 30th August. That day General Eichelberger and then General MacArthu r arrived . MacArthur made his headquarters in a hotel in Yokohama . At 8 .30 a.m. the Allied delegates were drawn up on the quarter-deck where , in the open under a grey sky, a table covered with green baize was set . The eleven Japanese representatives—five civilians in black suits and sil k hats and six officers in field uniform—appeared on deck at 8 .55 and stoo d in two rows about three yards from the table, their faces expressionless . At 8 .59 MacArthur arrived and invited the Japanese to sign . At once two of the civilians stepped to the table, examined the documents for half a minute and then returned to their places . Thereupon Mr Shigemitsu , the Japanese Foreign Minister, limped forward and signed the two copie s of the Instrument of Surrender.° Then the Chief of the General Staff , General Umezu, did likewise on behalf of the armed forces . General MacArthur then announced that the representatives of the United Nations would sign and, calling to his side General Wainwrigh t (who had surrendered on Luzon in 1942) and General Percival (who had surrendered at Singapore), he himself signed as Supreme Commander. MacArthur then announced each Allied representative as he advanced t o sign. The order of signing was : United States Admiral Chester Nimitz China General Hsu Yung-Chan g United Kingdom Admiral Sir Bruce Frase r

. The Australian party in the Missouri comprised in addition to General Blarney, and the officers mentioned above, Colonel Dwyer (Blarney's Personal Assistant) and Captain J. Balfour (Aus- tralian historical officer) . This account of the ceremony is drawn from one written by Balfour. .Shigemitsu had lost a leg in a bomb explosion caused by Koreans in the 1930s.

THE SURRENDER OF JAPAN 599 U.S.S.R. Neat-General K. N. Derevyanko Australia General Sir Thomas Blarne y Canada Colonel L. Moore Cosgrave France General Jacques Le Cler c Netherlands Admiral Conrad Helfrich New Zealand Air Vice-Marshal L. M. Isitt MacArthur made a short speech and that ended the ceremony . Soon after the Japanese had left the Missouri some hundreds of Allied aircraft flew over Tokyo Bay in squadron formation .

In a statement issued on 24th August Evatt described Australia's success- ful effort to achieve direct representation at the surrender in Tokyo. This, he said, was only one aspect of "the great question" raised by the Prim e Minister when he had said on the 17th that Australia's war effort agains t Japan had not had sufficient recognition in the Armistice negotiations an d arrangements . The Potsdam Declaration had been issued without an y reference to Australia . Next came the Japanese Government's request tha t the privileges and prerogatives of the Emperor should not be prejudiced . On that matter the Australian Government had expressed its views promptly and clearly. However, the facts showed that little consideration coul d have been given to Australia's very strong submissions . Again there wa s the matter of the Council of Foreign Ministers, from which at present Aus- tralia, a principal belligerent against Japan, was excluded even in relation t o the Japanese settlement, while China was included without having bee n a belligerent in Europe . In the Government's view that was unsatisfactory and they knew that this opinion was shared by New Zealand . Once again they would be in danger of being presented with cut-and-dried decision s in which they would have had no real participation and no effective voice . The fact was, Evatt continued, that, apart from the United States, the main contribution to victory in the Pacific was that of Australia . In spite of this there was a deplorable tendency, now that the fighting was over, t o relegate Australia to a subordinate status and either not to consult he r at all or to consult her in a perfunctory way and not on the footing o f equality. This process would have to be arrested, not only in the interest s of Australia but of the British Commonwealth . When the House of Representatives reassembled on 29th August Chifley described the events leading up to the surrender. He moved and the House agreed to an address to the King expressing loyalty and gratitude . He moved too that the thanks of the House be accorded to the members o f the services and other war workers, and that the House acknowledge th e heroism of the fallen . Menzies seconded the motion . After having informed the House of the events that followed the issue of the Potsdam Declaration Chifley said that as soon as his Governmen t saw that the Japanese were trying to preserve the Emperor's position they sent a strong expression of the view that no person or institution should have immunity from responsibility for Japanese aggression an d war crimes, and made it clear that Australia was entitled to claim a full

600 THE LAST PHASE IN THE PACIFI C and direct voice in decisions regarding Japan's future and a due part i n the execution of those decisions . Throughout the period Australia wa s kept informed by the Dominions Office and her Ministers in Washington , Moscow and Chungking, but events often moved very fast and there wa s no time for adequate consideration of Australian suggestions and proposals , "even when these were received before the actual decisions had bee n made, which was not always the case" . Chifley listed the military commitments that the Government ha d accepted "with the object of ensuring that Australia shall play its prope r part in the tasks arising from the Japanese capitulation and contribut e to the execution of the surrender terms against Japan" . The military commitments were : participation in the occupation of Japan and Singapore , occupation of key areas of enemy-held territories, and the release of Australian prisoners of war and internees . The Government proposed that a composite force of two cruisers, two destroyers, two brigade groups an d ancillary units, and three fighter squadrons should be made available t o take part in the occupation of Japan.'' Later in the day Chifley announced that the British Prime Minister ha d invited him to nominate a special representative to the Council of Foreig n Ministers, due to meet in London in September . He had chosen Evatt for this task. Evatt, he said, would be in London when Bruce's term as High Commissioner expired and would perform the duties of High Commissioner until the arrival of Beasley who would become Resident Minister i n London.8 After MacArthur had taken the general surrender off Tokyo and Mount - batten in Singapore had taken the surrender of the representative of Fiel d Marshal Count Terauchi, commanding the Japanese Southern Army, the surrenders of the principal local commanders were arranged . So far as possible each Japanese general surrendered to his opposite number . Thus the commander of the II Japanese Army and naval representatives surren- dered all their forces in the Netherlands Indies to General Blamey a t Morotai on 9th September; and separate surrenders were taken by Australian commanders in Dutch Borneo, British Borneo, off Rabaul, a t Torokina, at Wewak, in Timor and at Nauru and Ocean Islands.

Blamey was informed on 24th August that the Government was mos t anxious that early action be taken to ensure that Australian forces too k the surrender of the Japanese on Timor and occupied the island . Blamey asked on the 27th whether this applied to the whole island or only th e Dutch part; if the whole island, he would be glad of instructions in th e event of objection or opposition by the Portuguese . Shedden sent a message to Blarney on 28th August to say that th e Government wished separate surrenders of Japanese forces in respect of both Portuguese and Dutch Timor . With regard to Portuguese Timor th e

' Commonwealth Debates, Vol 184, pp . 4956-8 . *Beasley departed for London on 20th December .

THE SURRENDER OF JAPAN 601 Government had expressed to the United Kingdom Government th e following views : The Japanese surrender in Portuguese Timor should be made to Australian forces; meanwhile no facilities should be given for the despatch of Portuguese forces to the colony ; interim arrangements for th e restoration of administration should be made directly between the Aus- tralian forces and whatever local Portuguese administration was still in existence . This interim arrangement was aimed at the conclusion of a long-term arrangement with the Portuguese Government including as a minimum "the objectives of the 1943 understanding" . The Government ha d asked the United Kingdom Government to obtain the Portuguese Govern- ment's acquiescence to the first and third of these proposals . On the 29th in response to Blarney's request for enlightenment Shedde n informed him that the "1943 understanding" was that Australia recognise d Portuguese sovereignty and would wish after the war to have agreement s regarding common defence against possible future aggression, commercial relations and air communications . The Portuguese Government ha d accepted the principle that there should be such agreements . On 1st September, however, Shedden informed Blamey that further negotiations were proceeding and the Government wished the sending o f Australian troops to take the Japanese surrender in Portuguese Timo r to be deferred. The surrender of the Japanese forces in Timor was carrie d out aboard H.M.A.S. Moresby in Koepang Bay on 11th September. On 13th September General Northcott (the Chief of the General Staff ) signalled Blamey that a Portuguese sloop had sailed from Colombo and expected to reach Dili on the 28th . Could arrangements be made for Australians to take the surrender there at short notice? Brigadier L . G. H. Dyke, who took the surrender of the Japanese commander on Timor o n the 11th, had already ensured that the surrender included the 150 or so Japanese who were on guard and police duties in the Portuguese colony . On 18th September the War Cabinet endorsed directions given by th e Minister for Defence to the Chief of the General Staff that the Australia n commander or his representative should go at once to Dili by Australian warship and inform the Portuguese Governor of the surrender of the Japanese forces . He should arrange for the landing of a small party t o check that the terms of the surrender were effective, arrange with the Governor for the disposal of all Japanese in Portuguese Timor, of any Allied prisoners or internees and of enemy war material . He should als o discuss with the Governor arrangements concerning Australian war grave s and Japanese war crimes . If this action was taken without delay it woul d not be necessary to delay at Colombo Portuguese ships carrying an occupation force. ' The Chief of the General Staff had asked for directions on a number of points. What action should be taken if the Governor refused permission for troops to land; what action if the landing or action of the troops was opposed; what arrangements were desired concerning war graves and wa r

' War Cabinet Minute 4448, 19 Sep 1945 .

602 THE LAST PHASE IN THE PACIFI C crimes; was Dr Evatt's telegram of the 17th to be taken as a directio n to land troops if considered necessary by the forces commander and possibly in defiance of the Governor ; what action on the arrival of the Portuguese convoy? The Minister for Defence had replied that if the Governor refuse d permission to land a formal protest should be recorded and information sent promptly to Australia . The Governor should then be asked to deliver on board the Australian corvette or accompanying ship all Allied prisoners or internees, Japanese troops and war material. Troops were not to be landed unless the Governor agreed, and if landed with his permission should remain until their tasks were finished . Northcott had asked that the Australian commander should be give n a civilian political adviser. Mr Forsythe of the Department of External Affairs was appointed. All went smoothly . Forsyth met the Portuguese Governor at Dili o n 22nd September and had a satisfactory discussion . Next day Dyke went to Dili with Forsyth and others and a flotilla of five corvettes, visite d the Governor, formally told him of the surrender and congratulated hi m on the restoration of his authority . The Governor agreed that Australian officers might move freely to and from places agreed upon by him t o dispose of enemy troops and material and prisoners or internees . On 24th September the Portuguese Ambassador in London had hande d to Dr Evatt a note expressing pleasure that the two Governments wer e able in a friendly and understanding manner to settle the matter satis- factorily.

3-POST-SURRENDER PROBLEMS As a result of the transfer of a great part of the South-West Pacific Are a to Mountbatten's South-East Asia Command the Australian troops i n Borneo and Morotai fell within Mountbatten's command. The Australian forces in the Australian New Guinea territories were under purely Aus- tralian command, as, in effect, they had been for the greater part of a year. Mountbatten was at first unwilling to take over the additional areas unti l about the end of October but, when Japan capitulated, he was ordere d to accept the new responsibility on the next day—15th August . After discussions with a military mission from the South-East Asia Command, the Defence Committee recommended and the Advisory War Council and War Cabinet approved of a division of responsibility betwee n the South-East Asia Command and the Australian Command . In the first phase Australia would be responsible for Borneo and the islands to th e eastward and the British would be responsible for Java, Bali and Lombok . In the second phase, which it was hoped to complete by October 1945 , the British would extend their occupation in the western half of the Dutch territory . In neither the first or second phase would Australia take

2 W . D. Forsyth, OBE. Sec-Gen South Pacific Commission, Noumea, 1948-51 and 1963-66 ; Aus t Ambassador to Vietnam 1959-61, to Lebanon since 1967 . B . Casterton, Vic, 5 Jan 1909 .

POST-SURRENDER PROBLEMS 603 action to occupy all the islands within its sphere . In the third phase the British would become responsible for the whole of the Netherlands Eas t Indies (including Dutch New Guinea, but excluding Timor) . The pro- gressive assumption of responsibility by the British would be determine d by the resources available but the South-East Asia Command accepted an obligation to take over the area as rapidly as possible . On the completion of the third phase, the date of which was indefinite, the responsibility of Australia would be limited to Papua and the Mandated Territories, and t o any special action which might be necessary in Timor . Except in Papua and the Mandated Territories Australia limited her responsibility for civi l affairs administration to action necessary to prevent disease and unrest and would hand over civil administration as soon as the initial period o f military responsibility ended . In Borneo the general Australian intentio n was not to extend the existing area of responsibility except for specia l reasons such as the relief of prisoners of war and it was hoped to han d over to the British and Dutch not later than the end of October. In Dutch New Guinea Australian initial control would, for all practical purposes , be confined to Hollandia and Biak, which were of special interest as air force staging areas, and the general occupation of the territory woul d be left until British or Dutch troops were available ? The acceptance of "initial responsibility" in Borneo and the islands to the eastward brought Australia into the internal post-war strife in th e Netherlands East Indies . On 19th September Blamey sent a signal t o the Commander of the II Japanese Army which controlled the Japanese military forces in that part of the area of Australian responsibility tha t lay west of the border of Dutch New Guinea informing him that th e following areas of responsibility had been allotted to his subordinate com- manders : British Borneo to the commander of the 9th Division, Dutch Borneo to the commander of the 7th Division ; Timor and the Lesse r Sundas east of Lombok to the commander of the Australian force a t Koepang; Ambon, Ceram, Buru, Kai, An and Tanimbar Islands to the Australian commander at Ambon . Therefore the Japanese would directly control Celebes, Halmahera and Dutch New Guinea for the present . Later Australian forces were established also at Macassar, Menado and Ternate. By a combination of tact and firmness the Australian commanders and their troops succeeded admirably in maintaining law and order in th e eastern half of the Indies in very difficult circumstances and for a far longer period than had originally been intended, because the revolutionar y struggle in Java tied up British and Indian troops who might otherwis e have taken over responsibility for islands farther east .4 The Indonesian nationalists had the sympathy of trade unionists in Australia, and particularly of the waterside workers . In September som e Indonesian seamen walked off Dutch ships that were in eastern Australia n ports and bound for the Indies, and Australian wharf labourers refuse d

'War Cabinet Minute 4398, 30 Aug 1945 . The experiences of the Australian forces in the Indies in this period are described in Volume VI I of the Army series of this history.

604 THE LAST PHASE IN THE PACIFI C to load some of these ships . Opposition members complained in Parlia- ment that vessels carrying food and medical supplies to sick and starving people were being held up . Chifley told the House that, as a result of a conference he had had with the Dutch authorities, there would be n o

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interruption of the loading of ships carrying only food and medical supplies ; but any ship carrying munitions would be loaded by Dutch labour . "Is not the Netherlands Government entitled to arms and ammunition? " asked Holt. "I shall not go into that matter," replied the Prime Minister .5

While Australia was seeking to limit her military commitments in the Netherlands East Indies she was extending her political activities . In October, Mr Macmahon Ball, e appointed by the Minister for External Affairs as Australian Political Representative to the Allied Commander , Netherlands East Indies, went to Java and urged Australian interests o n the British commander and expressed Australian opinions side by sid e with the political advisers furnished to the commander by the Britis h Foreign Office . It might be argued that Australia had a double interest . The carrying out of the arrangements for the relief of Australian forces in the eastern half of the Netherlands Indies was being delayed by the internal disturb- ances in the British area of responsibility . More importantly, the present

s Commonwealth Debates, Vol 185, pp . 6128-9 . 9 W . Macmahon Ball . Director of Short Wave Broadcasting, Dept of Information 1940-44 ; British Commonwealth Rep on Allied Council for Japan 1946-47 ; Prof of Political Science, Melbourne University 1949-68 . B . Casterton, Vic, 29 Aug 1901 .

POST-SURRENDER PROBLEMS 605 and future stability of government in this region was of considerable con - sequence to Australian security. In November Dr Evatt, still in London, proposed by cablegram tha t Australia should intervene in Indonesia and take a leading part in callin g a truce and opening negotiations between the Dutch and the Indonesians , as well as landing an Australian force, under South-East Asia Command , to arrange and supervise the concentration and removal of all Japanes e troops and Allied prisoners of war and internees ? From Canberra, however, Chifley replied that he was sure that th e Cabinet would not agree to this additional commitment of forces . It would be difficult enough to keep Australians in Borneo for an extended period. Yet Australia could scarcely offer her services as a third party for mediation without accepting by implication the responsibility for enforcin g the conditions under which mediation would take place or for policin g any agreement that might be made . Chifley was against any initiative by Australia. 8 In the same week (27th November) the Australian Chiefs of Staff were also considering the problem on their own account . The military informa- tion they had about the situation in mid-November was that the Japanes e strength in Java was 50,000 troops of whom fewer than 1,000 had bee n disarmed; Indonesian troops numbered 100,000, of whom 25,000 ha d been trained by the Japanese, and their equipment, including 800 armoure d vehicles, 200 guns, 1,000 machine-guns, 1,000 sub-machine-guns an d 25,000 rifles, with plenty of ammunition, made them a force capable o f conducting a prolonged guerilla fight ; Allied prisoners of war and internees numbered 120,000 of whom only half were under any kind of Allie d protection; the British strength was two infantry divisions and one armoure d regiment, with an additional infantry division allocated but not yet i n occupation. The British were in Java, acting on behalf of the United Nations in accordance with the policy agreed upon for the disarmament and con- centration of Japanese forces, the recovery and repatriation of prisoners of war and internees and the maintenance of law and order . The Australian forces, the relief of which was dependent on th e capacity of the British forces to gain control of the situation in Java , consisted of two frigates and four corvettes in the Morotai area, tw o divisions, a brigade group and a battalion group in Borneo, south Celebes, Ambon and Timor, with advanced headquarters at Morotai ; and four air force squadrons, including a transport squadron . What would happen i f the internal disturbances in Java spread into the Australian area? Wha t should be done if the situation became so grave in the British area tha t the British commander asked for Australian assistance or if disturbance s broke out in parts of the British area where British forces were no t available? The Minister for Defence, Mr Beasley, put the possibilities raised by the Chiefs of Staff before the War Cabinet on 18th December. The War

? Telegrams E47 and E48 from Evatt to Chifley, 23 Nov 1945. s Telegram 1802, 26 Nov 1945 .

606 THE LAST PHASE IN THE PACIFI C Cabinet said they were hypothetical questions and the Chiefs of Staff shoul d submit an immediate report and recommendations when an actual situa- tion arose. They added, however, that "on the basis of the present position the Government is opposed, in principle, to the acceptance of any additional commitments for the use of Australian forces in the Netherlands Eas t Indies". It was the wish of the Government that the Australian force s stationed in the Netherlands East Indies should avoid, as far as possible , participation in internal strife . Their duties and responsibility as originally defined were (i) The carrying out of the Japanese surrender terms ; (ii) The recovery and repatriation of Allied prisoners of war and internees ; and (iii) The maintenance of law and order and the restoration of economic life t o the extent only of preventing disease and unrest .9 A month later, in the middle of January 1946, the Chiefs of Staff reported more definitely on the prospects for the relief of Australia n forces. The British were about to take over in British North Borneo an d the Dutch were expected to start relieving Australian garrisons exceptin g in Timor, by the end of January and, with the movement of further Britis h forces into south Celebes, the Australian "initial responsibility" woul d be completed about the middle of February . At the same meeting the War Cabinet gave separate consideration to the situation in Timor and, accepting the report of the Chiefs of Staff that there was no military reason why Australian forces (comprising 400 troop s and a small number of R .A.N. and R.A.A.F.) should be retained there , approved of their withdrawal.' When it made these decisions the War Cabinet had before it a report , dated 17th December 1945, which Macmahon Ball had presented to th e Department of External Affairs on his return to Australia from duty a s Australian Political Representative in Java . The report described variou s elements in the situation in the Netherlands East Indies and, after discussing the chances either of an early political settlement between the Dutch an d Indonesians or of the restoration of order by Allied forces, expressed th e belief that "if and when the hope of a Dutch-Indonesian settlement i s destroyed immediate steps should be taken to treat the N.E.I. as a problem that belongs to the United Nations, and not simply to the Netherland s and U.K." The report concluded : While I recognise our very vital interests in this area, I cannot see that Australi a could hope to succeed in any independent initiative . First, because Australia cannot mediate unless she is accepted as a mediator by both parties, and we would hav e little chance of acceptance by the Dutch . Second, because even if the Dutch did accept us, for fear that worse might befall them, this would imply some obligation s to back our political intervention with military force . If the impressions I gaine d on my flying visits to Morotai and Borneo are correct, then any Australian Govern- ment which sought to transfer our troops to Java instead of bringing them hom e would be faced with a major domestic crisis . I think it useless for us to give advice

° War Cabinet Minute 4598, 18 Dec 1945 ; Agendum 551/1945 . 'War Cabinet Minutes 4607 and 4608, 19 Jan 1946 ; Agenda 13/1946 and 14/1946 .

POST-SURRENDER PROBLEMS 607 to Dutch or Indonesians unless we are prepared to support our words with deeds . That is why I feel that if Australia is to participate directly in the Java crisis w e should do so, not as an independent nation, but as a member of the United Nations , which is specially concerned with our area of such strategic and political importance for our own future .

The War Cabinet noted the report and proceeded to consider the military proposals for the relief of the Australian forces .2 It would appear, however, that the decision of the War Cabinet was a decision for non-intervention and for withdrawal as quickly as possibl e from the risk of additional commitments in the Netherlands Indies, rathe r than an evaluation of the political situation in Java and a consideratio n of the various diplomatic courses open to Australia . Australian post-wa r diplomatic activity in the islands to the north might have begun at that point but in fact it did not do so . The old gap between defence and foreign policy started to open again. The pull of the old isolationism and of keeping out of other people's troubles was for the time being stronge r than the ambitions to shine in world councils . The Government wa s demanding separate and distinctive representation in the occupation o f Japan for that was a matter of national pride as one of the shapers of victory, but during the preceding months they had shunned opportunitie s for taking a larger part in other post-hostilities measures in either Asi a or Europe .3 On 24th January the Prime Minister publicly announced, with gratifica- tion, the prospect of the withdrawal of all Australian forces from Borne o and the Netherlands East Indies . The Australian forces handed over responsibility to Indian troops i n Celebes in February . The Australian headquarters on Timor was close d on 19th March when a Dutch administration took over . Thereafter Aus- tralian military government was confined to Australian territories . From 30th October onwards a "provisional administration" progressively too k over control of the New Guinea territories district by district, and on 24t h June 1946 it took charge of the last of these—the Gazelle Peninsula— and military government in New Guinea ceased . Meanwhile Australians had also been involved in military government in a British colony . From 1943 onwards a group in the Colonial Office i n London had been planning the re-establishment of civil government i n the British parts of Borneo . This group was one of several which were preparing for the administration of the civil population in territories tha t might be occupied by British or Allied armies in Europe, Africa or Asia . Australian interest in this British planning appears to have begun in 1943 .

4 War Cabinet Minute 4606, 19 Jan 1946, and Agendum 2/1946. •An early indication of the Chifley Government's attitude was given at a War Cabinet meetin g on 19th September 1945 . The Minister for External Affairs, Dr Evatt, who had only returne d from the United Nations Conference on International Organisation on 23rd July had left again for London on 4th September. War Cabinet decided to send a cablegram to him asking tha t the Government be kept informed of his activities and telling him "that the Government does not wish to be involved in controversial matters relating to Europe which do not affect Australia' s vital interests" . (War Cabinet Minute 4452, 19 Sep 1945 .) It was the drive of Dr Evatt rather than any immediate change in the outlook of the Labour Government that brought increase d participation by Australia in world affairs .

608 THE LAST PHASE IN THE PACIFI C In July of that year, on the recommendation of the Minister for Externa l Territories, Senator Fraser, a committee was established to plan the rehabilitation of Australian territories . G. W. Paton,4 professor of law at Melbourne University, was appointed chairman, and he was sent abroad with Major N. Penglase, of Angau, to study British and American doctrine s of military government. They visited the Army and Navy Schools of Militar y Government in the United States, did a course at the Civil Affairs Staff Centre in England and talked to the relevant authorities in London. When Paton presented his report in January 1944 General Blarney proteste d that he should have been consulted before the recommendations went to the Cabinet: for a considerable time control of the New Guinea territorie s must remain with the army and he had a Directorate of Research, on e of whose tasks was to advise him on administration in occupied o r re-occupied territories . To the Army Directorate of Research had very recently been added a number of lawyers, anthropologists and economists, evidently with th e object of lending weight to the advice being offered to the Commander-in - Chief on the administration of the territories ; and a school of civi l administration was being planned.5 While in London with Curtin in 1944 Blamey had talks with th e permanent heads of the War Office and the Colonial Office about plan s for civil administration in Borneo . In December 1944 a War Office liaison officer on Civil Affairs reache d Melbourne, and in the first quarter of 1945 a Civil Affairs Unit fo r Borneo arrived, commanded by Brigadier C . F. C. Macaskie, Chief Justice and Deputy Governor of North Borneo . By this time a civil affairs unit — British Borneo Civil Affairs Unit—with an establishment differing fro m the British one was being organised in Australia by Blamey's Directo r of Research and Civil Affairs. The British unit now became a holdin g centre from which its members were gradually transferred to the Australia n unit. On 23rd May the Minister for Defence asked for information about the new Australian unit, and this Blamey provided . On the 28th the War Cabinet approved the formation of the unit, expressed the opinio n that it should have been consulted sooner, and stated that the Unite d Kingdom should be asked to replace Australian members of the unit as soon as possible. On 22nd July Macaskie took command of B .B.C.A.U. in Borneo, about six weeks after it had begun operations there .6 Sir George Paton . Prof of Jurisprudence, University of Melbourne 1931-51, Vice-Chancello r 1951-68 . B . Geelong, Vic, 16 Aug 1902 . ° The LHQ School of Civil Affairs was established in November and December 1944 with Colonel J . K . Murray, a professor of agriculture, at the head of a staff of seven which, initially, include d three university anthropologists . Even so the Chief Civil Affairs Officer "found that he was allowed little say in controlling th e operations of the unit : as an example it may be recorded that appointments to specific post s in the unit were made, not by the C .C .A .O ., but by the Director of Research and Civil Affair s 4,000 miles away in Melbourne, without experience of civil or military administration . To thi s may be ascribed the occasional subordination of experienced civil administrators to young officer s lacking any experience of either civil administration or military staff work . Even if the earlie r exclusion of the C .C .A .O . from command of the unit was desirable in the interests of integratio n and flexibility, this later tight subordination to the Director of Research and Civil Affair s prevented any elasticity and sealed off all local knowledge and experience ." F . S . V . Donnison , British Military Administration in the For East 194346 (1956), p . 182 .

POST-SURRENDER PROBLEMS 609 It was unfortunate that the Ministers did not receive information abou t the development of these units far sooner, particularly in view of th e political factors that were involved. When in January Borneo was transferred from Australian to British com- mand B.B.C.A.U. ceased to exist and was replaced by "British Military Administration", 57 of whose 144 officers were Australians who volun- teered to continue . In recognition of the work done by the Australia n Army in the rehabilitation of British Borneo the insignia of the 9t h Australian Division was included in the coat of arms of the new Colony o f British Borneo which was established on 15th July 1946 .'

The initiative in regard to the British Commonwealth Occupation Forc e in Japan came from London. Before the termination of hostilities the United Kingdom had proposed the formation of a British Commonwealt h Force to take part in the operations against the main islands of Japan . The Australian response was to agree to such a force provided that satisfac- tory assurances were given that Australia would have a voice in th e policy relating to the control and use of Australian forces . Australia also wanted to know what principles would be followed in selecting th e commanders of such a force and pressed the claims of Australian officer s to consideration . The end of the war came before any further progress had been made in the discussion of an operational force, but on 13t h August the United Kingdom suggested that a British Commonwealth Force be formed from Australian, British, British-Indian, Canadian and Ne w Zealand troops to take part in the occupation of Japan and that Australia might contribute to the forces to be sent to Hong Kong . 8 The War Cabinet rejected the request to provide forces for the occupa- tion of Hong Kong, although willing to make available some minesweeper s for a stipulated period of "two months only" . In proposing to send t o Japan a Task Force of two cruisers and two destroyers, two brigade groups and three fighter squadrons the Government told the Unite d Kingdom : "We must insist, however, that this contribution is being made by Australia as a separate belligerent of Japan, and that our Force wil l operate under an Australian Commander who will be subject only to the Supreme Allied Commander ." It was at the same time that Australia agreed to a United Kingdo m proposal that the South-West Pacific Area should pass to the British an d Australian Command, the division of responsibility between them to be considered later. As mentioned earlier, the Government also accepted th e suggestion in respect of Borneo and the islands to the east, including Ocea n Island and Nauru, it being understood that the United Kingdom woul d make shipping available . In view of the part played by the 8th Division in Malaya, Australi a asked that the Australian parachute battalion might participate in th e

7 The formation and experiences of BBCAU are described in Volume VII of the Army serie s of this history. 5 Telegram 290 from Dominions Office, 13 Aug 1945 .

610 THE LAST PHASE IN THE PACIFI C re-occupation of Singapore, and urged that "the highest priority in every respect, including sea, land and air transport" should be given to ensure the safe return of prisoners of war.° In making these contribution s Australia insisted that it was doing so not as a subsidiary but as a principal Pacific power which had fought Japan .' When the Australian Government informed the United Kingdom that its force to go to Japan should operate under an Australian commande r who would be subject only to the Supreme Allied Commander,2 the British Government replied expressing the view that the general interests of the British Commonwealth would best be served by a single force rather tha n by separate forces . A joint force would "afford a valuable demonstratio n of our essential unity in matters of common concern and a good augur y for our future close cooperation in defence matters" . Moreover, the single commander of a joint force would carry more weight than two commander s of lower rank in command of smaller forces acting independently. If Australia would agree, then Britain would welcome the appointment o f an Australian officer as Commander-in-Chief of the British Commonwealt h Occupation Force . These proposals referred solely to the military aspec t of the occupation of Japan and any political aspects must be the subject of separate treatment .3 Chifley replied rejecting the offer and again asking for an independen t Australian force . Australia felt strongly, he said, that, in the military as well as the political tasks and responsibilities arising from the Japanese surrender, Australia was entitled to "a degree of recognition and statu s that is fairly and justly commensurate with the contribution which we have made to the final victory over Japan" . Australia accepted the commit- ments to provide an occupation force for Japan "as a separate belligeren t of Japan, and as a primary, and not as a secondary, Pacific power . We consider that the Australian Force to serve in Japan should operat e on the same basis as our Forces have operated in the South-West Pacifi c Area in the past, that is with direct responsibility to General MacArthur. . . . We have informed General MacArthur of our desire to organise a n independent Australian Force to serve in Japan and, although no fina l arrangements have yet been made, we have no doubt that General Mac - Arthur will cooperate fully with us in allotting to the Australian Force a role appropriate to our status and the contribution which we have mad e to the victory in the Pacific ."4 While Canberra insisted on an independent force, however, Dr Evatt , then in London, was induced by Australian advisers to look at the Britis h proposal as the recognition and not as the denial of the Australian claim s to take a primary part in Pacific affairs . In a telegram to Canberra, whil e agreeing with the general principles of Chifley's reply, he suggested tha t

'In the event only part of the parachute battalion went to Malaya where it performed polic e duties until January 1946. "War Cabinet Minute 4350, 17 Aug; Agendum 379/1945 . •Telegram 240 to Dominions Office, 17 Aug 1945 . 'Telegram 349 from Dominions Office, 1 Sep 1945. "Telegram 286 to Dominions Office, 10 Sep 1945.

POST-SURRENDER PROBLEMS 611 the British proposal might be looked at again . Providing that executiv e authority over the force was exercised from Australia and that th e Australian Government nominated the commander, it might be possibl e to use the occasion to demonstrate "Australian leadership in Pacific affair s and in the Pacific settlement" . He suggested that the Australian decisio n be reviewed to see if it were possible to amend the British proposal t o ensure "acknowledged and effective control of the enterprise and at th e same time direct responsibility to General MacArthur" . 6 Consequently, on 19th September, the War Cabinet decided tha t Australia should contribute to the British Commonwealth Occupation Force on the assumption that an Australian officer was the Inter-Service Commander-in-Chief and the bulk of the headquarters was provided by Australia ; the Force Commander would be under the control and have direct access to the Supreme Allied Commander. On policy and administra- tive matters the Commander-in-Chief would be jointly responsible to the United Kingdom and Australian Governments through the Joint Chief s of Staff in Australia, comprising the Australian Chiefs of Staff and a representative or representatives of the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff. All instructions to the Commander-in-Chief would be issued by th e Australian Chiefs of Staff as the agents of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Australia . A directive to the Commander-in-Chief would be drawn up by consultation between the Governments concerned .° The United Kingdom Government agreed with the proposals' an d after various administrative arrangements had been discussed and inter- preted to mutual satisfaction they were communicated to the United State s Government. While the United States accepted the principle of a British Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan, some difficulty arose ove r American views that the British Commonwealth Forces should be integrate d with the Allied forces, and consequently the Commonwealth army an d air forces would be placed under the American army and air commanders . The difficulties were discussed in Washington and in Tokyo and a satisfac- tory arrangement reached .° Finally only one Australian brigade was included in B .C.O.F. It was formed in the last part of 1945 and the first troops arrived in Japa n in February 1946 . The Australian air force component—a wing of thre e fighter squadrons plus an airfield construction squadron—began to arriv e in March. The Australian army and air force components at the outset included about 12,000 officers and men, which was about one-third of the strength of the whole force . The original commander was Lieut-General Northcott who remained in command until June 1946 when he wa s appointed Governor of New South Wales—the first Australian to hold tha t office—and was succeeded by Lieut-General H. C. H. Robertson . Control of the force by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Australi a

° Telegram EC .10 from Evatt to Chifley, 14 Sep 1945 . ^War Cabinet Minute 4400, 19 Sep 1945 . °Telegram 396 from Dominions Office, 1 Oct 1945 . s War Cabinet Minute 4482, 4 Oct, and Agendum 426/1945, Supplement No . 1 . •War Cabinet Minute 4595, 18 Dec 1945 ; Agendum 550/1945 and Supplement No. 1 .

612 THE LAST PHASE IN THE PACIFI C (J.C.O.S .A.) was continued until the end of 1947 when the three govern- ments still contributing to the force—Australia, the United Kingdom an d New Zealand—agreed that J .C.O.S.A. should be abolished and respon- sibility for the control and administration of the force assigned to th e Australian Government . In a statement made on 14th July 1948, Dedman , as Minister for Defence, said that the then organisation for the control of B.C.O.F. had great significance on three separate counts : It is (he said) the first practical example of an assignment of forces by several Commonwealth governments to the control of one government under the ne w machinery, which provides formal and adequate arrangements for retention by th e participating governments of sovereign control of their own policy and ful l consultation when their interests are affected . It is the first time that forces of the United Kingdom have been placed unde r the control of a Dominion government and thus constitutes the most complete expression to date in the Defence sphere of the principle of the "sovereign equality " of all Commonwealth members, which was enunciated at the Imperial Conferenc e of 1926. It represents a recognition of the special position of Australia in Pacific affair s and her willingness and ability to carry increased responsibilities for British Common - wealth defence in this area . The force's military tasks in its area, initially the prefecture of Hiro- shima but later enlarged by the addition of other prefectures, were militar y control, protection of Allied installations and demilitarisation and disposa l of Japanese installations and armaments . In two years and a half the force destroyed hundreds of thousands of tons of military equipment . In 1947 the Indian contingent was withdrawn and the United Kingdom and New Zealand contingents greatly reduced. By 1950 when the Korean war broke out the only combat unit remaining was a squadron of the R.A.A .F.

4—DEMOBILISATION At a meeting on 12th June 1944 the War Cabinet had approved recom- mendations by the Department of Post-War Reconstruction regarding th e general principles to govern demobilisation . These provided that the selec- tion of members of the forces for dispersal should be made on a syste m of individual priorities determined at the cessation of hostilities b y allotting points for length of service together with age at enlistment an d marital status. Discharges should be in advance of normal priority in the case of members whos e services were required on occupational grounds in the national interest; members accepted for full-time training courses as determined by the appropriate authority ; the medically unfit ; compassionate cases ; other cases in which circumstances woul d have justified discharge during hostilities. Discharge should be deferred in the case of members whose continued employ- ment was essential; members who volunteered to forego priority and whose continued employment was desirable . Demobilisation plans should provide for a rate of dispersal of 3,000 a day six days a week, and be capable of expansion to meet emergencies .

DEMOBILISATION 61 3 There should be dispersal areas in each State, the selection of sites, provision of accommodation etc. to be carried out immediately . The services and the appropriate Commonwealth civil departments should now plan and develop flexible administrative machinery for dispersal in such a wa y that it will be immediately available when required. Any policy or procedure which it is decided to adopt for the demobilisation period should be introduced as soo n as possible, provided that this is practicable during the war .1 After consultation with organisations representing trade unions, employer s and returned servicemen, an extensive "Outline Plan for Demobilisation of the Australian Defence Forces" was drawn up by an Inter-Service Demobilisation Committee and endorsed by a Reconstruction Demobilisa- tion Committee. This plan was eventually discussed by the War Cabinet on 6th March 1945 and accepted as a basis for planning . The Reconstructio n Demobilisation Committee was designated the demobilisation authority .2 The War Cabinet also directed that a Parliamentary Paper should be prepared on the subject; this was not completed until after the cessation of hostilities, but the progress made was such that, on the day after th e capitulation of Japan, the War Cabinet was able to put into train a n orderly procedure for demobilisation .3 In July War Cabinet had approved an expenditure of £250,000 fo r the provision in each State of an appropriate demobilisation dispersa l centre? A revised procedure for rehabilitation of discharged troops had come into operation on 8th November 1943 . Briefly it provided that a rehabilita- tion officer would interview each person about to be discharged an d complete his rehabilitation form . The person and the form would then pass on to an employment section of the Manpower Directorate established at each General Details Depot which would be responsible for placing th e person in employment, for civil registration and for the issue of identity cards and issue of civilian ration entitlements . At the beginning of August some 20,100 Australian servicemen wer e serving outside the South-West Pacific, three-quarters being members of the air force, and 224,000 were serving outside Australia in the S .W.P.A. There were 310,600 in Australia. In the three services were 43,60 0 women, all but some 1,800 within Australia . Thus the total number who had to be reabsorbed was 598,300 . Under the points system by which discharges were now governed, tw o points were awarded for each completed year of age at enlistment, tw o points were added for each month of service, and men with dependant s received an additional point for each month of service . In accordance with the War Cabinet's decision members whose early return to civilian lif e was considered essential and members whose discharge on compassionat e grounds had been approved were to be given a special priority, bu t

1 War Cabinet Minute 3607, 12 Jun 1944. 'War Cabinet Minute 4077, 6 Mar 1945, on Agendum 77/1945 . 'Report tabled by Minister for Defence (Mr Dedman) on 25 Mar 1947, "Demobilisation of the Australian Defence Forces, 194547" (not printed) . +War Cabinet Minute 4346, 24 Jul 1945 ; Agendum 318/1945 .

614 THE LAST PHASE IN THE PACIFI C members whose continued services were essential could be retained regard - less of priority. In the army, for example, on 1st June 1945 the length of service o f members was : Over five years 25,45 5 Four to five . 68,90 3 Three to four 193,129 Two to three . 51,243 One to two 10,91 0 Less than one . 9,87 5

Total . 359,515 Of these 214,886 had served abroad . Although long-service men, former prisoners and others continued to be discharged in August and September-26,167 men and women wer e released between 15th August and 30th September—general demobilisatio n in accordance with a comprehensive plan presented to Parliament on 29t h August did not begin until 1st October. Dispersal centres shared by th e three services had been established by then in each capital city and staffe d both by service people and people from civil departments concerned wit h the re-establishment of service personnel . At each centre the person bein g discharged was given information about employment, land settlement, housing, reconstruction training, re-establishment loans, tools of trad e and other available benefits . The plan provided that while service arrangements for discharge were being completed members might be allowed to live at home on leav e until recalled for final discharge . During this leave they might take a job. When finally discharged, members would be given a minimum period o f leave with pay of 30 days for those with more than six months' servic e and 15 days for those with less . The general demobilisation was carried out in four stages, the las t ending on 15th February 1947, when the services had been reduced to a n "interim" strength of 60,133 . The number to be discharged in each stage was decided by the Cabinet. The responsibility for carrying out the decisions rested on the Demobilisa- tion Committee . Thus on 19th September the War Cabinet decided tha t in the first stage, to begin not later than 1st October and to be complete d during January, 10,000 were to be discharged by the Navy, 135,000 b y the Army, and 55,000 by the Air Force . In fact a total of 249,159 were discharged by 31st January. By the end of December 76,000 service men and women had been brought back from the islands, largely by aircraft, by British aircraft carrier s and landing ships, and the converted liners Manoora, Kanimbla and Westralia. It was expected that all troops overseas who were not neede d for garrison duties would have reached the mainland by the end of March . Already in November the Cabinet considered that the problem it faced

5 Central Army Records Office : Compendium of Information .

DEMOBILISATION 615 concerning the men still serving in the islands was not that of transporting them home but providing men to relieve them, and on 21st November th e Full Cabinet decided that 10,000 men in training camps in Australi a should be sent to the islands to relieve a similar number of long-service men. At the same meeting the Minister was authorised to call for volunteer s for garrison work in the islands from men then serving and from civilians . The three services had still many tasks in addition to that of moving men to dispersal centres and arranging their discharge . As mentioned, naval and air force units were busy transporting men home . There were mines to be swept, stores to be assembled and moved, Japanese, who greatl y outnumbered the Australian troops in their areas, to be disarmed and super- vised, and normal day-by-day duties to be done . By the end of the year the Navy, for example, was 35,000 strong , including 1,700 in discharge depots ; 4,600 had been discharged . The Australian Squadron (one cruiser and a destroyer) was in Japanes e waters. As mentioned, three converted liners were engaged carrying troops back to the mainland . A minesweeping flotilla was sweeping off the eas t coast. Another such flotilla had completed its task at Hong Kong . Four destroyers and a number of frigates and corvettes were engaged on sur- veillance in waters north of Australia . Since 1st July a cruiser, a destroyer , 6 corvettes and 180 smaller vessels had been paid off; but in December three new frigates were commissioned . The defensively-armed merchant ships had been disarmed . The Army by the end of the year had closed th e headquarters of the I and II Corps and of two divisions, but had forme d a new 34th Brigade Group in Japan. In November it had reported that 255,958 Japanese troops and 67,323 civilians, Formosans and Korean s had surrendered in the areas it controlled, and that 244,546 of th e combatants had been disarmed. Some Japanese were allowed to retain a few weapons for self-protection in areas of the Indies where they wer e only indirectly controlled by the Australian Army . The Army still con- tained 255,200 men and 17,500 women . It had discharged 93,600 me n on points, 9,800 former prisoners, and 76,400 who had been release d to industry. The Air Force had disbanded 73 units between 19th October and 31s t December, including seven squadrons . In December 20 units including 10 squadrons had been moved from Morotai, Labuan or Tarakan to Aus- tralian bases . The force contained 105,500 men and 11,300 women , including 35,600 awaiting finalisation of discharge . Aircraft were still being delivered to meet outstanding orders : 8 Mustangs, 3 Beaufighters, 6 Mosquitos and 4 Wirraways in December . The existing strength was some 4,800 aircraft of all types, including trainers . There were 24 7 Liberators, 107 Dakotas, 108 Catalinas, 376 Beauforts, 313 Beaufighters, 320 Mustangs, 173 Mosquitos, 364 Spitfires . In the second stage of demobilisation the Government ordered that another 200,000 should be discharged by 30th June . Only 193,461 were discharged by that date, but the deficiency was made up in the next week .

616 THE LAST PHASE IN THE PACIFI C Thus in 10 months and a half after the cease-fire 468,700, or 80 pe r cent of the total, were dispersed . The Government decided that the third stage would extend to 31st December, when the three services were to have been reduced to th e strengths considered necessary to carry out their remaining tasks . These were: Navy, 13,500; Army, 50,000; Air Force, 15,000 ; total, 78,500. In the event, the Air Force made the required reductions by August, th e Navy by November and the Army in the first week of December . At this stage the "interim" forces (to be replaced eventually by post-war force s when post-war defence measures had been decided) still contained many who had not volunteered to soldier on . The Minister for the Arm y directed that all who had not volunteered were to be discharged b y 1st February 1946, except for essential medical and dental staffs . The Navy and Air Force were not given similar directions but their policy was to release all who wished to go as soon as possible . In this fourth stage 16,705 were discharged and the strength of the three services fell to some 60,000, all volunteers except for a few key personnel in the Navy and Air Force and a small number of medical and dental people needed by the Army until the Repatriation Commissio n took over responsibility for providing medical attention for repatriatio n patients. The services thus fell short of the final strength thought necessar y in the first half of 1946, but their tasks also had been much reduced . By June 1946 all but a few Japanese prisoners had embarked for home , Australian military responsibilities in the Indies had ended, and militar y government in every part of New Guinea had ceased . The manner in which the Army dwindled in 1945 and 1946 is show n in the accompanying table. Strength of the Army 1945 Men Women End of September 355,409 22,189 October 332,739 21,079 November 288,663 18,966 December 237,246 16,970 1946 End of March 140,445 11,697 June . 89,666 7,994 September 61,903 4,669 December 43,905 3,046 At the end of September 1945 there had been 286,000 men in th e A.I.F., 69,044 in the militia and 365 in the V .D.C. on full-time duty . There were 2,517 in the A.A.N.S., 4,945 in the A .A.M.W.S. and 14,727 in the A.W.A.S. A final report on demobilisation made by the Department of Post-War Reconstruction proudly claimed that while, as is inevitable in a scheme of this magnitude, a few individuals considere d that their demobilisation had been unduly delayed, it was generally conceded by both the Opposition and the press that Australia's Defence Forces had bee n

DEMOBILISATION 617 demobilised quickly and efficiently, and it is now known that the rate of demobilisa - tion achieved in Australia compares more than favourably with that of any othe r of the Allied countries .

In July 1945 proposals for the recovery and reception of Australia n prisoners of war in South-East Asia had been submitted to War Cabinet , but an immediate decision was not taken . On 18th August, however, th e War Cabinet approved the recommendation of the Commander-in-Chie f for the immediate despatch of a Prisoner of War Reception Group the n being formed.° Detailed planning of the recovery of prisoners of war in the Far Eas t had begun in London in 1944. In Australia the formation of the 2n d Australian Prisoner of War Reception Group had been begun in Jul y (the first such group was in England, concerned with caring for forme r prisoners of the Germans) . This group established itself at Singapore, and the 3rd Prisoner of War Reception Group, formed in August, was based on Manila, where it became the principal receiving depot for all Commonwealth prisoners (except Canadians) recovered from Formosa , Japan and Korea. By the end of September most of the prisoners recovere d in Singapore, Java and Sumatra had been taken to Australia and hal f the prisoners from the Bangkok area had been evacuated or were stagin g through Singapore. Lack of transport caused delay to the repatriation of prisoners from Manila, and by the end of September fewer than 400 Australians had embarked from that port. On the 4th, however, 1,50 0 were taken aboard the British aircraft carriers Formidable and Speaker, and in the next 12 days practically all the Australians were on their wa y home. Of the Australian soldiers, sailors and airmen take by the Japanes e 14,345 were recovered or escaped and 8,031 died in captivity ?

While the troops were returning to Australia, many of those from Englan d bringing recently acquired wives with them, Australian wives of American servicemen were preparing to go to the United States. Replying to a question in Parliament in August 1945 Chifley said that about 2,00 0 Australian wives of American servicemen had obtained visas and wer e awaiting transport to America, between 1,500 and 2,000 had completed visa arrangements or were expected to do so in the next few months, an d the American Consulate-General at Sydney considered that there remained in Australia from 8,000 to 8,500 wives and fianc@es who would ultimately want to go to the United States . 8

MacArthur announced on 28th August that from 2nd September th e South-West Pacific Command would cease to exist . Thereupon the War Cabinet, advised by the Advisory War Council, approved that fro m

°War Cabinet Minutes 4295 of 11 Jul and 4386 of 18 Aug 1945 ; Agendum 304/1945 an d Supplement No. 1 . I A more detailed account of the recovery of the prisoners of the Japanese, and of their experience s in captivity, is given in Volume IV of the Army series of this history, and in Volume III of th e Medical series . @ Commonwealth Debates, Vol 184, pp . 5000-1 .

618 THE LAST PHASE IN THE PACIFI C midday on 2nd September the Australian naval forces assigned to the S.W.P.A. would revert to the Naval Board, the military forces to th e Commander-in-Chief, Blamey, and the air forces to the Air Board .9 On 15th September Blamey, after reporting to Forde that he had bee n present at the surrender in Tokyo Bay a week before, advised that ther e was no longer any need for the exercise of his powers as Commander-in - Chief. The remaining tasks could be carried out under government super- vision "by the machinery of corporate control" . He wished to lay down his office as soon as possible to facilitate this transition and would appreciat e an indication as to when this would be acceptable . It was not until 15th November that Forde informed Blamey that th e Government had decided soon to re-introduce control of the Army b y the Military Board, and that General Sturdee would act as Commander- in-Chief from 1st December until the Military Board was formed (o n 1st March as it turned out) . Thus at a fortnight's notice the service of the man who during six years had commanded first the A .I.F. in the Middle East and then the whole army in the South-West Pacific wa s terminated. After further discussion it was agreed that Blamey should complete his dispatches in a period to be added to his accumulated leav e and that this task would be finished by 31st January .' On 18th December the War Cabinet met and decided that its nex t meeting would be its last . It had before it at the meeting on the 18th a memorandum by Shedden on "Cooperation in Empire Defence" . This described the development of doctrines of Empire defence at the Imperia l Conferences of 1923, 1926 and 1937 ; Australian pre-war defence policy ; some wartime defence developments in Australia, particularly in relatio n to supply; the Australian proposals of 1944 for improved machiner y for Empire cooperation . Finally it mentioned changes in the Australian higher defence organisa- tion "to ensure its adequacy to deal with the problems associated with the development of an effective Post-War Defence Policy and the stud y and development of its relation to cooperation within the British Common - wealth and World Security Organisation" . Shedden recalled the Prime Minister's statement in March 1945 that the security of Australia o r any other part of the British Commonwealth would rest on three safe - guards "each wider in its scope than the other" : the system of collective security, Empire cooperation, and national defence . Shedden continued that direct communication had been authorise d between the Secretary of the Department of Defence and the senior servic e member of the Accredited Government Representative and also with th e Secretariat of the United Kingdom War Cabinet. This enabled informatio n to be exchanged but without committing the governments concerned . The Australian-New Zealand Agreement provided for cooperation between thos e dominions in defence matters of mutual interest . The memorandum then

° War Cabinet Minute 4399, 30 Aug 1945 . ° For further details of Blamey's treatment by the Chifley Government see Vol VII in the Arm y series, and J . Hetherington, Blarney (1954) .

DEMOBILISATION 619 listed the departments concerned in the various principles laid dow n in the papers . The War Cabinet decided that the memorandum should be circulated to the departments concerned, that all specific proposals relating to Empir e cooperation in post-war defence policy should be subject to approval by the Government, and, before being considered by the Government, all such proposals should be reviewed by "the appropriate Higher Defence Machinery, from the Defence aspect", and that where consultation wit h the United Kingdom Government was necessary proposals involving defenc e cooperation should be referred to the Resident Minister in London fo r action.2 At the same meeting the War Cabinet decided to re-establish th e Council of Defence to advise on defence policy or organisation . The Council, which consisted of a selected group of Ministers, the Chiefs o f Staff and the Secretary of the Defence Department, had, in accordance with pre-war plans, been replaced at the outbreak of war by the Wa r Cabinet. The War Cabinet then endorsed views on departmental organisatio n expressed by the Minister for Defence after consultation with the Prim e Minister. 3 The Minister said that it was desirable, from a short-term aspect , to maintain the present set-up of a Defence Department responsible fo r defence policy and the joint-service machinery, and also service and supply departments responsible in their separate spheres of administration withi n the defined defence policy . The Defence Department was faced with considerable problems of post-war policy and joint-service organisatio n in addition to policy matters relating to the occupation force in Japan ; the service departments were confronted with demobilisation and th e organisation of post-war forces, and the group of supply department s each had parallel problems of contraction, disposal and post-war organisa- tion. The Prime Minister, he added, considered that when the department s had reached their ultimate post-war footing the matter might have to b e reviewed. The Defence Department's view, shared by the highest servic e opinion, was that war-time experience had indicated a definite trend towards the closer relation of the services through joint-service depart- mental machinery which had its counterpart in the operational sphere i n the appointment of Commanders-in-Chief commanding naval, land and air forces, and functioning with joint-staffs of the three services . The closer integration of the three services and their unified command and employment had involved a new conception of cooperation and strategica l employment. Another important feature had been the development o f machinery to provide a link between the commander of unified force s and the Government .

*War Cabinet Minute 4591, 18 Dec 1945 . *War Cabinet Minute 4594, 18 Dec 1945 .

620 THE LAST PHASE IN THE PACIFI C On 8th September Attlee informed Chifley that Britain was anxious to economise in shipping and reduce the length of time taken to send supplie s to the British Pacific Fleet, and proposed to move its base and suppl y organisations from Australia to Singapore and Hong Kong as soon as possible. A complete revision of the naval works programme in Australi a was called for. He expressed gratitude for all that Australia had done . "We have always been mindful of your contribution to the common effor t and the resulting pressure on your own resources . If you may sometimes have thought that this was not so, the root cause must, I think, lie in th e necessity which we have felt of stating our needs in full so as to discove r how much you could undertake in order that we might plan our man - power accordingly . If, in this way, we have unwittingly given cause for misunderstanding, we are the first to regret it and I trust that this telegra m will remove it ."4 It remained to reach a settlement with the British Government for works carried out in Australia for the Admiralty . The total estimated cost of work on fleet bases in Australia for the Royal Navy was £5,642,000 . These works embraced works at Cockburn Sound and Fremantle, Western Australia, and Sydney ; storage accommodation at 15 places ; repair bas e facilities ; and oil storage facilities at 14 places . An agreement approve d by the Treasurer and reported to the War Cabinet on 18th December provided that the British Government would pay the full cost of the "separate R .N. projects" at Cockburn Sound, Fremantle and Sydney and of repair base facilities, 50 per cent of the cost of oil storage works an d 60 per cent of the cost of the other storage accommodation . The net payment by the British Government was to be £3,000,000, the title i n fixed capital assets remaining with the Commonwealth . 5 In addition to these works on fleet bases, aerodromes, camps, stores, berthing and repair facilities and offices had been constructed far and wid e for the British Pacific Fleet by the Allied Works Council . The estimated total cost of these was £5,400,000. Agreement was reached that the British Government would pay £4,250,000 "leaving £1,150,000 as th e residual value of the assets which will become the property of the Com- monwealth" . This was made subject to the provision that should an y major variation be revealed when the final estimates had been prepare d the United Kingdom contribution should be varied proportionately . The War Cabinet was informed that

the property in some of the assets is substantial both for their intrinsic value i n cases such as office and storage accommodation, and their worth in cases such a s aerodromes, hangars, buildings and runways as an insurance by reason of thei r capacity for use and extension in the event of a future war . Many of them, however , would have little or no remaining value and indeed would be the subject of a set-off for the expense incurred on behalf of the United Kingdom in restoring the site s on which the works had been erected .°

• Dominions Office cables 364 and 365 of 8 Sep 1945 . 6 War Cabinet Minute 4575, 18 Dec 1945 . 9 War Cabinet Minute 4576, 18 Dec 1945 .

DEMOBILISATION 621 The Disposals Commission continued to operate until 31st July 1949 when its remaining tasks were taken over by the Department of Suppl y and Development. In five years the commission realised £135,189,000 . Its sales included 124,000 motor vehicles, thousands of army tractors, whol e camps that were used to ease the shortage of houses, large quantities of textiles and clothing, factories, machine tools (to the value of £9,217,000) , aircraft, ships and small craft . Some 670,000 garments and blankets were given to charitable institutions. The goods to be disposed of were as far afield as Borneo and Morotai, where sales totalled £6,735,000 .

An agreement with the United States on the settlement of Lend-Lease , reciprocal aid and surplus war property and claims was signed on 7t h June 1946. This provided that neither government would pay for Lend- Lease and reciprocal aid goods and services supplied up to 2nd Septembe r 1945; that the United States would complete the transfer to Australia of goods selected by Australia from those in course of being procured o n VI-day, and Australia agreed to make no charge for goods transferred t o the American forces between 2nd September and 31st December 1945 ; Australia agreed to pay 27,000,000 dollars (American) in consideration of the post-war value of Lend-Lease machine tools, the post-war value of other Lend-Lease capital equipment, and the transfer of America n surplus property valued at 6,500,000 dollars . Already 20,000,000 dollars had been paid by Australia . The remaining 7,000,000 dollars was to be paid by the delivery to the United States Government of real propert y and improvement of real property to a value not exceeding 2,000,000 dollar s and by the establishment of a fund in Australian pounds to be spent by the United States on educational and cultural programmes of mutua l benefit. In Parliament on 12th July 1946 the Treasurer said that the tota l value of Lend-Lease received by Australia was about 1,500,000,000 dollar s (about £A466,000,000) while reciprocal Lend-Lease from Australia t o the United States totalled about £A285,000,000.

Under the Commonwealth Reconstruction Training Scheme ex-servic e men and women were accepted for university, technical and rural training until 30th June 1950 . Full-time trainees were given allowances, ranging from £4.10.0 a week for a single man to £6 .10.0 a week for a married man with dependants, tuition fees were paid and there were allowance s for books, instruments, fares and, perhaps, for living away from home .7 (The average basic wage for six capital cities in May 1946 was £4 .17.0; by November 1951 it was £10 .) Fees and expenses up to a limit of £60 were paid to members accepted for part-time training . By 1951, 334,269 people had been accepted for training, 94,448 had completed training and 39,762 were still in training . Those who had

', The payment of the living allowance was limited to three years . People attempting a degree requiring more than three years to complete were lent the living allowance for the additional years and had to repay it.

622 THE LAST PHASE IN THE PACIFI C completed courses included 12,177 full-time and 4,983 part-time university men and women. Some 64,000 withdrew before beginning their courses , evidently having found congenial jobs . About 135,000 withdrew after begin- ning training, the great majority being part-time technical trainees many of whom had overstated their need for training in the first place . The War Service Homes legislation provided that a loan or advanc e might be made to ex-servicemen or their female dependants for th e purpose of acquiring a home . The maximum loan that might be granted for building a house was £2,750 and periods of repayment up to 45 years might be approved. War gratuity was paid to members of the forces at the rate, mentioned earlier, of £3.15.0 a month of overseas service and of certain subsequent periods in Australia and at the rate of 15s . a month of service in Australi a after 6th December 1941 . New Guinea, Papua and Norfolk Island were regarded as being "overseas" after 6th December 1941 . Payment of the overseas rate was subject to the member's having served continuously overseas for at least 90 days or an aggregate of 180 days in twelve months, and for 90 days after the return of a member to Australia . If a member was invalided home to Australia the time spent in hospita l and convalescence was included with the period of overseas service . All who had served the qualifying period were paid a minimum of 12 months' gratuity at the overseas rate. Payment for service in Australia was subjec t to a qualifying period of six months' service . If a member had died o n service at home or abroad and his family was totally dependent on hi m the minimum payment was equivalent to that for three years' oversea s service . In other cases of death on service gratuity at the rate accruing at the time death was notified was continued for a further seven months , and thus the minimum payment when a member died overseas was fo r a year and seven months. Qualifying service was considered to have ceased on discharge or o n 30th June 1947 if the member was still serving . Most of the payment s were made on 3rd March 1951, but in some circumstances were mad e earlier. Compound interest at the rate of 31 per cent on the yearly credit balance was added . In the year 1950-51 £61,447,000 was paid out.

Thus wartime experience recedes in a multitude of post-war tasks . It was not all a matter of tidying up a mess . Some of it was the beginnin g of living in peacetime. This brief recital of seemingly disconnected event s in demobilisation has been written so as to cease indeterminately and thus to emphasise once again the continuity of Australian history. The surrender did not rule a line across the book but only started a new page .