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Economics & Finance 2009 Economics & Finance 2009 press.princeton.edu Contents General Interest 1 Economic Theory & Research 11 Game Theory 14 Behavioral & Experimental Economics 15 Finance 16 Econometrics & Mathematical Economics 20 Labor & Organizational Economics 24 Public Economics 25 Political Economy, Trade & Development 26 Public Policy 31 Economic History & History of Economics 34 Economic Sociology & Related Interest 37 Classic Textbooks 42 Index/Order Form 44 Many of the books in this catalog are now being made available as ebook editions for the Amazon Kindle, Sony Reader, and in other formats that can be purchased from online booksellers. This icon, listed with the title information for the print edition, indicates that an electronic edition is available. For more information, please visit our website at press.princeton.edu. Princeton ebooks are currently available only in North America. TEXT Professors who wish to consider a book from this catalog for course use may request an examination copy. For more information please visit: press.princeton.edu/class.html Forthcoming Animal Spirits How Human Psychology Drives the Economy, and Why It Matters for Global Capitalism George A. Akerlof & Robert J. Shiller “This book is a sorely needed corrective. Animal Spirits is an important—maybe even a decisive— contribution at a difficult juncture in macroeconomic theory.” —Robert M. Solow, Nobel Prize–winning economist The global financial crisis has made it painfully clear that powerful psychological forces are imperiling the wealth of nations today. From blind faith in ever-rising housing prices to plummeting confidence in capital markets, “animal spirits” are driving financial events worldwide. In this book, acclaimed economists George Akerlof and Robert Shiller challenge the economic wisdom that got us into this mess, and put forward a bold new vision that will transform economics and restore prosperity. Akerlof and Shiller reassert the necessity of an active government role in economic policymaking by recovering the idea of animal spirits, a term John Maynard Keynes used to describe the gloom and despondence that led to the Great Depression and the changing psychology that accompanied recovery. Like Keynes, Akerlof and Shiller know that managing these animal spirits requires the steady hand of government—simply allowing markets to work won’t do it. In rebuilding the case for a more robust, behaviorally informed Keynesianism, they detail the most pervasive effects of animal spirits in contemporary economic life. George A. Akerlof is the Daniel E. Koshland Sr. Distinguished Professor of Economics at the University of California, Berkeley. He was awarded the 2001 Nobel Prize in economics. Robert J. Shiller is the Arthur M. Okun Professor of Economics at Yale University. March 2009. 248 pages. Cl: 978-0-691-14233-3 $24.95 | £14.95 Also by Robert J. Shiller New Second Edition The Subprime Solution Irrational How Today’s Global Financial Crisis Happened, and What to Do about It Exuberance “Although the housing boom “Shiller . is an ardent financial-technol- has lasted longer than anyone ogy optimist, and his book is a torrent of could have imagined, the fascinating ideas.” economy would still be in big —Clive Crook, Financial Times trouble if it came to an end. The subprime mortgage crisis has al- Robert Shiller, who correctly ready wreaked havoc on the lives of mil- called the stock bubble in his lions of people and now it threatens to book Irrational Exuberance has derail the U.S. economy and economies added an ominous analysis of around the world. In this trenchant book, the housing market to the new best-selling economist Robert Shiller edition. ” reveals the origins of this crisis and puts —Paul Krugman, New York Times forward bold measures to solve it. 2005. 336 pages. 9 line illus. 4 tables. Cl: 978-0-691-12335-6 $35.00 | £19.95 2008. 208 pages. 4 line illus. Cl: 978-0-691-13929-6 $16.95 | £9.95 press.princeton.edu general interest • 1 New Forthcoming Economic Gangsters Portfolios of the Poor Corruption, Violence, and the Poverty How the World’s Poor Live on $2 a Day of Nations Daryl Collins, Jonathan Morduch, Raymond Fisman & Edward Miguel Stuart Rutherford & Orlanda Ruthven “Economic Gangsters is a fascinating ex- “[W]ell written and ploration of the dark accessible. The side of economic book should find its development. Two way onto the shelves of the world’s most of nearly all academ- creative young ics and economists economists use their focused on microfi- remarkable talents nance and financial for economic sleuth- decision making ing to study violence, among the poor.” corruption, and —Christopher poverty in the most Blattman, Yale unexpected ways. Subjected to their genius, University seemingly inconsequential events (like New York City parking tickets and Suharto’s catching About forty percent of the world’s people live a cold) become potent tools in understanding on incomes of two dollars a day or less. If you’ve how the world really works. Rarely has a book on never had to survive on an income so small, it is economics been this fun and this important.” hard to imagine. How would you put food on the —Steven D. Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics table, afford a home, and educate your children? How would you handle emergencies and old In Economic Gangsters, Raymond Fisman and age? Every day, more than a billion people Edward Miguel take readers into the secretive, around the world must answer these questions. chaotic, and brutal worlds inhabited by these Portfolios of the Poor is the first book to systemati- lawless and violent thugs. Join these two sleuth- cally explain how the poor find solutions. ing economists as they follow the foreign aid money trail into the grasping hands of corrupt Indispensable for those in development studies, governments and shady underworld characters. economics, and microfinance, Portfolios of the Spend time with ingenious black marketeers as Poor will appeal to anyone interested in knowing they game the international system. Follow the more about poverty and what can be done steep rise and fall of stock prices of companies about it. with unseemly connections to Indonesia’s former dictator. See for yourself what rainfall has to do Daryl Collins directed the South African Financial with witch killings in Tanzania—and more. Diaries project and has taught finance at the University of Capetown. Jonathan Morduch is Raymond Fisman is the Lambert Family Professor professor of public policy and economics at New of Social Enterprise and research director of the York University. Stuart Rutherford is founder of Social Enterprise Program at Columbia Business SafeSave, a microfinance institution in Bangla- School. He is a columnist for Slate. Edward Miguel desh. Orlanda Ruthven recently completed a is associate professor of economics and director doctoral degree in international development at of the Center of Evaluations for Global Action at the University of Oxford. the University of California, Berkeley. June 2009. 320 pages. 9 line illus. 36 tables. Cl: 978-0-691-14148-0 $29.95 | £17.95 2008. 256 pages. 4 line illus. 1 table. Cl: 978-0-691-13454-3 $24.95 | £14.95 To receive notices about new books, subscribe for email at: press.princeton.edu/subscribe 2 • general interest Forthcoming New The Invisible Hook Heroes and Cowards The Hidden Economics of Pirates The Social Face of War Peter T. Leeson Dora L. Costa & Matthew E. Kahn “A fresh and pro- “This remarkable vocative take on the book is destined to Golden Age pirates. become a classic Leeson writes with in social science. It clarity and the depth addresses issues of of his research is supreme importance impressive.” and timeliness— —Colin Woodard, loyalty, betrayal, author of The Republic heroism, cowardice, of Pirates survival, the chal- lenges of diversity, Pack your cutlass and and the benefits of blunderbuss—it’s social bonds. It rests time to go a-pirating! The Invisible Hook takes on rigorous statistical analysis of an extraordinary readers inside the wily world of late seventeenth- historical archive, and yet it is so readable as to and early eighteenth-century pirates. With be unputdownable. It deals with a single epochal swashbuckling irreverence and devilish wit, Peter event in one nation’s history—the U.S. Civil War— Leeson uncovers the hidden economics behind and yet its lessons are highly relevant in many pirates’ notorious, entertaining, and sometimes other eras and societies, including our own.” downright shocking behavior. —Robert Putnam, author of Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community Peter T. Leeson is the BB&T Professor for the Study of Capitalism in the Department of Eco- Dora L. Costa teaches at the University of Califor- nomics at George Mason University. nia, Los Angeles. Matthew E. Kahn also teaches at June 2009. 296 pages. 8 halftones. 1 table. UCLA. Costa and Kahn are research associates at Cl: 978-0-691-13747-6 $24.95 | £14.95 the National Bureau of Economic Research. 2009. 344 pages. 11 halftones. 24 line illus. 1 table. Cl: 978-0-691-13704-9 $27.95 | £16.95 New The Price of Everything A Parable of Possibility and Prosperity Russell Roberts “[T]he best attempt to teach economics through fiction that the world has seen to date.” —Tyler Cowen, Marginal Revolution The Price of Everything is a captivating story about economic growth and the unseen forces that create and sustain economic harmony all around us. Russell Roberts is professor of economics at George Mason University, the J. Fish and Lillian F. Smith Distinguished Scholar at George Mason’s Mercatus Center, and a research fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution. 2008. 224 pages. Cl: 978-0-691-13509-0 $24.95 | £14.95 press.princeton.edu general interest • 3 New New The Case for Big The Venturesome Economy Government How Innovation Sustains Prosperity in Jeff Madrick a More Connected World Amar Bhidé “Jeff Madrick makes a convincing case “Amar Bhidé provides for the active role of a fresh and reassur- government in the ing perspective on growth of our mod- America’s techno- ern economy and our logical position in an shared prosperity.” increasingly global —Senator Edward M.
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