The Future of the Party System in Mexico

Politics

The Future of the Party System In Mexico

Alberto Begné Guerra* E V A / a v a N

o i v a t c O

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s o t o h P

The leaders of the three main political parties: Dulce María Sauri Riancho, of the PRI; Luis Felipe Bravo Mena, of the PAN; and Amalia García, of the PRD.

oday, all questions, expectations cratic life, their actions and interac tions will unravel the knots that held togeth - and concerns about Mexico’s will be decisive for governability and, er what today could be called the party T gov ernability must be seen as a result, for the future of Mexican system of the Mexican transition. Suf - through the prism of the system of polit - democracy. fice it to look at these three parties’ most ical parties. The reason is very simple: From my point of view, the party sys - obvious challenges to show that the least after July 2 —and it does not take great tem will inevitably change as a conse - probable scenario is that of the system perspicacity to see it— the three main quence of the July 2 election results. staying as it is now. political parties will undergo profound The new balance of forces and the new But, what factors will determine changes that will in turn affect the sys - distribution of power will sooner or later the recomposition of the party sys tem? tem of parties forged in recent years. be reflected in its make-up. Neither the What direction could it take? How will This will give rise to a new, different Institutional Revolutionary Party ( PRI ), that process be linked to Mexico’s go- system, whose composition and func - nor the National Action Party ( PAN ), nor v ernability? tioning are still an enigma. To the extent the Party of the Democratic Revolution that the parties are the keys to demo - (PRD ), the bases for political representa - tion and upon which public power was THE SYSTEM OF POLITICAL PARTIES * Lawyer, political analyst and coordinator formed during the last decade, will be of the Autonomous Technological Ins - able to continue as they did in the past, Historically speaking, the competitive titute of Mexico ( ITAM ) Electoral Studies Program. and in the process of their changes, they system of parties is new in our country.

7 Voices of Mexico • 53

DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS IN THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES

Until just a few years ago, the struggle solidation of the PAN as a really com - ties in the elections themselves, change for power and its transmission were not petitive force, and, finally, the split of a was imperative. What is more, Carlos resolved by genuine com petition among democratic current from the PRI in 1987, Salinas de Gortari’s economic project the parties. It was not until the second brought the regimen up against the fact to strengthen the market and open up half of the 1980s that elections began to that the efficacy of its revolutionary the economy required recognition and have real meaning and stopped being legitimacy had simply worn out. Neither trust from abroad, which could only be merely a democratic facade for the the power of the state, nor corporatist obtained by solving the problems of de - post-revolutionary regimen, useful only structures, nor the patronage networks mocracy. Simply, a modern, liberal eco - to lend legitimacy to what the presi - upon which the PRI system had been nomic face could not be presented on dent and the large interest groups built for six decades were sufficient any the old, authoritarian political body. inside the PRI had already decided at longer to contain society’s and the op - This was the beginning of the succes - their desks and dining tables: the selec - position parties’ demands for democra - sive electoral reforms (1989-1990, 1993, tion of occupants of practically each and cy. The 1986 elections in Chihuahua 1994 and 1996) aimed at guaranteeing every one of the country’s elected posts. and the 1988 presidential elections put transparency and impartiality in the The figures speak for themselves: in an end to the PRI ’s ability to stay in power organization of elections and equal con - 1982, the PRI still held 91 percent of through fraud without having to pay ditions for real competition among polit - the 3,479 elected posts that existed at extremely high costs and putting the ical parties. Parallel to this process of the time, including the presidency, the country’s governability at risk. After that, reforms, within the new regulatory and Con gress, the governors’ seats, local con - the PRI was forced to enter into dia - institutional electoral framework, a new gresses and municipal governments. logue and negotiations with the opposi - system of political parties began to take By 1997, of a total of 4,157 posts, the PRI tion about the rules and conditions for shape in which the three main protag - occupied only 54 percent. contending for political power. onists, even taking into consideration Things changed. The economic cri - After the 1988 ballot, when the le - their highs and lows during the 1990s, sis of the 1980s, the emergence of a gitimacy of the new administration was proved themselves truly representative more critical, demanding public, the con - questioned be cause of grave irregulari - of Mexican society.

8 Politics

DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS IN THE SENATE

Initially, however, the Salinas admin - 1991 and 50.1 percent in 1994, while fear of violence and the desire to con - istration’s electoral reforms (1989, 1990, the PAN consolidated itself as the main tinue looking ahead on the road to 1993 and 1994) and the results of the opposition, with 17.7 percent and 26.7 modernization produced a vote for 1991 and 1994 federal elections made percent, respectively. The rise of the peace and the continuity of the model. many analysts and political actors think PAN in 1994 led some to think that it The PRD ’s position, openly against the that Mexico’s democracy would end had serious possibilities of winning Salinas project and ambiguous vis-à- up being a two-party system. The PRI the presidency, even though its candi - vis the guerrilla movement and the was forced to face the challenge of elec - date, Diego Fernández de Cevallos, armed struggle road, paid heavily toral competition and was resolved to never really got close to PRI candidate at the polls. In the weeks after the win popular support by offering a new Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León. August 1994 elections, it seemed proposal for government; the PAN was Two contradictory phenomena can clear that the PRI and the PAN were concerned about the 1988 Cardenist be seen in the 1994 election results: the parties that would contend for or wave and was willing to negotiate to the Chiapas conflict and the enormous share power in an in creasingly com - build the norms and institutions need - support that Carlos Salinas’ project still petitive electoral arena. ed for its democratic struggle; and the enjoyed. On the one hand, the uprising This perception about the effects PRD was harassed by the regimen and of the Zapatista National Liberation of the 1991 and 1994 electoral results took a hard line on dialogue and nego - Army ( EZLN ) shook the conscience of on the party system was reinforced by tiation. In contrast with the results of Mexican society and brought it right another significant factor: the agree - the National Democratic Front ( FDN ) up against the crude, painful reality of ments between PRI and PAN on ques - in 1988, the PRD ’s 1991 and 1994 elec - the poverty and exclusion of millions tions of economic policy and the sig - toral performance was practically dis - of Mexicans. It was clear that modern - nal of certainty that they sent the astrous: it got only 8.2 percent and 17.1 ization did not have room for everyone markets and investors, who saw that percent of the vote in those two years. and that those excluded were increas - plurality of two, that incipient two- By contrast, the PRI did very well in ingly removed from the benefits of party format, as a guarantee that the those two elections: 61.5 percent in modernity. But, on the other hand, the big policy decisions would not be sub -

9 Voices of Mexico • 53

ject to changes and surprises because cal representation concentrated by the extent a supra-partisan phenomenon. of election results. PRI and the PAN (in the 1991 and 1994 Nevertheless, the July 2 results main - Despite this perception, the PRD elections, the two together re presented tained an essentially three-party sys - continued to represent broad sectors 79.2 percent and 76 percent of the tem. For how long is another question. of society who opposed the economic vote, respectively). It was also because None of the parties that ran alone (Party model supported by the PRI and the these two parties were the ones who of the Democratic Center [ PCD ], the PAN . It is no less true that a slip-up or designed, negotiated and carried out Social Democracy Party [ PDS ] and the failure of that model would be capi - the major reforms from 1988 to 1994. Authentic Party of the Mexican Rev - talized on by its only open opponent. In the second stage, particularly after olution [ PARM ]) kept their legal status. And that is just what happened. The the 1997 elections, things changed to And none of those that allied with the continuing conflict in Chiapas, the a three-party system, which repre - PAN (the Green Ecologist Party of scandals about crimes and corruption sented the nation and carried out the Mex ico [ PVEM ]) or with the PRD (Con - involving the Salinas family, and, above negotiations and agreements for the ver gen ce for Democracy [ CD ], the all, the profound financial crisis in exercise of public power. In this last Labor Party [ PT ], the Party of the So - which Salinas’ term ended and the period, the PRD had not only recov - cial Alliance [ PAS ] and the Party of the Zedillo administration began changed ered a very important space on the Nationalist Society [ PSN ]) will be de - things radically. If the Salinas years political scene, but also, Cuauhtémoc cisive in and of itself for the approval tended to show a trend toward a two- Cár de nas, given his landslide victory of constitutional and legislative re forms party system, during the first part of in Mex ico City, became a very strong in Congress. the administration of Ernesto Zedillo, candidate for the 2000 presidential The three main parties concentrate that trend was erased with the impos - elections. almost all the seats in the new Con - ing rise of the PRD . The climax of that gress. In the Chamber of Deputies, rise, in 1997, established the three- they hold almost 94 percent ( PRI , 42.2 party format, to the degree that the THE FUTURE OF THE PARTY SYSTEM percent; PAN , 41.2 percent; and PRD , PRD not only won the first elections 9.8 percent), and in the Senate, 94.4 for mayor of Mexico City —some - The results of July 2 and the Vicente percent ( PRI , 46.8 percent; PAN , 35.9 thing that had seemed a piece of cake Fox phenomenon outstripped the po - percent; and PRD , 11.7 percent). If we for the PAN only a few months before— litical parties in two senses. In the first consider that normal legislative proce - but, it even won more seats in the place because Fox practically appro - dures require a simple majority of those Chamber of Deputies than the PAN priated the PAN candidacy without its present in both chambers, clearly, to (PAN , 121; PRD , 125), where the PRI institutional structure and its tradi - approve any reform or new law, the lost its absolute majority for the first tio nal leaders —the party’s ideological presence of two of the three main par - time in history. There was no doubt core— being able to avoid it, despite ties will be re quired. In addition, none about it: PRI , PAN and PRD would be in their reservations about Foxism. The of them, even allied with a small party, the same league to share and contend second reason is that the Fox candi - would be able to make up that majori - for power in the next presidential elec - dacy broke down the barriers of the ty without one of the other two large tions. And in those conditions, the PRI and PRD electoral clienteles, pen - parties. For constitutional reforms re - road to 2000 began. etrating into segments of the voters quiring a two-thirds vote in both cham - In retrospect, we can say that the first who had seemed reserved for those bers and the majority of the 32 state competitive system of parties in Mex - two parties, achieving support and legislatures, the only road is a PRI -PAN ico went through two stages between votes previously alien to the PAN . With agreement. From that point of view, 1988 and 2000. In the first phase, his enormous capacity for turning the the federal elections maintain the PRI - under the administration of Carlos presidential elections into a choice be - PAN -PRD , three-party system, even if Salinas, it took on characteristics of a tween change, represented by himself, the PRD is smaller than the first two. two-party system. This was not just be - and continuity, represented by the PRI , However, as I said initially, the problems cause of the high percentage of politi - Fox’s candidacy became to a certain and challenges faced by these three

10 Politics

organizations will hardly be met and The PRD is confronted today by the varied that any prediction would be a solved without changing the party sys - challenge of going from what it is wild guess. What is clear is that the tem as a whole. Let us see. now, a conglomerate of currents and com bination of splits from the PRI and The PRI must build a leadership to factions tied together solely by the the PRD (ine vitable, from my point of substitute for the presidential leader - leadership of their caudillo, to the es - view) and the existence of four vacant ship it has revolved around for seven tablishment of democratic rules and or semi-vacant (practically represent - decades. It must establish legitimate, procedures that give it institutional ing no one or almost no one and with - effective rules and procedures for its solidity. It is also facing the demand out any quality ideological or program - internal life. It must define an ideolog - that it take a critical look at its identity matic content) but legally existing ical identity and a programmatic pro - and discourse in order to be able to organizations ( PAS , PSN , PT and CD ), is posal that are a coherent, attractive al - infuse its project with content and fea - a heavy brew, contaminated with the ternative for the voters, an alternative sible proposals in a con text of growing worst kind of opportunism, that will that must take the place of public interdependence with international mar - not be easy for the new government policies designed and executed from kets. Like the PRI , the PRD ’s horizon is to get down, a new government that, public office. And it must do all this fraught with the risk of splits. The above all needs to show signs of the without breaking up. If it does not fragility of the agreements and equilib - change that it offered and to guaran - succeed, the road to fragmentation ria among its currents and factions, as tee governability. This will necessarily will be ine vitable, and with it, the well as the opportunism that domi - depend on the Congress, where no splits to call for the creation of new nates the PRI -ism adopted by the PRD to party has the majority needed to leg - parties or to join other, already exist - win governors’ seats, are serious threats islate alone. ing forces. The critical moment will to its unity. Today, with three large parties in be when Pre sident Zedillo leaves of- The challenges and outcome of the Congress, negotiating and forging agree - fice and a new leadership will have to internal conflicts in the PRI and the PRD ments seems complicated, but feasi - be formed. In the meanwhile, each will be closely linked to the needs and ble. If in a few months the legislators local election will be a test for the PRI ’s interests of the small parties that main - regroup not in three caucuses but in ability to win the voters and maintain tained their legal status after July 2, eight, every agreement could become its internal cohesion. 2000. 1 Except for the Green Eco- a veritable miracle. For that reason, a The PAN , for its part, is facing a cru - logist Party of Mexico, whose elec - vital, strategic goal for the president- cial challenge. It must resolve its rela - toral alliance with the PAN will prob - elect will be maintaining the internal tionship with Vicente Fox and decide ably extend into Congress, the other cohesion of the two main opposition whether it will be the party of the admin - four parties ( PT , CD , PAS and PSN ) do parties, unless he believes it possible istration or not, something which does not look like they will continue in the and profitable to attract PRI and PRD not seem to be part of the vision of shadow of the PRD , under whose aus - split-offs himself in order to be able to the president-elect. The PAN ’s identi - pices —in a tactical decision by Cuauh - create his own parliamentary majority. ty and institutional solidity will be rid - témoc Cárden as the high costs and zero Time will tell. ing on this decision and the exercise benefits of which have still not been of the office of president. The danger of accepted by anyone— they maintained wi nning offi ce and losing the party — their registration. The four organizations NOTES as Don Luis H. Alvarez, one of its his - with legal status are already an enor - to rical leaders, once put it— is at hand. mous temptation for potential —and 1 The parties that kept their legal registration In the short term, the make-up of Vi - seemingly inevitable— splits from the were the PRI , the PAN , the PRD , the Green cente Fox’s cabinet and the terms of PRI and the PRD . Ecologist Party of Mexico, the Labor Party, Convergence for Democracy, the Party of the Fox’s relations with Congress during In these conditions, where is the Social Alliance and the Party of the Natio nalist the first session of his administration party system heading? That is a diffi - Society. The Social Democracy Party, the (September to December 2000) will be cult question to answer. The factors Authentic Party of the Mexican Revo lution and the Party of the Democratic Cen ter lost fundamental. in its recomposition are so many and their legal status.