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Federal Aviation Administration, DOT § 23.775

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Federal Aviation Administration, DOT § 23.775 Federal Aviation Administration, DOT § 23.775 (b) Where the flight crew are sepa- § 23.775 Windshields and windows. rated from the passengers by a parti- (a) The internal panels of windshields tion, an opening or openable window or and windows must be constructed of a door must be provided to facilitate nonsplintering material, such as non- communication between flight crew splintering safety glass. and the passengers; and (b) The design of windshields, win- (c) The aerodynamic controls listed dows, and canopies in pressurized air- in § 23.779, excluding cables and control planes must be based on factors pecu- rods, must be located with respect to liar to high altitude operation, includ- the propellers so that no part of the ing— pilot or the controls lies in the region (1) The effects of continuous and cy- between the plane of rotation of any clic pressurization loadings; inboard propeller and the surface gen- (2) The inherent characteristics of erated by a line passing through the the material used; and center of the propeller hub making an (3) The effects of temperatures and temperature gradients. angle of 5 degrees forward or aft of the (c) On pressurized airplanes, if cer- plane of rotation of the propeller. tification for operation up to and in- [Doc. No. 4080, 29 FR 17955, Dec. 18, 1964, as cluding 25,000 feet is requested, an en- amended by Amdt. 23–14, 38 FR 31821, Nov. 19, closure canopy including a representa- 1973] tive part of the installation must be subjected to special tests to account § 23.773 Pilot compartment view. for the combined effects of continuous (a) Each pilot compartment must and cyclic pressurization loadings and be— flight loads, or compliance with the fail-safe requirements of paragraph (d) (1) Arranged with sufficiently exten- of this section must be shown. sive, clear and undistorted view to en- (d) If certification for operation able the pilot to safely taxi, takeoff, above 25,000 feet is requested the wind- approach, land, and perform any ma- shields, window panels, and canopies neuvers within the operating limita- must be strong enough to withstand tions of the airplane. the maximum cabin pressure differen- (2) Free from glare and reflections tial loads combined with critical aero- that could interfere with the pilot’s vi- dynamic pressure and temperature ef- sion. Compliance must be shown in all fects, after failure of any load-carrying operations for which certification is re- element of the windshield, window quested; and panel, or canopy. (3) Designed so that each pilot is pro- (e) The windshield and side windows tected from the elements so that mod- forward of the pilot’s back when the erate rain conditions do not unduly im- pilot is seated in the normal flight po- pair the pilot’s view of the flight path sition must have a luminous transmit- in normal flight and while landing. tance value of not less than 70 percent. (b) Each pilot compartment must (f) Unless operation in known or fore- have a means to either remove or pre- cast icing conditions is prohibited by vent the formation of fog or frost on an operating limitations, a means must be provided to prevent or to clear accumu- area of the internal portion of the lations of ice from the windshield so windshield and side windows suffi- that the pilot has adequate view for ciently large to provide the view speci- taxi, takeoff, approach, landing, and to fied in paragraph (a)(1) of this section. perform any maneuvers within the op- Compliance must be shown under all erating limitations of the airplane. expected external and internal ambient (g) In the event of any probable sin- operating conditions, unless it can be gle failure, a transparency heating sys- shown that the windshield and side tem must be incapable of raising the windows can be easily cleared by the temperature of any windshield or win- pilot without interruption of moral dow to a point where there would be— pilot duties. (1) Structural failure that adversely affects the integrity of the cabin; or [Doc. No. 26269, 58 FR 42165, Aug. 6, 1993] (2) There would be a danger of fire. 237 VerDate jul<14>2003 21:33 Jan 19, 2004 Jkt 203042 PO 00000 Frm 00237 Fmt 8010 Sfmt 8010 Y:\SGML\203042T.XXX 203042T § 23.777 14 CFR Ch. I (1–1–04 Edition) (h) In addition, for commuter cat- one inch higher or longer to make egory airplanes, the following applies: them more prominent than propeller (1) Windshield panes directly in front (rpm control) or mixture controls. Car- of the pilots in the normal conduct of buretor heat or alternate air control their duties, and the supporting struc- must be to the left of the throttle or at tures for these panes, must withstand, least eight inches from the mixture without penetration, the impact of a control when located other than on a two-pound bird when the velocity of pedestal. Carburetor heat or alternate the airplane (relative to the bird along air control, when located on a pedestal the airplane’s flight path) is equal to must be aft or below the power (thrust) the airplane’s maximum approach flap lever. Supercharger controls must be speed. located below or aft of the propeller (2) The windshield panels in front of controls. Airplanes with tandem seat- the pilots must be arranged so that, as- ing or single-place airplanes may uti- suming the loss of vision through any lize control locations on the left side of one panel, one or more panels remain the cabin compartment; however, loca- available for use by a pilot seated at a tion order from left to right must be pilot station to permit continued safe power (thrust) lever, propeller (rpm flight and landing. control) and mixture control. [Doc. No. 4080, 29 FR 17955, Dec. 18, 1964, as (e) Identical powerplant controls for amended by Amdt. 23–7, 34 FR 13092, Aug. 13, each engine must be located to prevent 1969; Amdt. 23–45, 58 FR 42165, Aug. 6, 1993; 58 confusion as to the engines they con- FR 51970, Oct. 5, 1993; Amdt. 23–49, 61 FR 5166, Feb. 9, 1996] trol. (1) Conventional multiengine power- § 23.777 Cockpit controls. plant controls must be located so that (a) Each cockpit control must be lo- the left control(s) operates the left en- cated and (except where its function is gines(s) and the right control(s) oper- obvious) identified to provide conven- ates the right engine(s). ient operation and to prevent confusion (2) On twin-engine airplanes with and inadvertent operation. front and rear engine locations (tan- (b) The controls must be located and dem), the left powerplant controls arranged so that the pilot, when seat- must operate the front engine and the ed, has full and unrestricted movement right powerplant controls must operate of each control without interference the rear engine. from either his clothing or the cockpit (f) Wing flap and auxiliary lift device structure. controls must be located— (c) Powerplant controls must be lo- (1) Centrally, or to the right of the cated— pedestal or powerplant throttle control (1) For multiengine airplanes, on the centerline; and pedestal or overhead at or near the (2) Far enough away from the landing center of the cockpit; gear control to avoid confusion. (2) For single and tandem seated sin- (g) The landing gear control must be gle-engine airplanes, on the left side located to the left of the throttle cen- console or instrument panel; terline or pedestal centerline. (3) For other single-engine airplanes at or near the center of the cockpit, on (h) Each fuel feed selector control the pedestal, instrument panel, or must comply with § 23.995 and be lo- overhead; and cated and arranged so that the pilot (4) For airplanes, with side-by-side can see and reach it without moving pilot seats and with two sets of power- any seat or primary flight control plant controls, on left and right con- when his seat is at any position in soles. which it can be placed. (d) The control location order from (1) For a mechanical fuel selector: left to right must be power (thrust) (i) The indication of the selected fuel lever, propeller (rpm control), and mix- valve position must be by means of a ture control (condition lever and fuel pointer and must provide positive iden- cutoff for turbine-powered airplanes). tification and feel (detent, etc.) of the Power (thrust) levers must be at least selected position. 238 VerDate jul<14>2003 21:33 Jan 19, 2004 Jkt 203042 PO 00000 Frm 00238 Fmt 8010 Sfmt 8010 Y:\SGML\203042T.XXX 203042T.
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