standards and guidelines

RBMS Security Committee Guidelines for the security of rare books, manuscripts, and other special collections

n a climate where theft of special collec­ tant since administrators’ efforts to increase Itions materials is an everyday possibility, the use and knowledge of collections in their security must be a major concern of the en­ care can result in a greater public awareness tire library and special collections communi­ of their value, and may increase the risk of ties, with special collections administrators theft. Security arrangements vary from one addressing it to the best of their abilities institution to another and are dependent on within their institutional context. staffing, physical setting, and use. The ACRL/Rare Books and Manuscripts Rare book and manuscript dealers also Section (RBMS) Security Committee’s “Guide­ must concern themselves with collection lines for the Security of Rare Book, Manu­ security, since thieves may offer stolen materi­ script, and Other Special Collections,” pub­ als to them for sale. Librarians should make lished here, is the principal ACRL document every effort to familiarize such dealers with dealing with the security of library materials. the ways institutions attempt to secure and These guidelines identify important topics that identify their materials and help them use all collection administrators should address this knowledge to lessen anyone’s chances in developing adequate collection security. of profiting from theft. While directed primarily toward rare books, The appointment of a library security special collections, and manuscripts, the top­ officer and the development of a security ics are also applicable to general collections. policy can help insure that staff are aware of The RBMS Security Committee strongly urges their legal and procedural responsibilities in implementation of these guidelines, including applying security measures. the unique identification marking of materials and the appointment of a Library Security II. The library security offi cer Offi cer (LSO). Each institution concerned with the security of rare books, manuscripts, or other special I. Introduction collections materials should appoint a library These guidelines identify important topics security officer (LSO). The LSO should be that collection administrators should address appointed by the library director, have pri­ in developing adequate collection security. mary authority and responsibility to carry out While directed towards special collections, the security program, and have a thorough the topics are also applicable to general col­ knowledge of all repository security needs, lections. Administrators of rare book, manu­ particularly those of special collections. The script, and special collections materials must LSO should not necessarily be conceived of ensure that their collections remain intact as the library’s general security offi cer, al­ and secure from theft and damage. The se­ though he or she may also hold that role. curity of collections is now especially impor­ The identity of the LSO should be widely

C&RL News July/August 2006 426 known, especially among other adminis­ security of special collections materials. The trative officers of the repository. The LSO’s LSO should also be involved with any library principal responsibility should be to plan and emergency and disaster planning. administer a security program, which should include a survey of the collections, reviews Suggestions for implementation: of the physical layout of the institution, and 1. In larger institutions it may be neces­ training of the institution’s staff. He or she sary to assemble a Security Planning Group should develop active working relationships to assist the LSO in identifying problem areas with colleagues and seek the advice and the and to recommend solutions. assistance of appropriate personnel, such as 2. Institutions that lack appropriate staff institutional administrators, corporate coun­ resources may wish to bring in a security sel, life safety officers, the LSO mail lists, and/ consultant to assist in developing a policy or outside consultants from law enforcement and in determining any major threats to the agencies and insurance companies. collection. When engaging a security consul­ tant, the institution or LSO should use caution Suggestions for implementation: in evaluating the consultant’s competence or 1. In some repositories, the LSO and the ability to perform the work. The institution special collections librarian may be the same should investigate the security consultant’s person. background and references thoroughly. 2. Special collections administrators in institutions without another official for whom IV. The special collections building or the role of LSO would be appropriate are area encouraged to take on this role and advocate The special collections building or area that the institution recognize the importance should have as few access points as pos­ of this responsibility within the institutional sible, with a single entry and exit point for structure. both researchers and staff. Fire and emer­ gency exits, which should be strictly con­ III. The security policy trolled and provided with alarm coverage, The LSO should develop written policy on should not be used for regular access. With­ the security of the collections. In developing in the facility itself, the public should have the policy, the LSO should consult with ad­ access only to public areas, not to work ar­ ministrators and staff, legal authorities, and eas or stack space. Researchers should be other knowledgeable persons. The policy received in a separate reception area where should include a standard operating proce­ a coatroom and lockers should be provided dure on dealing with a theft or other security for researchers’ personal belongings and problems. The ACRL/RBMS Security Com­ outerwear. A secure reading room where mittee’s document, “Guidelines Regarding researchers can be continuously moni­ Thefts in Libraries,” provides steps to pursue tored at all times by staff trained in surveil­ in establishing adequate policies for deal­ lance should be identified as the only area ing with thefts. The security policy should in which material may be used. A security be kept up­to­date with current names and guard should check researchers’ research telephone numbers of institutional and law materials prior to their entering the secure enforcement contacts. The institution should area as well as when they depart. also review the policy periodically to insure Keys and their equivalents, such as that institutional needs continue to be ad­ keycards, are especially vulnerable items; equately addressed. The LSO should coop­ therefore, a controlled check­out system for erate with and be involved with develop­ all keys should be maintained. Keys to secure ment and implementation of general library areas should be issued to staff only on an security measures, as these may affect the as­needed basis, and master keys should be

July/August 2006 427 C&RL News secured against unauthorized access. Com­ the researchers’ legal rights when handling binations to vaults also should have limited possible problems. (See also ACRL “Code Of distribution and should be changed each time Ethics for Special Collections Librarians.”) there is a staff change involving a position with access to the vault. Strong consideration Suggestions for implementation: should be given to installing proprietary 1. The LSO and special collections admin­ keyways in locks in the special collections istrator should ensure that all staff are familiar area. (See Ronald L. Libengood and Bryan J. with these guidelines and the security policies Perun, “The Key to Good Security: Proprietary in their institutions and how they may apply Keyways and Electronic Locks,” Focus on specifically to their institution. Security, 2 [April 1995]: 6­16.) 2. When appropriate or consistent with institutional policies, background checks and Suggestions for implementation: bonding of staff members should be consid­ 1. In institutions where it is not possible to ered. hire an extra security guard, a staff member 3. The LSO or special collections adminis­ could perform this function. Consideration trator should be familiar with the institution’s should also be given to installing a video personnel policies, and advocate security surveillance system. concerns with the institution’s human re­ 2. As a precautionary policy, keys and sources staff. locks to secure areas should be changed on a regular basis. VI. The researchers 3. When an institution plans to remodel or The special collections administrator must renovate space or to build a new facility in carefully balance the responsibility of mak­ which special collections materials are to be ing materials available to researchers against housed, the LSO and the special collections the responsibility for ensuring the security of administrator should ensure that all security the materials. Staff must be able to identify needs are addressed in the design and plan­ who has used which material by keeping ning. adequate, signed check­out records, which should be retained indefi nitely. V. The staff Registration for each researcher who An atmosphere of trust and concern for the uses special collections materials should be collections is probably the best guarantee required, recording the name, address, sig­ against theft by staff. Nevertheless, close and nature, institutional affiliation (if any), and equitable supervision is essential. The staff, photo identification or some other form of including students and volunteers, should positive identification to establish physical be chosen carefully, using any avenues identity. These registration records should available in making the decision for hiring. be retained permanently. Careful personnel management is an ongo­ Researchers should be required to present a ing necessity. A weak point in maintaining reasonable explanation of their need to use the a security system is disgruntled staff who materials. Each researcher should be given an may seek retribution through theft, destruc­ orientation to the collections requested and to tion, or willful mishandling of collections. the rules governing the use of the collections. Consideration should be given to bonding Researchers should not be permitted to take employees who work in special collec­ extraneous personal materials into the reading tions. Training the staff in security measures areas. This includes such items as notebooks, should be a high priority of the LSO. Such briefcases, outerwear, books, and voluminous training should ensure that staff be aware of papers. Personal computers should be re­ their legal and procedural responsibilities in moved from the case before use in the reading relation to security as well as their own and room is permitted. Lockers or some kind of

C&RL News July/August 2006 428 secure space should be provided for any items materials themselves should be made iden­ not permitted in the reading room. tifiable. This can be accomplished by mark­ Staff should observe researchers at all ing them following the RBMS “Guidelines for times and not allow them to work unobserved Marking” (see Appendix I), by applying other behind bookcases, book trucks, stacks of unique marks, and by keeping photographic books, or any other obstacles that restrict or microform copies of valuable items. staff view. Researchers should be limited at any one time to having access only to those Suggestions for implementation: books, manuscripts, or other items which 1. Items that are more valuable should be are needed to perform the research at hand. segregated from the collections into higher Staff should check the condition, content, and security areas, with more restricted conditions completeness of each item prior to giving it for staff access and researcher use. to the researcher and also when it is returned 2. If appropriate security controls are ap­ after use. This checking of materials that are plied, unprocessed materials may be made returned is especially important for the use available to researchers for short­term use. of archival and manuscript collections, which often consist of many loose, unique pieces. VIII. Transfers from the general Researchers should be required to return all collection library materials prior to leaving the reading Many institutions house materials in open room, even if they plan to return later to con­ stack areas accessible to all users. These open tinue their research. Researchers should not stacks areas may contain rare materials which be allowed to exchange materials or to have are unidentified and unprotected. Materials access to materials brought into the room for in open stack areas are most vulnerable to use by another researcher. breaches in security. Many thieves search open stacks areas for materials considered Suggestions for implementation: rare, rather than attempt to infi ltrate special 1. The LSO or special collections ad­ collections areas or outwit the security mea­ ministrator should seek the advice of the sures implemented in monitored reading ar­ institution’s legal counsel or other appropriate eas. Institutions should establish procedures legal authority when developing researcher for the routine areas, using the ACRL/RBMS policies, to ensure adequate legal recourse if “Guidelines on the Selection of General Col­ researchers violate the use agreement. lection Materials for Transfer to Special Col­ 2. The institution should require that all lections” to assist in identifying rare materials researchers read and sign an agreement to on the open shelves in need of protection. abide by institutional policies. This agreement should be renewed annually. IX. Legal and procedural responsibilities VII. The collections The administrators of special collections and Administrators of special collections must the LSO must know the laws for dealing with be able to identify positively the materials library theft that are applicable in their state in their collections to establish loss and to and must convey this information to staff. substantiate claims to recovered stolen prop­ Staff members must be aware of their legal erty. This includes keeping adequate acces­ rights in stopping thefts and not infringing sion records; maintaining detailed cataloging on the rights of the individual suspected of records and lists in finding aids; recording theft. copy­specific information; and keeping con­ The administrator of special collections dition reports and records. Lists developed to and the LSO must report thefts of rare materi­ fulfill the requirements of insurance policies als to appropriate law enforcement agencies should also be kept current. In addition, the and must take responsibility for requesting

July/August 2006 429 C&RL News action from legal authorities. The theft of show that clear identifi cation of stolen mate­ materials, whenever the theft is discovered, rial is vital if material, once recovered, is to must be reported in a timely manner to help be returned to its rightful owner. The fol­ prevent the unknowing transfer of the items lowing guidelines are intended to aid librar­ and to facilitate their return. Appropriate ies and other institutions in marking their agencies to which to report include local, materials and to provide as consistent and institutional, and state law enforcement agen­ uniform a practice as possible. cies and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Even the most conservative marking pro­ Consult Appendix III for reporting details. gram results in permanent alteration of materi­ For legal and procedural responsibilities, see als. Choices concerning marking are likely to “Guidelines Regarding Thefts in Libraries” depend heavily on one’s aesthetic judgment (listed in Appendix IV). balanced against the need to secure materials from theft and to assist in their identifi cation Suggestions for implementation: and recovery. Each repository will have to 1. LSOs and/or special collections admin­ balance those competing needs. The ACRL/ istrators should take an active role in raising RBMS Security Committee recommends that the awareness of other institutional offi cials, libraries and other institutions use marking as e.g., institutional legal officers, public safety part of their overall security procedures and officers, the library director, etc., regarding the that they attempt to strike a balance between serious nature of materials theft, and urge the the implications for deterrence (visibility, per­ institution to actively seek the resolution of manence) and the integrity of the documents security threats and breaches and to seek the (both physical and aesthetic). strictest punishment possible for those con­ victed of theft or other security violations. II. General General recommendations are: X. Conclusion A. That markings be of two types: The guidelines presented here are necessar­ 1. Readily visible to the casual observer ily brief since further information is avail­ 2. Hidden and difficult to detect able through professional literature, profes­ B. That readily visible marks be made in sional organizations and consultants within an approved form of permanent ink, such as the rare book, manuscript, and special col­ that available from the Library of Congress lections community, and in the law enforce­ (http://www.loc.gov/preserv/marking.html) ment and insurance professions. The effort C. That marks which are hidden or diffi cult of the entire staff, with fi nal responsibility to detect never be the only or primary types vested in one senior staff member, working of marking in cooperation with law enforcement, will D.That visible marks be placed so that result in more secure collections wherein they will cause significant damage to the materials are preserved and made available aesthetic and commercial value of the item for all who wish to use them. if they are removed E. That marks be placed directly on the Appendix I - Guidelines for marking material itself and not on an associated part books, manuscripts, and other special from which the material may be separated collections materials F. That all marks unequivocally and clearly I. Introduction identify the repository There has been much thoughtful discus­ sion regarding the appropriateness of per­ III. Discussion manently marking book, manuscripts, and A. Readily visible marks are intended to other special collections materials. Failure to deter potential thieves; hidden marks are mark compromises security. Cases of theft intended to assist in the recovery of stolen

C&RL News July/August 2006 430 materials. If only one type of mark is to be that may be broken away without noticeable used, it should be of the readily visible type. injury to the volume. The location of each The size should be kept to a minimum (ca. subsequent marking would be the same; i.e., 5­point type size for lettering). lower inner margin approximate to the last B. Visible marks should be all but impos­ line of text. sible to remove and should never consist When the item is too tightly bound to mark of just a bookplate. Although not the only in the inner margin, alternate locations may be form of a visible mark, ink is perhaps the made in any blank area of the verso, as close best medium for this purpose, so long as the to the lower portion of text as possible. The ink meets current standards for permanence mark should be so placed that it may not be and conservation. There is still controversy excised without extreme cropping. (In items surrounding which inks are best suited for of double columns, the mark might be located this purpose, so a recommendation cannot in the blank area between the columns.) go beyond urging those in charge of marking 2. For leaf books, single leaves from programs to be current on the latest develop­ manuscripts: Mark on either verso or recto, ments in this fi eld. at the lower portion of the text or image of C. Hidden marks should never be used as each leaf. The choice may be determined by the only form of marking, because they are the document itself if one of the sides has worthless in alerting others, such as booksell­ more importance (owing to an illustration, ers, that material has been stolen. Hidden manuscript notation, etc.) The ownership mark marks are intended only as supplements to should then be placed on the reverse side. visible marks. E. Marks of whatever type must be placed D.Much controversy has surrounded the directly on the material itself. Marks placed placement of visible marks. Given the varying only on a front pastedown in a book, on a nature of special collections materials and portfolio that holds prints, or on some type of the varying nature of beliefs and sentiments backing material are rendered useless if that concerning what is proper placement for a element is separated from the item. Especially visible mark, it is probably futile to overly in the case of flat items, such as maps and prescribe placement of marks. It is recom­ broadsides, it is important that the marks mended, however, that no position for a be applied before any backing procedure is mark be rejected outright. Some repositories done. might, for example, be comfortable stamping F. Marks should not be generic (e.g., “Rare the verso of a title page or the image area Book Room,” “Special Collections,” “University of a map; others might reject those options. Library,” etc.) but should rather make plain However, no matter where the visible mark the repository to which they refer. It is recom­ is placed, it should not be in a position that mended that visible marking consist of the it can be removed without leaving obvious repository’s Library of Congress symbol. If a evidence of its former presence. repository lacks such a symbol, the Library of E. Some items do present unusual deci­ Congress will supply one upon request. If the sions on placement of visible marks. The Library of Congress symbol is not used, then following are specific recommendations for the name of the repository should be used, the formats listed. being careful that no confusion arises among 1. For Medieval and Renaissance man­ repositories with similar or identical names. uscripts, incunabula, and early printed books: Mark on the verso of the first leaf of principal IV. Other Considerations text, on the lower inner margin, approximate A. Hidden marks do not have to be marks at to the last line of text. Additional markings all. They merely have to provide some positive may be needed when the item is a composite ownership indication that is extremely diffi cult, manuscript or otherwise has a substantial text if not impossible, to detect. Microembossers,

July/August 2006 431 C&RL News for example, provide an extremely cheap and be marked individually. Volumes of bound difficult to detect type of nearly invisible mark. manuscripts and collections of individual Modern technology also provides non­invasive manuscripts present a similar problem and marking techniques, such as microphotog­ each discrete item in such collections should raphy, that does not leave any mark on the also be marked. item itself yet serves as positive identifi cation. E. Because marking should be part of an Other technologies, such as microtaggants, overall security program, the role of catalog­ may also be appropriate for this purpose. It is ing in identifying materials should not be vital if such marks are used, however, that the overlooked. Accurate and detailed physical repository keep extremely accurate records of descriptions that note anomalies, defects, such marks so that they can be readily found provenance, and unusual physical charac­ for identification purposes if the need arises to teristics are essential adjuncts to ownership do so. Generic secret marking systems, such markings. as underlining a word on p. 13 of every book, should be avoided as the sole means of such Appendix II – Secret marking marks. (See Appendix II.) technology B. Repositories should never attempt to For more information about several of the cancel marks, even in the event that the currently available secret marking technolo­ material is deaccessioned. No system has yet gies, see the following web sites. been devised for canceling marks that can­ Microembossers: not be imitated with relative ease by thieves, http://www.microstampusa.com/ and there seems to be no alternative but to Microtaggants: assume permanent responsibility for one’s http://www.microtracesolutions.com/915.htm mark on a book, manuscript, or other docu­ Microdots: ment. Permanent records should be kept of http://www.datadotdna.com/ deaccessioned materials, whether marked or unmarked, and the material itself, when Appendix III- Addresses for reporting released, should be accompanied by a docu­ thefts ment conveying ownership. It is advisable (Kept current and interactive at http://www. to place stamps or notes in items indicating rbms.info) that they have been deaccessioned, but no Antiquarian Booksellers Association of attempt should be made to cancel or remove America, 20 West 44th St., 4th floor, New York, previous ownership marks. NY 10035­6604. 212­944­8291; (fax) 212­944­ C. Marks should be applied to all items 8293; e­mail: [email protected]. Home page for when they come into the repository. It is theft reporting: http://www.abaa.org dangerous to send unmarked items into stor­ ACRL/RBMS Security Committee. C/O age or a cataloging backlog, where they may American Library Association, 50 E. Huron St., remain for years with no indication that the Chicago, IL 60611. 800­545­2433, ext. 2516; repository owns them. Despite the fact that (fax) 312­440­9374. E­mail: [email protected]. ALA some items may present extremely diffi cult Home page: http://www.ala.org; RBMS Home and complicated decisions about marking, page: http://www.rbms.info the process should never be deferred. It is Archives & Archivists Electronic Discus­ strongly recommended that programs also be sion List: [email protected] instituted to mark retrospectively materials DeRicci Project: [email protected] (for pre­ already in the collections. 1600 manuscripts only) D.Care must be taken to ensure that all Exlibris Electronic Discussion List. discrete or removable parts are marked. It is [email protected] (unmoderated but recommended that each separate plate, map, must be a member to post; contact Moderator chart, or other such item in a printed volume [email protected]

C&RL News July/August 2006 432 Intenational League of Antiquarian Book­ org. Home page: http://www.archivists.org. sellers. Send theft reports and requests for Security List (moderated and open to SAA database searches to: security@ilab­lila.com members only): saasecurityrt­[email protected] (List not available to public). Library Security Officer Electronic List. Appendix IV - Related guidelines Susan Allen, Chief Librarian, Research Library, (ACRL documents available at: http://www. Getty Research Institute, Suite 1100, 1200 rbms.info) Getty Center Drive. Los Angeles, CA 90049­ Association of College & Research 1688. 310­440­7611; (fax) 310­440­7781. Send Libraries. “Guidelines Regarding Thefts in reports to: [email protected] Libraries.” 1994. Museum Security Network. http://museum­ Association of College & Research security.org. Reporting address: securma@pop. Libraries. “Selection of General Collection xs4all.nl. Moderator Ton Cremers: museum­ Materials for Transfer to Special Collections.” security@museum­security.org 2nd ed. 1994. Professional Autograph Dealers As­ Association of College & Research Li­ sociation. C/o Catherine Barnes, P.O. Box braries. “Code of Ethics for Special Collection 27782, Philadelphia, PA 19118; e­mail: Librarians.” 2004. [email protected]; Home page: Society of American Archivists. “Librar­ http://www.padaweb.org. 215­247­9240; fax: ies and Archives: An Overview of Risk and 215­247­4645 Loss Prevention.” (1994). Society of American Archivists. 527 S. Society of American Archivists. “Protect­ Wells, Chicago, IL 60607. 312­922­0140 ing Your Collections: A Manual of Archival (fax) 312­347­1452; e­mail: sfox@archivists. Security.” (1995).

About the Guidelines The “Guidelines for the Security of Rare Book, Manuscript, and Other Special Collections” began in 1978 with an ad hoc charge to the RBMS Security Committee to develop guidelines for marking rare materials. Those marking guidelines were separately published in 1979 and when the present guidelines were originally published in 1982, the marking guidelines became an appendix to that document, a position they continue to occupy here. These guidelines have been revised on the ACRL five­year review schedule since their inception. The most extensive revision of them occurred in 1999; the present document is based on that revision and contains but few modifications. The decision to leave it basically unal­ tered was arrived at after deliberations in the Security Committee itself, input from the RBMS Executive and ACRL Standards and Accreditation committees, remarks by outside reviewers, and extensive publicity seeking comments. As with the text this revision supersedes, Appendix II contains numerous avenues for reporting thefts of rare materials, an unfortunate reality. Because the document is mounted on the both the ACRL and RBMS Web sites, efforts are made to keep the Internet links active and current so that the Web sites may be used directly for reporting thefts, an advantage not possessed by the printed iteration. Also, for the first time an appendix has been added to direct users to information about some secret marking methods for rare materials. The present members of the RBMS Security Committee are Everett C. Wilkie, Jr. (chair), Susan M. Allen, Todd Fell, Isaac Gewirtz, Martin Howley, Helice Koffl er, Melissa McAfee, Jeffrey D. Marshall, Elaine Schiner, Bruce Tabb, and Margaret Tufts Teeney. The section and the committee wish to acknowledge the support and assistance of the ACRL Standards and Accreditation Committee, for whose counsel and guidance it is grate­ ful.—Everett C. Wilkie, Jr.

July/August 2006 433 C&RL News