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Virtue Ethics in Kierkegaard

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Virtue Ethics in Kierkegaard VIRTUE ETHICS IN KIERKEGAARD ___________________ A Paper Presented To The American Catholic Philosophical Association November 22–24, 2019 ___________________ Timothy L. Jacobs University of St.Thomas, Houston [email protected] tljacobs.com Jacobs 1 ABSTRACT There has been some debate whether Kierkegaard’s ethics should be interpreted as exhibiting a virtue ethic. John J. Davenport interprets Kierkegaard as presenting a teleology in human nature, as does classical virtue ethics, but with the end, or telos, being authenticity instead of the moral ​ ​ virtues constituting eudaimonia. Others, such as Norman Lillegard, interpret Kierkegaard as ​ ​ being a virtue ethicist that distinguishes between moral virtues and aesthetic virtues. Still others, like Philip Quinn, reject the thesis that Kierkegaard is a classical virtue ethicist in any sense, and others, like C. Stephen Evans and Robert C. Roberts interpret him as agreeing with classical virtue ethics and supplementing it with additional contributions. I will argue in sympathy with Evans and Roberts that Kierkegaard is compatible with classical virtue ethics. Three aspects of Kierkegaard’s thought will be considered: (1) passion and interestedness, (2) authenticity as an existential virtue, and (3) Christian character and practice in classical virtues. Jacobs 2 VIRTUE ETHICS IN KIERKEGAARD There has been some debate on whether Kierkegaard’s ethics should be interpreted as exhibiting a virtue ethic. John J. Davenport interprets Kierkegaard as presenting a teleology in human nature, as does classical virtue ethics, but with the end, or telos, being authenticity instead ​ ​ ​ ​ of the moral virtues constituting eudaimonia. Norman Lillegard claims Kierkegaard’s virtue ​ ​ ethic distinguishes between moral virtues and aesthetic virtues. Philip Quinn rejects the thesis that Kierkegaard is a classical virtue ethicist in any sense. C. Stephen Evans and Robert C. Roberts interpret Kierkegaard as agreeing with classical virtue ethics but supplementing it with additional contributions. I will argue in sympathy with Evans and Roberts that Kierkegaard is compatible with classical virtue ethics, while still maintaining some reservations to this interpretation. Three aspects of Kierkegaard’s thought will be considered: (1) passion and interestedness, (2) authenticity as an existential virtue, and (3) Christian character and practice in classical virtues. It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a survey of interpretations of Kierkegaard, a comprehensive investigation of his texts, or an exhaustive comparison between Kierkegaard and classical virtue theorists, like Aristotle and Aquinas. The following argument serves as an apologetic for reading Kierkegaard as friendly to classical virtue ethics and does not aim to develop or advocate a Kierkegaardian normative theory. Passion and Interestedness An interpretive clarification of Kierkegaard’s motive should be made clear at the outset. His support of getting beyond the “ethical stage” (also described as the “rational stage”) is for the purpose of reaching the religious stage through a leap of faith characterized by authenticity. This is sometimes articulated by Kierkegaard as a many-stage process and sometimes as a two-stage Jacobs 3 process.1 Shunning modernist objectivism in the form of Hegelian or Kantian ethics, Kierkegaard sees the pursuit of a meaningful life through rationalistic means as harmful in its treatment of meaning as an object. He fears that his Danish culture will continue to treat ethics as passionless contemplation that sacrifices the value of the individual for a deontic view of right action devoid of passion or interest. This sterile, dead, and hypocritical ethic opposes his religious loyalties, and his ultimate goal is to rejuvinate authenticity in his religion. Understanding Kierkegaard’s motive provides necessary context for investigating whether his ethic is compatible with classical virtue ethics. Investigating compatibility may begin with passion and interestedness in ethics. In his disdain for the subject-object divide, Kierkegaard says, “When the question [of ethics] is treated in an objective manner it becomes impossible for the subject to face the decision with passion, least of all with an infinitely interested passion if at all.”2 Kierkegaard claims that the pursuit of a meaningful life through rationalistic mechanisms divorced from reference to a subjective aspect also divorces the subject from a meaningful life. He says, [When someone embraces objectivity] by forgetting that one is an existing subject, passion goes by the board, and the truth is no longer a paradox; the knowing subject becomes a fantastic entity rather than a human being, and the truth becomes a fantastic object for the knowledge of this fantastic entity.3 Kierkegaard treats passion is a prerequisite for a truly meaningful life. Kierkegaard is often interpreted as emphasizing passion over rationality to the point of advocating an irrational “leap of faith” that is an exertion of will without wisdom. Alasdair MacIntyre says Kierkegaard’s 1 For example, Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, trans. Alastair Hannay (London: Penguin, 2003), ​ ​ 71–80. 2 Soren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Translated by D. F. Swenson (Princeton: ​ ​ Princeton University Press, 1941), 26-35. 3 Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 26-35. ​ ​ ​ Jacobs 4 religious stage over the ethical stage is an “epitaph of the Enlightenment's systematic attempt to discover a rational justification for morality.”4 As such, his conception of the “ethical stage” is essentially rationalistic and deontic.5 MacIntyre presents Kierkegaard as irrecoverably influenced by Hegel and Kant in his ethical thinking. Life for Kierkegaard requires continual acts of will, or leaps of faith, which are expressions of passion that overcome deontic, rationalistic, disinterested ethics. MacIntyre is says that Kierkegaard presents a dichotomy between ethics as Kantian versus Kierkegaard’s own passionate interested ethic without recourse to or explicit consideration of Aristotle or Aquinas. It is to Aquinas that I now turn in order to rescue Kierkegaard from interpretations that see him as unfriendly towards virtue theory. Aquinas does not emphasize passion as having as much of a central role as Kierkegaard does, but Auinas does say that passion is necessary for the virtuous life, the life lived in accordance with reason. Passion is found in the sensitive appetite that must obey reason. Aquinas does not claim with Kant that passion is contrary to morality, as MacIntyre’s Kierkegaard claims. Kant says that generosity motivated by passion “however right and however amiable it may be, has still no genuinely moral worth.”6 With similar rationalism John Stuart Mill says, “Utilitarianism requires [someone] to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator.”7 One should be willing to sacrifice their own happiness for the sake of the “greater good.” Acting out of sentiment is wrong for Aquinas as well, since acting from emotion is not acting by wisdom. However, since the virtues, particularly courage and temperance, are for 4 MacIntyre, Alasdair, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 3rd edition (Notre Dame: University of ​ ​ Notre Dame Press, 2007), 39. 5 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 70–80. ​ ​ 6 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, translated by H. J. Paton (London: ​ ​ Hutchinson, 1948). 7 J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism, translated by John Cottingham, in Western Philosophy: An Anthology, edited by ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ John Cottingham (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2008). Jacobs 5 Aquinas located in the sensitive appetite, a virtuous action does act from passion if that passion ​ ​ has been habituated to follow reason. He says, “It belongs to the perfection of man's good that his passions be moderated by reason.”8 “If the passions be taken for inordinate emotions, they cannot be in a virtuous man, so that he consent to them deliberately; as the Stoics maintained. But if the passions be taken for any movements of the sensitive appetite, they can be in a virtuous man, in so far as they are subordinate to reason.”9 “Moral virtue perfects the appetitive part of the soul by directing it to good as defined by reason.”10 Aquinas agrees with the Stoic and Kantian claim that an action that comes from inordinate passion is wrong, but in virtuous actions, orderly passions cannot be absent. He says, “It belongs to the perfection of moral good, that man should be moved unto good, not only in respect of his will, but also in respect of his sensitive appetite.”11 Where the Stoics see virtue as devoid of passion, Aquinas says that “it is plain that moral virtues, which are about the passions as about their proper matter, cannot be without passions. Otherwise it would follow that moral virtue makes the sensitive appetite altogether idle.”12 Although Kierkegaard is not as clear or systematic in relating passion and reason, clearly his rejection of Kantian disinterest is in one accord with Aquinas’s support of passion in rejecting Stoicism. Authenticity as an Existential Virtue Kierkegaard’s “authenticity” presents the next investigation for compatibility. Davenport says that Kierkegaard’s conception of freedom and dispositional character provide the basis for 8 ST I-II.24.3. All translations of the Summa Theologiæ (ST) are from St. Thomas Aquinas, The Summa ​ ​ ​ Theologica, translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province, Benziger Bros. ed.
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