Journal of Chinese Military History 8 (2019) 101-113

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Book Reviews

Peter Worthing, General : The Rise and Fall of Nationalist China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016. pp. v, 316. $99.99. ISBN 978-1-107-14463-7.

He Yingqin has found his champion! Castigated by contemporaries and later historians as exemplifying the deformities of the Nationalist military and state, General He has not previously attracted serious inquiry. Peter Worthing at- tempts to remedy that and set the record straight on He’s public life, covering his education and early career, role in the Nationalist revolution, diplomatic ef- forts in the 1930s, work in military administration during the war against Japan, postwar tenure at the UN in New York (1946-48), and his attempt to rescue the regime from collapse (1948-49). In each era, Worthing serves up surprises. Rather than a conservative, lazy, and corrupt man, we are treated to He’s in- volvement with progressive political movements in Guizhou; his victories in the Northern Expedition that reveal him as a daring and effective commander; his self-conscious sacrifice of his reputation in the 1930s to buy time to prepare for war; his engineering of a conscription system that made victory in the War of Resistance possible, and his willingness in 1948 to leave Chiang Kai-shek, whom He now saw as the main obstacle to genuine reform. With this record of battlefield victories, diplomatic assignments, and state- building, Worthing puts He Yingqin back into our narrative of the Nationalist era, not as an emblem of its defects, but as an exemplar of its successes and good faith efforts in difficult circumstances. Worthing concludes that, instead of a sycophantic yes-man to Chiang Kai-shek, He was “the man Chiang most often relied upon to get the job done … to achieve critical objectives” (276). He provided a sober, steady counterpoint to the volatile and emotional Chiang; their mutual need for each other survived even a (short-lived) betrayal in August 1927 when He sided with Bai Chongxi against Chiang. For more than twenty years, He played a “central role in building the Nationalist military and

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/22127453-12341340 102 Book Reviews supporting Chiang Kai-shek’s attempts to extend the authority of the government” (7). The book is best in its narration of He’s military career, from 1925 into 1930. Worthing makes his case that He Yingqin’s victories were critical to the revolution and the security of the Nationalist state. He emerges as a commit- ted anti-imperialist and a decisive and resourceful combat commander, em- bodying the Whampoa Spirit. Worthing highlights the precariousness of the Nationalist endeavor, given the uncertainty of the military’s loyalty until 1930. In such circumstances, He Yingqin was an invaluable asset to Chiang. This is a welcome retelling of the Nationalist Revolution, for it places military conflict and military men at the forefront of a stage historians often populate with political actors. Worthing suggests that He’s many achievements have been overlooked due to American criticism starting in the 1940s. Worthing continues dismantling the American myth around Joseph Stilwell by revising the received caricature of one of its primary villains. Long-suffering General He, legitimately con- cerned with China’s war effort and sovereignty, frequently swallowed his pride to work with the unreasonable and myopic Vinegar Joe. Thus, Worthing takes another brick out of what Hans van de Ven calls the “Stilwell-White paradigm” that casts Nationalist China as incompetent, venal, and driven only by virulent anti-communism. Worthing acknowledges that He’s record after 1930 is “ambiguous and con- troversial” (138). Yet, by concentrating on successes, this study presents General He as he would have wanted to be seen. With no sources to look behind the public mask, Worthing is dependent on, and captive to, He Yingqin’s public records. To rehabilitate He, Worthing dismisses or discredits hostile sources and slides over domestic critical perspectives (like the National Salvation movement). Refusing to entertain the possibility that appeasement might have emboldened Japan, as critics claimed, Worthing takes the regime’s claims at face value, calling He’s 1930s diplomacy successful (156) without exploring Japanese decisions and perceptions (to my mind, essential for a dispassionate evaluation of He’s efforts). He Yingqin becomes an ideal paragon of Nationalist virtue, with only honorable intentions and a sterling record of success. And where poor outcomes are undeniable (e.g., the persistence of abuses in war- time conscription), they are not He’s fault and are frequently phrased in the passive voice (a form of rhetorical surgery that separates failure from the man and suggests negative results were unavoidable). His successes, however, are attributed to his skill and character, an asymmetry that would doubtlessly have pleased General He and winds up restating Nationalist orthodoxy.

Journal of Chinese Military History 8 (2019) 101-113