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Joint Force of the Group of Five of the Group of Force Joint The Group of Five for the Sahel (G5S), comprised of Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Joint Force of the Group of Five and Chad, established a joint force (Force Conjointe du G5 Sahel – FC-G5S) in responding to a deteriorating security situation in the Sahel region. This report provides an overview of the A review of multiple challenges main challenges facing the FC-G5S during the process of obtaining full operational capability in 2018. KAROLINA GASINSKA AND ELIAS BOHMAN FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency, is a mainly assignment-funded agency under the Ministry of Defence. The core activities are research, method and technology development, as well as studies conducted in the interests of Swedish defence and the safety and security of society. The organisation employs approximately 1000 personnel of whom about 800 are scientists. This makes FOI Sweden’s largest research institute. FOI gives its customers access to leading-edge expertise in a large number of fields such as security policy studies, defence and security related analyses, the assessment of various types of threat, systems for control and management of crises, protection against and management of hazardous substances, IT security and the potential offered by new sensors. FOI Swedish Defence Research Agency Phone: +46 8 555 030 00 www.foi.se FOI-R--4548--SE SE-164 90 Stockholm Fax: +46 8 555 031 00 ISSN 1650-1942 December 2017 FOI-R--4548--SE Karolina Gasinska and Elias Bohman Joint Force of the Group of Five A review of multiple challenges FOI-R--4548--SE Titel Gemensamma G5 Sahel-styrkan – En översikt av flerfaldiga utmaningar Title Joint Force of the Group of Five – A review of multiple challenges Rapportnr/Report no FOI-R-4548-SE Månad/Month December Utgivningsår/Year 2017 Antal sidor/Pages 60 ISSN 1650-1942 Kund/Customer Försvarsdepartementet/Ministry of Defence Forskningsområde 8. Säkerhetspolitik Projektnr/Project no A17104 Godkänd av/Approved by Lars Höstbeck Ansvarig avdelning Division of Defence Analysis Exportkontroll The content has been reviewed and does not contain information which is subject to Swedish export control. Bild/Cover: (JayCoop - Own work, CC BY-SA 4.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=60551278) Detta verk är skyddat enligt lagen (1960:729) om upphovsrätt till litterära och konstnärliga verk, vilket bl.a. innebär att citering är tillåten i enlighet med vad som anges i 22 § i nämnd lag. För att använda verket på ett sätt som inte medges direkt av svensk lag krävs särskild överenskommelse. This work is protected by the Swedish Act on Copyright in Literary and Artistic Works (1960:729). Citation is permitted in accordance with article 22 in said act. Any form of use that goes beyond what is permitted by Swedish copyright law, requires the written permission of FOI. 2 FOI-R--4548--SE Sammanfattning Som ett svar på en försämrad säkerhetssituation i Sahelregionen etablerade grupperingen "G5 Sahel” bestående av Burkina Faso, Tchad, Mali, Niger samt Mauretanien, en gemensam styrka. Syftet med denna studie är att ge en överblick över de huvudsakliga utmaningarna för den gemensamma styrkan (Force Conjointe du G5 Sahel – FC-G5S) för att uppnå full operativ förmåga under 2018. De identifierade utmaningarna har placerats i tre kategorier: utmaningar kopplade till operationalisering av FC-G5S, farhågor rörande FC-G5S:s ramverk och problem som kan uppstå i insatsområdet. De huvudsakliga utmaningar för operationalisering av styrkan har identifieras som bristen på finansiering samt att G5S-länderna även hotas av andra säkerhetshot som inte ingår i FC-G5S insatsområde. De huvudsakliga farhågorna gällande ramverken identifierades som oklarheter gällande poliskomponenten, avsaknaden av adekvata nationella mekanismer för ansvarsutkrävande samt frånvaro av vision för hur den gemensamma styrkan ska underlätta humanitära- och utvecklingsinsatser. Angelägna utmaningar i insatsområdet har identifierats som begränsad underrättelseförmåga, omfattande beroende av externt stöd och att det kan uppstå potentiella luckor i kommando- och kontrollstrukturerna i samband med rotationer av bataljonerna. Nyckelord: G5 Sahel, terrorism, Sahelregionen, Afrika FOI-R--4548--SE Summary The Group of Five for the Sahel (G5S), comprised of Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Chad, established a joint force (Force Conjointe du G5 Sahel – FC-G5S) in responding to a deteriorating security situation in the Sahel region. The aim of this study is to provide an overview of the main challenges facing the FC-G5S during the process of obtaining full operational capability in 2018. The identified challenges were placed into three main categories: challenges linked to the operationalisation of the FC-G5S, concerns connected to the frameworks that outline the work of the FC-G5S, and issues that FC-G5S are or could be facing in the area of operation. The main challenges for operationalising the FC-G5S were identified as the lack of financial resources and that the G5S countries also face other external threats that are not part of the zones of FC-G5S operations. The main identified framework concerns were the lack of clarity regarding the police component, absence of adequate national compliance frameworks, and a missing vision for how FC-G5S will facilitate humanitarian operations and development actions. The main in-theatre challenges were identified as limited intelligence capabilities, high dependency on external support, and the potential gaps in command and control structures during rotations of battalions. Keywords: G5 Sahel, Joint Force, Sahel region, Africa, counterterrorism, G5 Sahel 4 FOI-R--4548--SE Foreword This report was commissioned by the Swedish Ministry of Defence and has been produced within the African Security Project. It provides an overview of the main challenges facing the joint force of the group of five during the process of obtaining full operational capability. The authors would like to emphasize that it is crucial to bear in mind that the countries are in the process of establishing the force. Hence, some of the de facto challenges are yet to be seen. The authors are very grateful to Dr. John Karlsrud and Anna Sundberg for reviewing the report. Their insightful and constructive comments increased the quality of the study. A special thanks to Dr. Richard Langlais for editing the text. 5 FOI-R--4548--SE Innehållsförteckning Foreword ......................................................................................................... 5 Abbreviations ................................................................................................... 8 1 Introduction 9 1.1 Methodology and sources ............................................................... 10 1.2 Outline of the report ........................................................................ 11 2 Background 13 2.1 FC-G5S – one of many initiatives ................................................... 13 2.2 UN “welcomed” the force ................................................................ 14 2.3 Strategic concept of operations ...................................................... 15 2.3.1 Mandate ...................................................................................... 15 2.3.2 Area of operation and command architecture ............................. 16 2.3.3 Deployment ................................................................................. 19 2.3.4 Two-phased approach ................................................................ 20 2.4 FC-G5S activities ............................................................................ 21 2.5 Summary ......................................................................................... 21 3 Challenges for operationalisation 23 3.1 Funding ........................................................................................... 23 3.1.1 Lack of funding ............................................................................ 23 3.1.2 Short-term funding approach ...................................................... 25 3.1.3 Absorption of funds ..................................................................... 25 3.2 Status of the forces ......................................................................... 26 3.3 Internal instability of states .............................................................. 26 3.4 Parallel structures ........................................................................... 27 3.4.1 Operation Barkhane .................................................................... 28 3.4.2 MINUSMA ................................................................................... 29 3.4.3 African initiatives ......................................................................... 29 3.5 Summary ......................................................................................... 31 6 FOI-R--4548--SE 4 Framework concerns 33 4.1 The police component ..................................................................... 33 4.2 The accountability mechanism ........................................................ 34 4.3 Security vs. Development................................................................ 35 4.4 Summary ......................................................................................... 36 5 In-theatre challenges 39 5.1 Intelligence capabilities ................................................................... 39 5.1.1 Collecting information .................................................................
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