28/Autumn 2000

Journal of Issue 28 / Autumn 2000 / £4.00

Liberal DemocratHISTORY

Community Politics John Meadowcroft The Origins of Community Politics New Liberalism, Grimond and the Counter-Culture Peter Joyce The Liberal Party and the Popular Front Jaime Reynolds and Ian Hunter Liberal Class Warrior Tom Horabin Meeting reports Liberalism in the West Liberalism and the Boer War Reviews Bill Rodgers, Fourth Among Equals David Steel Roland Hill, Acton Ian Machin Liberal Democrat History Group Issue 28: Autumn 2000 Journal of Liberal Democrat History The Journal of Liberal Democrat History is published quarterly by the Liberal Democrat History Group. 3 The Origins of Community Politics ISSN 1463-6557 Editor: Duncan Brack New Liberalism, Grimond and the Counter--Culture John Meadowcroft Assistant Editor: Alison Smith Reviews Editor: Sam Crooks

10 The Liberal Party and the Popular Front Liberal Democrat History Group Peter Joyce assesses the arguments over progressive unity in the 1930s The Liberal Democrat History Group promotes the discussion and research of historical topics, particularly those relating to the 17 Biography: Tom Horabin histories of the Liberal Democrats, Liberal Party and the SDP. The Group organises Jaime Reynolds and Ian Hunter examine the maverick career of the radical Liberal MP discussion meetings and produces the Journal and other occasional publications.

For more information, including details of 22 Report: Liberalism in the West publications, back issues of the Journal, tape records of meetings and archive and other with Michael Steed and Malcolm Brown. Report by Graham Lippiatt research sources, see our web site at: www.liberalhistory.org.ukwww.liberalhistory.org.uk. 25 Report: ‘Methods of Barbarism’ – Hon President: Earl Russell Liberalism and the Boer War Chair: Graham Lippiatt

with Denis Judd and Jacqueline Beaumont. Report by David Cloke Editorial/Correspondence Contributions to the Journal – letters, articles, and book reviews – are invited. The Journal is a 29 Review: Last of the Gang … refereed publication; all articles submitted will be reviewed. Contributions should be sent to: Bill Rodgers: Fourth Among Equals. Reviewed by David Steel Duncan Brack (Editor) Flat 9, 6 Hopton Road, London SW16 2EQ. 30 Review: Nearly an Eminent Victorian email: [email protected]. All articles copyright © their authors. Roland Hill: Lord Acton. Reviewed by Ian Machin Advertisements 31 Review: Neville Chamberlain – Adverts are welcome; please contact the Editor. Policy Wonk Subscriptions/Membership Graham Stewart: Burying Caesar: Churchill, Chamberlain and the Battle for the Tory Party. Reviewed by Richard Grayson An annual subscription to the Journal of Liberal Democrat History costs £10.00 (£5.00 unwaged rate). This includes membership of the History 33 Review: Whigs, Liberals and History Group unless you inform us otherwise. Overseas subscribers should add £5.00; or, a special three- Victor Feske: From Belloc to Churchill: Private scholars, public culture and the year rate is available for £40.00 total. crisis of British Liberalism, 1900–1939. Reviewed by Iain Sharpe Cheques (payable to ‘Liberal Democrat History Group’) should be sent to: Patrick Mitchell 34 Review: I blame Sir Edward Grey 6 Palfrey Place, London SW8 1PA; email: [email protected] John Charmley: Splendid Isolation? Britain and the Balance of Power 1874–1914. Reviewed by Peter Truesdale Cover design concept: Lynne Featherstone

Published by the Liberal Democrat History Group, Front cover pictures (see ‘The Origins of Community Politics, pp. 3–9): c/o Flat 9, 6 Hopton Road, London SW16 2EQ Thomas Hill Green Printed by Kall-Kwik, Jo Grimond 426 Chiswick High Road, London W4 5TF Young Liberal leafletter September 2000

2 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 28 Autumn 2000 Philosophy How did the Liberal Party come to adopt a strategy of community politics in 1970? Dr John Meadowcroft traces the origins of the concept from the New, or Social, Liberalism of Thomas Hill Green, through Jo Grimond’s leadership of the Liberal Party, to the counter-culture of the 1960s. TheThe OriginsOrigins ofof CommunityCommunity PoliticsPolitics New Liberalism, Grimond and the Counter--Culture

n September  the Liberal Party’s annual strands within the Liberal Party. First, to the tradi- Iassembly met at Eastbourne on the south coast of tion of Social or New Liberalism dating back to England, three months after a disastrous general the Idealist philosophy of Thomas Hill Green. election at which the party’s parliamentary represen- Second, to Jo Grimond’s leadership of the Liberal tation had been halved from twelve to six MPs, and Party from  to , which emphasised par- its share of the vote had fallen from eleven per cent ticipation as the key modern Liberal value and lo- in  and nine per cent in  to eight per cent. cal electoral success as the only sound basis for a Of the  Liberal candidates,  had lost their de- national revival of the party. Third, to the ‘Red posits. With only a small local government base – the Guard’ of the Young Liberals, a small group of party had won less than  seats at the last local young idealistic libertarians inspired by the coun- elections and controlled no local authorities at the ter-culture of the s, who sought an alterna- time – the continued existence of a political party tive to the class politics and entrenched interests which in the previous twelve years appeared to have of the Labour and Conservative Parties. It was pulled itself back from the brink of extinction was the intertwining of these three strands that led to again in serious doubt. the adoption of community politics. Yet the Eastbourne conference proved to be a turning point in the history of the third party. An amendment to the agreed Party Strategy and Tac- The Social Liberalism of Thomas tics proposed by the youth wing of the party, and Hill Green known as the community politics resolution, was The individual was the basic unit of the philosophy of   passed by a majority of to votes. The reso- the nineteenth century Liberal Party. This reflected lution committed the Liberal Party to a strategy of the party’s traditional Whig values and the primary community politics. This was defined as: ‘a dual ap- concerns of past liberal thinkers: individual liberty, proach to politics, acting both inside and outside utilitarian self-interest and the political economy of the institutions of the political establishment … to the free market. Although liberal thinkers had been help organise people in their communities to take concerned with the collective, they saw society in and use power … to build a Liberal power-base in terms of individuals, rather than individuals in terms the major cities of this country … to capture peo- of society. To the most celebrated philosopher of this ple’s imagination as a credible political movement, classical liberal tradition, John Stuart Mill, social or with local roots and local successes’. political progress was only possible through measures The adoption of the community politics strat- that cultivated in each individual a distinct awareness  egy must be set in the context of the general of self, rather than through those that encouraged col- election, but it can also be traced to three specific lective action or a sense of fellowship.

Journal of Liberal Democrat History 28 Autumn 2000 3 munal activity that the opportunity arose truly to realise those interests. Who that individual was, and what op- portunities and possibilities he/she had, were determined by the social context in which the individual lived. Any attempt to understand, place or interpret an individual outside his/her social context was destined to failure. It was only through collective endeavour and association that each individual could achieve his/her true potential and ‘really live as persons’. This view of the individual in a social context led Green – like many of his contemporaries on the emerging left in British politics – to develop a political philosophy based upon a return to the values of community that many feared were being trampled in the incessant economic advance of the late nineteenth century. Green argued that Britain’s material prosperity was founded not only upon the success of free market and utilitarian principles, but also on pre-existing values of community that underpinned Victorian society. Without those communal values the existing social order would perish. Green transcended the essentially negative definition of liberty inherent in the work of Mill and the classical liberals. Mill had specifically defended the sale of alcohol in On Liberty on the grounds that the arguments for prohi- bition used in the United States could Thomas Hill Green (1836–82) be used to justify any violation of individual liberty. Green, however, argued Towards the end of the nineteenth and a leading figure in the temperance that to allow people to be ‘enslaved’ by century, however, a number of liberal movement. His philosophy and public alcohol, lack of education or poor thinkers grew ‘sensitive to the failure of life were underpinned by his evangeli- housing and working conditions was a utilitarian liberalism which stimulated cal upbringing, which influenced his greater infringement of their liberty competition to the extent that commu- advocacy of an Hegelian ideal view of than the state intervention required to nity was destroyed’. The liberal phi- the state as the embodiment of God’s ameliorate these wrongs. Green be- losophers who sought to grapple with will on earth and thus also the manifes- lieved it was a responsibility of govern- the apparent atomisation of society cre- tation of the common good in society. ment to intervene in the mechanisms ated by industrialisation and urbanisa- Green’s political philosophy set him of the market to ensure that unequal tion centred around Thomas Hill outside the existing liberal philosophi- power and economic relations in soci- Green. Green spent almost his entire cal hegemony. Green conceived the in- ety did not result in the exploitation of adult life lecturing at Balliol College, dividual as being firmly rooted in soci- the poor and powerless by the wealthy Oxford. Unlike many of his fellow ety and incomprehensible outside of and powerful. The invisible hand of the dons, who chose to live in a cloistered the collective. market could not always be relied upon academic environment, Green sought Green argued that although society to produce the best outcome. One par- an active engagement with wider soci- did consist of individuals who were ticular quotation on this subject from ety. He was an Oxford town councillor, conscious of their own identity and Green’s lecture on the principles of lib- a member of the Oxford school board, self-interest, it was only through com- eral legislation merits repetition in full:

4 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 28 Autumn 2000 No doubt there were many high- Grimond: repositioning equivocally condemned the govern- minded employers who did their best ment’s action, finally sending a clear for their workpeople before the days of and local campaigning message of the direction in which state interference, but they could not It was under Grimond’s leadership that prevent less scrupulous hirers of labour Grimond wished to move the party. He from hiring it on the cheapest terms ... the Liberal Party first showed real signs saw the Liberal Party as a progressive If labour is to be had under conditions of revival from the near-death experi- party of the centre-left and sought a re- incompatible with the health or decent ence of the previous thirty years. connection with its Social Liberal her- housing or education of the labourer, Grimond’s election to the leadership itage that he argued had often been there will always be plenty of people to took place during the Suez Crisis, an buy it under those conditions. overshadowed by its advocacy of classi- event that marked a significant shift in cal liberal values, particularly in the Green died in , but his influence on the positioning and outlook of the Lib- economic sphere. the Liberal Party, and on British politics eral Party. Jo Grimond sought to The Liberal Party under Grimond as a whole, in the nineteenth and the change the party from the backward successfully attracted a relatively large twentieth centuries should not be un- looking, quasi-conservative rump it had number of young people to a political derestimated. Green was influential in become, into a progressive and radical party with only six MPs, few local his support for a number of Gladstone’s  organisation. At the time of councillors, and next to no prospect of more controversial policies, notably re- Grimond’s election confusion sur- national power in the foreseeable fu- strictions on licensing, land reform and rounded the party’s stance on the Con- ture. This relatively high level of sup- employment rights legislation. It is servative Government’s action over port among young people owed a great noteworthy that the Liberal Prime Min- Suez. In parliament, Liberal MPs and deal to the Liberal Party’s apparently ister who first introduced state welfare peers voted for and against the govern- classless basis and approach, as opposed provision in the form of old age pen- ment in the space of two days. A month to what were portrayed as the old-style sions, H. H. Asquith, was an under- passed before the Liberal Party un- graduate at Balliol College during Green’s time. Green’s influence can also Jo Grimond (1913–93), leader of the Liberal Party 1956–67 be seen in the work of L. T. Hobhouse, whose seminal text, Liberalism, echoed Green’s view that liberalism was a philosophy that rooted the individual within a collective whole. Thomas Hill Green was the first of a tradition of Social Liberals extending from the final quarter of the nineteenth century to the present day. He laid the philosophical foundations for Social Liberalism that were developed first by Hobhouse and Hobson, and later by John Maynard Keynes and William Beveridge. Yet during the wilderness years of the Liberal Party the Social Liberal tradition became very distant. After the Second World War the party became more concerned with negative liberty and the fate of the individual in the face of what was perceived to be an ever-en- croaching state. The Liberal Party appeared to have more in common with the Conservative Party than the radical tradition of British politics, as illustrated by the fact that the majority of Liberal MPs throughout the s were in Parliament only via the acquiescence of the Tories. The Lib- eral Party did not move decisively from conservatism to radicalism until Jo Grimond ascended to the leadership in September .

Journal of Liberal Democrat History 28 Autumn 2000 5 class politics of the larger parties. A key doubtful whether these young activists that, ‘It is easier to change people’s vot- feature of this approach was Grimond’s would have been attracted to the Liberal ing habits at local elections than at by- contention that Britain required a new, Party and whether the community poli- elections and at by-elections than at modernised participatory democracy. tics resolution would ever have been general elections’. Although proportional representa- proposed, let alone passed. The emphasis upon local govern- tion had been a policy of the Liberal Grimond’s leadership also coincided ment was complemented by a wholesale Party since , Grimond’s thesis that a with a new emphasis on achieving elec- reorganisation of the Liberal Party Or- wholesale modernisation of all our social toral success at a local level. At a national ganisation, which involved the creation and political insti- level, Grimond’s of a Local Government Department un- tutions was neces- long-term strategy der the direction of Richard Wainwright sary before ‘real’ Grimond’s leadership laid was to reposition in . The Department was to provide democracy was the foundations for the the Liberal Party organisational back-up and support to possible became a as the non-socialist Liberal candidates fighting local elec- central tenet of modern strategy of radical alternative tions and those Liberals who were al- third party policy community politics by to the Conserva- ready members of local authorities. In from this time on- emphasising political tives, believing the first Local Government Handbook, wards. The empha- that the intellec- Pratap Chitnis declared the intention of sis that Grimond participation as central to tual bankruptcy of the party to attach equal prominence to placed on partici- liberalism and identifying socialism would aggressively contesting local elections as pation as a funda- local government eventually lead to well as developing sound policies: mental liberal a realignment of Those areas where in recent years Lib- value was an im- success as a prerequisite the left, with the erals have made the greatest progress in portant influence to a national revival. Liberal Party re- achieving representation on Councils on the Liberal Par- placing the Labour have not necessarily been those places where our policy was any better than ty’s future ap- Party as the major that of Liberals elsewhere, but places proach to local government and com- progressive force in British politics. In where our organisation, whether ama- munity politics, not least because it at- the short term, however, the party hier- teur or professional, could match and tracted to the party many of those inter- archy believed that success at local elec- even surpass that of our professionally ested in the ideas of the New Left, but tions was a prerequisite to national or organised opponents. Elections are not disillusioned with the frequently pater- parliamentary growth. The Liberal lead- won only on the merits of policy. Lib- erals must organise their elections, and nalistic and exclusive approach of the ership judged that significant parliamen- organise them well. Labour Party on the ground and in of- tary gains would not be possible until Although community politics was de- fice. Had Grimond, or any other leader, and unless the party made an impact at veloped into more than simply a means sought to move the party to the right local elections. The truth was self-evi- of winning local elections, the electoral and replace the Conservatives, it is dent in Mark Bonham Carter’s dictum success of locally based campaigning on specifically local issues was a crucial Young Liberals as the press saw them; the cover of the Guardian report on the Liberal factor in the acceptance of the strategy Assembly, 1966. by the wider Liberal Party. The necessity for Liberal councillors to be particularly responsive to their constituents to avoid being swept away on a national political tide was an important factor in the development and acceptance of community politics. The simple equa- tion that casework equalled votes and votes equalled political power, meant that constituency work was not seen as a tedious necessity, but was a means of directly furthering the cause of the Lib- eral Party and liberalism. As Grimond stated in a speech he delivered the year that the Local Government Depart- ment was created: ‘every time a local Liberal councillor gets a bus stop moved to a better place he strikes a blow for the Liberal Party’. At a time when any national break-

6 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 28 Autumn 2000 through was distant to the point of im- possibility a small number of activists, largely working in urban (but also sub- urban and rural) areas, began to see the first signs of the unprecedented local success that would follow by employing the methods that later formed the basis of community politics, in particular the all year-round campaigning built on Focus-style newsletters. Although the real fruits of this success did not flourish until after Jeremy Thorpe succeeded Grimond in , the techniques that were to form the backbone of Liberal election campaigns for decades to come were developed at this time by early pioneers such as Wallace Lawler in Bir- mingham and Trevor Jones in Liver- pool. The time of Grimond’s leadership Young Liberal conference, 1971; community politics architects Tony Greaves and Gordon saw a real change in the tactics, style Lishman on right. and approach of the Liberal Party. It laid the foundation for the development, in the first few years of Jeremy Thorpe’s establishment support for the United lives, to escape the endemic passivity of leadership, of the more radical aspects States’ involvement in the Vietnam War, contemporary society, it was necessary of the strategy that culminated in the many young people believed that their for them to stop accepting that others success of the community politics reso- ideas held equal if not greater validity should act on their behalf and be their lution in . than the ideas of older generations. In representatives. In the political field, this common with many of those involved meant mass participation in decision- in student and New Left politics at the making, rather than leaving all decisions The Red Guard and the time the Red Guard’s goal was radical to professional politicians. social change. Peter Hain wrote of the This critique of a passive political ‘transformation of community politics’ vision: culture had parallels with Jo Grimond’s society’ Our goal is nothing less than the trans- advocacy of democracy through par- The driving force behind the success- formation of society. In place of the ticipation, but also echoed the critical ful community politics resolution of competition and authoritarianism theory that had gained wide currency  and the bulk of the theory of which characterises contemporary so- among students at that time, notably ciety, we wish to see mutual aid and community politics was the ‘Red mutual cooperation. the neo-marxist theorist Herbert Guard’ leadership of the National Marcuse, and the Situationists, a small The belief in the need for a transforma- League of Young Liberals and, to a French anarchist group who inspired tion of society implies a critique of the lesser extent, leading members of the the Paris students involved in the cam- existing social order. The Red Guard Union of Liberal Students, towards the pus occupations and civil disturbances argued that the expansion of industrial end of the s. Indeed, the invention of May . Indeed, the events of May capitalism and the growing pace of of the term community politics (as  appeared to demonstrate that real technological development were un- understood within the Liberal Party social change could be born out of the sustainable because of the environmen- and Liberal Democrats) is usually activities and analyses of small groups of tal, economic and social problems that credited to two members of the Red young people and students. were an inevitable by-product, a view Guard, Gordon Lishman and Lawrie The Red Guard sought the transfor- that echoed Green’s fear for the survival Freedman, at a Young Liberal strategy mation of a stagnant political culture of community in the face of Victorian meeting early in . dominated locally and nationally by industrialism. The culture that sup- The original theory of community professional politicians who were not ported the capitalist system failed to ad- politics was developed in the political only out of touch with the lives and dress the questions of ecological dam- culture of the late s. As Maggie concerns of the majority of the popula- age, world poverty or the spiritual pov- Clay has pointed out, the theory must tion, but had a vested interest in main- erty of the lives of many in Western so- be seen in the context of the ‘profound taining their own positions of privilege ciety, but rather engendered a passive optimism about the possibilities for and influence rather than seeking a acceptance that crept into all areas of world society,’ shared by many students more equal distribution of power. Soci- social and political life. For people to and political activists at this time. It ety was perceived as being governed by regain an authentic meaning in their was a time when, in great part due to a professional elite of bureaucrats and

Journal of Liberal Democrat History 28 Autumn 2000 7 process of deciding which decisions ment success as a prerequisite to a na- were taken. While the principle of tional revival. Third, the Red Guard of subsidiarity was clear, how to decide the Young Liberals combined these two the most appropriate level at which to strands with the ideas and optimism of take a decision was much less so. Com- the s counter-culture in the  munity politics has remained vague as assembly resolution. to the ideal level to which power There has never been unanimity should be devolved. within the third party as to what com- The success of the community poli- munity politics actually entails. For tics resolution may be an example of a some, it is a system of ideas for social successful ‘breakthrough’ that was the transformation. For others, it is simply subject of a great deal of contemporary an extremely effective technique for discussion – where the youthful, radical winning local elections. Yet it is element in an established political or- probably no coincidence that the  ganisation becomes large enough to Liberal Party assembly was the last oc- take control of policy, strategy and or- casion when the continued existence ganisation. A year before radical Young of the third party was seriously ques- Liberal activists first gained national tioned by its own members. Commu- prominence at the  Brighton con- nity politics has been the key to the re- politicians, while the power relations ference, Abrams and Little argued that, vival of the party’s fortunes in local that were the root cause of poverty and ‘whatever the demands of young activ- government. Dorling et al’s analysis of inequality went unchallenged. It was ists, a breakthrough by the young them- the Liberal Democrat vote in local argued that the existing political insti- selves is not within the structural possi- elections demonstrates the importance tutions did not provide opportunity for bilities of British politics’. Certainly, of campaigning factors over socio- change, but instead served to perpetu- the Red Guard never assumed com- economic variables in explaining the ate the status quo. Even political parties plete control of the Liberal Party, but Liberal and Liberal Democrat advance had ‘become obsolete and [were] sim- the size and competence of the youth in local government during the last ply tools of the system rather being ve- wing enabled it to exert a profound and two decades. hicles for democratic control’. lasting influence during this period, Community politics, then, is part of The Red Guard theorists were clear suggesting that Abrams and Little had a long tradition of Social Liberalism that they wanted to see social change underestimated what could be achieved concerned with the mediation of forces on a wide scale, but they were less clear by young activists. that are beyond the reach of single indi- as to how that change would come viduals and therefore require collective about or where it would ultimately action for their control. Although it lead. In common with most (if not all) A long tradition would be contentious to suggest that a critical theorists they were a good deal The origins of community politics can majority of Liberal Democrat council- more successful at diagnosing society’s be traced to three specific strands lors or members are aware of the mod- ills than at prescribing a cure. Lishman within the history of the Liberal Party ern party’s roots in the philosophy of was certain that the creation of ‘real’ de- and liberal thought. First, the Social or Green and others, the policy positions mocracy was necessary: New Liberalism of Thomas Hill Green. of the Liberal Democrats do more The idea of real democracy is an im- This linked liberalism with a concern clearly reflect this tradition than that of portant part of this approach. We abhor for the health of communities in the classical liberalism. As Bennie et al con- the idea of a government acting with- face of seemingly pernicious economic cluded from their study of the attitudes out the consent of the people; we look or social forces. Green articulated a lib- of Liberal Democrat members: ‘Overall, forward to a time when people will not eral desire to use collective institutions, only passively consent but actively par- the political attitudes of Liberal Demo- ticipate both in making decisions and whether the local state, central state or crats fit well with the tradition of social in deciding what are the questions on the voluntary sector, to take action to liberalism as propounded by Hobhouse which decisions need to be taken. protect communities, even if this com- and Hobson rather than the classical The question of how greater participa- promised the short-term freedom of liberal approach of laissez-faire econom- tion might be achieved lies at the heart individuals. Second, Jo Grimond’s lead- ics … We can safely conclude that the of the theory of community politics. ership of the Liberal Party reconnected social liberal tradition is alive and well The Red Guard failed to address satis- the party with that Social Liberal tradi- in the attitudes of modern-day Liberal factorily, or were at least exceptionally tion. Grimond’s leadership laid the Democrats’. Community politics may vague about, the nature, size or scope of foundations for the modern strategy of once have been at the cutting edge of the institutions required to facilitate the community politics by emphasising po- radical political thought and practice, participation of members of communi- litical participation as central to lib- but it has now been subsumed into the ties in decision-making and in the eralism and identifying local govern- mainstream of the Liberal Democrats,

8 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 28 Autumn 2000 where it sits comfortably within a long 9 Green, Prolegomena to ethics, Section 202. 22 P. Chitnis, Local Government Handbook (Lon- tradition of Social Liberalism. 10 Here I use Isaiah Berlin’s distinction between don: Liberal Party Organisation, 1960), p. 80. negative liberty as freedom from external inter- 23 Quoted in Watkins, The Liberal Dilemma, p. 108. ference and positive liberty as freedom to real- 24 W. Wallace, ‘Survival and Revival,’ in V. Dr John Meadowcroft is a Lecturer in the ise one’s own destiny. For an eloquent consid- Bogdanor, ed., Liberal Party Politics (Oxford: Department of Politics at Queen Mary and eration of the subtleties and implications of the Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 63. distinction, see: I. Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Lib- 25 M. Clay, Liberals and Community (Hebden Westfield College of the University of Lon- erty’, in Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Bridge: Liberal Party Publications, 1985), p. 3. don. His Ph.D was an empirical study of Clarendon Press, 1969). 26 P. Hain, Radical Liberalism and Youth Politics the Liberal Democrats in local government. 11 Mill, On Liberty, p. 158. (London: Liberal Party Publications, 1974), p. 19. 12 For a full review of this fascinating argument be- 27 Green and the Red Guard understood ‘commu- tween Green and Mill see: Nicholson, ‘T. H. nity’ in very different ways, however. For Green, 1 Exact figures are not available, but refer to: D. Green and State Action: Liquor Legislation’, a restoration of community was to be based Butler and G. Butler, British Political Facts 1900– pp. 534–8. upon Christian spirituality and ethics, whereas 94 (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1994), p. 443; The 13 T. H. Green, ‘Liberal Legislation and Freedom of for the Red Guard community was an essentially Economist, 16 May 1970, pp. 20–3. Contract,’ in P. Harris and J. Morrow eds., T. H. secular construction, often perceived in geo- 2The term ‘Red Guard’ was originally given by Green: Lectures on the Principles of Political graphical terms. the national press to what was effectively an Obligations and other writings (Cambridge: 28 B. Greaves, ‘A New Perspective,’ in B. Greaves, earlier generation of Young Liberal activists, no- Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 204. ed., Scarborough Perspectives (London: Na- tably Louis Eaks and George Kiloh, who gained 14 I. Bradley, The Optimists (London: Faber and tional League of Young Liberals, 1971), p. 10. notoriety for their opposition to UK member- Faber, 1980), pp. 217–20. 29 National League of Young Liberals, Eastbourne ship of NATO at the 1966 Brighton assembly, 15 L. T. Hobhouse, Liberalism (Cambridge: Cam- ‘70: A Strategy for Liberals, p. 5. see: P. Hellyer, ‘Young Liberals: The ‘Red Guard’ bridge University Press, 1994), p. 60, inter alia. 30 S. Mole, Community Control (London: Union of Era’, Journal of Liberal Democrat History, 17 16 Although published at the outset of Grimond’s Liberal Students, 1969), p. 3. Mole also quotes (1997), pp. 14–5. tenure, good examples of this outlook can be from Marcuse on this page. 3For example: J. S. Mill, On Liberty (London: found among the essays collected in: G. 31 P. Hain, ‘The Alternative Movement,’ in B. Penguin, 1985), p. 128. Watson, ed., The Unservile State (London: Greaves, ed., Scarborough Perspectives (Lon- 4 K. Hoover, ‘Liberalism and the Idealist philoso- George Allen and Unwin, 1957). don: National League of Young Liberals, 1971), phy of Thomas Hill Green’, Western Political 17 Michael Meadowcroft has argued recently in p. 46. Quarterly, 26 (1973), p. 559. this journal that Grimond was to the left of the 32 G. Lishman, ‘Community Politics: A theoretical 5P. P. Nicholson, ‘T. H. Green and State Action: party he led: M. Meadowcroft, ‘The Alliance: approach’, The New Politics, 2 (1) (1970), p. 4. Liquor Legislation’, History of Political Thought, Parties and Leaders’, Journal of Liberal Demo- 33 For example: G. Lishman, ‘Community Politics,’ 6 (1985), pp. 517–9. crat History, 18 (1998), pp. 17–8. in B. Greaves, ed., Scarborough Perspectives 6T. H. Green, ‘Lectures on the Principles of Politi- 18 A. Watkins, The Liberal Dilemma (London: (London: National League of Young Liberals, cal Obligation’, in P. Harris and J. Morrow eds., MacKibbon and Gee, 1966), pp. 84–7. In his 1971), pp. 34–5. T. H. Green: Lectures on the Principles of Politi- memoirs Grimond wrote that the impact of the 34 Abrams and Little, ‘The Young Activist in British cal Obligations and other writings (Cambridge: Suez Crisis on public opinion presented an op- Politics,’ p. 324. Cambridge University Press, 1986). Sections portunity to transform Britain’s social and eco- 35 B. Greaves and G. Lishman, The Theory and 113–116 are a good example of Green’s Idealist nomic policy that was not taken: J. Grimond, Practice of Community Politics (Hebden Bridge, philosophy. Memoirs (London: Heinemann, 1979), Association of Liberal Councillors, 1980), p. 1. 7T. H. Green, Prolegomena to Ethics (Oxford: pp. 196–7. 36 D. Dorling, C. Rallings and M. Thrasher, ‘The Oxford University Press, 1884), Section 183. 19 For example: J. Grimond, The Liberal Challenge epidemiology of the Liberal Democrat vote’, Po- 8 S. den Otter, ‘“Thinking in Communities”: Late (London: Hollis and Carter, 1963), p. 33. litical Geography, 17 (1998), pp. 64–5. Nineteenth Century Liberals, Idealists and the 20 P. Abrams and A. Little, ‘The Young Activist in 37 L. Bennie, J. Curtice and W. Rudig, ‘Party Mem- Retrieval of Community’, Parliamentary History, British Politics’, British Journal of Sociology, 16 bers’, in D. MacIver, ed., The Liberal Democrats 16 (1997), pp. 67–84, provides an excellent de- (1965), p. 325. (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, scription of the desire for a return to community 21 Quoted in Watkins, The Liberal Dilemma, p. 109. 1996), p. 144. in British politics at this time.

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Journal of Liberal Democrat History 28 Autumn 2000 9 Popular Front Peter Joyce assesses the arguments over progressive unity in the 1930s, and Liberal and Labour responses. TheThe LiberalLiberal PartyParty andand thethe PopularPopular FrontFront

significant aspect of the decline which the Book’) and Britain’s Industrial Future (the ‘Yellow ALiberal Party experienced in the early decades Book’) in . Keynes in particular made a signifi- of the twentieth century was the loss of progressives cant contribution to progressive politics based on to the Labour Party. There were several reasons to social democratic principles in this period. How- explain this situation. The decision by Asquith’s gov- ever, the limited scope of the Liberal revival at the ernment to commence hostilities in  resulted in  general election (in which  MPs were re- pacifist progressives supporting the Union of Demo- turned with .% of the popular vote) suggested cratic Control, many of whose members subse- that the party was unlikely to secure a dominant quently joined the Labour Party (usually via the In- place in progressive politics through independent dependent Labour Party (ILP)). The nature of the political activity under the present electoral system. peace settlement in  also offended progressive The division of progressives into the Liberal and La- opinion by contradicting their desire for a ‘clean bour camps coupled with the Liberal Party’s minor peace’. The actions of David Lloyd George were a party status thus made it receptive to suggestions for further source of progressive discontent. His alliance inter-party cooperation which were made in the with the Conservative Party to obtain, and then s which could be directed towards securing a cling on to, the premiership was viewed as ‘oppor- realignment of progressives on terms favourable to tunistic chicanery’ and the actions of his govern- themselves. This article briefly assesses the nature of ment (especially its use of coercion in Ireland) were the call for progressive unity in this period and an anathema to progressive opinion. His resumption evaluates the responses of the Liberal and Labour of the Liberal leadership in  accentuated pro- Parties to them. gressive defections at that period. Desertions were also caused by the inability of Asquith to rally progressive opinion following his ousting by Lloyd The United and Popular Front George, especially his failure to offer a radical cri- campaigns: a brief synopsis   tique of the peace settlement. The long Calls for joint action by the parties of the left were oc- drawn-out intra-party dispute between Asquith and casioned by the rise of fascism in Europe and the re- Lloyd George also encouraged progressives to leave sponse (or, rather, lack of it) on the part of the Con- a party which seem preoccupied with its own feuds servative-dominated National Government to this to the exclusion of advancing progressive ideals. situation. There were two separate calls for joint ac- Labour thus became a key focus of progressive tion by the parties of the left during the s. The , politics after which had the effect of causing first of these was the united front and the second was some progressives to identify their beliefs with so- the popular front. The former was initiated by the cialism. However, this identification was not accept- Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) and able to all progressives and many remained attached sought an alliance of all socialists (i.e. themselves, the  to the Liberal Party. During the s much effort ILP and Labour Party) in order to oppose fascism was directed at developing Liberal Party policy to both in Europe and in Britain (where, it was per- appeal to non-socialist progressives; key develop- ceived, the actions of the National Government were ments including the publication of the report on inevitably moving in this direction, since capitalism in  Land and the Nation in (known as the ‘Green crisis would adopt undemocratic methods in order to

10 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 28 Autumn 2000 stabilise class relationships). This cam- tober , the National Progressive ers of both parties were signatories to a paign witnessed the publication in  Council, also failed to achieve progres- manifesto which was issued following of the Unity manifesto by the ILP, sive unity. a meeting at the Albert Hall in De- CPGB and the Socialist League (SL) The British government’s policy of cember  but were unable to agree (which following the secession of the non-intervention in the Spanish civil on any further progress which was ILP in  was the main organised war, which commenced in  was compatible with the concept of a body of left wing politics in the Labour the spur to a more determined attempt popular front, although it attracted Party). This advocated the unity of all to establish a popular front. This policy support from individual members sections of the working class to oppose meant that Germany and Italy were (Lady Megan Lloyd George, for exam- fascism, Britain’s National Government free to arm Franco’s forces whereas the ple, being active in discussions to pro- (which was depicted as the agent of fas- Popular Front government was denied mote such an objective). cism and imperialism), all restrictions on any military help from Britain or The Liberal party regarded itself as a civil and trade union liberties and the France. The deteriorating military posi- key player in the proposal to establish a militarisation of Britain. It has been as- tion of the Spanish Popular Front gov- popular front, and an official publica- serted that a key reason for the interest ernment prompted ten MPs of all par- tion asserted that the pivot to such an shown by Labour’s left wing in this form ties to organise a National Emergency arrangement was ‘an understanding be- of joint action was that it would Conference on Spain in  which tween the two largest parties – Liberal strengthen arguments in favour of La- sought to end the policy of non-inter- and Labour’. There were, however, bour’s adopting uncompromising social- vention. Around , delegates from several reasons to explain the Liberal ist politics and undermine the belief that the trade unions, the Labour Party, the party’s reluctance to throw itself whole- such could be achieved through the in- CPGB and the Liberal Party attended heartedly into the popular front cam- stitutions of liberal democracy. The La- this meeting which was chaired by Gil- paign. Although it was a vehicle to bour Party, however, was unwilling to bert Murray and addressed by, among unite progressive opinion, the popular enter into any relationships with the others, Wilfrid Roberts MP. The meet- front’s driving ideology was socialism, CPGB (having refused their application ing heard a call from Sir Charles believing this to be the only effective to affiliate to the party in ) and sub- Trevelyan for the formation of a popu- antidote to fascism. This initially made sequently disaffiliated and then pro- lar front in Britain both to help Spain it difficult for the Liberal Party to in- scribed the SL. This latter action meant but also to remove Chamberlain. In volve itself in the popular front. There that members of the Labour Party practical terms the popular front gave were additional problems in entering would be expelled for supporting the rise to two independent progressive into cooperation with the Labour Party. SL, whose response was to dissolve itself candidatures in by-elections in Oxford Against a background of unhappiness in May . City () and Bridgwater () with their treatment they had received The popular front sought the unity which were strictly not popular front from the Labour governments of – of all who opposed fascism (including campaigns but did witness the Labour  and –, Liberals put forward a the Liberal Party and those Conserva- and Liberal Parties withdrawing their number of objections to cooperating tives who were opposed to the appease- candidates in order to give electors the with Labour within the framework of a ment policies of the Chamberlain Gov- opportunity to vote for a progressive popular front. ernment). The Italian invasion of Abys- candidate. The progressive candidate at First, they opposed the fundamen- sinia in  resulted in the Hoare- Oxford, Dr A.D. Lindsay, failed to win talist socialist programme to which Laval pact which sought to divide Ab- but Vernon Bartlett did secure a pro- Labour was theoretically committed, yssinia to Italy’s advantage. This was gressive victory at Bridgwater. believing that it would entail abolish- viewed as cowardice by the British ing private enterprise and ownership, government in the face of fascist ag- which Liberals wished to diffuse. gression and this event (together with Liberals, the Labour Some Liberals also perceived that the the formation of popular front govern- Party and the Popular nationalisation of all the means of pro- ments in Spain in February  and duction, distribution and exchange France in May ) triggered the for- Front would involve the suppression of lib- mation of the first popular front or- Joint action between the Labour and erty which Liberals sought to pro- ganisation in Britain, the People’s Front Liberal Parties could be justified by mote. This view was forcibly ex- Propaganda Committee, whose sup- the similar views which many of their pressed by Sir Herbert Samuel who porters included a number of Labour members held on key contemporary stated that while he welcomed coop- activists, the Liberal Richard Acland political issues. Both parties endorsed eration in order to bring about a pow- and the Conservative Robert Boothby. similar aims in foreign policy, as evi- erful government able to resist attacks  This organisation failed to have much denced in May when Attlee and on freedom and policies which were political impact, principally because left Sinclair publicly endorsed support for dangerous to peace, and which was wing Labour supporters endorsed the the League of Nations and the princi- also ready to tackle unemployment, United Front’s campaign. A second or- ple of collective security in response to the standard of living and land policy, ganisation launched by Acland in Oc- Italy’s invasion of Abyssinia. The lead- ‘I am not willing to lend myself to the

Journal of Liberal Democrat History 28 Autumn 2000 11 to dampen the enthusiasm of some of the present emergency it is ready to Liberals for the popular front and to in- subordinate mere party considerations sist, as an alternative, that the main con- and to cooperate wholeheartedly with sideration was to build up Liberal men and women of all parties, who re- strength. These views were evident in alise the gravity of the time’. the approval given by the National Lib- The initial focus of the party leader- eral Federation in May  to an ship was directed at policy which could eighty-page policy document, The Lib- form the basis of cooperation with the eral Way, which was depicted as ‘the au- Labour Party. In late , following thoritative exposition of the dynamic Chamberlain’s signing of the Munich principles of liberalism’ and consider- agreement with Hitler, a draft mani- ably influenced the proceedings of the festo was laid before the executive  Liberal Assembly. An unofficial committee of the Liberal Party. Sinclair motion was put forward which called gave it his personal approval, arguing for the cooperation of all people of that it ‘breaks new ground in offering peaceful and progressive mind, based to give up controversial party politics if on a specific declaration of policy and a general agreement can be reached with Sir Archibald Sinclair, Liberal leader 1935–45 definite and agreed programme capable members of other parties on interna- of being carried out in the lifetime of a tional and defence questions’. It was destruction of private enterprise and single Parliament’. However, the pros- depicted as ‘a public policy statement personal initiative, to transferring the pect of an impending Liberal revival by the executive on behalf of the party whole of our industrial, commercial prompted the Assembly to approve a – an expression of our readiness, be- and financial system to political man- resolution which, as amended, urged cause of the present emergency, to sub- agement’. Many Liberals, such as the Liberal Party Organisation to use ordinate mere party considerations and Ramsay Muir, perceived that the La- every means to encourage and assist lo- to cooperate wholeheartedly with men bour Party’s attachment to socialism cal Liberal associations to fight by-elec- and women of all parties for the pur- disqualified it from being regarded as a tions wherever they occurred, and dep- poses which are defined in … the progressive party. recated assistance being given by Liber- manifesto’. While it was accepted that Second, Liberals were sceptical als to either Labour or National Gov- neither the Conservative Party nor about the effectiveness of the electoral ernment candidates. Lord Meston, in Transport House would respond posi- arrangements in the constituencies his presidential address, indicated his tively to this policy document, an at- which would be required unless a opposition to an electoral deal with any tempt was made to assume the initiative change first occurred in the electoral other parties or party. in creating progressive unity by appeal- system. They believed that the local as- However, the policy of appease- ing directly to their supporters. It was sociations of both parties would disre- ment pursued by the Conservative argued that ‘there is a great deal in it to gard any arrangement concluded by Party in the late s produced arouse all those – regardless of party – their national organisations and, more changes in the attitude of many Liber- who are disgusted with the govern- importantly, voters who were denied als towards the popular front. Increas- ment’s handling of the international the possibility of voting for a candidate ingly the importance of cooperation situation’. It was especially envisaged of their own party would not neces- with the Labour Party was discussed that those with Labour leanings who sarily support one put forward by a within Liberal circles. Richard Acland accepted these Liberal views and who participant in the popular front. In moved a motion on the popular front were dissatisfied with the ‘narrow- particular Liberals feared that electors at the  Assembly in Bath. This de- minded and dog-in-the-manger atti- who had the choice of voting Con- clared that ‘whilst scrupulously safe- tude’ of Transport House would give servative or Socialist would support guarding the independence of our concrete expression of their beliefs by the former and thus the popular front party position’ it was ‘prepared to give supporting Liberal candidates. would ironically become a mechanism assistance to and receive assistance Pressure within the Liberal Party for ‘to perpetuate the dominance of the from, an individual, any group or any cooperation with Labour intensified “National” Government’. organisation which is prepared to re- during . By then the issue of elec- A third difficulty was that coopera- ceive assistance from, and give assist- toral arrangements in the constituen- tion with the Labour Party would limit ance to the Liberal Party in order to cies was the preeminent consideration. the potential for independent Liberal put into operation the foreign policy Sinclair reiterated that Liberals wished political activity. It has been argued that adopted by this Assembly, and in order to work with other parties but insisted Sinclair believed in the imminence of a to achieve, in the immediate future, a that if the other parties wanted Liberal Liberal revival, which might be preju- programme of domestic reform which help and votes it was only fair that they diced if the party was prevented from is not inconsistent with the policy of should also do their share of helping putting forward its distinctive policies the Liberal Party’. Subsequently the and cooperating. He felt that Liberals and ideology. This consideration served party executive declared that ‘because were making more progress than

12 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 28 Autumn 2000 Labour and that cooperation would be attracted into cooperation with the opposed to the principle of supporting only be possible if it was clearly under- ‘socialist’ Labour Party. This view rested candidates not of their own party, par- stood that it was not always the Liberal on the belief that the Labour Party’s ticularly if this was at the expense of that was expected to stand down. stance on key political issues (most nota- withdrawing a Liberal candidate. A On  March  the Liberal bly foreign policy) was unlikely to secure problem of this nature arose towards Party Council advocated a change of support from those who opposed the end of  in connection with the government and called upon ‘all those Chamberlain’s views within the Con- Kinross and West Perthshire by-election who share its lack of confidence in the servative Party, whose leaders included which arose when the incumbent MP, present government to cooperate for Churchill and Eden. In  the Liberal the Duchess of Atholl (who had re- the dual purpose of overthrowing it W. Robert Davies observed to Sir signed the government whip in April and bringing into office a National Archibald Sinclair that although neither ), applied for the Chiltern Hun- Progressive government’. The motion of these Conservatives had said that they dreds in order to contest the seat at a by called for the early adoption of Liberal would fight against the Conservative election following the decision of the candidates in constituencies where Party to promote the policy embraced local Unionist association to replace Liberals stood the best chance of win- by the League of Nations Union, a pre- her as candidate at the next general ning, but at the same time did not wish mature alliance between the Liberal and election. The Liberal leadership was in- to prevent arrangements to give Lib- Labour Parties might serve to drive such clined to support the Duchess, whose eral support to candidates of other Conservatives back into their current views on foreign policy, and especially parties – or no party – in seats where a political alignments and help Chamber- her work in connection with Spain three-cornered fight would increase lain win the next general election. and the refugees, commended her to the prospect of a Government vic- Sinclair subsequently referred to Liberal opinion. The problem was, tory. It sought to place some flesh on this danger when he addressed the however, that the local Liberal associa- the bones of previous statements, call- Party Council in March . At this tion already had a candidate in place, ing for inter-party cooperation by ad- meeting, he called on all progressively- Mrs Call MacDonald, who had polled dressing the contesting of seats in a fu- minded citizens of all parties and of no well in a straight fight against the ture general election. The main inten- party to work with the Liberal Party to Duchess at the  general election, tion of this motion was to induce La- reverse the progressive deterioration in losing by just over , votes. She bour to stand down its candidates in a Britain’s national and world affairs. stood down and Sinclair praised her number of constituencies by making it However, he subsequently emphasised sacrifice, pledging her the fullest sup- clear that the Liberal Party would only that in recent by-elections the govern- port of the party at the next general fight seats where they had secured sec- ment candidates had performed quite election. This was, however, a decision ond place in ,  or  but, satisfactorily and that to defeat the she took reluctantly and intimated in a where this did not apply, would be government at the next election letter to Lord Rea that she did so as the willing to support a Progressive or a would require the rallying not only of Liberal Party had deployed sanctions Labour candidate. This had clear im- supporters of the existing parties on against her which left her with no alter- plications for the size of the Liberal the left but would additionally require native than to resign. Sinclair disa- ‘front’ at the next election and conse- the support of democratic Conserva- greed that Mrs MacDonald had been quences for the party’s electoral objec- tives. This perhaps suggested that the the victim of some kind of backstairs tives. The mover of this motion, Frank Liberal Party, acting independently of intrigue. He stated that he had advised Darvell, stated that these should be the the Labour Party, would be more the Duchess against resigning and forc- return of  Liberal MPs and the for- likely to rally Conservative support ing a by election and also said that he mation of a Progressive Government. against the existing government. A re- would support Mrs MacDonald in such lated consideration was the desire to a contest if she insisted on standing. make inroads into the support of the Problems posed by Liberal Nationals, who would not be Liberal endorsement of attracted by Liberal Party cooperation The Labour Party and the the Popular Front with the Labour Party. Popular Front A second difficulty was that while A further difficulty associated with the The enhanced level of support within the popular front might help the Lib- the Liberal Party in the late s for co- popular front was the unwillingness of eral Party to win some seats (especially the Labour Party to enter into active operation with the Labour Party to in the south and west) if the Labour form a popular front did not, however, cooperation with the Liberal Party. La- Party withdrew its candidates, it would bour was sceptical of the merits of a indicate a total commitment to this not aid Liberal progress in other parts of course of action, and a number of con- popular front. The issue was debated at the country (especially the north)  cerns were expressed. Some Liberals the Labour Party Conference where Liberals regarded Labour as their when an amendment to a united front feared it might impede the Liberal Par- main opponent. ty’s ability to secure Conservative sup- motion urged the party to consider se- A final problem posed by the popu- riously the formation of a ‘national port since those voters were unlikely to lar front was that many Liberals were

Journal of Liberal Democrat History 28 Autumn 2000 13 progressive front’. The formation of a the CPGB was deemed capable of tude to inter-party cooperation with cooperative federation of all workers’ backstabbing and the Liberals were the one which Labour had adopted, ar- parties and groups was advocated in condemned for their actions in the two guing that they had displayed no reluc- which communists would remain com- Labour governments of the s and tance in cooperating with Labour munists, Liberals would remain Liberals for latterly supporting MacDonald’s when it was in the national interest to but which would secure practical coop- National Government and both the do so. Accordingly, leading Liberals had eration in parliamentary action in a savage economies which had been im- spoken in favour of Labour candidates limited and reasonable programme. posed and the foreign policy of aban- at by-elections and Lloyd George had The  National Emergency doning China to Japanese aggression in made a significant contribution to Conference (which has been referred . The document concluded by ex- Philip Noel Baker’s victory at Derby in to above) prompted the Labour Party pressing high regard for what was best July 1936. Additionally, efforts had been to publish its response to calls for a in the Liberal tradition but stated that made in a number of constituencies to popular front. This was to reject this de- while the Liberal Parliamentary Party agree on a popular front candidate but velopment for a number of reasons. included sincere progressives and most had been frustrated by the oppo- These included the belief that the for- friends of peace the party as a whole sition of the Labour Party. In the case of mation of a popular front would not was uncertain and unreliable and that a Chertsey in 1937, for example, a pro- lead to the fall of the National Govern- government which included Liberals gressive candidate had stood but had ment, nor to an early election unless would be weak and indecisive and received no help from the Labour lead- evidence could be produced of a crisis might provide fascism with an opening ership who prevented Noel Baker from in the Conservative Party. It ques- in Britain. The way ahead was stated to speaking on his behalf.34 Sinclair be- tioned whether a popular front would be to work for a Labour victory at the moaned the fact that both Noel Baker be more electorally successful than the next general election and to achieve and Colonel Nathan (in Wandsworth, Labour party acting independently, as- this an appeal was made to sympathisers 1937) owed their victories to the help serting that Liberal voters could not be outside the party by arguing: given to them by Lloyd George and relied upon to vote for a Labour candi- We shall go forward in no spirit of party other prominent Liberals but that no date in the absence of one from their exclusiveness. We invite all men and Labour support was ever given to a own party, and that in many constitu- women who desire Great Britain to Liberal candidate.35 Subsequently, the encies the absence of a Liberal candi- take the lead for democracy and peace Liberal Party reinforced these declara- – whatever their political affiliation – to date tended to help the Conservative join us in our effort … We appeal to all tions by withdrawing its candidate at cause rather than Labour’s. It was as- that is best in the Nation – to all men the Oxford by-election in favour of the serted that the participation of the and women of goodwill – to make a Labour Dr Lindsay (1938), supported CPGB in a popular front would make victory for democracy and peace possi- Ver non Bartlett as an Independent Pro- this trend more likely to occur, and, ad- ble while there is still time.33 gressive candidate at Bridgwater (1938), ditionally, that the CPGB was an elec- Thus while Labour was willing to unite and offered to stand down its candidate toral liability which would boost progressive opinion on its own terms, it at the Holderness by-election (1939) in Chamberlain’s poll. It was further ar- was unwilling to endorse any novel po- favour of an Independent Progressive, gued that a popular front government litical arrangements in order to achieve but Labour refused to respond posi- would be unable to govern effectively: this goal. Liberals compared their atti- tively to this approach. However, although Labour’s official Lloyd George flirts with the Labour movement. (Clement Attlee is in the right-hand policy remained the rejection of any deckchair.) 29 May 1936. cooperation with the Liberal Party, Labour activists in the constituencies were sometimes more amenable to such joint action. A notable example of such inter-party cooperation occurred at the North Cornwall by-election in  when the Liberal candidate, Tho- mas Horabin, was given a free run by Labour against the Conservative Party, thereby making a significant contribution to his victory.

The Cripps petition Although the Labour Party was officially opposed to cooperating with the Liberal Party, this course of action was not endorsed by the left-wing Labour MP Sir

14 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 28 Autumn 2000 cist aggression towards the Spanish and March  meeting of the Liberal Chinese peoples), protecting the peo- Party Council. He stated that while ple’s interests (through the control of the Labour leaders were opposed to the armaments industry, agriculture, the Cripps petition they were not hos- transport, mining and finance), defend- tile to constituency arrangements in ing the people (by providing effective some cases, and would be: protection against air attack), and build- willing to join us in the next Parliament ing for peace and justice (by ending the in a Joint Government if the number of exploitation of subject races and laying our respective House memberships, and the foundations of a lasting peace other factors, then make such a combination possible … I am told that if we, through the principle of equality of op- instead of praising Sir Stafford and criti- portunity for all nations). cising Transport House, make it clear This petition could be seen as com- that we would be willing to consider patible with the frequent Liberal state- realistically arrangements with the offi- ments on the desirability of coopera- cial Labour Party … there would be a tion with other parties. The only main real possibility of an arrangement. On the other hand, if we … appear to be disagreement which they had with the welcoming Sir Stafford’s controversy petition was the fourth point, which re- Sir Stafford Cripps MP with the official Labour leaders, we ferred to ‘protecting the people’s inter- shall be destroying all possibility of such Stafford Cripps, solicitor general (– ests’, which could be taken to advocate an arrangement.39 ) in Ramsay Macdonald’s second gov- nationalisation. Liberals emphasised the There were, however, equally good ernment. The National Executive Com- lowering of tariff barriers and electoral reasons for supporting the petition. mittee of the Labour Party had expelled reform under such a heading. It was, Liberal involvement in it would aid the Socialist League from the Labour however, feared that if the party leaders the party’s cause, especially in seats Party in . In October  Cripps ‘signed up’ to all of these points the where they wished the Labour Party organised a conference which passed a party would split and the centre-right to stand down in favour of a Liberal resolution in favour of the formation of Liberals would join with the Liberal candidate. Active Liberal support for a people’s government led by the Labour Nationals. A further concern was that the petition in such places would both Party but based upon the broad agree- Cripps sought to ensure that the initia- make it harder for Labour to subse- ment of all progressive forces in the tive in cross-party cooperation was held quently adopt a Parliamentary candi- country. Subsequently Cripps circulated by the Labour Party. A speech by him date and would further get Labour a memorandum to all Divisional Labour in Birmingham on  February  supporters used to working with Lib- Parties and a number of Labour MPs re- had stated that the aims of the petition erals.40 Additionally, any official oppo- garding his beliefs. These two breaches of were to intensify opposition to the Na- sition to the Cripps petition might party discipline resulted in his expulsion tional Government, to reinvigorate the create difficulties in the constituencies from the Labour Party in January , Labour Party, and to convince the La- if this entailed Liberals who had sup- which was followed by the expulsion of bour leadership that rank and file opin- ported it being constrained to aban- a number of other prominent popular ion favoured cooperation between the don their cooperation with those La- front supporters in March (including political parties. The reinvigoration of bour activists who endorsed it. They Bevan and Sir Charles Trevelyan). the Labour Party was clearly not a Lib- would be unlikely to work enthusiasti- Cripps subsequently launched a pe- eral interest and Liberals thus insisted cally with such ‘turncoat’ Liberals tition in  designed to secure the that if they cooperated with the peti- should this course of action subse- adoption of a popular front. This drew tion they should be able to recruit and quently be approved by the Labour attention to a world threatened by war enrol members to the Liberal Party at leadership. Accordingly the official and fascism and called upon the parties the same time. Liberal line was subsequently stated to of progress to act together and at once The Cripps petition presented the be that while neither the party nor its for the sake of peace and civilisation. Liberal party with a dilemma. The pe- affiliated bodies would officially take The petition covered six main areas – tition could be viewed as a ruse by part in promoting the signing of the the defence of democracy, planning for him to gain support within the Labour petition, individual Liberals were free plenty (which involved reducing un- Party. Further, overt support for his to determine their own course of ac- employment, increasing old age pen- course of action would alienate the tion on this matter. If they did partici- sions and securing a higher standard of leadership of the Labour Party with pate, it was recommended that they life, education and leisure for the old whom a deal might conceivably be should seek to enrol new members to and young), guaranteeing the security made at some future point in time de- the Liberal Party.41 of Britain (by organising a peace alli- spite their current opposition to such The Cripps petition was timed to ance with France and Russia which an arrangement. This view was articu- exert pressure on the  Labour con- would rally American support, and by lated by Frank Darvell who moved the ference. However, its decision to en- discontinuing the appeasement of fas- resolution on cooperation at the dorse the views of the NEC regarding

Journal of Liberal Democrat History 28 Autumn 2000 15 the popular front, and also on the ex- conclusion of arrangements with other 12 Ramsay Muir, presidential address at the Na- pulsion of Cripps, led him to terminate progressive parties at the forthcoming tional Liberal Federation, Bournemouth, 3 May 1934. his campaign in June and seek readmis- general election. This motion was de- 13 Liberal Party (1937) op cit., pp. 12–13. sion to the party. feated on a card vote by the narrow 14 G. De Groot, Liberal Crusader: The Life of Sir margin of ,, to ,,. La- Archibald Sinclair, (London: Hirst, 1992, p. 119–20, 130–1 and 145). bour’s landslide victory at that election 15 Letter from Sir Archibald Sinclair to A Wood, 23 The demise of the was accompanied by the Liberal Par- November 1936, The Thurso Papers, Volume II, ty’s failure to achieve a substantial re- item 31/1. Popular Front 16 Sir Archibald Sinclair, speech at the National covery. This resulted in Labour subse- The above discussion has suggested that Liberal Federation, Bournemouth, 3 May 1934. elements in both the Labour and Lib- quently adopting a predatory stance 17 Resolution of the Liberal Party Assembly,  Buxton, 1937. eral Parties displayed an interest in co- towards the Liberal Party, seeking to absorb its radical support rather than to 18 Lord Meston, presidential address at the Liberal operating under the umbrella of a Party Assembly, Buxton, 27 May 1937. popular front. However, a realigning is- coexist with it within some form of in- 19 Resolution of the Liberal Party Assembly, Bath, sue was required in order for such a ter-party mechanism. 1938. The popular front was an expression 20 Resolution of the Liberal Party Executive Com- project to ‘take off’, and it is doubtful  mittee, October 1938. whether opposition to appeasement of the progressive tradition which set 21 Note from Sir Archibald Sinclair to W. Robert was sufficient to secure a popular front the scene for future attempts to rally Davies, 18 October 1938, The Thurso Papers, progressive opinion. Grimond’s call af- Volume 11, item 64/6. in time for the general election which 22 Letter from W. Robert Davies to Sir William ter the  general election for the should have occurred in . How- Goodchild, 4 November 1938, ibid. ever, it is quite possible that a number realignment of the left echoed the ob- 23 Liberal Party (1937), op cit., pp. 12–13. 24 Sir Archibald Sinclair, the BBC 9 O’Clock News, of local arrangements would have been jectives which were expressed by a number of Liberal and Labour support- 16 February 1939. negotiated in the constituencies to pro- 25 Motion of the Liberal Party Council, 15 March  vide for straight fights against Con- ers in the s, and the Liberal/Liberal 1939. Democrat cooperation with the La- 26 Letter from Frank Darvell to Milner Gray, 24 servative candidates, particularly as February 1939, The Thurso Papers, volume II, there was no requirement on Constitu- bour Party which has occurred, or been  item 63/3. ency Labour Parties at that time to field suggested, since the late s is com- 27 Letter from W. Robert Davies to Sir Archibald a candidate at a Parliamentary election. parable with the attempts to organise a Sinclair, 5 April 1937, ibid., volume II, item 64/5. popular front in the years before the 28 Letter from Sir Archibald Sinclair to W. Robert The outbreak of war and the resultant Davies, 14 April 1939, ibid., volume II, item 63/4. Second World War. party truce sidelined the debate on the 29 Memorandum by W. Robert Davies, ‘Mr. popular front, although some Liberals Acland’s Resolution’, 16 May 1938, ibid., volume II, item 64/5. who sympathised with this course of Peter Joyce teaches in the Politics and Phi- losophy Department of Manchester Metro- 30 Letter from Sir Archibald Sinclair to Gomer action (including Horabin and Acland) Owen (North Wales Area Federation Secre- continued their quest to construct an politan University. He is the author of Rea- tary), 13 December 1938, ibid., volume II, item lignment of the Left? A history of the re- 67/7. anti-Conservative arrangement for the 31 Letter from Mrs Call MacDonald to Lord Rea, 16 next general election through the Lib- lationship between the Liberal Democrat  December 1938, ibid., volume II, item 64/6. eral Action Group, later known as and Labour Parties (Macmillan, ), re- 32 Letter from Sir Archibald Sinclair to W. Robert Radical Action. viewed in the Journal of Liberal Democrat Davies, 21 December 1938, ibid. History  (summer ). 33 National Executive Committee of the Labour The subject of a popular front was Party, Labour and the Popular Front, (London: again raised towards the end of the war 1938, p. 8). 1 David Bleazer, The Popular Front and the Pro- and was debated at the  Labour 34 Letter from W. Robert Davies to Sir Archibald gressive Tradition: Socialists, Liberals and the Sinclair, 5 April 1937, ibid., volume II, item 64/5. Party conference, when the report of Quest for Unity, 1884–1939, (Cambridge: 35 Letter from Sir Archibald Sinclair to W. Robert the Conference Arrangements Com- Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 102). Davies, 15 February 1938, ibid. mittee was discussed. Some delegates 2 Sir Charles Trevelyan, From Liberalism to La- 36 Labour Party, Unity – True or Sham? (London: bour, (London: George Allen and Unwin 1921). Labour Party, 1939). put forward the proposal that Labour 3Peter Joyce, Realignment of the Left ? A History 37 Liberal Party Organisation briefing, ‘The Cripps should cooperate with other parties to of the Relationship between the Liberal Demo- Petition’, 17 February 1939, The Thurso Papers, bring about the downfall of Conserva- crats and Labour Parties, (Basingstoke: volume II, item 63/3. Macmillan, 1999, p. 64). tism. The Liberal Party was occasionally 38 Ibid. 4 Unity Manifesto, quoted in Bleazer, op cit., p. 170. 39 Letter from Frank Darvell to Milner Gray, 24 mentioned in this context but was 5 Bleazer, op cit., p. 147. February 1939, ibid. largely bypassed in a debate concerning 6 Ibid., p. 175. 40 Letter from Richard Acland to Lord Meston, 17 7 Ronald Sommer, The Organisation of the Liberal the wisdom of securing ‘a coalition of February 1939, ibid. Party 1936–1960, (unpublished PhD thesis, 41 Letter from W. Robert Davies, 22 February 1939 the left for the purpose of bringing so- University of London, 1962, p. 30). circulated by the Liberal Party Organisation,  cialism in our time’. The following 8 Liberal Party, For Peace and Democracy: The ibid. year an attempt was made to refer back Liberal Party and a ‘Popular Front’, (London: 42 B. Howells, speech at the Labour Party Confer- Liberal Party Organisation, 1937, p. 3). ence, London, 11 December 1944. Quoted in a section of the report of the Confer- 9 Bleazer, op cit., p. 183. Labour Party Conference Report,1944, p. 116. ence Arrangements Committee be- 10 Liberal Party (1937), op cit., pp. 11–12. 43 Joyce, op cit., p. 97–117. cause the conference agenda contained 11 Sir Herbert Samuel, speech at Bournemouth, 4 44 Bleazer, op cit., p. 197. May 1934. no specific resolution concerning the

16 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 28 Autumn 2000 Biography Jaime Reynolds and Ian Hunter examine the maverick career of the radical Liberal MP, Tom Horabin LiberalLiberal ClassClass WarriorWarrior

homas Lewis Horabin, –, was party and had no local links with the constituency. Tprominent in the Liberal Party in the s, a The crucial factor in his selection seems to have dismal and neglected period of its history. As the been his appeal to non-Liberal voters. Horabin ‘Radical-Liberal’ Member of Parliament for North stood as a candidate for the Popular Front and his Cornwall, elected at a bitterly contested by-elec- nomination papers were signed by both Labour tion in July , he was the last parliamentary sur- members and dissident Conservatives. vivor of West Country Liberalism in the s. He Horabin focused his successful by-election cam- held his seat in the disastrous  general election paign mainly on the failure of the appeasement policy and served briefly as Chief Whip before defecting of Chamberlain’s government. During the by-elec- to the Labour Party in . Very little trace of his tion he backed Churchill as ‘the only possible man for career survives apart from a slim Penguin Special Prime Minister in this hour of danger’. Writing to published in  which set out his distinctive and Churchill he stated that when he made these sugges- radical political ideas. tions to his audiences the suggestion had come as a Horabin was born in  in Merthyr Tydfil and shock at first, and ‘yet it took only about two minutes was educated at Cardiff High School. Traces of his for the idea to sink in, and then there was an outburst early years in the mining valleys of South Wales can of applause’. Churchill wrote back to thank him ‘for be detected in his left-wing views, his sympathy the favourable view you take of my usefulness. I with the miners, and perhaps in his later ambiva- greatly appreciate your goodwill and confidence’. lence towards Churchill, who was unpopular in During the campaign the North Cornwall Liberal South Wales on account of the Tonypandy incident Association circulated throughout the constituency a in . In  he married the daughter of a Dr petition requesting Chamberlain to resign and asking Cargill Martin. They had a daughter and two sons. the King to entrust to Churchill the formation of a During the – War Horabin served in the Government of National Defence, comprising all Cameron Highlanders. After demobilisation he parties. Churchill alone, the petition declared, had the worked first as a civil servant and later joined ‘moral purpose, courage, experience and capacity to Lacrinoid Ltd, manufacturers of buttons and small save us from these dangers in this hour of peril’. This artefacts from synthetic materials, rising eventually mutual appreciation was not to last, however. to become Chairman. He broadened his activity The other main campaigning theme was the old during the s, becoming one of the first people age pension which was considered ‘practically the to describe himself as a ‘business consultant’. only domestic question that aroused any interest’ in His political activity in the s and s, if any, . The Liberals linked the North Cornwall cam- must have been out of public sight. He did not paign with their national petition on the need to raise stand for Parliament and played no significant role pensions. Horabin’s election agent told Sinclair that in the Liberal Party at national level. In fact the au- the Liberal stand for larger pensions had been critical thors have been able to find no evidence of politi- to winning the by-election. The Liberal victory sub- cal activity on Horabin’s part before , when he sequently forced the government to hold an inquiry suddenly emerged as Liberal candidate for the into the subject. North Cornwall by-election. The by-election held Horabin benefited from the support of many on  July was caused by the death of Sir Francis prominent Liberals such as Sinclair, Viscount Samuel Acland who had held the seat for the Liberals in and Lloyd George, who came and spoke throughout  with a majority of  (.%) in a straight his campaign, attracting large and often enthusiastic fight with a Conservative. Horabin was a surprising crowds. He secured , votes to , for his choice to defend one of the Liberals’ very few re- Conservative opponent, E. R. Whitehouse – an in- maining winnable seats. He was little known in the creased majority of , (.%). It was the first

Journal of Liberal Democrat History 28 Autumn 2000 17 than Hitler, on the grounds that the man who lets the mad bull out of the field to run amok is more responsible than the bull for the damage done. After war was declared in September  Horabin continued his criticism of Chamberlain’s conduct of the war. Despite his admiration for Churchill’s qualities as a national leader, especially during the darkest days of the war during –, he was also sharply critical of Churchill’s general political outlook, and from  he became an outspo- ken member of the small band of dissident MPs who formed an unofficial opposition to the Churchill coalition. In January  he caused a stir by claiming that ‘Churchill might go down in history as the man who destroyed the Brit- ish Empire’. Shortly before that, he had joined Clement Davies and forty Labour members in voting for an amendment to the Manpower Bill demanding the nationalisation of vital industries in return for conscription’. Horabin became alienated from the Liberal leadership which was supporting and participating in the Churchill coalition. Several senior Liberals, including Sinclair, Harcourt Johnstone and Lady Violet Bonham Carter, were personal friends of Churchill. They did not hold Horabin in high regard. Violet Bonham Carter wrote in her diary in February  that she did not feel exhilarated by the prospect of accepting the role of party President as ‘there are too many lu- natics and pathological cases in the party – Clem Davies & Horabin – also rather Liberal by-election win since . Horabin himself did not believe that it small people bulking larger than they However, to at least one senior Liberal, did. In correspondence during June deserve because of the size of the party. the campaign was not a benchmark for  he made it clear that he did not We badly need an infusion of new campaigning efficiency. Harcourt John- see a possibility for any substantial in- blood’. With Clement Davies and Sir stone, Chairman of the Liberal Central crease in the number of Liberal MPs at Richard Acland, the semi-detached Lib- Association and close friend and adviser that election, and the perception at eral MP for Barnstaple who shortly af- to Sinclair, viewed the campaign as Liberal Central (the national head- terwards departed to form the Common having been weak and apathetic, com- quarters) was that the constituency or- Wealth Party, Horabin was one of the menting after a visit to the one of the ganisations were in a very weak state leading Liberals associated with the gin- campaign committee rooms that ‘I con- with little or no preparation apparent ger group Radical Action (formed as fess I don’t think games of pool with in the vast majority of seats. Liberal Action Group in ) which the office messenger an adequate sub- In his maiden speech Horabin spoke campaigned for profound reorganisation stitute for canvassing’. of the ‘infirmity of purpose that many of the structure and decision-making Whether the successful defence of people in this country and many peo- bodies of the party as an essential pre- the North Cornwall constituency by ple in neutral and allied countries, and condition for any electoral revival. Radi- the Liberal Party in  heralded an certainly, I believe, the leaders of the cal Action was also very critical of the upturn in party fortunes in the run-up Axis powers, saw in the British Gov- electoral truce which existed between to the general election due in  ernment’. He argued that Chamber- the three main parties during the coali- will remain a moot point. Significantly, lain had done more harm to the world tion government.

18 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 28 Autumn 2000 Horabin admired Lloyd George very the rights of the individual’. He argued courageous front against Chamberlain’s much and approached his private secre- that the Tories had been able to estab- disastrous foreign policy, but it has, be- tary, A. J. Sylvester, in July  to gain lish a dictatorship between  and cause of the fundamental divergence be- funding for Radical Action. Horabin  by ruthlessly exploiting the divi- tween the Whigs and the Radicals, failed claimed that Radical Action intended sion of the progressive forces between to establish itself’. He identified within to run a hundred candidates and had the Labour and Liberal Parties. The ur- the party ‘a strong element which com- successfully collected £, from the gent task was to form an electoral ar- bines with traditional free trade ideas a City. He feared that lack of money rangement of the progressive parties vested interest in unrestricted capitalism, would force a reunion with the Liberal (Labour, Liberal, Common Wealth) in as well as those radical elements that are Nationals and that without a radical order to capitalise on the radical mood prepared to accept a large measure of centre the Liberal Party would die. He of the electorate and finally destroy the collectivisation’. He warned that local urged Sylvester to tell Lloyd George To ry Party and all that it stood for. This constituency arrangements would be that Radical Action would deliver local would then open the way for the peo- necessary between radicals in the Labour deals with Labour (based on the model ple to ‘seize the real power and property and Liberal parties if their leaderships in the North Cornwall constituency) of the State from the vested interests’. failed to support a united front. and that this course of action would see Horabin underpinned this strategy More generally, Tom Horabin’s ideas at least fifty Liberal MPs elected who with a class-based economic and social sit uneasily within the traditional param- could hold the balance of power and theory. The ‘competitive free enterprise eters of Liberalism. In some respects he force fundamental change. However, capitalism’ of the nineteenth century, a can be seen as a Lloyd George radical, Horabin seems to have avoided openly period of ‘great prizes for the few, and a with few scruples about accepting ex- supporting members of Radical Action steadily improving standard of living for tensive state intervention and collectiv- who contested wartime by-elections as the many’, had gradually been trans- ism and significant curbing of individual independents and who almost pulled formed into ‘monopoly capitalism’ freedom in the interests of greater eco- off stunning victories at Darwen and at which, through the growth of cartels nomic efficiency and the destruction of Chippenham. and unions, had restricted production, class privilege. He argued that: By summer  he was in open leading to the recession and mass unem- a policy of full employment means using conflict with the Liberal leadership ployment of the s and ’s. In the power of the state to control finance whom he, Wilfred Roberts MP and Horabin’s view, governments should and industry. It does not mean the end of others were pressing to accept radical have responded by breaking up the car- private enterprise. It means the definition of the boundaries between state and resolutions for the coming party con- tels, instituting sweeping social reform private enterprise so that each can func- ference. Horabin’s proposals were re- and high wage policies as the only alter- tion effectively within its own sphere garded by the leadership as getting ‘very native to ‘a planned economy based on …it means opening up a new era of close to full-blooded socialism’. In democratic socialism’. Instead the Tories prosperity for private enterprise in February  he joined a broader- had allowed big business, represented by those fields … it means, however, inter- based rebellion by nine Liberal MPs a decadent and selfish ruling class, to ference with the privileges of wealth, with the freedom of sectional interests to who voted against the government in a dominate government and reinforce the protect themselves at the expense of the protest over its lukewarm response to monopolistic capitalist structure. community, and it means redistribution the Beveridge Report. Horabin appeared to have only one of national income. In October  Horabin published objection to the Labour Party: the But it is far from clear where, if at all, he a book in the Penguin Special series, en- domination of the party leadership by drew the line between Liberalism and titled Politics Made Plain: What the next the trade union bureaucracy which in- Socialism. He was in favour of state con- general election will really be about, which clined towards a ‘Big-Business-Trade- trol and planning and extensive nation- set out his political philosophy and Union-Front’. He argued that ‘the rela- alisation, including the nationalisation of reasons for opposing the government tions between the Trade Union bu- power, transport, land, mines, railways, and the Liberal leadership. This book reaucracy and big business are close and the Bank of England and ‘probably’ the was the only political polemic pro- confidential. It favours a syndicalist or- joint-stock banks. With his collectivist duced by a Liberal MP in the run-up ganisation of industry whereby capital egalitarian outlook he was ready to ex- to the  general election which was and organised labour would divide mo- cuse the defects of Soviet communism. published in a very large popular edi- nopoly profits between them at the ex- His uncritical acceptance of the eco-  tion, and its attitude to the Liberal Party pense of the community’. Horabin nomic and social superiority of the So- and liberalism generally can only be de- had no argument with the trade union viet system contrasts sharply with his  scribed as ambivalent. rank-and-file which he saw as a healthy hostility to the USA which he argued The striking feature of the book is its force. He supported the wartime min- would be ‘ruthlessly aggressive in the semi-revolutionary rhetoric and vis- ers’ wildcat strikes. postwar world in defence of the privi- ceral hostility to the Tory Party, who, His allegiance to the Liberal Party leges of wealth’. In his view an Anglo- according to Horabin, ‘believe in two was heavily qualified. The party had Soviet postwar alliance was the only ba- fundamental principles – inequality and ‘fought a consistent battle to preserve in- sis for an enduring peace. Even allowing that wealth has privileges transcending dividual freedom, as well as offering a for the adulation of the USSR then

Journal of Liberal Democrat History 28 Autumn 2000 19 prevalent as a result of its victories over mittee rather than continue working servatives) who crossed to the Labour Nazi Germany in –, and the left- with him. benches without first losing his or her wing consensus of the time, Horabin’s In October  he announced in a seat when standing as a Liberal. The oth- views placed him on the extreme left of letter to Davies that he was leaving the ers, Dingle Foot, Sir Geoffrey Mander, the Liberal Party and before long on the Liberal Party and would continue to sit Wilfred Roberts, Megan Lloyd George far left of the Labour Party. in the Commons as an Independent and Edgar Granville, all lost their seats Horabin was one of the few Liberal Liberal. Horabin argued that there was before making their conversion. MPs to hold his seat in the  Labour nothing in the Labour government’s Horabin soon gravitated to the left of landslide (when both the Leader and the programme with which the Liberals the Labour Party, joining the Keep Left Chief Whip lost their seats). He held on could quarrel. He saw the government group gathered around Michael Foot, in the face of the incoming Labour elec- as the personification of the radical ad- Richard Crossman and Ian Mikardo. toral tide – or rather benefited from it by ministration for which he had always When the group split in  over its at- securing Labour support. An independ- yearned and believed that it was entitled titude to the deepening Cold War, ent Labour candidate did contest the to the fullest possible support from the Horabin sided with the neutralist group seat but was publicly disowned by the Liberal Party. But the Liberal Party or- which continued to seek a middle way local Labour Party and won only .% ganisation, he felt, was ‘all too quickly between the Western and Soviet alli- of the vote compared to Horabin’s ridding itself of its radical associations ances. He was one of the twelve signato- .%. He polled , votes and in- and seems to think that by preaching a ries of the Keeping Left pamphlet pub- creased his majority from , (.%) merely negative anti-socialist crusade lished in January . It is unclear what in  to , (.%) in . Horabin and avoiding any positive expression of influence he had in the drafting of this was one of only twelve Liberal MPs to policies it can secure more tactical ad- document but its emphasis on the radi- be returned. Tom Horabin regarded the vantage’. Clement Davies replied that cal tradition of social and economic jus- result as a vindication of the Radical Ac- ‘the Liberal MPs have supported the tice rather than socialist planning and tion goal of a broad anti-Tory electoral Government whenever they were satis- public ownership may be significant. front, although it fell far short of his tar- fied that the proposals brought for- During the later s and early get of electing fifty radical Liberal MPs ward … gave the best service combining s, his business interests were focused through local deals with Labour. With its efficiency with justice.’ on promoting trade with Tito’s Yugosla- huge majority the Labour Party also had However, Horabin waited nearly a via which fitted well with his left-wing no interest in working with the Liberals. year, until November , before mak- socialist and neutralist political stance. Horabin was appointed Liberal Chief ing the final break with Liberalism. He Horabin did not contest North Whip in the new Parliament. There are wrote to the Prime Minister, Clement Cornwall in the  election, claiming some indications that he may have influ- Attlee, requesting the Labour Whip and that to do so he would have had to fight enced Clement Davies to try a strategy expressing his concern that the electoral against men who had previously fought of outflanking the new Labour govern- recovery by the Tory Party threatened for him. Perhaps equally significant was ment on the left. However, he soon be- the task of rebuilding postwar Britain. the fact that he had been seriously in- came disenchanted with what he per- He stated that ‘there was no place in this jured in an aircraft accident near Folke- ceived as the party’s rightward drift un- country for any party standing between stone in January . He was on a der Clement Davies’ leadership. He re- the Labour Party on the one hand and B.O.A.C. flight from London to Bor- signed as Chief Whip in March . He the Tory Party on the other’. deaux when it developed engine trouble wrote to Davies that he wished to relin- Despite the request of the North and crashed, killing six passengers and quish the position of Chief Whip be- Cornwall Liberals that he resign his seat crew and seriously injuring ten other cause ‘the position occasionally inhibits he declined to do so and sat as Labour people. He was in hospital for eight [the Chief Whip from] addressing the member for the constituency for the du- weeks and was lucky to have survived. house. A Whip is expected to be seen ration of the parliament through to He was still convalescing in  and and not heard, and that is not in accord- . His response to letters in the might have found an election campaign ance with my temperament’. press from the President of the North in a scattered rural constituency too Horabin had followed an increas- Cornwall Liberal Association great a strain. Tom Horabin must also ingly independent line since the  (J. H. Hallett) was that he would not re- have known that, with the local Liberal election and had alienated many sen- sign his seat because the Liberal Party association determined to run the expe- ior Liberals through various com- had moved away from the principles on rienced former MP Dingle Foot ments to the press and in the House of which he had fought the  election. against him, his chances of holding the Commons that many felt were far ‘While there is, therefore, rupture be- seat against a strong Conservative chal- from the spirit of Liberalism. Indeed, tween myself and the Liberal Party, there lenge were bleak. Instead he fought the Lady Rhys-Williams was so upset by is no rupture between me and my con- To ry seat of Exeter for Labour, losing by Horabin’s increasingly left-wing pro- stituents’, Horabin claimed. He was the some , votes. nouncements that she resigned from only leading Liberal advocate of pro- His political activity seems to have the position of head of the Liberal Par- gressive unity with Labour (in order to ceased after this and he turned to other ty’s Publications and Publicity Com- fight the radical cause against the Con- pursuits, both in business and to his

20 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 28 Autumn 2000 long-standing hobby of painting. His in Baines, The survival of the British Liberal achieved. Although when one considers realis- last recorded publication was a book he Party, 1932-1959, University of Oxford, D.Phil, tically the difficulties by which we are faced, 1989, p. 46. even in Britain with its system of parliamentary co-wrote in  on oil painting, 9 ‘Liberal Central’ is the term often used in party democracy in bringing about the transfer of which ran into several editions. He died publications during the period to refer to the power from the sectional interests to the peo- on  April . National Headquarters organisation in London. ple, it is obvious that Lenin and his collaborators 10 Quoted in R.A.C. Parker, Chamberlain and Ap- would have been defeated unless they had Tom Horabin’s parliamentary career peasement, p. 269 ruthlessly liquidated the Russian vested should be seen against the background 11 G.H. Tregidga, The Liberal Party in South-West interests … Political freedom, as we under- of the fluid party politics of the war England, 1929-59, Ph.D, Exeter University stand it, is largely absent from the Soviet set-up. 1995,p. 188. Horabin acknowledged that ‘we But when all possible criticisms are made, this years. He was one of a number of owe Churchill a debt of gratitude that nothing fact remains: in the Soviet Union they have dis- maverick MPs elected between  can repay … he had no hesitation in sinking his covered a way of identifying the selfish interests and  on an essentially anti-Tory class interests in the national interest at the most of the individual with the interests of the platform. Most of the others were critical turning-point of the war’. On the other community … Within five years the standard of hand Churchill’s stand against appeasement living in Russia will be higher than … in Britain. elected as independents or for the Com- was ‘for one reason and one reason only. He re- Within ten years it must exceed the standard of mon Wealth Party. The majority ended alised the threat implicit to the British Empire living in the United States.’ Ibid p. 120 up in the Labour Party as two-party implicit in Hitler’s rise. He was not fundamen- 25 Why was Horabin chosen as Chief Whip? A ma-  tally opposed to fascism. Indeed his hatred was jor factor was the lack of alternatives in the parlia- politics stabilised after . He was a reserved for communism and for those mentary party. With Davies as chairman and consistent Popular Fronter, more com- who … sought to interfere with the privileges Gwilym Lloyd George en route to the Tories, mitted to a broad progressive alliance of birth and wealth.’ Politics Made Plain, Pen- there were ten MPs to chose from. Four were guin Books 1944, pp. 84-86 first-time MPs with insufficient experience. against the Tories than to Liberal Party 12 Leo Amery Diaries, The Empire at Bay, p. 752. Megan Lloyd George, seen as too disorganised, values and always more sensitive to the Doubtless this was not intended as a compli- Rhys Hopkin Morris, seen as too pure and un- faults of opponents on the right than of ment, although Horabin favoured the transfor- bending in his free trade views, and Professor W allies on the left. His brand of radicalism mation of the Empire into a worldwide federa- J Gruffydd, seen as too preoccupied with his aca- tion based on self-determination, Politics …ibid demic duties, did not fit the part. Edgar Granville offered no escape from the political im- p. 121. had only very recently rejoined the party and passe in which the Liberal Party found 13 Mark Pottle (ed), Champion Redoubtable, Vio- was, like Davies, an ex-National Liberal. Having itself in the s because it offered no let Bonham Carter Diaries and Letters, p. 294 ex-Simonites as chairman and chief whip would 14 Horabin’s close political relationship with Acland have raised eyebrows. That left only Horabin, en- substantive critique of socialism, is evident but the details are obscure. In all prob- ergetic and businesslike, and Wilfred Roberts. whether of the democratic or indeed the ability Acland, as the leading Liberal campaigner Davies evidently preferred Horabin, his close undemocratic variety. In many ways in the West Country, played a part in the selec- sidekick in the wartime opposition. He may have tion of Horabin, a fellow left-wing Popular also calculated that making him Chief Whip Tom Horabin’s defection to Labour was Fronter, to fight his father’s old seat in the 1939 would help to keep him in the party. the least surprising aspect of his career as by-election. Both men were involved with Radi- 26 See R Ingham, ‘Clement Davies: a brief reply’ a Liberal MP. cal Action and both joined the Labour Party after Journal of Liberal Democrat History, 26, Spring 1945. Horabin finally joined Labour in November 2000. Davies’s reply to the Queen’s speech in 1947 at exactly the same time as Acland re-en- 1945 welcomed the end of Tory reaction and Dr Jaime Reynolds works for the Environment tered the Commons for Labour at a by-election. challenged the Labour government to take a Directorate-General of the European Com- They were both in the Keep Left Group and au- radical and determined road. We are grateful to mission. Ian Hunter is researching ‘The Liberal thors of the 1950 Keeping Left pamphlet. How- Robert Ingham for drawing our attention to this   ever Horabin did not follow Acland into the Com- reference. Party and the wartime coalition – ’ for a mon Wealth and there is no indication that he 27 Quoted in The Times, 21 March 1946, p. 4. PhD at St Andrew’s University. Together they shared Acland’s Christian Socialism and idealistic 28 The Times, 21 March 1946, p. 4. wrote a biography of Harcourt ‘Crinks’ enthusiasm for common ownership. 29 Quoted in The Times, 22 October 1946, p. 4. 15 ‘Lobby report 29 July 1942’, Lloyd George Pa- 30 Quoted in The Times, 22 October 1946, p. 4. Johnstone (Journal of Liberal Democrat pers, quoted in Baines op. cit. 31 The Times, 19 November, 1947, p. 2. History , spring ). 16 D Johnson, Bars and Barricades (1952) pp. 217- 32 This was the only occasion that North Cornwall 8. The authors are grateful to Robert Ingham for has had a Labour Member of Parliament. The 1 Not counting Frank Byers, MP for North Dorset his help in assessing Horabin’s involvement seat returned a Conservative in 1950 and re- until 1950, there were no Liberal MPs for Corn- with Radical Action. mained with the Tories until John Pardoe won wall or Devon after Horabin’s defection until 17 Lord Meston, ‘letter to Marigold Sinclair, the seat back for the Liberals in 1966. It is cur- Mark Bonham Carter won Torrington in 1958. 17.8.42’, quoted in G De Groot Liberal Cru- rently held by Liberal Democrat Chief Whip 2 Dodd’s Parliamentary Companion 1940, The sader p. 210. Paul Tyler. Times ‘obituary’, 30 April 1956. 18 Sir William Beveridge, a Liberal MP from 1944, 33 The Times, 28 November 1947, p. 6. 3 Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, Volume 5, published prolifically on his Plan for the welfare 34 Keeping Left (New Statesman Pamphlet 1950). 1922–1939, p. 1050 state, and also produced a pamphlet Why I Am According to Barbara Castle (Fighting All the 4 Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, Volume 5, a Liberal. Way (1993) p. 179) another signatory, Michael 1922–1939, p. 1050 19 Politics Made Plain, op. cit, Preface and Post- Foot, was responsible for the references to the 5 Thurso Papers, 11/65/5, Harcourt Johnston to script Radical tradition. However as Foot did not sign Sir Archibald Sinclair, quoted in G.H. Tregidga, 20 Ibid p. 100 Keeping Left, because he could not accept its The Liberal Party in South-West England, 1929- 21 Ibid pp. 124 and 128 neutralist line, this seems doubtful. Sir Richard 59, PhD, Exeter University 1995, p. 186. 22 Lloyd George ‘an outstanding fighter’ was the Acland and Woodrow Wyatt, already an oppo- 6When Dr George Morrison held the Combined one politician who seems to have received nent of further nationalisation, also signatories, Scottish Universities seat in March 1934. Horabin’s unqualified approval, both for his may well have had a significant influence. See G 7 Harcourt Johnstone to Horabin, 4 July 1939 radical record in the Liberal Government after Foote, The Labour Party’s Political Thought–a quoted in Baines, The survival of the British Lib- 1906 and for his attacks on Chamberlain’s ap- History (1987) pp. 271-2. eral Party, 1932-1959, University of Oxford, peasement policy before the war. 35 The Times, 30 April 1956. D.Phil, 1989, p. 45. 23 Ibid p. 112 36 The Times, 13 January 1947, p. 2 8 Horabin to Graham White, 7 June 1939 quoted 24 ‘There is much that can be criticised in the So- 37 MP for Dundee 1929–45. viet set-up and the way in which it was

Journal of Liberal Democrat History 28 Autumn 2000 21 the picture changed radically. Of forty- six MPs elected, twenty-one came from the territory which starts at ReportsReports Land’s End, comes as far east as Port- smouth and goes as far north as Cheltenham and Oxford. This represents a massive change in the power balance in the Parliamentary Liberalism in the West Liberal Democrats. In the post-war period up until , apart from North Fringe meeting, March 2000 Dorset in , and the Isle of Wight, with Michael Steed and Malcolm Brown held by Stephen Ross in the s, no seat was won outside Devon and Report by Graham Lippiatt Cornwall in the extended South West area. But in  Paddy Ashdown won Ye ovil and in  Bath and Chelten- he general election of  electoral terms. Is it the heartland of ham were added and the expansion had Tproduced a block of twelve Cornwall and Devon; or a wider entity begun. So there may be more contem- Liberal Democrat MPs from the corresponding with the Government porary rather than historical explana- counties of Devon, Cornwall and Office for the South West, which tions to Liberal strength. Somerset. With Spring Conference includes Bristol, Dorset, Gloucester- Looking at historical data, all five  taking place in Plymouth, it shire and Wiltshire; or for the purposes seats in Cornwall were won by the seemed an ideal venue in which to of his analysis for the seminar, an Liberals at the general election of , hold a History Group seminar focus- extended South West, up to a line from but only one other seat in the full ing on the strength and survival of the Isle of Wight to Oxford? He South West, East Dorset. In  Liberalism in the West Country. returned to this question later in his however the shape was totally different. Matthew Taylor, MP for Truro, talk but set out first the three angles Liberals had won a majority of the agreed to chair and introduce the from which he intended to approach seats in Cornwall, Devon, Somerset, meeting. The speakers were, Michael the issue of Liberal and Liberal Demo- Wiltshire, Berkshire, and even in Steed, the psephologist of the Univer- crat historical electoral strength. Buckinghamshire and Bedfordshire. By sity of Kent at Canterbury and Liberal The first was the nature of regional , apart from the core of seats in candidate for Truro at the  variation, why people vote differently Cornwall and one in the north of general election, and Malcolm Brown according to where they live. Standard Devon, the other clutch of Liberal seats who had agreed to stand in at short political textbooks written by theo- was in East Anglia. Bedfordshire notice when Adrian Lee of Plymouth rists of either a Marxian or right-wing returned two out of three MPs in  University was no longer able to perspective, or media commentators and . Huntingdonshire, now attend and speak. Malcolm was agent with a London-centric viewpoint, tell supposedly the safest Conservative seat in the Truro constituency, first to us that people vote principally on the in the country, was won quite easily by David Penhaligon and afterwards to basis of class, as consumers of political the Liberals in . Is this regional Matthew Taylor. services or on the basis of the mes- success the same phenomenon as that Matthew kicked off the meeting by sages they receive through the cen- in the South West, or a geographical revealing that Michael Steed was the tralised media. Yet the reality is that accident which just happened to meet first political candidate with whom he British electoral behaviour varies a somewhere north of Wiltshire on a had ever shook hands and for whom great deal geographically. Secondly, he once-only basis? he ever wore an election sticker. explored the nature of the Liberal One source of data which throws Michael was canvassing support among tradition and lastly, examined the light on the topic is Henry Pelling’s parents of children at St Paul’s school, psephology of the issue. study of election results down to . Truro, which Matthew attended, In preparing the background The election of  was atypical during the  election campaign. material for the talk, the problem of because of the support in Cornwall for Unfortunately, Matthew’s parents, what the South West actually is be- Liberal Unionism as a result of sympa- although thinking that Michael was comes apparent straightaway and it is thy for Northern Irish Presbyterianism the best candidate on offer, decided to difficult to be sure that the data relate among Cornish nonconformists. After support the Labour Party on the basis to the same things at different stages of , Scotland and Wales stand out as that Labour had lost only narrowly in history. From – the strength of having about % higher levels of  and might just do it this time. the Liberal Democrats and their support for Liberal politics than the Michael Steed began by raising the predecessor parties at general elections average across the whole country. On question of just where the West was founded mainly in Scotland and any measure, before the First World Country actually is in political and Wales – the Celtic fringe. But in  War, the Liberals had massive extra

22 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 28 Autumn 2000 strength in Scotland and Wales. The formed in the mid-nineteenth areas which had been Liberal strong- Celtic fringe, in that sense, is deeply century began to get stripped out. holds in the late nineteenth century, or embedded in Liberal history. The That coalition drew strength from the richer farming areas, but rural areas survival of the Liberal Parliamentary industrial, working-class interests and with substantial numbers of agricul- party in the mid to late twentieth provincial, nonconformist, social- tural labourers, small farmers and small century was based upon that history reforming, principled, moral interests. towns. This overlays a socioeconomic and tradition. But what about the It was a genuinely diverse and pluralist explanation on top of the noncon- South West region? On average, party – much more so than anyone formist one – which fits perfectly the although Devon and Cornwall are believes it possible for a political party profile of the South West as an area of marginally stronger, it does not appear to be today. That combination of small farms and small towns, where to amount to anything significant. It support enabled it to win elections. Liberal values could be held on to cannot therefore be said that Liberal What happened with the rise of much more easily and readily in the strength in the South West in the s Labour was that some elements of the inter-war period. or the s is based upon a tradition coalition, such as the miners, were Added to these considerations, the which can be seen to exist in the stripped away from the Liberals nonconformist tradition chimed in nineteenth or early twentieth centu- almost totally, and those which with Liberal beliefs and values. The ries. This is in marked contrast with the remained, such as nonconformity, two key essences of nonconformity are Conservative strength in the South therefore mattered more for the a deeply held social conscience and a East corner of England which has a survival of Liberal representation. strong belief in self-reliance. These two real continuity from the present day One of the main elements, there- elements were met specifically in the back to the late nineteenth century. fore, of Liberal support in the West Liberal Party in a way which could not The other interesting source of Country is the extent of noncon- be expressed in either of the other two data relates to nonconformity in the formist strength there in the inter-war main parties. The Conservatives s and s. This comes from period. On Kinnear’s figures, the most appealed to self-reliance at times and work carried out by Michael Kinnear nonconformist county in England managed to take some nonconformist for his Atlas of the British Voter, pub- was Cornwall, and the second, Bed- support as a result. Labour clearly was a lished in . As part of his survey, fordshire, where two of three MPs party with a social conscience. But the Kinnear added together the numbers returned in  were Liberals. particular mix of the two was only of nonconformist church members in A further part of the explanation of available from the Liberals and had a their circuits and districts and tried to Liberal strength is that the sort of seats stronger appeal than individual policy compare them, as far as possible, to which stayed Liberal tended to be issues such as church schools or Parliamentary constituencies outside made up of small agricultural towns. temperance. The social history and Greater London. He was able to show This fits the pattern, for example, in literature of the eighteenth, nineteenth an extraordinarily strong relationship Buckinghamshire, which returned two and early twentieth centuries featured between nonconformist worship and out of three seats as Liberals in ; it the contrast of church and chapel, not Liberal parliamentary representation. was then a mainly agricultural county as a religious contest but a political In constituencies with strong non- with many small towns. The seats one. Church was hierarchy and author- conformist populations, Liberal which fell to the Liberals in  ity, chapel was democracy and, particu- candidates were successful in a quarter tended not to be either the industrial larly, local democracy. In a sense, it was to a third of contests. In weaker areas of nonconformity the rate of success was as low as %. This suggests that the association of Liberal parliamentary representation with nonconformity was actually stronger in the s and s than it had been in the period before the First World War. This is strange because the policy issues associated with Liberal support for nonconformist causes – church tithes, church schools and temperance – peak in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, up to , and have ever since been in decline. What appears to have happened around the time of the First World War and the rise of the Labour Party was that the original Liberal coalition

Journal of Liberal Democrat History 28 Autumn 2000 23 the chapel philosophy, with ideas going owed something to the towering went beyond that and began to make back to the Civil War, the Levellers and personality of Lloyd George. There is popular the concept of squeezing the Lollards which brought into nothing of that order in the West third parties. He identified the fact modern Liberal Democracy the Country, although the memory of that there were a number of seats in concept of community politics. Isaac Foot and the legacy of the Foot which the Liberals had not won for Furthermore, the nonconformist family has been a significant influence. many years, but still retained strong tradition of dissent, or direct access to To look at this negatively, the area most support. In these seats the party had the written word of God in the Bible, closely associated with Jeremy Thorpe the potential to characterise the fits into the Liberal ethos, through the at the time of the Scott affair – and not Labour Party as unable to win, push Areopagitica of Milton to modern ideas just his own constituency – suffered in them into third place and eventually and beliefs in freedom of speech. The the general election of . By  take the seat. Eventually that is what nonconformists were also the churches the Liberal/SDP Alliance was doing happened in Truro. of moral internationalism in the better in an area which could be On the question of Liberal strength nineteenth century, whether related to defined as the Owen-Penhaligon zone. in the West Country, he queried the Gladstone’s international crusades or Regionally credible leaders do matter concept of the extended South West as the moral case for free trade made out electorally. One of the reasons the a strong Liberal area in the wake of the by Cobden. The Anglican Church was Liberal Democrats were able to expand failure to hold Robin Teverson’s seat in the church of the British interests and out of the South West heartland was the European elections of June . of protectionism. the election in  of Paddy Ashdown Malcolm set out to speak, rather, about These factors and other elements in and his later leadership of the party. Cornwall and why Cornwall’s voting Liberal strength can be summarised Looking at two-way marginals from pattern is distinct. through the three ‘Ps’ – peripherality, the  general election where Malcolm recalled a lecture given by particularity and personality. Liberal Democrat candidates best Adrian Lee given at the Institute of Peripherality – from the figures it is resisted the third-party squeeze, they Cornish Studies, chaired by Paul Tyler, clear that for well over a century the are almost all within the Bristol- which covered electoral behaviour in Conservative Party has been and still Southampton-Exeter area. Cornwall at parliamentary and local remains the party of the South East, In , however, there was one part levels. Rasmussen’s study of the Liberal the Home Counties, the metropolitan of the Celtic fringe which retunred Party placed Cornwall in the Celtic influence. It is a privileged part of the not one single Liberal MP – Scotland. fringe. Pulzer had distinguished country, which thinks it knows what The Liberals in Scotland rebuilt by Cornwall as the most strongly dissent- Englishness and Britishness are. But emphasising the identification of the ing among the four counties in which those views are based upon Surrey, Scottish Liberal Party with Scottishness he identified the survival of a three- Sussex or Kensington and the Tory and a Scottish particularity. This party system. In the s there were party actually has a very blinkered illustrates how regional credibility does few places where a three-party system view of the rest of the country. The work. The historic South West does did survive. In many areas the Liberal Conservative Party finds it more not include the Hampshire/Dorset Party had been effectively killed off. So difficult to relate to areas of the area, in which the Liberal Democrats this raised a number of paradoxes country which feel distant from the are now much stronger at parliamen- about Cornwall, where the party has metropolitan ethos, thus leaving the tary and local government levels, but continued to thrive. field for other political parties. The regional credibility can be built upon Why, given that the population of further west go you, the weaker the for the future. The area which returned Cornwall is largely working class and metropolitan culture is and the the block of twenty-one MPs referred economically disadvantaged, has weaker the Tory appeal. to at the outset is an identifiable region Labour failed to make any significant Particularity – this relates to a place with its own media from Southampton headway? Given that an increasing which is clearly defined and separate. and Bristol westwards. Within that proportion of the electorate are either In West Country terms that only region the Liberal Democrats have self-employed or retired people from works for Cornwall, with its mix of created a credibility the party never outside the county, why have the Methodism, its sense of Celticness and previously had and which now repre- Conservatives not benefited more in a distinct geographical area maintain- sents a foundation for the future. electoral terms? Why are there differing its sense of local identity. This Malcolm Brown began by recalling ences between the various Cornish predisposed Cornwall to vote Liberal Michael Steed’s candidacy for Truro constituencies, given the broad similar- as an expression of its own identity. in  and his role in canvassing ity in socioeconomic conditions across Personality – there is plenty of support for his adoption in the the county? Why is it that Plymouth is evidence that personality plays more of constituency. There was at that time a the only major city in the country a part in the chances of Liberal candi- conventional approach for looking at where major advances at local govern- dates winning seats than it does for winnable seats, which was to consider ment level have not been made? other parties. The continuing strength only those places where Liberals had Some of the possible explanations of Liberalism in Wales into the s formerly come second. Michael Steed go back to the Civil War, relating to

24 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 28 Autumn 2000 which towns supported Parliament and Liberals, who have been better Boer War were difficult ones for the which the Royalist cause, but there are placed to conform to and adapt to Liberals. From  the party was split a number of particular reasons to distinctive Cornish conditions. on the issue of Home Rule in Ireland explain these questions. Labour have had a history of import- and this in turn complicated the The first is that Cornwall is ing candidates into Cornwall from party’s relationship with the institu- intrinsically different, historically, outside without giving them the tion of Empire. culturally and economically, from time to establish any local credibility According to Professor Judd, there other counties. Secondly, there has and it has concentrated on national were a number of options for the party been a revival of interest in Cornish issues at the expense of Cornish ones. regarding its policy on the Empire. history and linguistic heritage, While national issues, of course, First, they could present themselves as contributing to a new sense of impinge in Cornish elections, the mildly anti-imperialist. The danger in Cornish consciousness, a feeling with local issues remain paramount. There this approach was that Home Rule in which the Liberals have traditionally was therefore a bedrock of Liberal Ireland could become seen as an been associated. There has been a support in Cornwall which was imperial issue and, therefore, as the first delay in the modernisation of the deeper and stronger than elsewhere step towards the disintegration of the Cornish socioeconomic structure. A which had been added to by the Empire. The party was conscious that it distinct style of politics has grown up campaigning, the image and the style had lost votes and seats on Home Rule in Cornwall which is anti-metro- of local Liberalism, particularly built and that the popular press was often politan and jealous to preserve the up in the s and s. pro-imperial. Hence the party offi- territorial integrity of the county. Relating this background to his cially disavowed this line. However, Class consciousness has not been own experience, Malcolm recalled the many Liberals opposed the worst overt either in rural or industrial beginnings of modern campaigning in aspects of imperialism. areas. Nonconformity has continued the s and s. There was a loyal, The second option was to be clearly to be important. There has been a bedrock Liberal support in the con- pro-Empire, but to what extent? A tradition of non-partisanship in local stituencies. On top of this was built group of Liberal MPs did emerge, government and politics. This has further support through a combination calling themselves Liberal Imperialists, resulted in the election of candidates of innovative campaigning tools, such who thought the party should respond in Cornwall who are local, are as community newsletters and sys- to the public interest in the Empire by prepared to act primarily as constitu- tematised electioneering techniques. becoming clearly in favour of it. ency representatives and are willing These factors combined with the very However, in Judd’s view this approach to take a genuine interest in Cornish local personality of Cornish Liberal would have had the danger of antago- affairs and problems. This has hin- candidates enabled the party to make nising the party’s traditional voters. dered Labour and helped the and, so far, sustain its breakthrough. Furthermore, the party faced a growing challenge from the trade union and labour movements. Judd argued finally that there was a middle way for the party between these two positions: to be generally ‘Methods of Barbarism’ – supportive of the Empire but high- lighting concerns and disassociating Liberalism and the Boer War itself from military conquests. Unfor- tunately, Liberals could not agree upon Evening meeting, July 2000 a majority view, leading to difficulties for the party in responding to the Boer with Denis Judd and Jacqueline Beaumont War. A further problem was the Report by David Cloke establishment of another liberal party in the form of the Liberal Unionists. They had membership and organisa- n the evening of  July members Beaumont and the meeting was tion and from , provided members Oof the History Group met at the chaired by the Liberal Democrats’ of Salisbury’s cabinet. How was the National Liberal Club to discuss the Foreign Affairs spokesperson, Menzies Liberal Party to win a future election? response of the Liberal Party and the Campbell MP. It was fundamentally split with its great liberal press to the Boer War – a venue Professor Judd began the meeting rising star, Joseph Chamberlain, having which was no doubt witness to many with a survey of the various responses defected. Another party was calling similar discussions and debates during of the Liberal Party to the Boer War itself liberal and was, under Chamber- the course of the war itself. The and the political difficulties posed for lain’s leadership, making a determined discussions were ably led by Professor the party by the war. Professor Judd effort to represent liberalism and to Denis Judd and Dr Jacqueline noted that the years running up to the win over working class voters.

Journal of Liberal Democrat History 28 Autumn 2000 25 However, Professor Judd argued, the it was ‘calculated brinkmanship’ – a and the conditions in the concentra- last years of the century saw the conclusion backed up, he argued, by the tion camps that provoked a response by development of a ‘new imperialism’, fact that from July  the government Campbell-Bannerman. After having perhaps flowing from a sense of was moving large numbers of troops to been lobbied by Hobhouse, C-B made insecurity. The triumphalism of the South Africa. At this time Campbell- a speech attacking the war, accusing Diamond Jubilee of  overlaid Bannerman said on several occasions the government of deploying ‘methods concerns at the that the two Boer of barbarism’. Despite the changing prospects for the republics should political landscape, Judd believed that new century and ‘When is a war not a war? be annexed in those who were antagonised by the how Britain some form; speech probably outnumbered those would compete When it is carried on by though he never who welcomed it. with the US and methods of barbarism in made clear what In describing the eventual peace the Russian South Africa.’ that form should treaty with the Boers, Judd stated that Empire. In Judd’s be. he believed it to be generous to them. view, the Empire Henry Campbell- For Judd a key The rebels were let off, the displaced became associ- Bannerman, 14 June point in the were given loans to restart their farms ated with guaran- development of and there was a general amnesty. The teed power and 1901 Liberal policy only issue of major concern to Liberals success in the towards South at this time was the significant weaken- new century. Africa came on ing of the commitment to the ‘native There were other difficulties for  October . On that day the franchise’, which was delayed until the party. During – the Liberal House of Commons was required to responsible governments were restored government undoubtedly connived vote the necessary supplies to enable to the Orange Free State and the with Cecil Rhodes and had discussed the prosecution of the war. The party Transvaal. Judd argued that the main interventions similar to the Jameson could not be seen to obstruct a war aim in the postwar period was coop- Raid of December . It was that had already begun. It could just eration with the Afrikaners and that, as revealing, Professor Judd argued, that hope that it would be over quickly if Milner brutally put it, ‘you only have the Liberal members of the official the British had the necessary supplies. to sacrifice the nigger completely and inquiry into the Jameson Raid rather From the outbreak of war there the game is easy’. pulled their punches. Furthermore, was a substantial opposition from In Judd’s view it was entirely to the although the party was out of power trade unions and church groups. This Liberal Party’s credit that once in from – there were Liberals developed as the crisis progressed, and government it granted responsible in key positions with regard to the a South African Conciliation Com- government to the Orange River development of South African policy. mittee was set up. The Liberal leader- Colony and the Transvaal, with Chamberlain was Colonial Secretary, ship found the Committee difficult to elections being held by . There Selborne Under-Secretary of State contain and a source of embarrass- were a number of reasons behind this: and Milner Governor of the Cape ment. With the news of defeats and the long Liberal tradition of appropri- from . the establishment of concentration ate devolution; part of the process of The left also caused problems. In camps, leading statesmen such as consolidating the peace and guaran- the view of many leftist critics one of Lloyd George joined the ranks of teeing the future; and it was hoped the key reasons underlying the crisis those opposed to the war – enabling that it would create an Anglo- was unfettered capitalism. This view government propaganda to portray Afrikaner middle ground of ‘moder- was tinged with anti-Semitism, as the Liberals as pro-Boers. Not sur- ate white supremacists’. Unfortu- many South African capitalists were prisingly, in such a political climate, nately in the Transvaal, whilst there Jewish. British Jewry was solidly and thinking that the war was won, were a large number of English Liberal at this time and three mem- the Conservatives called a general speakers, enough perhaps to win the bers of the Liberal cabinets from election in April . Judd argued election, they split their vote three – were Jewish. This, in turn, that despite this reopening the ways and the moderate Afrikaners made it difficult for the party to know divisions within the Liberal Party, and won. Whilst they were willing to how to respond to these critics. despite the party suffering vitriolic cooperate, they were not willing to According to Judd all these dilemmas attacks from the Conservatives, the extend the franchise to non-whites. worsened as the South African crisis Liberals’ performance was much The issue of the ‘native franchise’ developed, particularly once war broke better than expected. The Conserva- was again discussed during the passage out. Before the war actually began, tives gained only four seats. of the Union of South Africa Bill. Campbell-Bannerman had been The election result may, therefore, There were passionate calls from arguing that the Chamberlain/Milner have given the Liberal leadership more Liberal and Labour members for the policy of aggressive diplomacy was courage. However, it was Emily extension of the franchise, but the issue bluff. However, in Professor Judd’s view, Hobhouse’s reports of farm burnings was left to the individual governments.

26 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 28 Autumn 2000 It was hoped that the franchise would of its editorial staff. He was a close approve of this position as it was be extended in Natal and the Cape and associate of Balfour, had known both affecting turnover. He told that this good practice would spread Lord Curzon and Lord Cranborne at Massingham not to express views on elsewhere. Unfortunately, the reverse Oxford and was an old friend of the war. Massingham consequently happened and repressive practices Milner. The paper had supported resigned and was replaced by J. H. spread south. In Judd’s view, in giving Chamberlain before the war and Fisher; Spender and Nash also left the the greater South Africa its new form defended the camps and the farm paper. Nevinson was unaware of what the rights of black South Africans were burning during it. Emily Hobhouse’s was happening, caught up as he was in sold down the river. The culmination report was ignored. the siege of Ladysmith. of this process was apartheid, which in The divisions in the Liberal Party According to Dr Beaumont the Judd’s view was a rationalisation of had a more serious effect on the Daily fortunes of the Daily News and the what had come before. News, ‘the recognised organ of the Daily Chronicle horrified many Liberals. Following Professor Judd’s illumi- Liberal Party’. However its editor in Educated Liberals came to regarded nating review of the Liberal Party’s , E. T. Cook, was on the imperial the press as emasculated and an attempt response to the South African war and wing of the party, was a close friend to was made to raise funds to establish a its aftermath, Dr Beaumont outlined both Milner and the editor of the Cape new newspaper. Not enough money the response of the liberal press. Times, Edmund Garrett, who reported was raised for this and the change of Liberals had been at the heart of the for the Daily News until the summer of side of the Chronicle meant that there development of cheap newspapers . Not surprisingly, this influenced was little need to continue to do so. In from the s onwards; it was hoped the editorials of the paper: they the meantime the Manchester Guardian that they would educate the electorate. followed Chamberlain’s lead prior to filled the gap, taking on Massingham as It is reckoned that by  there were the war and defended Milner vigor- its London editor along with Spender  newspapers in London alone,  ously during it. and Nash. in the provinces,  in Scotland,  Cook’s appointment had always In Beaumont’s view there were in Wales and  in Ireland. Dr been unwelcome by Radicals and already other alternative papers: the Beaumont decided, probably rather early in  Lloyd George organised Morning Leader and the Star. The wisely, to focus her talk on the Liberal for the paper to be bought by a Morning Leader had been founded in newspapers from amongst the Lon- syndicate with the understanding that  and has been regarded of little don-based national press. it would take a neutral line on the political importance. It did not appeal When the war broke out there were war. This forced Cook’s resignation. to the elite of the party and had no thirteen national morning papers and However, the paper did not stick to its contacts with politicians. Its constitu- five national evening papers. Of the neutral position. With the reports of encies were tradesmen, women and former four were Liberal: the Daily farm burnings at the end of May  nonconformist ministers. Its aim was Chronicle, the Daily News, the Morning the paper took up the issue and gave to educate and it was written and Leader and the Daily Telegraph. Of the more coverage to it than the other presented in a more approachable latter three were Liberal: the Star, the newspapers. It also gave the fullest manner. Its sister paper, the Star, had Echo and the Westminster Gazette. Dr coverage of the Hobhouse Report. been founded in  under the Beaumont considered each of the According to Beaumont, it was editorship of T. P. O’Connor. It was papers in turn. difficult to escape the conclusion that consistently radical and letters in- The Daily Telegraph had been this was more than moral indignation; cluded correspondence from Marxists formed in  and was intended to it was part of a concerted plan to and Fabians. Beaumont declared that have a broader appeal than the estab- bring the party together behind in ‘reading its pages one cannot but be lished newspapers. It had been owned Campbell-Bannerman. struck by its sharp freshness in support by the Lawson family almost from the The Daily Chronicle had, meanwhile, of a frankly “anti-jingo” policy’. start, who, by the end of the century, had a more chequered career. Starting Nonetheless its importance has also were as split as the party. The proprie- in  with little political news, it had been dismissed. Both papers never tor (who was effectively in charge), Sir taken a Unionist line on Ireland in the wavered in their support of the Boers Edward Lawson, was a Liberal Union- s, returned to the Gladstonian fold and according to Beaumont, both ist, whilst his son Harry stood as a in  and from , under Henry never recovered from the conse- Radical in the  general election. Massingham’s editorship, had appeared quences of holding that position. The inconsistency in the family was to support Rosebery. Massingham Radical Liberals were also able to reflected, Beaumont argued, in the veered to the left over time, recruiting look to another evening paper, the newspaper. By , despite being like-minded journalists such as Harold Echo. It was founded in  as the first billed as a Liberal paper, the Telegraph Spender, Vaughan Nash and Henry halfpenny evening paper. It was owned was, in Beaumont’s view, editorially Nevison. In the build-up to the war. by a succession of Liberal MPs, most Conservative. There were informal Beaumont argued that the paper notably Passmore Edwards from – links with the Conservative Party became increasingly critical. However, . The editor from , William through E. B. Iwan Muller, a member the owner. Frank Lloyd. did not Crook, continued in Edwards’ tradition

Journal of Liberal Democrat History 28 Autumn 2000 27 of radical liberalism and took a consist- Liberal Party, especially with Campbell- put news first but one that gave equal ently pro-Boer attitude. However, the Bannerman who sent the paper ad- prominence to debate and comment. paper was making a loss and Cook and vance copies of his speeches. Despite its In Beaumont’s opinion this was his unpopular views on South Africa prestige, however, it made consistent disadvantageous to the wide dissemi- were blamed. Cook, therefore, resigned losses. Furthermore, despite this it did nation of Liberal views. Finally, like the as editor. Following his resignation the not give uncritical support to the party it lacked a uniform view or paper was more noncommittal in its Liberal Party’s position on the war. pattern. Liberal divisions were con- coverage of the war. Once war was declared, Beaumont stantly on show in the press. In Beaumont’s view, the most argued that Spender saw no option but Following the two presentations influential of the evening papers was the ‘to bend before the storm’. there was a lively question and answer Westminster Gazette, founded in  In summary, Beaumont argued that session covering a wide range of and whose editor from  was J. A. the traditional Liberal press was under- points. Despite a smaller turn-out than Spender. It was required reading for capitalised and was, therefore, unable to usual, the evening proved to be one of members of the cabinet and opposition compete with the emerging new press the most stimulating and informative alike. It had very good links with the such as the Daily Mail – not a press that of recent meetings.

Research in Progress If you can help any of the individuals listed below with sources, contacts, or any other information — or if you know anyone who can — please pass on details to them. Details of other research projects in progress should be sent to the Editor (see page 2) for inclusion here.

The party agent and English electoral culture, c.1880 – c.1906. The Liberals and the local government of London 1919–39. Chris Fox, development of political agency as a profession, the role of the 173 Worplesdon Road, Guildford GU2 6XD; election agent in managing election campaigns during this period, [email protected]. and the changing nature of elections, as increased use was made of Crouch End or Hornsey Liberal Association or Young Liberals in the the press and the platform. Kathryn Rix, Christ's College, 1920s and 1930s; especially any details of James Gleeson or Patrick Cambridge, CB2 2BU; [email protected]. Moir, who are believed to have been Chairmen. Tony Marriott, Flat Liberal policy towards Austria-Hungary, 1905–16. Andrew A, 13 Coleridge Road, Crouch End, London N8 8EH. Gardner, 22 Birdbrook House, Popham Road, Islington, London N1 The Liberal Party and foreign and defence policy, 1922–88; of 8TA; [email protected]. particular interest is the 1920s and 30s, and the possibility of The Hon H. G. Beaumont (MP for Eastbourne 1906–10). Any interviewing anyone involved in formulating party foreign and information welcome, particularly on his political views (he stood as defence policies. Dr R. S. Grayson, 8 Cheltenham Avenue, a Radical). Tim Beaumont, 40 Elms Road, London SW4 9EX. Twickenham TW1 3HD.

Edmund Lamb (Liberal MP for Leominster 1906–10). Any Liberal foreign policy in the 1930s. Focussing particularly on Liberal information on his election and period as MP; wanted for biography anti-appeasers. Michael Kelly, 12 Collinbridge Road, Whitewell, of his daughter, Winfred Lamb. Dr David Gill, Newtownabbey, Co. Antrim BT36 7SN [email protected]. The Liberal Party and the wartime coalition 1940–45. Sources, Joseph King (Liberal MP for North Somerset during the Great War). particularly on Sinclair as Air Minister, and on Harcourt Johnstone, Any information welcome, particularly on his links with the Union Dingle Foot, Lord Sherwood and Sir Geoffrey Maunder (Sinclair's of Democratic Control and other opponents of the war (including PPS) particularly welcome. Ian Hunter, 9 Defoe Avenue, Kew, his friend George Raffalovich). Colin Houlding; Richmond TW9 4DL; [email protected]. [email protected] The grassroots organisation of the Liberal Party 1945–641945–64; the role The political life and times of Josiah Wedgwood MP. Study of the of local activists in the late 1950s revival of the Liberal Party. Mark political life of this radical MP, hoping to shed light on the question Egan, 42 Richmond Road, Gillingham, Kent ME7 1LN. of why the Labour Party replaced the Liberals as the primary The Unservile State Group, 1953–1970s. Dr Peter Barberis, 24 popular representatives of radicalism in the 1920s. Lime Avenue, Flixton, Manchester M41 5DE. Paul Mulvey, 112 Richmond Avenue, London N1 0LS; [email protected]. The Young Liberal Movement 1959–1985; including in particular relations with the leadership, and between NLYL and ULS. Carrie Recruitment of Liberals into the Conservative Party, 1906–1935. Park, 89 Coombe Lane, Bristol BS9 2AR; Aims to suggest reasons for defections of individuals and develop [email protected]. an understanding of changes in electoral alignment. Sources include personal papers and newspapers; suggestions about how The political and electoral strategy of the Liberal Party 1970–79. to get hold of the papers of more obscure Liberal defectors Individual constituency papers, and contact with members of the welcome. Cllr Nick Cott, 1a Henry Street, Gosforth, Newcastle- Party’s policy committees and/or the Party Council, particularly upon-Tyne, NE3 1DQ; [email protected]. welcome. Ruth Fox, 7 Mulberry Court, Bishop’s Stortford, Herts CM23 3JW.

28 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 28 Autumn 2000 burgh and Prestwick. Ross thus prevented Scotland having the major international airport it deserved. ReviewsReviews He writes poignantly of the long campaign for European entry in the Labour Party, and his rough relations with Prime Minister Harold Wilson. I Last of the Gang … must admit that when he recalls the episode of his leaking in advance to the Bill Rodgers: Fourth Among Equals press a ‘showdown’ meeting with (Politico’s Publishing, 2000; 320pp) Wilson, my sympathies were wholly on the side of the cross Prime Minister. Reviewed by David Steel Other than that I found his account of events leading in  to Roy Jenkins’ resignation as Deputy Leader of the Labour Party, and the Labour MPs he most irritating aspect of Bill and being part of a community. The voting against their whip very moving. TRodgers’ autobiography is its title. community politics strategy of the Equally, when later the same people Fourth Among Equals is a wholly unnec- Liberal Party was a key part of its make trooped through the lobbies against the essary self put-down. It is not even an up, not to be derided except where legislation ratifying entry, and Bill accurate description of his role in the badly practised as mere ‘pavement confessed that he was reduced to tears, Gang of Four’s founding of the SDP. politics’. The disadvantages of such a I realised why I was right to have For while the other three all had their life for me was that I was never able to resisted early blandishments to join the distinctive merits, there is no doubt that be part of the London/weekend Labour Party. Bill was the most clearly capable network, as the SDP quartet obviously The  referendum campaign – organiser and strategist of the quartet. were. I do not claim universal superior- when we worked together for the first Having overcome my dislike of the ity for the Liberal position. On the time – is accurately described, espe- title, and before turning to assess this contrary, I recall being concerned that cially the material largesse (typewrit- history, let me say at the outset that it’s in a winnable by-election a few years ers, photocopiers, executive jets) a rattling good read. The early chap- ago a candidate who would have made which were available, and which ters are strikingly evocative of a a major contribution to the parliamen- opened both our sets of eyes to the Liverpool childhood, including some tary party did not even reach the short- fact that these were regularly available remarkably vivid descriptions of the list for selection because his tenuous to the Tory party. In all of these epi- blitz. His time at Oxford is passed local ties compared unfavourably with sodes he has some shrewd and critical over quickly in favour of his early the worthy local councillors who did. pen portraits of colleagues like Tony years in the Labour Party. But there were similarities for all Crosland, Roy Hattersely and David Two features of his life emerge that. ‘I saw too little of my children Owen. But he also has some cryptic which I believe were to colour the when they were growing up and now, one-liners which set me laughing differences between SDP culture and with families of their own they com- aloud in instant recognition: Merlyn Liberal culture (because his and my plain about my failure.’ Snap. I also now personal experiences illustrated them). recall – which I had forgotten, as, I The first was his almost cavalier ap- suspect, had Bill – that we served proach to constituency selection. From together briefly in the Assemblies of Bristol to Birmingham, Gloucester to the Council of Europe and Western Grimsby and eventually to Stockton, European Union around . Indeed the prevailing attitude was that these I wrote as rapporteur (aided by a were possible places to send you to knowledgeable clerk) a learned report Westminster. Second, Bill, like the other on Russian submarines in the Kola three, lived in London, with a second peninsula, about which I can recall house in what they would call ‘the nothing except a few words of ap- country’ – within a ½ hour drive of proval from the junior defence minis- London, not in their constituencies. ter, Bill Rodgers. Contrast this with my own – and As junior minister at the Board of most recent Liberal – experience, Trade he tried to promote a new living and working in our constituen- Central Scotland airport but was cies, often a full day’s travel from stymied by the Secretary of State for London, sending our children to local Scotland, Willie Ross, who wanted to schools, attending the parish church keep voters happy at Glasgow, Edin-

Journal of Liberal Democrat History 28 Autumn 2000 29 Rees ‘radiating muddled concern and was politically naïve and they mistak- and a willingness to let that flourish goodwill’; Edward du Cann ‘adopted enly allowed him full exposure. I recall organically locally rather than by some his suavest manner (and that could be coming off the sleeper and breakfasting blueprint from the top down. very suave indeed)’. with Bill, trying to explain to him how With most of Bill’s judgements I His role in establishing and main- it was possible to run a by-election concur (including his reservations taining the Lib-Lab Pact of – is while only allowing the candidate a about the current joint cabinet com- soundly recorded in detail. In retro- few carefully scripted words very mittee which my ex-leader loyalty spect I was too easily wooed by the occasionally. Richard Holme had done prevented me from expressing!). He promise of a free vote on PR for this at Croydon with Bill Pitt, but such doesn’t quote Jo Grimond’s typically Europe, failing to foresee that the pro- techniques were unknown to the SDP mischievous remark about the Alliance PR Tory vote would not turn out for who truly blew it by coming third. – ‘the thing is bound to succeed something that was part of a Lib-Lab His version of the  general because Jenkins is such a good Liberal agreement. The most interesting part election and its aftermath is both fair and Steel such a good Social Demo- of the chapter dealing with his time in and fascinating, as is the election of crat’ – but that it succeeded at all was cabinet is his account of the terrible David Owen as leader and the row on in no small measure due to Bill. Roy mistake Jim Callaghan made in not the joint commission on defence. The and I used to muse that his problem calling an election. as expected after disappointment of the  election, was a name and image one. Was he Bill the end of the Lib-Lab Pact in autumn the fall-out with Owen and the subse- or William, Roger or Rodgers? It , and of the subsequent winter of quent unnecessarily long-drawn-out didn’t matter to us internally, because discontent and the strains and disagree- struggle for merger are also robustly he was very much the essential equal, ments within the cabinet. portrayed. He is right to trace the and deserves to enjoy his years as leader His own account of leaving the satisfying achievement of forty-seven of the party in the Upper House of Labour Party and helping to found the Liberal Democrat MPs and ten MEPs parliament. SDP is familiar to those who have read to the foundation laid by the Liberal- Roy Jenkins and David Owen. What is SDP Alliance. If we were able to rewrite David Steel (Lord Steel of Aikwood) led the more revealing is the level of tension at history, there should have much more Liberal Party from  to . He is different times among the four of declared openness from the beginning currently MSP for South of Scotland, and them. It is to their credit that they about the partnership of the two parties Presiding Officer of the Scottish Parliament. concealed it well at the time. The famous by-elections come back to life through these pages and Bill’s mega- phone. He gives his side of the seat allocation problems, in which he is Nearly an Eminent Victorian quite critical of my part, leading to his public outburst at New Year , at which he records ‘David Steel put on Roland Hill: Lord Acton (Yale University Press, 2000; his disapproving son-of-the-manse 548pp) face and pretended the row had come Reviewed by Ian Machin as a surprise’. He is right. I did not want to inflame what I considered bad judgement on his part and simply he first Lord Acton (Sir John ancestral roots were in a Shropshire suggested he had eaten too many Emerich Edward Dalberg Acton, estate and baronetcy. But as his father, mince pies for Christmas. But damage T –) was nearly an eminent grandfather, and great-grandfather in was done, and I still believe in retro- Victorian, who might have reached the the Acton line had all been born spect that the SDP wholly underesti- undoubtedly eminent rank if he had abroad, Englishness was deemed mated the scale of sacrifice being concentrated on one line of activity officially to have run out in his case, expected of entrenched Liberal instead of several. He was a diverse and a special Act of Naturalisation as a candidates and organisations such as being by birth, a cosmopolitan aristo- British citizen was passed for him, as a Dumfries (next door to me) where the crat with English, German, Italian and three-year-old, when his father died in young Jim Wallace loyally resigned as a French forebears, who was born in . Thereafter he was a Shropshire hard-working PPC to make way for a Naples. He acquired homes in three squire, though often dwelling in passing Social Democrat. countries and amassed libraries in all of Germany or France. His account of the disastrous by- them, becoming known as one of the Acton was an unremarkable Liberal election at Darlington is understated. most ardent book-collectors as well as MP for an Irish county from  to Simon Hughes had won Bermondsey one of the most learned men of his , and a remarkable and prominent only a month before. The SDP had a time. He was aptly described as an Liberal Catholic journalist and contro- well-known local TV commentator as ‘international highbrow’. His paternal versialist during the same years. Later, candidate and started favourites. But he

30 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 28 Autumn 2000 The first of these is as a social and not only to be impartial but also to be family man, solicitous towards his morally fearless in condemning past wife and children and entertaining evils. He also successfully stimulated scholars and statesmen such as the work of others. Today the domina- Döllinger and Gladstone in both tion of the periodic research assess- Bavaria and England. ment exercise in British universities The second is as a noted Liberal would prevent his coming anywhere Catholic thinker, striving without near a chair in this country, but one success to stem the rising ultramon- cannot help feeling that this renders tane tide in his Church. He did this universities the poorer. first in the Catholic journals that he While the book gives sound and edited (The Rambler and its successor ample coverage to the main aspects of The Home and Foreign Review) from Acton’s life, there are one or two  to , and then in the fierce contradictions in the work and some controversy which took place over places where the British ecclesiastical the definition of papal infallibility at and social background might have the Vatican Council in , and been more fully sketched in. With which lasted for several years. The regard to the few factual errors it Vatican controversy showed Acton at should be noted that the Davis Strait a peak of intellectual and emotional off Greenland, and not ‘Davis Street’, involvement, clashing not only with was the place where a whale was when his close friend Gladstone’s final Pope Pius IX but with Manning and, caught in one of Acton’s historical ministry was formed in , he was to a lesser extent, Newman. This was anecdotes; that King Louis-Philippe’s disappointed not to receive a cabinet the central defining moment in son was the Duke of Aumale, not post, but was made a Lord-in-Waiting Acton’s life and it is given very full Daumale; that Gladstone, as a Puseyite, to the Queen, whom he was as con- examination by Hill, extending to did not have a ‘Low Church image’; spicuously able to charm as Gladstone nearly a quarter of the book. that it was actually a Tory government was not. Finally, in , Lord Rosebery The third level on which the book that carried Catholic emancipation in appointed this learned historian – who presents Acton is as an unexpected but ; and that only forty-one votes, had written little apart from numerous nonetheless effective professor of not forty-nine, were given in favour of periodical articles (of a contemporary history. His own historical research and the Irish Home Rule Bill in the House nature) and some general scholarly writing projects had been successively of Lords in . essays – to the Regius Chair of Modern dropped but in his chair he delivered History at Cambridge. Occupying this some notable, if debatable, aphorisms, Ian Machin is Professor of British History position until his death at the age of insisting on the duty of the historian at the University of Dundee sixty-eight in , Acton delivered notable lectures (later published) and launched the multi-volume Cambridge Modern History. This work had many writers but, characteristically, Acton Neville Chamberlain: Policy Wonk was not prepared to contribute a chapter himself. Roland Hill’s book is the fullest Graham Stewart: Burying Caesar: Churchill, biography of Acton to date. It well Chamberlain and the Battle for the Tory Party reflects its subject in being physically (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1999) large, learned and capacious. Its scholarly basis is provided by corre- Reviewed by Richard Grayson spondence from eighteen archives in different countries, especially the Acton papers in the Cambridge o we really need another book continent crept ever closer to the University Library, and by numerous Dabout Winston Churchill’s English Channel. And as for biogra- contemporary and subsequent pub- wilderness years? Almost certainly phies, it is difficult to see that there is lished sources. There is a frequent and not. My own shelves, though far any way to improve upon the nu- apt use of quotation, which gives from holding the complete Churchill merous readable and insightful works constant freshness to the work. The collection, are stacked full of mem- by historians such as Robert Rhodes treatment is generally solid throughout oirs telling the tale of the ‘guilty James and John Charmley, or the and gives us abundant opportunity to men’ who allowed Britain to sleep weighty tomes that are Martin observe Acton on three levels. while the gathering storm on the Gilbert’s life’s work.

Journal of Liberal Democrat History 28 Autumn 2000 31 Neville Chamberlain has not the early s, as a result of his attracted the same following. For increasing involvement in the great obvious reasons, there were never international economic issues of the crowds of people waiting to tell of day, such as the Ottawa agreements and their part in his life. And we even lack the  World Economic Conference. a full modern biography, with David When carrying out research on Austen Dilks’ work stopping in . Chamberlain, I was told by a close Nevertheless, Chamberlain’s role in friend of the Chamberlain family that appeasement has been told and told in the s, whenever Neville had again through countless monographs voiced opinions on foreign policy, he and journal articles analysing the would be told by his sisters: ‘Do shut minutiae of the decision-making that up, Neville – you know you know led to Munich and beyond. Mean- nothing about foreign affairs’. His time while, general readers are well served at the Treasury may not have remedied by Alastair Parker’s Chamberlain and that entirely, but it did at least make Appeasement. So does Graham him think that he was an expert. He Stewart’s Burying Caesar perform any successfully persuaded others of this useful function? too, prompting Harold Macmillan’s Stewart has not unearthed any new comment in , ‘if Chamberlain says sources. But in other ways he has more that black is white, the Tories applaud than justified this new volume on his brilliance. If a week later he says with people such as Churchill. That Churchill and Chamberlain. In particu- that black is after all black, they ap- overlooks the very vigorous debates on lar, he places much emphasis on Cham- plaud his realism.’ alternative options that took place berlain’s relationship with his party; no As for Churchill, Stewart demon- inside the opposition parties. While other writer has treated this as such a strates clearly the differing effects that there is no doubt that the size of the serious issue in the past. Meanwhile, he Churchill’s calls for rearming the government’s majority made internal has uniquely presented a fascinating RAF had on his relationship with the Conservative opposition crucial, its full twin biography, examining the links Conservative Party, as distinct to his significance can only be understood in between Churchill and Chamberlain at fight against the Government of India the context of activity beyond Con- every twist and turn, rather as Alan Bill. In the latter case, he was regularly servative ranks. Bullock did in his Hitler and Stalin: A seen to be disloyal to the Conserva- Had Stewart actually tackled this Study in Tyranny. Underpinning this is tive-dominated government, sup- issue, he might have slightly rebalanced the provocative suggestion that the ported only by diehards on the fringe his picture of the anti-appeasement battle for supremacy between the two of the party. But on rearmament, he cause. In particular, that applies to the men was a continuation of the late- was simply pushing the government belief in ‘collective security’ that is so Victorian struggle for the Tory soul in to pursue its own policy more enthu- often associated with Winston which their fathers, Randolph and Joe, siastically, thus consolidating his Churchill. In actual fact, ‘collective were leading figures. support on the party’s right wing, security’ was at the heart of the One of the key points to emerge while also securing allies from other Liberal concept of international from Stewart’s book is that Chamber- areas. As Stewart shows, one should relations from the early s. In the lain had a strong grip on the Con- not underestimate the extent to first part of the decade, they associated servative Party’s central machine in the which that campaign was inspired by it with the League of Nations. But by early s. In particular, as chair of the Churchill’s desire to return to Con- mid , some months before the Conservative Research Department, servative ministerial ranks in the mid Munich crisis, Liberals such as and head of the Cabinet Conservative to late s. It is all too easy now to Archibald Sinclair were arguing that Committee, he was the supreme policy forget that even on becoming Prime an alliance between, for example, wonk of his era. Combining these Minister in , Churchill did not Britain, France and the USSR, might posts with that of Chancellor of the enjoy the unquestioning loyalty of the be the only way to resist Hitler. Exchequer, Chamberlain was the Conservatives, and this book brings Analysis of the Liberal position also Gordon Brown of his day, with a grip his troubled relationship with the reveals the importance of the idea of on policy across the board – so much party to the fore. ‘economic disarmament’ to the anti- so that he wrote to one of his sisters in Missing from the book is any real appeasement campaign. That involved October  that it amused him ‘to sense that the Conservative anti- restoring free trade and making find a new policy for each of my appeasers were only one of several concessions to Germany on colonies. colleagues in turn’. groups working against the govern- It was a distinctive aspect of Liberal It is also clear that Chamberlain’s ment’s foreign policy. Liberal and anti-appeasement and adds an impor- interest in international affairs devel- Labour politicians are present in the tant dimension to any analysis of oped from his time at the Treasury in book, but only in so far as they worked alternative policies.

32 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 28 Autumn 2000 Yet despite this reservation, Stewart’s taste for biography and for grand all with different aims and from book is both accessible and illuminat- historical narrative seems to grow, we different political standpoints. Hilaire ing. It is so well written that devotees can expect to see much more of this Belloc wrote history to justify his own of inter-war politics will find it a rip- sort of book in the future. Radical and Catholic political philoso- roaring yarn. But its main achievement phy, which saw the pre-Reformation is to do all this while at the same time Dr Richard Grayson is Director of Policy of era as a golden age of cooperation maintaining a sense of balance. Argu- the Liberal Democrats. His book, Austen between aristocracy and people that he ably, for the first time, Burying Caesar Chamberlain and the Commitment to wished to recreate in the present presents the stories of the Conservative Europe, was published in . His second through the concept of ‘distributism’, appeasers and the Conservative anti- book, The Liberal Party and Appease- in which property would be shared out appeasers side by side. As the public’s ment, is to be published in . more equally, but without the dominance of the state. Sidney and Beatrice Webb, too, had a distinctly anti-Liberal agenda. They sought to emulate the research-based Whigs, Liberals and History scientific methods of academia, while at the same time writing history to influence social policy in the direc- Victor Feske: From Belloc to Churchill: Private tion of their own Fabian beliefs. Like scholars, public culture and the crisis of British the Whigs they saw history as a Liberalism, 1900–1939 narrative of progress, but they emphasised the development of public (University of North Carolina Press, 1996; 304pp) administration and the state, rather Reviewed by Iain Sharpe than advances in individual liberty. Although not in sympathy with Belloc’s Catholic sentiments, they hroughout the period of the Politically engaged history, written shared with him a hostility to what TLiberal Party’s ascendancy in by non-academics, continued, but in they saw as the selfish, individualist British politics during the nineteenth the political conditions of the Edward- ideology that prevailed in Britain century, the party was nourished and ian era, with empire at its height and between  and . Having failed sustained by a particular view of with increasing pressure for state in their efforts to permeate the British history – dubbed the ‘Whig intervention in social reform, the Liberal party, they increasingly Interpretation’ – as a story of narrow Whig emphasis on constitu- attacked it, aiming through their progress and reform, focusing in tional progress seemed anachronistic. history to promote rule by experts, particular on the development of Those seeking to write history in something that was anathema to the Britain’s constitution and the growth order to influence the present began to Liberal tradition. of individual freedom. Historical focus more on the role of the state practitioners within this tradition rather than just the nature of the were often amateur scholars who constitution. In doing so they ceased to were deeply involved in contempo- provide sustenance to the Liberal rary politics and saw the advance of tradition. The purpose of Victor Feske’s political liberty from Magna Carta to book is to explore the severing of this the Glorious Revolution and the connection between political Liberal- nineteenth-century reform acts as a ism and amateur scholarship, by continuous and continuing justifica- examining the careers of seven histori- tion for contemporary Liberalism. ans working outside an academic Towards the end of the nineteenth environment. All of his subjects were in century, this close link between history some way linked to the Liberal Party, and Liberalism began to uncouple. but their work either subverted the History in Britain was becoming a Whig tradition or adapted it to chang- more academic and scientific discipline. ing circumstances, removing it as a It was increasingly written by profes- source of strength for the Liberal cause. sionals, working inside universities and The seven subjects of the book (five relying on primary research rather than if one ‘merges’ the husband-and-wife mere interpretation. This academic teams of Beatrice and Sidney Webb history was, by definition, separate from and Barbara and J.L. Hammond) all the political process, not intended to wrote history with at least one eye on justify any particular party or policy. its contemporary relevance, although

Journal of Liberal Democrat History 28 Autumn 2000 33 The remainder of the subjects were history of Britain which sought to less hostile to Liberalism, but were not include the Conservative and Labour producing history designed to sustain traditions within the national history. Liberal politics. J. L. and Barbara Churchill, too, in his various historical Hammond, in their trilogy, The Village writings, set out a version of the Labourer, the Town Labourer and The national history that borrowed from Skilled Labourer, stressed the damaging the Whig tradition, but which stressed human consequences of industrialisa- not just the growth of liberty, but also tion for the working classes. Politically, the extent to which military strength they were Liberals, and Feske describes and power was necessary to defend it. their history as a ‘subtly shaded at- In analysing the relationship be- tempted to forge a contemporary tween these ‘private scholars’, the vindication of Liberalism’s ancestry public history they wrote and the without hiding the warts’. Unfortu- decline of Liberal politics, Victor Feske nately they found themselves con- has written a lively and original book demned by academia and the political which, despite its complex right alike for their emotive style, while historiographical subject matter, will at the same time they were lionised by be accessible to the lay reader. Inevita- the political left, with whom they were bly in a book devoted to the study of not necessarily in sympathy. just a few individuals, one is left feeling The final two subjects, G. M. that some elements of the picture are of British decline. By deciding to Trevelyan and Winston Churchill, each missing. It would be interesting, for abandon the realities of old Con- tried in slightly different ways to example, to know whether any servative tradition for the garish fashion a variant of the Whig interpre- attempts were made to continue an purple of Disraeli’s imperial destiny tation stripped of its partisan political overtly Liberal historical tradition and its Liberal variant, Britain’s nature. Trevelyan began his career by during the years of the party’s decline policy-makers forced her to punch rejecting academia and stressing in his between the wars. In addition, a more above her weight in global conflict approach to history his own Liberal detailed analysis of the impact on from which she could only emerge convictions and his belief in writing in Liberalism of the growth of academic severely weakened.’ a literary and accessible style. His history might have helped to give a That tells us all we need to know. trilogy on Garibaldi, published before more complete picture. But, of course, Charmley is the great pro-appeaser the First World War, was written in a complaints such as these amount to historian, the sole Tory chronicler of self-consciously poetic style and dealt asking the author for a different book any repute who is willing to say that a with a heroic Liberal cause. But in the from the one he set out to write. deal could (and should?) have been wake of the First World War and the struck with Hitler in  to save the decline of the Liberal Party’s fortunes, Iain Sharpe is an editor with the University Empire. He could have had Europe, we he fashioned a new version of the of London External Programme. the colonies. Even Andrew Roberts, cheerleader of the fogey right and worshipper at the shrine of Lord Halifax, has felt it necessary to distance himself from that extremist point of I blame Sir Edward Grey view. Nonetheless, Charmley is a distinguished historian and while his John Charmley: Splendid Isolation? Britain and the views on current politics, and his wishes of what might have been, shine Balance of Power 1874–1914 through the book, we cannot just (Hodder and Stoughton, 1999) dismiss it. To undertake a history, let alone a Reviewed by Peter Truesdale reinterpretation, of forty years of diplomatic history is no mean under- taking. The history Charmley chroni- he first question about any work the two world wars were, at most, cles is essentially one of Britain’s Tof history is ‘Why did the author catalysts which speeded up trends relation to the ebbing and flowing write it?’ Charmley, obliging fellow, already well under way; at worst, they fortunes of the European great powers. lays it out for us straight. ‘Some did no more than validate those This brings us to the great defect of historians have argued that Britain has trends. One of the implications of the the book. Charmley does not set out been a power in decline for a good version of events offered here is that the European context of events very long time. In this version of events, participation in the wars was a cause effectively. What effect had the unifica-

34 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 28 Autumn 2000 tion of Germany had on Britain and World War is how and why Asquith ery within the Tory shrine. Gladstone, the other powers? We are not told. and Grey were able to outmanoeuvre however, is dismissed as a sort of John What was the Habsburgs’ strategy to the peace party within the cabinet and the Baptist to Robin Cook’s Messiah. keep their multi-ethnic Empire on the parliamentary party. Charmley is The idea of a moral foreign policy is road? We are left guessing. How clearly unengaged by this question. seen as risible. This poses problems for dominant in France’s foreign policy This is a significant flaw in the book. the historian. Can Gladstone be so was a desire to regain Alsace-Lorraine? While it might be convenient in lightly dismissed without also dismiss- We are not told. This is a very Anglo- current ideological terms to concen- ing Canning, Palmerston and Russell? centric book. The intelligent and well- trate on the sanctimonious, interven- At any rate a polite veil is drawn over informed reader will be able to infer tionist strand within Liberal policy, it is Dizzy’s strayings, while Gladstone is many of the answers from what clearly an incomplete picture. drawn as a stumbler and humbug. Charmley writes but it would have No prizes will be awarded for the While Charmley is partisan been helpful for him to be explicit. second hero of Charmley’s narrative. throughout, and has an agenda to Charmley is clear about who his He is the third Marquess of Salisbury. which no Liberal Democrat could own heroes are. The fifteenth Earl of Salisbury is the Tories’ Mrs Thatcher of subscribe, it would be wrong to write Derby tops the list in the first part of the nineteenth century, the leader who him off. His book provides a splendid the narrative. Derby was firmly com- can do no wrong. Salisbury seemingly sweep of the forty years of diplomacy mitted to a policy of the avoidance of can lay claim to every strand of Tory covered and he makes out a good case war and European entanglements. This virtue. He is the exemplar of noblesse against Sir Edward Grey. It is hard to was for two reasons. The first was the oblige, the world-weary Christian see why Grey connived at the harden- classic old Tory squirearchical argu- pessimist and the visionary of villa ing of the arteries of European dip- ment. It was all very well for the grand To r yism. Doubtless Salisbury was a lomacy in the eight years preceding noble families to commit Britain to Victorian Titan but the claims made World War One. The fear of Germany war but its consequences were in- on his behalf by his latter-day apostles seems particularly ludicrous. Asquith creased taxation, which fell unduly are overblown. On the other hand, too can surely not escape criticism. To upon the squires and minor landown- Charmley does make out a good case have abandoned Belgium in the ers. We hear much of this from for Salisbury’s foreign policy. Salisbury’s summer of  would certainly have Charmley but rather less from him of fundamental perception about the been an act of caddishness, but the the Lancashire free trade argument balance of power was that Britain had real question is why had Britain against foreign adventures. A.J.P. no overriding interests on the conti- become so thoroughly engaged with Taylor’s grandfather, rooted in Lanca- nent beyond shunning entangling France (and thereby Russia) as to be shire commerce, alliances and in such a scrape at all. Here Charmley is supposed to ensuring no one makes out an effective case for the have said on the Not least of the lamps power became prosecution against Grey. Whether or outbreak of that were put out for a dominant. In not Charmley is right in his implicit World War One foreign policy, assumption that Britain was not on a ‘Don’t they generation during that therefore, Tories downward trajectory by , he is understand that hot and ill-fated summer should shun unquestionably right in asserting that every German as was the lamp of dynamic forces it could not be in Britain’s interest to they shoots is a and entangling become embroiled in the first Eu- customer?’ One enlightened and alliances. Clearly rope-wide war since the days of would have peaceful liberalism. this ought to Napoleon. It is hard to imagine thought that this make Britain Gladstone embroiling Britain in a argument was fundamentally full-scale European war. Doubtless he rather more important by the end of sympathetic to the Austria-Hungarian would have slithered out of commit- the nineteenth century than the cry empire, the power with the most to ments while maintaining a high- from the shires that fiscal prudence was lose from dynamic action. Britain falutin’ position of impeccable being sacrificed to the whims of should be wary too of moves to morality. Sadly Grey had painted irresponsible grandees. undermine the Sublime Porte, whose Britain into a corner. In the end only However, Charmley’s focusing on decline could only signal an advance Burns and Morley resigned – a the squirearchical arguments against of the European and (worse still) victory for Grey but a pyrrhic one. foreign entanglements allows him to Mediterranean influence of the Not least of the lamps that were put ignore the point of view of the Liberal Russian bear. out for a generation during that hot peace party. He is unwilling to address Charmley is not willing to follow and ill-fated summer was the lamp of in any detail the views of the Liberal through the logic of his own argument enlightened and peaceful liberalism. free trade nonconformist peaceniks. by a full and unbuttoned condemna- This is a pity. Clearly the central tion of Disraeli’s flash adventurism. Peter Truesdale is leader of the Liberal question of British entry into the First There must be no smashing of crock- Democrats on Lambeth Council.

Journal of Liberal Democrat History 28 Autumn 2000 35 A Liberal Democrat History Group Fringe Meeting 'The Fruits of the Liberty Tree' – The Liberal Tradition in North America In this year of Presidential elections in the US, we examine the history of the Liberal tradition in North America. The Canadian Liberal Party is one of the most successful liberal parties in the world, in terms of winning elections – why is this? And who are the liberals in the United States? Speakers: Dilys Hill (Professor in Politics, University of Southampton), Dr Terry McDonald (Senior Lecturer in Politics, The Southampton Institute) and Akaash Maharaj (National Policy Chair, Liberal Party of Canada). Chair: William Wallace (Lord Wallace of Saltaire, Reader in International Relations, LSE)

8.00pm, Sunday 17 September Westcliffe Room, Tralee Hotel, Bournemouth

History Group publications Available for £25.00 (DLBDLB) and £18.00 (DLQDLQ) (plus £2.50 P & P for postal or telephone orders) from: Dictionary of Liberal Biography Politico’s Political Bookstore 8 Artillery Row, Westminster, London SW1P 1RZ An iii ndispensable reference book for students of Liberal history An ii ndispensable reference book for students of Liberal history Tel: 020 7828 0010 Fax: 020 7828 8111 Bringing together in one volume the biographies of over 200 email: [email protected] web: www.politicos.co.uk individuals who have made major contributions to the Liberal Party, SDP or Liberal Democrats, or to the development of British Liberalism: • Liberal Prime Ministers, from Palmerston to Lloyd George Dictionary of Liberal Quotations • Party leaders, from Gladstone to Ashdown • Twentieth century Liberal Cabinet ministers The essential guide to who said what about Liberals and Liberalism • Leading Whigs and Victorian Liberals I am for peace, retrenchment and reform, the watchword of the great • Liberal thinkers, such as Mill, Beveridge and Keynes Liberal Party thirty years ago. • Leading Social Democrats, including Jenkins and Williams John Bright • All Liberal Democrat MPs elected in 1997, and front-bench peers As usual the Liberals offer a Contributors include leading academics, MPs and peers; with mixture of sound and original forewords by Rt Hon Paddy Ashdown MP and Professor Ben Pimlott. ideas. Unfortunately none of the Also included as appendices sound ideas is original and none are detals of all party leaders of the original ideas is sound. and chief whips in the Houses Harold Macmillan of Commons and Lords, and All the world over, I will back party presidents and chairs of the masses against the classes. executives; cabinet ministers W. E. Gladstone since 1859; and by-election winners since 1918. Faith, hope and canvassing — and the greatest of these is The Dictionary of Liberal canvassing. Biography is a unique source George Worman of reference for anyone requiring information on the Including over two thousand contribution of Liberals and quotations by and about Liberalism to British politics – Liberal Democrats, Liberals past and present. and Social Democrats, from over six hundred prominent politicians, writers and journalists.

36 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 28 Autumn 2000