John L. Esposito, Dalia Mogahed

ESPOSITO / MOGAHED: BATTLE FOR MUSLIM HEARTS AND MINDS

BATTLE FOR MUSLIMS’ HEARTS AND MINDS: THE ROAD NOT (YET) TAKEN

Dr. Esposito is University Professor of Religion & International Affairs and director of the Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding at Georgetown University. Ms. Mogahed is a Gallup strategic analyst and executive director of Gallup Muslim Studies. Their forthcoming book, “Who Speaks for Islam? Listening to the Voices of a Billion Muslims,” is scheduled for publication in 2007.

fter a five-year war against of civilian deaths and destruction from the global terrorism, it is apparent Israeli invasions of Gaza and Lebanon. that Muslim extremism and From Morocco to Mindanao, the “war Aviolence is growing. Attacks against Islam and Muslims” has become a are sweeping across the world from North popular belief and slogan. Leaders as Africa to Southeast Asia, with targets diverse as Saddam Hussein, Ayatollah extending from Casablanca, Madrid and Khomeini, Bin Laden, Zarqawi and Iranian London to Istanbul, Riyadh, Jakarta and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad have Bali. The Osama bin Ladens and Abu exploited memories of the Crusades and Musab al-Zarqawis of the world have European colonialism and charges of turned a once-popular jihad — a struggle in American neocolonialism as threats to Afghanistan against Soviet occupation Islam. This view is reinforced by the power supported by the Muslim world and the of globalization, fanned by the rapid penetra- West — into an unholy war of suicide tion of television and Internet news through- bombings, hostage-taking and broad-based out the Muslim world. Muslim feelings of violence. humiliation and powerlessness are com- Concurrently, a sharp increase in pounded by the widespread belief that not Islamophobia in Europe and America has only the prospect of democracy but also been accompanied by growing anti- Islam and Islamic tradition, sources of power Americanism in the Arab and Muslim and strength for renewal and future success, worlds. Western images of terrorist attacks are under siege by Western dominance. For and suicide bombings in Iraq, Palestine, many Muslims, Western — especially Afghanistan, Pakistan and Indonesia are American — political, economic, military and countered in the Muslim world by the cultural hegemony are threats to indepen- invasion and occupation of Iraq, abuses at dence and self-determination as well as Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo, and images Islamic identity.

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It is against this backdrop that the think, and what do they really care about? Is United States desires stable, secular there truly an increase in Muslim radical democracies in predominantly Muslim views? If so, what is driving it? countries it views as threats, with the In mid-2005 and early 2006, the Gallup successful creation of such democracies Organization surveyed 10 predominantly being the ultimate measure of victory in the Muslim countries (Morocco, Egypt, Turkey, “war on terrorism.” Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Paki- The Bush administration says it stan, Indonesia and Bangladesh) as part of its understands that a critical early step is to new World Poll, which by the end of 2006 win the hearts and minds of Muslims. But will survey about 130 countries, including a number of challenges exist before that more than 35 that are predominantly Muslim. step can successfully be taken. There were 1,000 in-home, face-to-face surveys per country, with sampling in urban DEMOCRATIC EXCEPTIONALISM and rural areas that is the statistical equiva- Belief that the United States is serious lent of surveying the nation’s adult population, about democracy in Muslim countries has with a statistical-sampling error rate of plus been undermined by what is perceived as or minus 3 percentage points. America’s, and to a great extent Europe’s, The findings of the Gallup World Poll double standard in promoting democracy: provide a critical foundation and context for its long track record of supporting authori- understanding the nature and origins of tarian regimes and failing to promote radical views, as well as perceptions about democracy in the Muslim world as it did in Western attempts to foster democratic other regions and countries after the fall of governments. the Soviet Union. To determine who might be accurately As former Ambassador Richard Haass categorized as “politically radicalized” and acknowledged in a speech on December 4, “moderate,” Gallup looked at how respon- 2002, the U.S. government has for decades dents answered a question about the moral practiced “democratic exceptionalism” in the justification of the 9/11 attacks and their Muslim world, subordinating democracy to favorability ratings of the United States. other U.S. interests such as accessing oil, Those who said the 9/11 attacks were containing the Soviet Union, and grappling completely morally justified and who also with the Arab-Israeli conflict. have an unfavorable or very unfavorable If, as many maintain, the war against opinion of the United States were termed religious extremism and terrorism is a war of politically radicalized and thus potential ideas and thus an essential and integral part supporters of terrorism. Those who did not of public diplomacy, making our case con- say the attacks were completely justified vincingly and effectively requires that were termed moderates. This group of rhetoric about the promotion of democracy “moderates” can be further broken down be matched by actions on the ground that are into “skeptical moderates,” those with devoid of a perceived double standard and unfavorable opinions of the United States (51 the practice of democratic exceptionalism. percent), and “pro-U.S. moderates,” those It also requires knowing the answers to with neutral to favorable opinions of the these questions: What do Muslims really United States (38 percent).

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The vast majority of all polled said the of the “domino theory” and the worldwide 9/11 attacks were unjustified. Our focus struggle to prevent the spread of a mono- however, will be on the 7 percent who said lithic communism, just as the present war is the attacks were completely justified and cast as a war against global terrorism, have unfavorable opinions of the United although some Muslims see it as a war States. against Islam. As the world community There are a number of findings that faces a continued struggle with global are surprising, and some defy conventional terrorism, it is critical that we look closer wisdom about the drivers of Islamic and understand "the other" Muslim main- extremism: stream majorities as well as those who are — or could someday be — linked with • Both the politically radicalized and extremism and terrorism. moderates have strong religious sentiments, Some of the key questions that must be as measured by frequency of religious asked, and to some degree have been service attendance and affirmation that answered by the Gallup study, are these: religion is an important part of their lives. • The politically radicalized are, on • Who are the politically radicalized, average, more educated and affluent than and what makes them tick? moderates. • What is the link between terrorism • The politically radicalized convey a and poverty or ignorance? sense of being “dominated” or even • What is the relationship between “occupied” by the West. Islam and terrorism, and between jihad and • Responding to an open-ended suicide terrorism? question, the politically radicalized most • Why do they hate us and our way of frequently mention “occupation/U.S. life? domination” as their greatest fear, while • How do those who are politically moderates express concerns about eco- radicalized feel about Western freedoms nomic problems. and technology? • How do they view America? In an atmosphere in which the clarion • What do they say about the coun- call of a clash of civilizations seems tries of Europe? increasingly inevitable, what can be done? • What are the primary drivers of The need for public diplomacy has never extremism? been more important, making the need for solid data about those we wish to convince even more critical. WHO ARE THE RADICALIZED? Robert McNamara says he now Debates about how people become believes that what doomed the United terrorists have been going on for decades. States during the Vietnam War was a lack The causes of terrorism are said to be of knowledge about its enemy, the North psychological (they are abnormal, de- Vietnamese. It didn’t know what they ranged, irrational), sociological (they are thought or what they wanted. The war was uneducated, alienated social misfits), seen only in broad geopolitical terms, part

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economic (they are poor, unemployed, summarized as being young (early hopeless), political (they reject democracy, twenties), of rural or small-town freedom, human rights), and religious (they backgrounds, from the middle and are fanatics, zealots, believers in a violent lower middle class, with high achieve- religion that rejects modernization and ment motivation, upwardly mobile, with science or engineering education, technology). and from a normally cohesive family…. The conventional wisdom is based on Most of those we investigated would old and deeply held stereotypes and be considered model young Egyp- presuppositions, in part an intuitive sense tians.1 that radicalism and terrorism were driven by a combination of religious fanaticism, Similarly, with some exceptions, poverty and unemployment. The reluctance today’s breed of militants and terrorists, to see radicals as otherwise intelligent, from the 9/11 attackers to the London rational people responding to perceived bombers of 7/7, have been educated grievances was reflected within weeks individuals from middle- and working-class after 9/11. Media reported the “stunning backgrounds. Some were devout; others discovery” that most of the attackers were were not. Most were not graduates of not from the poor, downtrodden, madrasas or seminaries but of private or undereducated and alienated sectors of public schools and universities. Bin Laden society, but rather that they, like their was trained in management and econom- leaders Bin Laden and the physician ics, Al-Zawahiri, a pediatric surgeon, and Ayman al-Zawahiri, were well-educated, other al-Qaeda leaders, as well as those middle- to upper-class and from stable responsible for the World Trade Center and family backgrounds. This profile raises Pentagon attacks such as Muhammad important questions about why people from Atta, were well-educated, middle-class seemingly normal backgrounds become professionals. British-born Omar Sheikh, terrorists. the terrorist kidnapper of the executed But, should we have been so surprised Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl, by the profile of the 9/11 attackers as well was educated at elite private schools, as the leaders of al-Qaeda and other including the London School of Economics. terrorist groups? Not if we remembered Analyzing the answers of the 7 percent recent history, for Muslim extremism is not of those who justify 9/11 and view the a new phenomenon. Extremist groups United States unfavorably and comparing from Egypt and Algeria to Lebanon, them with the moderate majority produces Pakistan, Indonesia and the southern some surprising results. Calling the 7 Philippines have existed for decades. Early percent “politically radicalized” is not to studies by the Egyptian sociologist Saad say that all in this group commit acts of Eddin Ibrahim and others of the assassins violence. However, those with radical of Egypt’s President Anwar Sadat in 1981 views are a potential source for recruit- have concluded: ment or support for terrorist groups. This group also is so committed to changing The typical social profile of members political situations that they are more likely of militant Islamic groups could be to view other civilian attacks as justifiable.

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For example, 13 percent of the politically secondary or higher educations versus 52 radicalized versus 1 percent of moderates percent of moderates. say attacks on civilians are “completely • The politically radicalized are also justified.” more affluent than moderates: 23 percent What is the age and gender of the of the politically radicalized say they have political radicals? They are younger, but not low or very low incomes versus 28 percent substantially. Forty-nine percent are of moderates. between the ages of 18 and 29, while 42 percent of those with moderate views are JOBLESS AND HOPELESS? in the same age range. Contrary to what Unemployment, like poverty, has been some might expect, while the politically a major social problem from Algeria, Egypt radicalized are more likely to be male, 37 and Sudan to Pakistan, Bangladesh and percent are female. In many Muslim Indonesia. Yet, neither unemployment nor societies (Egypt, Iran, Turkey, Saudi job status differentiates the politically Arabia, Malaysia and Indonesia), increas- radicalized from moderates: ing numbers of women are educated and, like men, also have access to the interna- No difference exists in the percentages tional media; their greater awareness of of politically radicalized and moderates international affairs and politicization is not who say they have a job. surprising. Similarly, a minority of suicide bombers have been women. Among those who are employed, the politically radicalized hold jobs with greater POOR AND IGNORANT? responsibility: almost half (47 percent) of The Arab Development Report of 2005 those with radical views versus 34 percent and many other studies of Muslim coun- of the moderates say they supervise other tries have documented for years the people at work. existence of significant poverty and The politically radicalized are not more illiteracy. They are found in Palestinian “hopeless” than the mainstream. In an- refugee camps and the slums of Algiers, swers to questions about their lives, larger Cairo, Baghdad and Jakarta, as well as in percentages of politically radicalized than many other non-Muslim developing nations. moderates respond that they are more Poverty and a lack of information and skills satisfied with their financial situation, necessary for social mobility are the result standard of living and quality of life. For of deep-seated economic and social example, 64 percent of the politically problems that can generate broad-based radicalized versus 55 percent of moderates discontent. However, are poverty and a believe their standard of living is getting lack of education and poverty key factors better. that distinguish those with radical views Surprisingly, the politically radicalized from moderates? The data say no. are also, on average, more optimistic about their personal future than are moderates. A • The politically radicalized, on aver- greater percentage of the politically age, are more educated than moderates: 67 radicalized (52 percent versus 45 percent percent of those with radical views have of moderates) believe they will be much

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better off in five years. However, while a HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE larger percentage of those with radical Although, today, many see linking views are more optimistic about their own religion and politics in Islam as somehow lives, they are, across the board, more unique and peculiar, many historical pessimistic about world affairs and interna- examples exist in other religions as well. In tional politics. Judaism, the conquest and settlement of the land of Israel was pursued under the RELIGION-TERRORISM direction of God; King David’s successors CONNECTION? were anointed by God. In Christianity, The religious language and symbolism kings and emperors were often crowned that terrorists use tend to place religion at by the pope. The Crusades were fought as center stage. Many charge that global a divinely sanctioned holy war; as Pope terrorism is attributable to Islam, a militant Urban II declared, “It is the will of God.” or violent religion, and terrorists who are The conquistadors and European particularly religious. What do the data colonialists were motivated by “crown and say? cross,” imperial expansion and Christian mission. In Hinduism, rulers upheld the • Large majorities of those with both divine order, and the doctrine of dharma radical and moderate views (94 percent supported the Hindu social class/caste and 90 percent, respectively) say religion is system. an important part of their daily lives. In recent decades, religion has become • Majorities of both groups (64 part of wars of liberation and resistance as percent of politically radicalized and 51 well as acts of terrorism throughout the percent of moderates) indicate that having world. We see this in conflicts between a rich spiritual life is essential. Sikhs and Hindus in India; Muslim • No significant difference exists Bosniaks, Croatian Catholics and Serbian between the politically radicalized and Orthodox in the former Yugoslavia; Chris- moderates in worship attendance. tian, Muslim, and Druze militias in Leba- non; Catholic and Protestant militants in Considering the link between religion Northern Ireland; Muslims and Christians and terrorism requires a larger and more in Nigeria; Muslim (Hamas and Islamic complex context. That other powerful Jihad) and Jewish fundamentalists (the forces such as political and economic Gush Emunim, Meir Kahane’s Kach party grievances are primary catalysts for and Yigal Amir, the assassin of Yitshak terrorism does not mean that religion may Rabin) in Israel-Palestine. not play a significant role. Throughout Closer to home, the vast majority of history, close ties between religion and terrorist attacks on American soil in the last politics have existed in societies. And 15 years have come from Christian terror- throughout history, leaders have used ist groups. Catholic, Lutheran and Presby- religion to recruit members, to justify their terian activists have bombed gay bars, shot actions, and to glorify fighting and dying in or killed abortion providers, and bombed a sacred struggle. their clinics. White Christian-supremacy groups have been linked to attacks on the

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Centennial Olympic Park in Atlanta and and religion. These multiple meanings many other incidents, including Ruby continue to exist across the Muslim world. Ridge. Timothy McVeigh used the One of the open-ended questions Cosmotheism espoused by William Pierce Gallup asks is, “Please tell me in one word to justify bombing the Alfred P. Murrah (or a very few words) what ‘jihad’ means Federal Building in Oklahoma City. How- to you.” Of the thousands of self-crafted ever different, religions have in the past as definitions received, personal definitions of well as today been a means to legitimate jihad include (in roughly decreasing order holy and unholy struggles and wars.2 of frequency) references to:

ISLAM AND “JIHAD”? • “A commitment to hard work” and No word has come to popularly “achieving one’s goals in life” symbolize violence and terror in the name • “Struggling to achieve a noble of Islam more than jihad, a term that is cause” widely used and abused. Jihad was used in • “Promoting peace, harmony or the Afghan resistance to Soviet occupation. cooperation, and assisting others” Post-Afghanistan, it has been employed in • “Living the principles of Islam” just about every Muslim struggle of resistance and liberation as well as extremism In the four Arab nations in which the and terrorism in Bosnia, Kosovo, question was asked in 2001 (Lebanon, Chechnya, Kashmir, Gaza, Lebanon and Kuwait, Jordan and Morocco), the most Bali. Terrorists like Bin Laden, Zarqawi, frequently articulated descriptions of jihad the London bombers and other radicals as included references to one’s “duty toward well as, ironically, many non-Muslims God,” a “divine duty” or a “worship of equate jihad with a Muslim holy war God” — with no explicit militaristic conno- against unbelievers. However, many tation at all. observant Muslims counter that holy war is In four of the eight countries in which not an Islamic but rather a Christian term, this question was asked (Pakistan, Iran, originating with the Crusades. Turkey and Indonesia), a significant Jihad, meaning “to struggle,” is rooted minority did include some reference to in the Quran’s command to “struggle or “sacrificing one’s life for the sake of Islam/ exert” oneself in the path of God. It God/a just cause” or “fighting against the primarily means the obligation of all opponents of Islam.” This was the single Muslims, individuals and the community, to most identifiable pattern within the verba- do God’s will: to lead a virtuous life, tim responses received, though in none of struggle against the evil in oneself, make a these countries save Indonesia was it serious effort to do good works and help to expressed by an outright majority. reform society. Depending on the circum- One thing is clear: among Muslims stances in which one lives, jihad can also globally, the concept of jihad is consider- mean fighting injustice and oppression, ably more nuanced than the single sense in creating a just society through preaching which Western commentators invariably and teaching and, if necessary, engaging in invoke the term. armed struggle to defend one’s community

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RELIGION AND SUICIDE Brigade, a secular Palestinian militia has, TERRORISM like Hamas, used religion to legitimate its The most controversial and increas- suicide bombings, choosing the name al- ingly widespread form of terrorism is Aqsa (a major mosque and religious site in suicide bombing, used since the early 1980s Jerusalem) as well as calling its attacks as a major strategic weapon of resistance “jihads” and its fallen “jihadists” martyrs. by Muslim militants as well as other Lebanon, Madrid and Iraq provide religious (Christian, Jewish, Hindu and good examples from the past two decades Buddhist) and ethnic groups. Often suicide of suicide bombers’ strategy, tactics and bombings are attributed to religious funda- objectives. Although suicide attacks are mentalism or religious fanaticism, moti- said to have originated with Hamas in the vated by a holy-war mentality and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, they actually promise of heavenly rewards for martyrs. first occurred in the Muslim world in But while terrorists use religious appeals to Lebanon, used by Hizbollah and al-Jihad in recruit volunteers, is religion the key 1983 against the U.S. Marine barracks in precipitator of terrorism? Beirut, when 241 Americans were killed. Robert Pape of the University of Hizbollah’s suicide attackers exemplify the Chicago, after a comprehensive study of all fact that members of resistance move- suicide terrorism incidents from 1980 to ments are not necessarily motivated by 2003, concluded: religion. The attackers in this case included only eight Muslim fundamentalists, along From Lebanon to Sri Lanka to with three Christians and 27 communists Chechnya to Kashmir to the West and socialists. Bank, every major suicide-terrorist The political context changed in 1989 campaign — over 95 percent of all the after the Taif accords ended the Lebanese incidents — has had as its central civil war. Hizbollah became a major player objective to compel a democratic state in electoral politics. Although as a political to withdraw.3 party Hizbollah enjoyed a significant However, while redressing real or per- presence in the Lebanese parliament, it ceived occupation and injustice, both refused to lay down its arms in the south, religious and secular groups have framed continuing to fight what it regarded as their terrorist acts within a powerful Israeli occupation. The Israeli pullout after religious medium. 18 years (1982-2000) was widely seen by The Tamil Tigers, a Marxist-Leninist many, in particular militant Islamists, as group whose main tactic is suicide bomb- vindicating the tactical use of violence and ings, has appealed to Tamil Hindu identity suicide bombing. In their minds, the tactic in its struggle against Sinhalese Buddhists was further vindicated in summer 2006 in Sri Lanka to achieve independence. during the latest Hizbollah-Israeli conflict in Hamas, an acronym for “Islamic resistance Lebanon. movement,” originated primarily to resist In contrast to Lebanon and many other Israeli occupation, but religion has been countries, the 2004 suicide bombing in used to legitimate its existence and its acts Madrid was carried out by al-Qaeda, not of terrorism. Even the al-Aqsa Martyrs against occupation in Spain but to terrorize

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Spaniards before elections and thus defeat moderates mention the top three spontane- the incumbent prime minister, who sup- ous responses: (1) technology; (2) the ported the invasion and occupation of Iraq. West’s value system — hard work, indi- This strategy succeeded when the new vidual responsibility, rule of law, and government withdrew Spanish troops from cooperation; and (3) fair political systems Iraq shortly after assuming power. — democracy, respect of human rights, Suicide terrorism was unknown in Iraq freedom of speech, and gender equality. before its invasion and occupation by the • Looking at their own countries, a United States and Great Britain. However, significantly higher percentage of the it became a widespread tactic, used by politically radicalized (50 percent versus 35 Sunni and Shii militants in their sectarian percent of moderates), contrary to popular conflicts over power and to end American belief, say that “moving toward greater occupation. governmental democracy” will foster If suicide terrorism is not simply driven progress in the Arab/Muslim world. by blind religious, ethnic, or cultural hatred but by perceived or real injustices, in Thus, contrary to conventional wisdom, particular occupation, then what about the those who are politically radicalized are not ever-present question, “Why do they hate necessarily anti-democracy. us?” Moreover, when considering relations between the Muslim world and the West, the WHY DO THEY HATE US? politically radicalized do not simply reject the This question, raised in the immediate West. No significant difference exists aftermath of 9/11, looms large following between the percentage of the politically continued suicide and other terrorist radicalized and moderates who say, “Better attacks as well as the dramatic growth of relations with the West concerns me a lot.” anti-Americanism. A common answer Even more surprising, those with radical provided by some U.S. politicians and political views more intensely believe that experts has been, “They hate our way of Arab/Muslim nations are eager to have life, our freedom, democracy and suc- better relations with the West. This point of cess.” view was expressed by 58 percent versus 45 Considering the broad-based anti- percent of moderates. Americanism not only among radicals but also among a significant mainstream WHAT ABOUT EUROPE? majority in the Muslim world (and indeed in Although many in the West believe that many other parts of the world), this answer anti-Americanism is tied to a basic hatred of does not satisfy. Although there are many the West as well as deep West-East religious common grievances expressed in the and cultural differences, Muslim assessments Muslim world, do the politically radicalized of individual Western countries reveal a and moderates differ in attitudes about the different picture. Unfavorable opinions of the West? United States or Great Britain do not pre- clude a favorable attitude toward other • When asked what they admire about Western countries such as France or Ger- the West, both politically radicalized and many.

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The politically radicalized are consis- Muslim nation surveyed in 2005 doubted tently more negative than moderates in that the United States is serious about the their opinions of all Western countries. establishment of democratic systems in the However, there is a stark contrast in their region: view of particular Western nations. Even those who are politically radicalized • Only 24 percent in Egypt and Jordan consistently differentiate between countries and 16 percent in Turkey agree that the and leaders and do not see a monolithic United States is serious about establishing West. For example, while only 25 percent democratic systems. of the politically radicalized have very • The largest groups in agreement are unfavorable opinions of France and 26 in Lebanon (38 percent) and Indonesia (48 percent have very unfavorable opinions of percent) but even there, 58 percent of Germany, this percentage jumps to 68 Lebanese and 52 percent of Indonesians percent for Britain and 84 percent for the disagree with the statement. United States. Strong unfavorable opinions of West- Although the politically radicalized, as ern heads of state also vary significantly. we have seen, are more optimistic about Ninety percent of the politically radicalized their personal lives, they are significantly and 62 percent of moderates express a more skeptical and pessimistic about world dislike for George Bush; dislike for Tony affairs. The skepticism among Muslims in Blair registers at 70 percent of politically general regarding the United States and its radicalized and 43 percent of moderates. promotion of democracy is intensified That level of dislike does not extend to among radicals: While about half (52 other Western leaders. For example, dislike percent) of moderates say they disagree of Jacques Chirac is significantly lower: 39 that the United States is serious about percent among the politically radicalized supporting democracy in the region, almost and 24 percent among moderates. three-fourths (72 percent) of the politically Similarly, 81 percent of the politically radicalized disagree. radicalized and 67 percent of moderates As mentioned in the discussion about describe the United States as aggressive, democratic exceptionalism, many Muslims while few see France (7 percent of charge that the United States and the West moderates and 9 percent of politically in general have a double standard when it radicalized) or Germany (8 percent of comes to the promotion of democracy and moderates and 9 percent of politically human rights in the Arab/Muslim world. radicalized) as aggressive. An across-the- Nearly two-thirds (63 percent) of the board blind hatred of Western culture by politically radicalized disagree that the those who are politically radicalized is not United States will allow people in the reflected in this worldwide data. region to “fashion their own political future as they see fit without direct U.S. influ- PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY? ence,” compared with 48 percent of While the spread of democracy has moderates. been the stated goal of the United States, The impact of that perception is clear majorities in virtually every predominantly when one considers that Gallup also found

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that 50 percent of the politically radicalized West, and the promise of widespread social feel more strongly that their progress will reforms. At the same time, Islamic move- be helped by “moving toward governmental ments such as the Muslim Brotherhood democracy,” compared with 35 percent of attracted tens of thousands of members in moderates. Egypt and Sudan as well as Syria, Jordan For the politically radicalized, their fear and Palestine. of Western control and domination, as well However, Arab nationalism/socialism as lack of self-determination, reinforces was discredited by the disastrous Arab their sense of powerlessness. Thus, there defeat in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. The is the development of a belief among the disillusionment was driven by a widespread politically radicalized that they must feeling of loss of identity, failed political dedicate themselves to changing an systems and economies, and the breakdown untenable situation. of traditional religious and social values. In response, many governments turned to Islam RELIGIOUS AND CULTURAL to buttress their legitimacy and deal with the IDENTITY challenge of Islamic reform and opposition The creation of modern Muslim states movements. Since the 1970s, religion and after World War II brought high expecta- culture have remained major forces in tions for a strong and prosperous future. Muslim politics and society. Many governments and elites looked to Issues of religious identity are very Western models (political, economic, legal, important to both the politically radicalized and educational ideas and institutions). and moderates. The usual response to what However, nation building in the Muslim they admire most about themselves was world, where borders were often artificially “faithfulness to their religious beliefs.” The drawn by European colonial powers, statement they most closely associate with placed peoples with diverse centuries-old Arab/Muslim nations is “attachment to their religious, tribal and ethnic identities and spiritual and moral values is critical to their allegiances under non-elected rulers (kings progress.” But, what distinguishes the and military officers). As later conflicts and politically radicalized from moderates is their civil wars in Lebanon and Iraq would greater emphasis on their spiritual and moral demonstrate, it was a fragile process that values. bore the seeds of later crises of identity, legitimacy, power and authority. • In contrast to less than half (44 By the late 1950s and 1960s, wide- percent) of the moderate group, fully two- spread dissatisfaction with the track record thirds of the politically radicalized give top of Western-inspired liberal nationalism took priority to holding on to their spiritual and its toll. Monarchs and governments moral values as something that is critical to tumbled from power and new rulers their progress. emerged in Egypt, Libya, Syria, Sudan, Iraq • The politically radicalized also, in and Algeria. All were based upon some significantly higher percentages, emphasize form of Arab nationalism/socialism with its preservation of their culture traditions and populist appeals to Arab identity and unity, principles as well as their holy places and the failures of liberal nationalism and the Islamic values as admirable qualities of the

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Muslim world. powerful West that does not share its Responses to poll questions also reveal values is overwhelming the Muslim world. the belief that Muslims’ Islamic heritage, When asked the open-ended question, “In which is critical to their progress, is also your own words, what do you resent most perceived to be in danger of being weak- about the West?” the most frequent ened by the West’s denigration of Islam response across all countries for both and perception of Arabs and Muslims as moderates (42 percent) and the politically inferior. Only 12 percent of the politically radicalized (51 percent) was “sexual and radicalized and 16 percent of moderates cultural promiscuity,” followed by “ethical associate “respecting Islamic values” with and moral corruption” and “hatred of Western nations. For both groups, the Muslims.” West’s “disrespect for Islam” ranks high Another source of resentment comes on the list of what they most resent. from the depiction of Muslims in Western Therefore, as one might expect, when media. A survey by Jack Shaheen in his asked what the Arab/Muslim world could book, Reel Bad Arabs: How Hollywood do to improve relations with Western Vilifies a People, found that the vast societies, the top response from the majority of Arab characters in 900 Ameri- politically radicalized was “improve the can films were outright racist caricatures. presentation of Islam to the West, present Images of ordinary Muslims and Muslim Islamic values in a positive manner.” cultures in a Western mass media that is distributed globally are almost non-existent THE WAR AGAINST ISLAM or distorted. Moreover, Western TV Many Muslims see the lure of Western programs and films that are most popular in pop culture in dress, the Internet and the Muslim world encourage a superficial Western media. Eighty percent of theaters emulation of Western fashions, personali- in Muslim countries show Hollywood films, ties and values. Notably, a significantly according to a recent study by the U.S. greater proportion of politically radicalized Council on Foreign Relations. The Gallup than moderates cite Western cultural World Poll found that about half of both the penetration, Western immorality and moral politically radicalized and moderates corruption as the top reasons for resent- associate “producing enjoyable films and ment. music” with the West. More informed about international While many are attracted, many others politics and committed to protecting cultural (not unlike many conservative Christians values needed for renewal and reform, the and members of the Christian right) are politically radicalized are far more intense repulsed. They perceive Western societ- in their belief that Western political, military ies’ permissiveness as an assault on and cultural domination is a major threat. traditional religious and cultural values. When asked to define their greatest fears They fear the strong appeal of Western about the future of their country, the music, movies and TV programs, especially politically radicalized most frequently cite among the younger generation. The interference in their internal affairs by strength of this threat is enhanced by a other countries, national security, coloniza- predominant feeling that a secular and tion, intrusion, occupation, manipulation, the

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fear that “might is right,” and U.S. domi- quality of life of people like you in this nance. In contrast, moderates rank eco- country?” Given what they admire about nomic problems as their top concern. themselves and resent about the West, The alienation from the West that the answers to these questions paint a consis- politically radicalized feel more intensely is tent picture: also shown by the larger percentage (40 percent versus 20 percent of moderates) • Reflecting the importance of Islam, who think that Western societies do not the most frequent response given by both show any concern for better coexistence groups was this: having more respect, with the Arab-Muslim world. The politically consideration and understanding of Islam radicalized (37 percent versus 20 percent as a religion; not underestimating the status of moderates) also feel more intensely that of Arab/Muslim countries; and being fair the time for a better understanding be- and less prejudiced. tween the West and the Arab/Muslim • Reflecting the priority they give to world probably will never come. democracy, the politically radicalized give Even more stunning, but consistent equal importance to the need for political with their responses to other questions, is independence. Their responses include the extent of radicals’ commitment. Fully these: stop meddling in our internal affairs, half said that willingness to “give one’s life colonizing us, and controlling natural for a cause, to fight against injustice” is resources. “completely justifiable.” This contrasts with only 18 percent of moderates who The heightened sense of the West’s express that view. threat to political freedom and to Islamic Although both groups are concerned identity has reinforced the desire for Sharia, about bias and Western political interfer- or Islamic law. Recourse to the Sharia, the ence in their affairs, the greater intensity blueprint for an Islamic society, provides a and fear expressed by the politically centuries-old paradigm. Thus, however radicalized predispose them to have a more different and diverse Muslim populations may sympathetic ear for terrorists if their be, for many Sharia is central to faith and grievances are not addressed. identity. While both moderates (83 percent) and the politically radicalized (91 percent) WHAT DRIVES RADICALISM? want Sharia as a source of law, a signifi- A primary catalyst for radicalism, often cantly higher percentage of the radicalized seen as inseparable from the threat to (59 percent versus 32 percent of moderates) Muslim religious and cultural identity, is the want to see Sharia as the only source of law. threat of political domination and occupa- This desire for Sharia is reminiscent of tion. The interplay of the political and the reasons behind the early development of religious is strongly reflected in radical and Islamic law: to create a rule of law as a moderate responses to open-ended ques- shield against the power of the caliph or tions like, “What can the West do to sultan. As Richard Bulliet in The Case for improve relations with the Muslim World?” Islamo-Christian Civilization notes: and “What is the most important thing the United States could do to improve the All that restrained rulers from acting as

39 MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XIV, NO. 1, SRING 2007

tyrants was Islamic law, sharia. Since politically radicalized give higher priority to the law was based on divine rather promoting democratic ideals and freedom then human principles, no ruler could of speech, enhancing their country’s 4 change it to serve his own interests. international status, earning more respect, and playing more important regional and Today, greater interest by the politically international roles. radicalized in the implementation of Islamic law reflects their desire to limit the power Moderates and the politically of rulers and regimes that they regard as radicalized differ more widely in expressing authoritarian, “un-Islamic” and corrupt. their greatest fears about their country’s This is not a call for theocracy, how- future. Moderates’ top concern focuses on ever. When asked to what extent they economic problems: inflation, stagnation, wanted religious leaders involved in public the high cost of living, a decline in the value life (secular family law, curricula in of their currency, and an increase of taxes schools, drafting new laws or a constitu- and foreign debt. This is followed by crime, tion, deciding who may run for office or assassinations and uncontrolled security how women may dress in public, or situations. determining their country’s foreign policy), Meanwhile, the top fear of the politi- majorities of both the politically radicalized cally radicalized is national security: and moderates do not want religious interference in internal affairs by other leaders to be directly in charge. Neverthe- powers. Concerns include colonization, less, the politically radicalized are more economic dominance, occupation, the fear likely to want religious leaders to play an that might makes right, and U.S. domi- “advisory” role, consistent with the ulemas’ nance, followed by other political issues: traditional role as advisers to rulers. civil war, internal conflict, disunity, sectari- One of the most important insights anism and regional wars. provided by Gallup’s data is that the issues that drive the politically radicalized are also DIAGNOSIS OR MISDIAGNOSIS? issues for moderates. The critical differ- Diagnosing terrorism as a symptom ence between these two outlooks is one of and Islam as the problem, though popular in priority, intensity of feeling, degree of some circles, is flawed and has serious politicization and alienation. This accounts risks with dangerous repercussions. It for key differences in the hopes of each confirms radical beliefs and fears, alienates group: the moderate Muslim majority, and reinforces the idea that the war against global • When asked about their dreams for terrorism is really a war against Islam. the future of their country, majorities of Whether one is radical or moderate, this both moderates and the politically negative attitude is a widespread percep- radicalized cite improved economic condi- tion. The politically radicalized are not tions, followed by greater security and an crazed lunatics caught up in an illusion that end to civil tensions. is not shared by the vast majority. Rather, • While moderates then focus on they are distinguished by a greater “degree improvements in educational systems, the of awareness,” leading to more intense

40 ESPOSITO / MOGAHED: BATTLE FOR MUSLIM HEARTS AND MINDS

alienation, politicization and a deeper and Americans, plus the fact that about 9 commitment to sacrifice and taking action out of 10 Muslims are moderates, is the to create change. good news for those optimistic about Americans, like the vast moderate Islamic coexistence with the rest of the majority in the Muslim world, share a world. But the bad news is the enormous fundamental aversion to extremism. Asked difference in perceptions between Muslims what they admire least about the Muslim and Westerners, as well as the vast world, Americans said overwhelmingly, number of politically radicalized Muslims “extremism/radicalism/not open to others’ who could be pushed to support or perpe- ideas.” Likewise, when asked what they trate violence against civilians. admired least about their own societies, How bad is it? Majorities of Muslims Muslims’ top concerns included extremism — both politically radicalized and moder- and terrorism. This should not be surpris- ates — say they know and admire the ing, given that the primary victims of West’s technology, freedom of speech, and Muslim extremism and terrorism have been value system of hard work. Meanwhile, Muslim societies. The “terrorist fringe,” far Americans asked what they know about from being glorified, is rejected by citizens Muslims predominantly offer two re- of predominantly Muslim countries, just as sponses: “Nothing” and “I don’t know.” it is by citizens in the United States. There are 1.3 billion Muslims today Americans and Muslims throughout the worldwide. If the 7 percent (91 million) world have at least two things in common: who are radicalized continue to feel a predominantly unfavorable opinion of politically dominated, occupied and disre- George W. Bush and a fundamental spected, the West’s opportunity to address aversion to extremism and terrorism. This these drivers of extremism will be as great amount of agreement between Muslims as the challenge of succeeding.

1 Saad Eddin Ibrahim, “Egypt’s Islamic Militants,” MERIP Reports, 103 (February 1982): p.11. See also Saad Eddin Ibrahim, “Islamic Militancy as Social Movement,” in Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, ed., Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World (Praeger, 1882), pp. 128-31, and Emmanuel Sivan, Radical Islam (Yale University Press, 1990), pp. 118-19. 2 From a statement by Mark Juergensmeyer at the International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism, and Security, March 8-11, 2006, Madrid, Spain. 3 Robert Pape, The Logic of Suicide Terrorism: It’s the Occupation, Not the Fundamentalism (Random House, 2005), p. 2. 4 Richard W. Bulliet, The Case for Islamo-Christian Civilization (Columbia University Press, 2004), p. 62.