Gaurav Rajen
The Problematic of a Nuclear Force- in-Being, a Stable Deterrence, and the Issue of Non-deployment
Gaurav Rajen
SASSU Research Report No. 5
February 2006
SOUTH ASIAN STRATEGIC STABILITY UNIT 1 The Problematic of a Nuclear Force-in-Being, a Stable Deterrence and the Issue of Non-deployment
Contents
1. Introduction...... 3
2. Evidence for a Force-in-Being...... 6
3. Ambiguities and Misperceptions...... 7
4. The Difficulties of Controlled Transparency for Disassembled Forces...... 8
5. Problems of Command and Control for Disassembled Forces ...... 9
6. Risks of Transport Accidents ...... 15
7. Difficulties of Safety and Reliability Analyses for Disassembled Forces ...... 18
8. Minimizing the Risks from Inadvertent or Deliberate Attacks ...... 19
9. The Issue of Non-deployment...... 21
10 Conclusion ...... 25
Acronyms
CBMs Confidence Building Measures COSC Chiefs of Staff Committee DRDO Defence Research and Development Organization IDS Integrated Defence Staff LDZ Limited Deployment Zone NCA National Command Authority NBC Nuclear chemical biological NSAB National Security Advisory Board SFC Strategic Forces Command SPD Strategic Plans Division TEL Transporter Erector Launcher
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The Problematic of a Nuclear Force-in-Being, a Stable Deterrence, and the Issue of Non-deployment
Gaurav Rajen
February 2006
Abstract
There is a need for India and Pakistan to exert restraint and undertake measures to make their nuclear standoff more stable. Their existing postures of a recessed deterrence, or a force-in-being, should not make the two sides complacent. There are steps the two sides could take and provide reassurances around, so that when and if in a crisis nuclear forces are assembled risks are minimized and crisis resolution is not precluded. Steps proposed here include restraints on the movement of nuclear forces during crises, establishing restraint measures on technologies for targeting mobile nuclear launch systems, and establishing limited deployment zones for mobile missile launchers. A non-intrusive strategy for verifying the exclusion of short-range missile systems from border areas is presented.
1. Introduction
The state of nuclear deterrence assumed to nuclear arsenals.2 There is a need, therefore, prevail in South Asia, with nuclear warheads for India and Pakistan to exert restraint and disassembled and stored separately from undertake measures to make their nuclear delivery vehicles, is recognized widely as standoff more stable, especially when and if playing a stabilizing role in the India- a crisis begins to unfold. The posture of a Pakistan nuclear standoff. This state has force-in-being should not make the two been called a force-in-being as opposed to a sides complacent. There are steps the two ready arsenal.1 The state is also sides could take and provide reassurances characterized as a recessed deterrence. around, so that if in a crisis nuclear forces However, as a crisis develops and if nuclear are assembled risks are minimized and crisis forces are ever constituted and deployed, the resolution is not precluded. two countries will face all the dilemmas that are realized by the possession of ready
2 See, for example, Michael Ryan Kraig, “The 1 Ashley Tellis, India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture: Political and Strategic Imperatives of Nuclear Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal (New Deterrence in South Asia”, India Review, Volume 2, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001). Number 1, pp. 1-48.
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In this paper I discuss some of the unique adopted produce some unique problems that and complex characteristics for the force-in- India and Pakistan need to recognize and being postures adopted by India and build an understanding and mutual Pakistan as compared to postures in which reassurances around, so that in a crisis room nuclear weapons are fully assembled and for misperceptions and inadvertent mistakes deployed in a clearly identifiable manner. is lessened. One of these is the issue of the balance between ambiguity and transparency needed Some of the complicating factors unique to a for strategic stability that is difficult to attain posture of a force-in-being can be for force-in-being postures. Issues of characterized as follows: transport safety and tests for weapon reliabilities for the existing postures have • The demonstration of preparedness and complicating features that deserve survivability is difficult with a non- examination, and some of these are deployed deterrence. With fully considered here. A disassembled nuclear deployed forces, controlled transparency force upon assembly may is more readily rely on delivery systems possible and, if that are designated for the forces are conventional as well as for A posture of a force-in-being identifiably nuclear roles. As has been proven able to noted by various analysts, is not a panacea for all the survive a such dual-role systems problems associated with preemptive strike, can be struck such transparency inadvertently in a possessing fledgling nuclear can increase crisis conflict.3 To minimize the forces. stability. In the risks of inadvertent and/or case of hidden deliberate attacks, I and distributed propose a set of possible forces, such restraint measures. If India and Pakistan controlled transparency is much more formally agree to the non-deployment of difficult though, perhaps, even more nuclear weapons and/or the non-deployment essential. Disassembled forces also of specific delivery systems in specified increase the survivability requirements geographical zones, the paper discusses a for a nation’s command and control possible strategy for verification that might structures, and the lack or perceived lack be sufficiently non-intrusive enough to be of survivability of an adversary’s acceptable and adopted by India and command and control system creates Pakistan. further room for misperceptions as well as incentives to contemplate a I would like to state unambiguously that the decapitation strike. point of this study is not to argue for India and Pakistan to implement a hair-trigger • For a disassembled posture, when, and alert posture with fully deployed nuclear if, the fissile cores, warheads and weapons and systems. Rather, what I wish to delivery vehicles are moved, so that the argue for and demonstrate is that a posture weapon systems can be constituted, of a force-in-being is not a panacea for all there is an increased risk of transport the problems associated with possessing accidents. In contrast, in the case of fledgling nuclear forces. The postures deployed systems in fixed and hardened silos transport occurs less frequently and the transport risks are less. I examine 3 V. R. Raghavan, “Limited War and Nuclear Escalation” Non-Proliferation Review, Fall/Winter these transport risks semi-quantitatively. 2001, pp. 83-98. By assessing these risks, I suggest
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approaches that India and Pakistan could assigned a nuclear role could also play a implement to minimize the likelihood of conventional role. Therefore, during transport-related accidents. hostilities, there is a risk of inadvertent attacks on the distributed forces. To • Probabilistic risk assessments to certify minimize such risks, I propose restraint the safety and reliability of nuclear regimes in targeting and other related weapons will have to deal with some technologies. Risks of inadvertent complicating issues related to the attacks could also be reduced by the storage of the components in a non-deployment of strategic systems in distributed form. For example, the fact specific exclusionary zones. I present an of warheads not being constituted option for verifying non-deployment implies that components of the total that could assist in managing and system are aging in differing chemical, reducing such risks while maintaining thermal and stress environments. An stability. analysis of failure modes may, therefore, be compounded in difficulty, as After a discussion of all the issues compared to a situation in which fully enumerated above, I end with some policy constituted weapon systems are recommendations that could enhance available for testing and study on a strategic stability in South Asia. First, to set routine basis. the context for the remaining discussions, I establish to the extent possible (given the • For disassembled forces, there is relatively opaque nature of India and ambiguity between the conventional and Pakistan’s nuclear postures) that India and nuclear roles of delivery systems – Pakistan do, in fact, employ a posture of a unlike for the case of fully deployed force-in-being. nuclear forces. With a force-in-being, the delivery systems that may be
SOUTH ASIAN STRATEGIC STABILITY UNIT 5 The Problematic of a Nuclear Force-in-Being, a Stable Deterrence and the Issue of Non-deployment
2. The Evidence for a Force-in-Being
Official statements by India and Pakistan An extensive discussion of this issue for about the deployment status of their nuclear India, with numerous references from the weapons, though infrequent and not always open literature and based on interviews with explicit, do provide some insight. Indian officials, is contained in a book by Ashley Tellis.5 An official statement that speaks to this issue for India is by Jaswant Singh, then Pakistan has not formally declared a nuclear India’s External Affairs minister. When doctrine but official statements imply a asked by The Hindu newspaper on 29 similar approach. For example, in a speech November 1999, if it was correct to at the plenary of the Conference on conclude that India follows different peace- Disarmament on 25 January 2001, the time and war-time deployment postures, Pakistani Foreign Secretary formally Jaswant Singh replied: “This would be a proposed the non-mating of nuclear correct assessment. You know that we weapons and delivery systems.6 would like to convey a sense of assurance in our region, also beyond so that our As a result of statements like these, analysts deployment posture is not perceived as commonly assume Indian and Pakistani destabilizing. We have rejected notions of nuclear deployment to be in a disassembled ‘launch on warning postures’ that lead to form – a force-in-being, also often termed a maintaining hair trigger alerts, thus recessed deterrence. increasing the risks of unauthorized launch.”4
5 Ashley Tellis, India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001). 4 Indian Government Ministry of External Affairs 6 Naeem Ahmad Salik, “Missile Issues in South Asia,” website. Available at The Nonproliferation Review, Summer 2002, Volume
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3. Ambiguities and Misperceptions
In the case of India and Pakistan, warning In fact, they may wish to reassure each other times are low and capabilities limited. It is that constitution will not take place in the difficult, therefore, for the two sides to adopt case of a border conflict, but only if a full- a posture of launch on warning with ready- fledged conventional war breaks out and to-go fully constituted systems. One could cities and critical infrastructure start being argue that with a constituted system the attacked.7 The weapons would be viewed as adversary is perhaps weapons of last resort, better deterred, and and only constituted if there is little risk of a forces of one country fully constituted system A code of conduct could be began to penetrate the being attacked territory of the other to inadvertently. This does created that would disallow an extent greater than not hold true for a the early constituting of what is involved in distributed and hidden forces in a crisis. border skirmishes. Each system. Such a system side would guarantee has an increased risk of that nuclear forces being attacked would not be brought inadvertently, as the into the border areas (to attacking side has no or little knowledge of a previously agreed distance, perhaps the locations of its adversary’s nuclear outside the range of their short-range forces. In the initial conventional phase of a missiles) and, thus, the risks that in a border conflict, attacks against conventional targets conflict inadvertent attacks on nuclear forces such as military bases and airfields could could occur would be minimized. inadvertently damage hidden and non- deployed nuclear forces. It can be argued that it is to Pakistan’s advantage to deter an Indian conventional Therefore, India and Pakistan need to evolve attack with the threat of nuclear escalation at a system that minimizes this risk. Perhaps, a even a “single step” across the border – but code of conduct could be created that would certainly it is to the advantage of both to not disallow the early constituting of forces in a let a crisis involve dangerous practices. crisis, or even if a conventional border conflict began.
7 This suggestion has also been proposed by Major General Mahmud Ali Durrani (ret.) of Pakistan in a recent study completed at the Cooperative Monitoring Center, Sandia National Laboratories: Pakistan’s Strategic Thinking and the Role of Nuclear Weapons. Available at
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4. The Difficulties of Controlled Transparency for Disassembled Forces
With a sufficient number of missiles in fixed demonstration to the Indians of the futility and hardened silos, as well as a fraction of contemplating a preemptive strike. deployed on mobile platforms, such as submarines or trains, it is possible to The inability to physically demonstrate the unequivocally demonstrate to an enemy the invulnerability of fully deployed fixed and impossibility of destroying all of the nuclear mobile forces leads India and Pakistan to forces in a country’s possession. rely on bellicose statements in a crisis. Such statements carry an increased risk of The situation for India and Pakistan is far escalation, and could complicate the murkier. With their forces in a distributed defusing of a crisis. mode and concealed to the best of their abilities, the two countries signal resolve For crisis stability, both sides have to through official statements meant to believe that no advantage can be gained by demonstrate their strength-of-will, and even, initiating a preemptive strike.10 To foster this sometimes, use missile flight tests in the belief requires some amount of transparency middle of a crisis to send a message. that can establish the guaranteed Sometimes, these signals send a conflicting survivability of one’s nuclear forces. With message. For example, in some crises non-deployed forces, transparency will have Pakistan has warned of an impending Indian to be carefully managed so that it enhances preemptive strike and put its nuclear forces crisis stability and does not unnecessarily on an alert status.8 9 The statements warning expose vulnerabilities. If the forces of Indian plans for preemptive attacks could disassembled were ever identified with be directed at an international audience to excessive transparency regarding their establish the aggressive nature of the Indian storage locations and likely modes of state. However, the underlying message is transport, the adversary would have an that Pakistan either fears real vulnerabilities, increased temptation to consider a damage or fears that there has not been adequate limiting preemptive strike.
8 For example, a story in Pakistan’s Daily Jang newspaper stated that Pakistani military officials were tracking hostile Indian moves of augmenting air squadrons and naval ships in what they believed might be preparations of a preemptive conventional strike against Pakistan. See, Aslam Khan, “Pakistan Says India Planning pre-Emptive Strikes”, Daily Jang, 30 September 2002. 9 A recent study by Rahul-Roy Chaudhry discusses this issue of signals and conflicting messages in greater detail: Nuclear Doctrine, Declaratory Policy and 10 This definition has been developed by the Center for Escalation Control. Available at Nonproliferation Studies of the Monterey Institute of
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5. Problems of Command and Control for Disassembled Forces
Controlled transparency and the sharing of war when they are at maximum alert. As relevant information would also help in pointed out by Paul Bracken, “Although avoiding miscalculations and misperceptions each side may well believe that it was taking regarding the survivability of command and necessary precautionary moves, the other control systems. Each side needs to reassure side might see a precaution as a threat. This the other that the nuclear weapons in its would in turn click the alert level upward possession are safe and secure, and that a another notch.”12 There is a danger, robust command and control system exists therefore, that India and Pakistan’s that would survive a first strike, thereby command and control structures could eliminating any temptation for considering become locked into an unstable, escalating such a strike. process.
The aim of nuclear operations, including The Indian and Pakistani nuclear command command and control systems, is to and control structures are evolving, as are “prevent peacetime nuclear operations from the military institutions that control nuclear leading to nuclear war, especially in crises, forces. The Indian and Pakistani military and to carry out in wartime the missions institutions that control nuclear forces are assigned to nuclear forces”.11 In peacetime, changing at an extremely deliberate and a time of crisis, or a time of war, each often ponderous pace. As new military country will attempt to manage its nuclear institutions are created that have links to operations for maximum advantage. A nuclear forces, these institutions by their danger exists that in doing so, either side very conception force a shift in Indian and could create conditions that spiral out of Pakistani thinking about the war-fighting control and lead towards a nuclear efficacy of nuclear weapons. No matter how confrontation. This is the dyadic coupling of vehemently each side’s politicians declare two command and control structures that their weapons are not meant for war recognized as existing between the US and fighting and solely for deterrence, their Soviet systems during the Cold War, militaries will prepare operationally to fight reaching a very tightly coupled state by the and, if not win, at least maintain escalation 1970’s as global warning and intelligence dominance in a nuclear exchange. systems became closely integrated with strategic forces. The Indian and Pakistani Pakistan has had a National Command systems, though loosely coupled at this time, Authority (NCA) in place since 2000. This will continue to get more tightly coupled NCA was established by the military over time, especially in a time of crisis or government led by President and General Pervez Musharraf. The NCA of Pakistan is 11 Michael M. May, and John R. Harvey, “Nuclear Operations and Arms Control” in Managing Nuclear Operations, edited by Ashton B. Carter, John D. 12 Bracken, Paul, The Command and Control of Steinbruner, and Charles A. Zrakert (The Brookings Nuclear Forces, (Yale University Press, New Haven, Institution, Washington, D.C., 1987). USA, 1983), p. 64.
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described in a flow chart published on the description of Pakistan’s doctrine is based web site of the Pakistani Ministry of Foreign on an analysis of public statements and Affairs.13 The NCA is responsible for policy interviews of key Pakistani officials. As formulation and will exercise employment described by General Durrani, deterrence is and development control over all strategic the cornerstone of Pakistan’s doctrine: forces and strategic organizations. The NCA is made up of an Employment Control The central theme of Pakistan’s nuclear Committee, a Development Control policy is to act in a responsible manner Committee, and a Strategic Plans Division and exercise maximum restraint in the (SPD). conduct of its deterrence policy. Some of the salient elements are as follows: The head of the Pakistani government chairs Pakistan’s nuclear capability is solely for the Employment Control Committee. Other the purpose of deterrence of aggression members include the Ministers of Foreign and defense of sovereignty…. Affairs, Defense, Interior; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee; the Although eschewing a policy of “No First three service chiefs; the Director-General of Use”, public statements by Pakistani leaders the SPD, and technical advisors as required. have in the main stressed that Pakistan Only this Committee is authorized to make a would use nuclear weapons only as a last decision on the employment of nuclear resort and only if the very survival of weapons. Pakistan was at stake. In this regard, an interview of General Khalid Kidwai, the The head of the Pakistani government also Director of Pakistan’s SPD, reported by the chairs the Development Control Committee. Landau Institute, an Italian arms control Other members include the Chairman of the institution, is extremely illustrative. The Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee; the three Landau report says, “Asked if Pakistan has service chiefs; the Director-General of the prepared something like a ladder of nuclear SPD; and representatives of strategic escalation, General Kidwai answered that of organizations and the scientific community. course there were options available in the The Development Control Committee nuclear response.”15 develops the strategic assets required to carry out the employment orders issued by The fact that Pakistan is ready, at least in the Employment Control Committee. principle, to employ its nuclear weapons in a war-fighting and possibly escalating mode The SPD acts as the secretariat for the NCA. results in India having to face the prospect, The SPD is located in the Joint Services however unlikely, of deterrence failure; and Headquarters and is led by a two/three-star to begin planning for the use of nuclear General, who is traditionally from the Army. weapons – that is, to begin viewing nuclear weapons (at least partially) as capable of Major General (ret.) Mahmud Durrani has being used and not simply as a political discussed the broad features of Pakistan’s hedge against coercion, never to be used, nuclear doctrine and command and control and sufficient simply by their very existence structures in an Occasional Paper published to deter an adversary. by the Cooperative Monitoring Centre at Sandia National Laboratories.14 The
13 Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Organization Centre, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, of Pakistan’s National Command Authority. Available NM, USA, 2004. at
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India’s NCA is made up of two Councils: exigency of having to use nuclear Political and Executive. The Prime Minister weapons.17 chairs the Political Council. This is the sole body that can authorize the use of nuclear As a crisis develops, and strategic units weapons. The National Security Advisor become operational, control of these assets chairs the Executive Council. The Executive is expected to pass to the SFC. The delivery Council provides inputs for decision-making systems include aircraft, and Prithvi and by the NCA and executes the directives Agni missiles. These systems will given to it by the Political Council. presumably stay with the respective forces (currently the Army and Air Force) in times In January 2003, India created its Strategic of peace, but move into the control of the Forces Command (SFC), taking another step SFC as a crisis develops. towards the greater operational integration of its nuclear forces with its military. The In October of 2001, India created the Commander-in-Chief of the SFC reports to Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) that began to the Chiefs of Staff serve as the principal Committee (COSC) that secretariat to the COSC. reports to the NCA. The An analysis of the Cabinet Committee on It is clear that the Indian charter of duties of the Security (CCS) military is studying the role IDS establishes that one appointed the of the IDS’s roles is the Commander-in-Chief of of nuclear weapons in war- “management of war the SFC. In the official fighting. fighting”. In his “Report press release of this on the first year of appointment, the role of existence by the Chief the SFC is described as of Integrated Defence being one “to manage 16 Staff to the Chairman and administer all Strategic Forces”. Chiefs of Staff Committee”, Lt. General Official statements have also been made that P.C. Joshi in his description of the activities the SFC will have “operational control” of of the Operations Branch of the IDS India’s strategic assets. Uday Bhaskar, the described an activity with nuclear Deputy Director of the Institute of Defence relevance:18 Studies and Analyses, a government-funded think-tank in New Delhi, has described the Nuclear Issues. I am not at liberty to connection between the SFC, the COSC, and disclose here the full extent to which the Executive Council of the NCA as work has been done in this field. follows: However, considerable work has been done and is progressing. [The SFC] will function under the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee that in turn will provide inputs If we juxtapose the IDS’s role in preparing to the Executive Council that reports to management plans for war-fighting with this the Political Council for the final reference to nuclear weapons, it is clear that decision-making in the hopefully unlikely the Indian military is studying the role of nuclear weapons in war-fighting. In this regard, certain military exercises and technologies being practised and developed
16 Press Release, “Cabinet Committee on Security reviews progress in operationalizing India’s nuclear 17 Bhaskar, Uday, “A Credible Minimum Deterrent, doctrine”, Press Information Bureau, Government of Silicon India”, Daily Byte, 6 January 2003. India, 4 January 2003. 18Report available at
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within India are significant. In May 2000, On 4 January 2003, the Indian Prime for example, the Indian Army in Minister’s Office distributed the press collaboration with the Indian Air Force, release that described conclusions reached conducted a number of training exercises, by the CCS on operationalizing India’s collectively known as Poorna Vijay or nuclear doctrine.23 This press release says, ‘complete victory’, “to evaluate concepts “The CCS reviewed the existing command and practice battle procedures during and control structures, the state of readiness, offensive and defensive operations on the the targeting strategy for a retaliatory attack, future battlefield, with a nuclear and operating procedures for various stages backdrop.”19 The Defence Research and of alert and launch.” This press release on Development Organization (DRDO) has India’s official nuclear doctrine is scanty in developed and transferred to the Indian details. In contrast, in 1999, India’s National military an Integrated Field Shelter that Security Advisory Board (NSAB) prepared provides a report for India’s National Security Council that dealt with options for India to collective personnel protection from consider in creating a nuclear doctrine. The NBC20 agents in a nuclear warfare document is called the “Report of the scenario. The shelter has multifarious National Security Advisory Board on the usage and apart from living can be used Draft Indian Nuclear Doctrine.”24 The report as [a] Command Post, Observation Post, was widely circulated by the government to Regimental Aid Center, and generate dialogue and discussion, and came Communication Center. The shelter can to be known as India’s draft nuclear also be utilized for storage of food, fuel, doctrine. This draft doctrine, however, was medical supplies, etc.21 never officially accepted; and has been superseded by the official pronouncement of These facts, that Indian war plans and 4 January 2003. Though not as doctrine, the exercises have simulated Indian troops NSAB report can be interpreted as a entering a radiological hazard area (using T- statement of intent, representing the 90 tanks that have filters against NBC opinions of influential security advisors to hazards), and that the DRDO has developed the government. portable fall-out shelters, point to a recognition within India’s military at least The NSAB report does address the issue of that nuclear weapons are capable of being the command and control of nuclear used on a battlefield.22 weapons. The doctrine makes it clear that India’s command and control structure and nuclear forces must be able to survive repeated attacks of attrition. The exact 19 Sainik Samachar, Ministry of Defence, Government words in the doctrine in section 4.3 are – of India, June 2000. 20 NBC = nuclear, biological, chemical. (i) India’s nuclear forces and their 21 Available at command and control shall be organized
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strike and to endure repetitive attrition issue of operations in an NBC environment attempts with adequate retaliatory has been recognized does give credence to capabilities for a punishing strike which the fact that the use of weapons is being would be unacceptable to the aggressor. thought about. (ii) Procedures for the continuity of nuclear command and control shall ensure Ashley Tellis identified three main reasons a continuing capability to effectively for India’s current refusal to treat nuclear employ nuclear weapons. weapons as military tools25: one, a tradition of liberal and idealistic thought that sees Section 5.2 of the NSAB report further nuclear weapons as inherently abhorrent; states that, “An effective and survivable two, a system that enshrines the primacy of command and control system with requisite civil over military institutions, and that fears flexibility and responsiveness shall be in the strengthening of the military in civil- place. An integrated operational plan, or a military relations through the greater series of sequential plans, predicated on military control over nuclear weapons strategic objectives and a targeting policy required by a nuclear war fighting posture; shall form part of the system.” The and, three, an aversion to paying the requirement for a series of sequential plans increased costs associated with a nuclear lends credence to the fact that the NSAB posture that may require nuclear weapons to report envisages a series of repeated, be in a more ready state of alertness and of perhaps escalating, attacks; to which India greater number and variety. For these would respond through its series of plans, reasons, a delayed yet assured retaliation for presumably having suffered damage to its punishment against countervalue targets is, command and control structure. The therefore, the main nuclear-use policy being flexibility and the series of attacks discussed currently followed by India for deterrence. in the doctrine are based on assumptions that Until further changes in existing conditions, the first attack India suffers may not be one at the level of declaratory policy India will that creates total destruction – rather it could attempt to avoid viewing nuclear weapons as be the first of a series of steadily escalating having utility as war fighting implements. attacks, to each of which India may respond However, as India’s nuclear posture evolves, with its sequential plans and targeting at an operational policy level the future will policy. The implication here is of weapons likely see a trend towards what Ashley either used in an escalating manner, or of a Tellis has called a “countervalue plus” variety of weapons of varying yields being targeting strategy. As Tellis points out, used. The principal assumption of a scenario It is reasonable to expect that India’s in which repeated attacks occur is that the nuclear doctrine will eventually first attack and its response are not of such incorporate a…. targeting orientation that intensity that no further attacks are either still presupposes mutual assured needed or possible. The command and vulnerability at bottom but integrates the control system is assumed to function capacity for more flexible responses in through a series of attacks, directing and order to ensure that punishment, employing appropriate responses. whenever inflicted, can be proportionate
and lead eventually to speedy conflict A further indication that the Indian doctrine termination at the most minimal cost to encompasses some issues related to the war- India. fighting use of nuclear weapons is that Article 5.5 states, “The Indian defense forces shall be in a position to execute operations in an NBC environment with 25 Ashley Tellis, India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture: minimal degradation.” The fact that this Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal, pp. 280-292.
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It is not clear, however, that Indian and What are the command and control issues Pakistani analysts have given much that are particularly and uniquely made consideration to the changes required in complex by India and Pakistan’s possession their command and control systems by the of disassembled forces? And what are the future adoption of nuclear war-fighting steps being implemented to optimize the strategies. Such strategies will require a command and control structures and major rethinking of India and Pakistan’s minimize any negative consequences arising command and control systems. A command from this state of possessing disassembled and control system that must simply give a forces? single order for a massive retaliation will be quite different from one that must coordinate These are the hard questions related to their a steadily escalating strategy under nuclear command and control structures that both attack. In the first case, the system can countries still need to answer and make disintegrate after it gives its single command transparent to each other without without a loss of function; in the second excessively exposing vulnerabilities. case, the system must survive repeated nuclear attacks. One of the key issues, apart from surviving a preemptive attack, for India and Pakistan’s As pointed out by Shaun Gregory, India and command and control systems will be to Pakistan have to be greatly concerned about move the separate components of their nuclear forces and reconstitute them, even command and control issues around the under attack. Let us consider the risks deployment and operation of nuclear involved in such movement. weapons. The dynamics of taking nuclear weapons from their recessed postures, mating warheads to delivery systems, deploying weapons in the field, and meeting the requirements of command and control through possible conventional and perhaps even nuclear engagement are immensely demanding and risk-prone.”26
26 Shaun Gregory, “Rethinking Strategic Stability in South Asia,” SASSU Research Report No. 3, South Asia Strategic Stability Unit, University of Bradford, September 2005, p. 19.
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6. Risks of Transport Accidents
To reiterate, the deployment status of India fuel leaked into the silo of a Soviet nuclear- and Pakistan’s nuclear forces is currently armed missile and exploded.29 understood as a state in which warheads are stored separately from delivery systems and As the components of India and Pakistan’s the warheads may be stored as disassembled nuclear forces begin to move, there will be components. As a crisis develops, the increased risks of transport accidents. Feroz readiness posture of nuclear weapons is H. Khan has pointed out the harsh physical expected to progressively change, moving conditions under which such movement will through stages until a nuclear-armed occur in South Asia: delivery system reaches a ready-to-use state. Conditions for armored and infantry Zia Mian, M.V. Ramana, and R. Rajaraman mobility are harsh and compounded by have assessed the risks and consequences heat and dust. Missile deployment is from the dispersal of plutonium into the logistically challenging. Strategic missile atmosphere and consequent biological types encompass both liquid- and solid- hazards from nuclear weapon accidents in fueled technologies, each having its own South Asia.27 They state that such accidents unique problems of handling and safety in involving nuclear weapons could be caused, movement.30 for example, by missile and jet fuel fires and explosions – and point out that many such To understand these safety risks of accidents have occurred to US nuclear movement quantitatively, we can use data weapons, as well as to those possessed by on accident rates based on numbers and other nuclear powers. As pointed out in this types of vehicles involved and distances paper, “prudence would dictate that India moved.31 We can then assume certain and Pakistan not deploy nuclear weapons or store them close to aircraft or ballistic missiles. Keeping the weapons disassembled 29 Shaun Gregory, The Hidden Cost of Deterrence: would further reduce the risk of accidental Nuclear Weapons Accidents (London: Brassey’s, 1990), pp. 184-190. detonation.” Other studies have also 30 Feroz Hassan Khan, “Nuclear Signaling, Missiles, reviewed and assessed nuclear weapons and Escalation Control in South Asia”, Chapter 4, in accidents for the US and other countries.28 Escalation Control and the Nuclear Option in South Shaun Gregory, for example, has described Asia, Michael Krepon, Rodney W. Jones, and Ziad some extremely serious accidents involving Haider (eds.), (Stimson Center, Washington D.C.) Available at nuclear weapons, including one in which
SOUTH ASIAN STRATEGIC STABILITY UNIT 15 The Problematic of a Nuclear Force-in-Being, a Stable Deterrence and the Issue of Non-deployment
numbers and types of vehicles and distances occurring will be 0.84. Therefore, when a moved for the mating of the nuclear number of fissile cores and warheads are components of a recessed force. Data from moved by helicopters, the probability of an India on transport accident rates are more accident increases quite significantly with readily available, and so they are used in the increasing numbers and travel time. analysis presented here, with the assumption that accident rates for Pakistan would be A similar calculation is possible for similar. In the case of helicopter accident transport by trains. Indian train accidents rates, data from the United States are used as occur at about 0.55 per million train- such data from India and Pakistan are not kilometers.33 Therefore, if we assume that readily available. movement of the forces involves 10 trains moving 1000 kilometers each,34 we get a When nuclear weapons or materials are total of 10000 train-kilometers, and the moved, extraordinary precautions will be probability of an accident is 0.0055. A train taken. However, some insight is still accident involving nuclear forces is, provided by using civilian transport accident therefore, a low probability event. However, rates. Using civilian transport accident rates it would be an event of very serious provides an upper bound on likely accident consequence. rates involving the movement of nuclear weapons or materials, assuming that the Globally, train accidents involving nuclear accident rates for the movement of materials have been known to occur. In the specialized materials (such as nuclear UK, for example, a train carrying spent weapons) are lower than for general civilian nuclear fuel flasks, and travelling at a very transport. low speed, derailed as it arrived at a power station.35 The accident occurred outside the Helicopter accident data from 1999 for the Torness power station near Dunbar, East US indicate that 8.4 accidents can be Lothian. In the case of India and Pakistan, a expected for every 100,000 hours of flight.32 train accident involving components of These data include all manner of accidents, nuclear forces could have serious even relatively minor ones. Therefore, the consequences if it does occur, even if no US data may still provide an upper (or nuclear material is released. If sabotage representative) estimate of risks for Indian were suspected, the political ramifications and Pakistani helicopter transport, as the US would be very troubling. data are not simply for significant accidents. Let us assume, for example, that in moving In 2002, major Indian road accidents were of fissile cores and warheads, India or Pakistan the order of 400,000, with approximately will need 10 helicopters that will move for 58,863,000 registered motor vehicles.36 If 10 hours each. In such a case, the probability of at least one accident occurring is 0.0084. 33 Statistics provided by the Indian Railways. However, if 100 helicopters carrying nuclear Available at components move for 100 hours each, then
16 SOUTH ASIAN STRATEGIC STABILITY UNIT Gaurav Rajen
we assume that each of these vehicles moves From the above numbers, it is clear that if approximately 10,000 kilometers annually37, warheads or other nuclear weapon we get an accident rate of 400,000 per 580 components are moved by land transport the billion vehicle-kilometers; or, risks will not be as significant as for the case approximately, 1 major road accident per 1.5 when warheads are moved by air, such as million vehicle-kilometers. Therefore, if 100 via helicopters. However, it will be in trucks will move 1000 kilometers each India’s and Pakistan’s interests to minimize during the constitution of distributed forces, the numbers moved, and the distances and the probability of an accident would be durations involved, if distributed and hidden 0.066. This is also a low probability event – nuclear forces are ever mobilized. but, again, with potentially serious consequences if it does occur.
37 This estimate of 10,000 km moved annually on average by Indian road vehicles is an assumption used primarily to create a bounding calculation of road transport risks, and should be treated as such by the reader.
SOUTH ASIAN STRATEGIC STABILITY UNIT 17 The Problematic of a Nuclear Force-in-Being, a Stable Deterrence and the Issue of Non-deployment
7. Difficulties of Safety and Reliability Analyses for Disassembled Forces
For a nuclear weapon, a principal safety exposed to in actuality, and another set of concern is to “prevent electrical energy from components could be measured as being reaching the nuclear package.”38 For this exposed to a slightly lower temperature. type of failure to occur, certain links have to These inaccurate readings could be within fail (such as a switch that fails to stay open) the normal errors of the temperature and other links have to stay intact in order to measuring sensors. As thermal radiation complete the required electric circuit. Safety effects might need to be modelled, and analyses have to take into account the thermal radiation varies as the fourth power possibility of failure of various critical of temperature, errors in assessing internal components, as well as the survival of other stress levels of components could be components. The reactions of such compounded. Such errors would further components to catastrophic or slow fires and complicate modelling the aging of other extreme environmental conditions components in disparate environments. have to be analyzed, as well as the effects of aging of sub-systems and components. A far worse scenario is that an incident might occur at a facility in which some With distributed and disassembled forces, components are exposed to off-design components are exposed to differing environmental conditions, but the personnel environments. Complete systems may not be at that facility do not report the incident easily available for regular testing. This deeming it not of sufficient concern. could complicate safety and reliability Engineers tasked with the constitution of an analyses. Let us assume that a component entire assembly from the separately stored gets exposed temporarily to a higher than components would never be able to take into design level of temperature. Engineers now account in their analyses the off-design will have to resolve whether this component exposures of some components, as these off- will still work when mated with the entire design exposures would remain unknown. assembly. This may not be a trivial exercise of their skills. Further, all measurements For all of these reasons, the Indian and have errors. For components stored Pakistani militaries may not be supremely separately, errors in measuring the confident about the efficacy of their own temperatures that different components are rapidly assembled nuclear weapons; and exposed to could get compounded – one set have equal doubts about the other’s forces. of components could be registered by Their lack of confidence in their own sensors as being exposed to a spuriously weapons would lead to greater higher temperature than the components are circumspection, but their doubts about the other’s weapons could lead to contemplation 38 Allan S. Benjamin, 1996, Comparison of of more adventurous strategies. Could such Methodologies for Assessing the Risks from Nuclear contemplations involve preemptive and Weapons and Nuclear Reactors, Proceedings, Probabilistic Safety Analysis 96, American Nuclear damage-limiting strikes? Society, Park City Utah, 1996.
18 SOUTH ASIAN STRATEGIC STABILITY UNIT Gaurav Rajen
8. Minimizing the Risks from Inadvertent or Deliberate Attacks
Fortunately, at this time, neither India nor battle. The actual consequence of these Pakistan has the capability to carry out a actions may be to escalate the exchange with “splendid” strike (a term popularized by devastating consequences – while the Herman Kahn) and sufficiently destroy the military logic may have simply been to try other’s nuclear arsenal that damage to itself to limit damage or quickly reach the can be dramatically reduced by having adversary’s break point. struck first. A probabilistic assessment of the current Indian and Pakistani capabilities The break point for ground forces (percent to destroy a significant proportion of the attrition at which a unit is pulled out of other’s mobile missile launchers is available battle) is often assumed as 30 – 50 %, as in a separate paper by the author. 39 The described by Davis, Hillestad and Crawford analysis presented in this paper establishes in a study of US capabilities to intervene and that, using tactical nuclear weapons and stop a major regional conflict.40 If we short-range missiles, Indian or Pakistani assume that an attrition of 30 percent would attacks against the other’s mobile missile stop an attack, that is, if at least 15 out a launchers would have a negligibly small force of 50 or at least 30 out of a force of probability of successfully destroying all 100 launchers could be destroyed, the launchers out of a force of 50 launchers, probabilities of success for various values of even for a very high probability, p, (p=0.9, p (=0.1, 0.5 and 0.9) are displayed in Table for example) of successfully destroying any 1. Here, N is the total number of launchers, one launcher. and the total numbers of launchers to be destroyed is greater than or equal to a However, a troubling possibility driven by a number L. high probability of success against an adversary’s opposing systems, is that a Table 1 presents the overall probability of military commander with decision power to success, P, of destroying launchers for a launch strikes may not be interested in range of values of p, N, and L destroying a very large number of opposing launchers – he may simply want to create a Here we see that the probability of high enough attrition rate that an imminent destroying 30 percent of the launchers (that attack gets blunted or stopped. In this case, is, L=15 for N=50, or L=30 for N=100) for a the commander may be interested in p=0.5 is very high. Therefore, with a high p, reaching the attrition point at which the enemy’s launchers would be pulled out of 40 Davis, Paul K., Richard Hillestad, and Natalie Crawford, “Capabilities for Major Regional Conflicts,” chapter in David Ochmanek and Zalmay 39“Strategic Stability in South Asia: The Need for Khalilzad, Strategic Appraisal 1997, RAND, 1997. Restraint in Targeting Technologies”, Disarmament Available at Forum, India and Pakistan: Peace by Piece, 2004,
SOUTH ASIAN STRATEGIC STABILITY UNIT 19 The Problematic of a Nuclear Force-in-Being, a Stable Deterrence and the Issue of Non-deployment
L = 15, N=50 L=25, N=50 L = 30, N=100 L=50, N=100 p=0.1 0.000074 ~ 0 ~ 0 ~ 0 p=0.5 0.998699 0.556138 0.99984 0.539795 p=0.9 ~ 1 ~ 1 ~ 1 ~ 1
Table 1: Overall probability of success P for different values of p, N, and L, where p is the probability of destroying a single launcher, N is the total number of launchers, and L is the least number of launchers that are sought to be destroyed a military commander may be tempted to track small, individual mobile targets to consider an attack that destroys 30 percent such an extent that they feel that their of the adversary’s launchers in the hope that mobile missile launchers could become this would blunt or stop an imminent attack. vulnerable. Recently, India has purchased However, if p is very low (p=0.1 for the Israeli Phalcon radar system for example), the commander has no possibility monitoring multiple air targets. This system of succeeding in such an attack. Crisis has a capability to track ground targets. This stability in such a case is much more has created alarm in Pakistan, and Pakistan’s enhanced. perceived vulnerability of its mobile missile launchers has undoubtedly increased. Pakistan may feel compelled to increase the size of its missile forces, and adopt a more 8.1 A Possible Restraint Regime aggressive launch posture. If Pakistan Clearly, if India and Pakistan establish a upgrades its capability to track ground restraint regime, and do not continually targets, India will feel more vulnerable and upgrade their ability to detect, search, track may increase the size of its nuclear forces, and destroy targets, a smaller number of and change its posture. In either case, crisis launchers could provide a higher level of stability could be threatened. comfort of survivability. Ideally, if both countries cannot detect, search and track Limiting improvements in missile even one of the other side’s launchers with a accuracy high probability of success, the probability India and Pakistan could also limit of destroying a significant fraction of the improvements in the accuracies of their other side’s launchers becomes very low. missiles. This could involve placing limits This then allows each side to have a smaller on the numbers of missile tests they number of launchers with a higher level of undertake. Reduced accuracy would confidence in the survivability of the force. decrease the temptation to consider the use This is a more stable situation. Decreasing of missiles against counterforce targets. the ability to find and target launchers makes the probability of destroying even a small fraction so close to zero that no first Eliminate short-range missiles strike against the launchers could ever be Finally, realizing that short-range missiles contemplated. are possibly vulnerable targets, as the area over which they are based is smaller than for 8.1.1 Restraining growth in sensors longer-range systems, India and Pakistan could eliminate their short-range systems A possible restraint regime for India and altogether. A precedent for such an Pakistan to consider could be against agreement exists in the Intermediate Nuclear developing or purchasing the sensors and Forces treaty between the US and the former related communication and analytical Soviet Union. infrastructure required to detect, search, and
20 SOUTH ASIAN STRATEGIC STABILITY UNIT Gaurav Rajen
9. The Issue of Non-deployment
As a step towards the elimination of short- 9.1 A Non-intrusive Strategy for range missile systems, a non-deployment Monitoring Non-deployment agreement is also a possibility. However, such an agreement could require intrusive This section outlines a statistically-based monitoring. In such a case, monitoring the approach to transparency in missile systems at their storage or other non- deployment that combines a high certainty threatening base locations to ensure that the of compliance with the preservation of systems have not been moved out and into a deterrence stability.41 restricted area would be required. The use of ground-based sensors could be an optimal A limited deployment zone (LDZ) could, for approach. Enhancing aerial and remote example, exclude missiles from designated monitoring technologies could create a risk zones, require basing only within certain that either side’s capabilities could be defined zones, restrict them to garrisons, or switched from a compliance verification require them to be in storage. Figure 1 mode to a more offensive application. An depicts a hypothetical situation in which option for monitoring non-deployment that India excludes a certain class of missiles would not increase vulnerabilities is from a zone close to its border with Pakistan presented here. and restricts them to a LDZ that keeps them far outside the range of any potential targets Verifying that missile non-deployment is in Pakistan. The case for India is used being implemented requires a balance of primarily as an example. Similar arguments opacity and transparency regarding apply for Pakistan. It may appear that operational status. Deterrence depends on Pakistan is restricted in its choices for LDZs, the survivability of the missile forces. Full given its lack of strategic space. However, transparency in missile deployment could for short-range missiles (with ranges of the actually reduce deterrence stability because order of 300 km), there would be numerous each side gains targeting information that locations within Pakistan that would make might tempt a counterforce strike by these missiles out of the range of any missiles, conventionally armed aircraft, significant Indian targets. Long-range and/or special operations forces. Therefore, only selected information should be shared. 41 Monitoring must provide information that is This concept was first presented by the author as a joint paper at the 46th Annual Meeting of the Institute geographically and temporally specific of Nuclear Materials Management in Phoenix, AZ, enough to provide assurance that the parties along with Michael G. Vannoni: “A Strategy for are complying with the agreement, yet not Verifying the Non-deployment of Nuclear Delivery so specific that it creates strategic Systems,” Proceedings, Annual Meeting, Institute of Nuclear Materials Management, Phoenix, AZ, July vulnerabilities. 2005. The concept was also presented as an invited paper to a workshop organized by the Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for Contemporary Conflict on “Strategic Stability in South Asia”, July 2005, Monterey, CA.
SOUTH ASIAN STRATEGIC STABILITY UNIT 21 The Problematic of a Nuclear Force-in-Being, a Stable Deterrence and the Issue of Non-deployment
missiles could, of course, be based anywhere A possible verification strategy presented within a country and still potentially impact here would use a combination of tagged an adversary’s significant targets. declared items, statistically-based sampling, tamper-protection devices, time delays, and There are several benefits from creating managed access during on-site inspections missile LDZs: to create a form of on-site inspection with • This is an advanced form of cooperation relatively low intrusiveness. that builds and sustains confidence. It is well known that the attributes of an • Restricting deployment of missiles from entire population can be inferred from a specific geographic locations moves randomly selected representative sample. If them away from preferred launching the missiles/TELs have been declared and points and greatly reduces the risk of a tagged in a suitable manner, only a small sudden crippling attack. sub-set of the missile force has to be polled (inspected) to determine whether any • In a crisis, LDZs delay any attempted missiles have moved out of the LDZs. Since use or alerting of missile forces – only a sub-set of the missile force is to be providing additional time for crisis inspected, the exact location of the inspected resolution. missiles can be provided to the other side without risking the survivability of the entire The exact number of missiles that India and missile force. The remaining missiles are Pakistan possess is highly sensitive held in dispersed and secure locations. information that neither may wish to share with the other. However, the number of The steps in the verification strategy are as Transporter-Erector-Launchers (TEL) each follows: side has is more widely known based on the 1. The parties agree to declare and tag organization of missile units that each missiles and/or their TELs and to restrict country has created. Therefore, the their locations to defined LDZs. monitoring of TELs may be more acceptable to each country than monitoring the missiles 2. Each party has the right to call a short- themselves. notice inspection of a subset of the missiles covered by the agreement to
Figure 1: A Hypothetical Depiction of Missile Limited Deployment Zones in India 22 SOUTH ASIAN STRATEGIC STABILITY UNIT
Gaurav Rajen
confirm that they are still in permitted integrity, and analyzes the photographs locations. The missiles to be inspected to determine the identity, location, and are identified by identification numbers tamper status of the specified tags. and the emplaced tags. There is a time lag from the time the picture is taken to the time the 3. The inspecting party issues a tamper- inspecting party receives the camera indicating sealed camera to the system. As the missile/TEL is permitted inspected party to photograph the tags to move after the photograph is taken, placed earlier on the missiles/TELs. The the inspecting party does not receive sealed camera could be stored and information that is so geographically maintained at the embassy of the and temporally specific that the inspecting party and transferred to the inspected missiles/TELs could be inspected country’s Ministry of Foreign precisely targeted. Affairs or Defense when a short-notice inspection is called. 8. The agreement defines the total number and frequency of short-notice 4. The inspected party has a set period of inspections during a year. time to photograph the tags on the specified missiles/TELs. The inspecting The key question for verification is whether party will not be present during the polling a statistically valid, appropriately photography process. chosen sample size can provide enough information about the entire population to 5. The camera system includes a GPS conclude that the commitment for limited receiver that superimposes the deployment is being met. The probability of geographical coordinates and date/time finding an errant missile (i.e., one outside of onto the digital image whenever a the permitted deployment zone) by polling photograph is taken. Analysis of the any single missile in the force at random if Z image would then show that the missiles out of a force of N have been specified missile/TEL was present at a moved illicitly out of the LDZ is Z/N, known location at a known time. This defined as p. The probability of finding x means that a party could not move a errant missiles out of N missiles (defined as missile/TEL farther from a limited P(x)) can be modeled as a Bernoulli trial deployment zone than it would take to problem, and a simple mathematical return in time for a short-notice approach can be used to calculate the inspection. The verification system thus probabilities of success of finding errant becomes a “leash” on the movements of missiles.42 individual missiles/TELs. 42 The probability of finding an errant missile (i.e., one 6. The tags also report tampering to the outside of the permitted deployment zone) by polling camera system. Tampering could be any single missile in the force at random if Z missiles detected visually in the image in the out of a force of N have been moved illicitly out of the LDZ is Z/N, defined as p. We assume that, after same way as a traditional on-site inspection, the inspected missile/TEL is again a part of inspection. Alternatively, a more the population that can be polled, keeping p constant sophisticated tag could transmit a state for each inspection. This precludes the possibility that of health message when it receives a after inspection the system could enter an exclusionary zone, as it could be recalled for another inspection. short-range radio frequency message The probability of finding x errant missiles out of N from the camera system. missiles [defined as P(x)] is then a Bernoulli trial problem, where, P (x) = {N! /(x! (N-x)!)} px (1-p) N-x 7. After the photography process, the The probability of finding one or more errant missiles inspecting party receives the sealed in a sample size, L, can then be found by a summation of P(x) over 1<= x <= L. camera system, verifies the system’s
SOUTH ASIAN STRATEGIC STABILITY UNIT 23 The Problematic of a Nuclear Force-in-Being, a Stable Deterrence and the Issue of Non-deployment
Figure 2 presents graphs that describe the If a large number of missiles/TELs were probabilities of success in finding errant moved out of the limited deployment zone, missiles for various sample sizes and polling a sample as small as three randomly numbers of missiles in violation, in a missile selected units gives a high probability of force of 50 units. The graphs show that detecting the violation. If a small number of polling to determine the locations of even a missiles/TELs are moved out and escape small number of missiles/TELs (selected at detection by virtue of a small sample size random) results in acceptably high being polled, the inspections still preclude confidence that a large number of missiles the possibility of a large preemptive attack have not moved out of the limited being assembled. Therefore, crisis stability deployment zone. can be strengthened by a small number of short-notice inspections.
1
n r o i
o 0.9 e at l n
o 0.8 5 out of 50 moved o
g 0.7 out of LDZ a vi in f t
c 0.6 10 out of 50 s e r t es i moved out of LDZ l e 0.5 d ccu f ssi 20 out of 50 i o 0.4 o moved out of LDZ m y t
n 0.3
ilit 30 out of 50 a b r
a 0.2 moved out of LDZ b er e o r r 0.1 o P
m 0 0102030 Sample size
Figure 2: The Effectiveness of a Verification Strategy Based on Statistical Sampling of the Monitored Missile Population
24 SOUTH ASIAN STRATEGIC STABILITY UNIT Gaurav Rajen
10. Conclusion
There is a need for India and Pakistan to • Provide assurances that if such strengthen the stability of their nuclear movement does occur it will only occur stand-off. The posture of a force-in-being with the nuclear package not mated with does not by its adoption create an inherently the warhead. stable situation. During crises, each side could take precautionary moves that might • Affirm that constitution of weapons will be misinterpreted and result in undesired only occur at a very late stage in a crisis escalation. when an attack seems imminent.
India and Pakistan should assure each other This last point does not prevent Pakistan that their nuclear weapon systems are safe, from deterring an Indian conventional attack undergo regular safety checks, and that by leaving open the threat of exercising its constitution will not nuclear option even in occur routinely or the early stages of a even if a crisis is conventional attack. beginning to escalate India and Pakistan can What it does is reassure – only as a matter of exercise restraint in the growth each other that signals last resort. Further, will not be misread and given the concerns of their targeting technologies, forces constituted and regarding limited and and/or eliminate certain classes moved frequently and in complicated safety a crisis’ early stages. tests, and the risks of of their more destabilizing transport accidents, short-range missile systems. Simultaneously, by both sides may wish assuring each other that to reassure each other their deterrence is that transport of credible, and will be nuclear weapons, when it does occur, will constituted when a crisis reaches close to the take place with the nuclear package not stage of a conventional war, they can both mated with the warhead. This would ensure work to avoid ever reaching such a stage – that if a transport or other accident did occur while having negated the need for bellicose during movement, the risks of an accidental statements through the public media. nuclear explosion would be minimized. To minimize the risks of inadvertently or In short, these are some of the steps India deliberately targeting the other’s missile and Pakistan could undertake to make their launchers and other nuclear delivery state of recessed deterrence more stable: systems, India and Pakistan can exercise restraint in the growth of their targeting • Minimize the numbers, distance and technologies, and/or eliminate certain duration of any move of force classes of their more destabilizing short- components. range missile systems. If short-range missiles are eliminated, India and Pakistan’s
SOUTH ASIAN STRATEGIC STABILITY UNIT 25 The Problematic of a Nuclear Force-in-Being, a Stable Deterrence and the Issue of Non-deployment
deterrent forces would consist of long-range In this strategy, a camera system takes an missiles hidden over a much larger territory. image of the tag and also records the time Longer-range missiles generally are less and coordinates of the image’s location. accurate, and are more expensive to build This approach avoids creating vulnerabilities and maintain. These systems are less likely by providing too much information about to be considered for use as battlefield the locations of the missiles/TELs. weapons. They would also be less likely to be inadvertently attacked during the border Recent moves toward peace by India and skirmish phases of a beginning armed Pakistan provide an opportunity to consider conflict, as they would be located well away taking steps to make their nuclear stand-off from the border. more stable. Steps proposed here include agreements on restraints on the movement of Monitoring technologies can facilitate the nuclear forces during crises, establishing establishment of limited and non- some restraint measures on technologies for deployment zones for missiles/TELs. A targeting mobile nuclear launch systems, verification strategy that polls a sub-set of a and establishing limited deployment zone tagged population of restricted items has for mobile missiles. been presented.
26 SOUTH ASIAN STRATEGIC STABILITY UNIT