TIME LINES 3RAR KOREA
KOREA Sariwon, Yongju, Chongju, Pakchon, Uijongbu, Chuam-ni, Maehwa San, Kapyong, Kowang San, Maryang San.
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TIME LINES KOREA 3 RAR
THE ROYAL AUSTRALIAN REGIMENT IN KOREA 1951-53
The Korean War has been branded the 'Forgotten War', a lonely, thankless, unromantic conflict fought in a remote corner of the globe. It was so soon after World War 2 that some saw it as a sad little echo – but it was a bigger war that cost the Regiment 1,584 Australian casualties including 303 KIA incl 29 MIA, 1210 WIA and 23 POW, yet its memory has been allowed to slumber. Land Battles Korea, is a compilation of events and casts some light on that sadly remembered conflict, documenting the heroism of the Australian solders in mobile warfare from the Yalu to Pusan and back, the gallant stand at Kapyong, the brilliant offensive at Kowang San and Maryang San and the grim determination and costly fighting patrols of the fixed defences along the Samichon which finalised with the desperate defence of the Hook.
2 FOREWORD
TIME LINES is a compilation of selected extracts from many sources, principal of which must be our official War Historian Bob O’Neill, Historian Bob Breen, the compilations Korea Remembered and Battlefield Korea. There are others who contributed in some way. Grateful acknowledgement is made to these and the authors. The following summaries and comments are in chronological order supported by a time line for ease of assimilation and understanding. This edition was inspired by the magnificence of the Royal Australian Regiment in Battle in Korea 1950-53 followed by the inspiration of their operational peacekeeping service overseas in which they have again distinguished themselves.
Solomon Islands, East Timor, Iraq 2003, Iraq 2008, Afghanistan 2012
In retrospect I have many proud memories of Korea, the principal one being the magnificence of the men of 3 RAR Old Faithful with whom I served. I was not their equal. To my everlasting regret I have seen little of them since that time. I wonder how the veterans who deserved so much have fared. Regrettably, on return to their Homeland the general Australian public conveniently forgot their sacrifices. Their Nation did not award them the honour or rewards they deserved. The Officers and senior NCO’s were trained and qualified to absorb the emotional blows of battle, to find a vocation in Civvy Street and to set their new lives in order. Not so for many of the front line K Force diggers and RAR soldiers. They had absorbed the many scars of battle, pumped up by victory and defeat and supported by comradeship and an understanding Army system. They then returned under a cloud, with anonymity to the peacetime world, stunned by the changes they must accept and often without adequate recognition of their sacrifice. The blow to personal esteem was devastating. Not everyone handled it. They returned home as forgotten heroes, to lick their wounds and put their lives together again. This is the real tragedy of War. It is not only death, wounds or tactical defeat, but also the damage to the spirit of those who participate and the inability to adjust to the future. It tore the heart out of many. The story of the Regiment in Korea will long endure in history. Age and sickness may dim the lives of those who participated but nothing can take away the pride of their achievements on those eventful days.
Many of us drew life long inspiration from the sacrifices of our colleagues.
“The breakout from Pusan”, “Approach to the Yalu”, “Kapyong”, “Maryang San”, “Samichon Fixed Defences and Patrols”, and “The Hook”, were the first and the last conventional Divisional battles fought by Australian infantry since 1939-45. As such they are classics of battalion tactics.
THEY REST PROUDLY ON THE REGIMENTAL COLOURS.
Maurie Pears 2014 …….
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS AND FURTHER READING Australia in the Korean War 1950-53. Bob O’Neill ISBN The Battle of Kapyong: Bob Breen ISBN The Battle of Maryang San: Bob Breen. ISBN Korea Remembered: Pears and Kirkland Battlefield Korea: Maurie Pears
The Australian War Memorial The Australian Army History Unit. Directorate of Infantry, Battle Honours of the RAR The Korean War: Korean Institute of Military History. ISBN. The Last Call of the Bugle by Jack Galloway: In Valiant Company: by Ben O’Dowd The Fight Leaders: by Butler, Argent, and Shelton. Remembering Korea: by George Odgers. Out in the Cold: by Ben Evans DVA. The Diggers Own Stories Vols 1 & 2: by Pat Cannard and Margaret Sheppard. A Potted History of the RAR in the Korean War 1950-53: by Fred Fairhead The Kapyong Battalion: by James J Atkinson Duty First: by David Horner and Jean Bou. The Occupation of Japan: by George Davies. With the Australians in Korea: Edited by Norman Bartlett. Sometimes Forgotten: by Fred Kirkland. Scorched Earth and Black Snow: by Andrew Salmon Korea – The undeclared War: by Stephen Lewis. The Spirit of the Digger: by Patrick Lindsay. The Korean War: by Michael Hickey. The Korean War: by Cameron Forbes. Only One River to Cross: by AM Harris. The Edge of the Sword: by A Farrer-Hockley. The three day promise – A Korean Soldiers Memoire: by Donald K Chung. Formidable Enemies: by Kevin Mahoney. Enter the Dragon: by Russell Spurr. And various publications of the Australian United Services Institute
4 Breaking the Ground Cascade Gardens
3 RAR Maryang San Vets
Veterans All
5 3 RAR Kapyong Veterans
The Kapyong Triptychs
Korean War Artist Joe Vezgoff on presentation of Triptych to 3RAR 2014
6 INTRODUCTION
LAND BATTLES KOREA – TIME LINES is a compilation of events, records and comments, which recalls the amazing courage, dedication and military skill of the Royal Australian Regiment in battle under the banner of the United Nations, during the war in Korea Their full story is told in the many references above which form the basis of this compilation.
A NEW TIME LINE IS INCLUDED IN ALL CHAPTERS TO FACILITATE UNDERSTANDING OF EVENTS AS THEY PROGRESSED.
THE KOREAN WAR It was on 25 June 1950, on a sultry summer’s day in another century, that the North Korean troops swept across the 38th parallel—without warning or declaration—against a peaceful South Korean community. Within three days the capital, Seoul, had fallen. This was an immediate threat to the sovereignty of the South Korean nation and to the stability of the world. The next day, 26 June, the President of the United States, Harry S. Truman, ordered American forces in Japan to repel any invasion attempt by the Chinese Communist forces. On the afternoon of 27 June, the United Nations Security Council in New York resolved that its members should assist South Korea to restore peace. The first Australian participation in the Korean War was airborne: RAAF operations commenced on 2 July 1950. The Naval contribution quickly followed when HMAS Shoalhaven set sail on 7 July 1950. The Army component deployed on 27 September 1950 when the 3rd Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment (3 RAR), left the British Commonwealth Occupation Force (BCOF), Japan, and embarked on the Aiken Victory heading for the southern Korean port of Pusan. Ultimately twenty- one other countries came to the aid of the South Koreans. It was the first real test of the United Nations’ resolve. These were perilous times for the world in the midst of a bitter international Cold War. The United States, USSR, United Kingdom and the Chinese Republic were poised for battle—apparently on the brink of a third world war. The threat of nuclear warfare was real. Elsewhere throughout the world former colonies were seeking independence. It was a perilous time for Nations East and West. Fortunately, due to the timely action of the United Nations and the courageous efforts of the allied and Australian troops within Korea, this conflict was to be isolated. A bitter localised battle raged throughout the Korean peninsula for some three years. The effects of the war in Korea were both global and local. Globally, the war spelt a moderation to the political stalemate between USA, Russia and China and marked a return to conciliation within the United Nations in the quest for world peace. For the citizens of Korea it meant a bitter civil war—family against family, friend against friend—resulting in the deaths of some three million men, women and children. South Korea was saved from occupation and developed into a vital and prosperous new democratic nation. Whilst direct combat operations ceased on 27 July 1953, a state of war between the North and the South continues to this day. For Australia it meant the deployment of over 17,500 troops—sailors, soldiers, airmen and women, significant and meaningful commitment for so small a population. With that deployment came also international recognition of Australia as an active member of the United Nations and a participant in world affairs. It was not the first time that Australia had come to protect its national interests outside its own borders. The cost to Australia was immense. The Australian tri service forces suffered 1,585 casualties: 340 killed in action; 1,216 wounded; and 29 taken prisoner. For others the cost was equally great:
7 Allies: 33,667 Americans and 3960 Allies (UK 1,078) died. Republic of Korea Armed Forces: 47,000 killed; 183,000 wounded; 70,000 missing. British Commonwealth: 7,268 casualties United States of America: 32,629 killed, 105,785 wounded North Korea: 520,000 armed casualties (estimated). Chinese Communist forces: 900,000 casualties (estimated). The civil casualties were numerous up to 2 million (estimated)
For our young regular army and our K Force diggers, it was a difficult and costly battle, not only against a numerically superior enemy, but in an extremely hostile climate and terrain. Australia’s infantry soldiers fought on the slopes of massive, rocky mountains, in paddy fields and rivers. Many battles were fought in the open, our troops protected only by bunkers and pits in the ground. The climate was another enemy: suffocating heat and disease in the summers and frigid, bone-chilling sub- zero temperatures and frostbite in the winters. It was tough in the field where soldiers lived with the sky for a roof, a rock for a kitchen and a dugout for a bed. At the start of its campaign, the Regiment was inadequately provisioned and supported, and thrown into battle with American and British troops with operational urgency. The demand for courage, military skill and morale from the Regiment’s soldiers was extraordinary. As in the past, the diggers, with their own unique brand of mateship, bravery and determination, overcame the extraordinary obstacles hurled at them by the Korean War and established a battlefield record second to none. The magnificent trio, Battalions 1, 2 and 3 of The Royal Australian Regiment, was born and blooded in this environment. The battles of the Korean War are now legendary. From the frantic mobile advances to the Yalu and, Sariwon, the Apple Orchard, the Broken Bridge, Pakchon, Salmon and Sardine: and later, the withdrawal and heroic stand at Kapyong. From the magnificent Operation Commando assault at Kowang San 355, Maryang San 317 and The Hinge to the dogged defence and punishing patrols of the Static War on 355, 227, 210, Blaze, Fauna, Flora, Buffalo, Songgok, and The Hook, the Regiment paid the price with 1,536 casualties: 303 killed, 1,210 wounded, and 23 prisoners of war. Yet these soldiers forged a reputation with their United Nations allies which remains today. The kin of the veterans of the First and Second World Wars and subsequent Peace Keeping and Asymmetrical Operations overseas maintained the finest Australian fighting tradition. Korea, as an extended campaign, is unique to the Regiment. It was the first battle engagement for the newly formed Regiment and it was the first and last time since World War II that the battalions engaged in large-scale conventional warfare: Advance to Contact, Attack, Defence, Counter Attack and Withdrawal. The detailed skills and tactics of the various phases of war in contrasting terrain and climate tested the mettle of the newly formed Regiment. These skills remain the foundation of the very different asymmetrical operations of today which are conducted with the same measure of success. All three battalions of the Regiment, 1 RAR, 2 RAR and 3 RAR, served in Korea: 3 RAR – September 1950 to July 53. 1 RAR – June 1952, 2 RAR – March 1953 A total of 10,840 Australian Army soldiers served in Korea. Most of these were from the Regiment. They were honoured with 99 awards and 97 Mentioned in Dispatches, including 85 Imperial decorations and 14 United States foreign awards. The Regiment itself was awarded 12 Battle Honours. Over the period September 1950 to July 1953 the Regiment was in constant contact with the enemy, conducting infantry operations of an epic proportion. The story of military skill, mateship, courage and determination expressed in these citations is now enshrined in Regimental history.
DUTY FIRST
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9 PREFACE
THE INFANTRYMAN Let us remember three facts. First, all wars are won in the end by the infantryman. Secondly, The Infantryman always bears the brunt. Thirdly, the art of the infantryman is less stereotyped and far harder to acquire in modern war than that of any other arm. British Army Field Service Regulations of 1925
THE ROYAL AUSTRALIAN REGIMENT On cessation of hostilities in 1945 the Australian Government made a commitment to contribute Australians to the British Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan. The 34th Infantry Brigade was raised in Moratai, specifically for this purpose, and consisted of three infantry battalions, namely the 65th, 66th and 67th Battalions. On 23 November 1948 the 34th Infantry Brigade was designated as the Australian Regiment, with the battalions becoming the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Battalions, The Australian Regiment. On 10 March 1949 Royal assent was given and the Regiment became The Royal Australian Regiment. The newly formed Regiment subsequently fought with distinction in Korea for three years in all phases of conventional warfare. This was the last occasion on which it was so deployed. The nature of war changed dramatically with the arrival of counterinsurgent and terrorist operations in Asia. However the spirit of the soldiers did not change. Throughout operations in Malaya, Borneo, Vietnam, Iraq, Timor, Afghanistan and all points north of our homeland, the children and grandchildren of those Korean veterans still carried the flag of mateship, initiative and courage forged so splendidly, so long ago, at Gallipoli and those far away countries. These conflicts are now emblazoned on our Regimental Battle Honours.
10 INTRODUCTION LAND BATTLES KOREA - TIME LINES PLEASE NOTE: The dates of events in the time lines are expressed in digital form eg 27 July 1953 = 27/07/53 = 530727
1885 The Australian Infantry and Artillery in Sudan. 1900 The Australian Forces in South Africa. 1914-18 World War I 1939-45 World War II 1950-53 Korean War 1953-57 Support Operations KOREA PRE INVASION HISTORY – SINO JAPANESE – RUSSO RELATIONS 1894-95 Sino-Japanese War 1904 Feb Russia Japan War begins 1905 Sep Treaty of Portsmouth war ends. 1906 Japan makes Korea a protectorate 1910 Japan makes Korea a formal colony. 1917 Russian revolution – Japan takes some Russian eastern Siberia territory. 1930-32 Japan occupies Chinese Manchuria – Manchukuo. 1937 Japan declares war on China. 1945 Nuclear attack Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Japanese offer surrender. Japanese colonisation of Korea ends. The US and USSR are unable to agree on an independent Korea. 450810 Russian troops enter North Korea. US forces partition South Korea 450828 Russian troops stop at 38th parallel. 451020 Syngman Rhee returns from exile, supported by US. 1947 Marshall plan. 471114 UN passes American resolution for free elections in Korea. 480510 Korean Election Day 480909 North Korea Democratic People’s Republic of Korea proclaimed PRK. 490900 Soviets test first A Bomb, Arms race escalates. 491002 Mao Zedong proclaims People’s Republic of China PRC. 500-114 Ho Chi Min proclaims DRV Democratic Republic of Vietnam 500530 South Korea, Republic of Korea elections. 500625 North Korea crosses the 38th parallel invading South Korea. 500626 North Korean tanks reach outskirts of Seoul. 500627 UN asked to furnish assistance to ROK 500627 Truman commits US Naval and Air support to ROK. 500626 General McArthur flies to Suwon. 500630 Truman agrees to two divisions to Korea. 500702 NKPA takes Suwon 500722 Communist Chinese attack National Chinese Islands of Quemoy 500915 US/UN/ROK forces pushed down to end of peninsula. McArthur launches the Inchon invasion. 500927 McArthur gives approval for US forces to cross 38th parallel. 500929 The Syngman Rhee Government restored in Seoul. 501009 US Army crosses 38th parallel at Kaesong. 11
Russian soldiers occupy North Korea Oct 1945
Kim talking to peasants Oct 1945
12 HISTORY OF CHINESE INVOLVEMENT. Chinese Peoples Army CPA Chinese Peoples Volunteers CPV in Korea General Peng Dehuai C in C Chinese Peoples Volunteers, Colonel Wong Lichan, liaison officer to North Korean Peoples Army NKPA, The Sharp Swords, a 30 man commando squad attached to 38th Field Army 39th Field Army Colonel Yang Shixian 40th Field Army Colonel Gu Dehua 50th Field Army Colonel One-Eye Pang 1945 Following Japanese defeat in the pacific, Korea was occupied by Russia north of the 38th parallel and United States of America south of the parallel. 1948 Elections held in South Korea by UN Temporary Commission on Korea, Syngman Rhee inaugurated as President. 1949 Following years of Civil War in China Chiang Kai-shek flees to Taiwan. He is succeeded on the mainland by the Communist regime of Mao Zedong. 1950 25 June North Korean Troops invade South Korea. 501027 First Chinese offensive. 501125 Second Chinese offensive 501225 Chinese troops cross the 38th parallel 510101 Third Chinese Offensive launched. 530727 Armistice signed. JAPAN 1945 Formation of United Nations Organisation 1946/50 Australian Occupation Force in Japan (BCOF) 481123 67 Bn renamed 3rd Bn 490331 Australian Regiment granted “Royal”: 3 RAR 500625 3 RAR preparing to return to Australia: North Koreans crossed 38th parallel 500625 3 RAR commenced 10 weeks training at Haramura 40km from Kure (Formerly Imperial Japanese Army jungle training centre) 500609 Major Stuart Peach and Sqn Ldr Ronald Rankin in Korea ARRIVAL AND DEPLOYMENT IN KOREA. 500625 3 RAR Japan placed on alert. 500821 K Force recruiting campaign launched. 500723 Lt Gen Robertson orders 3 RAR to Korea. 500927 3 RAR, 960 strong, embarked USNS Aiken Victory at Tokyo 500928 3 RAR lands Pusan and joins 27 Cwlth Bde. 500930 Minor operations were undertaken at Plum Pudding Hills – the visit by Brig Coad. 501001 First operational patrol Waegwon area 501005 3 RAR air move to Kimpo airfield Seoul 501009 27 Britcom Bde moves north to Kaesong and participates in advance on Kunsan. 501012 27 British Commonwealth Brigade (27 Britcom Bde) joins 1 Cav Div at Kaesong for pursuit operations.
501015 First Australian Casualties 2 WIA.
13 CHAPTER 1 KOREA 1950-53
BATTLE HONOURS OF THE ROYAL AUSTRALIAN REGIMENT IN KOREA: KOREA, SARIWON, YONGJU, CHONGJU, PAKCHON, UIJONGBU, CHUAM-NI, MAEHWA SAN, KAPYONG, KOWANG SAN, MARYANG SAN, (THE SAMICHON -THE HOOK)
KOREA 1950-53 The theatre honour Korea 1950-53 represents the sustained efforts of the Regiment throughout the Korean conflict. The Regiment took part in a number of phases of the Korean Campaign:
1. Phase 1: The United Nations counter offensive: 16 September to 1 November 1950. (Sariwon, Yongju, Chongju). 2. Phase 2: The withdrawal from the Yalu and the Chinese offensive: 1 November 1950 to 4 January 1951. (Pakchon, Uijongbu). 3. Phase 3: The advance to the 38th parallel 25 January to 16 April 1951. (Uijongbu, Chuam-ni, Maehwa San). 4. Phase 4: The Battle of the 38th parallel: 22 April to 30 May. (Kapyong). 5. Phase 5: The Final Phase (Static War): 1 June 1951 to 27 July 1953. (Kowang San, Maryang San, Samichon, the Hook.
After the Australian contribution to world peace in the many bitter wars of days gone by, the Korean War was the first and possibly the last occasion when the three Battalions of the Royal Australian Regiment would combine in battle in classic conventional warfare, within a Divisional Command. The lessons learnt in Korea assisted the Australian forces of the future to adapt to the demands of asymmetrical operations as experienced in Malaya, Vietnam, Iraq, Timor, Afghanistan and elsewhere.
The Infantryman’s objective never changes. It remains “to close with and destroy the enemy”.
ALL WARS ARE WON, IN THE END, BY THE INFANTRY. They are the first and the last to have boots on the ground.
THE QUEENSLAND KOREAN WAR MEMORIAL, GOLD COAST, QUEENSLAND, AUSTRALIA 2011
14 PHASE 1: THE UNITED NATIONS COUNTER OFFENSIVE. Plum Pudding Hills SARIWON YONGJU Apple Orchard CHONGJU Broken Bridge
The counter offensive for the Australian front line Digger was one of great confusion, exploitation and risk. This confusion led to a separation of command which forced the Digger to rely at times on his own initiative rather than the normal command structure. 500930 Minor operations were undertaken at Plum Pudding Hills – the visit by Brig Coad. 501001 First operational patrol Waegwon area 501005 3 RAR air move to Kimpo airfield Seoul 501009 27 Britcom Bde moves north to Kaesong and participates in advance on Kunsan. 501012 27 British Commonwealth Brigade (27 Britcom Bde) joins 1 Cav Div at Kaesong for pursuit operations. 501015 First Australian Casualties 2 WIA.
501013 3 RAR leads the Brigade, mounted on tanks, to Sariwon. There was constant mingling with retreating North Korean troops resulting in confusion from both sides. 501017 27 Britcom Bde occupies Sariwon. 3 RAR continues forward to a defensive position. The North Korean troops were unaware that The United Nations forces were deployed and confused the Australians with Russian troops. Friends and foe travelled side by side along the roads and many skirmishes occurred. This battle confusion resulted in North Korean surrender and some 1950 POW were taken at this stage. In total 1982 POW were taken by 3 RAR in the North Korean withdrawal. The roads were clogged with units of the 7 US Cavalry Unit, the main body of the Argyll and Southern Highlands, advanced elements of the 24 US Division, 3 RAR and the retreating enemy all unsure of the current situation. 501018 3 RAR A Coy completed a clearing action at Sangapo. RAR battle casualties were light.
BATTLE HONOUR On 17 October 1950, 27 British Commonwealth Brigade was ordered to capture the town of Sariwon, thirty-four miles to the north of the position then reached by the United Nations (UN) forces. Mounted on tanks and in trucks, the brigade rushed forward. The Argylls brushed aside the enemy dug in on the southern approach with a copybook attack and deployed in and around the town. Having passed through Sariwon, 3 RAR advanced a further four miles across the undulating plain to the north-west and took up defensive positions as last light fell. It was soon very evident that the retreating North Koreans had no idea that UN troops were in the area as, all through the night and into the next day, the enemy kept stumbling into the brigade lines. Often friend and foe travelled side by side and many skirmishes resulted. On at least one occasion the brigade was mistaken for a Russian unit, with enemy soldiers approaching, oblivious to its true identity. About 1,500 prisoners of war were taken, complete with their equipment, when enemy soldiers were bluffed into thinking that they were surrounded. This contact was initiated when the North Koreans ran into the 3 RAR Second-in-Command who, with a small party of men, was waiting for ration trucks to move up to F Echelon. In total, 1,982 prisoners were taken by 3 RAR, the largest haul by any unit in the campaign. The confusion caused by the rapid UN advance is easily understood given that one 20-mile stretch of road alone contained these troops in this order: 7 US Cavalry Regiment, North Koreans, 3 RAR, North Koreans, main body of the Argylls, North Koreans and advanced elements of 24 US Infantry Division.
15 YONGJU
Yongju was a battle of opportunity. The Apple Orchard paved the way for the challenging tasks ahead.
501020 27 Britcom Bde located on the outskirts of Pyongyang. 501020 US 187 Airborne dropped at Sukchon and Sunchon, in advance of the UN spearhead, to release a train load of US prisoners. 27 Brigade was leading the advance and was to link up with 187 Airborne moving south from Sukchon. 501021 1 Argyle and Sutherland Highlands (1ASH) clears the road for 187 Airborne at Yongju. 501022 The first major engagement for 3 RAR took place at Yongju Apple Orchard at about 0900 hrs. C Coy was engaged in close quarter fighting. Later D Coy cleared out pockets of resistance located near the 503 Airborne Battalion positions. The enemy were fleeing north and ran into enfilade fire and suffered heavy casualties. Enemy casualties were 150 KIA, 239 POW with 3 RAR 7 WIA.
BATTLE HONOUR On 20 October 1950, 187 Airborne Regimental Combat Team dropped in advance of the UN spearheads to release a trainload of American prisoners and to cut the enemy retreat route up the west coast of Korea. The 27th British Commonwealth Brigade, at this time leading the I Corps advance, was ordered to link up with elements of 187 Airborne Force moving south from Sukchon. Two days later, on 22 October at about 9.00 a.m., 3 RAR, which was leading the brigade, came under fire a mile north of Yongju. A few minutes later the battalion was informed that 187 Airborne Force was about a mile further north. The battalion then advanced to locate the Americans; C Company advanced in tanks towards the positions from which the enemy fire was coming. Close to the objective the C Company soldiers leapt out and engaged in a determined bayonet attack. In most instances the North Korean soldiers left their fire positions or pits and fled, suffering heavy casualties along the way. Artillery and mortars were not used as the exact location of the 187th Airborne troops was not known. D Company cleared out pockets of enemy remaining in the battalion area and then moved forward and contacted 503 Airborne Battalion. This battalion had been attacked at 6.00 a.m. that morning and had suffered some casualties. Many enemy soldiers attempted to escape through the ever-decreasing gap between 187 Airborne and 3 RAR by fleeing across the open paddy fields but ran into tank and small arms fire. Later the whole area had to be carefully cleared as enemy soldiers who had not fled would not surrender but lay low or sniped and had to be flushed out group by group, one by one. The Airborne Battalion then returned to Sukchon. Enemy casualties amounted to approximately 150 killed and 239 taken prisoner, while seven 3 RAR soldiers were wounded. Australian Vickers machine-gunners await a chance to fire on enemy targets from the crest of a hill. D Company cleared out pockets of enemy remaining in the battalion area and then moved forward and contacted 503 Airborne Battalion. This battalion had been attacked at 6.00 a.m. that morning and had suffered some casualties. Many enemy soldiers attempted to escape through the ever-decreasing gap between 187 Airborne and 3 RAR by fleeing across the open paddy fields but ran into tank and small arms fire. Later the whole area had to be carefully cleared as enemy soldiers who had not fled would not surrender but lay low or sniped and had to be flushed out group by group, one by one. The Airborne Battalion then returned to Sukchon. Enemy casualties amounted to approximately 150 killed and 239 taken prisoner, while seven 3 RAR soldiers were wounded. Australian Vickers machine-gunners await a chance to fire on enemy targets from the crest of a hill. Beaten from their attempt to dislodge D Company, enemy soldiers threw themselves at A Company but the attack was dispersed with the help of artillery and mortar fire. At 10.15 p.m. the enemy withdrew and, for the next forty-five minutes, there was periodic shelling of the battalion by a self-propelled gun, firing armour-piercing rounds directed mainly along the road. During 16 the action eleven Russian-made T34/55 tanks and two SU 76 self-propelled guns were destroyed. Of these, three were destroyed by A Company’s 3.5-inch rocket launchers and the crew of another was killed by a D Company Bren gunner, the crew attempting to escape when the Bren set fire to the auxiliary petrol tanks. In all cases the tanks were very well camouflaged, as the ridge was thickly wooded with pine trees. The next morning over 150 enemy bodies were counted still lying around the battalion defensive positions. Total casualties sustained by 3 RAR amounted to nine killed and thirty wounded. On 30 October, 3 RAR advanced to high ground overlooking Chongju. During this advance ten enemy stragglers were taken prisoner and twelve killed. At 3.00 p.m. the Argylls cleared the town without opposition and later the same day the brigade moved into the divisional reserve. Before 3 RAR left the forward area, six high velocity shells landed in the battalion headquarters area. The sixth struck a tree to the rear of C Company’s position and a piece of metal seriously wounded the battalion’s commanding officer. He was evacuated to the surgical hospital at Anjou but later died of his wounds.
Madden George Cross
17 CHONGJU The Battles of the Broken Bridge and Chongju fully bloodied the poorly equipped Diggers for the difficult tasks which they were to face in future operations.
501023 Still leading advance, 27 Britcom Bde reaches the Chongchon River. 501025 3RAR Battle of Broken Bridge near Pakchon. Sgt Tom Murray (Medic) was awarded the George Medal for conspicuous bravery in saving a wounded comrade from drowning in a flooded crossing. 3 RAR casualties were 8KIA 22WIA. 501027 27 Brigade continues the advance towards the mouth of the Yalu River. 501029 3 RAR in involved in heavy fighting against stiff opposition near Chongju. 501030 CO 3 RAR Lt Col Green fatally wounded by shell fragment. Lt Col Walsh appointed CO. 501101. 27 Britcom Bde to withdraw to Pakchon. Other RAR casualties were light.
BATTLE HONOUR Still leading the advance, 27 British Commonwealth Brigade reached the Chongchon River on 23 October 1950. The crossing was unopposed and, on 25 October, 3 RAR crossed the Taeryong River. After a series of short engagements, the battalion secured a bridgehead and linked up with the Argylls who had crossed further upstream on 26 October. The mouth of the Taeryong River marks the point on the western coast where the Korean peninsula begins. North of this parallel Korea spreads out to meet the border of Manchuria and stretches north-east to Russia. On 27 October, the brigade continued the advance eastwards towards the mouth of the Yalu River. On 29 October, and just four miles short of the town of Chongju, 3 RAR took the lead. Late that morning spotter aircraft reported the enemy in strength on high ground across the line of advance. At 2.30 p.m. D Company commenced an attack against heavy resistance and one Sherman tank accompanying the infantry was hit. By 4.30 p.m. D Company had secured its objectives and A Company, supported by tanks, attacked the enemy entrenched to the north of the road. Again, determined resistance was met, but by 5.30 p.m., the objectives had been secured. B Company moved forward without opposition to a position astride the road between A and D companies. The battalion then dug in and awaited the expected counter-attacks. At 8.00 p.m. an attack developed against D Company and the enemy succeeded in moving to the rear of the forward platoon, although the position was quickly reversed by a two-platoon charge. Still leading the advance, 27 British Commonwealth Brigade reached the Chongchon River on 23 October 1950. The crossing was unopposed and, on 25 October, 3 RAR crossed the Taeryong River. After a series of short engagements, the battalion secured a bridgehead and linked up with the Argylls who had crossed further upstream on 26 October. The mouth of the Taeryong River marks the point on the western coast where the Korean peninsula begins. North of this parallel Korea spreads out to meet the border of Manchuria and stretches north-east to Russia. On 27 October, the brigade continued the advance eastwards towards the mouth of the Yalu River. On 29 October, and just four miles short of the town of Chongju, 3 RAR took the lead. Late that morning spotter aircraft reported the enemy in strength on high ground across the line of advance. At 2.30 p.m. D Company commenced an attack against heavy resistance and one Sherman tank accompanying the infantry was hit. By 4.30 p.m. D Company had secured its objectives and A Company, supported by tanks, attacked the enemy entrenched to the north of the road. Again, determined resistance was met, but by 5.30 p.m., the objectives had been secured. B Company moved forward without opposition to a position astride the road between A and D companies. The battalion then dug in and awaited the expected counter-attacks. At 8.00 p.m. an attack developed against D Company and the enemy succeeded in moving to the rear of the forward platoon, although the position was quickly reversed by a two-platoon charge. Beaten from their attempt to dislodge D Company, enemy soldiers threw themselves at A Company but the attack was dispersed with the help of artillery and mortar fire. At 10.15 p.m. the enemy withdrew and, 18 for the next forty-five minutes, there was periodic shelling of the battalion by a self-propelled gun, firing armour-piercing rounds directed mainly along the road. During the action eleven Russian-made T34/55 tanks and two SU 76 self-propelled guns were destroyed. Of these, three were destroyed by A Company’s 3.5-inch rocket launchers and the crew of another was killed by a D Company Bren gunner, the crew attempting to escape when the Bren set fire to the auxiliary petrol tanks. In all cases the tanks were very well camouflaged, as the ridge was thickly wooded with pine trees. The next morning over 150 enemy bodies were counted still lying around the battalion defensive positions. Total casualties sustained by 3 RAR amounted to nine killed and thirty wounded. On 30 October, 3 RAR advanced to high ground overlooking Chongju. During this advance ten enemy stragglers were taken prisoner and twelve killed. At 3.00 p.m. the Argylls cleared the town without opposition and later the same day the brigade moved into the divisional reserve. Before 3 RAR left the forward area, six high velocity shells landed in the battalion headquarters area. The sixth struck a tree to the rear of C Company’s position and a piece of metal seriously wounded the battalion’s commanding officer. He was evacuated to the surgical hospital at Anjou but later died of his wounds.
“The men who fought with the 27 British Commonwealth Brigade could all stand proud. In the six months that this unique Commonwealth formation had existed, only the Australian battalion had ever been at full strength. The brief six months of its existence had cost the Brigade dearly; 148 dead, 485 wounded, 8 POWs and 6 missing in action – 647 casualties out of a brigade which at no stage numbered more than two thousand all ranks. Of the dead and wounded 373, 58 per cent were Australians.” The Last Call Of The Bugle - Jack Gallagher, 1994 “For most of the advance, and on each occasion when there was a major engagement to be fought, 3 Battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment was in the van. Twenty–seven British Commonwealth Brigade, and Three Battalion , its bright and shining tip, its cutting edge, routing road blocks, clearing river crossings and fighting the set piece battle that breached and dispersed the last of the North Koreans entrenched at Chongju.” The Last Call Of The Bugle - Jack Gallagher, 1994.
19 CHAPTER 2 PHASE 2: THE CHINESE OFFENSIVE, WITHDRAWAL FROM THE YALU
PAKCHON UIJONGBU
From Pyongyang to Pakchon to the Yalu the battalion fought valiantly in a series of mobile actions routing the enemy. Following the first Chinese Offensive they protected the withdrawal of the ROK and Allied Forces, culminating in the defence of Kapyong and the approaches to Seoul.
PAKCHON Pakchong was perhaps the biggest test for the battalion before Kapyong. 3 RAR paved the way for success at Kapyong, the most difficult battle to face the battalion before the divisional set piece Operation Commando at Maryang San. 501105 Battle Pakchon 501105 3 RAR Minor ops north of Pakchon 501124 First Chinese offensive. 501126 Second Chinese offensive. 501127 27 Bde withdraws to Kuni-ri 501128 3 RAR withdraws to Chasan (3 km south of Sunchon) 501201 3 RAR withdraws from Chasan to Sainjang (4.5 km south of Chasan). 1300 hrs ordered back. 501202 3 RAR withdraws to Yopa-ri. Occupy bridge head. 501204 3 RAR moves to Haya-ri 501206 3 RAR withdraws to Singye. 501208 3 RAR withdrawal to Sibyon-ni 501209-10 3 RAR guards pass on Kumchon Road, near Samsan-ni. 501211 27 Bde moves 130 km further south to Uijongbu. 3 RAR withdraws to Uijongbu.
3 RAR troops on an American tank halt by the Australian troops walk along a ruined road through war-torn wayside after the capture of Pakchon. Pakchon (AWM HOBJ1627) (AWM HOBJ1633)
20
BATTLE HONOUR Following the capture of Chongju on 30 October 1950, 27 British Commonwealth Brigade had been withdrawn to the area of Pakchon, the scene of the action on 25/26 October. On 1 November the Chinese entered the war, forcing the South Korean and UN forces to withdraw. The 27th British Commonwealth Brigade was to join a rearguard defending the lower crossings of the Taeryong and Chongchon Rivers. Both 3 RAR and the Middlesex were in position around the town of Pakchon. The 24th US Infantry Division was further upstream on the brigade’s right and, further to the right, were the South Koreans. During the night of 4/5 November, the Chinese and North Koreans pushed back a portion of the 24th US Infantry Division and turned west to advance between the Taeryong and Chongchon rivers threatening the rear of the brigade’s two forward battalions. On 5 November the enemy attacked a US field artillery regiment in support of the brigade about four miles south of Pakchon. The Argylls moved up to assist and then attacked the enemy forces holding a hill which formed an effective roadblock, although they were unable to hold the position against the Chinese counter-attacks. Late on 5 November, 3 RAR attacked the enemy-held hill and, after a very hard five hour fight balanced on precipitous slopes against superior numbers and despite heavy machine-gun and mortar fire, succeeded in capturing the objective. In the face of heavy counter-attacks the forward companies were ordered to withdraw but shortly afterwards were able to retake the position without opposition. During the attack 3 RAR had been supported by Mustangs from the RAAF’s 77 Squadron. The next day 3 RAR was still on the hill and patrols were sent out to contact the enemy, although only light contact was made over the subsequent days. The first Chinese offensive had drawn to a close. During the battle of Pakchon, 3 RAR casualties totalled sixty-four wounded and twelve killed. Australian troops walk along a ruined road through war-torn Pakchon.
For the soldiers in the front lines there were the hills of Korea; hills to be clawed up by painful inches in the face of lashing fire and hails of hand grenades; hills to be captured and held, to be endlessly and back-breakingly dug and wired, to be shelled off, to be overrun and retaken; hills which were to become homes for those who fought for them. Tim Carew, author
TO THE YALU But Kapyong was not the only battle. Most of the soldiers who held the ridges at Kapyong were also there at the Apple Orchard and the Broken Bridge, at Chongju and Pakchon. They mounted rearguard in the Big Bug Out from Kunu-ni: stood and fought on the snow covered hills; and were the last battalion remaining in the city of Seoul. The same frostbitten Diggers froze their tails off in the snow at Changhowan-ni and killed the prowling Chinese by the score during those frigidly cold nights on patrol at Ichon. These men climbed those unclimbable hills and fought the enemy inch by inch along the ridges at the Slippery Slide, at Sardine, and at Salmon, and then descended to the Kapyong Valley to establish their thin and attenuated line. Jack Gallaway—Korean veteran and author
21
CHAPTER 3
PHASE 3: ADVANCE TO 38TH PARALLEL UIJONGBU This phase was withdrawal at its most testing level. Individual field craft and initiative enabled the foot soldier to achieve remarkable objectives over threatening terrain, weather and a formidable enemy.
501211/19 27 Bde patrols approaches to Uijongbu. 501213 3 RAR B Coy encounters group of guerrillas pt 924 Unak San NE Uijongbu. 501214 60th Indian Field Ambulance joins 27 Bde. 501218 A Coy patrol 112 km to Hyon-ni 501219 The accidental clashes with ROK forces caused a halt to 27 Bde patrols. Brigade ceases patrols until 500101. 501221 3 RAR conducts reconnaissance of South Mountain to select a blocking position in event of withdrawal. 501231 Third Phase Chinese Offensive begins 510101 1000 hrs blocking position at Tokchong: withdrawal at 1500 hrs. 500102 3 RAR withdraws to NE Seoul. 500103 27 Bde becomes rearguard for withdrawal of Seoul 510104 3 RAR withdraws 160 km, through Ichon and Changhowon–ni to Yoda-ri. The Allied withdrawal from Seoul is complete. 510106-31 3 RAR occupy Line D, Changhowon-ni area patrolling forward to Ichon. 7 Australians taken prisoner and 2 released 510112 3 RAR patrols to Ichon commence. 510120 A Coy patrol occupies to Ichon. 500122 16th New Zealand Field Artillery Regiment joins 27 Bde. 510124 UN forces attack. Contact patrols to US units begin with Mulry, 3 Pl. 510125 Contact patrol Young, 6 Pl. The Eight Army Offensive, Operation Thunderbolt, is launched. 510126 Contact Patrol Morrison, 7 Pl. 510127 Contact patrol Montgomerie, 4 Pl. 510128 Contact patrol Beacroft, A Tk Platoon. 510129 Contact patrol Townsend, 8 Pl. 510131 27 Bde are in reserve. 3 RAR located Changhowon-ni. 510204 27 Bde takes over the Yoju sector. 510205 3 RAR movement to Yoju, 510210 Patrols to Chipyong-ni begin. 510211 Chinese fourth phase offensive begins. 510213 A Coy conducts last patrol to Chipyong-ni. 510213 3 RAR now located Yoju on Han River, 50 miles NE Seoul. 510214 Chipyong-ni besieged. Move to Chuam-ni valley. 27 Bde advances to Chuam-ni to secure 2nd Div right flank.
BATTLE HONOUR Having held the Pakchon perimeter from the end of the first Chinese offensive, 27 British Commonwealth Brigade moved south into corps reserve when the ill-fated Eighth Army offensive began on 24 November 1950. Two days later the second Chinese offensive pushed the leading elements of the advancing UN forces aside and, by sweeping towards the west coast, threatened to cut off the major part of the Eighth Army. At the end of the year the brigade conducted an orderly withdrawal to move more than 200 miles in nine days. At Uijongbu, just north of Seoul, the Middlesex and Argylls 22 were presented with a Korean Presidential Citation for their defence of the Pakchon River line. On 1 January 1951 the brigade moved six miles north to help cover the main withdrawal route. By nightfall 3 RAR was all but isolated by enemy advanced elements which kept the roads to the rear under fire. Brigade headquarters and Support Company received small arms fire from the village of Takchon thought to be held by troops from 6 Republic of Korea (ROK) Division. At 3.00 p.m., 3 RAR was ordered to withdraw on transport to a roadblock position in the rear of the brigade. The ‘O’ group came under fire from both sides of the road a mile south of Takchon, but the decision was taken to run the gauntlet of the enemy fire. All the ‘O’ group vehicles passed through safely except one which burst a tyre and overturned, injuring one passenger. Once the ‘O’ group members were on their way again the ground either side of the road was cleared by A and C companies. Seven enemy soldiers were killed and four 3 RAR soldiers were wounded. The 3 RAR withdrawals continued and that night the battalion occupied a position only one mile north of the position it had vacated that morning. During the night of ½ January, the remainder of the brigade moved back through 3 RAR and, at 3.00 a.m., the battalion began to withdraw again to an assembly area in Seoul. On 3 January, 3 RAR and the Middlesex again moved north out along the Seoul- Uijongbu road to occupy covering positions on the mountain ridge just north of Seoul. The Argylls guarded the bridges in Seoul itself. Early in the night the last units of the Eighth Army moved through the brigade’s position and at 11.00 p.m. D Company contacted the enemy advance guard. Enemy probes and attacks were repulsed throughout the rest of the night and the enemy was prevented from re- entering Seoul. At 4.00 p.m. on 4 January, 3 RAR was again ordered to withdraw and, as the last company mounted its trucks, the diggers could see the Chinese moving into the positions they had just vacated. The 3 RAR diggers passed through the Argylls’ lines and were the last troops to cross the railway bridge over the Han River south of Seoul before it was blown up. After the Argylls had withdrawn from their covering positions in Seoul (being the last UN troops in the South Korean capital), the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade continued its slow drive southwards, impeded by heavy traffic and refugees, moving towards Toda-Nae, about 100 miles from Seoul, and arriving late at night on 4 January 1951. Australian troops on an American tank halt by the wayside after the capture of Pakchon. CHUAM-NI The battalion faces the full force of North Korean weather and topography at Doctor.
510214 Chipyong-ni besieged. Move to Chuam-ni valley. 510215 Hill 195 Doctor attack. Task Force Crombez relieves Chipyong-ni. 3 RAR is involved in heavy fighting. 510216 Second attack Doctor. 510217 Enemy withdraw from Chuam-ni and Chipyong-ni sector. 510218 The Canadian battalion, 2 PPCLI. Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry, joins 27 Bde. BATTLE HONOUR After the fall of Seoul the Chinese offensive halted, the bulk of the enemy forces remaining north and east of the Han River. In late January and early February the UN forces had been moving slowly northwards to close the gap between them and the Communist troops. On 13 February 1951, 3 RAR was located at Yoju on the Han River, fifty miles north-east of Seoul. Contact patrols of company strength were sent along the western of two routes from Yoju to the French battalion and the 23rd US Infantry Regiment at Chipyong-ni (twelve miles north of Yoju). Considerable enemy movement was reported north and north-east of Chipyong-ni, but only very light contact had been made by 3 RAR’s patrols. On 14 February, a US mounted reconnaissance force was ambushed and severely cut up on the eastern route to Chipyong-ni. Despite this, 3 RAR’s patrols continued to report only very light contact.
23 The Middlesex moved up, crossed the Han, and commenced patrolling forward, with 3 RAR scheduled to follow up. Late in the afternoon the enemy was encountered on Hill 112, an important feature in the centre of the valley and, following artillery and mortar concentrations, the Middlesex successfully assaulted the hill, ejecting the enemy from deep, well-prepared positions. The 3 RAR diggers moved up the left rear of the Middlesex on the high ground west of Toksan-ni and dug in for the night. On 15 February, in the freezing pre-dawn, the Chinese hurled several savage attacks against Hill 112 and at one stage overran the forward company. The men fought their way back to the two supporting companies and, after bitter hand-to-hand fighting, the Middlesex held the position. Later that morning, 3 RAR was to take up the advance with C Company on the right of the road and B Company on the left. To assist C Company, the Middlesex was to take Hill 121, which dominated the valley on the right about 1,400 metres forward of Hill 112. The Middlesex was unable to get to Hill 121 because of heavy mortar and machine-gun fire. No further effort was made to move forward on the right and C Company later moved to the left. B Company secured its first objective unopposed but sighted the enemy in large numbers about a mile to the north and north-east on high ground to the left of the valley that included Hill 195 just south and overlooking Chuam-ni. A and B companies were ordered to capture that feature by attacking from the left. B Company was unable to move forward beyond the forming-up position because of machine-gun fire from higher ground further to the left (Hill 316). Air strikes, artillery and mortar fire failed to locate the various enemy positions and B Company was withdrawn. Late in the afternoon, A Company commenced attacking the spur running south from Hill 195 and came under heavy fire from right, left and front. The fire from the right came from Hill 121 on the other side of the valley. By nightfall A Company had fought most of the way up the steep, icy slopes onto the enemy position, but heavy concentrations of fire pinned the Australians down and A Company was withdrawn under cover of darkness. On the morning of 16 February, the resumption of the attack on Hill 195 was cancelled by brigade headquarters due to enemy troop concentrations a few miles to the east. When D Company’s 12 Platoon moved onto the south spur of Hill 316, it again encountered enemy fire from well dug-in positions. During the night of 16/17 February, 12 Platoon remained on the spur. Throughout the day there was little activity and sporadic enemy mortar fire fell in the battalion area. Snow continued to fall. The night was quiet except for an enemy patrol that was quickly dispersed by B Company fire. At dawn on 17 February, 12 Platoon advanced and secured Hill 316 which had been abandoned by the enemy. During the rest of the day the remaining high ground south of the Sanggyo-Don to Chuam-ni road was taken by A, B and C companies. The enemy had clearly abandoned his positions in a hurry as food and weapons had been left behind. On 18 February the Argylls and Middlesex occupied further high ground to the north-east and north- west. At the same time, in the region of Sogu-ni, Headquarters 3 RAR counted at least sixty bodies, twelve jeeps and three light tanks belonging to the ill-fated US reconnaissance force strewn along the road. On 19 February, 3 RAR moved into brigade reserve in the Chuam-ni area. During the period 13– 18 February, 3 RAR casualties had totalled four killed and sixteen wounded.
24
MAEHWA SAN
The massive heights of Hill 614, 532 and 410 test the endurance and mettle of the battalion veterans.
510224/7 Hill 614 falls to 3 RAR. 510307 3 RAR attack on Woodbine and suffers heavy casualties. 510307 3 RAR and 1 PPCLI are involved in heavy fighting for hills 410 and 532 respectively, during advance. 510311 3 RAR action near Chisan during the advance to Albany line. 510312 3 RAR C Coy captures Hill 703. 510322 Operation Courageous, an advance north of the 38th parallel is launched. 510328-31 27 Bde came under command 24 US Infantry Division. Joins Operation Courageous and advances to Benton Line.
Battle Honours After the action at Chuam-ni, 27 British Commonwealth Brigade advanced north-east into the very mountainous region of central Korea east of Seoul. The capture of Maehwa San, a dominating mountain peak on the right flank of the IX Corps line of advance, was the culmination of several engagements fought as the brigade advanced from mountain to mountain. Snow and ice covered the whole area, the slopes were so steep that casualties had to be slid down near the crests, and climbers had claw their way up on all fours. The ridge tops were so narrow that the men had to move along them in single file. On 24 February, Hill 614, which had halted the advance for several days, fell to 3 RAR. The summit was finally assaulted when a corporal and two of his men managed to crawl to within grenade range of the Chinese positions above them and then charge into the trenches and bunkers, killing or driving out the defenders and chasing them well down the reverse slope. On 7 March, 3 RAR was again in action, capturing a ridge three miles north of Hill 614. In order to attack this feature, the advancing companies had to descend (usually sliding) into the valley, cross open paddy fields covered
25 by enemy fire, and then scale the slopes on the other side. A Company managed to move about a third of the way up before the enemy fire became so intense that further progress up the exposed slope was impossible. D Company ran the gauntlet of the open paddy fields and tackled a spur a few hundred yards to A Company’s right. Five hours later, D Company finally crossed the ridgeline and A Company was able to advance once more. B Company joined the two forward companies to consolidate the position. This action cost 3 RAR eleven killed and twenty-five wounded. The brigade’s other battalion secured further mountain features without opposition. On 10 March, 3 RAR again moved forward to occupy hills overlooking the valley at the base of Maehwa San. The mountain consisted of a number of jagged ridges and its peak—at 2,000 feet—rose 1,500 feet above the valley floor at an average slope of 3 in 7. On 11 March, a brigade attack was launched with 3 RAR to attack on the right flank and, on their right, 6 ROK Division was to assault the high ground to the east of Maehwa San. At first light the Argylls and Middlesex advanced north and secured the foothills that dominated the immediate area of the valley. A and C companies of 3 RAR commenced the advance and had crossed the valley floor when A Company came under heavy fire from the village of Chisan to the right. As yet, 6 ROK Division had not attacked and the right flank of the brigade was exposed. A platoon from A Company assaulted the village, killing thirty enemy soldiers and driving out the remainder before heavy mortar and machine-gun fire from the high ground to the east and north-east forced the platoon to withdraw. In the meantime C Company had continued to attack towards its objectives. By midafternoon, however, the company was pinned down just below the ridgeline and was to remain there throughout the night. The Canadians and Argylls (who had reached the summit of Maehwa San) were able to secure their objectives without opposition. Early next morning (12 March), C Company moved onto the crest and advanced to its objective. B and D companies moved up and completed the occupation of 3 RAR’s objectives, the enemy having pulled out during the night. The next day, 27 British Commonwealth Brigade was relieved by US troops and moved into harbour near Chipyong-ni.
The ROK War Medal awarded to United Nations Troops
26
CHAPTER 4 PHASE 4: THE BATTLE OF THE 38TH PARALLEL KAPYONG Kansas, Utah, Sardine and Salmon, Kapyong Valley
Phase 4 of the Korean Campaign commenced with the withdrawal from the Yalu and ended with the Battle of Kapyong and the aftermath at the Kansas and Wyoming Lines.
KAPYONG
This was to be the signature battle for 3 RAR, establishing the unit as one of outstanding courage and performance within the 8th Army.
510403-15 27 Bde participates in Operation Rugged and advances up the Kapyong Valley to the Kansas Line. 510411 General McArthur is dismissed. Move to Utah Line begins. 510414 27 Bde north of 38th parallel. 510414/16 Attacks on Sardine and Salmon. Shortly after wards the brigade moved into Corps reserve in the Kapyong Valley. Their position in the new line was occupied by troops from the 6 ROK Division 510421 The Eight Army advances into the Iron Triangle. 510422 Last light, the Chinese launch the Fifth Offensive. This is a major offensive western, central and eastern front. 6 ROK Div gave way. 27 Britcom Bde and US Div move to plug gap. 510422 The Battle of Kapyong begins. 510423 3 RAR takes position north of Kapyong Valley. B Coy on knoll between river and road, other rifle companies on high ground to east. Canadians were to the west and Middlesex in the valley behind two forward battalions. 72 US Heavy Tk Bn and NZ Arty were in support. ROK troops in withdrawal.
510423 2200 hrs a platoon of heavy tanks were fired on by Chinese north of B Coy position. Probing attacks within battalion area. Strong assaults on A coy. 510423 0300 hrs B Coy under heavy attack. 510424 0700 hrs D Coy under heavy attack. C Coy isolated by enemy infiltration. 510424 3 RAR makes night withdrawal to Middlesex positions. 27 510426 3 RAR and 2 PPCLI transferred to 28th British Commonwealth Brigade (28 Britcom Bde) Battle Honour On 25 March 1951, 27 British Commonwealth Brigade came under command of 24 US Infantry Division operating on the central front. At this time, the enemy opposition was desultory. However, on 15 and 16 April a brisk fight developed as the brigade was taking two important hills that were intended to form part of a UN line just north of the 38th Parallel. Shortly afterwards, the brigade moved once more into corps reserve in the Kapyong River valley. Their position in the new line was occupied by troops from 6 ROK Division. At last light on 22 April, the Chinese commenced a full-scale offensive in three main thrusts on the western, central and eastern fronts. On the central front, 6 ROK Division gave way, but the flanking US divisions turned their inner flanks back and 27 British Commonwealth Brigade and a US regiment moved in to plug the gap. On 23 April, 3 RAR took up positions covering a ford and road from the north into the Kapyong valley. B Company was given the task of holding a low ridge between the river and the road, and the other rifle companies were allocated positions on high ground to the east. The Canadians were across the valley to the west and the Middlesex in the valley behind and between the two forward battalions. A US heavy tank battalion was in support and, by 11.00 p.m. that night, the New Zealand artillery had returned to the brigade from supporting 6 ROK Division. As darkness fell South Korean troops began to flood back through the battalion area destroying telephone lines and masking the advanced elements of the Chinese Army. At 10.00 p.m. a platoon of heavy tanks was fired on by the Chinese north of the B Company position. The tanks withdrew to the battalion area. Some of the leading enemy soldiers continued their advance down the road and across the ford and were able to attack Headquarters Company and threaten Brigade Headquarters. Probing attacks around the battalion positions continued throughout the night and strong assaults were made on A Company, where a platoon position was overrun, only to be retaken at daylight. At about 3.00 a.m., B Company came under heavy attack, although the position was still intact at dawn. At first light, Brigade Headquarters was withdrawn under fire to the Middlesex area and B Company was ordered to leave the position which had been so well defended during the night, and join the other rifle companies on the higher ground. B Company picked up several dozen prisoners on its move to the high ground and later was sent to clear a general withdrawal route to the south. After a three-hour battle, a route was cleared along the high ground to the east of the river, the ford remaining in Chinese hands. D Company on the right flank and on the highest ground came under intense attack at 7.00 a.m. and this lasted intermittently throughout the day. The enemy continued to suffer heavy casualties and made little progress although a platoon had to be withdrawn to strengthen the company defences. D Company then had a good view of an enemy attack with mortar support against the vacated platoon area and was able to inflict casualties on the attacking troops. C Company, the rear company on the defended hills, generally had only fairly isolated enemy infiltration to counter. That night the battalion was ordered to withdraw to the Middlesex positions which the Australians achieved with close artillery and tank support.
Casualties suffered by 3 RAR amounted to thirty-one killed, fifty-eight wounded and three missing.
28 CHAPTER 5
THE FINAL PHASE 5 – THE STATIC WAR KANSAS – WYOMING LINES MAY TO SEP 1951
The Lozenge before Minden
28 Bde settles in to prepare for the assault on the main Chinese battle line followed by Operation Commando to capture feature 317.
510501 28 Bde moves to Yangsu-ri and occupies a defensive position. 510520 28 Bde advances to within a few kilometres of the Imjin River. June – July 25 Canadian, 28 Britcom and 29 British Brigades concentrate to form the 1st Commonwealth Division. 510607 3 RAR patrols across the Imjin River and commence to control of the north bank. Such patrols formed the major activity of the 28 Bde for the following three months. 510706 Lt Col F G Hassett takes command of 3 RAR. 510728 Ceremony held near Tokchong to mark the formation of th3 1st Commonwealth Division. 510808 Australian Minister for External Affairs Mr R G Casey visits 3 RAR. 510907 3 RAR seizes bridgehead across Imjin River. 510908 1st Commonwealth Division begins Operation Minden.
29 CHAPTER 6 OPERATION COMMANDO
Hill 317 (Maryang San) in background captured during Operation Commando. (AWM 044421)
MARYANG SAN In this action 3 RAR had won one of the most impressive victories achieved by any Australian battalion. In five days of heavy fighting 3 RAR dislodged a numerically superior enemy from a position of great strength…The victory of Maryang San is probably the greatest single feat of the Australian Army during the Korean War. Robert O’Neill—Historian
…one of the finest battalion attacks in British History. Field Marshal Sir James Cassells—Korean veteran
KOWANG SAN
30
The combined attack on Kowang San by the KOSB and 3 RAR was a classic Brigade operation
Late September 1951, Planning for Operation Commando commenced. 28 Britcom Bde, 3 RAR, KOSB, KSLI with u/c RNF to capture Kowang San area. 25 Canadian Bde was located on Imjin River to the right flank.
511002 3 RAR (less D Coy) moved silently under cover, through positions held by R22R to preparatory positions. C Coy 1500 m in front of Canadian lines. Heavy shelling occurred. 511003 0300 hrs. B Coy located 2000 m north towards pt 199. A Coy located behind C Coy. 5110203 0800 hrs. B Coy located on the high ground and patrolling towards pt 199. At 1000 hrs A Coy occupies pt 199. B Coy returns to former position behind C Coy. Tanks and MMG moved to pt 199 and directed fire onto pt 355 in support of KOSB. C Coy and B Coy were shelled. At last light KOSB had failed to occupy the 355 objective and had pulled back to attack next morning with support of 3 RAR. 511004 0430 hrs C Coy moves to attack pt 355 along the NE spur line of pt 220 features. 0915 hrs C Coy closes with enemy. 1015 hrs reach main objective. 1215 hrs After two hours of close combat, 7 Pl reaches top of spur line in support of KOSB attack along SE spur line. C Coy 11 WIA, one later died. Enemy retreated down western slopes leaving 13 KIA and 3 POW. KSLI advanced to south of pt 355 securing Bde left flank.
31 BATTLE HONOURS In late September 1951, 28 British Commonwealth Brigade, as part of the 1st Commonwealth Division, was given the task of capturing the Kowang San area forward of the right flank of the division held by 25 Canadian Brigade, their extreme right flank resting on the Imjin River. The 28th British Commonwealth Brigade comprised 3 RAR, the King’s Own Scottish Borderers (KOSB) and the King’s Shropshire Light Infantry (KSLI). The Royal Northumberland Fusiliers (RNF) was under command for the attack. On 2 October 1951, 3 RAR (less D Company) moved forward through the positions held by the Royal 22nd Regiment (R22R). The enemy did not notice this forward concentration, which was very carefully executed. C Company had advanced to a position that had periodically been held by a small enemy force 1,500 metres in front of the Canadian lines and about the same distance north-east of the northern slopes of the enemy-held Hill 355. B Company was a few hundred metres behind C Company. During the afternoon, C Company came under heavy shelling but suffered only one soldier wounded. At 3.00 a.m. on 3 October, B Company moved north about 2,000 metres across an open valley under cover of darkness with the intention of taking Point 199. A Company moved up behind C Company. At 8.00 a.m., B Company had gained the high ground north of the valley and commenced patrolling the short distance to the west to Point 199, which the diggers took with the loss of three wounded. At 10.00 a.m., A Company took over Point 199 and B Company returned to its former position behind C Company. Tanks and a section of medium machine-guns moved up to Point 199 and directed their fire onto the northern slopes of Hill 355 (Kowang San) in support of the KOSB attack on that feature. D Company returned to 3 RAR (having previously been detached to the Canadian Brigade) and was placed in position between C Company and KOSB, attacking the eastern end of Hill 355. During the day C Company had again been shelled, as had been B Company to its rear. At last light KOSB had not completed its attack on Hill 355 and the decision was taken that 3 RAR would assist the next day. On 4 October, C Company attacked towards the northern spurs of Hill 355 in an effort to take out the enemy positions causing trouble to the right flank of the KOSB battle lines. By 9.15 a.m., C Company had closed with the enemy and an hour later the diggers had fought their way to their main objectives. Two more hours of close combat cleared the feature, providing considerable assistance to the KOSB in the final stages of its assault. Eleven C Company diggers were wounded, one of whom later died. The enemy left behind thirteen dead and three prisoners were taken. The KSLI had advanced on the south side of Hill 355 securing the brigade’s left flank.
Chinese troops assaulting UN positions.
32 MARYANG SAN
For the Australians, Maryang San was to become the major set piece battle of the Korean War. The Static War followed.
5 Oct: Second phase of brigade attack. The objective was Maryang San pt 317, 2,500 m north of pt 355. 3 RAR is to attack from the East and RNF from the SW KOSB holding pt 355. RNF held up on pt 217. 511005 0445 hrs B and D Coy were located north across valley. A Tk Pl crossed Imjin River to protect right flank. 511005 B Coy swings to right in heavy mist. D Coy meets enemy on eastern spur line leading to pt 317. 511105 1600 hrs D Coy occupies intermediate objective southern slopes pt 317. Enemy casualties were 98 KIA and 40 POW. RNF unable to occupy pt 217 and. A Coy completes diversionary attacks south of 317. 511005 1700 hrs C Coy moves through B and D Coy and reaches the heights of pt 317. Pressure maintained by RNF to the south east and A Coy diversionary attack coupled with D Coy rapid advance had outmanoeuvred the enemy. The night was quiet. 511006 At first light a platoon from C Coy moves forward to secure the position on P 317. RNF battle on against strong opposition but were unable to secure pt 217. RNF suffered 100 casualties in two days of operations. A Coy supports C Coy. A Coy had suffered severe shelling. 511007 3 RAR directed to take pt “The Hinge” just east of pt 317 and C Coy position, preparatory to taking pt 217. B Coy two leading platoons moved forward to the Hinge but Coy HQ and the reserve platoon when moving up to join them were assaulted from both flanks. After fierce close quarter fight the enemy dispersed. For the remainder of the day B Coy on the Hinge and C Coy on Pt 317 suffered intense bombardment. The A
33 Tk Pl and the Aslt Pnr Pl reinforced C Coy whilst another platoon from C Coy moved forward to assist B Coy. 511007 2100 hrs Pt 317 and the Hinge subjected to intense concentration from enemy shelling from the south east for about 45 minutes followed by numerous strong counter attacks. The enemy reached and at times penetrated the company perimeters. The attacks continued throughout the night until the enemy finally withdrew at 0500 hrs. “Here we are and here we bloody well stay.” At first light 3 RAR permitted the enemy stretcher bearers to move forward to collect casualties of 120 dead and wounded lying around the defence. 3 RAR against fierce opposition had held ground. This was to be the turning point of the Battle for Maryang San. 511008 0900hrs Two companies from KOSB came under command of 3 RAR and relieved 3 RAR. RNF advanced to pt 217 and occupied without opposition meeting patrols from KOSB at the Hinge. 3 RAR commenced orderly withdrawal. 3 RAR suffered 20 KIA and 104 wounded. 15 WIA remained on duty.
511009 1100 hrs KOSB assumed command of the Maryang San.
34
BATTLE HONOUR
The second phase of the brigade attack commenced on the 5 October 1951. The final objective was to have been Hill 317 (Maryang San), which lay approximately 2,500 metres north of Hill 355. The 3 RAR attack would come from the east and the RNF would attack from the south-west. However, the RNF met very determined opposition on an intermediate objective, Hill 217, and was unable to move forward. At 4.45 a.m., B and D companies moved further north across another valley. The anti-tank platoon crossed the Imjin and took up a position still further north to protect the right flank of the attacking companies whose advance from then on was to be towards the west through a series of enemy-held objectives with a final assault on Hill 317.
In the initial stages of the advance, B Company, which led the attack on the first objective, drifted to the right of the line of advance having lost direction in the heavy morning mist and thick timber. D Company continued forward and when the mist finally lifted found itself within grenade range of the enemy. With tank and artillery fire support D Company cleared the first objective and continued to press the attack along the high ground successfully assaulting the various enemy positions in its path. At 4.00 p.m., the last intermediate objective fell to D Company. The enemy had been deeply entrenched and very well equipped with heavy automatics. A platoon from B Company moved up to assist to clear and consolidate the feature. Enemy casualties counted thus far had been 98 killed and forty taken prisoner, while a large number had been wounded. In the meantime the RNF soldiers had reached Hill 217. Although the pressure of their attack was maintained, they were unable to gain the summit of the hill. A Company, 3 RAR, had been creating a diversion for B and D companies by attacking along a spur leading onto the final objective (Hill 317) from the south-west, meeting stiff opposition.
As B and D companies had progressed, C Company had moved up behind them, and by 5.00 p.m. the last intermediate assault on Hill 317 had secured the feature. Ten prisoners were taken while C Company suffered no casualties. The pressure maintained by the RNF to the south-east and A Company’s diversionary attack coupled with D Company’s rapid advance during the day and the very close tank and artillery support, had outmanoeuvred the enemy. A Company’s attacks had continued against heavy opposition and slowly the enemy had been forced back until a platoon from A Company had been able to join C Company in the consolidation of Hill 317. A Company’s two other platoons withdrew to the rear. A Company had been the target of heavy shelling during the whole of its advance and shells again rained down on the diggers as they withdrew. On 6 October a platoon from C Company moved forward of Hill 317 to secure a position so as to add depth to the defence. The RNF soldiers continued their attack on Hill 217. Although at one stage they were able to gain a toe-hold, they were unable to clear the hill in the face of very strong opposition. The RNF suffered 100 casualties during the two days’ fighting.
On 7 October, 3 RAR was directed to take Hill 217. To achieve this, a feature known as ‘The Hinge’, which dominated Hill 217 from the north, had to be taken. ‘The Hinge’ was just east of Hill 317 and C Company’s forward platoon. B Company’s two leading platoons gained the summit, but company headquarters and the reserve platoon, moving up to join them, were counter-attacked from both flanks. After a fierce fight at close quarters, the enemy melted into the trees and long grass. For the remainder
35 of the day, B Company on ‘The Hinge’ and C Company on Hill 317 were subjected to intense bombardment. The anti-tank platoon and the assault pioneer platoon reinforced C Company while a platoon from C Company moved forward to assist B Company. At 9.00 p.m., ‘The Hinge’ and Hill 317 were subjected to a tremendous concentration of enemy shelling for about forty-five minutes followed immediately by strong counterattacks. A heavy mist hung over the area and this assisted the enemy to reach and at times penetrate the company perimeters. The attacks continued throughout the night until the enemy finally gave up at 5.00 a.m. At first light, when the enemy stretcher-bearers were permitted to approach and carry away their casualties, they found 120 enemy dead and wounded lying around the defences.
At 9.00 a.m. on 8 October, two companies from the KOSB came under command of 3 RAR and relieved the Australians on ‘The Hinge’ and Maryang San. The RNF once more advanced on Hill 217 and was able to occupy the feature without opposition, meeting patrols from the KOSB on ‘The Hinge’. At 11.00 a.m. on 9 October, the KOSB assumed command of the Maryang San area. During this operation, 3 RAR had accounted for two full-strength Chinese battalions. Accurate figures show 283 counted enemy dead and fifty taken prisoner. This number does not include casualties from artillery, tank and medium machine-gun fire, which would have been considerable. The enemy fired accurate and sustained artillery concentrations, which was a new experience for 3 RAR. The night attack by the enemy was well controlled and occurred immediately after a heavy artillery concentration. Bugles were not used, nor was any movement heard before the attack began. In total, 3 RAR suffered twenty KIA and 104 WIA. Fifteen of the wounded had remained on duty.
During this operation, 3 RAR had accounted for two full-strength Chinese battalions.
36
CHAPTER 7 PHASE 6 THE STATIC WAR THE SAMICHON Raid on 227, Blaze, Buffalo, Songgok, and Patrol clashes winter.
THE STATIC WAR
3RAR Raid on 227, Blaze (1 RAR), Fauna (1 RAR), Songgok (1 and 3 RAR), Buffalo (3 RAR), Patrols (RAR), The Hook (2 and 3 RAR).
The battalions… [1 RAR, 2 RAR and 3 RAR]…then entered the early stages of the static war, which lasted for some two years. This was a hard monotonous period of trench warfare of a First World War nature. It was a life of patrolling and raids, wiring, mining and of being constantly shelled and mortared and fighting off local enemy attacks which persisted to the very end of hostilities in July 1953. There was a steady build-up of casualties. It was dangerous, onerous and lacked the excitement of significant achievement. I thought this a more exacting period, particularly for junior leaders, than the more mobile phase of the first year of the war. General Sir Francis Hassett—Korean veteran
I too have memories of those far off days in Korea. I remember the dust, the heat, the enervating humidity, the bitter cold of winter when men slept with their boots on and weapons cradled lest they should be found frozen in an emergency, the soldiers on listening post, lying silently on the frozen ground trying desperately to remain alert, knowing they were responsible for the safety of their comrades. The sounds of battle in the valley below—units involved in life and death situations, awaiting news of success or failure and the inevitable cost… General Sir Thomas Daly—Korean veteran
37 511009 3 RAR moves to eastern flank of pt 317, preparing strong defences and begins patrolling forward against active opposition. 511104 Chinese attack in Force and dislodge KOSB after a courageous defence, four weeks after its capture. 511105 3 RAR D Coy launches diversionary attack on Baldy. 511120/21 Chinese troops probe 3 RAR positions. 511122 28 Brigade moves into reserve. 511204 General Van Fleet presents Presidential Citation won by 3 RAR at Kapyong.
1952 1 Commonwealth Division now moved into fixed defences east of the Samichon valley and remained on this line in various defensive positions until the Armistice 27 July 1953.
520119 to 520418 3 RAR deployed on pts 159, 210 and 227 on eastern section of the divisional line beside the US Rock of the Marne Infantry Division.
520126/27 3 RAR D and C Coy attempt unsuccessfully to capture 227 in a night attack. C Coy, from Dog Outpost, secured the summit without opposition and D Coy assault troops advanced into the second line of defences and suffered heavy casualties. The Chinese troops had reinforced the position west of the initial objective and reacted strongly. The assault troops suffered heavy casualties amidst old KSLI wiring and abandoned weapon pits before being withdrawn. Chinese troops were firmly entrenched below ground and resisted any further movement west. 3 RAR casualties 7 KIA, 9 WIA.
THE 3RAR RAID ON 227 25/26 JANUARY 1952
After a short spell in reserve over Christmas 3 RAR was moved to the right of the line on 355 and 210 forward to Dog outpost under the enemy on 227. 7 Pl and 9 Pl of Coy were located on Dog outpost in the shadow of 227. They were fully exposed to the enemy. 7 Pl took a patrol forward on the night before the raid to determine possible resistance on John (227) and were unopposed. Pt 227 trig appeared to be unoccupied. During the raid 3 RAR were to occupy 227 and the knoll Luke and John and set up a defensive position with a view to occupying the ridge line. 7 and 12 Platoons were briefed personally by the CO Frank Hassett.
Firm plans were made to attack “the Apostles” and after last light the next night, elements of 7 Platoon snaked up the mountain, following the empty trench lines, to occupy the Observation Post on the top of 227 “John”. A resupply area, for consolidation and preparation by digging parties on reaching the objective, was set up below by D Company with extensive log and work parties to reinforce the objectives. CSM C Coy Arthur Stanley had this well under control (as usual). 7 Pl knew the area well, from frequent incursions, but the risk of booby traps and enemy patrols was always there. On arrival the Observation Post was empty but showed signs of recent occupation. 7 Platoon established the firm base in the OP bunker without opposition and called D Coy Platoon forward. All went well but when they reached the next knoll on “Luke”, all Hell broke loose on Luke. The enemy was "standing too", apparently reinforced from “Mark” and “Matthew” and waiting, ready to repel the attack. Opposition was strong and casualties high. Our firm base and re-supply was being mortared and shelled heavily with accurate registration and a number were wounded and killed in action. 7 Pl HQ bunker suffered a direct hit and partially collapsed and there were further casualties. In the meantime heavy casualties were flowing back from 12 Platoon D Coy. A temporary Casualty Clearing Station was set up inside and outside the main 7 Pl bunker. 38
The Brigade war diary subsequently reported events as follows; 25 Jan 52 1630 hrs. 3 RAR to capture pinnacle of 227 tonight starting at 1900 hrs. Platoon to form a screen west of pinnacle for follow up by digging party to establish bunkers before 1st light 26 January. 1825 hrs. Searchlight shining directly onto forward slope of 227. 1930 hrs. 3 RAR said all going well. Leasing patrol and standing patrol engaged enemy in firefight. One wounded so far. 2020 hrs. 3 RAR cleared pinnacle 227 – now moving west. Enemy mortar fire and on outpost. Leading platoon out of touch as wireless blown out. Casualties so far 3 KIA 2 wounded. 2055 hrs. 3RAR receiving heavy mortar and MMG fire from north of 227 and small arms fire west of 227. Possible counter attack forming up. 2150 hrs. Enemy mortar, MMG and tracer still coming back onto pinnacle. 2152 hrs. Div report intercept from enemy wireless “position is occupied by enemy platoon we are going to counter attack 2210 hrs. 3 RAR – enemy fire intermittent and much quieter. 2200 hrs. Enemy F.U.P. for counter attack being engaged by Regt guns. 3RAR screen now at 157190. 2245 hrs. 15 Regt on right of 3 RAR had evacuated 7x 3RAR wounded. 2245 hrs. 3RAR says all quiet, working parties under way. 2256 hrs. Div intercept “We found enemy platoon, they came from Nandong.- our troops will go forward at once when we hear your artillery fire.” 2258 hrs. Div arty fire engaging enemy mortars and MMG’s.
26 January 1952. 0250 hrs. 3RAR said platoon had to withdraw from hill 227 at midnight in the face of strong counter attack. Estimated that 2 enemy companies reached platoon on pinnacle. Attack was supported by heavy MMG and mortar fire. 3RAR casualties 6 Killed and 6 wounded. 0545 hrs. 3RAR says A & C companies heavily harassed by enemy MG and small arms fire from 227. 1 more killed. Only 2 enemy known to be killed but many more would have been. 0945 hrs .G>O>C visited command. GOC said that although 3RAR attack had failed to hold objective, he had learned a great deal …e.g. importance of ground to enemy, ability to mount a counter attack of battalion size within 4 hours and supported by mortar and MMG’s on fixed lines. 1245 hrs. 3RAR total casualties last night 7 killed and 9 wounded. The objective had been taken by about 2015 hrs and by 0015 hrs the counter attack had reached the two platoons having come through heavy defensive fire. The enemy had attacked from three sides. SECRET. 3RAR…. At 1915 hrs 12 Platoon of D Company moved through outpost 161191 onto the 227 feature where an unknown enemy were found in bunkers and crawl trenches. 1 enemy in bunker armed with burp gun engaged the platoon as they secured the crest causing 2 killed and 1 wounded. Further enemy engaged the platoon with grenades killing 1. At 0015 hrs platoon received very heavy mortar fire and were counter attacked on S>E>, West and North West and in one wave towards outpost 1161191 from the north. Friendly platoon ordered to withdraw at 0100 hrs. The situation quietened until 0412 hrs when a patrol departed C Coy perimeter for an attempt to recover bodies was met by LMG fire from 160190 and 227. Estimated that 2 enemy companies took part in counter attack.
The brunt of the 227 Assault was met by 12 Platoon D Company. 7 Platoon C Coy provided support and cover. 9 Pl C Coy provided the firm base on Dog outpost with D Coy elements. Later John Bennett Platoon Sergeant of 12 Platoon D Company (the raiding platoon) summarised his recollections of this daring and ferocious Platoon action
39 AFTER BATTLE REPORT BY SGT JOHN BENNETT. . The raid by 12 Platoon D Company. (Pl Coy Tiny Hone) At 1830 hrs 25 January Divisional artillery bombarded our objectives and we moved up the spur to the OP on John and passed through Lt Pears’ (OC 7 Pl) firm base, which was secured by elements of 7 Platoon. We moved quickly along the spur onto the “pinnacle” (Luke) our first objective. On nearing the summit we received heavy fire resulting in the death of the leading section leader. Shortly afterwards whilst engaging the enemy with grenades on the west side of the feature the second section commander was wounded and evacuated. By 2020 hrs the Pinnacle had been cleared but enemy mortar and small arms fire continued to come from the west. At this stage the platoon casualties had been 3 killed and 2 wounded. Despite this initial setback with consequent delay things worsened when the wireless was knocked out and the wireless operator killed. The Chinese reaction to the attack was swift and immediate with heavy mortar and MMG fire coming onto our standing patrol, and us from the west of 227. Lt Hone quickly dispatched listening parties to positions where it was thought any counter attack would come. One party went forward and down the slope and another west along the ridge. The remaining sections formed a defence along the former KSLI trench, which was some twenty or thirty feet below the summit of Luke. This gave the advantage not only of not being silhouetted against the skyline but with the searchlight to the rear of 227 and casting its ghostly light over the terrain it formed a very dark area where the defenders could be seen but not be seen. As indicated by the tracer rounds most of the small arms fire ended closer to or over the summit but it also appeared as if the searchlight was also a prime target for the enemy. Despite the intensity of the mortar fire most of it fell on the 7 Pl standing patrol or our rear echelons and support positions. We were in close contact with the enemy and they were loath to bring the fire too close. Unbeknown to the listening posts at the time they had been remarkably lucky since the west side and forward areas had been heavily mined as part of the old KSLI defences. The wire surrounds of the minefield had been destroyed. The other hazards were the many steel stakes protruding through the ground and weapon pits. At this stage Corporal Stark had been hit in the back with a grenade fragment and in some stage of shock. I took him back to the 7 Platoon OP. Tiny thought he should be accompanied in case he wandered off in his state of shock. I returned with some extra grenades as ‘plenty’ had been hurled down the west side. One soldier, who went on to Malaya and Vietnam was an aboriginal Australian, T. ‘Massa” Clark (who sometimes made it to Corporal level) and as I recall manned the manned the forward listening post with one other and the platoon’s most pessimistic soldier ‘Private X’. He was continually complaining about the cold, the food, the CO and Officers generally. He wondered why we should be here at all. He was in fine form this night so I’ll always remember Massa for not only his excellence as a field soldier but for his absolute patience in handling Private X. Enemy mortars, and artillery and our own drop shorts were constant. It was very messy and difficult to retain control. I was wounded (with what Tiny and I thought was a drop short) which hit me as I was jumping out of the trench (just behind Tiny’s pit) to locate the forward listening post. The blast blew me a short distance down the slope, permanently losing some hearing and my trousers as I bumped into the hidden steel stakes. I needed to shout above the din until I located the listening post which was well protected in an old pit but getting anxious as they had seen the rockets falling. They had been pretty cold all night, for, in the main trench we had been able to move around whereas they were very restricted in their own pit. They needed no persuasion to move back to the main trench, as enemy activity was still intense. (Bill Bennett was a stretcher-bearer that night and he had recovered one of the casualties (G. Bullock) Georgie was carrying the radio, which didn’t help communications much.) 40 Soon after this the enemy fire became sporadic which enabled casualties to be removed but because of the situation the digging and logging parties could not be called forward.. At this time our own artillery was engaging enemy positions and probably forming up places with some intensity. By about 2300 hrs enemy (?) flares soon lit up the sky indicating that a counter attack was soon to come. At this stage a decision was made to withdraw both listening posts to our main position. We had great difficulty in locating the forward listening posts due to the heavy fire, drop shorts and the confusion of darkness conditions. It was a perilous time. We were obviously in a great deal of trouble, weakened by casualties and lacking communications to our support. Things were getting worse with enemy activity increasing and we received a command to fall back. The enemy were obviously deeply entrenched in deep tunnels and bunkers in considerably numbers. It appeared the raid was over. It was still a long way home but we headed for the OP and the spur line back down the ridge to what we thought would be ‘comparative’ safety. I suppose my main recollections are; (1) Movement to the feature - I recall being at the OP on John with 7 Platoon when the artillery opened up on the hill in the preliminary bombardment. The guns had opened up on the hill on the two previous nights at the same time probably with the intent of confusing Charlie of our intentions. The searchlight was off during the firing but came on again as soon as the firing stopped. When the firing stopped and with a few seconds or so lapse to ensure no strays came over, Tiny said "GO" and off we raced in single file as planned. I recall there was still some "dust" in the air but the pinnacle (Luke) was clear. The idea was that as soon as we neared the summit the first section (Corporal Clark) would enter the trench and branch right -west - and the second section (Corporal Stark) would go left and around the trench. I was the platoon Sgt and between the end of the second section and head of the third section. The third section was to reinforce either section as required. "Tiny "Hone was located between the end of the first section and before the second section and had with him his wireless operator. I can't recall if we had any difficulty in racing up the hill as it had been fairly well cleared by the guns. i.e. no obstacles as such other than the slippery surface. (2) Orders group - "Tiny" had been briefed three days before the event. I recall he said that the guns would open up on the feature that night and at the platoon O group that day the section leaders were informed of the proposed attack. On the day of the attack we moved across the valley at last light and straight to the outpost. In hindsight, it would have helped to practise the planned manoeuvres (on the hill) as it became difficult to control since, once the second section wound around the hill, it ran the risk of colliding with the first section which would also be wrapping around from the west. Thankfully this did not happen. I don't think the trench wound right around the hill so at some stage the second section would be out of the trench and exposed. Verbal communication plus plenty of swearing would identify friend from foe but it would be "chancy”. (3) Difficulty of communications - We were in fairly close contact with each other so verbal communication was used. This failed with the forward outpost which was out of range and given the noise they were virtually cut off until I pulled them back to the main trench. I only found them by shouting as I had no idea where they had ended up as it was fairly dark despite the searchlight. The loss of the wireless was a major blow and I vaguely remember a runner from 7 Platoon OP coming to "Tiny" and passing on the various orders. This would have been fairly hazardous for the runner given the stuff flying around. (4) Courage - I was thinking of this recently. When you consider the incoming shells, mortars and machine guns and the noise for most of the time on the hill and consider the age of the diggers most of whom had never been in action before and the loss of close mates, it is remarkable that no one cracked or showed outwards signs of stress. Perhaps the word is stoic! I'm sure we were all scared stiff but at the same time were confident in our own ability and those around us. When the two section leaders were lost the 2i/c.s stepped in to fill the gap without fuss it indicates a measure of their training and confidence. There was also the feeling that we were not alone on the hill, the whole battalion would support us and the C.O. knew exactly what he was doing. We were also conscious that 7 Platoon was close by if things got really sticky. This was my first action and by training knew I would need to show example however difficult. It was 41 suspected that the non-arrival of the digging party in the trench indicated that things were not going according to plan and the loss of wireless communication also made us feel pretty helpless and vulnerable. "Tiny" was calm throughout, never seeming to be anxious, giving clear orders and instilling confidence in ourselves and in turn inspiring us with his leadership. I don't ever remember him swearing other than to say "shit" if things were really bad. (5) Evacuation of the wounded - I cannot remember when this happened other than it was fairly soon after things quietened down. Bill Bennett, A Company, was the stretcher-bearer allotted to us and he gave courageous assistance to us all. One day the story of these stretcher-bearers may be told. Their courage under fire in exposed positions is legendary. I took Corporal Stark down to 7 Platoon OP which, I think, was before the stretcher bearers arrived for the more badly wounded and dead. (6) Withdrawal from the feature - I was with "Tiny" when the 7 Platoon runner arrived with good news. He immediately withdrew both the listening posts to the main trench where the sections were located facing outwards to the front and west. Once we were all assembled "Tiny" checked each section and gave orders as to how we would head off towards 7 Platoon OP and 7 Platoon Dog outpost position (which appeared less safe than where we were). I cannot recall how we went down the hill other than fast and in order by sections. I did the last check and was the last off the hill (per manual?). What later concerned me was that two stretcher bearers had lost their lives recovering a body "from 227" I knew for sure that when we left the summit on 227 (Luke) all bodies had been removed so I was pretty upset for some years until I found out that the body was from the region of the 7 Platoon outpost position. (7) Insurmountable odds. - Thankfully we did not know precisely what was up against us at the time. The incoming fire was close and everywhere but directly on us as evidenced by the tracers. The return fire by our artillery was such that we wondered if anyone could come through it and reach the hill. I don't think we ever envisaged that we would be wiped out - that happens to others -. In hindsight and in view of what happened later in the war 7 Platoon outpost was much more vulnerable. If all else failed we could always withdraw to the rear of the hill whereas the Dog outpost was easily cut off. John Bennett Pl Sgt
John Bennett was one of the many brave soldiers of D Company who managed to turn “defeat into their own personal victory.” The full brunt of the attack was always felt by 12 Platoon. C Company was shielded from the initial effects and close encounter fighting. 7 Platoon Base. All of this was unknown to 7 Pl HQ at the time, as communications forward had been destroyed. The flow of wounded was the only source of information. 7 Pl Comd was on radio direct to the Commanding Officer who constantly monitored the position, prior to coming forward. (By this time that The D Company communications to him were out.) From the tone of his voice that he was deeply concerned at the casualties incurred, the lack of information and the strength of the opposition. As the situation deteriorated the Commanding Officer ordered 7 Pl Comd to abort the operation. 12 Pl was to withdraw through our firm base and we were to abandon the “John” OP. D Company began to withdraw under pressing enemy contact. Down below the FUP area commanded by WO Arthur Stanley and the 9 Pl Lt Arthur Pembroke platoon position which had provided the firm base for the operation was being pressed. Warrant Officer Stanley had courageously supervised the FUP for the supply of ammunition and the evacuated wounded. He himself was wounded in action. The raid showed the incredible courage, determination and discipline of the D and C Company soldiers. With many junior leaders killed or wounded in 12 Pl, a failed objective and enemy pressing strongly against them in a dark night operation they withdrew without panic and in an orderly fashion supporting each other home. Fortunately the enemy did not follow to the 7 and 9 Platoon Dog outpost. You would have to experience a failed night operation to understand the utter confusion caused by the change in plans and the lack of communications. I marvel that this was overcome.
42 Perhaps the platoon raid would have been the most outstanding actions since Commando. Brilliantly planned and supported as were all Hassett operations, but in this case the Platoons were fighting out of their own weight division. The enemy was far too strong and too well entrenched for a platoon raid.
Fortunately the decision to withdraw was made in time to prevent the possible annihilation of both 12 Platoon and 7 Platoon elements. Again, we can thank Hassett, the soldier’s General for that. 520303 1 RAR embarks from Sydney in troop ship Devonshire. 520406 1 RAR arrives in Korea. 520601 1 RAR joins 28 Bde. 520627 Brigadier T J Daly takes command of 28 Bde. 520629/521005 28 Bde occupies western sector of the divisional line. (See Appendix B) 520701 Platoon Raid Hill 115 In August 1952 3 RAR had returned to the line in the SW sector and on the night of 12 July launched a platoon raid against Hill 115, 1 kilometre forward of their position, to obtain a prisoner. The platoon met much stronger opposition than expected and suffered heavy losses. The Platoon Commander (Lt Ryan) was killed, 2 members were WIA believed captured and 10 of those who returned were WIA. A search patrol the following night found no trace of the 3 missing. 520702 1 RAR Operation Blaze 520702 Operation Blaze. Following a short period of handover and settling in 1 RAR launched Operation Blaze undertaken, to capture prisoners and destroy enemy defences once more against 227 the site of the 3 RAR operations in January. This daylight company raid to obtain a prisoner and destroy the 227 garrison 2 July 53 was undertaken by A Company Major Thomson. The leading platoon (Lt Lucas) attacked the bunkers ferociously with percussion, phosphorous and HE grenades but were unable to secure the position. After an hours fierce fighting and heavy mortar fire the company was instructed to withdraw. The company paid a heavy price of 3 KIA, 34 WIA 520702 Lt Col R L Hughes relieves Lt Col Hassett as Commanding Officer of 3 RAR. 520712 3 RAR Ryan patrol IKIA 3 MIA 10 WIA 520813 3 RAR Operation Buffalo Mid August the battalion was ordered to raid once more with a stronger force of B Coy Maj Richardson, Zwolanski and launched Operation Buffalo against Hill 75 some 1200m metres west of the battalion defences. The raid met with heavy opposition and all platoons suffered from MMG and mortar fire resulting on withdrawal of KIA 1, WIA 24 and MIA 2.
PATROLS IN THE SONGGOK AREA AUGUST TO SEPTEMBER 1952. Songgok patrols were demanding and costly to those involved. The brief two months of activity commenced with the Greville patrol. 520822/23 Greville patrol 1RAR 1 KIA, 6 WIA 520826/27 Skipper patrol 1 RAR 520902/3 White patrol 3 RAR 1 KIA 2 WIA 520904/05 Patrick patrol 3 RAR 2 KIA 520913/14 Cliff patrol 1 RAR 520928/29 Waterton/Holden/Saville patrol 3 RAR
Four diggers wait in a trench for the word to move out on a night patrol. (AWM HOBJ4384)
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Artist’s Impression Trench Warfare -JV
PATROL CLASHES WINTER 1952-53 Nov 52 – Jan 53. 28 Bde is located on eastern section of Divisional line. Hills 187, 159, 210, 355. 25 October 3 RAR detached to 29 Bde on western section at Yongdong on the Samichon to relieve 1 RAR. 521025 3 RAR detached briefly to 29 Bde on western sector, to relieve the 1 Bn, The Welsh Regiment which returned to Hong Kong 521022/23 Austin 1 RAR/Daly defence of 355 commences leading to period of aggressive patrolling. 521102/530131 28 Bde occupies the eastern sector of the line. 521102/521130 1 RAR regains control to the approaches to Hill 355 by vigorous aggressive patrolling. 521107/08 James patrol 1 RAR I KIA 4 WIA 521110/11 Khan patrol 3 WIA 521111/12 Seaton/Beresi patrol 1 KIA 521111 Crotty patrol 521115/16 Skipper patrol. Both patrols 3 WIA 4 WIA I MIA 521211/12 Operation Fauna undertaken by 1 RAR, to capture prisoners at Flora and destroy enemy defences. Mann, McNulty 22 WIA 3 MIA 521212/13 Carter/Withers/Ruttley Patrol 1 KIA 1WIA 521219/20 In support of Op Beatup. Boyd, Cupitt, Corcoran Patrol 521228 3 RAR relieved 1 RAR 1953 530106/07 Lloyd ambush patrol 3 WIA 530113/14 Bousfield patrol 1 KIA, 5 WIA 3 MIA 510114 Recovery patrol Dawson, Tippet, Smith 3 WIA 530123 Davies minefield patrol 1 KIA, 1 WIA 530124/25 Smith, Morrison, Terry patrol 13 MIA, 10 WIA. Morrison DCM, Mackay MM. Terry considered for VC. 530131 The 1st Commonwealth Division goes into reserve. 530314 Lt Col A. L. MacDonald takes command of 3 RAR. 530321 2 RAR relieves 1 RAR at Camp Casey, near Tongduchon. 530325 Brigadier J.G.N. Wilton takes command of 28 Brigade.
44 530408 1 Com Div returns to the line. 28 Bde moves to the eastern flank. 530505 2 RAR relieves the Royal Fusiliers (RF)on the left flank in the vicinity of Hill 159. 530507 The 1 Bn Durham Light Infantry (1 DLI) on Hill 355 530513 3 RAR Duff, Cashman patrol. 1 KIA, 3 MIA 6 WIA 530516/17 Chinese bombardment 3 RAR Burnard, Cocks 1 KIA 6 WIA 530519 3 RAR Mortar bombardment 2 KIA 5 WIA 530521 2 RAR Minefield incident 3 KIA 1 WIA 530523/24 2 RAR Hamilton ambush patrol. 1 KIA 2 WIA 530525 3RAR Yacopetti/Weaver ambush patrol, 1 POW 530527 Chinese attacks D Coy, the forward company of 2 RAR, on Hill 159. 530529 DLI relieves 3RAR on Hill 355. 530616 3 RAR relieves 2 RAR. 530709/10 28 Bde relieves 29 Bde on the “Hook” the western sector of the line. 530709 2 RAR relieved the Kings Regiment on the left flank of 1 Commonwealth Division. D Coy holds the high feature The Hook. C Coy was on Hill 121 to the south. B Coy was in reserve behind C Coy. The Anti Tk Pl, under command of D Coy, occupied the saddle between D and C companies. Australian Operations on the Jamestown line January 1952 to July 1953 were aggressive and demanding. Hundreds of patrols, ambushes and raids day and night, were conducted in no mans’ land to protect the Brigade fixed lines and obtain information of the enemy’s intention. For the soldiers occupying the trenches it was a time of hardship interspersed by periods of costly activity with heavy casualties. Both the climate and the terrain were unfriendly. The three Australian battalions proved their ability to undertake operations with great distinction. It was a demanding period for the battalions undertaking grinding defence operations without the satisfaction and glory of the earlier activities.
THE HOOK 530724-25 Chinese make major attacks on both the US marines and 2 RAR on the Hook. 530727 Armistice takes effect at 1000 hrs. 530724/25 Early in the night the Chinese probed Hill 121 held by C Coy. At the same time the enemy attacked 7 US Marine on 2 RAR’s left. An enemy force of about 50 advanced on D Coy occupying the Hook. A forward standing patrol directed tank and artillery fire on the enemy who dispersed. Enemy artillery and mortar concentrations on the Hook, the 2 RAR mortar base and Hill 121 heralded a major enemy advance. 2050 hrs Enemy soldiers reached the front of C Coy and infiltrated between C Coy and the US Marines on Hill 111. The enemy withdrew after fierce opposition. A Coy DLI moved up behind B Coy and came under command of 2 RAR. 2203 hrs Enemy artillery intensified once more. The situation on Hill 111 in the heat of battle became very confused. 2325 hrs Enemy tried once more to take Hill 121. Close quarter clash involving grenades and small arms resulted in enemy withdrawal after taking heavy casualties. At this stage it was estimated that the enemy objective was the US Boulder City and Hill111 and 2 RAR Hill 121. 530725 0400 Further fighting on Hill111 and it was not until 1730 hrs that the position was again firmly in the hands of the US forces. A steady barrage of enemy shelling continued throughout nthe day. 2 RASR suffered two KIA and 14 WIA. 530725 2100 hrs A small enemy force once more attempted to infiltrate The Hook held by D Coy but were driven off at 0130 hrs by a D Coy section patrol which suffered 1 KIA and 1 WIA. The patrol was withdrawn to the Hook.
45 530725 2300 hrs Enemy artillery and mortar fire intensified to 30 rounds per minute accompanied by considerable enemy activity to the left of the Hook. Forty minutes later the enemy penetrated the left of the 2 RAR position. After a close contact fight the enemy was driven back leaving 35 dead on the feature and another 35 either killed ort wounded around C Coy’s perimeter on Hill121. A further estimate of 300 enemy dead was made on Hill 111 the US Marine position. Casualties taken by 2 RAR on Hill 111 during this action totalled five wounded. 530726 0100 hrs D Coy 3 RAR moved up behind B Coy 2 RAR and came under command. A Coy DLI was warned but did not move up. At 0300 hrs activity along the whole front subsided and the artillery shelling ceased. D Coy 3 RAR left to rejoin the battalion. 530726 At daylight a steady stream of enemy casualties was seen evacuating Hill 111 and crossing paddy fields from the left of 2 RAR. The stretcher parties were not engaged. A group of 20 enemy soldiers attempting to withdraw was engaged by the Anti Tank Platoon and six casualties were recorded. The 2 RAR casualties for the night amounted to 3 KIA and 10 WIA bringing the toptal to 5 KIA and 24 WIA. 530726 During the night 26/27 July some light attacks occurred but were easily repulsed. The next morning numerous enemy stretcher parties were once again allowed to pass unmolested. Incoming artillery and mortar fire declined from 43,000 in the previous 48 hour period to 54 mixed rounds. There were no casualties. 530727 1000 hrs The Armistice was signed effective from 1000 hrs. Orders to cease fire were received at 1042 hrs. On the previous night the Anti Tank Platoon observed unusual enemy activity on their positions. The enemy had decorated their positions with paper and colourful flags. Propaganda and music blared across the valley. Some enemy exchanged gifts with 2 RAR.
BATTLE HONOUR On 9 July 1953, 2 RAR relieved the King’s Regiment on the left flank of 1 Commonwealth Division. At the time of the battle of The Samichon, D Company held the high feature known as ‘The Hook’, C Company was on Hill 121 to the south and A Company on high ground to the east of D Company. B Company was in reserve behind C Company. The anti-tank platoon, under command of D Company, occupied the saddle between D and C companies. On the night of 24/25 July, fighting broke out on the 2 RAR front when Hill 121—held by C Company—was probed by the enemy. At the same time enemy forces attacked the 7th US Marine Regiment on 2 RAR’s left. An enemy force of about fifty advanced on D Company occupying ‘The Hook’, but a forward standing patrol was able to direct tank and artillery fire which dispersed the force. Enemy artillery and mortar concentrations on ‘The Hook’, the 2 RAR mortar base plate and Hill 121 heralded an enemy advance. At 8.50 p.m., enemy soldiers reached the front of C Company’s left-hand position and infiltrated between C Company and the US Marines on Hill 111. A fierce fire fight ensued and the enemy withdrew. A Company of the Durham Light Infantry (DLI) moved up behind B Company and came under command of 2 RAR. At 10.03 p.m. the enemy artillery intensified once more. The position on Hill 111 became confused and at 11.25 p.m. the enemy again tried to take Hill 121. A clash developed involving grenades and small arms, but the attack petered out as the enemy had sustained heavy casualties. At this stage it was estimated that the objectives of the enemy attack were ‘Boulder City’ and Hill 111 in the US sector and Hill 121. At 4.00 a.m. another fight developed on Hill 111. By 5.30 p.m. the position was again fully in Marine hands. A section of 2 RAR medium machine-gun platoon on Hill 111 endeavoured to coax an enemy trapped in a bunker to surrender, but eventually was forced to kill him. During the night 2 RAR suffered two killed and fourteen wounded. A steady barrage of enemy shelling continued throughout the day. At 9.00 p.m. on 25 July, about twenty enemy soldiers again tried to move up to ‘The Hook’—held by D Company—but were driven off by a section patrol that killed at least one of the party. No casualties 46 were suffered by the 2 RAR patrol; however, around 1.30 a.m., one digger from the patrol was killed and another wounded by enemy mortar fire. The patrol was recalled. At 11.00 p.m., enemy artillery and mortar fire intensified to thirty rounds per minute accompanied by considerable movement on the left. Forty minutes later a determined attack by the enemy penetrated the left of 2 RAR’s position and fighting was also reported on Hill 111. After a close contact fight lasting around an hour the enemy was driven back leaving thirty-five dead on the feature and another thirty- five either killed or wounded, counted around C Company’s perimeter on Hill 121. A further estimate of 300 enemy dead was made on Hill 111—the US Marine position. Casualties taken by 2 RAR on Hill 111 during this action totalled five wounded. At 1.00 a.m., D Company, 3 RAR, moved up to a position behind B Company and came under command of 2 RAR. A Company, DLI, was warned out, but did not move up. Exchanges of small arms fire continued and, at 3.00 a.m., activity along the whole front subsided and the artillery shelling ceased. D Company, 3 RAR, left to rejoin the battalion. At daylight on 26 July, a steady stream of enemy casualties was seen evacuating Hill 111 and crossing the paddy fields from the left of 2 RAR. The stretcher parties were not engaged. One group of twenty enemy soldiers attempting to withdraw was engaged by the anti-tank platoon and six casualties were recorded. The 2 RAR casualties for the night amounted to three killed and ten wounded bringing the total to five killed and twenty-four wounded. On the night of 26/27 July, further light attacks occurred but were easily repulsed and the next day numerous enemy stretcher parties were once again allowed to pass unmolested. Incoming artillery and mortar fire declined from 43,000 rounds in the previous 48-hour period to 54 mixed rounds. There were no casualties. At 10.00 a.m. the Armistice was signed, to take effect from 10.00 p.m. Orders to cease fire were received at 10.42 a.m. That night, a patrol from the anti-tank platoon reported activity on the enemy defended hills and first light showed that the enemy had decorated his forward position with colourful flags and paper. Propaganda and music blared across the valley. The enemy intimated his willingness to exchange gifts and some intrepid troops accepted. Taking advantage of daylight and the cease-fire, the enemy continued to clear the battlefield of casualties and many funeral pyres were seen burning. The forward areas around ‘The Hook’ were flooded with sightseers and controlling this unauthorised intrusion proved difficult. Public relations personnel, war correspondents and the other press representatives were particularly attracted to the area. The 2 RAR diggers began dismantling their defensive positions prior to withdrawing behind the demilitarised cease-fire line. Taking advantage of daylight and the cease fire the enemy continued to clear the battlefield of casualties and many funeral pyres were seen. The forward areas around the hook were flooded with sightseers and press. The 2 RAR diggers began dismantling their defensive positions prior to withdrawing behind the demilitarized cease fire line. Rarely—if ever—did they complain. Their youthful eyes would ‘light up’ as we bent over them to dress their wounds or apply medication. Their eyes also revealed their suffering and pain. Their stoicism under such trauma had to be witnessed to be believed. As we approached the burns unit to report for duty, the stench from putrefying flesh was overpowering, the memory of which remains with me to this day. Nurse Dita McCarthy, Korean veteran THE WAR FOR THE ROYAL AUSTRALIAN REGIMENT WAS OVER.
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THE WAR ON LAND: CONCLUSIONS
The Korean War was overwhelmingly a land war, in terms of numbers of participants, casualties and material costs. It was fought across rugged terrain through which ran only rough, narrow roads and tracks. Operations were further complicated by extreme conditions of heat and cold, and rain and snow for long periods. The war was an exacting test of fitness of both men and equipment. Finally, the Korean War showed that the Australian soldier had lost none of the versatility, toughness and initiative which were the hallmarks of his predecessors in the First AIF and the Second AIF. The Australian Army contingent in Korea was an all-volunteer force. When special enlistments were called for, men with combat experience in the 1939-45 War ensured no shortage of applicants. They were motivated by a variety of factors: the challenge of combat; boredom or frustration with civilian life in Australia after demobilization; and a wider feeling of concern that the North Korean invasion, if it was not rebuffed, might be a harbinger of a direct threat to Australia’s security. They fought hard, in appalling climatic conditions, against a determined enemy who showed that he could sometimes get the upper hand. Yet the Australians proved that man for man and unit for unit they could acquit themselves on the battlefield better than most and they earned unstinted praise from their allies. Their record of bravery, of consideration for their wounded mates when in danger, of dash in the offensive and dogged persistence in defence – such as that displayed at Kapyong, on Maryang San and in countless small patrol actions on the Jamestown Line (The Static War) – and their quick-witted, aggressive and subtle tactics set the new, post-1939-45 War Army off to an excellent start. They enhanced Australia’s reputation as an ally and helped to make the Commonwealth Division one of the most highly regarded formations of the English Army. But perhaps their greatest achievement was to develop the skill of patrolling to a fine art of which they were undisputed masters. Robert O’Neill, Official War historian
THE GEORGE CROSS
MADDEN, Horace William, Private (2/400186), 3rd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment
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QUEENSLAND KOREAN WAR MEMORIAL CASCADE GARDENS GOLD COAST QUEENSLAND AUSTRALIA
In 2009 a memorial to the Korean War Veterans was constructed in the Cascade Gardens Gold Coast Queensland to recognise the dedicated and courageous service of Korean War veterans.
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QUEENSLAND KOREAN WAR MEMORIAL PO BOX 1, ISLE OF CAPRI, Q4217, AUSTRALIA [email protected] www.koreanwarmemorial.com.au BENEFACTORS: Republic of Korea, Federal Minister Veteran Affairs, Qld State Govt, Gold Coast City Council, RSL, AKWMQ/GCKS, KWMQ, Stratagem Pty Ltd. MEMORIAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE AQKV, GCKS, RSL, KWVAA ……………………………..
A PICTORIAL RECORD TO COMMEMORATE THE 60TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE KOREAN WAR AND THE SACRIFICES OF THE NAVY ARMY AND AIR FORCE THE ROYAL AUSTRALIAN REGIMENT PROVIDED THE LAND FORCES
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OUR NEW KOREAN AND AUSTRALIAN
VETERAN FAMILIES
51 WE REMEMBER THE AUSTRALIAN FORCES IN KOREA 1950 TO 1957
The inaugural meeting at Beenleigh RSL with Government Whip Margaret Keech MP, the ladies auxiliary and representatives of Korea Veterans and the Korean Communities of SE Queensland
Distinguished guests, Veterans and benefactors of the Queensland Korean War Memorial Dedication at the Unveiling of the Unknown Korean War Soldier and Memorial Wall 2011
The Construction Team: 52
60TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE ARMISTICE 27 JULY 2013
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OUR SISTER MEMORIAL AT BUSAN ROK, WHERE REST THOSE WHO FAILED TO RETURN, UNDER LOVING CARE OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE.
LEST WE FORGET
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Ambassador for Peace Medal Recipients 2013
The Captains and the Kings depart. Our memories live forever within the Memorial.
The Queensland Korean War Memorial was Designed by Screenart David Yardley, Constructed by W3D Constructions Ross Wolbers Major Benefactors: Republic of Korea, C of A Department of Veteran Affairs, Queensland Premier’s Department, Gold Coast City Council, Australian Korean War Memorial Queensland Ltd, Gold Coast Korean Society, Association Queensland Korea Veterans Inc, RSL, Stratagem and the Veteran and Korean Communities of SE Queensland. Construction Team: Project Manager Maurie Pears, GCCC Ross Greenwood, President AKWMQ Joseph Ahn and Committee, RSL Surfers Paradise Alan Whelan, AQKV Committee, GCKS Committee. Authorised by M B Pears, the Queensland Korean War Memorial Committee; PO Box 1, Isle of Capri, Q 4217.Australia; Photographs Alan Fortunato www.koreanwarmemorial.com.au
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