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Sudáfrica, Los Resultados Electorales Y La Composición Del Nuevo Gobierno

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Sudáfrica, Los Resultados Electorales Y La Composición Del Nuevo Gobierno Sudáfrica, los resultados electorales y la composición del nuevo Gobierno CABO NORTE PWV - PRnORIA, WI~WATtRSRAN[) VER~rl\¡ G NG MAPA DE LAS PROVINCIAS DE SUDÁFRICA 445 C OYUNTURA I NTERNACIONAL P OLlTICA I NTERNACIONAL. DE S EGURIDAD Y M EDIO A MBIENTE 1. Estimaciones oficiales de población Noroes te (Excluyendo Transkci, Bophuthatswana, Negros 88,0% Venda y Ciskei) Blancos 10,5% In dios 0,3% Mestizos 1,2% Sudá frica Población 3,3 millones Negros 75,6% Blancos 13,0% KwaZ ulu/N atal Indios 2.7% Negros 78,0% Mestizos 8.7% Blancos 9.7% Población 37,6 millones IndiOS 10,9% Mestizos 1.4% Transvaa l Oriental PoblaCión 8 millones Negros 86.7% Blancos 12,2% Estado Libre de Orange Indios 0,5% Negros 81,4% Mestizos 0,6% Blancos 15,9% Población 2,6 millones Indios 0,1% Mestizos 2,6% Transvaal N o rte Población 2,5 millones Negros 95,5% Blancos 4,2% Indios 0,1% Mestizos 0,2% 1I. Resu I tados c1cct()ralc~ Población 4.7 millones De una población de 37,6 millones, son 22.7 millones los Cabo O cc idental ciudadanos con derecho a voto. Cada elector tiene dos Negros 18,4% votos, uno para las listas nacionales y otro para las listas Blancos 27,6% provinciales. La Asamblea NaCional está formada por 400 Indios 0,9% diputados, 200 elegidos por sistema proporcional en las listas Mestizos 53,0% nacionales y 200 en las listas provinciales. Las listas Población 3,4 millones provinciales también eligen los 425 miembros de las nueve asambleas provinciales. El Senado, formado por 90 miembros, Ca bo Oriental se elige Indirectamente por las nueve cámaras provinCiales, Negros 83,2% representadas cada una por 10 miembros. El presidente es Blancos 8,6% elegido en una sesión conjunta de ambas cámaras. Todos los IndiOS 0,3% partidos que obtengan más de un 5% de los votos o 20 Mestizos 7,8% escaños, a nivel nacional, estarán proporcIOnalmente Población 5,9 millones representados en el Gobierno sudafncano. Cabo Norte Negros 30,6% Res u ltados globales Blancos 19, 1% Indios 0,2% Votantes: 22.72 millones Mestizos 50,0% Población 0.7 millones Partido Votos % Escaños PWV ANC 12.237.655 62,6 252 (P retor i a/W i t wa te rs r a n d/V e ree n igi ng) NP 3.983.690 20.4 82 Negros 62,3% IFP 2.058.294 10,5 43 Blancos 32,1% FF 424.555 2,2 9 Indios 2,1% DP 338.426 1,7 7 Mestizos 3,4% PAC 243.478 1,2 5 Población 6,5 millones ACDP 88.104 0.5 2 Otros 159.066 0,8 446 S )·ÁFRICA. LOS R ESULTADOS E LECTORALES y LA C OMPOSICiÓN DEL N UEVO G OBIERNO Siglas: ANC (Congreso Nacional Africano). NP (Partido Cabo Oriental Nacional). IFP (Partido de la Libertad Inkatha). FF (Frente Libertad). DP (Partido Democrático). PAC (Congreso Partido Votos Escaños Panafrlcanlsta). ACDP (Partido Demócrata Cristiano Africano). ANC 2.453.790 48 Otros partidos: AMP (Partido Musulmán Africano). AMCP NP 286.029 6 (Partido del Congreso de Moderados Africanos). UPF DP 59.644 (Frente Popular Unido). DPSA (Partido Dikwankwetla de PAC 59.475 Sudáfrlca). FP (Partido Federal). MF (Frente Minoría). Socc FF 23.167 (Partido Soccer). ADM (Movimiento Democrático ACDP 14.908 Africano). WRPP (Partido de la Paz y los Derechos de las IFP 5.050 MUJeres). XPP (Partido Progresista Ximoko). KISS (Keep 11 Seralghe and Simple) . WLP (Partido de la lista de los Votantes: 3. 18 millones (14.0% del total) Trabajadores). LUSAP (Partido Sudafricano Luso). Asamblea: 56 escaños Primer ministro: Ray Mhlaba (ANC) Asambleas provinciales Cabo Norte Transvaal Oriental Partido Votos Escaños Partido Votos Escaños ANC 200.839 15 ANC 1.070.052 25 NP 163.452 12 NP 119.311 3 FF 24.1 17 2 FF 75.120 2 DP 7.567 PAC 21.679 PAC 3.765 IFP 20.147 IFP 1.688 DP 7.437 Votantes: 0,44 millones ( 1.9% del total) Votantes: 1,59 mil lones (7,0% del total) Asamblea: 30 escaños Asamblea: 30 escaños Primer ministro: Manne Dlpico (ANC) Primer ministro: Matthew Phosa (ANC) (PWV) Pretori afW itwatersrandlVeree ni gin g Transvaal a rre Partido Votos Escaños Partido Votos Escaños ANC 2.4 18.257 50 ANC 1.759.597 38 NP 1.002.540 2 1 NP 62.745 FF 258.935 5 FF 41.193 DP 221548 5 PAC 24 .360 IFP 153.567 3 UPF 10.123 PAC 61.5 12 ACDP 7.363 ACDP 25.542 Votantes: 2.29 millones (10.1 % del total) Votantes: 4,86 millones (21,4% del total) Asamblea: 40 escaños Asamblea: 86 escaños Primer ministro: Ngoake Ramatlhodl (ANC) Primer ministro: TokiO Sexwale (ANC) Cabo Occidental Noroeste Partido Votos Escaños Partido Votos Escaños NP 1.138.242 23 ANC 1.310.080 26 ANC 705.576 14 NP 138.986 3 DP 141 .970 3 FF 72.821 FF 44.003 PAC 27.274 ACDP 25.731 DP 7.894 PAC 22.676 IFP 5.948 AMP 20.954 ACDP 5.570 Votantes: 2,40 millones (10,6% del total) Votantes: 1.73 millones (7,6% del total) Asamblea: 42 escaños Asamblea: 30 escaños Primer ministro: Hernus Krlel (NP) Primer min istro: Popo Molefe (ANC) 447 C OYUNTURA INTERNACIONAL. P OLlTICA INTERNACIONAL, DE S EGURIDAD y M EDIO A MBIENTE Kw aZulu/Natal 111. El nuevo Gobierno Partido Votos Escaños Presidente: Nelson Mandela (ANC) IFP 1.844.070 41 Primer vicepresidente ejecutivo: Thabo Mbeki (ANC) ANC 1.181.1 18 26 Segundo vicepresidente ejecutivo: Frederik De Klerk (NP) NP 410.710 9 Finanzas: Derek Keys (NP)* DP 78,910 2 Asuntos Exteriores: Alfred Nzo (ANC) MF 48.951 Defensa Joe Modise (ANC) PAC 26.601 Asuntos Internos: Mangosuthu Buthelezi (IFP) ACDP 24.690 Justicia: Dullah Omar (ANC) Seguridad y Protección: Sidney Mufamadi (ANC) Votantes: 4,59 millones (20,2% del total) Comercio, Industria y Turismo: T revor Manuel (ANC) Asamblea: 8 I escaños Trabajo: Tito Mbowenl (ANC) Primer ministro: Frank Mdlalose (IFP) Transportes: Satyandranath Moc Maharag (ANC) Asuntos Provinciales y Desarrollo Constitucional: Roelf Estado Libre de Orange Meyer (NP) Vivienda: Joe Slovo (ANC)** Partido Votos Escaños Correos, Telecomunicaciones y Radiodifusión: Palla Jordan ANC 1,037.998 24 (ANC) NP 170.452 4 Sanidad: Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma (ANC) FF 81.662 2 Educación: Sibusiso Bhengu (ANC) PAC 24.451 Agricultura: Kraai van Niekerk (NP) DPSA 17.024 Asuntos de la Tierra: Derek Hanekom (ANC) DP 7.664 Obras Públicas: Jeff Radebe (ANC) Empresas Públicas: Stella Sigcau (ANC) Votantes 1,64 millones (7,2% del total) Sel-vicios Públicos y Administración: Zola Skweyiya (ANC) Asamblea: 30 escaños Servicios Penitenciarios: Sipho Mizimela (IFP) Primer ministro: Patrick Terror Lekota (ANC) Deporte y Recreo: Steve T shwete (ANC) Asuntos del Agua y Bosques: Kader Asmal (ANC) Asuntos Ambientales: Dawie de Villiers (NP) Asuntos Mineros y Energía: Roelof Plk Botha (NP) Bienestar y Desarrollo Poblacional: Abe Williams (ANC) Artes, Ciencia, Cultura y Tecnología: Ben Ngubane (IFP) Sin cartera Jay Naidoo (ANC) *EI 6 de julio dimitió Derek Keys y le sustituyó en diciembre Chris Fismer, también del Partido Nacional. **Joe Slovo murió el 6 de enero de 1995. 448 .
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