Essays in the Public Philosophy
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
La Guerra Por La Mente Pública Moldeando La Mente Pública
La guerra por la mente pública Moldeando la mente pública NUÑO RODRÍGUEZ, POLITÓLOGO Y AnaLISTA l surgimiento de la sociedad de masas supuso un punto de giro en la narra- tiva de la historia. La necesidad de reconducir a la población por los nuevos parámetros fijados por las elites, supuso un punto de inflexión en la manera Ede gobernar. En el mundo moderno fue Napoleón el primero en usar abiertamente la propaganda para sus fines políticos, para ello creó la oficina de la opinión -pú blica. Napoleón veía la opinión pública como algo mecánico y manipulable a tra- vés de la psicología.1 De hecho, Napoleón pensaba que solo habían dos fuerzas en el mundo: la espada y el espíritu. Veía que a lo largo de la historia la espada siempre ha sido derrotada por el espíritu,2 y por ello pensaba que la fuerza de un estado residía en la opinión pública que la población tenía del propio estado. Na- poleón resumió su creencia en el poder de la opinión pública cuando dijo “tres periódicos hostiles son más temibles que mil bayonetas”.3 El beneplácito de la población era indispensable para la práctica de gobierno. Por este motivo el surgi- miento de las masas y su irrupción en los asuntos políticos es una de las razones 4 REVISTA FUERZA AÉREA-EUA TERCERA EDICIÓN La guerra por la mente pública principales por las que el estado moderno necesita de la propaganda.4 En la sociedad de masas la población conoce a sus líderes a través del sistema mediático y en el sistema mediático es más complejo ejercer una recia censura, como se podía ejercer en tiempos anteriores. -
Walter Lippmann and the Fallacy of Data Privacy Self-Management
Original Research Article Big Data & Society July–December 2015: 1–15 ! The Author(s) 2015 Big Data and The Phantom Public: Reprints and permissions: sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav Walter Lippmann and the fallacy DOI: 10.1177/2053951715608876 of data privacy self-management bds.sagepub.com Jonathan Obar Abstract In 1927, Walter Lippmann published The Phantom Public, denouncing what he refers to as the ‘mystical fallacy of dem ocracy.’ Decrying romantic democratic models that privilege self-governance, he writes: ‘‘I have not happened to meet anybody, from a President of the United States to a professor of political science, who came anywhere near to embody 2 ing the accepted ideal of the sovereign and omnicompetent citizen’’. Almost 90-years later, Lippmann’s pragmatism is as relevant as ever, and should be applied in new contexts where similar self-governance concerns persist. This paper does just that, repurposing Lippmann’s argument in the context of the ongoing debate over the role of the digital citizen in Big Data management. It is argued that recent proposals by the Federal Trade Commission, the White House and the US Congress, championing notice and choice privacy policy, perpetuate a self-governance fallacy comparable to Lippmann’s, referred to here as the fallacy of data privacy self-management. Even if the digital citizen had the faculties and the system for data privacy self-management, the digital citizen has little time for data governance. What we desire is the freedom to pursue the ends of digital production, without being inhibited by the means. The average digital citizen wants privacy, and safety, but cannot complete all that is required for its protection. -
A Celebration of the Contributions of Dr. Mortimer J. Adler
A Celebration of the Contributions of Dr. Mortimer J. Adler August 19-21,1994 Aspen, Colorado Contents (interactive) Mortimer J. Adler: Philosopher at Midday- Jeffrey D. Wallin...................51 MJA, POLITICS: Summary - John Van Doren............................................76 Mortimer Adler: The Political Writings - John Van Doren........................79 Remarks – Mortimer J. Adler.......................................................................93 From the Editor’s Desk - Sydney Hyman...................................................95 Mortimer Adler and The Aspen Institute - Sidney Hyman........................99 Authors........................................................................................................118 51 Mortimer J. Adler: Philosopher at Midday Jeffrey D. Wallin ortimer J. Adler has made an unusual number of difficult M ideas accessible to “everybody.” Perhaps that is why he has been so uncharitably dismissed as a “popular” philosopher by his critics, a good number of whom come from that narrow breed of specialists once dismissed by Nietzsche as equipped at best to study the lives of a single species of insect, say, the leech, or that being too broad, perhaps only the leech’s brain. Adler is not a spe- cialist. He speaks to broad issues, issues of importance to all of us as men and women. Even more surprising, he speaks without jar- gon, evasion or irony. Unlike the owl of Minerva, which is said to begin its flight at dusk, this is one philosopher who learns and teaches in direct sunlight. Among the most important topics Adler has shed light upon are liberal education, democracy and human nature. Adler favors all of them, by the way. And nothing could further distance him from the strongest trends in American education. * * * In early May 1994 The New York Times carried a story about a controversy raging in Lake County, Florida. -
Let Us Infotain You: Politics in the New Media Age
University of Pennsylvania ScholarlyCommons Departmental Papers (ASC) Annenberg School for Communication 1-1-2001 Let Us Infotain You: Politics in the New Media Age Michael X. Delli Carpini University of Pennsylvania, [email protected] Bruce A. Williams Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/asc_papers Part of the Social Influence and oliticalP Communication Commons Recommended Citation (OVERRIDE) Delli Carpini, M. X., & Williams, B. A. (2001). Let us infotain you: Politics in the new media age. In W. L. Bennett & R. M. Entman (Eds.), Mediated politics: Communication in the future of democracy (pp.160-181). Cambridge, UK ; New York : Cambridge University Press. Retrieved from http://repository.upenn.edu/asc_papers/14 NOTE: At the time of publication, the author Michael X. Delli Carpini was affiliated with Columbia University. Currently January 2008, he is a faculty member of the Annenberg School for Communication at the University of Pennsylvania. This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/asc_papers/14 For more information, please contact [email protected]. Let Us Infotain You: Politics in the New Media Age Abstract Political communications scholars, members of the press, and political elites have traditionally distinguished between entertainment and non-entertainment media. It is in public affairs media in general and news media in particular that politics is assumed to reside, and it is to this part of the media that the public is assumed to turn when engaging the political world. Politics, in this view, is a distinct and self- contained part of public life, and citizen is one role among many played by individuals. -
The Condition of Material Adequacy Classical Liberals
CONSTITUTIONAL CAPITALISM: Economic Freedom, Social Justice and the Myth of Modern Liberalism John Tomasi Working draft: please do not quote. Chapter 4: The Condition of Material Adequacy Classical liberals should accept social justice as concept. But what particular conception of social justice should classical liberals affirm? In this chapter, I gather materials to answer this question. With varying degrees of self-consciousness, most every major thinker in the classical liberal tradition affirms some version of what I call the condition of material adequacy. According to this condition, a liberals can advocate the classical liberal institutions of limited government and wide economic liberty only if, in light of a broad-gauged evaluation of the historical and economic realities of the society in question, they believe those institutions are likely to generate an adequate material and social outcome for all citizens. Towards what state of affairs must the provision of the material goods be adequate if, according to classical liberals, the condition 1 of material adequacy is to be satisfied? There are probably as many ways to answer that question as there are classical liberals. I shall suggest, though, that one way is morally most attractive when we consider that question at the level of regime-advocacy that I call political theory. It is this: classical liberal institutions can be advocated only if those institutions are deemed likely to generate social conditions within which citizens might develop the powers they have as free and equal citizens. That is, classical liberal institutions should be advocated only if they are deemed likely to help secure a thickly substantive conception of liberal social justice. -
Consequentialism
Consequentialism Consequentialism is the view that morality is all about producing the right kinds of overall consequences. Here the phrase “overall consequences” of an action means everything the action brings about, including the action itself. For example, if you think that the whole point of morality is (a) to spread happiness and relieve suffering, or (b) to create as much freedom as possible in the world, or (c) to promote the survival of our species, then you accept consequentialism. Although those three views disagree about which kinds of consequences matter, they agree that consequences are all that matters. So, they agree that consequentialism is true. The utilitarianism of John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham is a well known example of consequentialism. By contrast, the deontological theories of John Locke and Immanuel Kant are nonconsequentialist. Consequentialism is controversial. Various nonconsequentialist views are that morality is all about doing one’s duty, respecting rights, obeying nature, obeying God, obeying one’s own heart, actualizing one’s own potential, being reasonable, respecting all people, or not interfering with others—no matter the consequences. This article describes different versions of consequentialism. It also sketches several of the most popular reasons to believe consequentialism, along with objections to those reasons, and several of the most popular reasons to disbelieve it, along with objections to those reasons. Table of Contents 1. Basic Issues and Simple Versions a. Introduction to Plain Consequentialism b. What is a “Consequence”? c. Plain Scalar Consequentialism d. Expectable Consequentialism and Reasonable Consequentialism e. Dual Consequentialism f. Rule Consequentialism 2. Two Simple Arguments for Consequentialism a. -
Democracy Versus the Domination of Instrumental Rationality: Defending Dewey’S Argument for Democracy As an Ethical Way of Life
Humanities 2014, 3, 19–41; doi:10.3390/h3010019 OPEN ACCESS humanities ISSN 2076-0787 www.mdpi.com/journal/humanities Article Democracy versus the Domination of Instrumental Rationality: Defending Dewey’s Argument for Democracy as an Ethical Way of Life Justin Cruickshank POLSIS, School of Government and Society, University of Birmingham, Birmingham B15 2TT, UK; E-Mail: [email protected]; Tel.: +4-401-214-146-063 Received: 8 November 2013; in revised form: 11 December 2013 / Accepted: 13 December 2013 / Published: 2 January 2014 Abstract: For some, the problem with the domination of instrumental rationality is the tendency towards anomie. However, this fails to recognise the instrumental use of norms by elite groups to manipulate public opinion. Such manipulation can then allow elite groups to treat the citizenry as a means for the pursuit of their self-interest. Horkheimer was one of the first to recognise the problem in this form, but was unable to offer any solution because he conceptualised the citizenry as passive. By contrast, Dewey argued for an active citizenry to value participation in public life as good in, and of, itself. This is associated with his conception of democracy as an ethical way of life offering the possibility for the domination of instrumental rationality to be transcended. In this article Dewey’s resolution of the problem is addressed in the light of the weaknesses attributed here to Horkheimer and to later developments by Bellah, Bernstein, Gellner, Habermas and Honneth. Keywords: Bellah; Bernstein; Dewey; Gellner; Honneth; Horkheimer; instrumental rationality 1. Introduction Instrumental rationality is a mode of rationality that is exclusively concerned with the search for efficient means and which, consequently, is not concerned with assessing the goals—or ends— pursued. -
Religious Freedom and Public Argument: John Courtney Murray on “The American Proposition”
Religious Freedom and Public Argument: John Courtney Murray on “The American Proposition” Robin W. Lovin* In his classic essays in We Hold These Truths, John Courtney Murray developed an understanding of “the American proposition” that integrated a theological account of human good with the search for public consensus in a constitutional democracy. While this understanding of the relationship between religious freedom and political life was incorporated into Catholic social teaching at the Second Vatican Council, subsequent developments in both political theory and theology call Murray’s understanding of public discourse into question. This essay examines these challenges and argues that Murray’s reconciliation of moral truth and political choice is still an important resource for discussion of religious freedom and other moral issues in today’s polarized politics. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................... 25 I. MURRAY’S LEGACY .................................................................... 26 II. THE PUBLIC ARGUMENT ............................................................ 29 III. THE CASE FOR CONSENSUS ...................................................... 32 IV. IS IT GOOD? ............................................................................. 35 V. IS IT POLITICS? .......................................................................... 39 CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 43 INTRODUCTION From the late 1940s -
Object Theory in Consumer Research Detlev Zwick York University, [email protected]
University of Rhode Island DigitalCommons@URI College of Business Administration Faculty College of Business Administration Publications 2006 The piE stemic Consumption Object and Postsocial Consumption: Expanding Consumer‐Object Theory in Consumer Research Detlev Zwick York University, [email protected] Nikhilesh Dholakia University of Rhode Island, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.uri.edu/cba_facpubs Part of the Critical and Cultural Studies Commons, E-Commerce Commons, and the Marketing Commons Terms of Use All rights reserved under copyright. Citation/Publisher Attribution Zwick, Detlev, and Nikhilesh Dholakia. "The pE istemic Consumption Object and Postsocial Consumption: Expanding Consumer- Object Theory in Consumer Research." Consumption, Markets & Culture, Vol. 9, No. 1 (March 2006): 17-43. DOI: 10.1080/10253860500481452 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Business Administration at DigitalCommons@URI. It has been accepted for inclusion in College of Business Administration Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@URI. For more information, please contact [email protected]. 1 THE EPISTEMIC CONSUMPTION OBJECT AND POSTSOCIAL CONSUMPTION: EXPANDING CONSUMER-OBJECT THEORY IN CONSUMER RESEARCH Detlev Zwick, York University* Nikhilesh Dholakia, University of Rhode Island** *Detlev Zwick is Assistant Professor, Schulich School of Business, York University, Toronto, Ontario. Phone: (1)416-736-2100 ext. 77199, Email: [email protected]. ** Nikhilesh Dholakia is Professor of Marketing, University of Rhode Island, Rhode Island, United States. Phone: (1) 401-874-4172. Email: [email protected] The authors thank the Marketing Science Institute and the Research Institute for Telecommunication and Information Marketing (RITIM) at the University of Rhode Island for funding for this research. -
Evaluating Public Philosophy in Higher Education: Lessons Learned Baking Philosophical Bread
EVALUATING PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY IN HIGHER EDUCATION: LESSONS LEARNED BAKING PHILOSOPHICAL BREAD ANTHONY CASHIO (University of Virginia, Wise) & ERIC THOMAS WEBER (University of Kentucky) In the Last decade, there has been a resurgence of public phiLosophy. Many institutional structures and chalLenges impede or impose heavy costs on phiLosophers interested in public engagement. The American PhiLosophical Association has called for the development of tools for recognizing, evaLuating, supporting, and rewarding public phiLosophy. This essay offers a proposaL incLuding four concepts that couLd be usefuL for the fruitfuL evaLuation of pubLic phiLosophy in higher education: substance, accessibility, invitingness, and community-building. These concepts have arisen out of the authors’ experience with engaged public phiLosophy by means of the syndicated and award-winning PhiLosophy Bakes Bread radio show and podcast that Launched in January of 2017. The four concepts we propose for evaLuating public phiLosophy arise centraLLy in the work that we do and couLd offer a valuable starting point for the recognition and much needed support for public phiLosophical work in higher education. Volume 2 · Number 1 · Spring 2018 · Pages 72-94 Anthony Cashio & Eric Thomas Weber 73 n 2017, the American PhiLosophical Association released a statement drafted by its Committee on Public PhiLosophy calling I for members of the profession to encourage and reward quaLity work in public phiLosophy and to develop tools for evaLuating such work professionalLy.1 The need for evaLuating public phiLosophicaL work calls for systematic thinking about the vaLue of public phiLosophy and remains one of the movement’s challenges. While there are many nuanced forms of public phiLosophy and some usefuL considerations 1 APA Communications, “APA Statement on Valuing Public Philosophy,” The Blog of the APA, May 18, 2017, https://bLog.apaonLine.org/2017/05/18/apa-statement- on-vaLuing-pubLic-phiLosophy/. -
Liberalism, Republicanism and the Public Philosophy of American
Liberalism, Republicanism and the Public Philosophy of American Democracy I Introduction Political philosophers can be placed on a spectrum according to how they view the relationship between philosophy and social institutions. At one extreme, a naive a priorism considers social institutions only to the extent that they are necessary for the practical realization of, supposedly timeless, philosophical principles. At the other extreme, are certain Marxists and post-structuralists for whom philosophy is no more than an expression of specific social institutions: a particular discursive practice which occupies no privileged critical vantage- point in relation to other institutions. In this paper, I shall look at the relationship between philosophy and institutions in the context of a critical examination of the work of the contemporary Harvard political philosopher, Michael Sandel. Sandel made his name in the early nineteen-eighties with his first book, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice1, a fierce and eloquent critique of the work of his Harvard colleague, John Rawls. The extraordinary resonance of his original polemic 1 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982. The recently published second edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) contains a new preface and final chapter responding to Rawls’s Political Liberalism (New York, N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1993) as well as a very useful supplementary bibliography of the most important contributions to the debate that Liberalism and the Limits of Justice has provoked. Since, as far as the main body of the text is concerned, the two editions are identical, I shall specify an edition only when referring to this new material. 1 has elicited important clarifications of Rawls’s position on the part of Rawls’s followers and Rawls himself.2 But Sandel’s work recommends itself in the present context for another reason. -
Political Science 5 Comparative Government Course Syllabus – Spring, 2015
POLITICAL SCIENCE 5 COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT COURSE SYLLABUS – SPRING, 2015 Course Sections, Reedley College: Instructor: Dr. Tellalian 55511: MW, 2:00 – 3:15 P.M., CCI-200 Email: [email protected] Office Hours: Tuesdays, 9:00 – 10:00 A.M. Fridays, 10:00 – 10:30 A.M., 1:00 – 2:30 P.M., and by appointment. Course Description: This course provides an introduction to the basic workings of various political systems throughout the world, with an emphasis on both the formal (i.e., governmental institutions, political processes) and informal (i.e., cultural exchanges) dimensions of politics. Students will engage in comparisons of these political systems using some of the basic concepts of political analysis. Course Objectives: In the process of completing this course, students will: 1. analyze political and governmental systems by using the comparative method, including, but not limited to representative democracies, parliamentary democracies, totalitarian systems, and authoritarian systems. 2. examine the political philosophies and historical cultural values of selected governments. 3. survey the variables that influence the governmental direction of transitional states. 4. examine the impact of regional, economic, historical, and cultural factors on political institutions and behavior within a country. 5. explore the forms of political participation, including individual actions and pluralist influences. 6. analyze the economic systems of the selected countries and how these relate to their systems of government and geopolitical standing. 7. evaluate the functioning of various political and governmental systems in light of current events. 8. appraise the liberties and rights of people living under various political/governmental regimes. 1 Required Texts: Lord, Carnes, trans.