Stand To

When we used to talk about efficiencies, we referred ting a critical component for the space shuttle, but they to those little, cheaply built and cheaply rented, bare- don’t see a lot more ways to create efficiencies. bones apartments that single soldiers and geographical That our units are learning conservation is very good, bachelors could rent right outside the main gate of Fort for no one likes to see once-used but now contami- Really Hot. They offered some semblance of civiliza- nated tubes of grease thrown out, or see scrap metal tion: a stove top, a closet, and a commode. They were bins with untagged and perfectly good parts destined austere places, but a smart guy with some imagination for a smelter, rather than the turret. No one likes to see could get by if he cleverly used his limited space. soldiers who are not training. Waste should make every Nowadays, efficiencies have come to represent some- one of us mad. thing a little bit different. They still demand that clever- At some point we will have reached the limit of effi- ness from the user, but now we are talking about re- ciencies and actually begun cutting into our muscle. I sources when we hear the word. How can you leverage don’t pretend to know where that point is, for each unit your allocations of whatever you’ve been given to ac- will be different. I do know that a number of guys feel complish the mission, or missions? Not enough people? they have streamlined their operations a lot already. Look for some efficiencies. Not enough equipment? Talk of cutting annual ammo allocations or reducing Look for efficiencies. Not enough fuel or repair parts to PLLs and ASLs should always send a shudder through support your OPTEMPO? Look for some efficiencies. the force. We are all concerned about the erosion of Not enough training opportunities? Simulate. Then look collective skills that can’t be captured in simulations. for efficiencies. Sure, you can keep the simulation running a little bit Being the mission-type guys they are, tankers and longer to give the logisticians — that is, all of us — time cavalrymen will always say, “We’ll do our part.” Their to police up the battlefield. But, a simulation just isn’t units might go without as many chemical lights as last going to replicate the effort needed to simultaneously year, or quite as many batteries, or fewer CL III POL recover two or three dozen armored vehicles and surge package products to try and stretch the unit’s money for the increased casualty flow. Doing it for the first time and resources to last the year. More than likely though, at a Combat Training Center certainly isn’t our model they will maintain a readiness level close to where they now, nor what we want, although it may be the direction are supposed to be. Those new found efficiencies will forced on us by efficiencies. probably get ’em through enough of the exercises they There is everything right about operating more effi- had planned to meet the quarterly, semi-annual, and ciently; waste in any form is a bad thing. Soldiers not annual training objectives. training is bad; money that is thrown away is bad; or- Later, after the exercises and recovery operations are dering repair parts then not using them is unconscion- complete, these same guys catch up on their reading able; POL products used once, then contaminated, im- and see articles about multi-billion dollar acquisition poverish the unit, the Army, and ruin our environment. programs and wonder what is going on (for some en- As budgets continue shrinking, it behooves us all to be lightenment, read about the machinations surrounding creative, and to use our collective imaginations to effi- the F/A-18 and whether to upgrade or buy new). They ciently operate within increasingly tight resource alloca- look in their motorpools and sure don’t see $3,800 toilet tions. But, if you see muscle getting damaged, speak seats. They might see a stray, solitary bolt, inexplicably up. shipped via FEDEX or Express Mail in packaging befit- — TAB

By Order of the Secretary of the Army: Official:

DENNIS J. REIMER JOEL B. HUDSON General, United States Army Acting Administrative Assistant to the Chief of Staff Secretary of the Army 02269 The Professional Development Bulletin of the Armor Branch PB-17-96-5

Editor-in-Chief LTC TERRY A. BLAKELY Features 8 STAWs: New Threat from Above Managing Editor Smart Top Attack Weapons JON T. CLEMENS by Lieutenant Colonel James H. Boschma, U.S. Anny (Ret.) 10 Russia's Arena Active Protection System Commandant by First Lieutenant Adam Geibel MG LON E. MAGGART 11 Cavalry In Force XXI by Major General Lon E. Maggart ARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is published bi­ 13 Fort Knox Cavalry Branch Will Host Reconnaissance Symposium in October monthly by the U.S. Anny Annor Center, 4401 Vine Grove Road, Fort Knox, KY 40121- 14 The Indian Wars Staff Ride Disclaimer: The infonnation contained in AR­ by Lieutenant Colonel Edwin L Kennedy, Jr. MOR represents the professional opinions of the 20 Task Force Baum and the Hammelburg Raid authors and does not necessarily reflect the offi­ by Richard Whitaker cial Anny or TRADOC position, nor does it 31 Leadershlp ••• And Command and Control change or supersede any infonnation presented by Lieutenant Colonel Kevin C.M. Benson in other official Anny publications. 33 Honorary Colonels Can Re-energize Your Unit Official distribution is limited to one copy for by Captain Dave Clark each annored brigade headquarters, annored cavalry regiment headquarters, armor battalion 34 Operation Just Cause: The Armor-Infantry Team in the Close Fight headquarters, annored cavalry squadron head­ by Major Frank Sherman quarters, reconnaissance squadron headquar­ 36 Balkan Report III: The Six-Bradley Scout Platoon In Bosnia ters, armored cavalry troop, annor company, by First Lieutenant Frank Lozano and motorized brigade headquarters of the United States Anny. In addition, Anny libraries, 37 Kentucky Windage (Target acquisition and tracking with the M-18 Hellcat) Army and DOD schools, HQ DA and MACOM Letter from CPT Richard Buchanan (Ret.), 704th TO Battalion staff agencies with responsibility for annored, di­ rect fire, ground combat systems, organizations, 38 Tank Combat Training: Tactical Table VIII and the training of personnel for such organiza­ by Captain Pat White and Lieutenant Colonel Karl Gunzelman tions may request two copies by sending a mili­ 41 Mobility Analysis for the Digitized Brigade tary letter to the editor-in--chief. by Captain Robert S. Mikaloff Authorized Content: ARMOR will print only 45 The Task Force Commander's Role in Fire Support Planning those materials for which the U.S. Army Armor by Lieutenant Colonel Harry L Leiterman Center has proponency. That proponency in­ cludes: all annored, direct-fire ground combat Back "Driver, how much fuel do we have?" systems that do not serve primarily as infantry Cover Here's an easy way to report accurately... by Staff Sergeant Stephen A. Krivitsky carriers; all weapons used exclusively in these systems or by CMF 19-series enlisted soldiers; any miscellaneous items of equipment which ar­ Departments mor and armored cavalry organizations use ex­ 2 Contacts clusively; training for all SC 12A, 12B, and 12C 3 Letters officers and for all CMF-19-series enlisted sol­ 6 Commander's Hatch diers; and infonnation conceming the training, 7 Driver's Seat logistics, history, and leadership ot ann or and ar­ 52 Books mored cavalry units at the brigade/regiment level and below, to include Threat units at those lev­ els. Material may be reprinted, provided credit is given to ARMOR and to the author, except Second-class official mail postage paid at Fort Knox, KY, and additional mailing offices. Postmaster. Send address changes to Editor, ARMOR, ATTN: AUK·TDM, Fort Knox, KY 40121·5210. where copyright is indicated. Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. USPS 467·970 September-October 1996, Vol. CV No.5 Directory - Points of Contact

DSN - 464-XXXX Commercial - (502) 624-XXXX U.S. Army Armor Center Commanding General (ATZK-CG) MG Lon E. Maggart 2121 ARMOR Editorial Offices E-Mail: [email protected] Deputy Commanding General (ATZK-DCG) Editor-In-Chief BG Clayton E. Melton 7555 LTC Terry A. Blakely 2249 E-Mail: [email protected] E-Mail: [email protected] Chief of Staff (ATZK·CS) Managing Editor COL Jerry L. Veach 1101 Jon T. Clemens 2249 E·Mail: VEACH@KNOX·EMH1.ARMY.MIL

Editorial Assistant Command Sergeant Major (ATZK·CSM) Vivian Oertle 2610 CSM Ronnie W. Davis 4952 Production Assistant E·Mail: [email protected] Mary Hager 2610 E·Mail: HAGERM@KNOX·EMH1.ARMY.MIL Directorate of Force Development (ATZK-FD) COL John F. Kalb 5050 Staff Illustrator E·Mail: KALB@KNOX·EMH1.ARMY.MIL Mr. Jody Harmon 2610 Directorate of Training and Doctrine Development (ATZK·TD) COL G. Patrick Ritter 8247 E-Mail: [email protected] U.S. Army Armor School TRADOC System Manager for Force XXI (ATZK·XXI) COL Robert Westholm 4009 Acting Chief of Staff, Armor School (ATSB·CS) L. E-Mail: TSMFXX1@KNOX·EMH1.ARMY.M1L LTC James R. Harrison 1050 E·Mail: [email protected] TRADOC System Manager for Abrams (ATZK·TS) Armor School Sergeant Major (ATSB·CSM) COL David M. Cowan 7955 CSM Gerald D. Utterback 5405 E-Mail: COWAN@KNOX·EMH1.ARMY.MIL E-Mail: [email protected] Mounted Maneuver Battlespace Battle Lab (ATZK-MW) NCO Academy (ATZK·NC) COL Gary Krueger 7809 CSM Kevin P. Garvey 5150 E-Mail: KRUEGER@KNOX·EMH1.ARMY.MIL E·Mail: [email protected] Office, Chief of Armor (ATZK·AR) 16th Cavalry Regiment (ATSB'SBZ) Mr. Aubrey Henley 1272 COL Gregory M. Eckert 7848 E-Mail: HENLEYA@KNOX·EMH1.ARMY.MIL E-Mail: [email protected] FAX 7585

1st Armor Training Brigade (ATSB-BAZ) Special Assistant to the CG (ARNG) (ATZK-SA) COL Fred A. Treyz III 6843 LTC Randall Williams 1315 E·Mail: [email protected] E-Mail: WILLlAMR@KNOX·EMH1.ARMY.MIL

ARTICLE SUBMISSIONS: To improve speed and accuracy in edit­ gets lost or distorted.) If you have any questions concerning electronic ing, manuscripts should be originals or clear copies, either typed or art SUbmissions, call Vivian Oertle at the phone number above. printed out double-spaced in near·letter-quality printer mode. We also accept stories on 3'/, or 5Y4-inch floppy disks in MultiMate, WordS tar, MAILING ADDRESS: ARMOR, AT1N: ATZK-TDM, Fort Knox, Microsoft Word, WordPerfect, Ami Pro, XyWrite, Microsoft Word for KY 401ZI-5210. Windows, and ASCII (please indicate wordprocessing fonnat on disk or cover letter and include a double-spaced printout). Tape captions to any PAID SUBSCRIPTIONS/ST. GEORGE·ST. JOAN AWARDS: Re· illustrations or photos submitted. port delivery problems or changes of address to Connie Bright or Dar­ lene Kennedy, P.O. Box 607, Ft. Knox, KY 40121, or call (502) 942- SUBMISSION POLICY NOTE: Due to the limited space per issue, we 8624, FAX (502) 942-6219. will not prim articles that have been submilted 10. and accepted for pub­ lication by, other Army journals. Please submit your article to only one UNIT DISTRIBUTION: Report delivery problems or changes of ad­ Army journal at a time. dress to Mary Hager, DSN 464·2610; commercial: (502) 624,2610. Re­ quests to be added to the free distribution list should be in the form of a GRAPHICS AND PHOTOS: We can accept electronic graphics and letter to the Editor-in-Chief. photo files in most formats except Harvard Graphics. Compressed for­ mats .jpg and .gif take up the least disk space. We prefer PC Paint· ARMOR HOTLINE - DSN 464-TANK: The Armor Hotline is a 24- brush (.pcx). If you use Powerpoint Cppt), please save each illustration hour service to provide assistance with questions concerning doctrine, as a separate file. Try to avoid the use of color and shading, but if you training, organizations, and equipment of the Armor Force. must use shading to illustrate your point, send us an un shaded version of the illustration along with a printout of your shaded version. (We have ISSUES IN ARMOR: Visit the ARMOR Web site at the following ad­ found that when we convert tiles to a format we can use, the shading dress: http://www.entelechy-inc.comldocslknoxdoc/amlOrmaglcover.htm.

2 ARMOR - September-October 1996 Mortar Doctrine Writer that doctrine calls for the heavy mortar pla­ eration and lessened the chances of both toon always to operate in split sections. senior leaders becoming casualties from a Responds to Article This is not what the manual says. single round or mine. On page 3-1, paragraph one says that Dear Sir: As you can see, doctrine had already the commander employs the mortar pla­ driven TO&E changes that accomplished toon based on his analysiS of the factors of the same results the author was seeking, I'm sending you this message in re­ MEn-T, and that there are three standard lessening the chances that any single vehi­ sponse to an article in your May-June 1996 options: by platoon, section, or squad. This cle kill would render the heavy mortar pla­ issue, "Tactical Employment of the Heavy chapter then goes on to discuss when, and toon combat ineffective by killing irreplace­ Mortar Platoon," by CPT Matt Sebenoler. under what MEn-T conditions, each of the able personnel. CPT Sebenoler reduced I've never written to you before, but be­ three options would be most appropriate, that risk even further by cross-loading key cause of my close, long-term association Employment by split section is the second personnel within his platoon. Rather than with the subject of CPT Sebenoler's article, method discussed. At no place does FM 7- violating doctrine, he was on firm doctrinal I feel I must. You see, I have primary staff 90 state that operation by split section is grounds when making that decision. responsibility for mortar doctrinal issues at the preferred method. Page 3-4 provides a the Infantry School and wrote much of the chart that lists each employment option and The next supposed doctrinal shortcoming existing literature on the tactical employ­ then the advantages and disadvantages of concerned the actions he had to take to ment of mortar units. each. As is the case in all American Army compensate for his battalion commanders In this article, CPT Sebenoler states that doctrine, the leader on the spot is required decision to restrict wheeled vehicle use to to make an informed analysiS of the exist­ the trains area only. That decision was well little of the doctrine that he found in FM 7- 90, Tactical Employment of Mortars, actu­ ing situation and then choose the most ap­ within doctrinal norms, being based as it ally works under combat conditions. Obvi­ propriate course of action, was (I assume) on an evaluation of their ously, I disagree. I'd like to present you and The next supposed doctrinal weakness vulnerability and a desire to maximize the your readers with another side of this argu­ the author presents is that FM 7-90 calls cross-country movement speed of his unit ment. for three of the most important individuals once the ground combat phase of the war began. The author makes several misstatements in the platoon to ride in the same vehicle and misrepresentations of what is (and and that this makes them too vulnerable to However, every decision a commander what isn't) the Infantry School's doctrinal loss from a single kill. Once again, he mis­ makes has consequences and every bene­ position on certain mortar issues. The doc­ states, FM 7-90 simply does not say that. fit has an associated cost. The conse­ trinal manual that CPT Sebenoler had FM 7-90 makes no declaration as to who quence of this decision was to somewhat available to him in the desert was the first rides in which vehicle. The riding setup that reduce the flexibility of the heavy mortar version of FM 7-90, dated 11 June 1985, CPT Sebenoler describes, with the three platoon's command and control structure. We have revised it once since the Gulf FDC personnel riding in the same M577, is The actions the author had to take to com­ War, printing the upgraded version in Octo­ probably the most common in training, but pensate for that reduction seem logical, but ber 1992. it isn't, even by the wildest stretch of the they were certainly not necessitated by any When it was published in 1985, FM 7-90 imagination, demanded by doctrine. doctrinal shortfall within FM 7-90. provided, for the first time, detailed doc­ As he pOints out in his own article, the The next so-called shortcoming involved trinal guidance to the mortar platoon leader, heavy mortar platoon has two identical the platoon leader being forced to stop dis­ as well as to company and battalion com­ FDC sections, each with its own vehicle. placing his platoon by alternate or succes­ manders and the battalion S3s and FSOs We fought hard for several years during the sive bounds and begin to displace as a who had staff responsibility for integrating late 1980s to get the platoon's TO&E complete platoon. He found that, despite mortar fires into the commander's tactical changed to authorize the extra vehicle, his best efforts, the rest of the battalion plan. As part of a three-piece set of up­ driver, and FDC personnel. was driving away from his mortar platoon dated mortar-related manuals which in­ The justification we presented was two­ as each section continually stopped, set cluded FM 23-90, Mortars, and FM 23-91, fold. It was to facilitate split section opera­ up, waited for the other section to complete Mortar Gunnery, FM 7-90 was a timely ad­ tions, and secondly, it was to increase re­ its move, broke down, and moved again. dition to the doctrinal kitbag the Infantry dundancy of the FDC in case of just such a and Armor combined arms team had avail­ catastrophic kill. It was for the same rea­ Contrary to CPT Sebenoler's statement in able to take to the Gulf War. sons that we authorized the platoon ser­ his article, displacement by bounds is not Now, let's address some of CPT Se­ geant's wheeled vehicle. It faCilitated his the doctrinally required technique. In fact, benoler's specific criticisms. First, he states control of a section during split section op- in FM 7-90 on page 3-6, there is a detailed discussion of the factors that affect the commander's choice of displacement tech­ niques. Three displacement techniques are described in the 1985 FM 7-90, the first of Issues in ARMOR which is displacement by platoon. The dis­ cussion of displacement by alternate and ARMOR Issues in has been on-line successive bounds even includes the cau­ now for about four months. If you haven't tionary note that they are slower than dis­ visited us yet, please do, and let us know placement by platoon. what you think. What appears to have happened in the You will find us linked off the Fort Knox situation described by the author is that he home page, off the Fort Knox doctrine and his battalion commander were basing home page, or at the following address: their displacement techniques on two very different views of the existing tactical situ­ http://www.entelechy-inc.com/docs/knoxdoc/ ation. armormag/cover.htm If the mortar platoon leader's evaluation was correct - that the battalion needed

ARMOR - September-October 1996 3 continuous and uninterrupted immediate Javelin Opens Up wrong lessons from the Sheridan, a vehicle mortar support - then the battalion com­ before its time if ever there was one. The mander should have been regulating the Many New Possibilities Armored Gun System has been canceled speed of the unit to remain within the um­ on the eve of jts fielding, perhaps removing brella of that support provided by the Dear Sir: armor from the light forces for a generation. bounding sections. Many opportunities are coming to shape However, if the battalion commander's Major Morningstar's brilliant thinkpiece in the future, however. Javelin will participate evaluation of the existing METT-T condi­ the May-June 1996 ARMOR, "Javelins and in next year's Advanced Warflghtlng Experi­ tions was correct (which appears to have Skirmishers on the Battlefield," should be ment, although it probably will be analyzed been the case), then the mortar platoon required reading for force developers and only In comparison to the last generation was wasting its time bounding and was do­ doctrine writers around the world. This ob­ Dragon it replaces. The U.S. Marine Corps ing nothing but slowing the battalion down. servant young officer, apparently floating has given a high priority to precision weap­ The issue seems to have been resolved around the Atlantic somewhere, has cor­ ons and will conduct trade studies and pro­ in the battalion commander's favor, as they rectly identified the advent of a "new breed totype integration of Javelin on their Ad­ t usually arel The author states that once he of smart weapons (that) are about to fun­ vanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle and to changed the displacement technique and damentally change ground battle systems, replace TOW on the AT versions of the began to travel as a platoon behind the organization, and tactics." On 27 June Light Armor Vehicle. International interest is maneuver companies, all was well. 1996, the Javelin antitank missile system very high, particularly in countries facing a was fielded to the 3d Battalion, 75th Rang­ high tank threat, those needing the low Once again, none of this had anything to ers, marking the world's first deployment of training overhead of fire-and-forget simplic­ do with doctrinal shortcomings within FM 7- precision strike, flre-and-forget technology ity, and those wanting to upgrade current 90. You could perhaps chalk it up to a lack to the individual soldier. In the coming platforms without expensive development of communication between the author and years, AT sections in the U.S. Army, U.S. costs. the battalion commander. Marine Corps, and selected brigades of the The next few years will tell those who If I've come across as being harsh on National Guard will receive a revolutionary see the possibilities will shape the future. CPT Sebenoler, I don't mean to. He capability, comparable to the English long­ sounds like a thoughtful and energetic bow at Crecy. The future is here: there now young officer who successfully met the exists the ability for dismounted soldiers to FRANK HARTLINE challenges that came his way in the Gulf. I kill modern tanks with a man-portable, top­ COL, Armor (Ret.) congratulate him for achieving such a de­ attack weapon at tank ranges, with more Allen, Texas gree of proficiency within his platoon that it accuracy than the tank. could complete preparation for a hip shoot As the author points out, Javelin systems in under two minutes. That's an impressive Javelin Missile May Be Capable, properly employed have the potential to But Is Not a Panacea time, and it shows what a well-trained, well­ strip an advancing formation of Its key tank led heavy mortar platoon is capable of do­ assets, force deployment and delay, and ing. Some of the technology we are now greatly Improve survivability in an NTC or Dear Sir: integrating into the Mortar Fire Control Sys­ Desert Shield scenario. Horizontally Inte­ tem will allow us to shorten into-action grated in an organization conducting a times even more. As a Field Artilleryman, I feel compelled force projection mission, Javelin's mobility to correct a few misconceptions and men­ To sum up, let me say that the American and high stowed kill precision can be a tion a few additional points not covered by Army's approach to tactical doctrine is al­ critical element in protecting an area for fol­ Major James K. Morningstar in »Javelins most unique in the world. Not only are our low-on heavy forces. One could envision a and Skirmishers on the Battlefield" (AR­ leaders authorized to modify the tactics and light cavalry regiment built around precision MOR, May-June 1996). techniques they use at any particular time, weaponry, airborne units that are much basing that decision on their personal more than "speed bumps," airmobile tank Overall, I think Major Morningstar makes evaluation of the existing METT-T condi­ raids, and a thousand other concepts yet to an excellent case for the capabilities of the tions and their commander's intent, but be created. The Chief of Armor has pointed Javelin missile and a rebirth of the skir­ they are required to do sol We select, train, the way: ''to find ways to accommodate the misher concept. Moreover, I agree with his and promote leaders precisely on their change brought on by new weapons, new analysis of the tactical possibilities offered demonstrated ability to make just these technology, new organizations, and new by this system. However, I disagree with sorts of decisions and use just that sort of missions, within existing manpower and his assertion that these tactics are not pos­ initiative. We do not often promote leaders budget constraints ... to gird against defeat sible using existing systems. that demonstrate they are incapable of is not to change." The TOW II missile is far more capable such mental agility and must follow a rigid One hopes that we do not squander this than a SAGGER ever dreamed of being, written doctrine as if it were dogma. technology, repeating our tank development and comparing the two is unjust. TOW lis, All of us would be better served, and experience of 1918-1940. The early signs when fired from ITVs which have been would serve our soldiers better, if we un­ are not good - It being so difficult to properly deployed, sighted, and supported, derstood that unique aspect of our doctrinal change in a period of relative peace, con­ are capable of inflicting the type of damage philosophy. We should all read carefully strained resources, and the "lessons" of that Major Morningstar describes. True, and study our existing tactical doctrine, Desert Storm. The lessons of Waterloo on ITVs are not a "light" system, as Javelin rather than make unsubstantiated claims the superiority of bronze cannon come to skirmishers are, and the TOW II is not a that it is inadequate, based on an incom­ mind. The prototype Force XXI Army Divi­ fire-and-forget system. However, its longer plete understanding of its fundamentals. sion is remarkable by its lack of change range of 3750+ meters, small silhouette, and reduces manpower by removing AT and overhead armor protection do give it units from the organization, although many some capability in this area. ARTHUR A. DURANTE, JR. iterations remain. The Future Scout Vehi­ In addition, Major Momingstar gives the Deputy Chief, Doctrine Division cle, a potential skirmisher if ever there was impression that the Javelin is a stand-alone Combined Arms and Tactics Directorate one, is focused on medium caliber machine weapon and that field artillery is not very U.S. Army Infantry School guns, of all things. The tankers continue to effective against armored targets. Any Ft. Benning, Ga. ignore missiles - perhaps still learning the weapon is only as effective as the sum of 4 ARMOR - September-October 1996 its parts and its integration into the overall tinues to hammer them in conjunction with With digital information transfer in practice scheme of the operation. No one weapon direct fire from Javelin and M1A2-equipped at section and platoon level, our ability, as is capable of winning the battle on its own. skirmishers. The skirmishers, in conjunction an army, to force a murderous OPTEMPO not the M1A2 tank, not the M109A6 howit­ with additional obstacles and continuing on the enemy may be constrained by users zer and. most certainly, not the Javelin mis­ fires from the FA battalions and mortars plugging the pipes with non vital information sile. continue to atlrit the FSE until it is de~ that will slow the decision-making cycle. Fire support, like all the other BOSs, is stroyed. As the Advanced Guard Main Leaders at all levels must do their part in not perfect. and is most effective when it is Body enters the constricting terrain, it can pulling and pushing the correct information correctly integrated and synchronized into look forward to the same treatment, aug­ up and down the digital pipes that feed our the maneuver commander's concept of the mented by attacks from fixed and rotary information-starved forces. operation. Remember, the maneuver com­ wing CAS. mander owns the fire support plan just as t grant that the above actions are easy to JAKE ROSE surely as he owns the maneuver plan and talk about. but are very difficult to achieve. CPT,MI the logistic support plan. Furthermore: However, if we expect to fight and win on - Field Artillery does have a precision the battlefield of the future, we have to im­ guided munition available to attack point prove our ability to integrate and synchro­ National Guard Needs Ml A2s targets - the M712 Copperhead. Although nize all available weapons, and BOSs. To Keep Up with Modernization we will never have as many Copperheads Javelin is a wonderful system. but it cannot win by itself. available as we might wish. and it is not a Dear Sir: fire-and-forget system. it does have the ca­ pability to attack and destroy individual tar­ JEFFREY A. CUSHING In reading everything I can get my hands gets (especially when they are high payoff MAJ, FA, CAARNG on in reference to digitization, I am slapped targets). Brigade FSO. 2nd Brigade 40 ID (M) in the face with the fact that the words The M 109A6 Paladin does not simply "Army National Guard" cannot be found reduce the time threshold for em placing. Too Much Digital Information anywhere. It is true that National Guard ~xecuting a fire mission, and then displac­ magazine printed an article (Mar 96, "Lou­ Ing; It changes those thresholds completely. Could Slow Operations, Not Help isiana Is Ready to Roll on the New M1A2") M109A6-equipped FA battalions do not op­ that suggested my battalion would be the erate from traditional static firing positions. Dear Sir: first Guard unit to receive M1A2s. At the Instead, the Paladin platoon (which con­ article's printing, a lobby effort was under­ sists of four M109A6 howitzers operating in way to convince Congress to include $300 two, two-howitzer pairs and one M577A2 It it great to see the "Issues in ARMOR" forum in place... and even Qetter to see million in the FY97 budget for dedicated command track) moves continually in its procurement of a battalion set of M1A2s for position area and only stops to execute fire that the first issue is one near and dear to me. I was a platoon leader along with Bob the Guard. Due to budget constraints and a missions. Since the M109A6 takes far less desire by the HNSC to present a budget time to emplace/displace. and fire missions Krenzel in Al3-8 Cav for the M1A2 IOTE. I am now a Military Intelligence officer who that they believed would fly they were are received and executed digitally, respon­ already $10-$12 billion over the White siveness and timeliness are vastly in­ still keeps up with new developments in ar­ House proposal - the lobby effort has creased. Additionally, survivability moves mor and maneuver doctrine. dropped to one dedicated company's worth are not necessary as a separate act. One of the key issues that we will see Of. -A2s. (While this is quite disappointing. it The employment of the FA battalions in come up with this new digital technology is might not be a bad thing as it would show the examples Major Morningstar gives, that the dissemination of battlefield informa­ the reserve components how we would while probably true, are misleading and tion and intelligence now has the ability to have to radically alter the way we train.) definitely not in keeping with current U.S. flow higher. lower. and to adjacent units with the push of a button. Imagery from a The FUTURE must include us in the mix. Army maneuver and fire support doctrine. Over and over again, I must repeat former Any FA battalion that fires continually for corps deep-look asset can be digitally sent Chief of Armor General Brown's words that six minutes at its max range deserves to to frontline battalions and soon, even pla­ " ... We cannot do another Desert be acquired and destroyed, especially if an­ toons. Information from the critical battalion Stor~ without the Guard's armor battalions .. : We other battalion was available to reinforce its scout can be viewed by the division com­ mander in near-real time. Information man­ must be able to interface with the active fires but did not because it was out of component if we are to fight alongside. range. agement needs to be practiced and re­ hearsed at all levels to keep only the nec­ While it would seem that a by-product of What should have happened is that as essary intelligence and information flowing. the lobby effort mentioned above is a reali· the Forward Security Element (FSE) en­ Commanders need to carefully develop zation in Congress that 1,079 may not be tered the constricting terrain (as predicted Commander's Critical Information Require­ enough, I argue that some Guard unit. by the S2, who made this area a Targeted ments (CCIR) and staffs need to pick Prior­ somewhere, must start now with the M1A2 Area of Interest or TAl), it came under the ity Intelligence Requirements (PIR). in order to find its sea legs. What is taking observation of the Brigade's Combat Ob­ Friendly Force Information Requirements a daily effort of trial. error, retrial, success, servation/Lasing Teams (COLTs). As the (FFIR). and Essential Elements of Friendly etc., by the EXFOR at Ft. Hood will take FSE reached the trigger point, the COLTs Information (EEFI) that support those even longer for the Guard to realize. While initiate a series of fire missions. Indirect fire CCIRs. These requirements need to be un­ nearly every Guard leader drills more than lands on the FSE and an FA-delivered derstood at least two levels up and three just two days a month. all of those days not FASCAM minefield, which reinforces obsta­ levels down to assure that the vital informa­ In th~ turret do nothing to add to teaching, cles already emplaced by the engineers in tion is pushed up ... and down. Lower eche­ learning. doing, and/or assessing curves. the TAl, is emplaced. These serve to attrit, lon units (battalions) need to understand One day, the M1A2 will be in our armory slow, and disorganize the FSE. As the FSE higher level collection techniques so they motor pools and MATES sites. It is much executes a hasty breach of this obstacle, know what information can be pulled down. better that we start the process now, how- intense indirect fire from bQth FA battalions Staffs need to keep the commander's IVIS (which were positioned so that the TAl was screen updated with what he needs ... not well within their 30,000 meter range) con- cluttered with nice-to-know information. Continued on Page 50 ARMOR - September-October 1996 5 MG Lon E. Maggart Commanding General U.S. Army Armor Center

Building Victory From the Ground Up

All great endeavors have one thing in keep the Armor Force leading change used in overwhelming, violent, and de- common: they were all built from the in the 21st Century. cisive actions on the battlefield. ground up. Without firmly laid founda- In the past, new ideas often were de- Among its most important missions, tions, no accomplishment can stand the test of time. The United States Army is veloped separately from their intended the Armor Center has the requirement users because the gap in experience to unlock and then organize the genius no different. It was built from a well- and knowledge between users and de- of our soldiers and junior leaders into organized plan, led by dedicated lead- ers of uncommon vision, and its great- signers was so great that it could not be something useful for the entire Army. easily bridged. But today’s information For example, the Armor Center re- est strength comes from the ground up technology allows these two to work cently created Integrated Concept — well-trained and highly-motivated soldiers. hand-in-hand. On the digitized battle- Teams (ICTs) to chart out the Future field, the increased access to informa- Combat System (Future Main Battle Our soldiers are the best in the world tion will not be used to concentrate Tank), future scout cavalry system because our Army takes care of them control at the highest levels, but to em- (FSCS), and improvements in tank ar- from the ground up, with tough, realis- power initiative by everyone in the maments and ammunition, as well as tic training, opportunities for advance- force to achieve decentralized execu- upgrades to the Abrams fleet. ment, skill and professional develop- tion. These ICTs pulled together partici- ment, and quality support for them and Passing information —and the ability pants from many different Army or- their families. Make no mistake: Op- eration Desert Storm was not won by to use that information — down to the ganizations and disciplines to ensure lowest levels, will help us win future that the ideas and expertise of all con- high technology or smart weapons. It battles. New combat vehicles, new in- cerned with the future of the mounted was won by tough, smart soldiers, who knew their equipment and fought with formation transfer structures, new or- force were focused in a manner consis- ganizations, and new doctrine cannot tent with today’s realities. It also was a skill and bravery, because they knew be created by bureaucracies isolated way to build the future from the the Army would take care of them. Our soldiers are the bone, the muscle, and from the field. Instead, these things ground up. must be created out of the experiences the lifeblood of our Army, and our and lessons learned by those who actu- We will use these same techniques country — and it will never be any when developing new combat organi- other way. ally use them everyday. That is why zations, new doctrine, new training the Army has invested in Advanced Warfighting Experiments and the EX- packages, and new technologies. All of Building from the ground up also de- FOR. these will ensure that the equipment we scribes how our Army, and specifically give our soldiers of the future will be the Armor Force, must adapt to change. As warfare and technology change, the best in the world. Creativity and in- In the past, the Army was run from the the Army must accommodate these novation are key ingredients to build- “top down.” changes in creative ways that meet the ing the future. Creativity and innova- real needs of a changing world. The tion from the entire force — not just Decisions were made at the top. Armor Force understands this concept from those at the top. It is, therefore, Equipment was designed at the top. Or- because it was born in response to ad- incumbent on all of us to think about ganizations were developed at the top. vances in mechanization, firepower, the future and to offer suggestions on All this has changed now. Our soldiers and communication. As our yellow, how to improve the mounted force. and civilian employees are the best blue, and red insignia suggests, the Ar- quality we have ever had. We must use mor Force was created from the combi- their input — from the ground up — to nation of tanks, infantry, and artillery ON THE WAY!

6 ARMOR — September-October 1996 DRIVER’S SEAT Soldier Utilization: Mission and Men by CSM Ronnie W. Davis, Command Sergeant Major, U.S. Army Armor Center

Since Fiscal Year 1990, we have seen a soldier’s promotion possibilities. sibilities. Accomplish the mission, but a 32 percent drawdown in the Armor Good soldiers must be given the oppor- not at the expense of a soldier’s career. enlisted force, from 26,112 to 17,742. tunity to compete for such prestigious The Armor Enlisted Professional De- As we continue to downsize, the re- awards as the Soldier of the sponsibility of leaders, to our missions Month/Year, Sergeant Morales and velopment Guide provides the com- mander with 12 rules for Armor NCO and our soldiers, will require us to Audie Murphy Clubs, and the Excel- professional development. The first make sure we properly utilize the sol- lence in Armor program (EIA). En- diers under our control. courage soldiers to take varied assign- rule is “Work your soldiers in their Pri- mary MOS.” By keeping this rule in The first leader involved in this area, ments, such as drill sergeant, recruiter, mind, we will properly utilize assigned AC/RC duty, and instructor, just to the unit command sergeant major, must name a few. Commanders must also be soldiers. actively manage enlisted personnel as- aware of the damage they can cause signments within his unit. By thor- The guide also tells the soldier what oughly screening records and being in when they keep soldiers in key, non- he must do to meet minimal standards leadership positions within their organi- of branch qualification in each grade, tune with the needs and missions of the zation. and how to become eligible for the unit, he can place soldiers in the best positions, both for their careers and the next higher grade. The soldier must The master gunner position is a good also play a key role in his own career good of the unit. However, the CSM is example. This is a critical position that development. If he is misassigned, he not alone in this assignment process. must be staffed by soldiers who are must inform the chain of command that Commanders and first sergeants must highly motivated, extremely competent, the present assignment is not advanta- track their personnel by MOS, assign- and show the potential for advance- geous to his career. If he is in an un- ing them to the proper paragraph and ment; in short, a soldier who is a cut authorized or invalid position, he must line number within the unit. All mem- above the rest. But leaving a soldier in take the appropriate steps to be re- bers of the chain of command must in- that position too long, and not giving leased and reassigned to a unit author- form their soldiers about staying on a him the chance to be a platoon ser- ized his MOS and grade. The soldier good career track (See CMF 19 Career geant, will not only stagnate the sol- must pay close attention to Item 35 on Development Model) and its impact on dier, but also hinder his promotion pos- his DA Form 2-1 and the job title on the NCOER. Additionally, the job that he is doing must match CMF 19 CAREER DEVELOPMENT MODEL with the paragraph and line THE CENTER number on the DA Form 2A. RANK PVT PFC SPC/CPL SGT SSG SFC MSG/1SG SGM/CSM The bottom line: the soldier SKILL LEVEL SKILL LEVEL 10 SKILL LEVEL 20 SKILL LEVEL 30 SKILL LEVEL 40 SKILL LEVEL 50 must seek out and excel in hard INSTITUTIONAL LEADER DEVELOPMENT jobs to further his career. INSTITUTIONAL OSUT PLDC BNCOC ANCOC RECOMMEND SERGEANTS TRAINING BATTLE STAFF NCO MAJOR COURSE AND/OR 1SG COURSE Generally, the Armor commu- OPERATIONAL LEADER DEVELOPMENT nity is doing a fine job utilizing DUTY RECRUITER/RETENTION/DRILL SERGEANT/INSTRUCTOR Armor soldiers. As the Army ASSIGNMENT OPS/INTEL SERGEANT MOS 19D LOADER/DVR GUNNER TANK COMMANDER continues to downsize, it is our PLATOON SGT FIRST SERGEANT MOS 19K SCOUT/DVR GUNNER/SQUAD LDR SQUAD/SECTION LDR responsibility as leaders to en- LEADER SELF-DEVELOPMENT sure our soldiers receive the PRIOR TO PLDC PRIOR TO BNCOC PRIOR TO ANCOC PRIOR TO USASMA RECOMMENDED training and leadership positions NCOES RELATED 1. ENGLISH COMP 1. COMMUN SKILLS 1. PRINCIPLES OF MGT 1. RESEARCH TECH (STATS) COURSES 2. BASIC MATH 2. PERSONNEL SUPV 2. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV 2. HUMAN RESOURCE MGT 3. COMPUTER LIT 3. BEHAV SCIENCE 3. INFO MGT SYSTEMS necessary for career advance- 4. STRESS MGT 4. TECHNICAL WRITING ment. We must continue to chal- RECOMMENDED READING STD 10 10 10 10 12 lenge our soldiers, properly util- ACHIEVE ARMY WRITING STANDARD ize them within our units, and SKILL LEVEL 10 SKILL LEVEL 20 SKILL LEVEL 30 SKILL LEVEL 40 SKILL LEVEL 50 give them challenging and diver- RECOMMENDED 1. ANTENNA/EXPED 1. ARMY MAINT SYS 1. MILITARY HISTORY 1. FUNDAMENTAL OF 1. FOUNDATIONS OF CMF RELATED ANTENNAS (ACCP) (ACCP) 2. RECOVERY VEH & OFFENSE (ACCP) LDRSHP IV-V (ACCP) sified assignments. The soldier COURSES 2. PRINC OF AUTO 2. MAINT OF M1 OR CMPNTS (ACCP) 2. TANK & MECH INF 2. LDRSHP & MGT AND ENGINES (ACCP) M3 (ACCP) 3. RECOVERY FUND TASK FORCE (ACCP) 3. PROBLEM SOLVING ACTIVITIES 3. PRINC OF AUTO 3. MAINT MGT (ACCP) AND PROC (ACCP) 3. FOUNDATIONS OF too must be willing to seek hard ELECTRICITY 4. RECORDS MGT 4. NCO ROLE IN LDRSHP I-III (ACCP) 4. EFFECTIVE WRITING 5. LAND NAV (ACCP) LDRSHP I&II (ACCP) 4. ORGANIZATIONAL MGT jobs which hone his skills and 5. APPLY FOR EIA 5. INSTR METHODS 5. INTERNATIONAL REL (MUST MEET STDS) 6. INTERPER COMMUN 6. GROUP DYNAMICS prepare him to fight, if neces- 7. COUNSELING TECH 8. CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL PROBLEMS sary, on any battlefield in the world. Doing these things will RECOMMENDED AA/AS IN: INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDIES, APPLIED MANAGEMENT, CMF RELATED GENERAL STUDIES, AUTOMOTIVE MAINTENANCE ensure a strong and viable Ar- CERTIFICATION OR DEGREE BY 15TH YEAR OF SERVICE mor Force and prepare our sol-

NOTES: * ARMY WRITING STANDARDS ARE OUTLINED IN DA PAM 600-67 FIGURE 8-1 diers for the XXIst Century.

ARMOR — September-October 1996 7 STAWs: New Threat from Above Smart Top Attack Weapons

by Lieutenant Colonel James H. Boschma, U.S. Army (Ret.)

New Smart Top Attack Weapons and the STAWs’ down-looking seekers (STAWs) are rapidly emerging from overcome attempts at camouflage. Be- the research world and entering the bat- cause of the small, portable nature of tlefield, exposing our soldiers to a new many STAW systems, they can be em- threat. We need to develop doctrine, ployed relatively covertly, do not at- tactics, and a training program to tell tract patrolling aircraft, and cannot be our soldiers how they can reduce their easily seen by long range electronic vulnerability to this new family of anti- sensor systems. Thus, STAWs offer tank weapons. Third World nations a 21st century an- The performance of the first-genera- titank system that is possibly more ef- tion STAWs is so impressive ---- and fective than the easily obtained, ex-So- the advances in STAW supporting sen- viet main battle tanks in the antiarmor sor and computational technology so role. rapid ---- that we must act now to de- Recent advances in the development velop a doctrine which addresses this of STAWs have resulted in their field- threat. To delay would virtually ensure ing to (at least) two foreign armies. that American soldiers will face STAW More than 50 non-U.S. STAW systems Development, and Engineering Center systems without the training and are known to be under development. (ARDEC), and the Army Materiel knowledge necessary to operate effec- Additionally, several successful STAW Command, Smart Weapons Manage- tively in the STAW environment. systems, in manufacture by foreign- ment Office (AMC-SWMO). Two Emerging STAWs are highly mobile, owned aerospace and defense firms, weapons were purchased: the British- deployable from a variety of platforms, are ‘‘for sale’’ on the open arms market. manufactured MERLIN millimeter deadly when striking intended targets, One Asian country is in the process of wave-guided 81mm mortar, and the and are in the hands of potential enemy producing a low-cost STAW weapon Swedish STRIX 120mm infrared- forces today. They are almost always specifically developed for world-wide guided mortar. These two weapon sys- fired from extremely long ranges, or sales. One analyst stated that ‘‘...We tems were matched against M60 target from sites which cannot be targeted should expect to see at least 20 STAW tanks to examine their performance with direct-fire weapons. They search systems in the field within the next five against moving and stationary armored for armored targets from an optimum years.’’ So, it is virtually certain that vehicles. A total of nine STAWs were vantage point high above the battle- U.S. and Allied forces will encounter fired under a variety of environmental field, capitalize upon a range of mod- STAW systems on the battlefield. conditions. Of these, five found their intended targets and either damaged or ern seeker types (visible, millimeter In the winter of 1993, a STAW For- wave radar, infrared, acoustic, and la- eign Military Evaluation program was destroyed them. ser) to find targets, and conduct undertaken by the Foreign Intelligence, While both weapon types managed to autonomous maneuver to attack the Science and Technology (FSTC) Labo- hit targets, the infrared 120mm mortar relatively thin top armor surfaces of ratory, the Army Armament Research, was especially effective. Its thermal-en- our vehicles, thus increasing their ef- fectiveness. It is in this environment of a rapidly emerging threat ---- probably more deadly than any of the antitank guided missile systems fielded in the past two decades ---- that triggers this call for an- other look at our doctrine, tactics, and training. STAWs are attractive to Third World nations who do not have the financial resources or political advocacy to pro- cure advanced armored systems. The STAW offers an effective defense against modern armor at a bargain price. Top attack sidesteps the protec- Typical IR signature of tion value of the best modern armor, armor as seen from which is oriented toward defending the the STAW’s vantage. 60-degree frontal arc of the vehicle,

8 ARMOR ---- September-October 1996 hicles. These approaches need to be found, nurtured and then fielded. Be- cause the foreign STAWs are in the process of being fielded, we need to move forward very rapidly in these en- deavors. There must be a renewed level of in- terest in the emerging STAW threat, and rapid development, especially of doctrine and training programs, to re- duce the effects of STAWs on the bat- tlefield. I emphasize the first step (doc- trine, tactics, and training) because these are areas that can be addressed now, versus the materiel development cycle, which usually takes many years to deliver countermeasures. Those of Typical STAW attack scenario. you at the service schools, battle labs, and within TRADOC must become ac- hanced warhead easily penetrated the at an unprecedented pace. The rate of tive players in the early assessment of M60’s topside armor. It then penetrated technological development demands the STAW threat. and exited through the floor of the that we aggressively look forward at tank. Its over-pressure and fragmenta- the emerging threat, and define a doc- The development community needs tion performance inside the tank ap- trine which addresses not only the last to review the progress of foreign peared lethal to the crew, and possibly battle, but both the last and our vision STAWs, and then establish priorities the vehicle. It can be fired from reverse of the next. These words are not meant which will provide our forces with the slope positions up to seven kilometers to downplay the need for conventional best countermeasures technology can from its intended target, and its ability defenses, but rather to emphasize the yield. Do it soon; otherwise, the re- to detect and strike armor was clearly need for serious consideration of quirement may be accentuated in evident during the Eglin tests. emerging threat technology as part of American blood after the next battle. Of major concern is the combination every design, tactic, training, and doc- If we, the soldiers, scientists, and Army of viewing geometry, and sensing spec- trinal development. The STAW is one managers, can agree on the STAW dan- trum (typically IR or MMW) that is threat that we cannot afford to relegate ger, prioritize its importance, and move achieved by STAW weapons. These to the status of ‘‘insignificant.’’ Wishing together to develop doctrine, tactics, two factors serve to negate, or at least it away will not make it go away. training, and technology, our forces can substantially dilute, many years of re- There is much to be done, and delay overcome this new threat. We can then search and lessons learned concerning is not acceptable: delay may well be advance into the new century with the the management of visible signatures measured in American lives. We must knowledge that our front line troops of armored vehicles. Battlefield STAWs develop a fuller understanding of what have all the tools needed for survival require new thinking about vehicle sig- the STAW sees as it looks down upon and effectiveness in combat, and that natures and countermeasures against our forces, and then develop tactics that our combat power is second to none. top attack targeting sensors. we impart to our troops to reduce their The STAW realities require develop- vulnerability. Techniques and proce- ment of a strategy for operations in this dures to reduce STAW vulnerability new top attack environment. U.S. can be developed at low cost, in con- forces have never been subjected to junction with training and testing al- Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) STAW attack, and we have thus con- ready underway. We have the tools to James H. Boschma departed centrated our doctrine and tactics de- collect the information needed, and the expertise to convert observations to a active duty with the U.S. Army velopment, as well as our countermea- in 1988. During his military ca- sure developments, upon threats pre- list of actions that support our war- fighters. TRADOC can then develop reer, he served as a cavalry viously encountered. Our general troop commander with the 3rd thought process has always been to the doctrine, tactics, and training pro- concentrate upon the capabilities the grams needed to impart this knowledge Armored Cavalry, a staff officer enemy has widely deployed today, not to individual soldiers and reduce the on an armored brigade staff, upon those he may display tomorrow. significance of the STAW threat. two combat tours in Vietnam as History is replete with examples of Simultaneously, the Research and De- an aviator, and then ten years military disaster facilitated by such velopment (R&D) community must in weapons R&D assignments. thought, such as the fate of the Israeli continue to advance technologies He is currently the technical di- 2nd Armored Brigade, which fell to which offer STAW countermeasures. rector for BOSCH Aerospace, Egyptian Saggers, or the ‘‘Fokker Countermeasures may range from coat- Inc., a defense research firm in- Scourge’’ of WWI, where German ma- ings to reduce our emitted and reflected volved in weapons testing and chine guns firing though propellers signatures, to decoys which can draw decimated Allied aviation for nearly a the STAW’s fire, to active countermea- the development of unmanned year. Today, the computer age is upon sure technologies which can impair or reconnaissance systems, lo- us, and technology is moving forward kill the STAWs before they hit our ve- cated in Huntsville, Ala.

ARMOR ---- September-October 1996 9 Learning From Their Mistakes: Russia’s Arena Active Protection System

by First Lieutenant Adam Geibel

As a result of the Russian Army’s reminiscent of the BDD ‘Horse Shoe’ existing ones scheduled for rebuilds, is mauling at the hands of the Chechen armor. They provide a 110-degree arc expected to double the tanks’ surviv- rebels — particularly the disastrous as- of protection, centered on the gun tube ability during assaults and reduce sault on Grozny on 31 December 1994, (Russian reactive armor kits weigh the losses from 1.5 to 1.7 times. the Kremlin made a shocking admis- same as an active kit, but only cover a Arena-fitted tanks are not supposed to sion of shortcomings at a televised sci- 35-40 degree arc). The system has 22 create electromagnetic interference entific-technical conference at Kubinka to 26 rounds, depending upon the type on 20 February 1995. of tank, which are mounted so that they while working with other tanks. The manufacturers also claim that the sys- Defense Minister Pavel Grachev ad- provide overlapping ‘fields of fire.’ Un- tem is extremely immune to ECM. like reactive armor, an expended round mitted that unnecessary casualties were will not leave a hole in the defensive Support for the system has also been sustained due to the T-80Y’s vulner- curtain. abilities: short range, flammable fuel addressed by the manufacturer. Subsys- and ammunition stowage, thin upper The silos are armored against splin- tems are modular and can be pulled for fast replacement. Test and control surface armor. ters and bullets to prevent accidental equipment is mounted on a cross-coun- detonation of the rounds. The whole 27 Bitten by their own RPGs, the Rus- V system weighs 1,000-1,100 kg and try capable truck, for forward mainte- sians have developed a defensive coun- nance. termeasure that solves some of the consumes 1 kW of power. Like the T-90, this system may not be technological problems addressed at The description of the system in use fielded in substantial numbers with Kubinka. sounds fairly simple. Prior to entering a Russian forces for some time, due to The Arena Active Protection System, hostile area, the TC turns the system budgetary constraints. developed at the Kolomna-based Engi- on. Arena automatically tracks incom- neering Design Bureau, is designed to ing rounds, ignoring incoming rounds provide protection from antitank gre- until they’re within 50m, then engaging nades and ATGMs, including those anything approaching at speeds of 70- References: with top-attack warheads. Arena is 700 m/s. False targets, such as outgo- “ARENA: Active Protection System For foreseen as useful, both on battlefields ing rounds, near misses, birds, small Tanks,” V. Kashin, Military Parade, May-June where the latest generation of 3-8 km projectiles (like bullets or splinters) 1996, pp. 32-35. ATGMs prevail and during peacekeep- would be ignored. ing operations and LICs, where the When fired, the round detonates the greatest threats are from light antitank weapons. warhead at a stand-off distance of a few meters, so that the double-charge Arena includes three major subassem- ATGM warheads designed to defeat re- blies. Inside the turret, and taking up active armor are rendered impotent. about 30m3, is the target detection and Time to detect and destroy a threat is First Lieutenant Adam Geibel tracking equipment (computer, TC’s .07 sec, with .2 to .4 sec for the system is a tank platoon leader with control panel, command signals con- to reset. The danger zone for accompa- 5/117th Cav, 42d ID, NJARNG. vertor unit). nying infantry is 20-30m. He is also the Assistant Editor of Journal of Military Ordnance The radar itself is fitted to a If necessary, the TC can manually ‘Kladivo’-style folding radar mast, override and fire the system. The num- and a journalism graduate stu- mounted on the centerline at the rear of ber of remaining rounds are displayed dent at Temple University. His the turret roof. The octagonal radar on the TC’s control panel. The rounds last contribution to ARMOR panel assembly is fairly large, approxi- are rectangular and reloadable by the was a chronicle of the Che- mately 1.5m3. crew. chen Revolution (January-Feb- Launchers, which the makers call ‘si- The Arena system, which can be fit- ruary 1995). los,’ are mounted around the turret, ted to new production tanks as well as

10 ARMOR — September-October 1996 Cavalry In Force XXI

by Major General Lon E. Maggart

Photo by Greg Stewart

As the U.S. Army rapidly transforms neity and depth will be based on the the battlespace and facilitate move- itself into the decisive force of the 21st success of cavalry operations. Cavalry ment of the striking force. century, the requirement for specially provides a critical maneuver capability • organized, trained, and equipped cav- to larger forces conducting deep and si- Tactical commanders will require alry forces must be re-evaluated and multaneous attacks. To rapidly defeat accurate, manned, real-time infor- stated. While some suggest that cavalry the enemy, commanders will employ mation that can be gained in all forces are no longer needed in an era cavalry to set favorable conditions for weather, terrain, and varying de- of electronic sensors and battlefield in- maneuver by gathering information and grees of enemy threat to supple- formation technologies, our Force XXI shaping the battle space. In this con- ment and verify information gained developmental efforts to date indicate text, maneuver is used to attack the en- by other sources. the opposite — a dedicated, specialized emy’s vulnerabilities, such as flanks, • Tactical units will be required to cavalry force, enabled by new systems, rear, lines of communication, logistics, fight for information and expand is paramount to fighting and operating and combat support capabilities. Tacti- the battlespace in space, time, and within this new strategic environment. cal commanders in the future will need purpose without the expenditure of This article lays the foundation for the an unprecedented, high degree of situ- combat power from the decisive continued evolution of cavalry as the ational awareness to protect their forces force. “eyes and ears” of the combined arms and successfully maneuver. This aware- team. ness is acquired by reducing uncertain- ties on the battlefield through aggres- Future Battlefield Requirements sive security and reconnaissance opera- Success in Force XXl operations will A Fundamental Role tions by digitally equipped cavalry units. require unique capabilities which only cavalry units possess and can employ As a start point, the role of cavalry for the decisive force commander. With needs to be restated, given the new op- digital systems, cavalry units will pro- erational conditions within which we Information Age Warfare: vide information with unprecedented will fight in the 21st century. We be- Key Assumptions levels of timeliness, accuracy, and re- lieve that the importance of cavalry op- dundancy. Cavalry’s ability to provide erations to provide security and con- The Armor Center, in concert with confirmation for other information sen- duct reconnaissance in Force XXI will our TRADOC partners and the Experi- sors, as well as to provide security for dramatically increase. Cavalry is mental Force (EXFOR), have per- the decisive force, allows cavalry uniquely capable of providing the deci- formed extensive work to define future forces to fulfill vital battlefield require- sive force commander the assured operating conditions and concepts for ments for the commander. means to gain information, secure the Force XXI and beyond. From this ef- force, and control battlefield tempo fort, key assumptions relevant to the Provide Time and Space to Regu- necessary to concentrate overwhelming role of Cavalry in Force XXI have late Tempo. Tactical commanders will combat power against the enemy at de- emerged that shape our thinking: think and plan in terms of battlespace. cisive times and places. Cavalry units will operate to continu- • Reconnaissance and security tasks ally expand the battlespace, which in As an enabling capability of the require specialized organizations, turn provides more time and space for Army’s new capstone doctrine on in- equipment, and training. the commander to assess the situation, formation operations (FM 100-6), cav- determine courses of action, and take alry forces will be tasked to signifi- • Battlefield information collection and force protection are assured ca- action. Security operations will delay cantly enhance the decisive force com- enemy movements and deny or deceive mander’s ability to set conditions for pabilities that tactical commanders must possess organic to their force. force information to the enemy, ensur- success. ing reaction time for any necessary fol- The ability for the combined arms • Tactical commanders require inde- low-up actions. Further, cavalry pos- force of Force XXI to achieve simulta- pendent maneuver forces to shape sesses the lethality to destroy enemy ARMOR — September-October 1996 11 reconnaissance and security elements, and security of lines of communica- cavalry units will be capable of physi- which is essential to setting the condi- tions between widely dispersed units. cally guarding friendly forces from en- tions to gain information dominance Enabling the decisive force to execute emy contact, as well as providing the prior to engaging the enemy. continuous movement will require se- real-time information needed to effec- Obtain Current Information. In the curity and support of highly mobile tively employ passive security meas- cavalry forces. future, tactical commanders will have a ures to further protect the force. wide variety of digital information as- Support Area Operations. The fluid sets available. However, the ability to nature of future combat also increases Gain Information Dominance. use these systems may decrease on the criticality of locating and securing Gaining and denying information has contact with the enemy. As a result, the support areas. This requires allocating been, and remains, cavalry’s core capa- force commander relies primarily on assets to establish and retain their use. bility. Cavalry forces are capable of his cavalry to provide him the informa- Future adversaries may also be capable employing active measures to gain in- tion that he needs to fight current en- of attacking throughout the depth of the formation in all weather, terrain, and gagements. Information gathering can battlefield. Thus, support areas and our varying threat conditions. Whether then be focused on collecting informa- decisive force may be engaged simulta- through raids or active security meas- tion the commander will need in sub- neously. While other capabilities exist ures, cavalry can seek out and destroy sequent actions, or in other physical ar- to secure these areas, the versatile na- the enemy’s capability to gain informa- eas of the battlefield. Technical and ture of cavalry units makes them suit- tion. Cavalry is a dedicated force that procedural connectivity between cav- able to perform critical reconnaissance augments, supplements, and verifies in- alry forces and other units employing and security tasks of support areas formation collected throughout the in- joint and Army reconnaissance, surveil- when required. These tasks may in- formation build-up period. It provides lance, and target acquisition systems is clude several of the base reconnais- large-scale human intelligence that can imperative to the effective integration sance missions (route, area, or zone), only be gained through close contact of all information functions supporting area damage control, restoring com- with the enemy — validating the pre- the commander. Thus, cavalry collects, mand and control, guiding movement dictive analysis of threat intentions and confirms, and interprets real-time bat- of forces, and combat escort. capabilities. The performance of force- tlefield information, wholly dedicated oriented reconnaissance will enable the to the tactical commander’s needs, and decisive force commander to focus his fills gaps left by other intelligence as- Cavalry and Force XXI: cavalry on finding and staying with sets. Patterns of Operations specific enemy forces, wherever they may maneuver on the battlefield. The Preserve Combat Power. Sustaining The Force XXI operational concept cavalry force performing force-oriented and preserving the combat power of a centers around six patterns of operation reconnaissance will provide the up- smaller force will be critical to winning that provide a conceptual framework dated information needed to set condi- in the future. Cavalry units possess suf- that enable us to think about and de- tions and conduct decisive attacks upon ficient combat power to serve in an velop future warfighting capabilities. the enemy from positions in depth. The economy-of-force role. Cavalry units, We firmly believe that cavalry forces dynamic and fluid nature of this type of when performing security operations are fully suited to perform tasks and operation will rely minimally on ter- (screen, guard, cover), protect the deci- functions within all of these patterns. A rain-oriented control measures and sive force from prematurely engaging brief description of the versatile nature maximize the use of situational aware- the enemy, thus preserving combat of cavalry follows. ness gained by digitization of the cav- power and retaining freedom of ma- alry force. neuver. Furthermore, cavalry units ex- Project the Force. Cavalry is ponentially increase the effectiveness uniquely organized as a self-contained, Additionally, cavalry performs terrain of their parent organizations. For exam- combined arms force suitable for early reconnaissance and verifies mobility ple, in many instances, a divisional entry into a theater of operation to ex- data bases prior to the commitment of cavalry squadron is the equivalent of pand lodgments, and set the stage for the decisive force. This allows the another maneuver brigade to the divi- ease of entry of the decisive force. commander to fill in the gaps in terrain sion commander because it frees a bri- Cavalry can also conduct combat op- data and to identify environmental gade for use in other places, or relieves erations directly from the port of debar- changes due to natural and man-made it of duties it would otherwise have to kation upon arrival, also setting favor- factors over time. perform. able conditions for the arrival and em- ployment of decisive forces. Shape the Battlespace. The cavalry Facilitate Movement. We posit the force will be operating to shape the future battlefield to possess non-linear Protect the Force. Cavalry will per- commander’s battlespace in order to set or non-contiguous relationships among form critical force protection activities the conditions for decisive operations. friendly and enemy forces. This condi- for the decisive force. The performance Cavalry can perform a multitude of tion places a premium on the ability to of security and reconnaissance mis- tasks to alter the tempo and disposi- command and control unit movements. sions will be essential in providing tions of the enemy, such as forcing the Operating within such a fluid environ- early warning of enemy dispositions, enemy to expend resources by having ment will demand rapid establishment capabilities, and activities. Moreover, to cope with multiple threats simultane-

12 ARMOR — September-October 1996 “Clearly, for Cavalry to fulfill the roles and missions described in this operational concept will require change through modernization of current organizations and equipment.” ously. Cavalry can identify the enemy’s broad precepts that guide our future or- ditions desired by the decisive force capabilities and intentions in real-time ganizational and materiel develop- commander. These characteristics are by observing enemy reactions to ments. some of the design principles for guid- friendly contact. Only an armed ma- ing the development of cavalry units Cavalry or reconnaissance forces neuver unit can delay a force and make must be organic to all major warfight- for the future. it show intent. Cavalry will operate to deceive the enemy as to the decisive ing echelons, from battalion to corps Conclusion force’s intentions. — and must be organized as combined arms teams. Cavalry units exponen- While much work remains to be per- Decisive Operations. Cavalry’s main tially increase the effectiveness of their formed, it is clear that cavalry is an es- function is to support the maneuver of parent organization. sential warfighting capability for Force the decisive force. It accomplishes this XXI. New operational conditions by controlling the tempo of operations Further, they must maneuver faster caused by non-contiguous operations, — by destroying enemy information or than the decisive force they support. new warfighting doctrine, new techni- This mobility differential is gained by cal capabilities, and diverse threats in- security forces and allowing the deci- the synergistic effects of air and ground crease the value of cavalry. The sol- sive force to attack the enemy unhin- dered. Cavalry is uniquely capable of cavalry units working together. diers and leaders of cavalry units will performing real-time battle damage as- operate in the face of the enemy to Future cavalry units must also have gain information, shape the battlespace, sessment that allows the decisive force greater operational endurance than the commander to re-orient combat power secure friendly forces, and set condi- decisive force. Organized as self-con- tions for decisive maneuver throughout to finish the fight or exploit battlefield tained units possessing organic combat opportunities. Cavalry must also locate the depth of the battlefield. Armed with support and logistics, cavalry units the best equipment in the world, and maintain contact with the enemy; must be capable of operating for 72 to trained to fight, and led by aggressive, as the decisive force attacks in depth 96 hours without external support. simultaneously, enemy forces will relo- competent leaders, cavalry will con- cate to meet friendly forces. Cavalry Lastly, cavalry units must be capable tinue its long tradition of leading provides the commander with real-time of performing multiple missions in a si- America’s Army into battle well into information on changing enemy dispo- multaneous fashion in order to set con- the 21st Century. sitions. Cavalry can also secure critical friendly assets, such as logistical units, command and control nodes, and intel- ligence facilities. Additionally, cavalry can operate independently of the deci- sive force to perform economy-of-force Fort Knox Cavalry Branch Will Host operations that allow the commander to Reconnaissance Symposium in October allocate more relative combat power at critical and decisive points. Fort Knox Directorate of Training and Doctrine Development (Cavalry Sustain and Transition to Future Branch) is hosting a Reconnaissance Symposium from 28-31 October 1996. Operations. Cavalry provides security The focus of the symposium is on the planning and execution of reconnais- so the decisive force can transition be- sance operations at the tactical level. The purpose of the symposium is to tween missions and reorganize for fu- assemble all organizations in one location and discuss issues pertinent to ture operations unhindered by enemy reconnaissance operations and to provide recommendations in accordance forces. It can survey and secure lines of to those issues. The tentative schedule is as follows: communications and sustainment areas Day One - In Processing (Gaffey Hall) and No Host Social (Brick Mess) while the decisive force conducts re- supply. During post-conflict operations, Day Two - Large Group Seminar (Gaffey Hall) cavalry units are ideally suited to per- form activities such as separating Day Three - Small Group Discussion (Boudinot Hall) forces and controlling buffer zones im- mediately upon cessation of hostilities. Day Four - Small Group Presentations (Gaffey Hall) All TRADOC installations will be invited to participate as well as repre- Organizing the Cavalry Force sentatives from active duty and reserve component divisions and regiments. Fort Knox needs participation from outstanding professionals from the field For Force XXI and various organizations in order to have a successful and productive sym- posium. Clearly, for Cavalry to fulfill the roles and missions described in this opera- Information regarding the symposium can be obtained on the internet via tional concept will require change the Cavalry Branch Web site at http://www.awwg.org/~dave/cavdiv.htm. The through modernization of current or- Fort Knox point of contact is CPT Vic Harris, DSN 464-3154/5576 or com- ganizations and equipment. To support mercial (502) 624-3154/5576. PROFS: [email protected]. our efforts, we have established some

ARMOR — September-October 1996 13 The Indian Wars Staff Ride by Lieutenant Colonel Edwin L. Kennedy, Jr.

The name “Custer” usually brings to mind a variety of images, ranging from the brave commander surrounded on a hill in southern Montana, fighting off hordes of Indians, to an egotistical mar- tinet leading his troops to disaster. Many people view Custer on the basis Students ride horses during parts of the three-day staff ride. of Hollywood impressions. Unfortu- nately, this narrow perspective of the entire Indian Wars experience, and that tion necessary with numerous agencies 1866-1890. These are just a few of the of the U.S. Army in the West, is based and individuals to gain access to the reasons for conducting the staff ride. upon the Little Bighorn battle fought lands over which the school conducts The Indians Wars staff ride is nor- on 25 June 1876. the staff ride. Unlike some of its Civil War counterpart rides, the Indian Wars mally conducted over a three-day pe- There is much more to the Plains In- riod. It begins in Wyoming, along the dians Wars than the short battle that staff ride covers an area encompassing old Bozeman Trail which runs from took place over the span of a couple of a couple of hundred square miles. Whereas the Civil War staff rides are Wyoming into Montana. The Bozeman hours on the Little Bighorn at Last Trail was developed during the Civil Stand Hill. Numerous parallels exist in normally conducted on one major na- War, and by 1865, there were enough tional or state park and adjoining land the small, regular Army of the Indian settlers and miners using the trail to Wars period to the “downsized” Army accessible to the public, the Indian Wars staff ride covers locations that in- warrant Army protection, even though of today as it searches for new roles in the trail cut through designated Indian a post-Cold War environment. This clude private and corporate lands, as hunting lands confirmed by treaty. Fort makes the staff ride not only interest- well as state and national parks. The amount of coordination involved re- Phil Kearny was one of three forts built ing, but applicable in a number of re- along the Bozeman Trail to protect set- spects to situations currently facing the quires good relations between the land- tlers and miners attempting to shortcut Army. owners and the staff ride committee in order to maintain access. the route to the western Montana gold The Combat Studies Institute of the fields. The purpose of the staff ride is not to U.S. Army’s Command and General During the immediate post-Civil War Staff College frequently conducts staff conduct battlefield tours, but to link period, the large number of settlers rides to Wyoming and Montana to put “...a historical event, systematic pre- liminary study, and actual terrain to moving westward increasingly clashed Custer and tactical actions at the Little with the Indians. The U.S. Army was produce battle analysis in three dimen- Bighorn into their proper context. 1 caught in a dilemma of enforcing treaty Originally developed by Dr. Glenn sions.” In this regard, staff ride partici- pants are prepared for the exercise by land provisions granted to the Indians Robertson and the Staff Ride Commit- and protecting the settlers who often tee, the Indian Wars staff ride covers self study, classes, and briefings. violated the treaty provisions. several significant events leading to the Little Bighorn battle. Additionally, Dr. The overall importance of the exer- Complicating the situation was the is- Jerold Brown of the Combat Studies cise is the integration of the lessons sue of the Indians, who also violated Institute teaches the elective, “Irregular learned to current doctrine and opera- the treaty land provisions to hunt or Warfare” which uses the Indian Wars tions. Significantly, there are many les- raid outside artificial geographic staff ride as the basis of study. Dr. sons involving the human dimensions boundaries they did not always recog- Brown has conducted about 20 Indian of war and the dynamics of battle nize. Additionally, the Indians were not Wars staff rides. which are timeless and can relate to a monolithic entity with a centralized conflicts today. In today’s strategic situ- government. Even different clans In terms of complexity, the Indian ation, reduced force structure and non- within tribes did not feel compelled to Wars staff ride has been one of the conventional missions pose issues that obey treaties signed by fellow chiefs. most difficult to develop, due to the are analogous to those the U.S. Army This fact continuously caused conster- time-distance factors and the coordina- faced on the western frontier from nation and confusion with Army com- 14 ARMOR — September-October 1996 manders, who were used to fighting a by the U.S. Army, especially battles further north to establish Fort C.F. conventional enemy with defined lines such as the Little Bighorn. Most impor- Smith. of authority and chains of command. tant is an understanding of the individ- The importance of Fort Phil Kearny ual battles taken in respect to the entire This was the situation brevet Major conflict in an operational and strategic is evident in the events that occurred General and regular Army Lieutenant along the Bozeman Trail in 1866 and Colonel George A. Custer and his context, not in isolation. 1867. The staff ride uses these events newly formed 7th Cavalry found them- to put into context further study of the selves in. Over a period of ten years, Staff Ride Day 1 Plains Indian conflicts for the next ten from 1866-76, the 7th Cavalry was 21 December 1866/2 August 1867 years, leading to the battle at the Little spread across the United States and In- Bighorn. The significant actions which dian territories trying to perform a vari- took place in conjunction with Fort ety of missions, to include occupation The first stop on the staff ride is Fort Phil Kearny include the Fetterman duty in the South, as well as garrison Phil Kearny, now a state park. In 1866, “Massacre” on 21 December 1866 and Colonel Henry Carrington and the 18th duties in the West. Within a short three- Infantry Regiment were ordered to gar- the Wagon Box Fight which took place day period, the staff ride draws to- on 2 August 1867. The first was a dis- gether the issues facing the Army in its rison posts along the Bozeman Trail, aster for the Army and the second a running northwest from central Wyo- 2 conflict with the Plains Indians, show- ming along the base of the Bighorn victory. ing how it adapted from conventional warfare to fighting irregular warfare Mountains into Montana. During the After studying the establishment of summer of 1866, Carrington moved his the fort and its activities during the lat- with varying results. regiment into Indian territory and built ter part of 1866, the staff ride partici- Beginning with the post-Civil War three posts running in a string north pants move to a point along the Boze- from Fort Laramie to a point west of man Trail about three miles north of Army of 1866, the staff ride concen- present day Billings, Montana. the fort. It was here that Captain James trates on the background and events which eventually led to the destruction Fort Reno (no relation to Major Mar- Fetterman and his 80-man command, consisting primarily of elements of of five companies of the Seventh Cav- cus Reno, 7th Cavalry) was garrisoned Companies A, C, and H, 18th Infantry, alry under Custer’s command ten years with companies of the 18th Infantry, later. Critical to the analysis of what while the balance of the regiment and Company C, 2nd Cavalry, were an- happened to Custer is the historical nihilated by a force of about 1,200 moved on to establish Fort Phil Kearny Cheyenne and Sioux Indians gathered context of the campaign of 1876. Un- just south of present day Sheridan, by Chief Red Cloud.2 derstanding the cause and effect rela- Wyoming. Carrington chose Fort Phil tionships is key to proper critical analy- Kearny for his regimental headquarters Some of the issues examined include sis of the conduct of the Indian Wars and sent another couple of companies troop training, leadership, the effects of ARMOR — September-October 1996 15 The contrast between the two engage- three major columns would converge ments is an outstanding lesson in how somewhere in the area between their technology, organization, and the tacti- garrisons in the Unceded Territories to cal situation can radically alter battle- cause the Indians to face one of the field outcomes in a very short period of largest Army forces fielded on the time. Both units were severely outnum- western plains to that date. The desired bered. The Fetterman fight was charac- result would be the defeat of the hostile terized, however, by an ad hoc unit tribes and their return to the reserva- caught in the open with out-of-date tions. The overwhelming Army forces weapons, and destroyed in detail. Pow- would assure compliance. ell’s fight was characterized by a rela- tively cohesive unit, armed with The Rosebud battle offers excellent lessons on synchronization, command breech-loading weapons and fighting and control, reconnaissance, intelli- from a protected defensive position. gence, and security. The battlefield ride The visit to the Wagon Box Fight site covers about 5.5 to 6 miles of the ter- concludes the field portion of the first rain and begins and ends near General day of the staff ride. During dinner, the Crook’s first CP. Crook’s column con- staff riders normally conduct prepara- tions for the next day. This includes briefings and discussions to transition the group to the 1876 campaign. The briefings cover the intervening years between 1866 and 1876 and the con- cept of the campaign plan envisioned by General Philip H. Sheridan. The second day of the staff ride is The Fetterman Monument, near Fort Phil conducted in Montana, at the Rosebud Kearny, Wyoming. battlefield. This battle, which took place a week prior to the Little Big- technology, the effects of terrain, the horn, is put into its proper perspective Indians and their tactics, and the prob- by describing the forces involved, the lems with the tactical deployment of command and control structure, and the the force under Fetterman. Under- concept of the operations from General standing these factors helps understand George Crook’s view. Because the why Fetterman’s force was wiped out. Rosebud battlefield is fairly compact The staff riders then transition to the and relatively accessible, units conduct- survivors of the disaster and their ac- ing the staff ride may elect to be tions seven months later. mounted on horseback. Local cavalry The staff riders move to the location reenactors lease horses equipped with of the “Pinery,” where trees were har- McClellan saddles, which give an vested for use at the fort. Only a couple added air of authenticity to what was of miles west of the Fetterman engage- largely a cavalry and mounted infantry ment site, and situated on the lower battle. slopes of the Bighorn Mountains, the Units under the command of General Pinery was the site of an engagement Crook, the renowned Indian fighter, immortalized on one of the “Army in moved as one of three columns ordered Retired Major Rod Cooley, dressed as a Action” series prints commonly seen in by Sheridan to converge on the Indians 1876-era bugler, adds authenticity to the many barracks. In this action, Captain in the Unceded Territories in order to Rosebud Battlefield visit. He is a member James Powell, with many of the same force them back onto the reservations of the U.S. Horse Cavalry Association. soldiers remaining at Fort Phil Kearny in accordance with treaty provisions. after the Fetterman engagement, de- Crook’s column was the southernmost, feated a greatly superior force of Indians. sisted of companies of the 2nd and 3rd originating from Fort Fetterman in the Cavalry and 4th and 9th Infantry Regi- During the interim between the Fet- spring of 1876. Two other columns, ments.4 In terms of the number of par- terman engagement and the Wagon one under Colonel John Gibbon in the ticipants, this battle was not very sig- Box Fight, the 18th Infantry units at northwest, and one under General Al- nificant. For those veterans of the Civil Fort Phil Kearny were reflagged and fred H. Terry, in the east, were to oper- War, the battle would have been classi- rearmed.3 Now the 27th Infantry, Pow- ate in cooperation with each other in fied as a minor engagement. To put it ell commanded a company armed with order to corner and subdue the hostile into perspective, the battlefield covers newly issued Allin conversion, breech- tribes. approximately the same area as the bat- loading rifles. Unlike Fetterman’s in- Custer and the 7th Cavalry were the tle of Chickamauga. But at Chicka- fantrymen, who were fighting with major subordinate combat component mauga, each side fielded more than muzzleloading Civil War leftovers, of General Terry’s column, and there- 60,000 men each. At the battle at the Powell’s soldiers were armed with ri- fore only one portion of a number of Rosebud, each side numbered only fles converted to fire metallic car- units participating in the campaign. about 1,000 men and lasted only about tridges. Under Sheridan’s proposed concept, the six hours, as opposed to several days. 16 ARMOR — September-October 1996 The battle, which took place on June and the fields of fire are as they were ing the battle, is a relevant point of de- 17, 1876, progressed in a northerly di- at the time the battle occurred. Even so, parture for all following discussions. rection uphill from the Rosebud valley it is almost incomprehensible that the Ironically, the ride on the third day fol- where Crook’s command had halted for soldiers in Crook’s column expended lows the timeline of the 7th Cavalry a rest. Surprised in a position which about 25,000 rounds and killed only fairly closely as the routes converge on could best be described as an adminis- about 36 warriors.5 Naturally, these Davis Creek, thereby allowing for con- trative halt, Crook had to deploy numbers indicate that marksmanship, sideration of visibility due to sunlight. quickly and attempt to regain the initia- or lack thereof, was a consideration The ride participants then follow the tive. The infantry began to fight dis- which still impacts soldiers’ training to- route parallel to Davis Creek to the mounted under their commander, Ma- day. jor Alexander Chambers, having been west out of the Rosebud valley, moving mounted on mules the day before in or- The second day’s staff ride is con- towards the “Divide.” The second halt cluded with a brief integration period. occurs at the early morning rest stop der to increase their mobility. The cav- Riding or walking all day in a warm astride Davis Creek, where Custer then alry was ordered to resaddle, form, and take the high ground. sun helps the staff riders appreciate rode to the observation point on top of how the weather and physical exertion a high hill known as the “Crow’s Terrain played an important role in may have affected the participants of Nest.” Custer’s initial plan, his past ex- the disposition of forces, and as Crook’s the battle, who were clothed in wool periences combating the Indians, and elements advanced, they followed the uniforms. Most riders are glad to get his orders from General Terry are top- natural lines of the ridges and hills back to the vehicles for a cold drink ics normally debated. leading out of the valley. By mid- and the drive back to Sheridan to pre- The third halt is atop the Crow’s morning, subordinate elements of the pare for the third day of the ride. command had become separated. Lieu- Nest. This is where the scouts, under Lieutenant Charles Varnum, first tenant Colonel William Royall, Crook’s claimed to have seen the signs of the second-in-command, was separated from Staff Ride Day 3 the main body by a large valley for a camp on the Little Bighorn 15 miles in 24/25 June 1876 the distance. Staff ride participants distance of about a mile as he pursued must dismount and walk up the hill due warriors to the northwest. In danger of being defeated in detail, Crook at- Day three of the ride begins along the to the steep slope. Custer ascended the tempted to consolidate his forces. route Custer followed the evening be- hill but did not see the Indians’ camp. fore he rode to the Little Bighorn, near Returning to the regimental march col- Misreading the Indian’s intentions, current day Busby, Montana. Using umn, Custer received new information suffering from a lack of tactical infor- four-wheel drive vehicles, the staff ride regarding the Indians, which seemed to mation, and focusing on an Indian vil- follows the approximate route that the irrevocably change his concept for at- lage thought to be in proximity to the 7th Cavalry covered during its move to tacking the village. Key to the changes battlefield, Crook sent part of the cav- the Little Bighorn. The most significant in the initial decision — to wait over- alry to threaten the lodges. Continued part of the entire staff ride takes place night, rest the regiment, and attack in hostile pressure forced the dispatched this last day for a number of reasons, to the morning — was the perception that column to be recalled. Crook hoped include the synthesis of the background the 7th Cavalry had been discovered. that he could envelop the Indians fac- materials presented on the first two Based on the soldiers’ previous experi- ing him at the Rosebud. After several days. ences, and the actions of the Indians hours of tough skirmishing, Crook’s Important to the understanding of the when their camps were discovered, force held the field, the Indians left, Custer’s decisions are analyzed within and the village was not found by events at the battle are the backgrounds the context of the specific situation of the commanders making the deci- Crook’s column. sions and the “doctrine” (if it can be which faced him. Riding over the battlefield on horse- called that) under which the Army op- Custer felt pressured to move quickly back allows the staff riders to get a erated at the time. The analysis of the in order to maintain operational secu- sense of the time-distance factors, the final events in the battle are driven by a rity and establish contact with the In- difficulties in controlling mounted units, number of decision points along the dian village. The regiment was ordered and, for non-riders, a feel of how the line of march from the camp of the 7th to attack, rather than rest, and wait for mounted infantry must have felt after Cavalry on 24 June 1876 to the Little further reconnaissance of the objective. riding mules for the first time over 35 Bighorn. Several times along the route, Custer’s dilemma was whether to allow miles to get to the battlefield the day the group halts where the 7th Cavalry the Indians to follow the pattern nor- prior to the battle. An appreciation for did, and the situation to that point is re- mally established when they felt their the terrain and the effects of cross-com- viewed. Each stop is important due to camps were threatened; that is, disperse partmentalized country on intervisibil- the presentation of new information and run. Failing to hit the Indians in ity is gained by traveling the width and made available to Custer as he pro- their camp would have been tanta- breadth of the battlefield. gressed toward the Little Bighorn. Staff mount to failure since tracking the Finally, students absorb the human di- riders are reminded not to make judg- small bands would have been very dif- ments or assessments, despite their ficult and resource-intensive. mension of battle by traveling along knowing the final outcome of the bat- the steep slopes of the ridgelines, nego- The fourth halt is conducted on the tiating the hills, and viewing the same tle. “Divide,” the geographic division be- areas which the soldiers and Indians The first halt is used to orient the tween the drainage to the Rosebud in would have seen. Unlike many eastern staff riders to the ground and present the east and the Little Bighorn in the battlefields of the Civil War, the Rose- the written order given to Custer by west. It is here that Custer task-organ- bud is in much the same state it was in General Terry on 21 June. The order, ized the regiment into four separate 1876. Very few trees obscure vision, much debated during the years follow- elements. Custer’s experience at the ARMOR — September-October 1996 17 Washita battle in December 1868 pro- traveled by both the animals and men Many of the discussion points are taken vides an excellent background to un- during the previous four days, the lack from Gray’s book, Custer’s Last Cam- derstand why he formed a strong guard of water, and the time since eating their paign, which presents an excellent to accompany the trains and split the last full meal. These factors may have timeline analysis of the actions during regiment into two wings to envelop the impacted on the unit’s performance as the 25th of June. Reno’s orders always Indian camp. it neared the objective. Sleep depriva- bring up interesting arguments as to the tion is also considered in relation to the meaning and intent Custer wished to A discussion of personalities, and the leaders’ performance. convey. part they played in the organization of the force, makes for interesting specu- The sixth stop is made at the site Crossing the Little Bighorn begins the lation. It is just past the “Divide” that known as the “Lone Teepee.” The final phase of the staff ride. From an Captain Frederick Benteen was sent with teepee held the body of a warrior slain observation point on the western side one of the ad hoc battalions to sweep the week before during the fight with of the valley, the staff riders are ori- the adjoining ridgelines on the left flank Crook’s column. Unbeknownst to Cus- ented to the advance by Reno’s battal- and prevent the escape of the Indians ter, the Indians he attacked were largely ion towards the Indian camp. Reno’s to the south, thus saving him from the the very same ones that fought Crook deployment into line, his charge, and fate awaiting the main body. By now to a standstill on the Rosebud. At this subsequent skirmish lines are from a the staff riders have begun to form point in the ride, Custer begins to ap- vantage point which allows the ob- their opinions of whether or not Custer pear to be more harried. He has now server to determine how the action pro- was acting within the parameters of his been awake for over 30 hours and rid- gressed. Reno’s fighting withdrawal, orders, and whether or not his decisions ing hard. This point provides an excel- back over the river and up the bluffs to were logical given the circumstances. lent discussion of a problem which his final defensive positions, can be faces the Army today when considering easily viewed. The ride then follows what is now known as Reno Creek. This creek “continuous operations.” Staff ride par- The final move to the battlefield is ticipants are asked to analyze Custer’s flowed westerly from the “Divide” to actions and determine whether or not made by driving the length of the for- the Little Bighorn and provided a natu- mer Indian camp, now dissected by In- ral feature on which to orient the col- they are logical, given the circum- terstate Highway 90 and a frontage stances. umn. The fifth stop is made at a place road. Because the actions of the sepa- known as the “morass,” a place where The final stop before reaching the rate battalions were occurring concur- the packs and Benteen’s battalion stop battlefield sites is at the Reno Creek rently, this portion of the staff ride enroute to water their horses. Time-dis- fork, where Custer orders Reno’s bat- sometimes becomes more difficult to tance and movement rate considera- talion into the attack. Using the post- comprehend for those unfamiliar with tions are normally discussed, along battle inquiry results, the discussion fo- the details of the actions. The staff ride with human and animal fitness dimen- cuses on whether or not Benteen’s bat- moves to the Reno-Benteen defense sions. Of significance is the distance talion could have joined the main body. site on the far end of the ridgeline to 18 ARMOR — September-October 1996 begin discussions about actions on the soldier accompanying Custer from Notes objective. Reno was joined in his de- Companies C, E, F, I, and L were lost fense by Benteen’s battalion and the to a man. 1Dr. William G. Robertson, “The Staff Ride,” packs in the middle of the afternoon. Center of Military History, United States Army By this time, Reno’s battalion had suf- The final stop is on Last Stand Hill at Washington, D.C., 1987, p. 5. the 7th Cavalry monument. The battle 2“Massacre” is the description that is nor- fered a significant setback, being is normally summarized and everyone chased back up the bluffs by over- mally associated to the fight conducted by Fet- whelming Indian forces. A walk along is allowed to leave with their own terman’s command by historians. The word mental picture of the final minutes of “massacre” however, generally connotes the the perimeter of the defensive site pro- the fight as the soldiers were over- lack of resistance. A number of Indians were vides an excellent understanding of the whelmed in hand-to-hand combat. Gib- killed by Fetterman’s soldiers, indicating that problems facing the surrounded survi- there was an attempt to resist. The number of vors in the seven remaining companies bon’s column’s actions are reviewed and the post-battle affairs on the battle- Indians killed by the members of Fetterman’s of the 7th Cavalry. Much like the field are discussed. Prior to leaving the organization, which included civilians armed Wagon Box Fight, the discussion fo- with modern Henry rifles, will never be known cuses on the ability of the Army units National Park, the most important exactly. However, the pools of blood surround- phase of the staff ride is conducted, the ing the soldier’s position, and Indian accounts to defend from prepared positions, as integration phase. opposed to being caught in the open, combine to indicate that about thirty warriors were probably killed and a number wounded. moving. The integration phase results in the 3 synthesis of all the materials studied John K. Mahon and Romana Danysh, Infan- Concentrating on the actions of the and observed during the entire three try, Part I: Regular Army, Center of Military 6 History, United States Army, Washington, battalion led by Custer, the staff riders days. It provides the unit commander a D.C., 1972, p. 31. The increase in the size of move parallel to Custer’s route north chance to tie all the issues covered into the Regular Army in 1866 included reorganiza- approximately four miles. Poignantly lessons that he desires subordinates to tion of the 19 established regiments. The sec- located along the route of march are take away from the ride. Most notably, ond battalions of the 11th through the 19th In- markers indicating where troopers were the human dimension factors and dy- fantries formed the basis for the new 20th cut down individually, or in small namics of battle offer many examples through 28th Infantry Regiments. As part of groups. A short stop is made at Weir of timeless lessons which are useful for this planned reorganization, the 2nd Battalion, Point, enroute to Last Stand Hill for an study on the modern battlefield. In the 18th Infantry, located at Fort Phil Kearny, was excellent view of the hill, about three era of “military operations other than redesignated as the new 1st Battalion, 27th In- fantry. miles in the distance. Four major war” (MOOTW), many applicable les- 4 events are discussed at Weir Point, the sons can be applied from the frontier Dr. William G. Robertson, Dr. Jerold E. dispatch of Trumpeter Martini to Ben- Army’s conflict with the tribes of the Brown, Major William M. Campsey, and Major Scott R. McMeen, ed., Atlas of the Sioux Wars, teen, Custer’s view of the entire Indian plains. Important lessons are derived in Combat Studies Insitute, USACGSC, Fort camp, Custer’s further division of his the Army’s dealings with the many dif- Leavenworth, Kan., 1993, Maps 4-5. five companies into two battalions, and ferent Indian tribes in a low-intensity 5Douglas C. McChristian, An Army of Marks- the move by Captain Weir out of the warfare setting. While a direct analogy men, The Old Army Press, Ft. Collins, Colo., Reno-Benteen defense to join Custer. to the current situation the Army now 1981, p. 32. faces would be stretching the compari- The staff ride progresses to the next- 6Robertson, pp. 17-18. sons, there are too many similarities to to-last site, Calhoun Hill, to discuss the be overlooked. possible scenario confronting the com- panies of James Calhoun’s and George Leaders who conduct the Indian Wars Yates’ battalions. Enroute to Calhoun staff ride usually come away with a Hill, the staff riders pass through the different appreciation for how the fron- Lieutenant Colonel Edwin L. confluence of Medicine Tail Coulee tier Army was able to deal with situ- Kennedy has served as com- and Deep Coulee. Also located there is ations which were not prescribed in mander, C Company, 1-18 In- Miniconjou Ford, the site at which any formal doctrine. Whether a Custer fantry (Mech), 1st ID; G3 opera- Yates’ provisional battalion was re- fan or not, most participants change tions officer, 3AD; S3, 1-36 In- pulsed and forced back up the their perceptions of what happened on fantry (M2 Bradley), 3AD; a tac- ridgeline. that hot afternoon of 25 June 1876 at tics instructor, CGSC; in the the Little Bighorn. If they do change Tactics/Doctrine Department, From Calhoun Hill to Last Stand Hill, their perceptions, then the staff ride has the fight is pure speculation based on U.S. Army Infantry School; and Trumpeter Martini’s account, Indian accomplished part of its purpose of making them think critically about how as XO, Battlefield Coordination scout Curley’s account, and extensive the 7th Cavalry got to the Little Big- Element, CFC, Korea. He at- archeological findings. Martini was the tended the Israeli Armored last surviving soldier to have contact horn and why five of the twelve com- panies were destroyed. At the end of Corps Commanders Course with Custer, and Curley was the last the three-day staff ride, most partici- surviving Indian scout to speak to Cus- while assigned to the Infantry ter. Marker stones along the ridgeline pants agree that the real Custer prob- School in 1981. He is currently ably lies somewhere between the hero assigned to the Combat Studies from Calhoun Hill to Last Stand Hill and the villian. indicate that the fight was probably dis- Institute as an instructor at the jointed and conducted in a highly mo- CGSC. LTC Kennedy has had bile fashion. A number of theories have NOTE: Indian Wars staff rides may be articles published by ARMOR, been posited, but no one will ever be arranged by contacting the Combat Stud- Army, The Australian Lighthorse sure, nor is it central to the under- ies Institute, USACGSC, Fort Leaven- Association journal SPUR, and standing of the staff ride how the fight worth, Kansas. Telephone DSN 552-3904, Infantry magazines. actually went. What is fact is that every commercial (913) 684-3904.

ARMOR — September-October 1996 19 TASK FORCE BAUM and the HAMMELBURG RAID

Reliving the Incredible Adventure of a Young Captain Ordered to Rescue General Patton’s Son-in-Law Major Abraham Baum, at left, in April 1945, shortly after the ill-fated raid on a German prisoner-of-war camp 40 miles by Richard Whitaker behind enemy lines. Above, Baum with the author in October 1995.

Several years ago, I read with great and proceeded to call the authors and was too late to plan one. It seemed enthusiasm RAID, a book by Richard some of the key participants regarding ironic since the original mission was Baron, Abraham Baum, and Richard a 50th reunion in Hammelburg, Ger- planned in less than 24 hours! Baron Goldhurst. It is a true story about a many. In a later telephone call, MAJ was awarded the Bronze Star for his WWII U.S. Army raid 40-plus miles Abe Baum, the leader of the raid, was efforts during the escape. behind German lines, covering the dis- delighted to hear that he had not been tance from Aschaffenburg to Hammel- forgotten and wished he had been noti- T/SGT Charles O. Graham, who led the antitank platoon, also did not wish burg. This raid was conceived and or- fied earlier so he could have planned to to participate, even if there was a reun- dered by GEN George S. Patton Jr., attend. There were no funds provided then commanding the U.S. 3rd Army. by the military for this purpose. ion. He was awarded five Silver Stars and two Bronze Stars during his Army Although the reason for this raid was MAJ Baum sent me a list of 29 offi- career. LT Nutto, who commanded a concealed from the task force and its cers and men who received the Silver platoon of tanks, also elected not to commander until H-hour, it was an at- Star for this action, and I would guess participate. tempt to liberate some 1,200 U.S. that there were five times as many Army POWs, one of whom was LTC Bronze Stars awarded, in addition to By March 26, 1945, units of Patton’s John Waters, General Patton’s son-in- probably 150-200 Purple Hearts to 3rd Army, in particular the 4th Ar- law. those wounded and killed in action. mored Division, arrived near Schwein- When the raid failed, speculation Baum got three. heim after four days of hard fighting inside Nazi Germany. They paused in about LTC Waters’ relationship to the Baum also was personally awarded the hills overlooking the German-held army commander entered into criti- the Distinguished Service Cross by towns of Aschaffenberg and Schwein- cisms that the operation was ill-timed, GEN Patton himself. His certification poorly planned, undermanned, and reads: “For the brilliant leadership he heim. This was to be the opening scene of Patton’s biggest military blunder. doomed to failure from the beginning. displayed while in command of Task Force Baum. The mission of this task It was not until the operation by force had led them far behind enemy Patton ordered the raid after having “Task Force Baum” had begun, that been ordered to the north by GEN CPT Abraham Baum, leading the raid, lines with only a small force. The dar- Omar Bradley. He knew that his son- ing of this movement threw the enemy learned from MAJ Stiller, GEN Pat- into a panic, believing that all this terri- in-law, LTC John Waters, was being ton’s aide, that LTC Waters was be- held approximately 70 kilometers to lieved to be in the camp and that he tory was being overrun by our troops. the east, in Oflag XIIIB, a prisoner of Communications were disrupted and was GEN Patton’s son-in-law. At this large enemy forces were needlessly war camp for officers overlooking the point, CPT Baum wondered if his mis- old Frankish town of Hammelburg. sion had any chance of success. shifted from more important strong- LTC Waters had been captured by ele- points, facilitating a later drive by an- The task force included 300 men and other combat command of this division ments of GEN Erwin Rommel’s Afrika Korps during the battle for the Kasser- 53 vehicles, including tanks, tank de- through Hanau and to Hernfeld.” ine Pass two years earlier. Military in- stroyers, and halftracks. I spoke with the book’s co-author, telligence had been tracking his intern- I thought that it would be good to MAJ Richard Baron, via telephone, ment and had informed Patton that he commemorate the 50th anniversary of and he informed me that as far as he was in the Hammelburg lager, a few this famous 4th Armored Division raid, knew there would be no reunion, as it miles east of Frankfurt. 20 ARMOR — September-October 1996 This proved to be too tempting for lected his old friend, LTC Harold Co- assigned to the Army’s Officer Candi- GEN Patton, and he immediately is- hen, a battle-hardened veteran com- date School at Fort Benning, Georgia. sued verbal orders for the now-infa- manding the 10th Armored Infantry mous raid, despite the fact that he had Battalion, to lead the raid, and ordered CPT Baum was far from being under- qualified, however. At this point in the been ordered to turn 3rd Army north him to hand-pick his own men. How- war, he had been one of the first to ar- and vacate his former positions to GEN ever, Cohen was to be medically ex- Patch, whose 7th Army was to the cused from the mission. rive at Bastogne. Baum had earned two Bronze and two Silver Stars. south, on Patton’s right. GEN Patton (Apparently, LTC Cohen had a severe claims he received verbal permission The units assigned to accompany him from GEN Omar Bradley prior to or- case of hemorrhoids. He was removed on the mission were C Company of the from the assignment by GEN Patton dering the mission, but in Bradley’s himself who, after personally inspect- 37th Tank Battalion, commanded by book, A Soldier’s Story, he does not re- 2LT William J. Nutto, consisting of 10 member it that way. ing the inflamed area, remarked, “That Sherman tanks, and a platoon of five is some sorry ass!”1) The raid took place in spite of imme- light tanks from D Company, com- manded by 2LT William Weaver. There diate protests by two of Patton’s subor- Cohen then immediately selected his was also a platoon of three self-pro- dinates, MG William M. Hoge, com- own replacement with Abrams’ ap- manding 4th Armored Division, and proval. pelled assault guns, under the com- mand of T/SGT Charles O. Graham. General Manton Eddy, both of whom He was 24-year-old CPT Abraham These were Shermans adapted to carry thought this mission was ill-timed, poorly conceived, and undermanned — “Abe” Baum. At this point, Patton mo- a 105-mm gun that could be used as an ill-timed in that it came following sev- tioned for the young captain to step antitank weapon or as an artillery aside and stated to him, “Listen, Abe, piece. The balance of “Task Force eral days of hard fighting by the same you pull this off and I’ll see to it that Baum, as it later became known, con- group of men who had just been given the orders to liberate the camp. These you get the Congressional Medal of sisted of 27 halftracks carrying Com- Honor!”1 CPT Baum was a tough, pany A of the 10th Armored Infantry, men had crossed the Rhine River on scrappy, hands-on officer from New under the command of CPT Robert March 24th, and had just arrived at the Main River on the 26th after continu- York City with questionable qualifica- Lange, together with a recon platoon of tions to be heading a raid this far be- nine men and three jeeps, and medical ous fighting and going without sleep hind enemy lines. For one thing, he and maintainance personnel with an in- for days. was Jewish, and capture meant uncer- terpretor, PFC Irving Solotoff. Also as- The men selected for the mission tainty when the letter ‘H,’ signifying signed to the column was an additional were from units of the famed 4th Ar- Hebrew, was discovered on a soldier’s jeep carrying MAJ Alexander Stiller, mored Division, Patton’s favorite, one dogtags. He had been a patternmaker one of Patton’s most trusted aides, who of only two divisions in Europe in by trade and, because of this, had been had served with Patton as a tanker in WWII to have been awarded a Presi- assigned to the Army engineers upon WWI. dential Unit Citation by President his enlistment. Army enlistment per- Franklin Roosevelt. The man selected sonnel apparently did not know he was Back in the hills overlooking Schwein- to plan and choose the units sent on the a patternmaker of clothing; he was as- heim, an artillery barrage ended at raid was LTC Creighton Abrams, then signed to the engineers because they 2100 hours, and the platoon selected by thirty years old and in command of thought he was a metal patternmaker. Cohen to lead the breakout through the Combat Command B. LTC Abrams se- This stroke of luck eventually got him main street of town began moving. Af- ARMOR — September-October 1996 21 ter proceeding only 200 yards, they came under fire, and a Panzerfaust (ba- zooka) stopped the lead Sherman in its tracks and blocked the street. CPL Lester Powell drove his jeep forward, entered the burning tank, and drove it out of the way, also rescuing the sur- viving tankers. During this action, he was hit by enemy fire, and when he awakened in a hospital in England, he was told he had been awarded the Sil- ver Star for his bravery and a Purple Heart for his wounds. At 2300, the situation grew worse. Another tank was hit and abandoned, causing further delay. At this point MAJ Stiller joined CPT Baum and LTC John K. Waters, seen at left in 1961 as a LTG, was in the Hammelburg prisoner-of- said, “We’re late.” war camp in March 1945. Captured at Kasserine Pass in North Africa two years earlier, he was the son-in-law of General George S. Patton, Jr., then commanding the U.S. 3rd Baum replied, “I might not be able to Army. Patton’s troops were approaching within 40 miles of the camp when Patton ordered reach Hammelburg before dawn... We CPT Abraham Baum to lead a raid on the camp. need the cover of darkness.” “Is there another way to Hammel- Grünmorsbach, they soon passed weapons so that the tanks could drive burg?” Stiller asked. Baum shook his through Bessenbach, and then Keil- over them, rendering them useless. This head no, and stared at the major, still berg. After reviewing the order of scene was repeated again a short dis- wondering why he was included in the march as the column passed by, Baum tance further along and the Germans mission.1 Abrams and Cohen had been then sped ahead, and after several turns were told to march toward the ap- told the reason, but they had not passed on the narrow, winding road out of proaching American Army in the west. it on to Baum. Both had thought the Keilberg, came to his first objective, mission very risky and foolish. the main road to Hammelburg. Baum’s task force raced through Hain and Rechtenbach, then approached The assignment of MAJ Stiller had It was now 0230 hours. Now on Lohr, the largest town since leaving caused CPT Baum to question who Route 26, Baum had just accomplished a very difficult leadership test. Leading Schweinheim, and also the mid-way was actually in command, and to won- point on the route. Baum decided to der what the aide to a famous general an armored column in daylight is diffi- move Nutto’s Shermans, with their was doing on a combat mission about cult enough; leading one at night in un- familiar territory, over a complicated 75mm guns, to the front of the column to proceed over 40 miles behind enemy in case the city had been warned and lines. The answer to Baum’s question route, is even more challenging. As fortified. This proved a prescient deci- caused him to turn cold. “It’s important they proceeded to their next objective, the town of Laufach, Baum ordered the sion. As the column approached the to General Patton,” said Stiller, who outskirts in the early morning light, explained that LTC Waters was in the tanks to run over several telephone they spotted an overturned heavy truck camp. poles along the highway. He also or- with telephone poles piled around it, dered some lines cut by hand for added “Who’s Colonel Waters?” asked protection. Then one of his men no- blocking the main road ahead. At this Baum. roadblock, another Panzerfaust struck ticed that, in several of the towns along the lead tank and disabled it, but the “He’s Patton’s son-in-law. Didn’t you the route, white sheets were hanging from the windows as a sign that they crew escaped and scrambled to the know that?” rear. A second Sherman then used its had surrendered. At this point, the task main gun and machine guns against the After hearing this, and knowing that force leaders realized that the lines had 300 men were about to risk their lives not been cut soon enough. roadblock, scattering the soldiers man- for one man, he considered pulling the ning it. The Shermans proceeded into plug and aborting the mission. How- As they sped on in the early dawn the roadblock, clearing a path for the ever, after collecting himself, Baum hours outside of Laufach, the road task force and scattering the defenders hoped that the rest of the men would passed by a military parade ground. A after bulldozing the truck aside. After see it as he did, a job to be done. At large contingent of German troops continuing a short distance and scan- this point, he ordered his men to pro- were taking morning exercise. After ning the town with his binoculars, ceed through the town of Schweinheim spraying these troops with a hail of Baum decided to try to bypass the city, without pausing. Thus began one of the machine gun fire, it again became ap- thus avoiding further resistance. After most daring sagas in U.S. military his- parent that the mission was no longer a doing this, he ran head-on into a truck tory. secret and worse yet, their exact posi- convoy coming from the opposite di- tion was now known to the enemy sur- rection and hauling 88mm antiaircraft After clearing the town, the column vivors. They next came upon a detach- guns. With LT Weaver back on point, stretched out over a mile. Baum’s next ment of troops marching along the road he ordered his crew to “let them have task was to find the main east-west who immediately surrendered to the it!” As Weaver swept by in his tank, highway, Route 26. After passing lead tank unit, headed by LT Weaver. “Conquering Hero,” he was shocked to through the small villages of Haibach- They were ordered to throw down their see that the 88s were manned by young 22 ARMOR — September-October 1996 girls. They had been trained for this As Weaver and the duty because all the available men column neared were at the various fronts.1 Gemünden, another juicy target appeared. On March 26th, 1995, as I approach This time it was a the town of Lohr down the scenic road tugboat hauling five which slopes rather steeply into this barges through the “Hansel and Gretel” town, I can envi- locks on the river sion the roadblock and am surprised to Main. After firing find yet another roadblock of a differ- high explosive and in- ent sort. It is a full-blown street fair, cendiary rounds into and it turns out to be a nice treat as the them, the barges ex- old strasse through the village is filled ploded. Continuing with the bright colors of spring and the further, another vital wonderful odor of many locally pro- target appeared along- duced cheeses and smoked meats. It is side the road, the here that I mail my first postcard to huge railroad mar- myself. It will bear the postmark of shalling yards on the Lohr and a 50th Anniversary date of outskirts of Gemün- the day when Task Force Baum was den. Baum ordered all here. The route Baum selected around of his tanks to fire on the town was located just above the this bonus target. town, and was just visible from below. They destroyed two It was in Lohr that General Hans von more trains, unknow- Obstfelder, responsible for all German ingly disrupting the ground forces in the southern region, unloading of the Ger- was summoned from his office by an man 7th Division, who aide who said the Americans were on were trying to get to the upper road. Seeing that they were the front. In addition, bypassing Lohr and heading toward they destroyed several Gemünden, he immediately called for more locomotives and reconnaissance planes to follow the then followed up by column and instructed his troops in ordering a nearby Gemünden to prepare to dynamite a American spotter plane to call in an air pile of dozens of land mines which the bridge to block the route. strike on this valuable target. Germans had just started to bury in the road. After throwing out smoke gre- Approaching Gemünden, Baum again nades, Hofner and his men began toss- As LT Weaver was leaving the Lohr halted to survey the bridge across the area, he began to overtake a German ing the stacked mines off the road and train on his left. The train consisted of river and into town. He sent the recon began firing across the bridge into tar- platoon down the hill to verify that the gets in the town. For this effort, Hofner both freight and passenger cars. Some bridge was intact. As LT Hofner ap- soldiers were waving at him! They earned a Silver Star. proached the old bridge, he spotted a stopped waving as the 75mm guns and As soon as the road was cleared, machine guns of “Conquering Hero” Baum put Nutto’s medium tanks in the began to point toward them. At this lead, and they started across with LT moment, the doors to the boxcars slid Above right, the Roman Hofner’s platoon of infantry. From his back to reveal small antiaircraft guns turret, Nutto heard the fire from the aimed at the tanks. Luck again was on bridge at Gemünden, first Panzerfaust, then another and an- the American side as the road dropped other. There was also 75mm antitank suddenly below the railroad bed. The and the castle where the Ger- fire coming from an old castle over the tanks were now able to fire on the river and above the town. At this point, train, but the reverse was not possible. mans had sited their 75mm an- the lead tank was hit and rolled to a The fire from the task force struck a titank guns. stop just five yards from the bridge, freight car loaded with ammunition, blocking the column. Nutto watched as which blew up, and after firing addi- the stunned platoon leader, LT Ray- tional rounds into the engine, two engi- mond Keil, helped his badly burned neers jumped out, leaving the damaged crew out of the tank. At this point, train to its own demise. panic ensued and the lead tank’s ser- geant broke and ran for the rear, yell- A short while later, a train approach- ing, “I’ve had it, I’ve had it!” ing from Gemünden appeared to have a chance to cross the tracks in front of LT Nutto, who At this point, Baum ran up as Nutto the column and block the task force, commanded heard another “whoomp” from a but another Sherman fired two 75mm Baum’s medium panzerfaust. Looking up he saw it wob- rounds into the engine and derailed the tanks. ble and strike the asphalt in front of train just short of the crossing. them before exploding and showering ARMOR — September-October 1996 23 them with steel fragments and searing Burgsinn, the task force chanced upon phosphorus. He also felt the fragments a staff car containing a high-ranking pierce his body, and then watched as German general, Oriel Lotz. After Baum went down. Baum struggled to forcing him to mount the front of one stand up while bleeding from his right of the lead tanks to quell possible hos- knee and hand. As the two men tile fire, they proceeded through Re- moved back to receive first aid, Baum ineck and then across the narrow but watched as Elmer Sutton, leading the intact Burgsinn bridge. infantry platoon, made it across the The town of Burgsinn is an older bridge with two more men running af- ter him. Suddenly, the Germans blew walled city and, had they been for- the bridge and the two men vanished warned of Baum’s arrival, they could have easily blocked the main gate into forever. town, forcing another costly delay. It is March 26th, 1995. While stand- Even after passing through the main ing above the roadside overlooking gate, the streets are so narrow that any the bridge, which has long since been stalled vehicle would have created ad- rebuilt, it is starting to rain and again I ditional problems and further delay. am reminded of what must have been Upon leaving Burgsinn, there is a going through the minds of the men rather steep incline to negotiate on the who watched as their comrades died. road to Gräfendorf. Somewhere in the The bridge still has the original foun- The narrow city gate of Burgsinn, the only route wooded region between the two vil- dation erected by the Roman army al- through the town, remains much like Baum’s task lages, another unexpected event oc- most 2000 years ago. The bombed-out force found it in 1945. curred. The task force encountered castle also survived and is still stand- several hundred conscripted Russians ing in the mist above the city. ering the tank tracks leading out of the who were working on the construction The town is strangely quiet, with no city, proceeded to catch up with the of an autobahn bridge, guarded by a group of German soldiers. Again, the one in sight on this lazy Sunday after- column, thinking it to be one of their own. They then began broadcasting in captured paratrooper ordered them to noon. Then a policeman drives up to throw down their arms. Upon seeing see why we are stopped here. Reality German, directing the message into the returns, and we press on along Baum’s woods towards some enemy soldiers this, the Russians mobbed Baum’s jeep, shouting, “Amerikanski, Amerikanski.” path. who had outrun the column from Gemünden. The broadcast message The Russians wanted to do something On March 27th, 1945, at 1100 hours, was simple: it would be better to sur- further to help their liberators, and hav- render to the 7th U.S. Army than to the ing armed themselves with the German Baum is also backing out of the town. rifles, they wanted to take the town. He has sent a recon probe to look for Russians, who were coming from the another road out of the village. After east. About 100 of them walked out of Baum approved of this, but on one the woods and began laying down their condition — they were to wait until af- Baum consulted his map, Stiller asked ter the task force had passed through. him if he wanted to go back. weapons. Then one of Baum’s men in- In addition, the Russians wanted the formed the team that the task force was 1 “We don’t quit,” Baum said, adding not part of 7th Army. The propaganda general. Baum again complied. that the enemy had no idea of where team immediately left to find their own On March 27th, 1995, driving out of his unit was heading. troops. the woods, which were spectacular to After turning north on a back road, With Baum leaving in the opposite see, the road again turns steeply down- Baum sent his second message back to direction, the abandoned Germans must hill and offers a splendid view of the 10th Armored: “Two tanks lost, two of- have thought the American rules for town of Gräfendorf. As the main street ficers and eighteen men wounded or fighting a war a bit odd. wound through the town, I was amazed killed. Proceeding.”1 to see how narrow the roadway was, Moving to the north, the column cap- and how easily it could have been A short while later, at a fork in the tured a lone paratrooper who was ab- blocked. About halfway through the road, another tank was lost after throw- sent without leave from his unit and ing a track. At this point, the wounded village, we spotted a cafe and stopped heading for home. After finding out for coffee and cake. Since the owner of were lifted out of the halftracks and that he was originally from Hammel- the cafe was in his late fifties, I asked placed on the side of the road, where burg, Baum and the interpreter, Private they would be found and given medical him if he remembered the panzer raid Solotoff, convinced him to lead them of Task Force Baum. He became ex- aid. They were in no condition to con- to a bridge in Burgsinn. The para- cited, and immediately produced his tinue. trooper proved to be a valuable asset. copy of the RAID, the book by Baron, The unit had moved ahead only a Several times along the route he con- Baum, and Goldhurst. He told me that short distance when a lost American vinced other smaller groups of German he was a small boy, hiding in the base- jeep from the 7th Division, carrying a soldiers to surrender and walk towards ment below where we were standing, combat propaganda team with a loud- the oncoming U.S. Army. The last when the American tanks came rum- speaker, wandered across Baum’s path. group to follow his instructions were bling through. He watched them from The team had seen the smoke from the manning two camouflaged antitank the basement window, and it was a battle in Gemünden and, upon discov- guns. Further along the road to sight he will never forget. Another man 24 ARMOR — September-October 1996 who had been sitting nearby got up to tipping his wings in defiance. As it ears. The situation was now desperate tell me that he had also been a young turned out, the small plane had posi- and the task force was stalled and way man in the town of Burgsinn when the tively identified and counted the re- behind schedule. column passed by, and he recalled maining vehicles — 13 tanks, three as- similar memories. After saying good- sault guns, and 27 halftracks. Mean- After leading the column back up the correct road to Highway 27, and after bye and thanking them for their time, I while and unknown to Baum, General arriving at the intersection to Hammel- then asked them if they would send me Lotz had gotten free of the Russians a postcard from their towns with a and phoned Gräfendorf, passing on the burg, the innkeeper again asked to be excused to return to his wife, and this short story of what they had seen, and information that the Americans had time he was allowed to go home. After they both have complied. (I sent them talked about nothing but Hammelburg. each a 4th Armored shoulder patch and Among those forewarned of the col- seeing the entire column pass by, he re- a thank you card.) umn’s destination was the camp com- alized the consequences he faced if the SS found out about his involvement mandant at Oflag XIIIB, General Von with the Americans. So, after returning Outside, as we were getting into our Goeckel, and other commanders in the car, the cafe owner pointed to some area, including Oberst (Colonel) Cord and aiding in the birth of a new son, he went into the woods, where he re- second floor windows above the shop Van Hoepple, area commander, and mained until the end of the war. next door, and explained that his neigh- General Bernhard Weisenberger at It was raining again as we passed by a covered bus stop in Weickersgrüben, where my friend John Dirks noticed three men standing and smoking, seek- ing shelter from the rain. We wondered if they knew of the raid and Herr Stür- zenberger? The answer was an excited yes! One of the men was among the Russians freed by CPT Baum and his men. He had elected to remain in the area after the war. He said we were only 50 meters from the home of Herr Stürzenberger. A few minutes later, ringing the innkeeper’s doorbell, I felt much the same anticipation as Solotoff At left, the bridge at the village of Gräfen- must have felt. A member of the family dorf , where SS men shot civilians who dis- answered; not Karl, but his grandson, played white flags. Above, the author with who invited us in to meet the family — Frau Stürzenburger, widow of Karl, and Karl’s sons, Herbert and Edgar. After their son Edgar. explaining the reason for my pre- viously unannounced visit, (Abe Baum had told me to look up his friend Karl bors had draped a white sheet over the Schweinfurt, positioned just east of when I passed through), we were im- window sill in order to keep the Ameri- Hammelburg. mediately escorted into the family room where we were given a glass of cans from firing on them. This worked At 1200 hours on March 27th, the fine until some SS troops came through local wine and treated like royalty. the village later and, upon seeing the column had just passed through Michelau and then over another small It was at this point that we learned of white sheets of surrender, proceeded to bridge across the Saale River and north Karl’s passing. We were saddened, but shoot the townspeople who had hung also delighted to meet Klara, his them up! This proved to be a very so- of Weickersgrüben, their next destina- tion. At this point, the guide, who was widow and the mother of Herbert, bering experience, and at this point I unfamiliar with this region, became Edgar, and Walter, the son who was wished I had not eaten such a large born on this day 50 years earlier. Karl piece of cake. useless, and after turning the column up a dead-end road, needed to be re- had died in 1991. The family told me After we crossed yet another tiny placed. Baum’s next move was to send that Walter would be coming later if bridge in the middle of town, the valley his driver, with Solotoff the translator, we wanted to stay and meet him, but narrowed as the road followed the rail- back to Weickersgrüben with instruc- our schedule depended on available road and the river up out of town to- tions to find somebody who could get light for additional photographs, so we ward Weickersgrüben. This was the site them to Hammelburg. After speeding thanked them for their hospitality and, of another crucial incident for Task back into the town, they arrived at an after presenting them with 4th Armored Force Baum. inn. patches, moved on towards Hammel- burg. As the task force left Gräfendorf, a Solotoff found the owner, Karl Stür- single-engine German spotter aircraft zenberger. After telling Solotoff that his Task Force Baum is now in the hills flew up the valley behind them. After wife was due to give birth this very overlooking Hammelburg and at the in- the column had fired several hundred night and he was the only one to help tersection of a road that led south over rounds at the aircraft, unsuccessfully, her, he asked to be excused from acting the Reussenberg hills and toward the the pilot managed to fly out of range, as a guide. This request fell on deaf lager. It was not far from this point that ARMOR — September-October 1996 25 Hauptmann Richard Koehl, leading a company of eight panzerjaegers (tank hunters), had positioned himself. He had been alerted by one of the phone calls that General Lotz had placed after escaping from the Russians. He set up his guns near the railroad station, about 1,000 yards from the road that CPT Baum would have to pass on his way into the camp. He seemed to be in an ideal location for an ambush, but the task force was traveling at high speed when it reached this point, and all the rounds fired by Koehl’s 75mm guns missed their targets. Baum sent T/SGT Graham’s assault guns 500 yards up the hill to fire on Koehl and protect the rear of the col- umn. Unfortunately, this section of the road turned up rather steeply toward a saddle at the top on the ridge, and be- fore all of the column had passed by, they took casualties from Koehl’s anti- tank guns. Slowed by the incline, two more tanks were knocked out and the halftrack carrying CPT Lange was hit. He was seriously wounded. Three of his men placed him on another vehicle and headed up over the ridge to safety. While Koehl was firing on the col- umn, Baum was racing up and down the road in his jeep, trying to get stalled vehicles off the road and trying to restore order. Now Graham’s guns were in position on the ridge and infantry following close behind. With (tank road) and saw an overview of the started to return fire. Capable of firing the final goal in sight, they headed steep winding route the task force took 8-10 rounds per minute, Graham’s guns downhill towards the camp. When they coming up from the base of the moun- scored three knockouts on Koehl’s were about 200 yards from the wire tain. panzerjaegers and also wiped out a fuel fence, the Germans began firing. We returned to our van and pro- and ammunition column of six trucks We were met at the Schloss Hotel ceeded to the first camp buildings that moving toward Koehl. Unfortunately, Saalach by Herr Oberstleutnant (LTC) Baum’s men approached. They are still Baum’s unit had been shot up badly, Taube of the Hammelburg Infantry in use as Infantry School support and losing two mediums and one light tank, Training School, and drove to his of- supply buildings. During the time of five halftracks, and two jeeps. Now out fice. The Infantry Training School was the raid, these buildings were adminis- of range and over the hill’s crest, the celebrating its 100th year in Hammel- trative buildings, located just inside the task force regrouped at the sight of a burg. In Colonel Taube’s office, we had compound fence. large French memorial cross, erected coffee and were introduced to LTC by the French government after WWI Bradford, the U.S. Army liaison officer Baum’s unit responded to the enemy to commemorate the French soldiers fire which commenced about 200 yards assigned to the school; Hans Schnebel, out from the wire fence. Then the tanks who had perished in Hammelburg. the school’s librarian and historian; and Baum now had his first view of Oflag Peter Martin, a history instructor, who broke through the wire. General Von XIIIB. It lay on the reverse slope about Goeckel, the officer in charge, surren- acted as our translator and guide. A dered his entire command to a sur- 1,700 yards away. short time later, we found ourselves at prised POW, Colonel Paul R. Goode. As remaining light was growing the saddle, standing in the road next to the French cross monument where we During the initial melee, LTC Waters, short, Baum left Graham’s assault guns the primary objective of the raid, was and a rifle platoon behind to protect the had our first view into the compound severely wounded by a German soldier, rear and to provide covering fire from from the point at which CPT Baum and his men first saw it. carried back into the compound, and above and into the German positions hidden by a Serbian medical officer. outside the camp. He arranged the re- Standing at the location of Graham’s He later learned that the bullet had maining 11 tanks into a “desert forma- support position near the cross, we missed his lower spine by a fraction of tion” (spread out side by side), with the looked back down the panzerstrasse an inch. During all the confusion that 26 ARMOR — September-October 1996 ficult a task as he had faced up to this point, and it was only with extreme dif- ficulty that he was able to explain to the excited crowd that only a few hun- dred of them could leave with him. At this point, many of the stunned and confused men stood paralyzed in front of him. Slowly they began to move in two directions, most back into the camp from which they had just come, and several hundred onto the tanks and into the halftracks. Among these was LT Baron, who was one of the men searching for a spot on one of the tanks. As it was now dark, Baum thought perhaps this would provide cover for his exit from the compound. He sent LT Nutto out with three tanks and three halftracks to probe the roads for an es- cape route. After Nutto left, Baum reor- ganized the remaining task force with five light tanks in the front, then five halftracks, and the assault guns with the recon jeep and the remaining halftracks in the rear. This was accom- plished just prior to moving to another assembly area to await the results of Nutto’s probes.

Upon finishing the latest order of bat- tle and just prior to moving out, disas- ter struck again. An explosion occurred in the last tank in the column and blew began with the American entrance into only be able to accommodate and res- it up. The tank had been struck by a the compound, MAJ Stiller had been cue 200 or less. Far worse was the fact panzerfaust fired by an infiltrating Ger- running from building to building, that no one seemed to be in charge of man combat engineer who had gotten searching for LTC Waters. When he this unruly bunch! It was like Times close under cover of darkness. found him, he was already in the oper- Square on New Year’s Eve, Baum re- ating room, fighting for his life, and in called later. In the time it took for Baum to reach no shape to travel. After speaking with the new assembly area, the Germans LT Richard Baron, one of the prison- were also moving quickly. The officers him, and verifying his condition, he left ers and a co-author of RAID, came out in search of Baum. and senior enlisted men quickly dis- of the compound and realized that patched soldiers and cadets to the vari- The camp was in pandemonium, with Baum had only a small task force. ous exit roads. They immediately sent prisoners running around everywhere. Since it was not supported by any addi- men to the south, to the small villages They were jumping on all the vehicles tional American forces, they would of “Hundsfeld” and “Bonnland.” and some were kissing Baum’s men. have to fight their way out and back to These small villages had been appro- Others were asking for cigarettes, still the west. Baron had been captured in priated by the German government to not realizing that they were over 40 Alsace-Lorraine while fighting with his be used in house-to-house infantry miles from the American front lines! machine gun platoon, a part of the 45th training. The villages had been vacant Division. While he realized the di- Meanwhile, Baum was making a few of civilians since 1895, but to Nutto discoveries of his own. First, there lemma the task force faced, he decided they looked just like any other sleeping that leaving was still a better option German village. After passing were far more men here than he had than remaining at Hammelburg. planned on rescuing, and he was now “Hundsfeld,” the first small village on severely short of transport vehicles. At about that time, Baum and Goode his right on the route south, he soon Even if his original column had sur- found each other and were discussing spotted a roadblock of felled trees vived the 16 hours of fighting and whose duty it was to inform the men across the road, difficult to bypass in travel it had taken to get there, they that only 200 or so would be able to go the darkness. Shortly after Baum ar- would have still been far short of trans- out with the column. Baum mounted rived to survey the situation, he ordered portation vehicles. There were more the hood of one of the vehicles and be- Nutto back to the intersection in than 1,500 prisoners, and he would gan to shout for quiet. This was as dif- “Hundsfeld” and then out toward the ARMOR — September-October 1996 27 While his men were following Baum’s latest orders, he summoned Moses, Graham, Weaver, and Stiller to a final pre-breakout conference and was informed by Stiller that more of the POWs wanted to return to the lager. About this time, a group gathered around Colonel Goode as he stood on one of the tanks. In short order, he ex- plained that, due to the additional vehi- cle losses, there were still too many of them and they would be a burden to the remaining task force trying to break out and fight their way back to the U.S. The old cobblestone road that Baum’s task force took, looking back toward Hammelburg. lines. After this sober news, about 70 of them elected to return with Colonel Reussenberg Woods, which were above the survivors coming back. He immedi- Goode and left at 0500 hours. This left the small valley they were in. ately sent two tanks about a mile to only a dozen of the original POWs, in- probe the next town of “Hessdorf,” cluding Richard Baron and a few of the By now, the Germans were reacting. which was also situated along the main officers of the 45th that Baum then as- They had spotted Nutto’s change in di- signed to replace the vacant slots rection, and a team of combat engi- road, Highway 27. At this point, he or- dered the remaining former POWs off among his own remaining infantry. neers was sent ahead, to the area and told them to wait with the known as Hill 340, near the Reussen- Colonel Bradford unlocks the gate at berg, to intercept them. As soon as halftracks. In addition, he ordered the the intersection where Baum lead the main column to continue on the route task force up the road to Hill 427. The these engineers began firing on Nutto’s he had just traveled and to wait for fur- unit, Baum heard them and raced to the gate is locked because this is a live fir- trouble spot in his jeep. It was another ther instructions at a road crossing ing day and an artillery training exer- about midway between him and the lat- cise is scheduled to begin in an hour. I roadblock with supporting fire coming est probe. Some of the POWs had con- from the woods above. This forced yet am feeling a bit uneasy now, as I have another change in direction for the sidered returning to the safety of the la- been in this kind of situation early in ger and were discussing this option my Marine Corps training at Camp probe, this time to the west toward the among themselves. main road at “Hollrich.” Pendleton and have heard of the acci- At 0230 hours, as Baum and the two dents that can occur due to short or This route passed Hill 427 on their long rounds. It is also raining, and a right flank and continued about four probe tanks were approaching the town of Hessdorf, he glanced at the odome- cold winter wind is blowing up the miles into town. After passing through ter in his jeep. It revealed that with all hillside towards the Reussenberg the town and with the main highway in of the diversions, he had already trav- Woods. We saw the exact spot where sight, Nutto radioed Baum with the the task force was deployed and the ap- news. He was elated, replying, “We are eled 52 miles since leaving Schwein- heim, and had been without sleep for proximate position of the panzerjagers moving up... We should be there in over 100 hours. Then, suddenly, from waiting hidden about 1,500 yards down twenty minutes.”1 out of the darkness, a panzerfaust took the hillside. About 100 yards away, LT Baron, who was riding on one of out another of his tanks. The surviving there was a burned-out personnel car- the probe tanks, recalls what happened men scrambled up on the remaining rier and additional target vehicles for next. With Nutto back in his tank and tank and headed for the intersection be- the artillery training school. on the main road just out of town, two low the Reussenberg Woods. The panorama of the battlefield from panzerfausts lit up the night, revealing After joining up with the main body the plateau is breathtaking. The scene German tanks, in addition to infantry! once more, Baum decided to retire un- is also quite sobering, and I feel a sud- One of the German rounds slammed til daylight when they would be able to den sense of awareness toward the men into Nutto’s tank and knocked him force their way out across country and of Task Force Baum. semiconscious. Then the second tank around any roadblocks. It would be fu- It is almost as if I have stepped back was also hit. After waking up, Nutto tile to attempt any more this night; the in time 50 years and the drama is about found himself on the road and a pris- losses had already been too high. He to reach its final climax. oner of war. then ordered his men up to Hill 427 and onto a semi-flat area adjacent to At 0500 hours on March 28th, 1945, The remaining halftracks and the sur- the woods. Using the woods as cover the column of men returning to the la- viving tanks made their way back to- to the rear, he fanned the assault guns ger is barely half a mile from the task ward the task force. This was a serious and the remaining tanks out toward the force when they hear a familiar sound. blow to Baum, as he had just lost the It is the sound of tanks and men dig- irreplaceable Nutto and two more valley below and toward the lager. Next, he ordered the men to refuel ging in and preparing for battle. Unfor- much-needed tanks. prior to dawn and prepare to destroy tunately, the sounds are not coming At 0030 hours, Baum’s jeep ap- the remaining empty and damaged ve- from the task force, but from Koehl’s proached the town, where he ran into hicles. panzerjager platoon! After waiting 10 28 ARMOR — September-October 1996 hours for fuel and ammunition, they are now maneuvering into position, waiting for daylight. Ironically, none of Colonel Goode’s men returning to the safety of the lager thought to send a runner back to warn CPT Baum of their discovery. Could they have all been so dispirited and exhausted from the last 12 hours of emotional ups and downs that they overlooked this critical point? In the meantime, even more ac- tivity was occurring in the German ranks. A team of 20 officers and cadets were quietly positioning themselves in the woods just above the plateau and to The Hammelburg camp’s hospital, where Waters, and later Baum, were treated after the fail- the rear of where Baum’s men were ure of the raid and capture of members of Baum’s force. making final preparations for the breakout. These men had followed the task force during the confusion and were falling over, and branches were guessed that fewer than a hundred men were armed with panzerfausts. Just flying through the air and floating to had made it to the woods. The last or- prior to daybreak, they were in the the earth... To Baum it seemed as der shouted to his men was, “Fan Reussenberg Woods and were wide though a single enemy salvo had ut- out...make your way west in groups of awake with anticipation of the coming terly destroyed his task force... Tanks twos and threes, and go your own way dawn. In the task force, however, some were ablaze... Halftracks stopped sud- so you won’t be visible. Get as much denly... and men were spilled out over distance between you and them before of the men had finally fallen asleep af- 1 ter days of having none. Their sleep the ground. From his jeep and using his they get here. Get going!” would be short-lived. field glasses, he saw Koehl’s five anti- With these last hurried orders, Task tank guns moving up the hillside to- The seriously wounded men who ward him and firing faster than he had Force Baum had effectively disinte- were still with Baum, and who were in ever seen them fire before. They were, grated. It was a great effort, and not no condition to endure the journey without many successes. Although the he thought, firing like semi-automatic primary mission failed, the havoc cre- back to the front lines, were taken on rifles... Scanning across the slope in an- stretchers to a nearby barn and made as other direction, he saw five tanks firing ated this far behind enemy lines had comfortable as possible with extra occupied the Germans for the better their main guns as well as their ma- part of two days as they ran around in blankets. A large cloth red cross was chine guns. All of the units were sup- then fashioned on the roof, visible in ported by infantry, also firing and mov- circles trying to figure out what was daylight. Baum gave the order to going on. Meanwhile, the U.S. Army’s ing up rapidly. The fire was so intense 3rd and 7th Armies were making rapid mount up at about 0800 hours. that Baum never had a chance to deal progress. In the German headquarters, Oberst with the panzerfaust fire coming from Hoepple’s aide awakened him at 0730 his rear. The one bright spot occurred In addition, there were so many acts hours and told him that the American when he saw many of his tankers re- of bravery and heroism that everyone tanks were visible on the hillside just turning fire... The attack was so over- should have gotten a medal. As it whelming... and unremitting... and un- turned out, I am not sure that they did above Koehl’s position and below the 1 Reussenberg Woods. At this point, commonly accurate. not. I know of at least fifty Silver Stars, one Distinguished Service Cross Hoepple radioed coordinated instruc- Within three minutes of Baum’s order tions to the various units surrounding to move, “the entire clearing seemed to (Baum’s), and more than one hundred the task force. No one was to fire until be one single sheet of flame, every ve- Purple Hearts, (Baum got three), as Koehl’s antitank guns opened up, and well as Bronze Stars for everyone. hicle was hit... It was then he knew he (Baum got one also.) then everyone was to fire at will! had lost his task force.”1 At 0810 hours, CPT Baum was still As I walk into the dense woods be- issuing the final commands to his men Sidles was still on the radio, tapping hind the plateau, I envision the may- before the breakout. His radioman was out the final message from Task Force Baum in Morse code: “Task Force hem that had taken place here that fate- transmitting a situation report to the ful morning. Men running in all direc- American lines and advising them they Baum surrounded. Under heavy fire. tions, trying to remain alive and also might require air support later. As the Request air support.” Sadly, several rounds struck the barn sheltering the attempting to escape. T/SGT Graham tanks roared to life and began moving was one of a few who accomplished towards their preassigned positions, wounded and the stone walls support- this feat. He eventually made it back to and with many of the men still on foot ing it collapsed in on the men. It was doubtful that any had survived. the 7th U.S. Army sector after several and hurrying to mount vehicles, it hap- days of close encounters with the en- pened! “A sheet of Hell engulfed the “Every man for himself,” Baum emy. CPT Baum and LT Baron were clearing... The ground shook with con- shouted as he leapt from his jeep and not as fortunate, however, and ended cussion after concussion... Geysers of headed into the woods. He soon found up back in the lager, thrown together dirt and steel were thrown up... Trees cover with Sidles and Stiller. He by fate and still 25 years away from ARMOR — September-October 1996 29 telling the world in writing of this ad- know of no error I made except that of story of the individual heroism and venture. failing to send a combat command to courage of these men remains as one of Hammelburg.” Additionally, in his the great military feats of all time. As I take one last look around the book, War As I Knew It, after realizing floor of the woods for a souvenir of this moment in history, I remember that that the raid had failed, Patton states, “I made arrangements to reconstitute the Endnotes CPT Baum was still thinking clearly two companies of the 4th Armored Di- 1 enough at this stage to throw his dog RAID, Baron, Baum, and Goldhurst, N.Y., tags into the forest as he ran. He did vision, which we now knew was defi- Putnam and Sons, 1981. nitely captured. After forcing a crossing 2 this because they were imprinted with over the Main east of Frankfurt, in Personal Interview, Richard Baron, 5 Jan 95. the letter ‘H,’ for Hebrew, and he was 3 well aware of the many atrocity stories which the captain in command was Personal interview, Charles Graham, 7 Jan slightly wounded, they continued the 95. that had been told about Jews in Nazi attack and reached the outskirts of captivity. As it turned out later, he was 4Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, never identified nor discovered by the Hammelburg (interesting that he refers to it as an attack). Here they ran into Pa., 1703-5008. Germans in the lager as the leader of elements of three German divisions 5 the mission. It was not conceivable to “The Hammelburg Affair,” Martin Blumen- them that all this havoc had been cre- which, as we had hoped, had been son, Army, 15 Oct 65. drawn by their attack. (At this point, I 6 ated by a 24-year-old captain; they had Personal interview, Abe Baum, February think the general was “stretching it” 1995. been searching for a much higher-rank- somewhat.) While some of the tanks... ing officer. It is unclear what happened 7War As I Knew It, George S, Patton, Jr., to Stiller after his capture and he is not and armored infantry engaged these di- visions, other tanks went to the prison Houghton Mifflin, 1947, pp. 280-281. mentioned again in any of the manu- camp, some six miles to the north, and 8 scripts at my disposal. Patton’s Best, Frankel and Smith, Hawthorn, released the prisoners. [Again, Patton 1978, pp. 140-170. About one hundred yards from the does not mention Colonel Waters.] 9 edge of the woods, I began to look in These tanks, accompanied by some Baum, A.J., “Notes on Task Force Baum,” earnest for the dogtags which Abe 1200 prisoners, rejoined the rest of the 4th Armored Division report, 10 Apr 45. Baum discarded 50 years ago in hopes force in the vicinity of Hammelburg 10The Mighty Endeavor, Charles MacDonald, of the ultimate treasure find, but it was and started back over the road they had Oxford University Press, 1969, pp. 460-461. not to be. As I walked out of the taken. The following report was made 11 woods, the others were waiting, and a by my aide, MAJ Stiller, who was with 48 Hours to Hammelburg, Charles Whiting, glance at my watch told me that we them but not in command [again no Ballantine Books, 1970. had only 15 minutes until the live-fir- mention of Waters.] He suggested that 12The Last 100 Days, John Toland, Random ing began. Not wishing to relive instead of returning over the road al- House, 1966. Baum’s encounter to the fullest, I has- ready used, the column strike north. 13Telephone interview and materials sent by ten my pace. As we are driving out of The officer in charge declined that ad- COL James Leach, DSC, 4th Armored Histo- the area, we are aware of German sol- vice and the column stopped to refuel. rian. diers in “camo” cover with radios and, While engaged in this refueling, they yes, Panzerfausts too! The soldiers are were attacked by three regiments of 14Telephone interview and materials sent by part of the training cadre and are wait- German infantry from three different SGT Sam Schenker, Secretary, 4th Armored ing in foxholes for the artillery fire to directions and scattered. When the con- Division Association. begin. Again, I am reminded of the fusion had cleared, MAJ Stiller, the task force and how real this 50th Anni- captain in command of the force, and versary tour had become. five enlisted men continued to fight un- til they had used up all their ammuni- Shortly after closing and locking the gate behind us, I hear the sounds of the tion and had their vehicles destroyed, Richard Whitaker, A.A./B.S. when they surrendered.” guns firing in the distance, but my mis- University of California at sion has been completed. This is the only mention of the raid San Jose, is a 55-year-old that the general saw fit to include in his former U.S. Marine Air Re- In trying to establish a complete pic- ture of what happened, the following only book on the war. servist and ardent collector comments are of note: Because the mission was labeled Top and writer of military history. Secret (GEN Patton’s influence contin- He has written articles on Patton died denying publicly any ued until 24 years after his death in small and unusual battles for knowledge of his son-in-law being in 1946), it was 25 years before MAJ Hammelburg when he ordered the mis- the Medal Collector, the jour- Baum and MAJ Baron told their stories nal published by the Orders sion. But on March 23rd, shortly before in book form. ordering the raid, Patton had written a and Medals Society of Amer- letter to his wife Beatrice: “We are I am indebted to both of them for ica. He lives in Los Gatos headed straight for John’s place and their help and information. Without with his wife, Christine. He may get there before he is moved.” them I could never have made this would be happy to hear from Patton stated in his journal, published journey back in time. I also believe any of the other survivors of after his death, “I can say this — that that, although many of the men of 4th the raid on Hammelburg. throughout the campaign in Europe, I Armored died and suffered in vain, the

30 ARMOR — September-October 1996 Leadership... And Command and Control

by Lieutenant Colonel Kevin C.M. Benson

“It’s against anyone’s nature to rush fort. These were: priority of fires, nuclear age a leader should not, indeed headlong into gunfire. But, for the com- placement of the reserve, and the pres- could not, be heroic — especially at mander, it’s pride that pushes him. And ence of the commander. The advance the national level. This was unquestion- for his men, it’s the sight of the com- of technology has made this practice ably true when the threat of mutually mander in front of them. At such mo- less and less likely, the higher in the assured destruction hung over the ments you cannot hesitate.” chain of command an officer goes. planet. But the extension of this con- Conceivably, we will end up like the clusion into the tactical and operational (CPT Francois Lecointre, French platoon leader in the movie Aliens, realm is incorrect. Keegan also points Army in NYT Times Fax, p. 2, June 6, 1995) where the lieutenant stayed in the land- out the imperatives of command that ing craft to be in a position to over- defined leadership in the past: kinship The history of the profession of arms watch his platoon’s monitors. with common soldiers, sanction of re- wards and punishments according to is filled with the exploits of leaders Rapidly advancing command and who led from the front. Young Lieuten- control technology is forcing com- common values, leadership by exam- ant Rommel led the bulk of the Würt- ple, prescription of risk-taking to sub- temburg Mountain Battalion in the sei- manders at nearly every level to remain ordinates, and direct action in putting in the command post to be near the zure of Mount Matajur during the Ital- monitors that give them the situational these principles into effect (p. 343ff, ian campaigns of World War I. He The Mask of Command). These impera- wrote of these feats of arms in Infantry awareness to “see” the entire battle and tives still have a place in the military remain in contact with higher head- Attacks. He inspired his soldiers by quarters. Indeed, we have found a Na- art, and we cannot let technology placing himself at the decisive point of eliminate these imperatives of com- action and led from the front. poleonic “hill” from which to see the mand. entire field. Yet this capability removes Guderian, when serving as a corps a key morale factor from the fight, the Keegan also briefly touched on the commander in the Battle for France in 1940, led his corps from the front. presence of the commander. velocity of events, both in their report- ing and response. We have seen many When Guderian’s lead infantry regi- examples of this in the past five years, ments were crossing the Meuse under French fire, he was at this decisive The recent experience of 3d Squad- from Kuwait to Haiti. The need for in- ron, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment in formation is such that, for example, point to better direct the actions of all Haiti is a prime example. During its everywhere the XVIII Airborne Corps other arms and fires in support of the main headquarters goes, CNN follows, crossing effort. Lieutenant Colonel deployment, the squadron was outfitted Creighton Abrams led his battalion with cameras that mounted on the bar- both within the headquarters as a rels of the scouts’ rifles. These cameras means of receiving information, and from the front throughout World War connected to the squadron tactical op- outside as reporters. The world of op- II. General Patton led from the front as a brigade commander in World War I erations center through the radio, erations other than war (OOTW) places thence to the Pentagon. The Army Staff the rings of strategic, operational, and and as an army commander in World can now watch squad fights from the tactical arenas within each other, as op- War II. He directed efforts on the beachhead at Gela, Sicily, during Op- ultimate in foxholes. This experiment posed to the traditional concept of in technology raises the specter of merely overlapping. The pace of events eration Husky, and was present when Moltke the Elder, sitting in his railroad demands that a leader remain abreast of the Hermann Goering division counter- attacked the beachhead. car, sending telegraph messages to his events on the world stage. far-flung armies during the battle of The trait these great leaders shared Koeniggratz. Moltke never saw the bat- There are times when the proper place for the commander IS in the was leading from the front, as a visible tlefield, rather remaining aloof from the headquarters. Here, he can detach him- example to the soldiers they led into fight and sending and receiving reports. battle. What is wrong with this picture? self from the mundane and think. There are also times, even in the world of op- The Armor School, during the Armor John Keegan wrote of “post-heroic” erations other than war, when the place Officer Basic Course (in 1977), taught leadership in his work, The Mask of for the commander is at the decisive three means of reinforcing the main ef- Command. His conclusion: that in the point or the point of danger. The com-

ARMOR — September-October 1996 31 “The world of operations other than war (OOTW) places the rings of strategic, operational, and tac- tical arenas within each other, as opposed to the traditional concept of merely overlapping. The pace of events demands that a leader remain abreast of events on the world stage....” mander and his staff must retain the higher headquarters and on specific sions based upon the best information bond with the soldiers who daily take platforms such as the USS Mount Whit- available. Call it coup d’oeil, finger- the risk of executing the orders of the ney. While this appears to be a reason- spitzengefuehl, or situational aware- higher commander. Kinship is still a able compromise, it does remove an ness, but the commander requires tech- valid imperative. As Keegan wrote, option from the commander’s range of nology that gives him the freedom to “Those who impose risk must be seen decisions. The commander CANNOT go to the decisive point and retain the to share it...” (p. 329, The Mask of decide that he will accompany the in- advantages of the technological “Napo- Command). Our technology for com- itial assault, even if that is the right de- leonic hill.” mand and control increasingly puts the cision. This concentration of technol- The changing world is unpredictable. means of control in the headquarters. ogy makes the apparent risk of the commander at the decisive point The changes in vital national interests, Consider the following hypothetical greater; he may not be in communica- as well as the increasing frequency of scenario: An Army corps is selected as OOTW-type operations, will increase the nucleus for a JTF, which will plan tion with the command and control the demands on our entire force. The means necessary to direct a far-flung and lead a forcible entry of an island task force. This is a mistake. nature of the combined arms team will nation. When the corps commander change, although the concept remains takes the first briefing on the operation, We must give the commander the the same: the effects of all arms under his planners recommend that he com- freedom to go to the point of action, the command of one commander, sup- mand from the USS Mount Whitney, while retaining contact with the means ported by one staff. where he’ll be able to control the entire of control and the situational awareness The constant in this changing world, JTF fight, while maintaining contact afforded by the electronic “high even in the era of “post-heroic” war- with the regional commander-in-chief ground.” Doctrine remains the engine (CINC). Stating that a visit to the front of change. FM 100-5, Operations, re- fare, is the commander. As General Patton said, “Staff systems and me- is worth one thousand reports, the tains the essence of military leadership chanical communications are valuable, corps commander states he will take a by stressing the art of command and small assault headquarters in with the the science of control. Commanders but above and beyond them must be the commander; not as a disembodied later assault echelons of the forcible command, staffs control. The thrust of brain linked to his men by lines of wire entry. When this intention becomes our drive for technology, especially in known, the CINC worries that he will the area of information management, and waves of ether, but as a living not be able to talk to the corps/JTF must afford us this means. Technology presence, an all-pervading, visible per- sonality. The unleavened bread of commander while in transit. As the must allow the JTF commander the ca- knowledge will sustain life, but it is planning proceeds, it becomes apparent pability to lead at the decisive point — that the commander of the JTF needs whether the mission is a parachute as- dull fare unless seasoned by the yeast of personality” (p. 56, Leadership, to be in a position to respond to the sault, amphibious raid, or maritime in- Cavalry & Armor Heritage series). CINC and national leaders, the media, terdiction operation — while simulta- and the requirements of the battlefield, neously controlling the entire JTF fight. simultaneously and in real time. The The emerging new world order (or USS Mount Whitney provides such a medium, allowing the commander ac- disorder, as it appears) brings with it new missions for the armed forces. The Lieutenant Colonel Kevin C.M. cess to the electronic high ground and missions themselves are strange, and Benson is the executive officer the ability to visit the front. some are even distasteful. The require- of the 2d Armored Cavalry Regi- The command ship provides security ments range from winning a “Desert ment. He has served in armor and no drain on shore facilities, which Storm” type war to UN operations in battalions and cavalry squad- are at a premium during the initial Haiti and Macedonia. The definition of rons in the U.S. and Europe. He phases of the operation. The availabil- the vital national interest of the United ity of a U.S. Navy helicopter allows the States will undoubtedly change as the also served on the staff of XVIII CJTF to quickly speed to the decisive new powers within the world jockey Airborne Corps. Most recently point when necessary. Indeed, the heli- for position. We may even face the de- he served as the Chief of Staff, copter in this operation becomes the mise of the influence of the nation- U.S. Forces Haiti. He has been commander’s “horse” carrying him to state, as Martin van Creveld spoke of published in Military Review, and from the place on the field requir- in The Transformation of War. Never- ARMOR, Infantry, and Special ing his presence. The technology to en- theless, the requirements of the com- Operations magazines. sure instant voice and video communi- mander will remain the same: lead by cation contact is currently available at example, share danger, and take deci-

32 ARMOR — September-October 1996 the regiment: the Honorary Colonel their respective regiments in times of and Honorary Sergeant Major. peace and conflict. An example of such a champion is All Honorary Colonels are retired Honorary Colonels MG(R) Ronald Fairfield, Jr., Honorary commissioned officers in the rank of Colonel of the 69th Armored Regi- colonel or above with former service in ment. A combat veteran of three wars the regiment. The Honorary Colonel’s Can Re-energize and former battalion commander of 1- duties include: service as a liaison be- 69 Armor, MG Fairfield was appointed tween the regiment and regimental as- Your Unit the Honorary Colonel of the 69th Ar- sociations, attending regimental func- mor Regiment by the Secretary of the tions and command ceremonies, par- Army in 1987. During his tours as ticipating in award ceremonies, speak- by Captain Dave Clark HCOR, he was the guest of honor at 10 ing on the regiment’s history and tradi- of 11 battalion changes of command tions at dining-ins and similar func- with the two battalions of the 69th sta- tions, assisting in historical professional tioned in CONUS — 2-69 and 3-69 re- development programs for officers and spectively. He also conducted annual NCOs, and presiding over regimental History, heraldry, and heroes. The Ar- professional development seminars for committees. The Honorary Sergeant mor and Cavalry Regimental System both officers and NCOs, and wrote an Major is a retired NCO in the rank of keeps all three of these alive in our average of 25 flag letters a month rec- sergeant first class or above who has mounted force. Every battalion or ognizing achievements by soldiers of former service with the regiment. The squadron carries before it the colors of the battalions. MG(R) Fairfield encour- HSGMOR’s duties are to assist the a particular regiment. Emblazoned on ages units to, “Invite their Honorary HCOR in perpetuating the history and those colors are the crest and motto of Colonels for a visit so they can contact lineage of the regiment and assist in the regiment, framed in the campaign and get to know the soldiers.” The maintaining an honorary program and streamers of past battles which adorn most important thing the Honorary its many aspects as listed for the its staff — battles which made our Colonel can contribute to the members HCOR. of his regiment, according to MG(R) forefathers and their comrades heroes. Incorporating these helpful and im- They fought, bled, and often made the Fairfield, is heritage. “They can com- bine that past with the heritage they are portant members into a unit’s activities ultimate sacrifice for their brothers-in- is a matter of commitment on the part arms, unit, and country. making today, every day, and carry of battalion and brigade commanders. both with them into the future. Heri- The regiment and its traditions pro- tage is what the regiment is all about, Nothing is free in the military and this vide a vital link to that past and an im- unfortunately applies to the Honorary the heritage that was, is today, and will Colonels and Sergeants Major program. portant tool in building unit cohesion, be tomorrow.” pride, and esprit de corps. Travel to both OCONUS/CONUS regi- As the Army force structure stabilizes mental functions is done by invitational Most soldiers affiliate with regiments and we become a CONUS-based con- travel orders funded by the installation for a variety of reasons: it was their tingency force, the esprit, teamwork, or activity requesting the HCOR’s or first active duty assignment; they as- and sense of belonging afforded by the HSGMOR’s presence. Reimbursement sumed command within that regiment; Regimental System takes on even of incidental costs is not authorized, they have combat experience with the greater importance. The best tool in a but regimental associations may be es- unit, or they want an assignment to a commander’s bag for energizing pride tablished to support honorary positions. post that is home to a battalion of that in his battalion or squadron’s regiment regiment. Whatever the reason, it is is the Honorary Program of Colonels The Honorary Colonel and Sergeant usually with some amount of pride that and Sergeants Major of the Regiment. Major can be a tremendous addition to a soldier wears his chosen regiment’s The purpose of the honorary program a unit’s regimental association, provid- crest on his uniform and barks the is to provide a link with history ing valuable role models for both offi- unit’s motto when challenged. through the Honorary Colonel of the cers and NCOs. A list containing names, The Armor and Cavalry force is cur- Regiment (HCOR) and the Honorary locations, and biographies of the cur- rently finishing a massive series of re- Sergeant Major of the Regiment rent HCORs and HSGMORs is main- designations as a result of the draw- (HSGMOR). The primary mission of tained by the Armor Proponency Divi- down and restructuring of Army forces the soldiers holding these honorary po- sion of the Office, Chief of Armor worldwide. The dizzying rearrange- sitions is to perpetuate the history and (OCOA). The OCOA pamphlet, Armor ment of unit designations in the last 12 traditions of the regiment, thereby en- Regimental System, 1996 contains com- months has caused a degree of conster- hancing unit morale and esprit. This, in plete information on the Armor Regi- nation among the mounted force — turn, helps the commander develop mental System, including current active new patches to sew on, crests to buy, loyalty and commitment in his troops, regiments and HCORs/HSGMORs. and new mottoes, songs, and histories fosters a sense of belonging, and insti- This Fort Knox publication can be ob- to learn. What was once a dependable tutionalizes the warfighting ethos. The tained by calling OCOA directly at element in the unit has now departed, HCOR and HSGMOR are credible DSN 464-3188/1368, Commercial (502) like so many soldiers who PCS. With sources who have lived through our 624-3188/1368, or by calling Armor the new set of colors comes a couple of Army’s brilliant history and can relay Wide Training Support (AWTS) at dedicated spokesmen and champions of their feelings and experiences about DSN 464-2987, 24-Hr FAX 464-7554. ARMOR — September-October 1996 33 Operation Just Cause: The Armor-Infantry Team In the Close Fight

by Major Frank Sherman

Based on my experiences in Panama eight surviving the drop. As the Sheri- This barrier was well made, with cars as the commander of Company C, 3rd dans were readied for combat and wired together and what appeared to be Battalion (Airborne), 73rd Armored crewed, they formed the nucleus of the propane tanks inside. Quickly analyz- Regiment, I would like to highlight the brigade’s firepower. Initial missions ing the situation, we decided against versatility of the M551A1 Sheridan were to deter counterattack and support the normal obstacle drill and opted to light tank. Its 152mm main gun, and its the infantry’s simultaneous assault on clear the roadblock with a 152mm heat .50 caliber and coax machine guns, four D-day objectives. round instead. The TC identified the coupled with the modified M60A3 tank middle red car, and the gunner engaged thermal sight (TTS) — arguably the Striking the D-day Targets the target. We had to wait a few min- best tank-mounted thermal sight in the Forcing Roadblocks utes for the fire to subside, and smoke force — produce an awesome amount to clear, then a Sheridan moved for- of firepower, while its armor affords Our first encounter with the Panama- ward, pushing its way through the the crew a moderate level of protec- nian Defense Force (PDF) occurred as wreckage. There was no enemy re- tion. Because of the vehicle’s compact the infantrymen of 1st Battalion, 504 sponse to our obstacle reduction, even design, light weight, parachute deploy- Parachute Infantry Regiment, were es- though we were exposed for over five ability, and modest support require- tablishing a supply route from Tocu- minutes. Maybe they had heard about ments, Sheridans deploy and maneuver men International Airport to their initial their buddies guarding the other road- where other heavier vehicles would objective of Tinajitas. The convoy had block? bog down or be restricted. In short, the only moved a few kilometers when it Sheridan remains the only armored, di- stopped to clear a roadblock located on rect-fire weapon that can accompany a bridge. As the Sheridans moved to Urban Fighting at the Comandancia the Airborne Infantry, beginning on the the edge of the highway to support the drop zone at P-hour. infantry, SSG Troxell, the lead tank At about the same time, fighting in and around La Comandancia was heat- commander, called me on the radio and ing up. The remaining PDF defenders stated, “This is a hell of a place for an Strategic Forcible Entry obstacle, buildings all around and no were going to stay and fight, so U.S. forces were preparing to go in after On two separate occasions during the cover. It looks like swamps on both them. The 3rd Platoon leader, LT sides of the road.” As the infantry dis- Panama operation, the Sheridan dem- mounted and began to execute their ob- Kozar, knew from the radio traffic that onstrated its ability to strategically de- fighting on the south wall of the Co- ploy. The first involved secretly air- stacle drill, they began receiving auto- mandancia was intense. He was not matic weapons fire from the buildings landing one platoon of four Sheridans, no more than 50 meters away. The lead surprised to be ordered to move there two pallets of ammunition, two with a tank section and assist in the HMMWVs, a trailer, and 25 personnel tank commander opened up with .50 evacuation of wounded personnel. caliber fire as the wing tank com- on a single C5 Galaxy transport into mander screamed to his gunner to iden- What did surprise him when he turned Howard AFB, Panama. Once on the tify the threat. A moment later, SFC the corner was to see a burning M113 ground, four HETs quickly moved to and PDF soldiers using the Comandan- the rear of the aircraft, and the Sheri- Freeman, 1st Platoon sergeant, yelled, cia’s 10-foot-high wall as cover, shoot- “I got ’em, concrete building, second dans were off-loaded, covered, and floor, fourth window from the right.” ing in all directions. LT Kozar ordered moving out the front gate, on their way his gunner to, “take the wall out,” and to their hide position — all before day- He fired a 152mm heat round at the with one round make a hole large target, ripping through the room, col- light. The second and larger deploy- lapsing the right side of the building. enough to drive his tank into the build- ment of ten Sheridans attached to 1st ing’s courtyard. As the Sheridan Brigade, 82d Airborne Division con- The enemy fire stopped and the infan- climbed what was left of the wall and try finished clearing the roadblock. ducted history’s first combat heavy began to enter, a bus attempting to drop of armored vehicles from six C- Later that day, along the same route, block its advance was halted by the 141 aircraft, into enemy territory, with we encountered another roadblock. 152mm battlecarry HEAT round. With

34 ARMOR — September-October 1996 Above, a 152-mm HEAT round from a Sheridan impacts on the Comandancia, military headquarters of the Panamanian de- fense forces.

Above left, the concrete wall surrounding the Comandancia af- ter being penetrated by a 152-mm HEAT round.

At left, the remains of the bus that attempted to block LT Kozar’s move into the Comandancia.

enemy fire subdued, LT Kozar backed The rules of engagement specified Uniquely Suited to his tank out, and the wounded were that we identify a PDF soldier with a Armor-Infantry Close Battles evacuated without incident. weapon or a combatant about to com- mit a hostile act before we could en- While the M551A1 General Sheridan gage; hence, most of our engagements has served the Army longer than any APERS Engagements were directed at stationary targets at a mount since the horse, it remains a le- range of 50-400 meters. Only once did thal and versatile weapon system. De- The next day, LT Jennings, 2d Pla- toon leader, and his wingman moved we engage a moving target which oc- spite its age, Sheridan OR rates remain curred immediately after shooting two in the high 90s. Its unique ability to be slowly through the jungle and over a delivered by parachute during the cru- light bridge guided by an infantry squad from 4th Battalion, 325 Airborne cial airborne assault phase of a forced “During this assault, enemy entry operation provides planners enor- Infantry Regiment. The battalion was personnel were identified mov- mous flexibility — and the commander preparing to assault the PDF’s Ranger, ing along this road, and the Airborne, and Air Assault training base. on the ground an enormous advantage. Sheridan responded by firing a In contingency operations where LT Jennings was tasked to support by flechette round. METT-T often will not require a sys- fire. No enemy personnel at- tem capable of defeating massed for- When the order was given to assault, tempted to counterattack down mations of state-of-the-art main battle the infantry commander used the Sheri- that route.” tanks, where airframes are always dan’s rear deck telephone to lift and scarce, and where the in-country road shift the tank’s fire, helping to prevent net frequently limits the utility of our fratricide. The wingman overwatched a rounds into a building and the infantry near 70-ton MBT, the M551A1 Sheri- road that was obscured by dense forest, moved forward to sort out the EPWs. dans of the Army’s parachute tank bat- which the AC-130 (SPECTRE) could The tanks were in the process of repo- talion continue to offer the commander not cover. During this assault, enemy sitioning when, from around the build- the decisive edge. personnel were identified moving along ing, came a yellow Toyota Corolla car- this road, and the Sheridan responded rying PDF members attempting to es- by firing a flechette round. cape. SGT Pennington, the tank’s gun- ner, identified, fired, and hit the car be- Major Frank Sherman is the No enemy personnel attempted to fore it could enter the highway...at a operations officer of 3/73 Armor, counterattack down that route. range of 100 meters. Fort Bragg, N.C.

ARMOR — September-October 1996 35 BALKAN REPORT III The Six-Bradley Scout Platoon In Bosnia

by First Lieutenant Frank Lozano

This article is the third to appear in the last three issues Bradleys at a Bosnia checkpoint. discussing mobility in Bosnia. - Ed.

The three-Bradley scout section lodgment area security, and checkpoint scout platoon more able to conduct moves through the narrow back roads operations. these missions, unlike the tank platoon, connecting the many Bosnian villages which is unable to provide both suffi- that line the Zone of Separation (ZOS). Mounted Patrols cient dismounted security and the abil- It is mid-afternoon, and the mounted ity to fight their vehicles at the same patrol is about to link up with the Ser- The peacekeepers conduct daily day time. Also, one cannot overlook the sur- bian engineers who will provide secu- and night patrols in and around the vivability advantage, both for the crew rity and ensure the destruction of the ZOS. The M3A2 is well suited for this and the vehicle. The amount of armor Serb bunkers along the confrontation mission for a number of different rea- protection provided by the M3A2 pro- line. The morning had been spent with sons, but one of the most important is vides enhanced crew protection, and elements of the Bosnian Army as they its maneuverability. The narrow roads acts as a visible deterrent, especially to removed mines and marked minefields. of Bosnia act as very restrictive terrain. those who are quicker to throw rocks at The section would return to “Ft. The width of the M3A2 CFV (3.61 HMMWVs than Bradleys when denied Apache” (Lodgment Area Walker) meters) allows it to move through the candy or an MRE. around 1700, with enough time to grab country much more easily than an A good example of the CFV’s dura- chow, ensure the other section’s readi- M1A1 (3.65 meters width). When com- bility was shown when the platoon ness for its night patrol, and prepare for pared to the M113 series, the CFV’s the nightly mission brief. ability to pivot steer makes it more ag- leader’s Bradley in 3/B/1-1 Cavalry ran over an AP mine. The mine, which The evening would be spent execut- ile in areas where it is important to stay would have ruined the mobility of a on the cleared route. Another formida- ing the necessary troop leading proce- ble obstacle is the country’s great num- HMMWV, inflicted no damage to the dures and pre-combat inspections, en- Bradley. suring their readiness for the next day’s ber of reckless drivers. The M3A2 is narrow enough to allow traffic to move mission. Once that was complete, then in both directions and safely pass. This Lodgment Area Security would come the showers, a little AFN, maybe a movie, exercise, and the other aids the M3A2 in performing its neigh- The size of the unit, in both soldiers borhood patrols while displaying a amenities provided by the 1st Armored large, visible deterrent. and vehicles, allows the six-Bradley Division. scout platoon to execute a number of The M3A2, more so than a different missions at once. For exam- HMMWV or an M113, is a very im- ple, the platoon is able to run an effi- Scout Platoon posing fighting machine. In an environ- cient guard roster while conducting in- ment where only force is respected, the tensive vehicle maintenance. The pla- The many differing missions of Op- M3A2 easily fits the role. One of the toon is also able to make good use of eration Joint Endeavor make a six- Bradley scout platoon a valuable asset. factors that makes the CFV such an in- the time back at the lodgment area by timidating vehicle is visibility of its maximizing personnel recovery while There has been much discussion on three turret-mounted weapons systems. conducting concurrent training. which vehicle is the best for use in a peacekeeping environment. [See AR- The easily seen 25mm, TOW launcher, The lodgment areas in theater are and coax provide a much more visible MOR, July/August 96 for one such dis- deterrent than the single crew-served small and restrictive in regard to motor cusion. - Ed.] In making this decision, pool space. This requires a vehicle that we must take into account the task or- weapons mounted on both the not only can move quickly, but one HMMWV and M113. ganization of the vehicles. This issue narrow enough to maneuver through can be examined by focusing on the The size of the unit also makes the the lodgment areas. This gives the three main missions that ground forces scout platoon a valuable asset. Since commander the flexibility to either execute in the other than war environ- physical work is often done with the move one or all of his Bradleys to ment in which we are currently de- factional elements, dismounted security cover any disturbance. The biggest ad- ployed. They are mounted patrols, is vital. This characteristic makes the vantage of having an M3A2 comes in

36 ARMOR — September-October 1996 “Since most checkpoints are set up in the center of the ZOS, it is important that they portray a formidable, as well as intimidating, presence. The M3A2 is again preferable in this role than either the HMMWV or M113.” the form of available weapons systems. set up in open areas, with good obser- The M-18 “Hellcat” Tank Destroyer. Since most lodgment areas are in built- vation and fields of fire, the platoon’s up areas, there are a number of differ- ability to defend itself is important. The ent threats. The M240 coax machine optics of the M3A2 allow for continual Kentucky Windage gun is excellent for taking care of any observation of the surrounding domi- Dear Sirs: close dismounted or POV-mounted nating terrain and built-up areas. Al- Reading in the May-June issue about threat, while the 25mm HE or AP deals though HMMWVs and M113-series the increased “lethality and fightability” of with any medium range threat. The vehicles can be outfitted with good op- the enhanced M1A2, with its extensive 25mm chain gun is an outstanding tical systems, they are not standard on use of digital electronics for target acqui- sition and target tracking, made me won- weapon for built-up areas. It is both ac- these vehicles. der if any younger readers knew how tar- curate and destructive. The ability to There are many characteristics of the get acquisition and target tracking was minimize collateral damage is a key done fifty-odd years ago. I would like to factor in peacekeeping operations. The M3A2 CFV that make it well-suited quote a paragraph from the combat his- for peacekeeping operations. There is tory of the 704th Tank Destroyer Battal- TOW, able to make the long range kill, no vehicle that is completely suited for ion, Fourth Armored Division, of General is great for covering the many roads Patton’s Third Army. that are near the lodgment areas. Used all aspects of peacekeeping, and it does, of course, take the proper integra- The time was September, 1944, the properly, the M3A2 becomes an effec- tion of all available assets to success- weapon was the 76mm, high-velocity an- tively lethal weapon for lodgment area titank rifle that armed the M-18 “Hellcat.” security. fully accomplish the many missions of The gunner was SSG Phillip Hosey. I Operation Joint Endeavor. I do not quote from Phil Hosey. doubt that even though the M3A2 “Near Nancy, France, between Checkpoint Operations alone is an intimidating factor in the Luneville and Arracourt, we faced a group of German tanks that had taken a ZOS, the local factions as well as the position one mile away, across a shallow Here again, the number of people and lurking troublemakers are also well open valley. Our M-18s were in defilade, vehicles available in the six-Bradley aware of the M1A1 QRF platoon posi- facing out over a small hill. Infantry led platoon aid in the efficient manning of tioned a few miles down the road. the way across the valley with three M-4s intermingled. The Krauts let them get checkpoints. There are enough people They are also aware of the artillery bat- halfway across, then opened up with anti- to conduct vehicle and weapons main- tery prepositioned a few more miles tank fire from woods on the right. They tenance, concurrent training, and away. It is my opinion that the M3A2’s immediately KO’d two M-4s and drove checkpoint improvement, as well as al- ability to integrate maneuverability and the infantry to the ground. Two Panthers, a Mark IV, and an assault gun came out lowing for a quick reaction force. The survivability, its visible array of lethal of the woods and moved across our line preferred approach is to occupy a weapons, and its superior optics make of fire at the distance of about a mile. In checkpoint with an entire platoon, but it a superb vehicle for peacekeeping his position in our open turret, the tank that is not always possible. With the operations. When the Bradley is organ- commander, SSG Hicklin, watched their progression through his glasses and six-Bradley scout platoon, the com- ized into a six-vehicle scout platoon called out the range: “Two thousand mander has the flexibility to man two configuration, it becomes a very valu- yards, moving at about ten mph.” Our ri- checkpoints at the same time. able asset to the commander who must fle, with AP, had a muzzle velocity of execute a variety of peacekeeping mis- 2,700 fps, so it would take two seconds The M3A2 proves its worth during sions. It has proven its worth traveling to arrive on target. The Krauts were mov- checkpoint operations by superbly ful- ing at fifteen feet per second, which let thousands of patrol miles over the nar- filling all of the necessary require- them travel thirty feet in two seconds. row roads of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Their lead tank was twenty feet long ments. The restrictive terrain, coupled (from the book), so we led him a good with the small areas of land that are will continue to do so for the duration of our mission. length for a center shot. We laid on and cleared of mines, creates cramped fired. Voila, a hit! It struck two feet in front checkpoints with little room to maneu- of his rear drive idler. We then picked the last tank and scored — he began to ver vehicles. The CFV is narrow and burn. The two intervening tanks were de- quick enough to react to any distur- stroyed by two fast AP shots. So we got bance. Since most checkpoints are set two Panthers, a Mark 4, and an assault First Lieutenant Frank Lozano gun. Our 76mm rifle packed a good up in the center of the ZOS, it is im- was commissioned in Armor in portant that they portray a formidable, punch, even at two thousand yards. We 1993 as a Distinguished Mili- felt that we had the best self-propelled as well as intimidating, presence. The antitank gun in the ETO.” tary Graduate from Texas A&M M3A2 is again preferable in this role to In spite of his Purple Hearts and contin- either the HMMWV or M113. As University. A graduate of AOBC ued combat-related disabilities, Phil Hosey noted previously, the weapons systems and SPLC, he has served as a has provided many important first-hand accounts of his experiences for our com- and armor protection play a large factor tank platoon leader and scout bat history of the 704th Tank Destroyer as a visible deterrent. platoon leader. He is currently Battalion. Along with these characteristics, an- executive officer of Troop A, 1- other important factor is the optics of 1 Cavalry, at Lodgment Area CPT Richard R. Buchanan, MC (Ret.) Walker, Sebrenik, Bosnia-Her- Bn. Surgeon, 704th Tank Destroyer Bn. the M3A2. On a checkpoint where 24- Secretary/Historian, 704 TD Bn Assn. hour observation is key, good optics are zegovina. Wilmington, Ohio vital. Since checkpoints are generally

ARMOR — September-October 1996 37 Tank Combat Training: Tactical Tank Table VIII

by Captain Pat White and Lieutenant Colonel Karl Gunzelman

Standing around the “deadpool” ment no longer allow gunnery to be a man concept facilitates control... tank 2 waiting for the platoon observer/con- crew-focused event, and as a platoon- orients on the platoon leader’s tank, troller to start his after-action review, focused event, the focus must be on the while tank 3 orients on the platoon ser- the commander of A-11 looks around at platoon leader. Current tank and tacti- geant’s (PSG) tank. The PSG orients on the blinking yellow lights. He finds it cal tables fail to provide a realistic the platoon leader’s tank.” Again, the hard to believe that the entire platoon challenge to Force XXI tankers. The platoon leader is the focus. was destroyed by one T-80 tank. After training of the tank platoon via qualifi- all, his platoon averaged 921 on Tank cation of Tank Table XII, and achieving Situational awareness is another criti- cal factor in understanding and master- Table VIII. His was the low score, and the optimum training experience of- ing control. Situational awareness is he still ended with 897 points. At the fered at the CTCs, should become the time, he was a little disappointed that focal point in development of a Tacti- described as “the ability to maintain a he didn’t get a distinguished score, but cal Tank Table VIII which fully inte- constant clear mental picture of the tac- tical situation... For platoon leaders and a superior score is pretty good, isn’t it? grates the platoon leader, thus optimiz- PSGs... the key to making sound, quick After all, the crew qualification table is ing the training of the platoon. As TT challenging, if not stressful and, ac- VIII currently stands, the platoon tactical decisions. It allows them to form logical conclusions and to make cording to FM 17-12-1-2, the table leader participates only as a tank com- decisions that anticipate future events should be realistic within the safety and mander. The platoon leader is not in- resource constraints of live fire tank volved in tactical decisions, or much in and information.” FM 17-15, Chapter 2, section II. Developing situational ranges. the development of his crews. Consider awareness as a skill is difficult, but the two primary training events in the After thinking some more, maybe he development of a tank platoon leader: paramount to success as a combat should have ‘performed reconnaissance leader. by fire’ on the woodline. Maybe that semi-annual gunnery and a CTC rota- tion. How does TT VIII help in prepar- Seeing the battlefield, based on re- would have drawn the T-80 out. And, ing the platoon leader for TT XII? ports from the platoon, is critical to what about “Actions on Contact”? Af- ter initial contact, the platoon didn’t re- More importantly, how, in the overall success and the development of platoon readiness and training of a platoon, leaders. Too often, platoons and pla- spond. Nobody returned fire, and he does TT VIII prepare a platoon leader toon leaders who are successful in gun- didn’t receive a contact report in time for combat? Truthfully, TT VIII doesn’t; to develop the situation. At least this nery fail to achieve similar results dur- was just a training experience, one he in essence, the Armor Corps is missing ing CTC rotations. Primarily, this is a an excellent opportunity to train the direct reflection of the platoon leader’s wouldn’t forget, and one he was sure platoon leader, who is quite often one ability to react and act in unfamiliar the platoon observer/controller wouldn’t let him forget. of the youngest, most inexperienced situations. All gunnery tables are rote. members of the platoon. Yet the pla- Learn the fire commands, G2 the The training program hadn’t been a toon leader is responsible for the safety, course, and you’re guaranteed some complete waste of time. At least gun- welfare, and training of the platoon. level of success. The problem is that nery went well. the OPFOR doesn’t react the same Gunnery tables should support ma- way; it doesn’t deploy on a given piece Comparing tank gunnery scores with neuver through more tactically sound results at the Combat Training Centers, execution with direct involvement of of terrain the same every time. Is it re- alistic to expect the platoon leader to a clear-cut problem surfaces; platoon the platoon leader, especially given the generalize those skills from TTVII to leaders need a combined leader and conditions our gunnery manuals depict, tactical training program. The Armor “the tank platoon is the smallest ma- the fluid battlefield? So, why are we training precision gunnery to an ex- force does not offer platoon leaders an neuver element within a tank company pected, unrealistic opposing force? adequate chance to transition from pre- and the tank platoon is organized to cision gunnery to combat training. fight as a unified element....” The train- Train proficiency in battlefield aware- ing of the platoon, and thus the platoon ness, and success in gunnery and CTC Moreover, our tank combat training rotations should increase. Only then program does not accurately depict leader, clearly becomes the purpose of will a platoon be able to accomplish what platoon leaders might encounter revising current tank gunnery tables. at a CTC or in combat. If the platoon what FM 17-15 says it can, “At the Chapter 2, FM 17-15, further states most fundamental level, battle space is fails, the company fails, and so, “the command and control of combat the three dimensional area in which the shouldn’t we at least consider changing a training program developed some 30- elements are the biggest challenges platoon can acquire enemy forces and faced by combat leaders on the modern influence them with effective fires.” odd years ago? battlefield... command has two vital The reason to change is to focus tank components: decision-making and lead- The first major maneuver training ex- platoon proficiency on warfighting ership.” Control at platoon level is de- perience for a platoon leader is a CTC skills and platoon leader proficiency in fined further by the wingman concept. rotation. The learning curve is often too fighting a platoon. Changes in environ- “Under battlefield conditions, the wing- steep, and doesn’t afford the platoon an 38 ARMOR — September-October 1996 opportunity to digest and learn, because Armor Corps must link gunnery to platform. Stress must be placed on the immediately after CTC rotations, it’s doctrine, tactics, techniques, and proce- platoon leader in reporting, directing, back to garrison for three to four dures of the developing Force XXI. We and moving his tank during TT IV. FM months of gunnery prep (again, that must link gunnery to FM 17-15 and 17-15 designates the platoon as the precision training broken-up by weeks ARTEP 17-237-10-MTP, and, as men- lowest level of a tank company. Field of duty company). With shrinking tioned, refocus the ‘gate’ system to ac- Manual 100-25 directs that we train training funds and downsizing almost commodate a Tactical VIII. The im- one level down, and evaluate two lev- complete, the Armor community needs proved gate system would still contain els down; therefore, the platoon leader to rethink the focus of tank combat individual qualification, crew qualifica- would initiate engagements for his tank training. The Gunnery and Tactical De- tion, and platoon qualification. commanders on TT IV similar to partments at Ft. Knox should combine UCOFT; however, during TT IV, the efforts in development of a training Individual qualification consists of the platoon leader would report battlefield Tank Crew Gunnery Skills Test concept which complies with advanced (TCGST), but all crewmembers would information to the company com- technology, limited funds, advanced mander. This training would reinforce simulations, and audacious leaders in be required to pass all stations. The fo- UCOFT and prepare the platoon leader cus of individual qualification would the Armor Corps. More challenging ta- become familiarization and proficiency for Tactical VIII, and TT XII. bles, combining leader and tactical de- velopment with precision gunnery tech- with all aspects of the tank, possibly Crew qualification would begin with through a written test as well. Once the training intermediate tank gunnery ta- niques, would be more applicable. individual effectively qualifies the bles consistent with current standards; With the focus on training platoon TCGST and proficiency exam, Gate 1 however, the platoon leader would leaders, the time has come to rethink is complete. again be involved with reporting, dis- our training strategy. Chapter 16 of FM seminating information, controlling his Gate 2 would begin with crew certifi- 17-12-1-2 states that, “tank gunnery ta- cation, and be completed upon crew tanks, and moving on his tank. Crew bles are designed to develop and test qualification is complete upon qualifi- the proficiency of individual, crew, and qualification. The platoon leader (PL) cation of the second gate, Tactical VIII. would begin training by fully partici- platoon gunnery techniques at the ba- pating in the crew certification pro- Platoon certification focuses on the sic, intermediate, and advanced levels for both the active and reserve compo- gram. All PLs would have to be In- use the Platoon Gunnery Trainer nents.” Chapter 16 further states that structor Operator (IO) certified. This (PGT), Simulations Network (SIM- serves two purposes. First, it fully inte- NET), and a Platoon Tactical Profi- “the series of engagements on each is grates the PL into understanding the ciency Course (PTPC). The PTPC intended to duplicate.... typical battle- field tasks under realistic firing condi- functions and use of the Unit Conduct would be a combination of platoon of Fire Trainer. Second, the PL would MTPs and current tank tactical tables G tions and against likely enemy target begin his training in the tactical portion and H. The tanks would be equipped arrays. Thirty years ago or more, when the tank tables were developed, of Tactical VIII. As the IO, the PL be- with the Multiple Integrated Laser En- gins tactical reporting, command and gagement System II. Platoon qualifica- Unit Conduct of Fire Trainers, platoon control, and decision-making. As tar- tion would be qualification of TT XII. gunnery trainers, and numerous gun- nery training devices did not exist. gets appear, the scenario is relayed as such, “A12, this is A11, enemy tanks Use of simulations, such as the Unit Knowledge and technology have ad- vicinity TRP 2, engage and report, Conduct of Fire Trainer (UCOFT), Pla- vanced greatly, and changes should be considered for tank combat training. over.” The tank commander then takes toon Gunnery Trainer (PGT), and SIM- action, but must also report tactically NET, in conjunction with home station The changes need not effect the ‘gate’ through contact reports and spot re- certification programs, would ensure system, but merely reemphasize that the ‘gates’ will be based on training the ports. Of course, the tank commander maximum training for platoon leaders platoon leader. must also issue a fire command. Using and bring crew proficiency levels up to the advanced matrix, commanders can a standard where the gunnery experi- Currently, the Armor Corps is pre- also utilize the current TT VIII scenario ence more fully focuses on the platoon sented with a double standard. FM 17- to train crew technical proficiency. The leader. Simulations are excellent for 12-1-2, Chapter 14 states, “The tank UCOFT is a great tool for training teaching the technical aspects of gun- tactical tables parallel the gunnery ta- crew proficiency in fire control mal- nery. Leaders can induce errors and bles; together these tables overcome functions. The ability to induce subsys- malfunctions into the fire control sys- the deficiencies inherent to range train- tem failures greatly enhances the level tem, and help the crew learn to deal ing. Preferably, the tactical tables are of preparedness of crews prior to firing routinely with those malfunctions. conducted in concert with the gunnery any main gun ammunition; however, tables.” Honestly, how often does that the battalion and company command- The proposed qualification course happen? How often does a unit train ers must stress proper IO feedback. consists of any of a number of varying tactical tables in conjunction with the And, again, the platoon leader would scenarios; scenarios based on guidance gunnery tables? According to our doc- be the primary trainer, the quality con- from the company commander, recom- trine, together the tables overcome the trol manager, of the training of his mended by the battalion commander, deficiencies! Great! Of course, now we crews. Thus would begin the tactical and approved by the division com- have to refer to two separate FMs in training, reinforced by the technical as- mander; scenarios driven by the tactical order to train Abrams tank gunnery and pects of UCOFT. decisions of the tank commander and tactical proficiency through platoon platoon leader; scenarios which offer a level. How can we combine the tactical Crew certification also consists of TT standard, but challenge the tank crew tables and gunnery tables, providing a IV (Tank Crew Proficiency Course). and platoon leader and are based on realistic training experience for the pla- This is the first time the platoon leader any variety of “threat” doctrinal tem- toon leader and the platoon? First, the would begin training from his fighting plates. ARMOR — September-October 1996 39 Development and execution of Tacti- ing tank to destroy with main gun and Integrating FM 17-15 and ARTEP 17- cal VIII scenarios focuses on the pla- machine gun. The PL leader sends ap- 237-10-MTP into Tactical VIII offers toon leader. Scenarios for Tactical VIII propriate reports to the commander and Armor the much needed combination are developed by combining FM 17-15 Tactical VIII continues based on deci- of Tactical Tables with Gunnery Tables. and ARTEP 17-237-10-MTP. Focusing sions by the company commander. The integration allows home station on the leader tasks in ARTEP 17-237- Execute Actions on contact (17-3- training to focus on one training event, 10-MTP, and applying these tasks to and the result will be more competent, doctrinal concepts in FM 17-15 in- 0221) is a very necessary drill that aggressive platoon leaders. Tactical must be practiced to perfection, and creases the proficiency of our platoon should be included within the Tactical VIII will also provide the base for suc- leadership. Reconnaissance by Fire is cess on TT XII, and CTC rotations. an example of an engagement in a pro- VIII scenarios. Again, Actions on Con- Development of a Tactical VIII would posed scenario. Perform Reconnais- tact is an easy scenario to develop. be more challenging, realistic, and Conditions are “the platoon is conduct- sance by Fire, (17-3-0218) is an un- ing offensive operations in a tactical would better prepare crews, platoons, common task which is often not ap- and the platoon leader for combat than plied in a tactical environment, often to environment, is moving, and encoun- our current gunnery models. Similar to ters a moving or stationary Threat tank the detriment of the platoon, but is an or motorized rifle platoon. The Threat any new concept, there are plenty of easy task to rehearse and practice. bugs to be worked out, but with current force engages the platoon.” Task Stand- simulations, the advances in technol- ard is “ the platoon returns fire, and the The conditions for Recon by Fire platoon leader orders a contact drill ogy, and the quality of armor/cavalry state, “The platoon is operating in a crewmen, let’s present a challenging, tactical environment, as part of a com- within 15 seconds. No more than one gratifying training experience based on tank is lost to hostile fire.” Leader tasks pany team attack where Threat contact for this scenario include, PL directs a the M1A1/M1A2 series tank, not a se- is expected. The commander gives the ries of tables — tactical and gunnery platoon permission to develop the situ- platoon battle drill; PL informs the — based on the M48/M60 fleet. commander of Threat contact; and the ation through reconnaissance by fire to PL sends a complete spot report to the flush the threat out of a suspected posi- tion. The threat consists of no more company team commander. than a platoon in hasty defensive posi- Following Recon by Fire, the PL tions.” Task standard is “The platoon could issue FRAGO for the firing tank flushes the Threat from its position or to begin movement to a designated Captain Pat White is a determines that there is no Threat in Phase Line. The firing tank reports graduate of the Claremont the position, with minimal expenditure REDCON 1 and begins movement. As Colleges, California. He was of ammunition and time. No friendly the firing tank moves, the tower pre- commissioned in Armor in losses are incurred.” By studying the sents Threat targets which present sig- 1986. He has attended AOB, Task Condition and Standard, Recon natures representing enemy fire. The the Scout Platoon Leader by Fire could be the initial engagement firing tank returns or initiates fires to Course, AOAC, and FAOAC. for Tactical VIII scenarios involving destroy or suppress the enemy, seeks His former jobs include tank Attack or Defense — the two primary cover or concealment, and alerts the missions of a tank platoon. platoon leader with a contact report. platoon leader, scout platoon The PL then directs a battle drill, and leader, and company XO with There are five leader tasks under Re- the firing tank completes destruction of 1-33 Armor, Ft. Lewis, Wash; con by Fire, 1) The platoon leader (PL) the enemy with direct fire. tank company commander identifies the expected location(s) of with the 2-32 Armor, Kirch- Threat contact, 2) The PL identifies Meanwhile, the PL informs the com- goens, Germany; and Oppos- overwatch position(s), 3) The PL issues mander of Threat contact. Upon de- ing Force Tank Company a FRAGO to the platoon to occupy the struction or suppression of the enemy, Commander, Combat Maneu- overwatch position and to prepare to the PL sends a complete spot report to ver Training Center (CMTC), conduct reconnaissance by fire, 4) The the commander, and Tactical VIII con- PL or PSG utilizes indirect fires, and 5) tinues. Hohenfels, Germany. He is If indirect fires are not available or the currently an Armor com- indirect fires do not flush the Threat, Scoring and evaluation would be pany/team observer controller the PL orders the platoon to conduct similar to current standards. The with the Grizzly O/C Team, reconnaissance by fire. The scenario changes to scoring would involve tar- CMTC, Hohenfels, Germany. would be constructed in the following get exposure time, engagement range, manner. The commander issues a and incorporation of tactical scoring. FRAGO to the PL via FM, while the Qualification standards would only Lieutenant Colonel Karl Gun- platoon occupies an attack position. vary based on scenarios, 70% target zelman was commissioned in The PL determines likely Threat posi- destruction or suppression within allo- 1975. He has served in a vari- tions and issues a FRAGO to the firing cated times still being a standard for ety of command and staff po- tank to occupy an overwatch position qualification. The scoring still involves sitions with the 2d Armored Di- on the course. The firing tank moves to crew cuts to include correct reporting vision, 3d Armored Cavalry identified position, reports set, and pre- procedures (SALT format). Considera- Regiment, and the 11th ACR. pares to engage. The PL issues the or- tion to target presents may alter, but not He is currently the Senior Task der, and the firing tank begins Recon the 70%. How often in war do we get a Force O/C at CMTC, following by Fire of designated areas — first chance to pull off the range, conduct with crew served weapons. The tower diagnostics, and continue when we are the command of 3/3 ACR. then presents Threat targets for the fir- ready? 40 ARMOR — September-October 1996 Mobility Analysis for the Digitized Brigade

by Captain Robert S. Mikaloff

Today’s emphasis on achieving un- quantity of terrain information and made features, such as vegetation, soil precedented levels of situational aware- speed its production. By reducing time composition, roads, drainage, and ur- ness by digitization of the battlefield used to classify terrain (severely re- ban areas. DTED provides elevation and visualization skills of battle com- stricted, restricted, or unrestricted), data. Both are good tools to aid a com- mand requires a greater knowledge of more time is available to analyze the mander in terrain visualization and pro- terrain than in the past. New and so- significance of terrain relative to en- vide some baseline information needed phisticated weapons, sensors, and com- emy and friendly force tactical situ- to perform mobility analysis. However, mand and control methods demand de- ations. these applications cannot integrate this tailed information for employment. The Currently, an automated terrain analy- information into mobility predictions. ability to gather and understand infor- To adequately meet the needs of the mation about the terrain is critical to sis capability is available to command- commander, the brigade requires a mo- our success. ers at division level. This resides at the bility prediction tool, like Risk Based Division Topographic Engineer Detach- ST 71-3, Tactics Techniques and Pro- ment. The Topographic Engineer De- Mobility Modeling, that can merge all variables that affect mobility. cedures for the Digitized Brigade out- tachment supports the entire division, lines the importance of more precise and has adequate conventional systems The Risk Based Mobility Model is a terrain products to a digitized force, to aid in terrain visualization. There are UNIX-based system potentially com- given the nature of its operations: “The several factors that limit the adequacy patible with the ASAS, being fielded brigade must integrate its combat of this support to meet future needs. to divisions, and ASAS WARLORD, power at the right time and place to projected to be fielded at the brigade Operations other than war, force pro- achieve the effects required to accom- tection operations, and other diverse re- level. It complements the capabilities plish the mission and protect the of DFAD and DTED. With DFAD and force.” Listed as a capability critical to quirements generated by the end of the DTED, the S2 has information on the cold war increased the burden on divi- the integration of the force is a “move- sion topographic teams. With this in- characteristics of the area. Risk Based ment rate program” able to predict Mobility merges the type of informa- rates of movement of subordinate units creased workload, the Division Topo- tion found on DFAD and DTED with graphic Detachment cannot adequately along independent approaches. answer the brigade commander’s re- information on soil composition, pre- cipitation, etc., into predictions useful During the 1995 Armor Conference, quirements in a timely fashion while for intelligence, tactical maneuver, fire the Army Corps of Engineers Water- still responding to the needs of the di- planning, and battlefield logistics. vision commander. ways Experiment Station displayed The capabilities of Risk Based Mobil- automated mobility prediction software The Topographic Engineer Detach- that can provide this information; it is ment supports the entire division. At ity Modeling include standard IPB products, such as identification of unre- called Risk Based Mobility Modeling. brigade or task force level, getting stricted, restricted, or severely restricted The focus of this model is on ground topographic support involves making a mobility. It examines how various fac- request through intelligence channels to terrain. These are principal considera- tions for Phase II of the IPB process, tors, such as soil composition, slope, the G2. Once a request is in the queue, “Describe the Battlefield’s Effects,” and precipitation, relate to terrain data the G2 sets the detachment’s priorities. for any given area. Risk Based Mobil- The increased operational tempo of and a major element in the develop- ment of the Modified Combined Obsta- ity Modeling can provide mobility esti- digitized forces requires that terrain cle Overlay (MCOO). Risk Based Mo- mates with a level of accuracy, detail, analysis be responsive and timely. If and precision impossible to achieve your request is not high on the priority bility Modeling can further define traf- ficability based on the type of vehicle, through manual terrain analysis. The list, the support you get will be late in (i.e., areas where tracked vehicles can program can be applied to movement coming, probably too late for your pur- of enemy forces or planning the move- pose. Once again, the S2 will be left in move). ment of friendly forces. the corner drawing lines on a map and Risk Based Mobility can take this a At brigade and task force levels, the making a guess on terrain. A solution is step further. Mobility analysis can be giving the brigade S2 an automated ter- tailored to specific characteristics of formal process of terrain analysis tradi- rain analysis capability that addresses enemy and friendly vehicles and for- tionally belongs to the S2. It is a famil- iar sight to see S2s bent over a map, one of his, and his commander’s, prin- mations (see Figure 1). In addition to cipal concerns — mobility. identification of unrestricted, restricted, circling terrain features and making an or severely restricted terrain, Risk educated guess about the trafficability The All Source Analysis System of terrain. Through a map analysis, the (ASAS) WARLORD, projected to be Based Mobility Modeling can render a prediction of the speed at which spe- S2 seeks to define if the terrain is traf- fielded to brigades, has limited terrain cific vehicles can traverse an area. Fig- ficable at all, where vehicles are likely analysis capabilities. The map and ter- to be able to go, and how long it will rain tools currently resident on ASAS ure 2 illustrates cross country speed for an M1A1. take to move through certain areas. An WARLORD are Digital Feature Analy- automated mobility prediction capabil- sis Data (DFAD) and Digital Terrain Other mobility studies analyze terrain ity, such as Risk Based Mobility Mod- Elevation Data (DTED). DFAD pro- based on homogeneous soil composi- eling, will increase the quality and vides information on natural and man- tion. The Risk Based Model compen-

ARMOR — September-October 1996 41 Figure 1

These illustrations are intended to give readers a Even in the black and white versions here, the ca- feel for the screen formats of the mapping system. pability of the system to quickly reveal go and no- Many of the fine details visible in the actual color go areas can be appreciated. In the lower left illus- versions are not apparent in these black-and-white tration, the heavier lines show the optimum routes renderings. selected by the system.

Figure 2 Figure 3

42 ARMOR — September-October 1996 ENEMY SITUATION AAG sates for heterogeneous soil composi- OPERATION VKIII tion as part of the mobility prediction algorithm. Through a series of tests comparing actual movement rates of TANK BRIGADE vehicles and the predicted rate of DAG movement, the differences are factored into the mobility predictions rendered by Risk Based Modeling. In addition, recent precipitation is accounted for in mobility predictions. The model adds further accuracy by allowing the user to consider subjective variables effect- ing mobility, such as the level of main- tenance of the vehicle and the profi- ciency of the driver. If levels of main- tenance and driver training can be gen- Figure 4 eralized to a unit, an adjustment for unit movement times is possible. For example, we know that enemy vehicles being lead element of a follow-on force commander directed his S2 to develop are well maintained, but the training of when the enemy division resumed the a graphic showing where and in what enemy drivers is generally poor. Risk offensive. The friendly brigade com- time frame the enemy tank brigade Based Mobility accounts for these con- mander’s plan called for destroying the could move in any direction. Normally, ditions and allows differences in move- enemy tank brigade and the division the short time given to an S2 to de- ment time based on variance in driver artillery group simultaneously. By at- velop this product demands that it be training and vehicle maintenance. Fig- tacking them simultaneously he could done in the TOC and involves the S2 ure 3 identifies two routes from point A defeat both the enemy defense and the guessing about the trafficability of the to B. The time of travel between these coming offensive operations. The terrain, applying normal movement routes is given in minimum, maximum, friendly brigade commander’s scheme speeds for that type unit, and develop- and average time. A good driver in a of maneuver called for infiltrating sub- ing time phase lines to illustrate move- well maintained vehicle will take the ordinate mounted task forces through ment times (see Figure 6). The preci- minimum time, an average driver will the enemy main defensive belt, then sion and reliability of this product is take the average time, and a poor conducting a near simultaneous attack low. With a mobility prediction tool, driver the maximum time. against the enemy tank brigade and the like Risk Based Mobility Modeling, enemy division artillery group. An air this product is at the S2’s fingertips. By The most unique capability of Risk assault task force would be inserted to picking a series of start points and end Based Modeling is its ability to predict the north between the enemy tank bri- points, as shown in Figure 3, the S2 random movement. This means the gade and an artillery group present to can develop a product that provides a model can identify a range of possible support the future enemy offensive (see mobility estimate with much greater routes for vehicles. Using Risk Based Figure 5). Due to the non-linear nature precision and speed than any manual Modeling, a start point and an end of the battlefield, the friendly brigade product. point are selected for analysis. The model identifies possible routes be- tween selected points for the type of ROUTES OF ADVANCE vehicle indicated and specifies the time OPERATION VKIII it will take for each route giving a best case, worst case, and average time. The routes identified in Figure 3 were iden- AAG 327 tified by picking a start point and an TF 1- end point. The model identifies routes and the minimum, maximum, and aver- age time needed to traverse the routes. TANK BRIGADE DAG To illustrate the utility of a mobility prediction tool at brigade, consider the following scenario. (Borrowed from Virtual Kyrgyzstan III, a JANUS exer- cise held at Ft. Knox to validate the concepts of ST 71-3, Tactics, Tech- niques, and Procedures for The Digit- PD ized Brigade.) The brigade was to at- PD 3 tack an enemy mechanized division. The enemy division defended with two 1 PD TF 2-33 understrength brigades forward and a TF 1-41 2 tank brigade situated to their rear (see TF 1-70 Figure 4). The enemy tank brigade had dual missions of division reserve and Figure 5

ARMOR — September-October 1996 43 ROUTES OF ADVANCE OPERATION VKIII on movement times, the commander DOTTED LINES INDICATE AAG 5 MINUTE INTERVALS can sequence departure times for sub- 327 TF 1- ordinate units allowing for the planned near-simultaneous attack against the enemy tank brigade and division artil- TANK BRIGADE lery group. DAG This scenario highlights the utility and need for an automated mobility prediction tool, at least at the brigade level. The information requirements and high tempo of Force XXI opera- tions demand a terrain visualization aid PD that can provide the commander accu- 3 rate and useful mobility predictions. If PD resident at brigade level, this capability 1 PD TF 2-33 would provide the commander an in- 2 valuable decision-making aid with util- TF 1-41 TF 1-70 ity in both operations and intelligence, responsive to his needs before and dur- Figure 6 ing the battle. During the Army’s transition from an The application of mobility prediction task forces, the brigade plan had to be industrial age force to an information software is not limited to intelligence. altered. Other units had to slow their age force, we are providing brigade As part of the same scenario, the movement and go into concealed posi- commanders the means to gain un- scheme of maneuver called for all the tions to wait for the slow task force to precedented situational awareness of subordinate task forces to be in posi- get into position. This gave the enemy the enemy and his own forces. To com- tion to attack the enemy tank brigade commander time to react. He dispersed plete this, the commander needs a pre- and division artillery group in a near-si- the tank brigade into battalions and cision tool to help him understand the multaneous manner. During execution, used them to counterattack (see Figure terrain on which he will fight. An auto- the subordinate units crossed multiple 7). mated mobility prediction application points of departure at the same time. such as Risk Based Mobility Modeling Resulting from inaccurate mobility pre- Using an automated mobility predic- provides this tool. dictions, the unit with the shortest dis- tion tool with the capabilities of Risk tance to travel, TF 1-41, took the long- Based Modeling, movement times are est to get in position (see Figure 6). indicated on routes selected by the task This was due to the nature of the ter- forces. If a certain route is identified as rain along his route. The soil was soft, unsuitable during analysis, an alternate Captain Robert S. Mikaloff resulting in slower movement. Because can be chosen. With more precision in earned his commission in his movement lagged behind the other planning routes, and a better estimate 1985 through Officer Candi- date School. His previous as- ROUTES OF ADVANCE signments include assistant S3, 311th MI Battalion, 101st Air- OPERATION VKIII borne (AASLT); S2, 2/327th In-

AAG fantry, 101st Airborne (AASLT); G2 ASPS Chief, 6th ID (L); 1-327 TF company commander, HHSC, 106th MI Battalion; and instruc- tor, Armor School. Recently, he DAG served as the S2 Trainer at the Virtual Training Program, Ft. Knox. Currently, he is the USAARMC Threat manager and a member of the Advanced Warfighting Working Group. PD 3 The author would like to PD thank Dr. Niki C. Deliman of 1 PD TF 2-33 the U.S. Army Corps of Engi- 2 neers Waterways Experiment TF 1-41 TF 1-70 Station for technical advice in the writing of this article. Figure 7

44 ARMOR — September-October 1996 The Task Force Commander’s Role In Fire Support Planning

by Lieutenant Colonel Harry L. Leiferman

One of the trends reinforced with the force commander’s inability to under- maneuver. The scheme of fires is the transition to brigade operations at the stand his role in fire support planning detailed sequencing of fire support National Training Center is the inabil- as well as the role of the task force as events that must occur in order to ity to synchronize indirect fires and an executor of the brigade scheme of achieve the endstate articulated in the maneuver to achieve the effects desired fires during brigade operations. concept of fires. from combined arms operations. The The brigade concept usually assigns task force commander is not getting This article attempts to explain what timely, accurate indirect fires. There the task force should expect from bri- fire support tasks to subordinates. As part of the concept, it is brigade’s re- have been a number of reasons identi- gade as the ‘provider’ of indirect fires sponsibility to provide indirect fires to fied, some of which are related to the and clarify the role of the task force training level of the field artillery bat- and task force commander in fire sup- the task force close/direct firefight. talion staffs and firing units. However, port planning. Although some of what These fires are for a specific period of time and a specific purpose. The bri- it has become more and more evident is contained in this article introduces gade must clearly specify when fires that part of the problem is the task new terminology and may be consid- ered ‘emerging’ tactics, techniques and will transition to the task force and when the task force will lose them. Re- procedures, there is a basis for this finements to the brigade scheme of methodology in FM 6-71, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Fire fires from subordinate units must also be integrated. Finally, the brigade inte- Support for Combined Arms Com- grates the movement of artillery units “Army forces prefer to fight manders. These observations are also as a combined arms team... based on lessons learned during the with the scheme of maneuver. producing effects that are first six brigade-level rotations at the greater than the sum of the National Training Center. This article Brigade Role in individual parts. The com- also offers a step-by-step approach to Fire Support Planning bined arms team strives to task force fire support planning. conduct fully integrated op- • Synchronize the brigade concept of erations in the dimensions of Brigade’s Role: The brigade plays a fires with brigade maneuver vital role in task force fire support time, space, purpose and re- • Develop brigade scheme of fires sources.... The goal is to con- planning and execution. With the ex- ception of the task force mortars, the and assign tasks to subordinates fuse, demoralize and destroy brigade is the ‘provider’ of indirect • Provide indirect fires for task force the enemy with the coordi- fires. Therefore, before we can accu- close/direct firefight (specified pe- nated impact of combat rately clarify the task force role in exe- riod of time and purpose - clearly power.... The sudden and dev- cuting the brigade scheme of fires, it is defining when fires transition to the astating impact of combined necessary to quickly review brigade’s TF close/direct firefight and when arms paralyzes the enemy’s role. The brigade develops a synchro- the task force will lose fires) nized brigade scheme of maneuver and response, leaving him ripe for • Integrate refinements from subordi- defeat.... The application of brigade concept of fires, translating that nates combined arms in this man- concept into a scheme of fires. • Integrate movement of artillery ner is complex and demand- There is no clear doctrinal definition ing. It requires detailed plan- for either concept of fires or scheme of units with scheme of maneuver ning and violent execution by fires. For the purpose of this article, highly trained soldiers and concept of fires, expressed in terms of The Task Force Role: The task force units who have been thor- task, purpose, method, and endstate, is is the ‘executor’ of their portion of the oughly trained.” the allocation of fire support assets to brigade scheme of fires. With the ex- achieve a specific effect on an enemy ception of the task force mortars, the FM 100-5 formation with a visualized purpose brigade commander ‘owns’ the indirect and endstate to support the scheme of fire assets. The artillery is normally in

ARMOR — September-October 1996 45 direct support (DS) of the brigade. • Bottom-up refinement from com- TF Commander’s Role Therefore, the task force must clearly pany/teams in Fire Support Planning understand not only the brigade con- • Forward TF concept of fires and cept of fires, and how it is synchro- • Synchronization of indirect fires nized to support brigade maneuver, but target refinements to brigade with maneuver • the task force’s role in the brigade Rehearsals • Clearly articulate the task force scheme of fires so that the task force can execute its portion. Understanding concept of fires Task Force Commander’s Role: • this, the task force must develop its Much of the following relates directly Articulate for each target the ‘se- own concept of fires. This concept nor- quenced’ mally involves assigned tasks from the to work being done at the National brigade scheme of fires along with tar- Training Center on the abbreviated - Task in terms of desired effects planning process. One lesson we have Purpose for each target (as it re- gets to support the task force close/di- - rect firefight. This may require only the learned with brigade operations is that lates to maneuver) refinement of a brigade target or may time for planning at the task force level - Method is very limited. A task force cannot - Endstate require the task force to submit new plan to have sufficient time for the de- targets to support the task force com- • Synchronization of mortars with mander’s scheme of maneuver. Addi- liberate planning process. This is concept of fires and the scheme of equally true for planning indirect fires. tionally, the task force must plan to maneuver synchronize mortar fires with the • scheme of maneuver, integrate the mor- Ensure the brigade commander/staff understand the importance of task tars into the scheme of fires, and syn- force fires to the scheme of maneu- chronize their movement with the scheme of maneuver. The task force “Synchronization is arrang- ver then develops a scheme of fire that ing activities in time and It is worth noting here that once the supports those tasks assigned by bri- space to mass at the decisive task force commander approves the gade and the targets developed by the point.... Synchronization thus scheme of fires, he must clearly articu- task force. It then issues the fire sup- takes place first in the minds late to the brigade commander and bri- port plan to its subordinates. Bottom-up gade staff the importance of those fires refinement to support the company/ of commanders and then in to the task force scheme of maneuver team commander’s scheme of maneu- the actual planning and coor- and the impact on mission success if ver will also be incorporated. The task dination of movement, fires those fires are not received. If a task force forwards a concept of fires and and support activities.” force critical fire support task is not target refinements to brigade as soon as FM 100-5 also included as a brigade critical fire possible to ensure it is fully integrated support task, the likelihood of getting with, and does not desynchronize, the the target fired by artillery or CAS is brigade scheme of fires. Finally, the greatly diminished. plan must be rehearsed to ensure it is Observations at the National Training clearly understood. This process is the The key role of the task force com- essence of the step-by-step approach Center indicate that many commanders mander in indirect fire planning is syn- are unable to clearly define what they that will be discussed in more detail chronization of indirect fires with the want their fires to do, and cannot visu- later. scheme of maneuver. Fires and maneu- alize their synchronization with maneu- ver must be considered together. Com- ver. Of those that can, many cannot ar- manders must first decide precisely ticulate their intent for fires to their Task Force Role what they want their fires to accom- in Fire Support Planning staff. If they can, the level of training plish. If the commander thinks maneu- and experience of their staff and par- • Understand the integration of bri- ver first, and then tries to add fires ticularly their fire support officer is not later, he will have difficulty. gade maneuver and fires sufficient to translate that guidance into • Understand task force role in bri- a concept of fires. It is clear that, until Once he has decided what he wants time permits more deliberate planning, gade scheme of fires/maneuver fires to accomplish, the commander or until the staff and FSO become bet- • Act as ‘executor’ of their portion of must take an active role in developing ter trained, the task force commander brigade scheme of fires the task force Concept of Fire Support. must take a more active role in devel- He must clearly articulate to his staff, oping the concept of fires. He cannot • Develop task force concept and not just his fire support officer, the ‘se- scheme of fires afford to divorce himself from this quenced’ critical fire support tasks in process. • Integrate/refine brigade targets for terms of the desired effects for each target; the purpose of each target as it Now that we have discussed the role close/direct fire fight relates to the scheme of maneuver; the of the commander, as well as the role • Plan for the synchronization of TF method he would like to use to achieve of the brigade and task force in fire mortars with the scheme of fires the desired effects; and the endstate he support planning, what follows is one and their movement with the wants for each target. This will be ex- method of indirect fire planning at the scheme of maneuver plained in more detail later. task force level. Again, it is important

46 ARMOR — September-October 1996 Mission Analysis Brief (FSO Input) to note that this methodology is tied di- • • rectly to the abbreviated planning proc- Brigade Scheme of Fires Assets Available/When - Higher Commander’s Concept of Fires - FIST status ess and the commander’s role in abbre- - Allocation of FPFs/priority TGTs - Mortar status/location viated planning. - Current and on order FSCMs - CAS allocation - Specified and implied tasks - COLT allocation/location Step 1: Mission Analysis Brief: In - Limitations order to make the right decision about - Priority of fires • Current Ammunition Status the employment of his indirect fires, - Number of killing missions the commander must get certain infor- • FA Organization For Combat Available (FA/MTR) mation from his fire support officer. - Location - Smoke (length/duration) This is normally done during the Mis- - When in position - FASCAM (# of disrupt, fix, sion Analysis Brief. The key informa- turn, block/release tion he must receive includes a clear authority) understanding of the brigade scheme of - Number of Copperhead fires as those fires relate to the maneu- ver plan, a clear understanding of the task force role as an ‘executor’ of its portion of the brigade scheme of fires, and a clear picture of available indirect will have a severe impact on the ability and Sequenced ...to clearly prioritize fire assets. to accomplish the maneuver task it the order the targets should be fired supports. It is imperative that the com- based on the scheme of maneuver. Step 2: Specify the Concept of Fire mander personally establish the task Commanders must ensure that artillery Support: (Note: One could argue that and purpose for each target. The FSO is available when required to support this step should be the ‘Commander’s can assist the commander in estab- the scheme of maneuver. If the scheme Intent for Fire Support’ as part of the lishing the method and endstate. Criti- of maneuver requires firing of more commander’s planning guidance to his cal fire support tasks should be ex- than one critical fire support task at a staff. This is probably true above the pressed in terms of... time, the commander may have to ‘ap- task force level, where you have a portion’ his assets to meet all the planning staff and a FSCOORD and The Task ...Although FM 6-20-10, needs. This ‘apportionment’ normally can effectively plan and execute simul- The Targeting Process discusses task occurs at brigade level. taneously. However, at the task force and purpose in terms of disrupt, limit, It may be worth noting here that not level you do not have a planning cell, and delay, at the maneuver task force and most FSOs do not have the experi- level it is more appropriate for the task all critical fire support tasks have to be ence of fire support planners at higher firing tasks. For example, the insertion force commander to state his tasks in of an observer to have eyes on a target levels and are unable to translate com- terms of the effects he desires... Sup- mander’s intent for fire support into an press, Destroy, Obscure, Screen. These may be so important that the com- effective, synchronized concept of mander specifies it as a critical fire effects should be related to a specific support task. Another example may be fires. Couple this with limited planning enemy formation and/or function. time, and the result is a requirement for the use of CAS or nonlethal EW fires. the commander to specify the ‘concept The Purpose ...of the fires as they re- of fires’ as the next step rather than late to the scheme of maneuver. This is Step 3: Wargame - Develop the simply provide his intent for fires. how the commander synchronizes indi- Scheme of Fires: The sequenced criti- Time and training permitting, the ‘com- rect fires with maneuver. cal fire support tasks specified by the commander are a key component of the mander’s intent for fire support’ could The Method ...to achieve the desired be the second step at the task force effects (FA, mortars, CAS). At this wargame. Proper wargaming will en- level.) hance synchronization with maneuver. point, the commander may have a pref- When time is limited, as it is for abbre- At the conclusion of the mission erence for delivery of indirect fires. He viated planning, the commander should analysis brief to the task force com- may specify that he wants to use his mortars; he may specify that his desire participate in wargaming with his staff. mander, the commander gives his plan- During the wargame, the commander ning guidance to the staff. The com- is to use artillery or CAS; he can leave and fire support officer may need to mander specifies his maneuver course developing the method to his FSO. However, with the exception of speci- make minor adjustments to the concept of action, assigning maneuver task and of fires. What the wargame should ac- purpose to subordinate units. To ensure fying mortars, he must ‘negotiate’ with complish is flushing out the method of synchronization of indirect fires with brigade for artillery or CAS. The method may also be refined during the achieving the desired effects — the maneuver, rather than giving only his scheme of fires. This scheme of fires intent for fires, he must specify his con- wargame. must be ‘nested’ in the brigade scheme cept of fire support. He does this by The Endstate ...as it relates to the en- of fires, focused on a few key tar- clearly articulating his ‘sequenced’ emy or friendly formation/function. gets/critical fire support tasks, and link critical fire support tasks. There is no Endstate at the task force level is often observers to firing tasks, firing units clear definition of a critical fire support the accomplishment of the task. How- and an established schedule of fires. task. However, from a maneuver com- ever, a statement of the endstate is still The wargame will refine the target lo- mander’s perspective, it is a fire sup- desired and can be developed by the cations, means of delivery, target trig- port task that, if not properly executed, FSO. gers, observer locations, movement and

ARMOR — September-October 1996 47 “How To” Commander’s Critical Fire Support Tasks positioning for the mortars, CFZs, NFAs, and Fire Support Coordination Scenario: Your task force is the lead element in a brigade deliberate attack Measures (FSCMs). The fire support to destroy an MRB-size enemy. The enemy is defending with three MRCs officer produces two key products dur- abreast. You are the supporting effort. Your task is to breach the enemy ing the wargame, the target overlay and northern MRC, which cannot be supported with direct fires from the two the fire support execution matrix. The southern MRCs. Your purpose is to allow the trail task force to pass through target overlay is often incorporated the breach you create in the enemy position and complete the destruction of with the maneuver overlay. The scheme the two remaining MRCs. of fires must be forwarded to brigade Maneuver Course of Action: Because planning time is short, part of your to ensure they incorporate the task commander’s planning guidance to your staff, specifies a maneuver course of force fires into the brigade concept. action that calls for a task force deliberate breach of the northern MRP. You The fire support plan must also be dis- assign maneuver task and purpose to subordinate units: two company/teams seminated to the task force. will suppress the two southern MRPs from support by fire positions to pro- Step 4: Rehearsals: Rehearsal of the tect the breach and assault forces; one company/team will breach the enemy fire support plan is the next critical obstacles and northern MRP to allow the assault force to pass through the event. The bottom line to all this plan- breach; and one company/team will pass through the breach and destroy the ning is ensuring that it is clearly under- remainder of the northern MRC to allow the trail task force to pass through stood by those who must execute it the breach and destroy the two southern MRCs. (subordinate co/tms, observers, etc.) Concept of Fires: To ensure synchronization of indirect fires with maneu- and those who must support with fires ver, you also specify your concept of fires. You develop three “Sequenced” (brigade, firing units, mortars). The Critical Fire Support Tasks (CFST) to support your scheme of maneuver. most important task force rehearsal is the combined arms maneuver rehearsal. CFST #1: First, I want to continuously suppress the northern MRC for This rehearsal must integrate fully the approximately 12 minutes — the time I estimate it will take to occupy the fire support plan. Task force personnel two SBFs. The purpose is to allow both company/teams to occupy their sup- should also participate in the brigade port by fire positions without taking effective enemy direct fire. The method fire support ‘technical’ rehearsal to en- I prefer to use is FA fires on a group target by one battalion of artillery. The sure the task force targets are incorpo- endstate is both co/tms in their SBFs without losses to enemy direct fire. rated and synchronized in the brigade CFST #2: Next, I want to screen the point of penetration from the two scheme of fires. Time permitting, the southern MRPs of the northern MRC. The purpose is to prevent the enemy task force should also conduct a fire from engaging the breach force with direct fires until the breach is complete support rehearsal. (approx. 30 minutes). I want to use our 20 minutes of mortar smoke initially Step 5: Refinement: A plan is just — followed by generated smoke if wind conditions permit. This will free up that — a plan. As new information is FA fires for my last CFST. It is critical, however, that FA smoke be available gained on the enemy, the fire support if wind conditions are not blowing in our favor. The endstate is both southern plan must be updated. The staff must MRPs unable to bring effective direct fires on the breach force until the ensure that changes are coordinated breach is complete. and disseminated. It is also a proven CFST #3: Finally, as the smoke builds, I want to shift FA fires and sup- technique to establish a ‘target cut-off press the two southern MRPs of the northern MRC. The purpose of these time.’ This is a time after which any fires is to allow the assault force to pass through the breach and build combat change to the fire support plan requires power on the far side without taking effective direct fire from the two south- approval by the commander responsi- ern enemy platoons. Again, the method I prefer is FA fires on a group target ble for the target. If a refined target lo- by one battalion of artillery. We should need the suppressive fires for ap- cation is determined after the target proximately 30 minutes. The endstate has the assault force through the cut-off time, shoot a grid mission. The breach and postured on the far side to complete the destruction of the re- task and desired effects, purpose and mainder of the MRC. endstate should not change. Before concluding this paper, there are a few other important issues that impact on task force fire support plan- HVTs or HPTs. Normally, they are des- order to fire somewhere else. If the ning and execution. ignated by the brigade commander and commander is going to designate and High Value Targets/High Payoff incorporated into his concept and fire at HPTs and HVTs, they have to be Targets: (High Value Target (HVT) - a scheme of fires. The issue with HVTs carefully synchronized with critical fire target whose loss to the enemy can be and HPTs is their synchronization with support tasks, and all observers must expected to contribute to substantial the ‘sequenced’ critical fire support clearly understand that the target may degradation of an important battlefield tasks. Oftentimes, at the exact point in only be an HVT/HPT during a speci- function; High Payoff Target (HPT) - a the battle when the commander wants a fied time or phase in the battle. For ex- target that, if successfully attacked, will critical fire support task fired to support ample, AT-5s may be a HPT, but when contribute to the success of our plan.) his scheme of maneuver, someone calls the first echelon battalion is in your At the task force level, there seems to an HVT/HPT, and because so desig- face, the payoff is less than if the AT-5s be very little utility in identifying nated, the guns shift off the target in are identified and destroyed earlier.

48 ARMOR — September-October 1996 and limitations (windows for use/tar- gets/observers) have some unique chal- lenges that must be considered, but the commander must plan his CAS to- gether with maneuver the same way as his other indirect fires. It is conceivable at the task force level that CAS may be allocated or a CAS target assigned from brigade as part of the scheme of fires. More likely, however, CAS will be ‘handed-off’ to the task force when brigade has no viable target. If this happens, the task force must have a plan that synchronizes it with maneu- ver and their concept and scheme of fires.

Conclusion This paper is not designed to solve all the challenges of getting timely and ac- curate indirect fires at the task force level. Hopefully, it has addressed some HPTs are only high in payoff relative tions the FISTs, the task force or com- of the issues that are encountered at the to the time they are identified during pany/team commander. The com- National Training Center and high- the fight. HVTs/HPTs must not under- pany/team commander needs them to lighted the emerging observations from mine the sequenced critical fire support assist in his fire support planning and brigade operations. The step-by-step tasks. to trigger targets assigned to him from approach to fire support planning is Priority of Fires: (The organization the task force scheme of fires. The task one way to approach the challenge of force commander wants to position getting the effects of combined arms and employment of fire support means them to ensure they are in the proper according to the importance of the sup- operations. Whatever method used, the ported unit’s mission.) Worthy of dis- positions to call the targets he wants. key is synchronization with maneuver, Observations at the National Training cussion is its relationship with the com- commander involvement in planning Center offer this — the amount of and refinement, and well rehearsed mander’s sequenced fire support tasks. certainty or uncertainty will dictate If indirect fires are properly synchro- plans understood by every observer, nized with maneuver, and the com- the level of control of the FISTs. In a leader, and firing unit. movement to contact, the task force is mander has sequenced those critical more likely to leave control of the fire support tasks to support maneuver, then it seems priority should go to fir- FIST with the company/team because the situation is unclear. ing those targets regardless of who has priority of fires. One could argue that, Lieutenant Colonel (P) Harry if the commander has developed a In the defense, where the targets are L. Leiferman is a 1974 gradu- scheme of fires properly, then the right fully synchronized with the task force ate of Gonzaga University. His observer will have priority when the scheme, the task force is more likely to commander wants to fire the critical dictate where the observers are posi- troop experience includes two task. The key has to be every observer tioned. In a deliberate attack, the task company commands, battalion and leader understanding the concept force may take the observer away from S3 in 9ID, battalion XO in 1AD, of fires — the sequenced critical fire the breach force company/team to pro- and commander, 2d Battalion, support tasks — and sticking to that vide redundancy at the point of pene- 5th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Divi- concept. It is especially important for tration but leave the FISTs with the rest sion. He has served on the DA the various artillery FDC and fire con- of the teams. staff and on the staff of Armed trol officers to understand this and not Close Air Support: Simply stated, Forces Central Europe. His deviate from what the commander CAS is another means of indirect fire most recent assignment was wants. However, priority of fires re- mains a valid concept that should allow support available to the brigade and Senior Mechanized Infantry task force. The commander, first under- Task Force Trainer (Scorpion anyone to receive fires as long as no standing the capabilities and limitations critical fire support task is being fired. 07) at the National Training of close air support, must synchronize Center. He is currently attend- Observer Planning: The issue at the it with the fire plan to support the task force level is who owns and posi- scheme of maneuver. The capabilities ing the Naval War College.

ARMOR — September-October 1996 49 LETTERS (Continued from Page 5) ever slowly it may move, than well into the have done more to correct the greatest Author's Queries 21 st century. weakness of the Sherman - the low muz­ zle velocity of its main gun - but the Army For a study of women's experiences dur­ did not realize the changing nature of tank CPT MICHAEL l. PRYOR ing the Vietnam War, I would appreciate combat until the huge losses in Normandy hearing from the mothers, wives, and girl­ Co C, 1-156 Armor forced the Army's leadership to face the louisiana ARNG friends of men who fought in the Vietnam stark reality of modem armored wariare ... " conflict. Please include memories about the and other comments about the M4's defi­ period your loved ones served overseas, ciencies. including (but not restricted to) strategies PIRs Are Not Focused Enough Not entirely so, MAJ Mansoor! I refer you for coping, networks of support, and atti­ For Scouts' Reconnaissance to my letter to ARMOR in the March-April tudes of the population at large. Please 1974 issue, pages 3 and 51. I'll quote only also include a brief description of your a portion of that letter on the matter of the background, including age, race, ethnicity, Dear Sir: controversy surrounding the 75mm gun on and the area of the military with which your the Sherman: "It was the Ordnance Depart­ loved one served. Send responses to: After reading the article, "Training the ment's position that this gun was inade­ Task Force Scout Platoon," by lTC lynch quate, but this viewpoint was overruled by VIRGINIA LAFFEY and CPT Cichocki in the July-August issue the Army Ground Forces. After the combat P.O. Box 2052 of ARMOR, I need to clarify a fine point on experiences in North Africa highlighted the Jamaica Plain, MA 02130 tasking R&S assets. In the article, the discontent with the Sherman, it was the authors use Priority Intelligence Require­ Ordnance Department, ironically, that ac­ ments (PIR) to task the scout platoon, stat­ crued the 'blame.' At the time when Gen­ * * * ing these "provide focus for the actual con­ eral Patton was supposedly incognito in I am researching the U.S. Armed Forces duct of reconnaissance." This is not entirely England, just prior to the Normandy inva­ stationed in and around Stroud, Glouces­ true. sion, he and my father (then Colonel tershire, England, prior to the Normandy George G. Eddy) got embroiled in a very According to FM 34-2-1, Reconnaissance landings, June 1944. I would like to obtain loud and public argument about the source enough information on the units camped and Surveillance and Intelligence Support of the tank's deficiencies. The dispute was to Counterreconnaissance, PIRs provide around Stroud, who were here for training broken up in a large officer's mess in lon­ and practice before going into battle, for a the initial focus for R&S. In essence, they don by Major General E.S. Hughes, later get you started. The real focus comes from publication in memory of the men and also Chief of Ordnance when General Eisen­ for a part of Stroud's history. translating those PIRs into indicators of a hower was Chief of Staff, who pulled Gen­ particular enemy activity. The S2 takes the eral Patton away, reminding him of General I need additional information on the fol­ indicators and develops Specific Informa­ Eisenhower's concern about any publicity lowing unit that was camped on Minchin­ tion Requirements (SIR). SIRs are nothing of Patton's whereabouts." hampton Common on a hill above Stroud. I more than indicators put in the form of a think it to be a tank destroyer force, for the question. It is from these SIRs that the It should be remembered that the using shoulder flash (patch) was a Tiger with a Specific Orders or Requests (SOR) that service determines what it wants in outlin­ tank in its jaws; a Collar Dog that I have tasks the scouts are issued. ing key specifications, not Ordnance. Cer­ here belongs to the Quartermaster Corps. The key to successful R&S planning and tainly Ordnance is expected to point out This was given to a boy at that time by one tasking is to give the scouts a mission they consequences and alternatives. This was of the men. Also, they were Black Ameri­ can accomplish. Even the most focused done with the Sherman, and the using cans. lastly, I have one name and possible PIR is often too large a requirement for service got what it requested. address: Andrew (Andy) Dodson, North scouts. By breaking PIRs down into spe­ While I hope I've got your attention, may I June Street, Philadelphia, Pa. cific pieces of information, you give scouts use this opportunity to recommend to your I would like to hear from some of the requirements they can satisfy. Through all readers the article, "Planning For Kwa­ guys who were here for their memories, of this, the S2 and the rest of the staff jalein" by my father, BG George G. Eddy, in and any photographs, including themselves need to understand the logical ties be­ the July 1996 issue of ARMY. After he re­ in uniform, that I may purchase. tween the SORs that the scouts are collect­ tired in the 1960s, I prevailed upon him to ing against and the PIRs that the specific describe some of his most significant WWII requirements are focused on. PAUL F. ASTON experiences in a number of tapes. Years 15 Hillclose later, I transcribed and edited some of the Lightpill events he related, and this article was the Stroud ROBERT S. MIKAlOFF result. During WWII, he was the Director of CPT, MI Gloucestershire the Ordnance Research Center at Aber­ Gl5 3PG England USAARMC Threat Manager deen Proving Ground, Maryland, and be­ came intimately familiar with a great variety of weapons, armaments and ammunition, * * * and especially terminal ballistics. As a re­ Army's Users, Not Ordnance, sult of General Marshall's first-hand knowl­ For a book on the Maginot Line, I would Delayed Sherman Upgunning edge of my father's competence, he sent like to hear from anyone with personal him on several special missions overseas reminiscences or family papers, military or to demonstrate new weapons and equip­ civilian, from the period August 1939 Dear Sir: ment, as well as to review upcoming inva­ through July 1940. sion plans for the proper deSignation and With some interest, I read MAJ Man­ employment of Ordnance materiel. John J. Gallagher soor's book review about the M4 Sherman c/o Sarpedon Publishers tank (May-June 1996), especially where he 166 Fifth Avenue wrote: " ... The Ordnance Department could COL (Ret.) GEORGE G. EDDY, PH.D. New York, NY 10010

50 ARMOR - September-October 1996 Confessions of an of their willingness to listen and learn. How­ vision WFX is an excellent new staff team ever, if I recommended a soldier do some­ building exercise. Observer/Controller thing differently, I would also strongly rec­ Several times I have been asked if the ommend he first get the approval of the brigade should operate with a TOC only, or Dear Sir: chain of command. This kept me from step­ ping on toes, and I did not want to give the operate both a TAC and a TOC during a impression that I was the judge of success division WFX. A brigade can provide the di­ vision all the radio traffic and staff interac­ Now that I have concluded a year as an or failure. observer controller (OC) in the Battle Com­ tion they can handle from a single TOC. mand Training Program at Fort Leaven­ In today's Army, everyone believes he or However, I have seen units exercise both worth, , believe I have some experiences she is being evaluated all the time. We very well during division WFXs. Everyone and opinions worth sharing. And since I am have almost a zero-defects mentality that believes we must train as we would fight, no longer an OC, I won't have to eat my has made some soldiers fearful of making but the brigade really needs to address words at a later date. The opinions and ob­ mistakes and taking chances. Many of us where they are in the development of the servations expressed in this letter are mine believe that one screw-up can potentially staff to determine if they want to operate a alone and DO NOT represent the opinions differentiate us on the next rating. AU of this TAC. The brigade should ensure it will not or pOlicies of the Battle Command Training may be true, but I believe commanders still detract from the focus of the exercise, Program or its leadership. want soldiers who are imaginative, knowl­ which is the division commander and his edgeable, and willing to take chances to staff. I was a brigade OC for Division Warfight­ get the job done. ing Exercises (WFXs). As an OC, I always I have had the opportunity to observe a emphasized the TOC operations and not Don't misunderstand; you are being brigade operate both a TAC and TOC just the results of the Corps Battle Simulation evaluated, just not by us. Most BCTP OCs before they deployed to the National Train­ believe strongly that they are not evalua­ (CBS) or the game. The game can become ing Center. This brigade had spent consid­ a great distracter from the learning experi­ tors. Most of us believe outsiders should erable time training as a coherent staff and ence. It simply does not have the fidelity never evaluate a unit. It is the chain of used the WFX as an opportunity to fine necessary to determine the combat suc­ command's responsibility. The chain of tune their SOPs. They were more prepared cess of a unit. It is not an analytical model. command wants to do it; they just cannot after the WFX. Another brigade had just re­ be everywhere all the time. That is where The key for an OC and a unit is to look at turned from a different CTC and used the what the commander and staff did, based the OC comes in. We observe and provide division WFX as an opportunity to exercise on the information the game provided, the information to the chain of command to as­ the changes recommended there. The commander's guidance, and the techniques sist in assessment of individuals and staffs. WFX gave them an opportunity to assess and procedures the unit wanted to exer­ The unit commander decides what he the changes and continue to improve. cise. No one should believe they will be wants the OC to focus on. successful in a future battle based on win­ The bottom line is that all of us are get­ As most can tell you, TOC operations are ning at a WFX. A WFX is only one of many ting evaluated every time we do our job. basically information management. The contributors to the future success or failure This is true in everyday life, as it is true right person, usually the commander, of a staff. during a Warfighter. needs to know the right information at the right time so he can make the right deci­ I realize that everyone wants to win. I My greatest recommendation to any staff sion. There is little well-written doctrine on also believe we do not want personnel in officer is: know what capabilities your Bat­ how to operate a TOC efficiently. Being effi­ the Army who are not competitive. Compe­ tlefield Operating System (BOS) brings to cient is a matter of practice, practice, and tition and the will to win keeps us motivated the battiefield; how to adapt those capabili­ practice. Unfortunately in today's Army, and sharp; just be careful of the conclu­ ties to the ever-changing plan, but staying there is not much time for practice. In each sions you draw from a computer simulation. within the commander's intent; and a cur­ WFX I observed, two-thirds to one-quarter Try to draw conclusions about the staff rent status of those capabilities. Too often I of the staff was new. process and what needs to be done to im­ have seen some assets go unused be­ prove the performance of the staff. cause the person responsible for integrat­ Because of the great turnover, many staff I am proud to say that I never once went ing those assets into the fight was just not officers look to the OC for an approved so­ into a TOC where I was considered a paying attention, or was Sitting back waiting lution. There aren't any. An OC can tell the threat, and it was not necessarily because I for someone to tell him what to do. staff what he has seen work, or not work, was a great OC. Today's soldiers and lead­ Most of the brigade commanders, XOs, but usually cannot explain why a technique ers want to learn, and will take every ad­ and S3s I have observed do have an ex­ is successful for one staff and not another. vantage offered. The members of today's cellent understanding of the BOSs and how I have tried. I believe group dynamics is Army are true professionals who believe to integrate those into the fight. However, the only real reason for these inconsisten­ they must be tactically and technically profi­ these key personnel often get over­ cies. The staff's experience, the length of cient and believe in the individual's respon­ whelmed about the same time the plan time the staff has worked together, the sibility to improve himself. goes awry. Therefore, such critical assets wants and needs of the commander, and the staff officer's ability to fully understand as artillery, GSRs, UAVs, helicopters, volca­ Because of the learning attitude of to­ how his battlefield operating system can af­ noes, and transportation go unused. Every day's soldier, the informal AAAs are easy fect the mission are all keys to success. staff officer and NCO in the TOC must and very rewarding. Commanders and their The relative importance of these keys are keep abreast of the current tactical situ­ soldiers are willing to listen, willing to ana­ different for every staff. lyze the successes and the failures, and ation and be willing and able to suggest make appropriate changes. The MAs are how his battlefield operating system can I will truly miss being an OC. My greatest great learning experiences and an opportu­ assist in the fight. reward in the Army has been knowing that I nity to hear someone else's ideas (for both A division WFX is an excellent opportunity was having an impact. I hope my com­ the staff and the OC). But, I truly believe I for a new staff to get to know how the com­ ments will be helpful to someone some­ had the greatest impact on the captains, mander operates. The pace usually allows where. lieutenants. and sergeants I had a chance the brigade commander and XO to do lots to talk with one-on-one. These conversa­ of mentoring of the staff. There is time for tions were truly non-threatening and pri­ the staff to discuss their operations and MAJ EDWARD W. PAYNE vate. I really felt I had an impact because make improvements during the WFX. A di- Fort Leavenworth, Kan.

ARMOR - September-October 1996 51 BOOKS

An Exciting Combat History...... But with a Hidden Agenda

Grenadiers by Kurt Meyer, translated when he becomes their regimental com- and field grade officers who had fought by Michael Mende, J.J. Fedorowicz mander. His units never break, from Nor- against the 12th SS Panzer Division at Publishing, 106 Browning Blvd., Win- mandy to the Falaise Pocket, even though Normandy threw Meyer a secret birthday nepeg, Manitoba, Canada R3K 0L7 they never receive reinforcements and are party. He was allowed to see his wife, and at below 20% strength when he is cap- was promised that his execution would be (PH: 204-837-6080), 1994, 254 pages. tured. They never break international laws commuted by their efforts. This happened, $45.00. of warfare, either, according to Meyer. as promised. Only near the end of the book does Shortly after writing this book, Meyer One might say that Grenadiers, an inter- Meyer’s hidden agenda emerge. It be- would die of a heart attack. To the end, he esting combat narrative by a key leader in comes clear that he is writing to convince spent his days trying to raise support for WWII Germany’s panzer forces, is for ar- readers that the members of the 1st and former members of the SS, who received mor officers what Rommel’s Infantry At- 12th SS Panzer Divisions were soldiers no pensions and were treated as outcasts. tacks is for infantry officers. who did their duty to their country, and He died trying to rewrite history, and in this Told in the first person, from an enemy were not war criminals. He skillfully avoids book, he has. perspective, it is a personal account of Kurt any discussions of a political nature, focus- The book was never translated into Eng- “Panzer” Meyer’s experiences in World War ing instead on battlefield vignettes. The tar- lish until 1994, and most of the evidence is II, beginning in 1939, when Meyer was a get audience is the future military historian so convoluted it is hard to prove or dis- reconnaissance battalion commander in the whom Meyer must have pictured as a well- prove. One thing is certain: Kurt “Panzer” 1st SS Panzer Division, fighting in Poland, educated doubting Thomas. He knows that Meyer was a great warrior whose story is Holland, France, Greece, Russia, and after time, there will be those who doubt well worth reading. Whether or not his con- eventually in France. By that time, he was the judgment of history, those who want to viction on charges of war crimes was just is division commander of the 12th SS Panzer know details of life in the Waffen SS. He a question for great debate. If his side of Division. Meyer provides an intense de- bluntly states this near the end of his story. the story is not true, why was Meyer freed? scription of his experiences in mechanized Meyer was convicted of war crimes be- And, at what level is a war crime an indi- warfare; one can almost feel the wind and cause he was in command when a mem- vidual decision or a command climate prob- smell the gunpowder. The translation is ex- ber of his unit executed 37 Canadian sol- lem? This is the puzzle which Meyer cellent, and little is lost in Meyer’s count- diers within rifle shot of their comrades on frames in his well-told story. Meyer cleverly less stories of men gallantly charging the Normandy beachhead. Though Meyer convinces the audience that he is a gra- against foes no less so vigorous and bold, does not dispute that the event occurred, cious war hero and then paints the picture if less successful. Meyer paints himself as he despises the men who convicted him. of vindictive Allied war tribunals acting out a fair-fighting, gracious victor, never cutting While he admits that war crimes occurred of victor’s anger. Clearly, there are other down foes in cold-blood, offering cigarettes in his command, he insists they were not sides to the story of Meyer’s part in the war to captured officers, a man caught up in his unpunished and not without cause. At his crimes; it is very much worth investigating times, doing deeds he could not conceive trial, he tries rather unsuccessfully to con- more deeply. of as criminal. vince his judges that the Canadians had The amount of “political correctness” in- He describes the attitude of the men in committed exactly the same crimes on the volved in writing or translating a book of his unit as outstanding, and is often moved same day. He makes little headway be- this nature cannot be overestimated. Meyer by their camaraderie, especially when en- cause the commander who had faced him never mentions the Jewish question and, emy fire takes several of his drivers out on the beaches of Normandy happened to for all intents and purposes, plays ignorant from under him. be the chairman of the tribunal which even- of the Final Solution. In not addressing the tually sentences him to death. actions of the Allgemeine (General) SS, There are tense moments. Meyers de- Meyer has limited the topic to something scribes the assault on a hill in Greece as (Editor’s Note: Soldiers of the 12th SS for which only few can answer — the con- his most “dire situation” as an officer, when Panzer Division murdered 19 soldiers of duct of Waffen SS units in combat. He is he had to toss a grenade behind his cower- Canada’s Royal Winnipeg Rifles on 7 June very careful not to bruise his enemies’ ing men (and himself) to get them to as- 1944, near Authie. The bodies of the pris- egos. He often praises their bravery, a sub- sault. In Russia, he outruns his reconnais- oners were thrown down in a roadway and liminal method to gain their support and sance battalion and finds himself in the crushed by trucks and tank treads, accord- make himself look more humble and he- middle of a Russian assembly area. He ing to one Canadian historical study.) roic. promptly exchanges cigarettes with the ranking Russian and waits for his men to The reader who believes Meyer’s one- But overall, Meyer has created a master- arrive and rescue him on cue. Countless sided argument might be convinced that piece in combat documentary. The book is stories of such bravery and leadership Meyer was wronged, and that possibly packed full of adventure and pictures. It abound. Meyer is the leader every soldier many more like him were also falsely ac- does lack maps, which makes following dreams of being led by. He joins his new cused. The most convincing piece of evi- Meyer’s path difficult at best. However, any troops as a comrade and rides with the re- dence that Meyer presents is that, on his leader of mechanized forces should arm connaissance battalion in their first battle birthday in prison, on death row, company himself with maps and read this book.

52 ARMOR — September-October 1996 More adventurous historians could travel Grant relied on his ability to chop complex alty, and courage are essential for any suc- to Normandy, where, at the Abbey of the problems down into simple segments. For cessful leader. Dr. Holton’s civilian interpre- Ardenne, near Caen, Meyer had his regi- example, when dealing with strategy, Grant tation and analysis of Lee’s actions under mental headquarters. This is where the 37 had no need for multiple intelligence an- these headings ring true and are useful for Canadians were executed and buried. nexes, detailed orders of battle, or studies all leaders. However, some of his analysis There is a gardener in the abbey who was of the enemy commander’s personality. To misses the mark completely for military a child when Meyer was there. He holds Grant, who boiled down information to its readers. The most striking was a very mov- keys to the towers where Meyer could see necessary essence, all questions about the ing description of the desperate fighting at all the way to the beaches at Juno and enemy could be answered by under- the “Bloody Angle.” During a critical point in Gold. This man gave insight into Meyer the standing strength, disposition, and inten- the battle, a group of Confederate soldiers man. He said to me, “No we did not hate tion. were attempting to surrender when another this man. He was very charismatic. He Most historians focus on Grant’s leader- Confederate soldier shouted, “Shoot them came here in peace after his release from ship and strategic record from Vicksburg fellows! Shoot them fellows!” The soldiers prison, and some people were afraid. It through Appomattox. In contrast, The Rise trying to surrender were gunned down by was a bad time for our people and his. of U.S. Grant provides a detailed analysis their own. Soldiers fight for each other; Maybe he was angry with us. But no, Pan- of Grant’s tactical and logistical skills at the their highest loyalty is to their buddy next to zer Meyer said he only wanted to see the regimental and division level. If you are them. It is a very intense loyalty that when battlefield again. He said a great warrior willing to sift through a cumbersome text, betrayed results in incidents like at the must always return to his battlefield.” then you will enjoy linking together the daily “Bloody Angle.” That would be a military in- In the end, Meyer’s book is an attempt to events in Grant’s early commands that terpretation. Dr. Holton, however, uses this return to the battlefield and separate him- shaped the eventual leader of the Union extreme act as an example of “Groupthink” self from the record revealed at his trial. He Army. warning, “...in their intense desire to be honestly believes he was wronged, and team players and collaborators... group wants a chance to set the record straight. members censor the kind of independent, Despite the author’s bias, and the book’s COURT R. HORNCASTLE critical thinking that produces more objec- lack of maps, it is a must-read account of CPT, Armor tive and discriminating results.” The con- armored warfare from an enemy perspec- USAR nection to the example is a stretch. In an- tive. Whether or not you agree with it, Mandeville, La. other, Dr. Holton uses Lee’s last words, Meyer’s story is a compelling one. “Strike the tent,” as the starting point to list similar words a civilian leader might utter From Battlefield to Boardroom: The such as, “Balance the budget” or “Decouple JOHN R. STARK Leadership Lessons of Robert E. Lee old electronics networks.” Perhaps, these CPT, Armor words carry the same significance to a by Bil Holton, Ph.D., Presidio Press, plant manager as Lee’s to a soldier, but 1st Armor Training Brigade Calif., 1995. 158 pages. $9.95. Ft. Knox, Ky. next to Lee’s, these phrases seem incon- gruous. For over one hundred and thirty years, It has become fashionable to read and The Rise of U.S. Grant by Colonel Robert E. Lee has been an inspiration to study civilian management methods and Arthur L. Conger (1872-1951), new in- military leaders. Bold and audacious in the theories in the name of breaking old para- troduction by Brooks D. Simpson, Da attack; firm and resolute in the defense; digms and moving the Army into the 21st magnanimous and charitable in victory; dig- Capo Press, New York. Originally pub- century. It is imperative that we maintain an nified and courageous in defeat, can Lee open mind and accept leadership lessons lished 1931, republished 1996. 362 also be an inspiration to civilian leaders? pages (includes 12 maps and 8 illustra- from any source. However, From Battlefield As military leaders, we understand the to Boardroom illustrates the gulf in the “bot- tions), plus 25 pages of appendices, timeless universality of leaders and sol- tom line” between the Profession of Arms bibliography, and index. $15.95. diers. What inspired and motivated the Ro- and all other professions. Few, if any, man legionnaire still inspires and motivates CEO’s have had to make decisions they You’ve got to be a big U.S. Grant fan to the modern soldier; it is only updated to ac- knew would cause the death of their subor- really appreciate the full content of this me- count for era and social circumstances. dinates or, like Lee, have had the fate of a ticulously detailed book. The new introduc- From battlefield to boardroom is an attempt nation placed on their shoulders. Yet, a 22- tion, by a noted Civil War historian, updates to show civilian leaders that they, too, can year-old platoon leader may be called upon the relevance of the text, yet with every learn from past military leaders, and who to make life and death decisions daily. We page, I was waiting for something to hap- better to study than Robert E. Lee? Unfor- must also remember that we do not have pen as I plodded through verbatim orders tunately, the transition from battlefield to “customers” or “products,” rather we lead and counter-orders between Grant and his boardroom is not very smooth. and command soldiers and units of the subordinates at Cairo, Illinois; Forts Henry Dr. Holton is a management and leader- United States Army. and Donelson; Shiloh; and Vicksburg. COL ship consultant who, rightly, believes there Dr. Holton is to be commended for his Conger’s formal, dry writing style, although are qualities essential for good leadership thorough and extensive research. The pas- appropriate for the early 1930s, fails to hold regardless of profession. To illustrate his sages he chose for the sketches provide the 21st century reader’s full interest. point, he uses a series of brief sketches of concise insight into Robert E. Lee’s person- However, select parts of the book are Robert E. Lee’s leadership and several ality. He is to be further commended for his quite interesting. Specifically, COL Conger vignettes of Civil War battles. Drawn from noble attempt to teach leadership principles details how Grant rose, in 1861, from an numerous sources, each sketch is titled to civilian managers by interpreting military obscure civilian clerk in Galena, Illinois, to with a leadership trait or quality and ar- history into business language. However, a command the Union armies by 1864. There ranged alphabetically. Following each soldier may find some of his interpretations are several interesting leadership points sketch is Dr. Holton’s interpretation and disconcerting. concerning Grant’s rapid rise. Foremost, business application for that trait. COL Conger highlights Grant’s common Under the headings of the basic leader- M.R. PIERCE sense. Without the flash and charisma as- ship competencies, Dr. Holton is on firm MAJ, Armor sociated with many Civil War generals, ground. The traits of honesty, integrity, loy- Austin, Texas

ARMOR — September-October 1996 53 “Driver, how much fuel do we have?” Here’s an easy way to report accurately...

by SSG Stephen A. Krivitsky In all operations conducted by M1A1 forces, to include Operations Other Than War (OOTW), logistical reporting REAR must be clear, concise, and accurate. These reports, when LEFT E 1/4 1/2 3/4 F tabulated correctly, may save hours wasted in unnecessary EMPTY 0 62 124 186 248 resupply or missent fuelers. To aid the tank commander, pla- 1/4 26 88 150 212 274 toon sergeant, and platoon E 1/2 52 114 176 238 300 leader, each vehicle com- 3/4 78 140 202 264 326 mander can use this simple chart, which allows the tank FULL 107 169 231 293 355 crew to quickly compute an EMPTY 38 100 162 224 286 accurate Class III report. 1/4 64 126 188 250 312 The tank commander re- 1/4 1/2 90 152 214 276 338 quests fuel status from the driver, who reads fuel levels 3/4 116 178 240 302 364 from his instrument panel in FULL 145 207 269 331 393 this order: Right Front first, fol- EMPTY 75 137 199 261 323 lowed by Left Front and finally the Rear tank. 1/4 101 163 225 287 349 127 189 251 313 375 The driver states each tank’s 1/2 1/2 level: “Right Front.... 1/2 .... 3/4 153 215 277 339 401 Left Front .... 3/4 ... Rear FULL 182 244 306 368 430 ....1/2” EMPTY 112 174 236 298 360

The tank commander, follow- RIGHT FRONT 1/4 138 200 262 324 386 ing the driver’s response, moves down the “RIGHT” col- 3/4 1/2 164 226 288 350 412 umn to 1/2. While staying in 3/4 190 252 314 376 438 that block, he moves to the 3/4 mark for the “LEFT” Col- FULL 219 281 343 405 467 umn. Once there, he moves EMPTY 150 212 274 336 398 his finger right to the “REAR” 1/4 176 238 300 362 424 columns where he continues to go to the right until he FULL 1/2 202 264 326 388 450 reaches the 1/2 section. 3/4 228 290 352 414 476 The fuel remaining is 277 FULL 257 319 381 443 505 gallons. GREEN 401-505 RED 201-300 AMBER 301-400 BLACK 0-200 SSG Krivitsky has served as an armor crewman and battalion master gunner. He is currently a company master gunner and tank commander with C/1-68 Ar- (IAW FM 101-5-1) mor at Ft. Carson, Colo.

PIN: 074832-000