New START Treaty U.S. Senate Briefing Book
A Joint Product of the United States Departments of State and Defense April 2010
New START Treaty U.S. Senate Briefing Book
A Joint Product of the United States Departments of State and Defense April 2010
SUMMARY
NEW START TREATY RATIFICATION KEY POINTS ...... 2
THE NEW START TREATY AT A GLANCE ...... 3
APRIL 8, 2010 STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT OBAMA ...... 4
QUOTES FROM ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS ...... 7
KEY ADMINISTRATION STATEMENTS ON NEW START TREATY PRESIDENT OBAMA ...... 10 SECRETARY OF STATE CLINTON, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE GATES, AND CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS MULLEN ...... 12
FACT SHEETS
NEW START AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS...... 16
CENTRAL WARHEAD AND DELIVERY VEHICLE LIMITS OF THE NEW START TREATY ...... 17
THE TRIAD/U.S. NUCLEAR FORCE STRUCTURE ...... 18
INVESTMENTS IN THE NUCLEAR COMPLEX FACT SHEET ...... 19 VICE PRESIDENT BIDEN’S OP-ED ...... 20
MISSILE DEFENSE FACT SHEET ...... 22 SECRETARY GATES’ OP-ED ...... 23 SEPTEMBER 17, 2009 White House Fact Sheet on PAA KEY POINTS ...... 26 DOD MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW FACT SHEET ...... 29
CONVENTIONAL PROMPT GLOBAL STRIKE ...... 32
VERIFICATION ...... 33
TELEMETRY ...... 34
COMPARISON OF THE START, SORT AND NEW START TREATIES ...... 35
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ...... 37
U.S. NUCLEAR POLICY: OVERVIEW
OVERVIEW OF ADMINISTRATION’S NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION POLICY ...... 42
New START Treaty U.S. Senate Briefing Book
A Joint Product of the United States Departments of State and Defense April 2010
PRESIDENT OBAMA’S PRAGUE SPEECH ...... 43
PRESIDENT OBAMA’S STATEMENT ON THE 40TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE NPT ...... 49
VICE PRESIDENT BIDEN’S SPEECH AT THE NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY ...... 50
NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW FACT SHEET ...... 56
ADDITIONAL REFERENCE MATERIALS
STATEMENT ON THE START FOLLOW ON TREATY BY GEORGE P. SHULTZ, WILLIAM J. PERRY, HENRY A. KISSINGER AND SAM NUNN, MARCH 26, 2010 ...... 59
HOW TO PROTECT OUR NUCLEAR DETERRENT BY GEORGE P. SHULTZ, WILLIAM J. PERRY, HENRY A. KISSINGER AND SAM NUNN, OP-ED JANUARY 19, 2010 THE WALL STREET JOURNAL ...... 60
TOWARD A NUCLEAR-FREE WORLD BY GEORGE P. SHULTZ, WILLIAM J. PERRY, HENRY A. KISSINGER AND SAM NUNN, OP-ED JANUARY 15, 2008 THE WALL STREET JOURNAL ...... 62
ARMS CONTROL’S NEW ERA EDITORIAL MARCH 28, 2010 The New York Times ...... 66
A WORTHY U.S.-RUSSIA ARMS CONTROL TREATY EDITORIAL MARCH 27, 2010 THE WASHINGTON POST ...... 67
NEW START TREATY U.S. SENATE BRIEFING BOOK APRIL 2010
SUMMARY
Page 1
NEW START TREATY U.S. SENATE BRIEFING BOOK APRIL 2010
NEW START TREATY RATIFICATION KEY POINTS
• In a world where the United States faces the challenge of preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) makes America more secure.
• The Treaty reduces – by 30 percent – the limit on the number of Russian nuclear weapons and helps us better track the remaining ones.
• At the same time, the United States retains the nuclear force level we need to protect ourselves, as validated by the Defense Department’s planners through rigorous analysis in the Nuclear Posture Review.
• New START also ensures our own military the flexibility to deploy and maintain our forces – including bombers, submarines, and missiles – in ways that best meet U.S. national security interests.
• The new Treaty places no limits on America’s missile defense systems and plans, nor does it limit our long-range conventional strike capabilities.
• Strong verification measures are built into the treaty so that we can monitor compliance.
• New START is also accompanied by smart investments in America’s nuclear security enterprise – about $5 billion in additional funds over the next five years – to ensure that our own weapons remain safe, secure and effective.
• Finally, the new Treaty creates powerful momentum for broader U.S.-Russian cooperation on important other issues ranging from cooperation in Afghanistan, to responding to Iran and North Korea, to facilitating trade and investment; and the treaty will strengthen our collective leverage in preventing nuclear proliferation throughout the world.
• New START is squarely in line with the last three strategic nuclear arms treaties, which received nearly unanimous bipartisan support in the U.S. Senate:
o SORT Treaty, 2003: 95-0 o START II Treaty, 1996: 87-4 o START I Treaty, 1992: 93-6
Page 2
NEW START TREATY U.S. SENATE BRIEFING BOOK APRIL 2010
THE NEW START TREATY AT A GLANCE
Treaty Structure: The New START Treaty is organized in three tiers of increasing level of detail. The first tier is the Treaty text itself. The second tier consists of a Protocol to the Treaty, which contains additional rights and obligations associated with Treaty provisions. The basic rights and obligations are contained in these two documents. The third tier consists of Technical Annexes to the Protocol. All three tiers will be legally binding, and all three tiers will be submitted to the U.S. Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.
Strategic Offensive Reductions: Under the Treaty, the U.S. and Russia will be limited to significantly fewer strategic arms within seven years from the date the Treaty enters into force. Each Party has the flexibility to determine for itself the structure of its strategic forces within the aggregate limits of the Treaty. These limits are based on a rigorous analysis conducted by Department of Defense planners in support of the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review.
Aggregate limits:
• 1,550 warheads. Warheads on deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs count toward this limit and each deployed heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments counts as one warhead toward this limit. This limit is 74% lower than the limit of the 1991 START Treaty and 30% lower than the deployed strategic warhead limit of the 2002 Moscow Treaty.
• A combined limit of 800 deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments.
• A separate limit of 700 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments. This limit is less than half the corresponding strategic nuclear delivery vehicle limit of the START Treaty.
Verification and Transparency: The Treaty has a verification regime that combines the appropriate elements of the 1991 START Treaty with new elements tailored to the limitations of the Treaty. Measures under the Treaty include on-site inspections and exhibitions, data exchanges and notifications related to strategic offensive arms and facilities covered by the Treaty, and provisions to facilitate the use of national technical means for treaty monitoring. To increase confidence and transparency, the Treaty also provides for the exchange of telemetry.
Treaty Terms: The Treaty’s duration will be ten years, unless superseded by a subsequent agreement. The Parties may agree to extend the Treaty for a period of no more than five years. The Treaty includes a withdrawal clause that is standard in arms control agreements. The 2002 Moscow Treaty terminates upon entry into force of the New START Treaty. The U.S. Senate and the Russian legislature must approve the Treaty before it can enter into force.
No Constraints on Missile Defense and Conventional Strike: The Treaty does not contain any constraints on testing, development or deployment of current or planned U.S. missile defense programs or current or planned United States long-range conventional strike capabilities.
Page 3
NEW START TREATY U.S. SENATE BRIEFING BOOK APRIL 2010
THE WHITE HOUSE Office of the Press Secretary ______Remarks of President Barack Obama – As Prepared for Delivery New START Treaty Signing Ceremony
Prague, Czech Republic April 8, 2010
Good morning. I’m honored to be here in the Czech Republic with President Medvedev and our Czech hosts to mark this historic completion of the new START treaty.
Let me begin by saying how happy I am to be back in the beautiful city of Prague. The Czech Republic, of course, is a close friend and ally of the United States. And I have great admiration and affection for the Czech people. Their bonds with the American people are deep and enduring, and Czechs have made great contributions to the United States over many decades – including to my hometown of Chicago.
I want to thank my friend and partner, Dmitry Medvedev. Without his personal efforts and strong leadership, we would not be here today. We have met and spoken by phone many times throughout the negotiation of this Treaty, and as a consequence we have developed a very effective working relationship built upon candor, cooperation, and mutual respect.
One year ago this week, I came to Prague and gave a speech outlining America’s comprehensive commitment to stopping the spread of nuclear weapons, and seeking the ultimate goal of a world without them. I said then – and I will repeat now – that this is a long-term goal, one that may not even be reached in my lifetime. But I believed then – as I do now – that the pursuit of that goal will move us further beyond the Cold War, strengthen the global non-proliferation regime, and make the United States, and the world, safer and more secure. One of the steps that I called for last year was the realization of this Treaty, so I am glad to be back in Prague today.
I also came to office committed to “resetting” relations between the United States and Russia, and I know that President Medvedev shared that commitment. As he said at our first meeting in London, our relationship had started to drift, making it difficult to cooperate on issues of common interest to our people. And when the United States and Russia are not able to work together on big issues, it is not good for either of our nations, or for the world.
Together, we have stopped the drift, and proven the benefits of cooperation. Today is an important milestone for nuclear security and non-proliferation, and for U.S.-Russia relations. It fulfills our common objective to negotiate a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. It includes significant reductions in the nuclear weapons that we will deploy. It cuts our delivery vehicles by roughly half. It includes a comprehensive verification regime, which allows us to further build trust. It enables both sides the flexibility to protect our security, as well as America’s unwavering commitment to the security of our European allies. And I look forward to working with the United States Senate to achieve ratification of this important Treaty later this year.
Finally, this day demonstrates the determination of the United States and Russia – the two nations that hold over 90 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons – to pursue responsible global leadership. Together, we are
Page 4
NEW START TREATY U.S. SENATE BRIEFING BOOK APRIL 2010
keeping our commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which must be the foundation of global non-proliferation.
While the new START treaty is an important step forward, it is just one step on a longer journey. As I said last year in Prague, this treaty will set the stage for further cuts. And going forward, we hope to pursue discussions with Russia on reducing both our strategic and tactical weapons, including non-deployed weapons.
President Medvedev and I have also agreed to expand our discussions on missile defense. This will include regular exchanges of information about our threat assessments, as well as the completion of a joint assessment of emerging ballistic missiles. And as these assessments are completed, I look forward to launching a serious dialogue about Russian-American cooperation on missile defense.
But nuclear weapons are not simply an issue for the United States and Russia – they threaten the common security of all nations. A nuclear weapon in the hands of a terrorist is a danger to people everywhere – from Moscow to New York; from the cities of Europe to South Asia. So next week, 47 nations will come together in Washington to discuss concrete steps that can be taken to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials around the world in four years.
And the spread of nuclear weapons to more states is also an unacceptable risk to global security – raising the specter of arms races from the Middle East to East Asia. Earlier this week, the United States formally changed our policy to make it clear that those non-nuclear weapons states that are in compliance with the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and their non-proliferation obligations will not be threatened by America’s nuclear arsenal. This demonstrates, once more, America’s commitment to the NPT as a cornerstone of our security strategy. Those nations that follow the rules will find greater security and opportunity. Those nations that refuse to meet their obligations will be isolated, and denied the opportunity that comes with international integration.
That includes accountability for those that break the rules – otherwise the NPT is just words on a page. That is why the United States and Russia are part of a coalition of nations insisting that the Islamic Republic of Iran face consequences, because they have continually failed to meet their obligations. We are working together at the UN Security Council to pass strong sanctions on Iran. And we will not tolerate actions that flout the NPT, risk an arms race in a vital region, and threaten the credibility of the international community and our collective security.
While these issues are a top priority, they are only one part of the U.S.-Russia relationship. Today, I again expressed my deepest condolences for the terrible loss of Russian life in recent terrorist attacks, and we will remain steadfast partners in combating violent extremism. We also discussed the potential to expand our cooperation on behalf of economic growth, trade and investment, and technological innovation, and I look forward to discussing these issues further when President Medvedev visits the United States later this year. Because there is much we can do on behalf of our security and prosperity if we continue to work together.
When one surveys the many challenges that we face around the world, it is easy to grow complacent, or to abandon the notion that progress can be shared. But I want to repeat what I said last year in Prague: When nations and peoples allow themselves to be defined by their differences, the gulf between them widens. When we fail to pursue peace, then it stays forever beyond our grasp.
Page 5
NEW START TREATY U.S. SENATE BRIEFING BOOK APRIL 2010
This majestic city of Prague is in many ways a monument to human progress. And this ceremony is a testament to the truth that old adversaries can forge new partnerships. I could not help but be struck the other day by the words of Arkady Brish, who helped build the Soviet Union’s first atom bomb. At the age of 92, having lived to see the horrors of a World War and the divisions of a Cold War, he said, “We hope humanity will reach the moment when there is no need for nuclear weapons, when there is peace and calm in the world.”
It is easy to dismiss those voices. But doing so risks repeating the horrors of the past, while ignoring the history of human progress. The pursuit of peace and calm and cooperation among nations is the work of both leaders and peoples in the 21st century. For we must be as persistent and passionate in our pursuit of progress as any who would stand in our way. Thank you.
##
Page 6
NEW START TREATY U.S. SENATE BRIEFING BOOK APRIL 2010
QUOTES FROM ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS ON THE NEW START TREATY MARCH 26, 2010
On the New START Treaty
President Obama: “We’ve turned words into action. We’ve made progress that is clear and concrete. And we’ve demonstrated the importance of American leadership and American partnership on behalf of our own security and the world’s.”
Secretary of Defense Gates: “This Treaty strengthens nuclear stability.”
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Mullen: “I, the vice chairman and the Joint Chiefs, as well as our combatant commanders around the world, stand solidly behind this new treaty, having had the opportunity to provide our counsel, to make our recommendations and to help shape the final agreements.”
“This treaty achieves a proper balance more in keeping with today's security environment, reducing tensions even as it bolsters nonproliferation efforts.”
“[T]his treaty enhances our ability to do that which we have been charged to do: protect and defend the citizens of the United States.”
“I am as confident in its success as I am in its safeguards.”
On Verification
President Obama: “[The new START treaty] puts in place a strong and effective verification regime. And it maintains the flexibility that we need to protect and advance our national security and to guarantee our unwavering commitment to the security of our allies.”
Secretary of Defense Gates: “The verification measures for this treaty have been designed to monitor compliance with the provisions of this treaty. Because throw-weight of missiles was not an issue, telemetry is not nearly as important for this treaty as it has been in the past. In fact, we don't need telemetry to monitor compliance with this treaty.”
“Nonetheless, there still is a bilateral agreement to exchange telemetry information on up to five missile launches a year.”
“I think that when the testimony of the intelligence community comes on the Hill that the DNI and the experts will say that they are comfortable that the provisions of this treaty for verification are adequate for them to monitor Russian compliance and vice versa.”
“It will reduce the number of strategic nuclear weapons that both Russia and the United States are permitted to deploy by a third, and maintains an effective verification regime.”
Page 7
NEW START TREATY U.S. SENATE BRIEFING BOOK APRIL 2010
On the Non-Proliferation Treaty and Elimination
Secretary of State Clinton: “The treaty also shows the world, particularly the states like Iran and North Korea, that one of our top priorities is to strengthen the global nonproliferation regime and keep nuclear materials out of the wrong hands. The new START treaty demonstrates our commitment to making progress toward disarmament under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the so-called NPT. So as we uphold our commitments and strengthen the NPT, we can hold others accountable to do the same.”
“That's not only in our security interests, but it also is a commitment by the United States and Russia toward nonproliferation and toward the eventual goal of a world without nuclear weapons.”
“So I'm going to reaffirm our commitment to convincing countries that the path of nonproliferation, of lowering the temperature when it comes to nuclear weapons, which we are doing with this treaty, is the path they want to be on.”
On Ratification
Secretary of State Clinton: “Some of the time that had to be taken in order to really get the point where we both felt like we had the package necessary to go to our legislative bodies.”
“I believe that a vast majority of the Senate at the end of the day will see that this is in America's interest and it goes way beyond politics.”
“I'm not going to, you know, set any timetables, but we're confident that we'll be able to make the case for ratification.”
Secretary of Defense Gates: “Let me first say a word about ratification from my perspective. There has been a very intense continuing consultation on the Hill as the negotiations have proceeded. Two of the areas that have been of concern in the Senate, among senators: Are we protecting our ability to go forward with missile defense? And are we going to make the investment in our nuclear infrastructure so that the stockpile will remain reliable and safe?”
“We have addressed both of those. Missile defense is not constrained by this -- by this treaty. And we have in our budget, the president's budget that went to the Hill for F.Y. '11, almost $5 billion for [new] investment in the nuclear infrastructure and maintaining the stockpile. So I think we have addressed the concerns that there may have been on the Hill, and so I echo the sentiments of Secretary Clinton. I think the prospects are quite good.”
Page 8
NEW START TREATY U.S. SENATE BRIEFING BOOK APRIL 2010
On Missile Defense and Extended Deterrence
Secretary of Defense Gates: “There are no constraints on missile defense.”
“America’s nuclear arsenal remains an important pillar of the U.S. defense posture, both to deter potential adversaries and to reassure more than a dozen allies and partners who rely on our nuclear umbrella for their security.”
“The reductions in this treaty will not affect the strength of our nuclear triad. Nor does this treaty limit plans to protect the United States and our allies by improving and deploying missile defense systems.”
Secretary of State Clinton: “We, we have consistently conveyed to our European friends and allies America's absolute commitment to our NATO partners and to their defense. The phase adaptive approach that the president concluded was the best way forward on missile defense, we think, actually makes Europe safer from what are the real threats that are out there.”
“One of the reasons why it's so significant that the presidents will meet in Prague is because we want to send exactly that signal, that this is good for Europe, as well as for the United States and Russia.”
Page 9
NEW START TREATY U.S. SENATE BRIEFING BOOK APRIL 2010
THE WHITE HOUSE Office of the Press Secretary ______
Remarks of President Barack Obama – As Prepared for Delivery Announcement of New START Treaty
The White House Friday, March 26, 2010
Good morning. I just concluded a productive phone call with President Medvedev. And I’m pleased to announce that after a year of intense negotiations, the United States and Russia have agreed to the most comprehensive arms control agreement in nearly two decades.
Since taking office, one of my highest national security priorities has been addressing the threat posed to the American people by nuclear weapons. That is why – last April in Prague – I stated America’s intention to pursue the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons, a goal that has been embraced by Presidents like John F. Kennedy and Ronald Reagan.
While this aspiration will not be reached in the near future, I put forward a comprehensive agenda to pursuit it – to stop the spread of these weapons; to secure vulnerable nuclear materials from terrorists; and to reduce nuclear arsenals. A fundamental part of that effort was the negotiation of a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with Russia.
Furthermore, since I took office, I have been committed to a “reset” of our relations with Russia. When the United States and Russia can cooperate effectively, it advances the mutual interests of our two nations, and the security and prosperity of the wider world. We have worked together on Afghanistan. We have coordinated our economic efforts through the G-20. We are working together to pressure Iran to meet its international obligations. And today, we have reached agreement on one of my Administration’s top priorities – a pivotal new arms control agreement.
In many ways, nuclear weapons represent both the darkest days of the Cold War, and the most troubling threats of our time. Today, we have taken another step forward in leaving behind the legacy of the 20th century while building a more secure future for our children. We have turned words into action. We have made progress that is clear and concrete. And we have demonstrated the importance of American leadership – and American partnership – on behalf of our own security, and the world’s.
Broadly speaking, the new START Treaty makes progress in several areas. It cuts – by about a third – the nuclear weapons that the United States and Russia will deploy. It significantly reduces missiles and launchers. It puts in place a strong and effective verification regime. And it maintains the flexibility that we need to protect and advance our national security, and to guarantee our unwavering commitment to the security of our Allies.
With this agreement, the United States and Russia – the two largest nuclear powers in the world – also send a clear signal that we intend to lead. By upholding our own commitments under the Nuclear Non-
Page 10
NEW START TREATY U.S. SENATE BRIEFING BOOK APRIL 2010
Proliferation treaty, we strengthen our global efforts to stop the spread of these weapons, and to ensure that other nations meet their own responsibilities.
I am pleased that almost one year to the day after my last trip to Prague, the Czech Republic – a close friend and ally of the United States – has agreed to host President Medvedev and me on April 8th, as we sign this historic Treaty. The following week, I look forward to hosting leaders from over forty nations here in Washington, as we convene a Summit to address how we can secure vulnerable nuclear materials so that they never fall into the hands of terrorists. And later this spring, the world will come together in New York to discuss how we can build on this progress, and continue to strengthen the global non-proliferation regime.
Through all of these efforts, cooperation between the United States and Russia will be essential. I want to thank President Medvedev for his personal and sustained leadership as we worked to reach this agreement. We have had the opportunity to meet many times over the last year, and we both agree that we can serve the interests of our people through close cooperation.
I also want to thank my national security team, who did so much work to make this day possible. That includes the leaders with me here today – Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and Admiral Mullen. And it also includes a tireless negotiating team. It took patience. It took perseverance. But we never gave up. And as a result, the United States will be more secure, and the American people will be safer.
Finally, I look forward to continuing to work closely with Congress in the months ahead. There is a long tradition of bipartisan leadership on arms control. Presidents of both parties have recognized the necessity of securing and reducing these weapons. Statesmen like George Shultz, Sam Nunn, Henry Kissinger, and Bill Perry have been outspoken in their support of more assertive action. Earlier this week, I met again with my friends John Kerry and Dick Lugar to discuss this Treaty, and throughout the morning, my Administration will be consulting Senators from both parties as we prepare for what I hope will be strong, bipartisan support to ratify the new START treaty.
With that, I’ll leave you in the able hands of my Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton. Thank you everybody.
###
Page 11
NEW START TREATY U.S. SENATE BRIEFING BOOK APRIL 2010
THE WHITE HOUSE Office of the Press Secretary ______
Press Briefing by Secretary of State Clinton, Secretary of Defense Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mullen on the Announcement of the New START Treaty
James S. Brady Press Briefing Room March 26, 2010
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, thank you all very much. This is a good day for America and our security. And as President Obama just reiterated, it is one of the highest priorities of the Obama administration to pursue an agenda to reduce the threat posed by the deadliest weapons the world has ever known. President Obama set that forth in his speech at Prague last year. And today, he and President Medvedev reached an agreement to make significant and verifiable reductions in our nuclear arsenals.
Long after the Cold War’s end, the United States and Russia still possess more than 90 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons. We do not need such large arsenals to protect our nation and our allies against the two greatest dangers we face today: nuclear proliferation and terrorism.
This treaty represents a significant step forward in our cooperation with Russia. We were committed from the beginning to reset the U.S.-Russia relationship, because we saw it as essential to making progress on our top priorities -- from counterterrorism, to nuclear security and non-proliferation.
Now, we will continue to have disagreements with our Russian friends. But this treaty is an example of deep and substantive cooperation on a matter of vital importance. And more broadly, it shows that patient, principled diplomacy can advance our national interests by producing real results, in this case results that are good for us, good for Russia, and good for global security and stability.
The treaty also shows the world -- particularly states like Iran and North Korea -- that one of our top priorities is to strengthen the global non-proliferation regime and keep nuclear materials out of the wrong hands. The new START treaty demonstrates our commitment to making progress toward disarmament under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, the so-called NPT.
So as we uphold our commitments and strengthen the NPT, we can hold others accountable to do the same. I know that Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen will say more about the details of the treaty, but I want to make clear that we have adhered to the Russian proverb that President Reagan frequently employed, “trust, but verify.” Verification provides the transparency and builds the trust needed to reduce the chance for misunderstandings and miscalculations.
President Obama insisted on a whole of government effort to reach this result, and that’s exactly what this was. He and President Medvedev met several times and spoke often by phone. Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, General Jones worked closely with their Russian counterparts. Foreign Minister Lavrov and I met in person, most recently last week in Moscow, and we spoke on the phone too many times to count.
Page 12
NEW START TREATY U.S. SENATE BRIEFING BOOK APRIL 2010
Assistant Secretary Rose Gottemoeller worked tirelessly in Geneva for many months as our chief negotiator. Under Secretary Ellen Tauscher, who is here with us, joined her at a crucial time to help complete the agreement, assisted very ably by our State Department expert team, including Jim Timbie. Teams of people at the State Department, the White House, DOD, elsewhere worked tirelessly to make this happen.
Let me conclude by saying that I look forward to working with my former colleagues in the Senate. They will be our partners in this enterprise. I know President Obama had an excellent meeting, as he reported to you, with both Senators Kerry and Lugar. And Rose, Ellen and General Jones and others of us have briefed members along the way. I look forward to working toward ratification to bring this treaty into force.
Now it’s my great pleasure and honor to turn the podium over to my friend, Secretary Bob Gates.
SECRETARY GATES: This treaty strengthens nuclear stability. It will reduce the number of strategic nuclear weapons that both Russia and the United States are permitted to deploy by a third, and maintains an effective verification regime.
America’s nuclear arsenal remains an important pillar of the U.S. defense posture, both to deter potential adversaries and to reassure more than two dozen allies and partners who rely on our nuclear umbrella for their security.
But it is clear that we can accomplish these goals with fewer nuclear weapons. The reductions in this treaty will not affect the strength of our nuclear triad. Nor does this treaty limit plans to protect the United States and our allies by improving and deploying missile defense systems.
Much of the analysis that supported the U.S. negotiating position was provided by the Defense Department’s nuclear posture review, which will be released shortly.
As the number of weapons declines we will have to invest more heavily in our nuclear infrastructure in order to keep our weapons safe, secure and effective.
I look forward to working with the Congress to make sure that Departments of Defense and Energy have the funding necessary to properly accomplish this mission.
The subject of America’s nuclear deterrent and this treaty carries special personal meaning for me. My professional career began as a junior Air Force Officer under the Strategic Air Command, and my first assignment 43 years ago was at Whiteman Air Force Base, then home to 150 Minuteman ICBMs. Since 1971, I have been involved in strategic arms negotiations in different capacities at CIA and here at the NSC. And I particularly recall the day President Reagan signed the Intermediate Range Nuclear Treaty, which marked the transition from arms control to disarmament. That process accelerated with START and reaches another important milestone with this treaty.
The journey we have taken from being one misstep away from mutual assured destruction to the substantial arms reductions of this new agreement is testimony to just how much the world has changed and all of the opportunities we still have to make our planet safer and more secure.
Page 13
NEW START TREATY U.S. SENATE BRIEFING BOOK APRIL 2010
Admiral Mullen.
ADMIRAL MULLEN: Good morning, everyone. I would only like to add that I, the Vice Chairman, and the Joint Chiefs, as well as our combatant commanders around the world, stand solidly behind this new treaty, having had the opportunity to provide our counsel, to make our recommendations, and to help shape the final agreements.
We greatly appreciate the trust and confidence placed by us -- placed in us by the President and by Secretary Gates throughout this process. And we recognize the trust and confidence this treaty helps foster in our relationship with Russia’s military -- a trust complementary to that which the President has sought to achieve between our two countries.
Indeed, I met with my Russian counterpart, General Makarov, no fewer than three times during the negotiation process. And each time we met, we grew closer not only toward our portion of the final result, but also toward a better understanding of the common challenges and opportunities our troops face every single day.
The new START deals directly with some of the most lethal of those common challenges -- our stockpiles of strategic nuclear weapons -- by dramatically reducing these stockpiles. This treaty achieves a proper balance more in keeping with today’s security environment, reducing tensions even as it bolsters non- proliferation efforts. It features a much more effective, transparent verification method that demands quicker data exchanges and notifications. It protects our ability to develop a conventional global strike capability should that be required. And perhaps more critically, it allows us to deploy and maintain strategic nuclear forces -- bombers, submarines, missiles; the triad which has proven itself over the decades -- in ways best suited to meeting our security commitments.
In other words, through the trust it engenders, the cuts it requires, and the flexibility it preserves this treaty enhances our ability to do that which we have been charged to do: protect and defend the citizens of the United States. I am as confident in its success as I am in its safeguards.
Thank you.
Page 14
NEW START TREATY U.S. SENATE BRIEFING BOOK APRIL 2010
FACT SHEETS
Page 15
NEW START TREATY U.S. SENATE BRIEFING BOOK APRIL 2010
NEW START TREATY AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS
Key Point: The New START Treaty makes America more secure.
The New START Treaty will enhance U.S. national security by stabilizing the strategic balance between the United States and the Russian Federation at lower levels of nuclear forces. The Treaty will establish lower limits for U.S. and Russian nuclear forces of 1,550 deployed strategic warheads and 700 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments. It also will limit to 800 the total number of deployed and non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments.
The Treaty’s lower strategic force limits were validated through rigorous analysis conducted by Department of Defense Planners in support of the Nuclear Posture Review. The New START Treaty allows the United States to determine our own force structure, giving us the flexibility to deploy and maintain our strategic nuclear forces in a way that best serves U.S. national security interests. As long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal to deter any adversary and protect our allies.
The New START Treaty’s verification provisions provide visibility into Russia’s nuclear forces and thereby help to mitigate the risks of surprises, mistrust, and miscalculations that can result from excessive secrecy or decisions based on worst-case assumptions. The Treaty will give us a vital window into the Russian strategic arsenal. This goal is achieved through a verification regime that is adapted from START, but is simplified, less costly to implement, and tailored to the specific provisions of the new Treaty, as well as transparency measures such as the exchange of telemetry on flight tests.
Page 16
NEW START TREATY U.S. SENATE BRIEFING BOOK APRIL 2010
CENTRAL WARHEAD AND DELIVERY VEHICLE LIMITS OF THE NEW START TREATY
Key Point: The Treaty reduces by about 30 percent the limit on the number of Russian nuclear weapons and helps us better track the remaining ones. At the same time, the United States retains the nuclear force level we need to protect ourselves, as validated by the Defense Department’s planners through rigorous analysis in the Nuclear Posture Review.
The principal U.S. objective in bilateral strategic arms control is to increase stability in the U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship at significantly lower levels of nuclear weapons. The New START Treaty sets aggregate limits which are 56% lower than the limit for deployed strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and 74% lower than the limit for deployed warheads established in the 1991 START Treaty, which expired in December 2009. The New START Treaty limit for deployed warheads will be 30% lower than the limit for deployed strategic warheads established under the 2002 Moscow Treaty, which the New START Treaty will supersede. The New START Treaty provides the United States the flexibility to determine for ourselves the structure of our strategic forces within the aggregate limits of the Treaty.
The Central Limits of the New START Treaty are:
Deployed Warheads: 1,550 All warheads emplaced on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs are counted under this limit Deployed heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments are each counted with one warhead
Deployed and Non-Deployed Launchers and Heavy Bombers: 800 Deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers Deployed and non-deployed SLBM launchers Deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments
Deployed Ballistic Missiles and Heavy Bombers: 700 Deployed ICBMs Deployed SLBMs Deployed heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments
Timetable for Limitations: Limits begin to apply seven years from the date the Treaty enters into force
Duration of Agreement: Ten years with an option to extend, if both sides agree, by no more than five years
Page 17
NEW START TREATY U.S. SENATE BRIEFING BOOK APRIL 2010
THE TRIAD AND U.S. NUCLEAR FORCE STRUCTURE
Key Point: The New START Treaty ensures our own military the flexibility to deploy and maintain our forces – including bombers, submarines, and missiles – in ways that best meet U.S. national security interests.
An early task for the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) was to develop U.S. positions for the New START negotiations. The Treaty’s lower strategic force levels are based on analysis conducted last year, at the initial phase of the 2010 NPR process, which also considered how U.S. forces should be structured at the levels established by the new agreement. The NPR reached the following conclusions: • Stable deterrence can be maintained while reducing U.S. strategic delivery vehicles by about 50 percent from the START I level and reducing deployed strategic warheads by about 30 percent from the 2002 Moscow Treaty level. • Contributions by non-nuclear systems to U.S. deterrence and reassurance goals should be preserved by avoiding limitations on missile defenses and preserving options for using heavy bombers or long-range missile systems in conventional roles. • During the ten-year duration of New START, the triad of ICBMs, SLBMs, and nuclear-capable heavy bombers will be maintained, keeping all 14 Ohio-class strategic submarines (SSBNs) in the force at least for the near term and “de-MIRVing” all Minuteman III ICBMs to a single warhead each to increase stability in a crisis. The FY 2011 budget request includes funds to sustain the Triad, including: continuing the Minuteman III life extension program; developing new technologies to replace the current fleet of Ohio-class SSBNs, which begin to retire in the 2027 timeframe; and investing over $1 billion over the next five years to support upgrades to the B-2 stealth bomber. The New START Treaty affirms the right of the United States to determine the composition and structure of our strategic offensive arms within the Treaty’s overall limits. This allows the United States to adjust our force structure over time as appropriate to the strategic circumstances. The Treaty limitations take effect seven years after the date the Treaty enters into force.
Page 18
NEW START TREATY U.S. SENATE BRIEFING BOOK APRIL 2010
INVESTMENTS IN THE NUCLEAR COMPLEX
The United States is committed both to taking concrete steps toward a world without nuclear weapons and ensuring the safety, security and effectiveness of our stockpile as along as nuclear weapons exist. This requires investing now in revitalizing the intellectual infrastructure that serves as the foundation of our capabilities in addition to recapitalizing an outdated physical infrastructure. These investments will transform a nuclear weapons complex into a modern, sustainable 21st Century Nuclear Security Enterprise. This is not only critical to maintaining the U.S. nuclear deterrent, but also supports a number of other essential nuclear security missions, including nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear counterterrorism, emergency response, and support to the intelligence community.
By law, the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is tasked to “maintain and enhance the safety, reliability and performance of the United States nuclear weapons stockpile,” in addition to broader nuclear security missions. The President’s budget request for NNSA for fiscal year 2011 reflects the Administration’s commitment to the Nation’s nuclear deterrent and the Nuclear Security Enterprise that enables it. The President’s budget includes more than $7 billion for Weapons Activities and associated infrastructure, up 10 percent from fiscal year 2010. This request:
• Increases funding for directed stockpile work by 25% to ensure the safety, security and effectiveness of the nuclear weapons stockpile, including: full production of the W76-1 to extend the life of the warhead for an additional 30 years; a life extension study for the B61 gravity bomb to extend its service life, enhance its safety and use control features, and ensure compatibility with modern aircraft; a study to explore future options to maintain the W78 warhead; and continued maintenance, surveillance and certification for all weapons systems. • Increases funding for science, technology and engineering by more than 10% to ensure the ability to assess and certify the stockpile without underground nuclear testing utilizing advanced scientific capabilities, including the world’s fastest supercomputers, and stepwise development of the predictive framework capability. • Reinvests in the scientists, technicians and engineers responsible for a successful stockpile stewardship and management program and recapitalization of the physical infrastructure, including major long-term construction projects to replace aging facilities that house essential capabilities for plutonium and uranium.
The President’s plan sustains and augments stockpile stewardship and management investments into the future, with funding for these programs increasing steadily, to $7.6 billion per year by fiscal year 2015. Through these investments, NNSA’s Nuclear Security Enterprise will ensure a highly specialized and trained technical workforce, committed to maintaining the U.S. nuclear deterrent through safe and security operations and stewardship of the environment, while leveraging their capabilities to address cross-cutting national security mandates through scientific innovation.
Page 19
NEW START TREATY U.S. SENATE BRIEFING BOOK APRIL 2010
OP-ED: The President's Nuclear Vision We will spend what is necessary to maintain the safety, security and effectiveness of our weapons. By JOE BIDEN The Wall Street Journal January 29, 2010
The United States faces no greater threat than the spread of nuclear weapons. That is why, last April in Prague, President Obama laid out a comprehensive agenda to reverse their spread, and to pursue the peace and security of a world without them.
He understands that this ultimate goal will not be reached quickly. But by acting on a number of fronts, we can ensure our security, strengthen the global nonproliferation regime, and keep vulnerable nuclear material out of terrorist hands.
For as long as nuclear weapons are required to defend our country and our allies, we will maintain a safe, secure and effective nuclear arsenal. The president's Prague vision is central to this administration's efforts to protect the American people—and that is why we are increasing investments in our nuclear arsenal and infrastructure in this year's budget and beyond.
Among the many challenges our administration inherited was the slow but steady decline in support for our nuclear stockpile and infrastructure, and for our highly trained nuclear work force. The stockpile, infrastructure and work force played a critical and evolving role in every stage of our nuclear experience, from the Manhattan Project to the present day. Once charged with developing ever more powerful weapons, they have had a new mission in the 18 years since we stopped conducting nuclear tests. That is to maintain the strength of the nuclear arsenal.
For almost a decade, our laboratories and facilities have been underfunded and undervalued. The consequences of this neglect—like the growing shortage of skilled nuclear scientists and engineers and the aging of critical facilities—have largely escaped public notice. Last year, the Strategic Posture Commission led by former Defense Secretaries William Perry and James Schlesinger warned that our nuclear complex requires urgent attention. We agree.
The budget we will submit to Congress on Monday both reverses this decline and enables us to implement the president's nuclear-security agenda. These goals are intertwined. The same skilled nuclear experts who maintain our arsenal play a key role in guaranteeing our country's security now and for the future. State-of- the art facilities, and highly trained and motivated people, allow us to maintain our arsenal without testing. They will help meet the president's goal of securing vulnerable nuclear materials world-wide in the coming years, and enable us to track and thwart nuclear trafficking, verify weapons reductions, and to develop tomorrow's cutting-edge technologies for our security and prosperity.
To achieve these goals, our budget devotes $7 billion for maintaining our nuclear-weapons stockpile and complex, and for related efforts. This commitment is $600 million more than Congress approved last year. And over the next five years we intend to boost funding for these important activities by more than $5
Page 20
NEW START TREATY U.S. SENATE BRIEFING BOOK APRIL 2010
billion. Even in a time of tough budget decisions, these are investments we must make for our security. We are committed to working with Congress to ensure these budget increases are approved.
This investment is long overdue. It will strengthen our ability to recruit, train and retain the skilled people we need to maintain our nuclear capabilities. It will support the work of our nuclear labs, a national treasure that we must and will sustain. Many of our facilities date back to World War II, and, given the safety and environmental challenges they present, cannot be sustained much longer. Increased funding now will eventually enable considerable savings on both security and maintenance. It also will allow us to clean up and close down production facilities we no longer need.
Our budget request is just one of several closely related and equally important initiatives giving life to the president's Prague agenda. Others include completing the New START agreement with Russia, releasing the Nuclear Posture Review on March 1, holding the Nuclear Security Summit in April, and pursuing ratification and entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
We will by these initiatives seek to strengthen an emerging bipartisan consensus on how best to secure our nation. These steps will strengthen the nonproliferation regime, which is vital to holding nations like North Korea and Iran accountable when they break the rules, and deterring others from trying to do so.
Reflecting this consensus, Sen. John McCain has joined the president in endorsing a world without nuclear weapons—a goal that was articulated by President Ronald Reagan, who in 1984 said these weapons must be "banished from the face of the Earth." This consensus was inspired by four of our most eminent statesmen—Messrs. Henry Kissinger, William Perry, Sam Nunn and George P. Shultz.
Some critics will argue that we should not constrain our nuclear efforts in any way. Others will assert that retaining a robust deterrent is at odds with our nonproliferation agenda. These four leaders last week in these pages argued compellingly that "maintaining high confidence in our nuclear arsenal is critical as the numbers of these weapons goes down. It is also consistent with and necessary for U.S. leadership in nonproliferation, risk reduction and arms reduction goals."
This shared commitment serves our security. No nation can secure itself by disarming unilaterally, but as long as nuclear weapons exist, all nations remain ever on the brink of destruction. As President Obama said in Prague, "We cannot succeed in this endeavor alone, but we can lead it, we can start it."
Mr. Biden is Vice President of the United States.
Page 21
NEW START TREATY U.S. SENATE BRIEFING BOOK APRIL 2010
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE AND NEW START TREATY
Key Point: The New START Treaty does not contain any constraints on testing, development or deployment of current or planned U.S. missile defense programs or current or planned United States long-range conventional strike capabilities.
The United States is developing and fielding missile defenses to defend the United States, our forces abroad, and our allies and partners against the threat of ballistic missile attack.
The New START Treaty contains no limits on our ability to continue developing and fielding missile defenses. The Treaty does contain a statement in the preamble acknowledging the interrelationship of missile offense and missile defense, as President Obama and President Medvedev agreed in their Joint Statement of July 2009. This provision is not a binding obligation.
As was done in the case of START, Russia has made a unilateral statement regarding missile defenses. Its statement is not legally binding and therefore does not constrain U.S. missile defense programs. In fact, we have also made a unilateral statement, making clear that nothing in the Treaty will limit current or planned U.S. missile defense programs. Such unilateral statements are documents associated with the Treaty, but are not part of the Treaty. These statements will not be subject to Senate advice and consent, though they will be shared with the Senate.
The Treaty prohibits the conversion of ballistic missile defense interceptor launchers to intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) or submarine- launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers, and vice versa. This provision has no effect on our ability to develop and field missile defenses.
• The United States is currently building 14 Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) silos at Ft. Greely, Alaska. New construction of silo launchers for missile defense purposes at Ft. Greely, Vandenberg Air Force Base, or anywhere else is not limited by the New START Treaty. • The five existing GBI silos at Vandenberg Air Force Base, which were converted from ICBM silos prior to treaty signature, are grandfathered under the Treaty, and thus are not constrained by the Treaty.
The United States will continue to invest in improvements to both strategic and theater missile defenses, both qualitatively and quantitatively, as needed for our security and the security of our allies. The Administration’s approach to sustaining and enhancing our ballistic missile defense program is detailed in the February 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report and reflected in the FY 2011 $9.9 billion request for missile defense, almost $700 million more than FY 2010.
Page 22
NEW START TREATY U.S. SENATE BRIEFING BOOK APRIL 2010
OP-ED: A BETTER MISSILE DEFENSE FOR A SAFER EUROPE By ROBERT M. GATES The New York Times September 20, 2009
THE future of missile defense in Europe is secure. This reality is contrary to what some critics have alleged about President Obama’s proposed shift in America’s missile-defense plans on the continent — and it is important to understand how and why.
First, to be clear, there is now no strategic missile defense in Europe. In December 2006, just days after becoming secretary of defense, I recommended to President George W. Bush that the United States place 10 ground-based interceptors in Poland and an advanced radar in the Czech Republic. This system was designed to identify and destroy up to about five long-range missiles potentially armed with nuclear warheads fired from the Middle East — the greatest and most likely danger being from Iran. At the time, it was the best plan based on the technology and threat assessment available.
That plan would have put the radar and interceptors in Central Europe by 2015 at the earliest. Delays in the Polish and Czech ratification process extended that schedule by at least two years. Which is to say, under the previous program, there would have been no missile-defense system able to protect against Iranian missiles until at least 2017 — and likely much later.
Last week, President Obama — on my recommendation and with the advice of his national-security team and the unanimous support of our senior military leadership — decided to discard that plan in favor of a vastly more suitable approach. In the first phase, to be completed by 2011, we will deploy proven, sea- based SM-3 interceptor missiles — weapons that are growing in capability — in the areas where we see the greatest threat to Europe.
The second phase, which will become operational around 2015, will involve putting upgraded SM-3s on the ground in Southern and Central Europe. All told, every phase of this plan will include scores of SM-3 missiles, as opposed to the old plan of just 10 ground-based interceptors. This will be a far more effective defense should an enemy fire many missiles simultaneously — the kind of attack most likely to occur as Iran continues to build and deploy numerous short- and medium-range weapons. At the same time, plans to defend virtually all of Europe and enhance the missile defense of the United States will continue on about the same schedule as the earlier plan as we build this system over time, creating an increasingly greater zone of protection.
Steady technological advances in our missile defense program — from kill vehicles to the abilities to network radars and sensors — give us confidence in this plan. The SM-3 has had eight successful tests since 2007, and we will continue to develop it to give it the capacity to intercept long-range missiles like ICBMs. It is now more than able to deal with the threat from multiple short-and medium-range missiles — a very real threat to our allies and some 80,000 American troops based in Europe that was not addressed by the previous plan. Even so, our military will continue research and development on a two-stage ground- based interceptor, the kind that was planned to be put in Poland, as a back-up.
Page 23
NEW START TREATY U.S. SENATE BRIEFING BOOK APRIL 2010
Moreover, a fixed radar site like the one previously envisioned for the Czech Republic would be far less adaptable than the airborne, space- and ground-based sensors we now plan to use. These systems provide much more accurate data, offer more early warning and tracking options, and have stronger networking capacity — a key factor in any system that relies on partner countries. This system can also better use radars that are already operating across the globe, like updated cold war-era installations, our newer arrays based on high-powered X-band radar, allied systems and possibly even Russian radars.
One criticism of this plan is that we are relying too much on new intelligence holding that Iran is focusing more on short- and medium-range weapons and not progressing on intercontinental missiles. Having spent most of my career at the C.I.A., I am all too familiar with the pitfalls of over-reliance on intelligence assessments that can become outdated. As Gen. James Cartwright, the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said a few days ago, we would be surprised if the assessments did not change because “the enemy gets a vote.”
The new approach to European missile defense actually provides us with greater flexibility to adapt as new threats develop and old ones recede. For example, the new proposal provides some antimissile capacity very soon — a hedge against Iran’s managing to field missiles much earlier than had been previously predicted. The old plan offered nothing for almost a decade.
Those who say we are scrapping missile defense in Europe are either misinformed or misrepresenting what we are doing. This shift has even been distorted as some sort of concession to Russia, which has fiercely opposed the old plan. Russia’s attitude and possible reaction played no part in my recommendation to the president on this issue. Of course, considering Russia’s past hostility toward American missile defense in Europe, if Russia’s leaders embrace this plan, then that will be an unexpected — and welcome — change of policy on their part. But in any case the facts are clear: American missile defense on the continent will continue, and not just in Central Europe, the most likely location for future SM-3 sites, but, we hope, in other NATO countries as well.
This proposal is, simply put, a better way forward — as was recognized by Prime Minister Donald Tusk of Poland when he called it “a chance for strengthening Europe’s security.” It is a very real manifestation of our continued commitment to our NATO allies in Europe — iron-clad proof that the United States believes that the alliance must remain firm.
I am often characterized as “pragmatic.” I believe this is a very pragmatic proposal. I have found since taking this post that when it comes to missile defense, some hold a view bordering on theology that regards any change of plans or any cancellation of a program as abandonment or even breaking faith. I encountered this in the debate over the Defense Department’s budget for the fiscal year 2010 when I ended three programs: the airborne laser, the multiple-kill vehicle and the kinetic energy interceptor. All were plainly unworkable, prohibitively expensive and could never be practically deployed — but had nonetheless acquired a devoted following.
I have been a strong supporter of missile defense ever since President Ronald Reagan first proposed it in 1983. But I want to have real capacity as soon as possible, and to take maximum advantage of new technologies to combat future threats.
Page 24
NEW START TREATY U.S. SENATE BRIEFING BOOK APRIL 2010
The bottom line is that there will be American missile defense in Europe to protect our troops there and our NATO allies. The new proposal provides needed capacity years earlier than the original plan, and will provide even more robust protection against longer-range threats on about the same timeline as the previous program. We are strengthening — not scrapping — missile defense in Europe.
Robert M. Gates is the Secretary of Defense.
Page 25
NEW START TREATY U.S. SENATE BRIEFING BOOK APRIL 2010
THE WHITE HOUSE Office of the Press Secretary September 17, 2009 ______
Fact Sheet on U.S. Missile Defense Policy A "Phased, Adaptive Approach" for Missile Defense in Europe
President Obama has approved the recommendation of Secretary of Defense Gates and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a phased, adaptive approach for missile defense in Europe. This approach is based on an assessment of the Iranian missile threat, and a commitment to deploy technology that is proven, cost- effective, and adaptable to an evolving security environment.
Starting around 2011, this missile defense architecture will feature deployments of increasingly-capable sea- and land-based missile interceptors, primarily upgraded versions of the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3), and a range of sensors in Europe to defend against the growing ballistic missile threat from Iran. This phased approach develops the capability to augment our current protection of the U.S. homeland against long-range ballistic missile threats, and to offer more effective defenses against more near-term ballistic missile threats. The plan provides for the defense of U.S. deployed forces, their families, and our Allies in Europe sooner and more comprehensively than the previous program, and involves more flexible and survivable systems. The Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended to the President that he revise the previous Administration’s 2007 plan for missile defense in Europe as part of an ongoing comprehensive review of our missile defenses mandated by Congress. Two major developments led to this unanimous recommended change:
New Threat Assessment: The intelligence community now assesses that the threat from Iran’s short- and medium-range ballistic missiles is developing more rapidly than previously projected, while the threat of potential Iranian intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capabilities has been slower to develop than previously estimated. In the near-term, the greatest missile threats from Iran will be to U.S. Allies and partners, as well as to U.S. deployed personnel – military and civilian –and their accompanying families in the Middle East and in Europe.
Advances in Capabilities and Technologies: Over the past several years, U.S. missile defense capabilities and technologies have advanced significantly. We expect this trend to continue. Improved interceptor capabilities, such as advanced versions of the SM-3, offer a more flexible, capable, and cost- effective architecture. Improved sensor technologies offer a variety of options to detect and track enemy missiles. These changes in the threat as well as our capabilities and technologies underscore the need for an adaptable architecture. This architecture is responsive to the current threat, but could also incorporate relevant technologies quickly and cost-effectively to respond to evolving threats. Accordingly, the Department of Defense has developed a four-phased, adaptive approach for missile defense in Europe. While further advances of technology or future changes in the threat could modify the details or timing of later phases, current plans call for the following:
Page 26
NEW START TREATY U.S. SENATE BRIEFING BOOK APRIL 2010
Phase One (in the 2011 timeframe) – Deploy current and proven missile defense systems available in the next two years, including the sea-based Aegis Weapon System, the SM-3 interceptor (Block IA), and sensors such as the forward-based Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance system (AN/TPY-2), to address regional ballistic missile threats to Europe and our deployed personnel and their families;
Phase Two (in the 2015 timeframe) – After appropriate testing, deploy a more capable version of the SM- 3 interceptor (Block IB) in both sea- and land-based configurations, and more advanced sensors, to expand the defended area against short- and medium-range missile threats;
Phase Three (in the 2018 timeframe) – After development and testing are complete, deploy the more advanced SM-3 Block IIA variant currently under development, to counter short-, medium-, and intermediate-range missile threats; and
Phase Four (in the 2020 timeframe) – After development and testing are complete, deploy the SM-3 Block IIB to help better cope with medium- and intermediate-range missiles and the potential future ICBM threat to the United States.
Throughout all four phases, the United States also will be testing and updating a range of approaches for improving our sensors for missile defense. The new distributed interceptor and sensor architecture also does not require a single, large, fixed European radar that was to be located in the Czech Republic; this approach also uses different interceptor technology than the previous program, removing the need for a single field of 10 ground-based interceptors in Poland. Therefore, the Secretary of Defense recommended that the United States no longer plan to move forward with that architecture.
The Czech Republic and Poland, as close, strategic and steadfast Allies of the United States, will be central to our continued consultations with NATO Allies on our defense against the growing ballistic missile threat. The phased, adaptive approach for missile defense in Europe:
Sustains U.S. homeland defense against long-range ballistic missile threats. The deployment of an advanced version of the SM-3 interceptor in Phase Four of the approach would augment existing ground- based interceptors located in Alaska and California, which provide for the defense of the homeland against a potential ICBM threat.
Speeds protection of U.S. deployed forces, civilian personnel, and their accompanying families against the near-term missile threat from Iran. We would deploy current and proven technology by roughly 2011 – about six or seven years earlier than the previous plan – to help defend the regions in Europe most vulnerable to the Iranian short- and medium-range ballistic missile threat.
Ensures and enhances the protection of the territory and populations of all NATO Allies, in concert with their missile defense capabilities, against the current and growing ballistic missile threat. Starting in 2011, the phased, adaptive approach would systematically increase the defended area as the threat is expected to grow. In the 2018 timeframe, all of Europe could be protected by our collective missile defense architecture.
Page 27
NEW START TREATY U.S. SENATE BRIEFING BOOK APRIL 2010
Deploys proven capabilities and technologies to meet current threats. SM-3 (Block 1A) interceptors are deployed on Aegis ships today, and more advanced versions are in various stages of development. Over the past four years, we have conducted a number of tests of the SM-3 IA, and it was the interceptor used in the successful engagement of a decaying satellite in February 2008. Testing in 2008 showed that sensors we plan to field bring significant capabilities to the architecture, and additional, planned research and development over the next few years offers the potential for more diverse and more capable sensors. Provides flexibility to upgrade and adjust the architecture, and to do so in a cost-effective manner, as the threat evolves. Because of the lower per-interceptor costs and mobility of key elements of the architecture, we will be better postured to adapt this set of defenses to any changes in threat.
We will work with our Allies to integrate this architecture with NATO members’ missile defense capabilities, as well as with the emerging NATO command and control network that is under development. One benefit of the phased, adaptive approach is that there is a high degree of flexibility – in addition to sea- based assets, there are many potential locations for the architecture’s land-based elements, some of which will be re-locatable. We plan to deploy elements in northern and southern Europe and will be consulting closely at NATO with Allies on the specific deployment options.
We also welcome Russian cooperation to bring its missile defense capabilities into a broader defense of our common strategic interests. We have repeatedly made clear to Russia that missile defense in Europe poses no threat to its strategic deterrent. Rather, the purpose is to strengthen defenses against the growing Iranian missile threat. There is no substitute for Iran complying with its international obligations regarding its nuclear program. But ballistic missile defenses will address the threat from Iran’s ballistic missile programs, and diminish the coercive influence that Iran hopes to gain by continuing to develop these destabilizing capabilities.
Through the ongoing Department of Defense ballistic missile defense review, the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff will continue to provide recommendations to the President that address other aspects of our ballistic missile defense capabilities and posture around the world.
Page 28
NEW START TREATY U.S. SENATE BRIEFING BOOK APRIL 2010
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW FACT SHEET
The 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) is a review conducted pursuant to guidance from the President and the Secretary of Defense, while also addressing the legislative requirement to assess U.S. ballistic missile defense policy and strategy. The BMDR evaluates the threats posed by ballistic missiles and develops a missile defense posture to address current and future challenges.
First-Ever Ballistic Missile Defense Review The Secretary of Defense delivered the 2010 BMDR report to Congress on February 1, 2010. The Department of Defense conducted the first-ever Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Review from March 2009 through January 2010. • Mandated by Congress, and guided by a Presidential directive, the review comprehensively considered U.S. BMD policies, strategies, plans, and programs. • The BMDR aligns the missile defense posture with the near-term regional ballistic missile threat while sustaining and technically enhancing the U.S. ability to defend the homeland against a limited long-range attack. • The review includes input from agencies across the entire U.S. government.
The report begins with an overview of the ballistic missile threat to the United States and its allies and partners, followed by the strategy and policy framework and the priorities of the Administration. • The report describes the steps proposed by the Administration both to defend the homeland and to address threats to our forces overseas, and our allies and partners. • It also sets out in detail steps to strengthen international cooperation on BMD. • Finally, the report addresses a series of issues associated with the Department’s management of the missile defense program.
The Ballistic Missile Threat The ballistic missile threat is increasing both quantitatively and qualitatively, and is likely to continue to do so over the next decade. Current global trends indicate that ballistic missile systems are becoming more flexible, mobile, survivable, reliable, and accurate, while also increasing in range. Several states are also developing nuclear, chemical, and/or biological warheads for their missiles. Regional actors such as North Korea and Iran continue to develop long-range missiles that will be capable of threatening the United States. There is some uncertainty about when and how this type of long-range threat to the U.S. homeland will mature, but there is no uncertainty about the existence of regional threats. The threat from short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs, MRBMs, and IRBMs) in regions where the United States deploys forces and maintains security relationships is growing steadily.
Strategy and Policy Framework Following guidance from the President, this review has set the following six policy priorities: • The United States will continue to defend the homeland against the threat of limited ballistic missile attack.
Page 29
NEW START TREATY U.S. SENATE BRIEFING BOOK APRIL 2010
• The United States will defend against regional missile threats to U.S. forces, while protecting allies and partners and enabling them to defend themselves. • Before new capabilities are deployed, they must undergo testing that enables assessment under realistic operational conditions. • The commitment to new capabilities must be fiscally sustainable over the long term. • U.S. BMD capabilities must be flexible enough to adapt as threats change. • The United States will seek to lead expanded international efforts for missile defense.
Defending the Homeland The United States is currently protected against limited ICBM attacks. This is a result of investments made over the past decade in a system based on ground-based midcourse defense (GMD). Because of continuing improvements in the GMD system and the number of ground-based interceptors now deployed compared to potential North Korean and Iranian long-range ballistic missile capabilities, the United States possesses a capability to counter the projected threat from North Korea and Iran for the foreseeable future. In order to maintain defense of the U.S. homeland against the threat of limited ballistic missile attack, and hedge against the possibility of new threats emerging, we will: • Continue to develop existing operational capabilities at Fort Greely, Ala., and Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif. • Invest in further development of the Standard Missile 3 for future land-based deployment as the ICBM threat matures. • Increase investments in sensors and early-intercept kill systems to help defeat missile defense countermeasures.
Defending Against Regional Threats Over the past decade, the United States has made significant progress in developing and fielding capabilities for protection against attack from short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. These include increasingly capable: • PATRIOT batteries for point defense • AN/TPY-2 X-band radar for detecting and tracking ballistic missiles • Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) batteries for area defense • Space-based sensors • Sea-based capabilities such as the SM-3 Block IA interceptor.
The Department of Defense will further invest in these deployable assets while developing new capabilities that will increase the capability of our ballistic missile defense system.
Integrating Capabilities Regionally As threats have advanced and technical solutions have matured, it has become increasingly important to think strategically about the deployment of low-density, high-demand missile defense assets in a regional context.
Page 30
NEW START TREATY U.S. SENATE BRIEFING BOOK APRIL 2010
Such deployments must be tailored to the unique deterrence and defense requirements of each region, which vary considerably in their geography, the character of the threat, and the military-to-military relationships on which to build cooperative missile defenses. To help facilitate regional integration, the United States will work with allies and partners to strengthen regional deterrence architectures, pursue a phased adaptive approach to missile defense within each region that is tailored to the threats and circumstances unique to that region, and develop capabilities that are mobile and re-locatable.
Strengthening International Cooperation The United States seeks to create an environment in which the development, acquisition, deployment, and use of ballistic missiles by regional adversaries can be deterred, principally by eliminating their confidence in the effectiveness of such attacks. Toward this end, the United States seeks broad-based international cooperation. Strengthening cooperation with allies and partners to develop and field, pragmatic and cost-effective capabilities is an important priority. In Europe, the Administration is committed to implementing the new European Phased Adaptive Approach within a NATO context. In East Asia, the United States is working to improve missile defenses through a series of bilateral relationships. The United States is also pursuing strengthened cooperation with a number of partners in the Middle East. The Administration also seeks to engage Russia and China on missile defense. • With Russia, we are pursuing a broad agenda concentrating on shared early warning of missile launches, possible technical cooperation, and even operational cooperation. • With China, we seek further dialogue on strategic issues of interest to both nations, including missile defense.
Managing the Missile Defense Program The Administration is committed to deploying capabilities that have been proven under extensive testing and assessment and are affordable over the long term. To ensure adequate oversight of the missile defense program, DoD has enhanced the roles and responsibilities of the Missile Defense Executive Board (MDEB) which provides oversight and guidance in a collaborative mode involving all missile defense stakeholders in DoD and some from outside DoD. The MDEB also oversees the Ballistic Missile Defense System Life Cycle Management Process, which is used by DoD to identify requirements, allocate resources, and provide departmental insight to control costs. After careful study, DoD has come to the conclusion that it does not see benefit in bringing MDA into the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS) or the full DoD 5000 acquisition reporting process at this time. There is, however, benefit in further innovation in management of the program, and DoD is pursuing the creation of additional hybrid MDA/Service program offices.
Page 31
NEW START TREATY U.S. SENATE BRIEFING BOOK APRIL 2010
CONVENTIONAL PROMPT GLOBAL STRIKE
Key Point: The New START Treaty does not contain any constraints on current or planned U.S. conventional prompt global strike capability.
The growth of unrivaled U.S. conventional military capabilities has contributed to our ability to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks, assuring allies and partners of our security commitments, and reinforcing regional security. The Department of Defense (DoD) is currently exploring the full range of technologies and systems for a Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) capability that could provide the President more credible and technically suitable options for dealing with new and evolving threats.
Current CPGS projects focus on the development and demonstration of technologies that could support an eventual U.S.-based operationally deployed system. Current efforts are examining three concepts: Hypersonic Technology Vehicle, Conventional Strike Missile, and Advanced Hypersonic Weapon. These projects are managed by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the U.S. Air Force Space and Missile Center, and Army Space and Missile Defense Command respectively.
New START protects the U.S. ability to develop and deploy a CPGS capability. The Treaty in no way prohibits the United States from building or deploying conventionally-armed ballistic missiles. Long-range conventional ballistic missiles would count under the Treaty’s limit of 700 delivery vehicles, and their conventional warheads would count against the limit of 1550 warheads, because the treaty does not make a distinction between missiles that are armed with conventional weapons and those that are armed with nuclear weapons. (The prior START treaty also made no such distinction). This warhead ceiling would accommodate any plans the United States might develop during the life of this Treaty to deploy conventional warheads on ballistic missiles
DoD is studying CPGS within the context of its portfolio of all non-nuclear long-range strike capabilities including land-based and sea-based systems, as well as standoff and/or penetrating bombers. This analysis will be concluded in summer 2010, with investment recommendations reflected in the Fiscal Year 2012 budget submission.
Page 32
NEW START TREATY U.S. SENATE BRIEFING BOOK APRIL 2010
VERIFICATION Key Point: Strong verification measures are built into the New START Treaty to monitor compliance with the Treaty.
The New START Treaty can be effectively verified with a verification regime that builds on lessons learned from 15 years of implementing START. The regime, which will be simpler and less costly to implement than START, provides for data exchange and notifications regarding strategic systems and facilities covered by the Treaty, two types of on-site inspections, exhibitions, and as a transparency measure provides for the exchange of telemetric information. • NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS (NTM) – The Treaty provides for the use of and non-interference with national technical means of verification (e.g. satellites). There are explicit provisions that prohibit interference with NTM and the use of concealment measures that may impede monitoring by NTM. As in the 1991 START Treaty, the prohibition against concealment measures does not apply to cover or concealment practices at ICBM bases or to the use of environmental shelters. • DATA EXCHANGE AND NOTIFICATIONS – The sides will exchange data on numbers, locations, and technical characteristics of weapons systems and facilities that are subject to the Treaty and will provide regular notifications and updates. • ON-SITE INSPECTIONS – The Treaty provides for 18 on-site inspections per year. There are two basic types of inspections. Type One inspections focus on sites with deployed and non-deployed strategic systems; Type Two inspections focus on sites with only non-deployed strategic systems. Permitted inspection activities include confirming the number of reentry vehicles on deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs, confirming numbers related to non-deployed launcher limits, counting nuclear weapons onboard or attached to deployed heavy bombers, confirming weapon system conversions or eliminations, and confirming facility eliminations. Each side is allowed to conduct ten Type One inspections and eight Type Two inspections annually. • UNIQUE IDENTIFIERS – Each ICBM, SLBM, and heavy bomber will be assigned a unique identifier (number), which will be included in the applicable notifications and may be confirmed during inspections. • TELEMETRIC INFORMATION – During ICBM and SLBM flight tests, measurements of various technical parameters are made to monitor missile performance. To enhance transparency and supplement verification provisions, the Parties have agreed to an annual exchange of telemetric information on a parity basis, for up to five ICBM and SLBM launches per year. • COMPLIANCE – The Treaty establishes the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) as a compliance and implementation body that will meet at least twice each year, unless otherwise agreed. Compliance or implementation questions may be raised by either Party in the BCC.
Page 33
NEW START TREATY U.S. SENATE BRIEFING BOOK APRIL 2010
TELEMETRY
Key Point: Telemetry is not needed to verify compliance with the New START Treaty. Nevertheless, the U.S. and Russia will exchange telemetric information periodically on ICBM and SLBM launches.
What is Telemetry?: When flight testing ICBMs and SLBMs, the United States and Russia routinely make on-board measurements of certain technical parameters of the missiles, such as missile acceleration, temperatures, and stage separation times. The data obtained from these measurements are broadcast from the missile during flight for collection by ground- or sea-based receivers. The collected data is then analyzed to assess the performance characteristics of the missile system. The broadcast data is referred to as telemetric information, or “telemetry.”
Telemetry under the START Treaty: To monitor the central limits, prohibitions, and restrictions of the START Treaty, which expired on December 5, 2009, it was necessary for the Parties to be able to assess missile parameters such as throw-weight, number of reentry vehicle releases, and accelerations. These parameters could be more effectively monitored by analyzing telemetric information obtained during missile flight tests. Therefore, the requirement to share telemetry was a critical element of START’s verification regime. Both sides agreed, with limited and specified exceptions, that they would not engage in deliberate denial of telemetric information. The Parties to START also agreed to exchange recordings of telemetric information collected during all ICBM and SLBM flight tests, along with equipment and information needed to interpret and analyze the recorded data.
Telemetry under the New START Treaty: The obligations in the New START Treaty are different from those in START. None of the new Treaty’s specific obligations, prohibitions, or limitations requires analysis of telemetric information to verify a Party’s compliance. For instance, the Treaty does not limit the development of new types of missiles, so there is no requirement to determine the technical characteristics of new missiles such as their launch weight or throw-weight in order to distinguish them from existing types. Nevertheless, to promote openness and transparency, the Parties have agreed to exchange telemetric information on an agreed equal number (up to five annually) of launches of ICBMs and SLBMs, as well as space launch vehicles that utilize ICBMs or SLBMs, or their first stages. Early each year in the Bilateral Consultative Commission, the Treaty’s implementation body, the Parties will discuss the issue of the exchange of telemetric information on launches of ICBMs and SLBMs, focusing on the launches conducted in the previous calendar year, and agree on the number of those launches for which telemetric information will be exchanged. Then, the Party conducting the launches will determine the specific ICBM and SLBM launches from the previous year for which it will provide telemetric recordings. Recordings of telemetric information collected during the flight of those missiles will be provided along with interpretive data to allow the monitoring Party to extract useful information regarding the performance parameters measured onboard the missile during its flight test.
Page 34
NEW START TREATY U.S. SENATE BRIEFING BOOK APRIL 2010
COMPARISON OF THE START TREATY, MOSCOW TREATY, AND NEW START TREATY
START Moscow Treaty New START 6,000 1,700 – 2,200 1,550 warheads attributed to strategic nuclear deployed warheads* Warheads deployed ICBMs and warheads SLBMs, and heavy bombers 1,600 700 strategic nuclear delivery deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and vehicles (deployed ICBMs heavy bombers equipped for nuclear and SLBMs and their armaments Delivery associated launchers, and Not limited 800 Vehicles heavy bombers) deployed and non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers and deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments * Includes warheads on deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs, and nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers.
START Verification Regime: START, which expired on December 5, 2009, had an extensive verification regime to verify its numerous and diverse Treaty obligations and prohibitions. The use of national technical means (NTM) of verification was supplemented by: on-site inspections; periodically exchanged data on weapons systems and facilities; regular notifications updating the data; exchange of telemetry information to verify technical missile parameters pertaining specifically to obligations and requirements of the treaty; cooperative measures; and continuous monitoring at mobile ICBM assembly facilities. Moscow Treaty Verification Regime: The Moscow Treaty has no verification regime, but relied upon START’s verification regime -- until START’s expiration -- to provide insight into each Party’s strategic forces. The Moscow Treaty will be superseded by the New START Treaty when the new Treaty enters into force. New START Verification Regime: The obligations and prohibitions of New START are different than those in START, reflecting both the improved U.S.-Russian relationship and lessons learned from our experience implementing START. Accordingly, the Treaty’s verification provisions are simpler and less costly to implement than those in START. The New START Treaty prohibits interference with NTM and prohibits the use of concealment measures to avoid NTM. NTM will be supplemented by: on-site inspections; periodically exchanged data on weapons systems and facilities; regular notifications and data updates; and a requirement to assign a unique alphanumeric identifier to each ICBM, SLBM, and heavy bomber. This unique identifier may be confirmed during inspections and will be included in the database and applicable notifications. To promote openness and transparency, the Parties will also conduct an annual exchange of telemetry information on up to five ICBM or SLBM launches, as chosen by the Party conducting the launches.
Page 35
NEW START TREATY U.S. SENATE BRIEFING BOOK APRIL 2010
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS
Page 36
NEW START TREATY U.S. SENATE BRIEFING BOOK APRIL 2010
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS
Q. How does the New START Treaty enhance U.S. national security?
A. The New START Treaty will enhance U.S. national security by: stabilizing the strategic balance between the United States and the Russian Federation at lower levels of nuclear forces; providing for predictability, transparency and stability in the U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship; and reinforcing America’s ability to lead and revitalize global efforts to prevent proliferation and to strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty by demonstrating that the world’s two largest nuclear powers are taking concrete steps to reduce their nuclear arms.
Q. What does the New START Treaty do?
A. The New START Treaty requires significant reductions in the permitted number of deployed strategic warheads to 1550 per side – about 30% below the maximum of 2,200 warheads permitted by the Moscow Treaty. The Treaty also provides for significantly lower limits than in previous treaties on the number of deployed strategic delivery vehicles (deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed nuclear-capable heavy bombers), and limits the total number of deployed and non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments. It will enhance predictability regarding the strategic forces of the United States and Russia. The Treaty includes provisions for data exchanges and notifications regarding strategic offensive systems and facilities, and on-site inspections and exhibitions for verification. In addition, the new Treaty provides for the continued use of and non-interference with national technical means of verification.
Q. Just how significant are the reductions of strategic arms under the New START Treaty?
A. The new warhead limit of 1,550 represents a 30% reduction below the upper limit of 2,200 warheads permitted by the 2002 Moscow Treaty, while the deployed delivery vehicle limit of 700 is less than half the total permitted under the 1991 START Treaty, which expired in December 2009.
Q. Why are heavy bombers counted under New START Treaty rules with a single warhead when they are capable of carrying many more?
A. Throughout the history of strategic arms control, both the United States and Russia have considered heavy bombers to be stabilizing in the strategic relationship because they are not first-strike weapons. Consequently, the number of weapons counted for bombers in arms control agreements has traditionally been much less than the bombers can carry, i.e., bomber weapons are “discounted” by the treaties. For example, in the 1991 START Treaty, the sides counted heavy bomber weapons at less than the bombers were capable of deploying. In the New START Treaty, we sought to count strategic offensive arms according to the number of armaments they actually carry. Rather than count heavy bombers at zero warheads to reflect the fact that nuclear weapons are never loaded on them, the sides agreed to an attribution rule of one warhead per heavy bomber, as we had used in START for the narrower category of heavy bombers not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. The continued “discounting” of bomber weapons in the New START Treaty is consistent with the current strategic relationship between the United States and Russia and with the real threat -- or lack thereof -- that bombers represent.
Page 37
NEW START TREATY U.S. SENATE BRIEFING BOOK APRIL 2010
Q. Does the Treaty limit missile defense?
A. No. The New START Treaty does not limit our ability to test, develop, or deploy missile defenses.
• The Treaty’s preamble includes language acknowledging the inter-relationship between strategic offensive and defensive forces; this preamble language is NOT a binding obligation. Presidents Obama and Medvedev agreed in July 2009 that the Treaty would include such an acknowledgement. A similar provision existed in the START Treaty.
• The New START Treaty prohibits the conversion of ICBM and SLBM silos into launchers for missile defense interceptors and vice versa. This provision has no effect on our ability to develop and field missile defenses. First, the Treaty explicitly exempts the five ICBM silo launchers at Vandenberg Air Force Base that were converted to missile defense interceptor launchers prior to treaty signature. Second, the United States has no plans to convert additional ICBM or SLBM silos into launchers for missile defense interceptors, nor do we have plans to convert missile defense interceptor launchers into ICBM or SLBM launchers. New construction of silo launchers for missile defense purposes at Ft. Greely, Vandenberg, or elsewhere is not limited by the New START Treaty.
• We expect Russia to make a unilateral statement regarding missile defenses. Its statement will not be legally binding. We will also make a unilateral statement, making clear that nothing in the Treaty will limit U.S. missile defense plans. The United States is not bound by, and does not accept, the Russian view. These statements will not be subject to Senate advice and consent, though they will be shared with the Senate.
Q. Does the New START Treaty limit conventional prompt global strike capabilities? How are conventional warheads that might be deployed on ICBMs or SLBMs handled under this Treaty?
A. The New START Treaty does not restrict our ability to develop and deploy a conventional prompt global strike capability, should we pursue such a capability. The Treaty does not prohibit or limit the United States from building or deploying conventionally-armed ballistic missiles. Just as in START, both nuclear warheads and conventional warheads that may be deployed on ICBMs or SLBMs will count toward the aggregate warhead limit of 1,550 under the New START Treaty. This warhead ceiling would accommodate any plans the U.S. might develop during the life of this Treaty to deploy conventional warheads on ballistic missiles.
Q. Why did it take so long to reach this agreement on the New START Treaty?
A. The United States took the time required to get an agreement that protects our national interests and will enhance our national security. Both sides set an ambitious goal to complete negotiations in less than a year, and we nearly met that goal. It took time to work through complex issues, exchange views, reach agreement, and put the details in writing in both English and Russian. For comparison purposes, the INF
Page 38
NEW START TREATY U.S. SENATE BRIEFING BOOK APRIL 2010
Treaty, which entered into force in 1988, took over five years to negotiate, and START, which entered into force in 1994, took over nine years to negotiate.
Q. Why did the President sign the New START Treaty before all the Annexes were negotiated?
A. The New START Treaty is organized in three tiers, which are all legally binding: The Treaty Text, the Protocol, and the Annexes to the Protocol. All of the basic rights and obligations are contained in the Treaty and Protocol. The Annexes spell out the technical details on how some of the Treaty’s rights and obligations will be carried out. Presidents Obama and Medvedev decided last fall that they would sign the New START Treaty once the Treaty and Protocol were completed and that the technical annexes could be completed after Treaty signature. The negotiators have completed the substantive negotiations on the Annexes, and they will be transmitted to the Senate with the Treaty and Protocol.
Q. When will the New START Treaty enter into force?
A. The treaty will enter into force when both nations have completed their internal constitutional processes for approval of treaties. The New START Treaty must be sent to our Senate for advice and consent to ratification. Similarly, the Russian Parliament also must give its approval. We will transmit the Treaty to the Senate as soon as the technical annexes have been completed and the transmittal package is ready. We expect to send the Treaty to the Senate later this spring. Meanwhile, some of the Treaty’s provisions (such as provisions for convening sessions of the treaty’s implementing body – the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC)) will be applied on a provisional basis upon signature.
Verification
Q. Will the New START Treaty have strong verification mechanisms?
A. Yes. The New START Treaty has a verification regime that combines elements of the START Treaty with new elements designed for the limitations of the Treaty. The Treaty requires on-site inspections of both deployed and non-deployed systems, data exchanges, exhibitions, and notification of changes to strategic offensive forces. The verification regime will be less complicated and less costly than that in START, and is tailored to monitor the limits of the New START Treaty, which allow the Parties greater operational flexibility to configure their strategic forces as they see fit within the overall Treaty limits. The verification regime builds on the knowledge accumulated during fifteen years of START implementation and reflects the current relationship between the United States and Russia, which is much improved compared to the relationship that existed between the United States and the Soviet Union when START was negotiated.
Q. Why did we end Portal monitoring at Votkinsk?
A. Votkinsk monitoring began as part of the INF Treaty and was one of the verification measures used to monitor mobile missile production under the START Treaty. The New START Treaty contains new, simplified provisions to track and account for new missiles being produced at Votkinsk. The Treaty specifically requires Russia to notify the United States 48 hours in advance every time a new solid-fueled ICBM or SLBM leaves the Votkinsk production facility. The new Treaty also continues the requirement
Page 39
NEW START TREATY U.S. SENATE BRIEFING BOOK APRIL 2010
from START that each side notify the other of completion of a missile’s transit and its destination. These provisions will facilitate monitoring through national technical means. In addition, New START requires unique alphanumeric identifiers on all missiles (and heavy bombers), including ICBMs for mobile launchers, to help track and account for them, from the time they are produced until they are eventually eliminated.
Telemetry
Q. Does the New START Treaty guarantee the exchange of telemetric data, which was a key provision of the START Treaty? Is telemetry needed for verification of this treaty?
A. We do not need telemetry to verify compliance with the new Treaty, unlike under the expired treaty. That treaty had limits, prohibitions, and obligations that required the analysis of telemetric information to ensure that a Party was complying with the treaty. There are no specific obligations, prohibitions, or limitations in the new Treaty that would require the analysis of telemetric information in order to verify a Party’s compliance with the Treaty. For instance, the Treaty does not limit the development of new types of missiles, so there is no requirement to determine the technical characteristics of new missiles such as their launch weight or throw-weight in order to distinguish them from existing types. Nevertheless, to promote transparency and predictability, the Parties have agreed to exchange telemetric information on an agreed equal number (up to 5 annually) of launches of ICBMs and SLBMs, with the testing party deciding the launches on which it will exchange information. The specifics of the annual telemetry exchanges will be worked out in the Treaty’s implementation body, the Bilateral Consultative Commission.
Page 40
NEW START TREATY U.S. SENATE BRIEFING BOOK APRIL 2010
U.S. NUCLEAR POLICY: OVERVIEW
Page 41
NEW START TREATY U.S. SENATE BRIEFING BOOK APRIL 2010
U.S. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION POLICY: OVERVIEW
Proliferation and the risk of nuclear terrorism are the most pressing nuclear threats to U.S. national security. The United States is leading international efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism and strengthen the global nuclear nonproliferation regime.
The United States is committed to revitalizing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the global nuclear nonproliferation regime to meet challenges posed by noncompliance with the Treaty and the expanding use of nuclear energy. The United States is championing and reaffirming through its own actions the grand bargain that underpins the Treaty: states without nuclear weapons will not acquire them, states with nuclear weapons will pursue disarmament, and all Parties in compliance with their NPT obligations can have access to peaceful nuclear energy. The United States is leading international efforts to strengthen the regime by:
• Bringing North Korea and Iran into compliance with nonproliferation obligations. • Strengthening International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and ensuring that the IAEA has the resources necessary to fulfill its vital missions. • Creating consequences for non-compliance with nonproliferation obligations. • Dissuading use of the NPT’s withdrawal provision by Parties in noncompliance with the Treaty. • Ensuring that any sensitive nuclear trade is carried out responsibly and, if necessary, impeding trade that poses a proliferation risk. • Promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy without increasing proliferation risks. • Seeking global participation in the NPT.
The United States is also committed to improving nuclear security worldwide and has given high priority to strengthening and accelerating international efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism, including by:
• Pursuing aggressively the President’s Prague initiative, endorsed in UN Security Council Resolution 1887, to lock down all vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide. • Hosting the April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit.
Disarmament efforts contribute to our nonproliferation goals. By taking seriously our NPT obligation to pursue disarmament, we strengthen international support to reinforce the nonproliferation regime. In pursuit of our commitment to the goal of a world without nuclear weapons, we are:
• Concluding a verifiable New START Treaty that limits U.S. and Russian nuclear forces to levels well below those provided for in START and the Moscow Treaty. • Pursuing entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. • Seeking negotiations on a verifiable Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty to halt the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons.
Page 42
NEW START TREATY U.S. SENATE BRIEFING BOOK APRIL 2010
THE WHITE HOUSE Office of the Press Secretary
REMARKS BY PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA Hradcany Square Prague, Czech Republic April 5, 2009
PRESIDENT OBAMA: Thank you so much. Thank you for this wonderful welcome. Thank you to the people of Prague. Thank you to the people of the Czech Republic. (Applause.) Today, I'm proud to stand here with you in the middle of this great city, in the center of Europe. (Applause.) And, to paraphrase one of my predecessors, I am also proud to be the man who brought Michelle Obama to Prague. (Applause.)
To Mr. President, Mr. Prime Minister, to all the dignitaries who are here, thank you for your extraordinary hospitality. And to the people of the Czech Republic, thank you for your friendship to the United States. (Applause.) I've learned over many years to appreciate the good company and the good humor of the Czech people in my hometown of Chicago. (Applause.) Behind me is a statue of a hero of the Czech people –- Tomas Masaryk. (Applause.) In 1918, after America had pledged its support for Czech independence, Masaryk spoke to a crowd in Chicago that was estimated to be over 100,000. I don't think I can match his record -- (laughter) -- but I am honored to follow his footsteps from Chicago to Prague. (Applause.)
For over a thousand years, Prague has set itself apart from any other city in any other place. You've known war and peace. You've seen empires rise and fall. You've led revolutions in the arts and science, in politics and in poetry. Through it all, the people of Prague have insisted on pursuing their own path, and defining their own destiny. And this city –- this Golden City which is both ancient and youthful -– stands as a living monument to your unconquerable spirit.
When I was born, the world was divided, and our nations were faced with very different circumstances. Few people would have predicted that someone like me would one day become the President of the United States. (Applause.) Few people would have predicted that an American President would one day be permitted to speak to an audience like this in Prague. (Applause.) Few would have imagined that the Czech Republic would become a free nation, a member of NATO, a leader of a united Europe. Those ideas would have been dismissed as dreams.
We are here today because enough people ignored the voices who told them that the world could not change.
We're here today because of the courage of those who stood up and took risks to say that freedom is a right for all people, no matter what side of a wall they live on, and no matter what they look like. We are here today because of the Prague Spring –- because the simple and principled pursuit of liberty and opportunity shamed those who relied on the power of tanks and arms to put down the will of a people.
We are here today because 20 years ago, the people of this city took to the streets to claim the promise of a new day, and the fundamental human rights that had been denied them for far too long. Sametová Revoluce
Page 43
NEW START TREATY U.S. SENATE BRIEFING BOOK APRIL 2010
-- (applause) -- the Velvet Revolution taught us many things. It showed us that peaceful protest could shake the foundations of an empire, and expose the emptiness of an ideology. It showed us that small countries can play a pivotal role in world events, and that young people can lead the way in overcoming old conflicts. (Applause.) And it proved that moral leadership is more powerful than any weapon.
That's why I'm speaking to you in the center of a Europe that is peaceful, united and free -– because ordinary people believed that divisions could be bridged, even when their leaders did not. They believed that walls could come down; that peace could prevail. We are here today because Americans and Czechs believed against all odds that today could be possible. (Applause.)
Now, we share this common history. But now this generation -– our generation -– cannot stand still. We, too, have a choice to make. As the world has become less divided, it has become more interconnected. And we've seen events move faster than our ability to control them -– a global economy in crisis, a changing climate, the persistent dangers of old conflicts, new threats and the spread of catastrophic weapons.
None of these challenges can be solved quickly or easily. But all of them demand that we listen to one another and work together; that we focus on our common interests, not on occasional differences; and that we reaffirm our shared values, which are stronger than any force that could drive us apart. That is the work that we must carry on. That is the work that I have come to Europe to begin. (Applause.)
To renew our prosperity, we need action coordinated across borders. That means investments to create new jobs. That means resisting the walls of protectionism that stand in the way of growth. That means a change in our financial system, with new rules to prevent abuse and future crisis. (Applause.)
And we have an obligation to our common prosperity and our common humanity to extend a hand to those emerging markets and impoverished people who are suffering the most, even though they may have had very little to do with financial crises, which is why we set aside over a trillion dollars for the International Monetary Fund earlier this week, to make sure that everybody -- everybody -- receives some assistance. (Applause.)
Now, to protect our planet, now is the time to change the way that we use energy. (Applause.) Together, we must confront climate change by ending the world's dependence on fossil fuels, by tapping the power of new sources of energy like the wind and sun, and calling upon all nations to do their part. And I pledge to you that in this global effort, the United States is now ready to lead. (Applause.)
To provide for our common security, we must strengthen our alliance. NATO was founded 60 years ago, after Communism took over Czechoslovakia. That was when the free world learned too late that it could not afford division. So we came together to forge the strongest alliance that the world has ever known. And we should -- stood shoulder to shoulder -- year after year, decade after decade –- until an Iron Curtain was lifted, and freedom spread like flowing water.
This marks the 10th year of NATO membership for the Czech Republic. And I know that many times in the 20th century, decisions were made without you at the table. Great powers let you down, or determined your destiny without your voice being heard. I am here to say that the United States will never turn its back on the people of this nation. (Applause.) We are bound by shared values, shared history -- (applause.) We are
Page 44
NEW START TREATY U.S. SENATE BRIEFING BOOK APRIL 2010
bound by shared values and shared history and the enduring promise of our alliance. NATO's Article V states it clearly: An attack on one is an attack on all. That is a promise for our time, and for all time.
The people of the Czech Republic kept that promise after America was attacked; thousands were killed on our soil, and NATO responded. NATO's mission in Afghanistan is fundamental to the safety of people on both sides of the Atlantic. We are targeting the same al Qaeda terrorists who have struck from New York to London, and helping the Afghan people take responsibility for their future. We are demonstrating that free nations can make common cause on behalf of our common security. And I want you to know that we honor the sacrifices of the Czech people in this endeavor, and mourn the loss of those you've lost.
But no alliance can afford to stand still. We must work together as NATO members so that we have contingency plans in place to deal with new threats, wherever they may come from. We must strengthen our cooperation with one another, and with other nations and institutions around the world, to confront dangers that recognize no borders. And we must pursue constructive relations with Russia on issues of common concern.
Now, one of those issues that I'll focus on today is fundamental to the security of our nations and to the peace of the world -– that's the future of nuclear weapons in the 21st century.
The existence of thousands of nuclear weapons is the most dangerous legacy of the Cold War. No nuclear war was fought between the United States and the Soviet Union, but generations lived with the knowledge that their world could be erased in a single flash of light. Cities like Prague that existed for centuries, that embodied the beauty and the talent of so much of humanity, would have ceased to exist.
Today, the Cold War has disappeared but thousands of those weapons have not. In a strange turn of history, the threat of global nuclear war has gone down, but the risk of a nuclear attack has gone up. More nations have acquired these weapons. Testing has continued. Black market trade in nuclear secrets and nuclear materials abound. The technology to build a bomb has spread. Terrorists are determined to buy, build or steal one. Our efforts to contain these dangers are centered on a global non-proliferation regime, but as more people and nations break the rules, we could reach the point where the center cannot hold.
Now, understand, this matters to people everywhere. One nuclear weapon exploded in one city -– be it New York or Moscow, Islamabad or Mumbai, Tokyo or Tel Aviv, Paris or Prague –- could kill hundreds of thousands of people. And no matter where it happens, there is no end to what the consequences might be -– for our global safety, our security, our society, our economy, to our ultimate survival.
Some argue that the spread of these weapons cannot be stopped, cannot be checked -– that we are destined to live in a world where more nations and more people possess the ultimate tools of destruction. Such fatalism is a deadly adversary, for if we believe that the spread of nuclear weapons is inevitable, then in some way we are admitting to ourselves that the use of nuclear weapons is inevitable.
Just as we stood for freedom in the 20th century, we must stand together for the right of people everywhere to live free from fear in the 21st century. (Applause.) And as nuclear power –- as a nuclear power, as the only nuclear power to have used a nuclear weapon, the United States has a moral responsibility to act. We cannot succeed in this endeavor alone, but we can lead it, we can start it.
Page 45
NEW START TREATY U.S. SENATE BRIEFING BOOK APRIL 2010
So today, I state clearly and with conviction America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. (Applause.) I'm not naive. This goal will not be reached quickly –- perhaps not in my lifetime. It will take patience and persistence. But now we, too, must ignore the voices who tell us that the world cannot change. We have to insist, "Yes, we can." (Applause.)
Now, let me describe to you the trajectory we need to be on. First, the United States will take concrete steps towards a world without nuclear weapons. To put an end to Cold War thinking, we will reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy, and urge others to do the same. Make no mistake: As long as these weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies –- including the Czech Republic. But we will begin the work of reducing our arsenal.
To reduce our warheads and stockpiles, we will negotiate a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with the Russians this year. (Applause.) President Medvedev and I began this process in London, and will seek a new agreement by the end of this year that is legally binding and sufficiently bold. And this will set the stage for further cuts, and we will seek to include all nuclear weapons states in this endeavor. To achieve a global ban on nuclear testing, my administration will immediately and aggressively pursue U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. (Applause.) After more than five decades of talks, it is time for the testing of nuclear weapons to finally be banned.
And to cut off the building blocks needed for a bomb, the United States will seek a new treaty that verifiably ends the production of fissile materials intended for use in state nuclear weapons. If we are serious about stopping the spread of these weapons, then we should put an end to the dedicated production of weapons-grade materials that create them. That's the first step.
Second, together we will strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a basis for cooperation. The basic bargain is sound: Countries with nuclear weapons will move towards disarmament, countries without nuclear weapons will not acquire them, and all countries can access peaceful nuclear energy. To strengthen the treaty, we should embrace several principles. We need more resources and authority to strengthen international inspections. We need real and immediate consequences for countries caught breaking the rules or trying to leave the treaty without cause.
And we should build a new framework for civil nuclear cooperation, including an international fuel bank, so that countries can access peaceful power without increasing the risks of proliferation. That must be the right of every nation that renounces nuclear weapons, especially developing countries embarking on peaceful programs. And no approach will succeed if it's based on the denial of rights to nations that play by the rules. We must harness the power of nuclear energy on behalf of our efforts to combat climate change, and to advance peace opportunity for all people.
But we go forward with no illusions. Some countries will break the rules. That's why we need a structure in place that ensures when any nation does, they will face consequences.
Just this morning, we were reminded again of why we need a new and more rigorous approach to address this threat. North Korea broke the rules once again by testing a rocket that could be used for long range
Page 46
NEW START TREATY U.S. SENATE BRIEFING BOOK APRIL 2010
missiles. This provocation underscores the need for action –- not just this afternoon at the U.N. Security Council, but in our determination to prevent the spread of these weapons.
Rules must be binding. Violations must be punished. Words must mean something. The world must stand together to prevent the spread of these weapons. Now is the time for a strong international response -- (applause) -- now is the time for a strong international response, and North Korea must know that the path to security and respect will never come through threats and illegal weapons. All nations must come together to build a stronger, global regime. And that's why we must stand shoulder to shoulder to pressure the North Koreans to change course.
Iran has yet to build a nuclear weapon. My administration will seek engagement with Iran based on mutual interests and mutual respect. We believe in dialogue. (Applause.) But in that dialogue we will present a clear choice. We want Iran to take its rightful place in the community of nations, politically and economically. We will support Iran's right to peaceful nuclear energy with rigorous inspections. That's a path that the Islamic Republic can take. Or the government can choose increased isolation, international pressure, and a potential nuclear arms race in the region that will increase insecurity for all.
So let me be clear: Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile activity poses a real threat, not just to the United States, but to Iran's neighbors and our allies. The Czech Republic and Poland have been courageous in agreeing to host a defense against these missiles. As long as the threat from Iran persists, we will go forward with a missile defense system that is cost-effective and proven. (Applause.) If the Iranian threat is eliminated, we will have a stronger basis for security, and the driving force for missile defense construction in Europe will be removed. (Applause.)
So, finally, we must ensure that terrorists never acquire a nuclear weapon. This is the most immediate and extreme threat to global security. One terrorist with one nuclear weapon could unleash massive destruction. Al Qaeda has said it seeks a bomb and that it would have no problem with using it. And we know that there is unsecured nuclear material across the globe. To protect our people, we must act with a sense of purpose without delay.
So today I am announcing a new international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years. We will set new standards, expand our cooperation with Russia, pursue new partnerships to lock down these sensitive materials.
We must also build on our efforts to break up black markets, detect and intercept materials in transit, and use financial tools to disrupt this dangerous trade. Because this threat will be lasting, we should come together to turn efforts such as the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism into durable international institutions. And we should start by having a Global Summit on Nuclear Security that the United States will host within the next year. (Applause.)
Now, I know that there are some who will question whether we can act on such a broad agenda. There are those who doubt whether true international cooperation is possible, given inevitable differences among nations. And there are those who hear talk of a world without nuclear weapons and doubt whether it's worth setting a goal that seems impossible to achieve.
Page 47
NEW START TREATY U.S. SENATE BRIEFING BOOK APRIL 2010
But make no mistake: We know where that road leads. When nations and peoples allow themselves to be defined by their differences, the gulf between them widens. When we fail to pursue peace, then it stays forever beyond our grasp. We know the path when we choose fear over hope. To denounce or shrug off a call for cooperation is an easy but also a cowardly thing to do. That's how wars begin. That's where human progress ends.
There is violence and injustice in our world that must be confronted. We must confront it not by splitting apart but by standing together as free nations, as free people. (Applause.) I know that a call to arms can stir the souls of men and women more than a call to lay them down. But that is why the voices for peace and progress must be raised together. (Applause.)
Those are the voices that still echo through the streets of Prague. Those are the ghosts of 1968. Those were the joyful sounds of the Velvet Revolution. Those were the Czechs who helped bring down a nuclear- armed empire without firing a shot.
Human destiny will be what we make of it. And here in Prague, let us honor our past by reaching for a better future. Let us bridge our divisions, build upon our hopes, accept our responsibility to leave this world more prosperous and more peaceful than we found it. (Applause.) Together we can do it.
Thank you very much. Thank you, Prague. (Applause.) END
Page 48
NEW START TREATY U.S. SENATE BRIEFING BOOK APRIL 2010
THE WHITE HOUSE Office of the Press Secretary March 5, 2010
Statement by President Obama on the 40th Anniversary of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
Forty years ago today, in the midst of a Cold War, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) entered into force, becoming the cornerstone of the world’s efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Today, the threat of global nuclear war has passed, but the danger of nuclear proliferation endures, making the basic bargain of the NPT more important than ever: nations with nuclear weapons will move toward disarmament, nations without nuclear weapons will forsake them, and all nations have an “inalienable right” to peaceful nuclear energy.
Each of these three pillars -- disarmament, nonproliferation and peaceful uses -- are central to the vision that I outlined in Prague of stopping the spread of nuclear weapons and seeking a world without them.
To promote disarmament, the United States is working with Russia to complete negotiations on a new START Treaty that will significantly reduce our nuclear arsenals. Our forthcoming Nuclear Posture Review will move beyond outdated Cold War thinking and reduce the number and role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy, even as we maintain a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent. In addition, we will seek to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and negotiate a treaty to end the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons.
To prevent proliferation, we will build on the historic resolution that we achieved at the United Nations Security Council last September by bringing together more than 40 nations at our Nuclear Security Summit next month with the goal of securing the world’s vulnerable nuclear materials in four years. At this spring’s treaty review conference and beyond, we will continue to work with allies and partners to strengthen the NPT and to enforce the rights and responsibilities of every nation, because the world cannot afford additional proliferation or regional arms races.
Finally, to ensure the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the United States seeks a new framework for civil nuclear cooperation among nations, including an international fuel bank and the necessary resources and authority to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency. For nations that uphold their responsibilities, peaceful nuclear energy can help unlock advances in medicine, agriculture and economic development.
It took years of focused effort among many nations to bring the NPT into force four decades ago and to sustain it as the most widely embraced nuclear agreement in history. On this 40th anniversary, the United States reaffirms our resolve to strengthen the nonproliferation regime to meet the challenges of the 21st century as we pursue our ultimate vision of a world without nuclear weapons.
Page 49
NEW START TREATY U.S. SENATE BRIEFING BOOK APRIL 2010
THE WHITE HOUSE Office of the Vice President
Remarks of Vice President Biden at National Defense University - As Prepared for Delivery
“The Path to Nuclear Security: Implementing the President’s Prague Agenda”
February 18, 2010
Ladies and gentlemen; Secretaries Gates and Chu; General Cartwright; Undersecretary Tauscher; Administrator D’Agostino; members of our armed services; students and faculty; thank you all for coming.
At its founding, Elihu Root gave this campus a mission that is the very essence of our national defense: “Not to promote war, but to preserve peace by intelligent and adequate preparation to repel aggression.” For more than a century, you and your predecessors have heeded that call. There are few greater contributions citizens can claim.
Many statesmen have walked these grounds, including our Administration’s outstanding National Security Advisor, General Jim Jones. You taught him well. George Kennan, the scholar and diplomat, lectured at the National War College in the late 1940s. Just back from Moscow, in a small office not far from here, he developed the doctrine of Containment that guided a generation of Cold War foreign policy.
Some of the issues that arose during that time seem like distant memories. But the topic I came to discuss with you today, the challenge posed by nuclear weapons, continues to demand our urgent attention.
Last April, in Prague, President Obama laid out his vision for protecting our country from nuclear threats.
He made clear we will take concrete steps toward a world without nuclear weapons, while retaining a safe, secure, and effective arsenal as long as we still need it. We will work to strengthen the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty. And we will do everything in our power to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to terrorists and also to states that don’t already possess them.
It’s easy to recognize the threat posed by nuclear terrorism. But we must not underestimate how proliferation to a state could destabilize regions critical to our security and prompt neighbors to seek nuclear weapons of their own.
Our agenda is based on a clear-eyed assessment of our national interest. We have long relied on nuclear weapons to deter potential adversaries.
Now, as our technology improves, we are developing non-nuclear ways to accomplish that same objective. The Quadrennial Defense Review and Ballistic Missile Defense Review, which Secretary Gates released two weeks ago, present a plan to further strengthen our preeminent conventional forces to defend our nation and our allies.
Page 50
NEW START TREATY U.S. SENATE BRIEFING BOOK APRIL 2010
Capabilities like an adaptive missile defense shield, conventional warheads with worldwide reach, and others that we are developing enable us to reduce the role of nuclear weapons, as other nuclear powers join us in drawing down. With these modern capabilities, even with deep nuclear reductions, we will remain undeniably strong.
As we’ve said many times, the spread of nuclear weapons is the greatest threat facing our country. That is why we are working both to stop their proliferation and eventually to eliminate them. Until that day comes, though, we will do everything necessary to maintain our arsenal.
At the vanguard of this effort, alongside our military, are our nuclear weapons laboratories, national treasures that deserve our support. Their invaluable contributions range from building the world’s fastest supercomputers, to developing cleaner fuels, to surveying the heavens with robotic telescopes.
But the labs are best known for the work they do to secure our country. Time and again, we have asked our labs to meet our most urgent strategic needs. And time and again, they have delivered.
In 1939, as fascism began its march across Europe, Asia, and Africa, Albert Einstein warned President Roosevelt that the Nazis were racing to build a weapon, the likes of which the world had never seen. In the Southwest Desert, under the leadership of Robert Oppenheimer, the physicists of Los Alamos won that race and changed the course of history.
Sandia was born near Albuquerque soon after the Second World War and became our premier facility for developing the non-nuclear components of our nuclear weapons program.
And a few years later the institution that became Lawrence Livermore took root in California. During the arms race that followed the Korean War, it designed and developed warheads that kept our nuclear capabilities second to none.
These examples illustrate what everyone in this room already knows - that the past century’s defining conflicts were decided not just on the battlefield, but in the classroom and in the laboratory.
Air Force General Hap Arnold, an aviation pioneer whose vision helped shape the National War College, once argued that the First World War was decided by brawn and the Second by logistics. “The Third World War will be different,” he predicted. “It will be won by brains.”
General Arnold got it almost right. Great minds like Kennan and Oppenheimer helped win the Cold War and prevent World War Three altogether.
During the Cold War, we tested nuclear weapons in our atmosphere, underwater and underground, to confirm that they worked before deploying them, and to evaluate more advanced concepts. But explosive testing damaged our health, disrupted our environment and set back our non-proliferation goals.
Eighteen years ago, President George H.W. Bush signed the nuclear testing moratorium enacted by Congress, which remains in place to this day.
Page 51
NEW START TREATY U.S. SENATE BRIEFING BOOK APRIL 2010
Under the moratorium, our laboratories have maintained our arsenal through the Stockpile Stewardship Program without underground nuclear testing, using techniques that are as successful as they are cutting edge.
Today, the directors of our nuclear laboratories tell us they have a deeper understanding of our arsenal from Stockpile Stewardship than they ever had when testing was commonplace.
Let me repeat that - our labs know more about our arsenal today than when we used to explode our weapons on a regular basis. With our support, the labs can anticipate potential problems and reduce their impact on our arsenal.
Unfortunately, during the last decade, our nuclear complex and experts were neglected and underfunded.
Tight budgets forced more than 2,000 employees of Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore from their jobs between 2006 and 2008, including highly-skilled scientists and engineers.
And some of the facilities we use to handle uranium and plutonium date back to the days when the world’s great powers were led by Truman, Churchill, and Stalin. The signs of age and decay are becoming more apparent every day.
Because we recognized these dangers, in December, Secretary Chu and I met at the White House with the heads of the three nuclear weapons labs. They described the dangerous impact these budgetary pressures were having on their ability to manage our arsenal without testing. They say this situation is a threat to our security. President Obama and I agree.
That’s why earlier this month we announced a new budget that reverses the last decade’s dangerous decline.
It devotes $7 billion to maintaining our nuclear stockpile and modernizing our nuclear infrastructure. To put that in perspective, that’s $624 million more than Congress approved last year—and an increase of $5 billion over the next five years. Even in these tight fiscal times, we will commit the resources our security requires.
This investment is not only consistent with our nonproliferation agenda; it is essential to it. Guaranteeing our stockpile, coupled with broader research and development efforts, allows us to pursue deep nuclear reductions without compromising our security. As our conventional capabilities improve, we will continue to reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons.
Responsible disarmament requires versatile specialists to manage it.
The skilled technicians who look after our arsenal today are the ones who will safely dismantle it tomorrow.
And chemists who understand how plutonium ages also develop forensics to track missing nuclear material and catch those trafficking in it.
Page 52
NEW START TREATY U.S. SENATE BRIEFING BOOK APRIL 2010
Our goal of a world without nuclear weapons has been endorsed by leading voices in both parties. These include two former Secretaries of State from Republican administrations, Henry Kissinger and George Shultz; President Clinton’s Secretary of Defense Bill Perry; and my former colleague Sam Nunn, for years the Democratic Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee.
Together, these four statesmen called eliminating nuclear weapons “a bold initiative consistent with America’s moral heritage.”
During the 2008 Presidential campaign, both the President and Senator McCain supported the same objective. We will continue to build support for this emerging bipartisan consensus like the one around containment of Soviet expansionism that George Kennan inspired.
Toward that end, we have worked tirelessly to implement the President’s Prague agenda.
In September, the President chaired an historic meeting of the UN Security Council, which unanimously embraced the key elements of the President’s vision.
As I speak, U.S. and Russian negotiators are completing an agreement that will reduce strategic weapons to their lowest levels in decades.
Its verification measures will provide confidence its terms are being met. These reductions will be conducted transparently and predictably. The new START treaty will promote strategic stability and bolster global efforts to prevent proliferation by showing that the world’s leading nuclear powers are committed to reducing their arsenals.
And it will build momentum for collaboration with Russia on strengthening the global consensus that nations who violate their NPT obligations should be held to account.
This strategy is yielding results. We have tightened sanctions on North Korea’s proliferation activities through the most restrictive UN Security Council resolution to date - and the international community is enforcing these sanctions effectively.
And we are now working with our international partners to ensure that Iran, too, faces real consequences for failing to meet its obligations.
In the meantime, we are completing a government-wide review of our nuclear posture.
Already, our budget proposal reflects some of our key priorities, including increased funding for our nuclear complex, and a commitment to sustain our heavy bombers and land and submarine-based missile capabilities, under the new START agreement.
As Congress requested and with Secretary Gates’ full support, this review has been a full interagency partnership.
Page 53
NEW START TREATY U.S. SENATE BRIEFING BOOK APRIL 2010
We believe we have developed a broad and deep consensus on the importance of the President’s agenda and the steps we must take to achieve it. The results will be presented to Congress soon.
In April, the President will also host a Nuclear Security Summit to advance his goal of securing all vulnerable nuclear material within four years. We cannot wait for an act of nuclear terrorism before coming together to share best practices and raise security standards, and we will seek firm commitments from our partners to do just that.
In May, we will participate in the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. We are rallying support for stronger measures to strengthen inspections and punish cheaters. The Treaty’s basic bargain - that nuclear powers pursue disarmament and non-nuclear states do not acquire such weapons, while gaining access to civilian nuclear technology - is the cornerstone of the non- proliferation regime.
Before the treaty was negotiated, President Kennedy predicted a world with up to 20 nuclear powers by the mid-1970s. Because of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the consensus it embodied, that didn’t happen. Now, 40 years later, that consensus is fraying. We must reinforce this consensus, and strengthen the treaty for the future.
And, while we do that, we will also continue our efforts to negotiate a ban on the production of fissile materials that can be used in nuclear weapons. We know that completing a treaty that will ban the production of fissile material will not be quick or easy - but the Conference on Disarmament must resume its work on this treaty as soon as possible. The last piece of the President’s agenda from Prague was the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
A decade ago, we led this effort to negotiate this treaty in order to keep emerging nuclear states from perfecting their arsenals and to prevent our rivals from pursuing ever more advanced weapons. We are confident that all reasonable concerns raised about the treaty back then – concerns about verification and the reliability of our own arsenal - have now been addressed. The test ban treaty is as important as ever.
As President Obama said in Prague, “we cannot succeed in this endeavor alone, but we can lead it, we can start it.”
Some friends in both parties may question aspects of our approach. Some in my own party may have trouble reconciling investments in our nuclear complex with a commitment to arms reduction. Some in the other party may worry we’re relinquishing capabilities that keep our country safe.
With both groups we respectfully disagree. As both the only nation to have used nuclear weapons, and as a strong proponent of non-proliferation, the United States has long embodied a stark but inevitable contradiction. The horror of nuclear conflict may make its occurrence unlikely, but the very existence of nuclear weapons leaves the human race ever at the brink of self-destruction, particularly if the weapons fall into the wrong hands.
Page 54
NEW START TREATY U.S. SENATE BRIEFING BOOK APRIL 2010
Many leading figures of the nuclear age grew ambivalent about aspects of this order. Kennan, whose writings gave birth to the theory of nuclear deterrence, argued passionately but futilely against the development of the hydrogen bomb. And Robert Oppenheimer famously lamented, after watching the first mushroom cloud erupt from a device he helped design, that he had become “the destroyer of worlds.” President Obama is determined, and I am as well, that the destroyed world Oppenheimer feared must never become our reality. That is why we are pursuing the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. The awesome force at our disposal must always be balanced by the weight of our shared responsibility.
Every day, many in this audience help bear that burden with professionalism, courage, and grace.
A grateful nation appreciates your service. Together, we will live up to our responsibilities. Together, we will lead the world.
Thank you. May God bless America. May God protect our troops.
Page 55
NEW START TREATY U.S. SENATE BRIEFING BOOK APRIL 2010
NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW FACT SHEET
The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) is a legislatively-mandated review that establishes U.S. nuclear policy, strategy, capabilities and force posture for the next five years to ten years.
The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR): • Outlines the Administration’s strategy for implementing the President’s Prague agenda for reducing nuclear dangers and pursuing the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons, including concrete steps we can and should take now. • Explains how the United States will sustain a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent for us and our allies as long as nuclear weapons exist.
Its findings and recommendations support five key objectives:
#1: Preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism: For the first time, the NPR places preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism atop the U.S. nuclear agenda. • It defines specific steps to strengthen the global non-proliferation regime, and accelerate the securing of nuclear materials worldwide. • It renews the U.S. commitment to hold fully accountable any state, terrorist group, or other nonstate actor that supports or enables terrorist efforts to obtain or use weapons of mass destruction, whether by facilitating, financing, or providing expertise or safe haven for such efforts.
#2: Reducing the role of nuclear weapons: Declaratory policy has been updated to bring it into alignment with 21st century needs. • The United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations. • The United States would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners. • The United States will continue to strengthen conventional capabilities and reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks, with the objective of making deterrence of nuclear attack on the United States or our allies and partners the sole purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons.
#3: Maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at reduced nuclear force levels: The NPR Report reflects the Administration’s commitment to renew arms control and work with Russia to reduce our nuclear forces while maintaining strategic stability. The NPR provided inputs to the instructions to U.S. negotiators and the resulting New START agreement helps to significantly advance this third objective: • The United States and Russia agreed to limits of 1,550 accountable strategic warheads, 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles, and 800 deployed and non-deployed strategic launchers. The Treaty does not constrain U.S. missile defenses, and allows the United States to pursue conventional global strike systems. • The U.S. nuclear Triad of ICBMs, SLBMs, and nuclear-capable heavy bombers will be maintained under New START. • All U.S. ICBMs will be “de-MIRVed” to a single warhead each to increase stability. • The United States will pursue post-New START arms control with Russia that addresses not only strategic weapons, but also non-strategic and non-deployed nuclear weapons.
Page 56
NEW START TREATY U.S. SENATE BRIEFING BOOK APRIL 2010
• The United States will pursue high-level bilateral dialogues with Russia and China aimed at promoting more stable and transparent strategic relationships.
#4: Strengthening regional deterrence and reassurance of U.S. allies and partners: The NPR reflects the Administration’s commitment to strengthening deterrence against 21st century threats to the United States, our allies, and partners. • The Administration is pursuing a comprehensive approach to broaden regional security architectures, including through missile defenses and improved conventional forces. • As long as regional nuclear threats to our forces, allies, and partners remain, deterrence will require a nuclear component. • The United States will retain the capability to forward-deploy U.S. nuclear weapons on tactical fighter-bombers and heavy bombers. • The nuclear-tipped, sea-launched cruise missile (TLAM-N) will be retired as redundant in the overall mix of capabilities.
#5: Sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal: The United States will sustain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal as long as nuclear weapons exist. The United States will modernize the nuclear weapons infrastructure, sustain the science, technology, and engineering base, invest in human capital, and ensure senior leadership focus. The significantly increased investments called for in the NPR will not only guarantee our stockpile, but facilitate further nuclear reductions, and help enhance our ability to stem nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. It will also extend the life of warheads currently in the nuclear arsenal. This is an alternative to developing new nuclear weapons, which we reject. Several principles will guide this effort: • The United States will not conduct nuclear testing, and will seek ratification and entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. • The United States will not develop new nuclear warheads. Life Extension Programs (LEPs) will use only nuclear components based on previously tested designs, and will not support new military missions or provide for new military capabilities. • The Administration will study options for ensuring the safety, security, and reliability of nuclear warheads on a case-by-case basis, consistent with the congressionally mandated Stockpile Management Plan. The full range of LEP approaches will be considered: refurbishment of existing warheads, reuse of nuclear components from different warheads, and replacement of nuclear components. • In any decision to proceed to engineering development for warhead LEPs, the Administration will give strong preference to options for refurbishment or reuse. Replacement of nuclear components would be undertaken only if critical Stockpile Management Program goals could not otherwise be met, and if specifically authorized by the President and approved by Congress.
Page 57
NEW START TREATY U.S. SENATE BRIEFING BOOK APRIL 2010
ADDITIONAL REFERENCE MATERIALS
Page 58
NEW START TREATY U.S. SENATE BRIEFING BOOK APRIL 2010
Statement on START Follow-On Treaty BY GEORGE SHULTZ, WILLIAM PERRY, HENRY KISSINGER, AND SAM NUNN March 26, 2010
The four of us have expressed our belief that the potential use of nuclear weapons is one of the gravest dangers the world faces and have expressed our support for moving toward a world without nuclear weapons. But we understand that eliminating nuclear weapons will be a long-term and very difficult undertaking, and so we have emphasized the importance of near-term steps leading to that goal. Critical to achieving any of these steps was the renewal last year of nuclear arms talks between the United States and Russia. The goal of those talks has been a near-term reduction of nuclear weapons, with mutually-agreed verification procedures.
The governments of Russia and the United States have recently concluded the talks started last year. We congratulate them on this important achievement. We look forward to carefully reviewing the Treaty when it is made public. We strongly endorse the goals of this Treaty, and we hope that after careful and expeditious review that both the United States Senate and the Russian Federal Assembly will be able to ratify the Treaty. We also urge the two governments to begin planning now for even more substantial reductions, including tactical nuclear weapons. ### Former Secretary of State George Shultz, former Secretary of Defense William Perry, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and former Senator Sam Nunn have joined together to coauthor three op-eds in The Wall Street Journal linking the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons with urgent steps that can be taken to reduce nuclear dangers. For more information about their efforts, please visit www.nuclearsecurityproject.org
Page 59
NEW START TREATY U.S. SENATE BRIEFING BOOK APRIL 2010
HOW TO PROTECT OUR NUCLEAR DETERRENT Maintaining confidence in our nuclear arsenal is necessary as the number of weapons goes down. By George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, And Sam Nunn The Wall Street Journal January 19, 2010
The four of us have come together, now joined by many others, to support a global effort to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons, to prevent their spread into potentially dangerous hands, and ultimately to end them as a threat to the world. We do so in recognition of a clear and threatening development.
The accelerating spread of nuclear weapons, nuclear know-how, and nuclear material has brought us to a tipping point. We face a very real possibility that the deadliest weapons ever invented could fall into dangerous hands.
But as we work to reduce nuclear weaponry and to realize the vision of a world without nuclear weapons, we recognize the necessity to maintain the safety, security and reliability of our own weapons. They need to be safe so they do not detonate unintentionally; secure so they cannot be used by an unauthorized party; and reliable so they can continue to provide the deterrent we need so long as other countries have these weapons. This is a solemn responsibility, given the extreme consequences of potential failure on any one of these counts.
For the past 15 years these tasks have been successfully performed by the engineers and scientists at the nation's nuclear-weapons production plants and at the three national laboratories (Lawrence Livermore in California, Los Alamos in New Mexico, and Sandia in New Mexico and California). Teams of gifted people, using increasingly powerful and sophisticated equipment, have produced methods of certifying that the stockpile meets the required high standards. The work of these scientists has enabled the secretary of defense and the secretary of energy to certify the safety, security and the reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile every year since the certification program was initiated in 1995.
The three labs in particular should be applauded for the success they have achieved in extending the life of existing weapons. Their work has led to important advances in the scientific understanding of nuclear explosions and obviated the need for underground nuclear explosive tests.
Yet there are potential problems ahead, as identified by the Strategic Posture Commission led by former Defense Secretaries Perry and James R. Schlesinger. This commission, which submitted its report to Congress last year, calls for significant investments in a repaired and modernized nuclear weapons infrastructure and added resources for the three national laboratories.
These investments are urgently needed to undo the adverse consequences of deep reductions over the past five years in the laboratories' budgets for the science, technology and engineering programs that support and underwrite the nation's nuclear deterrent. The United States must continue to attract, develop and retain the outstanding scientists, engineers, designers and technicians we will need to maintain our nuclear arsenal, whatever its size, for as long as the nation's security requires it.
This scientific capability is equally important to the long-term goal of achieving and maintaining a world free of nuclear weapons—with all the attendant expertise on verification, detection, prevention and enforcement that is required.
Page 60
NEW START TREATY U.S. SENATE BRIEFING BOOK APRIL 2010
Our recommendations for maintaining a safe, secure and reliable nuclear arsenal are consistent with the findings of a recently completed technical study commissioned by the National Nuclear Security Administration in the Department of Energy. This study was performed by JASON, an independent defense advisory group of senior scientists who had full access to the pertinent classified information.
The JASON study found that the "[l]ifetimes of today's nuclear warheads could be extended for decades, with no anticipated loss in confidence, by using approaches similar to those employed in Life Extension Programs to date." But the JASON scientists also expressed concern that "[a]ll options for extending the life of the nuclear weapons stockpile rely on the continuing maintenance and renewal of expertise and capabilities in science, technology, engineering, and production unique to the nuclear weapons program." The study team said it was "concerned that this expertise is threatened by lack of program stability, perceived lack of mission importance, and degradation of the work environment."
These concerns can and must be addressed by providing adequate and stable funding for the program. Maintaining high confidence in our nuclear arsenal is critical as the number of these weapons goes down. It is also consistent with and necessary for U.S. leadership in nonproliferation, risk reduction, and arms reduction goals.
By providing for the long-term investments required, we also strengthen trust and confidence in our technical capabilities to take the essential steps needed to reduce nuclear dangers throughout the globe. These steps include preventing proliferation and preventing nuclear weapons or weapons-usable material from getting into dangerous hands.
If we are to succeed in avoiding these dangers, increased international cooperation is vital. As we work to build this cooperation, our friends and allies, as well as our adversaries, will take note of our own actions in the nuclear arena. Providing for this nation's defense will always take precedence over all other priorities.
Departures from our existing stewardship strategies should be taken when they are essential to maintain a safe, secure and effective deterrent. But as our colleague Bill Perry noted in his preface to America's Strategic Posture report, we must "move in two parallel paths—one path which reduces nuclear dangers by maintaining our deterrence, and the other which reduces nuclear dangers through arms control and international programs to prevent proliferation." Given today's threats of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism, these are not mutually exclusive imperatives. To protect our nation's security, we must succeed in both.
Beyond our concern about our own stockpile, we have a deep security interest in ensuring that all nuclear weapons everywhere are resistant to accidental detonation and to detonation by terrorists or other unauthorized users. We should seek a dialogue with other states that possess nuclear weapons and share our safety and security concepts and technologies consistent with our own national security.
Mr. Shultz was secretary of state from 1982 to 1989. Mr. Perry was secretary of defense from 1994 to 1997. Mr. Kissinger was secretary of state from 1973 to 1977. Mr. Nunn is former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee.
Page 61
NEW START TREATY U.S. SENATE BRIEFING BOOK APRIL 2010
TOWARD A NUCLEAR-FREE WORLD By George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn The Wall Street Journal January 15, 2008
The accelerating spread of nuclear weapons, nuclear know-how and nuclear material has brought us to a nuclear tipping point. We face a very real possibility that the deadliest weapons ever invented could fall into dangerous hands.
The steps we are taking now to address these threats are not adequate to the danger. With nuclear weapons more widely available, deterrence is decreasingly effective and increasingly hazardous.
One year ago, in an essay in this paper, we called for a global effort to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons, to prevent their spread into potentially dangerous hands, and ultimately to end them as a threat to the world. The interest, momentum and growing political space that has been created to address these issues over the past year has been extraordinary, with strong positive responses from people all over the world.
Mikhail Gorbachev wrote in January 2007 that, as someone who signed the first treaties on real reductions in nuclear weapons, he thought it his duty to support our call for urgent action: "It is becoming clearer that nuclear weapons are no longer a means of achieving security; in fact, with every passing year they make our security more precarious."
In June, the United Kingdom's foreign secretary, Margaret Beckett, signaled her government's support, stating: "What we need is both a vision -- a scenario for a world free of nuclear weapons -- and action -- progressive steps to reduce warhead numbers and to limit the role of nuclear weapons in security policy. These two strands are separate but they are mutually reinforcing. Both are necessary, but at the moment too weak."
We have also been encouraged by additional indications of general support for this project from other former U.S. officials with extensive experience as secretaries of state and defense and national security advisors. These include: Madeleine Albright, Richard V. Allen, James A. Baker III, Samuel R. Berger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Frank Carlucci, Warren Christopher, William Cohen, Lawrence Eagleburger, Melvin Laird, Anthony Lake, Robert McFarlane, Robert McNamara and Colin Powell.
Inspired by this reaction, in October 2007, we convened veterans of the past six administrations, along with a number of other experts on nuclear issues, for a conference at Stanford University's Hoover Institution. There was general agreement about the importance of the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons as a guide to our thinking about nuclear policies, and about the importance of a series of steps that will pull us back from the nuclear precipice.
The U.S. and Russia, which possess close to 95% of the world's nuclear warheads, have a special responsibility, obligation and experience to demonstrate leadership, but other nations must join.
Some steps are already in progress, such as the ongoing reductions in the number of nuclear warheads deployed on long-range, or strategic, bombers and missiles. Other near-term steps that the U.S. and Russia could take, beginning in 2008, can in and of themselves dramatically reduce nuclear dangers. They include:
Page 62
NEW START TREATY U.S. SENATE BRIEFING BOOK APRIL 2010
• Extend key provisions of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty of 1991. Much has been learned about the vital task of verification from the application of these provisions. The treaty is scheduled to expire on Dec. 5, 2009. The key provisions of this treaty, including their essential monitoring and verification requirements, should be extended, and the further reductions agreed upon in the 2002 Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions should be completed as soon as possible.
• Take steps to increase the warning and decision times for the launch of all nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, thereby reducing risks of accidental or unauthorized attacks. Reliance on launch procedures that deny command authorities sufficient time to make careful and prudent decisions is unnecessary and dangerous in today's environment. Furthermore, developments in cyber-warfare pose new threats that could have disastrous consequences if the command-and-control systems of any nuclear-weapons state were compromised by mischievous or hostile hackers. Further steps could be implemented in time, as trust grows in the U.S.-Russian relationship, by introducing mutually agreed and verified physical barriers in the command-and-control sequence.
• Discard any existing operational plans for massive attacks that still remain from the Cold War days. Interpreting deterrence as requiring mutual assured destruction (MAD) is an obsolete policy in today's world, with the U.S. and Russia formally having declared that they are allied against terrorism and no longer perceive each other as enemies.
• Undertake negotiations toward developing cooperative multilateral ballistic-missile defense and early warning systems, as proposed by Presidents Bush and Putin at their 2002 Moscow summit meeting. This should include agreement on plans for countering missile threats to Europe, Russia and the U.S. from the Middle East, along with completion of work to establish the Joint Data Exchange Center in Moscow. Reducing tensions over missile defense will enhance the possibility of progress on the broader range of nuclear issues so essential to our security. Failure to do so will make broader nuclear cooperation much more difficult.
• Dramatically accelerate work to provide the highest possible standards of security for nuclear weapons, as well as for nuclear materials everywhere in the world, to prevent terrorists from acquiring a nuclear bomb. There are nuclear weapons materials in more than 40 countries around the world, and there are recent reports of alleged attempts to smuggle nuclear material in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. The U.S., Russia and other nations that have worked with the Nunn-Lugar programs, in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), should play a key role in helping to implement United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 relating to improving nuclear security -- by offering teams to assist jointly any nation in meeting its obligations under this resolution to provide for appropriate, effective security of these materials.
As Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger put it in his address at our October conference, "Mistakes are made in every other human endeavor. Why should nuclear weapons be exempt?" To underline the governor's point, on Aug. 29-30, 2007, six cruise missiles armed with nuclear warheads were loaded on a U.S. Air Force plane, flown across the country and unloaded. For 36 hours, no one knew where the warheads were, or even that they were missing.
• Start a dialogue, including within NATO and with Russia, on consolidating the nuclear weapons designed for forward deployment to enhance their security, and as a first step toward careful accounting for them and their eventual elimination. These smaller and more portable nuclear weapons are, given their
Page 63
NEW START TREATY U.S. SENATE BRIEFING BOOK APRIL 2010
characteristics, inviting acquisition targets for terrorist groups.
• Strengthen the means of monitoring compliance with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a counter to the global spread of advanced technologies. More progress in this direction is urgent, and could be achieved through requiring the application of monitoring provisions (Additional Protocols) designed by the IAEA to all signatories of the NPT.
• Adopt a process for bringing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) into effect, which would strengthen the NPT and aid international monitoring of nuclear activities. This calls for a bipartisan review, first, to examine improvements over the past decade of the international monitoring system to identify and locate explosive underground nuclear tests in violation of the CTBT; and, second, to assess the technical progress made over the past decade in maintaining high confidence in the reliability, safety and effectiveness of the nation's nuclear arsenal under a test ban. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization is putting in place new monitoring stations to detect nuclear tests -- an effort the U.S should urgently support even prior to ratification.
In parallel with these steps by the U.S. and Russia, the dialogue must broaden on an international scale, including non-nuclear as well as nuclear nations.
Key subjects include turning the goal of a world without nuclear weapons into a practical enterprise among nations, by applying the necessary political will to build an international consensus on priorities. The government of Norway will sponsor a conference in February that will contribute to this process.
Another subject: Developing an international system to manage the risks of the nuclear fuel cycle. With the growing global interest in developing nuclear energy and the potential proliferation of nuclear enrichment capabilities, an international program should be created by advanced nuclear countries and a strengthened IAEA. The purpose should be to provide for reliable supplies of nuclear fuel, reserves of enriched uranium, infrastructure assistance, financing, and spent fuel management -- to ensure that the means to make nuclear weapons materials isn't spread around the globe.
There should also be an agreement to undertake further substantial reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear forces beyond those recorded in the U.S.-Russia Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty. As the reductions proceed, other nuclear nations would become involved.
President Reagan's maxim of "trust but verify" should be reaffirmed. Completing a verifiable treaty to prevent nations from producing nuclear materials for weapons would contribute to a more rigorous system of accounting and security for nuclear materials.
We should also build an international consensus on ways to deter or, when required, to respond to, secret attempts by countries to break out of agreements.
Progress must be facilitated by a clear statement of our ultimate goal. Indeed, this is the only way to build the kind of international trust and broad cooperation that will be required to effectively address today's threats. Without the vision of moving toward zero, we will not find the essential cooperation required to stop our downward spiral.
Page 64
NEW START TREATY U.S. SENATE BRIEFING BOOK APRIL 2010
In some respects, the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons is like the top of a very tall mountain. From the vantage point of our troubled world today, we can't even see the top of the mountain, and it is tempting and easy to say we can't get there from here. But the risks from continuing to go down the mountain or standing pat are too real to ignore. We must chart a course to higher ground where the mountaintop becomes more visible.
Mr. Shultz was secretary of state from 1982 to 1989. Mr. Perry was secretary of defense from 1994 to 1997. Mr. Kissinger was secretary of state from 1973 to 1977. Mr. Nunn is former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee.
The following participants in the Hoover-NTI conference also endorse the view in this statement: General John Abizaid, Graham Allison, Brooke Anderson, Martin Anderson, Steve Andreasen, Mike Armacost, Bruce Blair, Matt Bunn, Ashton Carter, Sidney Drell, General Vladimir Dvorkin, Bob Einhorn, Mark Fitzpatrick, James Goodby, Rose Gottemoeller, Tom Graham, David Hamburg, Siegfried Hecker, Tom Henriksen, David Holloway, Raymond Jeanloz, Ray Juzaitis, Max Kampelman, Jack Matlock, Michael McFaul, John McLaughlin, Don Oberdorfer, Pavel Podvig, William Potter, Richard Rhodes, Joan Rohlfing, Scott Sagan, Roald Sagdeev, Abe Sofaer, Richard Solomon, and Philip Zelikow.
Page 65
NEW START TREATY U.S. SENATE BRIEFING BOOK APRIL 2010
ARMS CONTROL’S NEW ERA Editorial The New York Times March 28, 2010
The negotiations took a lot longer and were more grueling than anyone expected, but the United States and Russia have finally agreed on a nuclear weapons agreement to replace the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. Although the deal makes only modest cuts in both countries’ arsenals, President Obama deserves credit for reviving an arms control process that his predecessor disparaged as a cold-war relic. He is now leading the way on reducing the nuclear threat.
This new accord will substantially strengthen his hand to press for tighter controls on nuclear materials at a nuclear security summit meeting next month, and then for tighter penalties on nuclear scofflaws like Iran and North Korea at a Nonproliferation Treaty review conference in May.
Mr. Obama cannot rest there. We hope he quickly sends his negotiators back to the table to get going with Russia on a follow-on deal that would make even deeper reductions in deployed weapons and, for the first time, in both the number of stored warheads and tactical nuclear weapons — the thousands of smaller bombs that are frighteningly vulnerable to covert sale or theft. That is expected to take years to thrash out, rather than the months this latest agreement took.
The United States and Russia cannot credibly argue for restraining other countries’ nuclear programs if they are not moving ahead on reducing their own combined total of some 20,000 nuclear weapons.
The broad outlines of the agreement — to be signed by Mr. Obama and President Dmitri Medvedev in Prague on April 8 — are encouraging. It calls for both countries to reduce their deployed strategic warheads from the current ceiling of 2,200 to 1,550 within seven years after the treaty enters into force. Delivery vehicles — missiles, bombers and submarines — would be cut from 1,600 each to 800.
We, like others, are keen to see the details, which may not be available for a while as negotiators complete technical annexes. That work must not be allowed to drag out. It will only encourage doubts about what was agreed to in the main treaty text and postpone putting the deal before the Senate for ratification.
Three previous arms control treaties — Start I (1992), Start II (1996) and the Moscow Treaty (2003) — were ratified with substantial bipartisan support. (Start I expired in December. Start II never took effect because Russia withdrew after the Bush administration abrogated the ABM Treaty in 2002 to pursue missile defense. The Moscow Treaty set the current ceiling of 2,200 deployed warheads.)
Winning approval of this new deal in Washington’s nasty political climate, when Republicans are refusing to cooperate on much of anything, is less certain. Ratification requires a two-thirds vote in the Senate.
The administration must convince senators that the verification regime is credible and that the text does not limit America’s ability to pursue missile defense. Administration officials are confident they can win both arguments, but President Obama must be prepared to make the case himself.
Page 66
NEW START TREATY U.S. SENATE BRIEFING BOOK APRIL 2010
A WORTHY U.S.-RUSSIA ARMS CONTROL TREATY Editorial The Washington Post Saturday, March 27, 2010; A12
THE NEW U.S.-Russian arms control treaty was described Friday by the Obama administration as a step toward the achievement of a host of ambitious goals: a "strong partnership" with the regime of Vladimir Putin; multilateral action to stop or reverse the nuclearization of Iran and North Korea; and not least, as President Obama put it, "a world without nuclear weapons." But it's not necessary to share the president's long-term vision, or his expansive estimation of the new treaty's influence, in order to celebrate what appears to be a solid diplomatic achievement.
A year in negotiation, the accord mandates a trim of about 30 percent in the deployed strategic weapons of the two countries, to 1,550 warheads on each side. Launchers -- land and sea-based missiles as well as bombers -- would be reduced to 800. Russia is already near that figure and will almost certainly fall well below it during the treaty's 10-year term. The United States will have to cut launchers by several hundred, though it will be able to convert some to carry conventional weapons. That's one reason why the treaty is more important to Moscow, and its ambitions of remaining on a par with the United States, than it is to U.S. national security.
Mr. Putin also hoped to use the accord -- dubbed New START, for Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty -- to curtail U.S. plans to deploy a missile defense system in Europe. Administration officials insisted Friday that the bid failed, and that "the treaty does not contain any constraints on . . . planned U.S. missile defense programs," as a White House statement put it. There is, however, language linking offensive and defensive weapons in a nonbinding preamble. Republican senators -- at least eight of whom will be needed for ratification -- can be expected to form their own opinions about whether or not it could constrain a vital defense program.
There will also be questions about verification: Past procedures for the monitoring of missile tests have been weakened. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said Friday that the United States would have all the data it needed to verify the treaty. The administration will argue that, unless it is ratified, there will be no inspections of Russian weapons, since the previous regime expired in December.
As described Friday, the accord sounds worthy; the United States still deploys more nuclear weapons than it needs. Mr. Obama's broader vision of what can be achieved through arms control is more open to question. He hopes the deal will add momentum to two upcoming summit meetings, on the control of nuclear materials and on revisions in the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; that seems possible. Officials say they expect Russia will now cooperate in imposing sanctions on Iran, though Moscow is still resisting strong measures. Still, it's hard to see how new treaties will bring about the disarmament of North Korea or stop Tehran's centrifuges.
As for the notion that Mr. Obama has begun a march toward a nuclear-free world, we are with Mr. Gates, who said: "I don't think anyone expects us to come anywhere close to zero nuclear weapons anytime soon." Given the threats the United States and its allies still face, that is a good thing.
Page 67