FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT AND THE GERMAN ANTI-NAZI RESISTANCE n July 20,1944, a bomb exploded in Adolf among them the problem of the generally OHitler's Führerhauptquartier near Ras- non-productive relationship betwen members tenburg, East Prussia. Under the leadership of of the Resistance and representatives of the Count Claus Schenck von a con- Roosevelt Administration and the White spiracy to overthrow the Nazi government House itself. The major source for investigat- had come close to fruition. The conspirators ing this problem are the documents which are wanted to create a decent which collectively referred to as the "Breaker would fulfill its proper role among the nations Reports," which are deposited in the National of the world. Yet the plot failed. Many of the Archives in Washington D.C. This article is conspirators were tried and executed through largely based on those documents. the Nazi People's Court. The activities of the Contacts between members of the anti- anti-Nazi Resistance reach back to the early Hitler Resistance and members of the Roose- years of the Hitler regime. As early as the velt Administration existed from the early crisis of 1938, highly placed years of the Hitler regime until after the July members of the Army began to play a signifi- 20, 1944, assassination attempt on the dicta- cant role in the Resistance. Their goal of over- tor's life. During the late summer and early throwing the Nazi regime became increas- fall of 1937, Dr. Carl Gordeler, the former ingly urgent as they realized that Hitler Lord Mayor of Leipzig and the later "motor of spelled disaster for Germany. the Resistance," visited with the endorsement In the immediate post-World War II years of the Hitler government Canada and the little was publicized about the story of the . The official purpose of Gordel- German Resistance. The Cold War and the er's journey was to gather facts about these birth of the Federal Republic of Germany in countries and to report his findings to . 1949 witnessed a growing flow of publications In the States Gordeler met Secretary of State dealing with this topic. Today there is an Cordell Hull, Secretary of War Henry L. Stim- abundance of Resistance literature. Hans son, Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgen- Rothfels German Opposition to Hitler (1948) and thau, George Messersmith of the Department Gerhard Ritter's Carl Goerdeler and the German of State and former President Hoover. Goer- Resistance (1956) belong to the early major deler had two goals, he wanted to strengthen works. Today Peter Hoffman's The History of the "Peace Party" in Hitler's circle by emphas- the German Resistance (1969) and Der Widerstand izing the strength of the Western democra- gegen den National Sozialismus (1985), edited by cies. He also wanted to establish a personal Jürgen Schmäedecke and Peter Steinbach, relationship with influential personalities of must be considered the leading reference the Administration so that a basis of opera- works in the field. They include all aspects of tion and perhaps mutual trust could be Resistance history. Karl Dietrich Bracher's created for the establishment of good rela- essay "Zur Widerstands-Problematik in tions between a new German government 'Rechtsdiktaturen' die deutsche Erfahrung" and the American government should the in Deutschland zwischen Krieg und Frieden: Hitler government be replaced. Festschrift für Hans-Adolf Jacobsen (1991) is likely In October, 1939, a few weeks after Ger- the most recent contribution by the noted many's , Adam von Trott zu Bonn scholar to the field of Resistance Solz, Rhodes Scholar and employee of the history. It presents a concise summary of German Foreign Office, arrived in America to Bracher's comprehensive knowledge of the participate in a convention of the Institute of history and the problems of Resistance, which Pacific Relations. Trott travelled with the addresses many of the questions pertaining to approval of Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop. the story of the Resistance. Yet some issues In his request for approval of the journey he continue to demand the historian's attention, stated that through the convention he would

-59- obtain valuable insights into power-politics in and that it declare its war-aims openly. The the Pacific area as well as the political and war, von Trott insisted, should be ended economic involvement of Great Britain and quickly. An organization for European coop- the U.S.A. He emphasized how much Great eration should be created. In , von Britain relied on American support. Trott Trott maintained, there was an influential wrote that he would be able to use his many group which should not be trusted. This contacts, among them Secretary of War Henry group might be willing to conclude a peace L. Stimson, Colonel William Donovan and with Germany under non-acceptable terms.2 President Roosevelt's friend Harry Hopkins Trott's ideas expressed in the memorandum "in the service of Germany." State Secretary came to the attention of Secretary of State Weizsäcker supported Trott's request to keep Cordell Hull, Under-Secretary Sumner Welles, the United States from entering the war. Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau,Justice During his approximately three-month stay Frankfurter and President Roosevelt. Trott's in the States, met and immediate contact person in the Roosevelt interacted with private and public personali- Administration was Under-Secretary of State ties, among them Hamilton Fisk Strong, edi- George Messersmith. Trott sought in vain to tor of the journal Foreign Affairs, Robert Bald- confer with the President himself. win of the American Civil Liberties Union, Historian Margaret Boveri holds Felix , editor of , Frankfurter responsible for preventing Trott's and Supreme Court justice Felix Frankfurter, meeting the President, an allegation that a personal friend of President Roosevelt. Frankfurter denied.3 Moreover, Boveri asserts President Roosevelt and F.B.I. Chief Edgar that "Roosevelt's temporary attention changed Hoover must have considered von Trott an to mistrust and rejection. From this time on he important enough person to have him sha- was convinced that Germany must be pun- dowed by agents of the Bureau throughout ished and rendered innocuous."4 his stay in the United States. According to The State Department file on Trott's activi- F.B.I, reports, Trott was "soliciting the assist- ties carries the heading "Espionage Activi- ance of prominent individuals in the U.S.A. to ties."5 In a later memorandum to Alexander support a movement involving the overthrow 1 Kirk, U.S. Charge d'Affaires in Berlin, Mes- of the present regime in Germany." Hoover sersmith advised caution in future dealings also pointed out that von Trott believed that with Trott because of the latter's contacts with the socialist circles in Germany and the Soviet persons who were working for the Hitler Union would have to cooperate, that the government, although, so he says "this maybe future Germany would have to consist of a the price that Trott has to pay to enjoy his socialist life-style in a peaceful , and freedom of movement."6 that ultimately the world would be socialist. According to Hans Rothfels' pioneering German victory, Trott said, was not obvious. chapter on Friedensfühler (peace probings) with The allied powers would have to give a new the Allied powers, Trott's message was relayed Germany "a chance" if the resistance effort to F.D.R. directly through the former German were able to set aside Hitler, "but if these Chancellor Heinrich Burning, who supposedly powers deny us this chance (then) we will not visited the White House in December, 1939. continue to seek their aid but we must con- Initially, President Roosevelt seems to have sider them our enemies." In a memorandum been interested in supporting the German for the Department of State, Trott suggests Resistance, but "soon thereafter and because that the Allies afford the German anti-Hitler of the influence of persons in F.D.R.'s closer Resistance freedom of action and asks that environment, he declared further contacts to they not take advantage of the moment of be uncalled for."7 military weakness which would necessarily In March 1940, Under-Secretary Sumner follow from Hitler's overthrow. He further Welles visited Berlin on a peace mission. Dur- asks that the American government not sub- ing his stay he met and the scribe to the war-guilt thesis of

-60- former Reichminister Hjalmar Schacht. Sch- cions the American entrepreneur succeeded acht informed Sumner Welles that there were in meeting representatives of the anti-Hitler generals in Germany who were willing to group, including high-ranking military lead- overthrow the Hitler regime, if they received ers and Ulrich von Hassell. To them Stallforth Allied guarantees that Germany would obtain suggested the creation of a constitutional a fitting position among the nations of the monarchy and the overthrow of the Hitler- world and that it would not be treated as it had Göring regime. This would please the British been in 1918. Essentially Schacht made the and it would make peace with Great Britian same request in Berlin that Trott had made in possible.11 the States. In October, 1941, Stallforth had reported to German military victories did not deter Roosevelt about his contact with the Resist- representatives of the Resistance from ance and its plans. F.D.R. was elated over searching for opportunities to remain in con- these revelations.12 But a few weeks later Stal- tact with the Roosevelt Administration or at lforth was declared persona non grata at the least with U.S. citizens who, through their White House.13 Stallforth thought that F.D.R. position, would possibly have access to the had changed his mind about dealing with the White House. One such opportunity seemed German anti-Hitler Resistance for political to offer itself through the American entre- reasons. In order to be re-elected, so Roose- preneur Federico Stallforth. Stallforth had velt thought, he needed to enter the war on been involved in business deals between the the side of Great Britain. An incident which U.S. and the Weimar Republic. He had per- sheds light on President Roosevelt's reaction sonal contacts with political leaders such as to the Resistance and its attempts to obtain Adolf Hitler, , Pope Pius XII, American support is his refusal to receive the Kennedys and Dwight D. Eisenhower. Louis P. Lochner of the Berlin Office of the During late June and early July, 1940, Stall- Associated Press. Lochner had met represen- forth had seen Hermann Goring, who tatives of the anti-Hitler group on several supposedly submitted a peace plan to him for occasions, especially in November, 1941, in the settlement of European issues, which was the home of Dr. Joseph Winner, former then turned down by Churchill and President Reichstag representative for the Catholic Roosevelt. Stallforth travelled at this time with Center Party. Lochner was asked to inform 8 the official approval of the Nazi-Government . the American President of the existence and For some time in 1941, Stallforth enjoyed the the activities of the Resistance. The President support of S.S. Obergruppenführer Heydrich, was to let them know his preference for a who was reacting positively to the American future German government. A secret code entrepreneur's plan to influence American was to facilitate direct radio contact between public opinion in favor of Germany and the Resistance and the White House.14 against Great Britain. Stallforth suggested that The entry of the United States into World he might be able to delay or perhaps even War II with the Japanese attack on Pearl Har- prevent America's anticipated entry into bor and Hitler's subsequent declaration of World War II. The Auswärtige Amt discovered war against the United States increased Amer- early in April, 1941, that Stallforth was not to ica's interest in the internal affairs of Nazi- be trusted, that he served his own personal Germany and the German Resistance. To and financial interests only. Hjalmar Schacht have a regular channel to the highest level of had called Stallforth "a dubious person who the German government providing useful 9 was not always reliable." Ilse von Hassell, information offered an opportunity not to be wife of the former German ambassador in missed. Thus, in November, 1942, Colonel and prominent member of the Resist- William J. Donovan, head of the Office of ance, wrote that her husband "never totally Strategic Services, appointed Alan Welsh lost his reservations in regard to the legiti- Dulles Legal Assistant to the American minis- 10 macy of Stallforth." In spite of these suspi- ter in Bern, . Through Dulles and

-61- Donovan, the German Resistance had a line what offers, if any, we could give to any resist- of communication to the White House. The ance movement."16 A detailed message which German Resistance's messenger was Hans Dulles forwarded to Washington notes that Bernd Gisevius, officially German Vice Con- labor leaders of the Resistance urge F.D.R. sul in Switzerland. Gisevius enjoyed the pro- and Churchill to reveal practical goals for the tection of the Abwehr, the German equivalent future of Central Europe. Military victory will of the Office of Strategic Services. Another mean little, the note insisted, if the uncer- go-between for Dulles and Gisevius was Mary tainty of the situation were not clarified in the Bancroft, who had become a friend of both. near future; "peace will be quickly lost and Messages about the anti-Hitler group were new dictatorships may take the place of the sent with increasing frequency, especially as one in Central Europe." The labor leaders of the summer of 1944 approached and plans to the German Opposition also raised the spec- assassinate Adolf Hitler and topple the Nazi- ter of a Central Europe in despair which regime were maturing. Especially important would be a fertile field for the growth of messages from Dulles/Donovan were accom- communism. Bombs and air leaflets should panied by a brief cover-note from William, not be dropped at the same time.17 "Wild Bill" Donovan to Roosevelt's personal Five days before the assassination attempt secretary Grace Tulley. These cover-notes on July 20, 1944, O.S.S. Bern suggested to read, "Dear Grace: Would you please make Washington that F.D.R. issue a declaration in sure that the President sees this." Miss Tulley which he should state that the Allies do not assured me in a personal interview that she intend the destruction of Germany. The dec- did make sure that F.D.R. saw those messages. laration should also encourage anti-Nazi for- Thus we know that President Roosevelt was ces.18 O.S.S. Chief Donovan did not react well informed about the German Resistance. favorably. He wired back to Bern that "your Eleanor Roosevelt wrote a brief letter to this jobs have all involved merely the passive author stating that her husband knew about acceptance of intelligence regarding the the Resistance, "but it was little."15 desire of the Breakers to find some way out. While the flow of information from Berlin You have done no bargaining of any kind."19 to Bern and from Bern to Washington, includ- One concern was the , which ing the White House, was steady, the response apparently had no knowledge of the O.S.S.'s in the opposite direction was thin. The Resist- dealings with the anti-Hitler Opposition. ance desired an endorsement and recogni- General Watts and Ambassador Winant in tion of their existence and support of their agreed to inform the Soviets,20 but proposed action to overthrow the Hitler Bern opposed the London position and at the regime. They desired an Allied declaration same time wired to London that the Breakers that they — the Allies —would recognize the were entirely on their own and had received new Germany and that they would favor a just neither encouragement nor political news.21 and fair peace. The unconditional surrender The decision to release or not release infor- formula of early 1943 was the opposite of what mation to Moscow was left with Washington. the anti-Nazi Resistance had asked for. A description of contacts between the Understandably, the opposition in Ger- Roosevelt Administration or self-appointed many was frustrated, but so was the O.S.S.'s representatives of the United States and spokesman in Bern, Alan Welsh Dulles. In a members of the anti-Hitler Opposition and message of January, 1944, Dulles wrote, "I an evaluation of the reception of these "con- would appreciate hearing of any indication tacts" leaves one major question unanswered: with which you would supply me regarding why did the Resistance receive neither sup- what you would be interested in achieving via port nor even encouragement from the F.D.R. the Breakers (code-name for the Resistance). Administration? The answer can only be spe- I do not understand what our policy is and culative. It was not President Roosevelt's prac-

-62- tice to make marginal comments on messages tional surrender appeared to create a that came to his desk. Nor are we privy to the more solid basis of bringing about deliberations in the White House Map Room, peace in Europe. Roosevelt was the pol- which was the place where important discus- itician who preferred to deal with pol- sions took place. No minutes were kept. No itical/military realities rather than with tapes were produced. Yet, some tentative indefinite and insecure potentialities. answers are possible: Often, when F.D.R. was asked what his (1) Roosevelt and his administration did ideas were for peace, he answered "let not entirely trust the representatives of us win the war first", and so it was with the Resistance. Their credentials led to Germany and its anti-Hitler Resistance. the fear of duplicity. Leaders of the In retrospect it is possible to appreciate the Resistance were often identical with the Roosevelt Administration's non-supportive conservative Prussian class. behavior. It makes the efforts of the Resist- (2) There was concern about the Soviet ance shine the brighter. They can claim that Union. One did not want to give Stalin their ultimate motivation to overthrow the more reason to suspect the loyalty and Nazi regime was ethical, that they acted in reliability of his partners in the West. spite of only slim chances of success. They The interests of the Western Allies acted because their conscience ordered them would not be served by another Soviet- to do so. German rapprochement. Allied-Soviet —Armin Mruck cooperation was considered essential Towson State University to achieve victory and had to be safeguarded. NOTES (3) There was no assurance that the 1Hoover to General Watson, Secretary to the President, Resistance would be successful in rid- White House,January 16, 1940). ding Germany of the Nazi regime. What 2Department of State, MS 862.20211. would be the consequence of a civil war 3Der Verrat im zwanzigsten Jahrhundert (Hamburg in Germany? Would such a conflict pos- 1956),72-73. 4Boveri, 72-73. sibly see the Western powers and the 5 Soviet Union on opposite sides? State Department #862.20211. 6Messersmith to Kirk, December 8, 1939, Memorandum (4) If the anti-Hitler Opposition were to for the File, Department of State, Assistant Secretary, succeed, how would one deal with the #862.20211. new government of the "other, the 7Rothfels, Die deutsche Opposition gegen Hitler, Fischer Bücherei 1958,145. decent Germany"? Again, there would 8 be at least the potential for a West-East Auswärtiges Amt, Inland II G, 517, 217293, 217290, 217292. split which may have been an intention 9Hjalmar Schacht to author, January 6,1958; February of the Resistance. 9, 1957. (5) President Roosevelt did not relish the 10Ilse von Hassell to author, June 11, 1957. 11 thought of a possible repetition of Whitney/Stallforth-Donovan Memorandum. 12Stallforth, in an interview with author. 1918/1919, when a new German 13 Stallforth, in an interview with author; cf. Georg government had to be dealt with. It was Schöllen, U. v. Hassell, 1881-1944 Ein Konservativer in der inside the Weimar Republic that the Opposition (1990), 25 ff.. "stab-in-the-back legend,"; which 14Rothfels, Verrat, 146. 15Mrs. Roosevelt to the author, personal letter. helped the Nazis come to power, had 16 grown. O.S.S., Official Dispatch from Bern, 27January, 1944. 17Dulles from Bern, 27 Jan. 1944. (6) By July, 1944, weeks after the successful 18O.S.S. Bern, 15 July 1944, Breakers, #4111-12. invasion, victory, so one thought, was 19O.S.S. director to Bern, 26 July, 1944. close at hand. A complete victory over 20Ustravic, London-Bern, Breakers #62869, 24 July, Germany, accompanied by an uncondi- 1944. 21O.S.S. Bern to London, July 26, 1944, #855-7.

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Immigrant children waiting for processing at Ellis Island. Courtesy National Park Service: Statue of Liberty National Monument.

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