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Abuse of Power – Corruption in the Office of the President Is His Most Recent Book
Contents 1. Preface 2. 1 “Evil has to be stopped” 3. 2 Marchuk, the arch-conspirator 4. 3 Kuchma fixes his re-election 5. 4 East & West celebrate Kuchma’s victory 6. 5 Kuchma and Putin share secrets 7. 6 Corruption 8. 7 Haunted by Lazarenko 9. 8 Bakai “the conman” 10. 9 “Yuliya must be destroyed” 11. 10 Prime minister’s wife “from the CIA”? 12. 11 Kidnapping Podolsky & killing Gongadze 13. 12 Covering up murder 14. 13 Marchuk’s “secret coordinating center” 15. 14 Kolchuga fails to oust Kuchma 16. 15 The Melnychenko-Kuchma pact 17. 16 “We can put anyone against the wall” 18. 17 Fixed election sparks Orange Revolution 19. 18 Yanukovych’s revenge 20. Bibliography 21. Acknowledgements 22. A note on the author 23. Books by JV Koshiw Artemia Press Ltd Published by Artemia Press Ltd, 2013 www.artemiabooks.com ISBN 978-0-9543764-3-7 Copyright © JV Koshiw, 2013 All rights reserved. Database right Artemia Press Ltd (maker) The photograph on the front cover It shows President Leonid Kuchma and Viktor Yushchenko clasping hands, while his rival Viktor Yanukovych looks on. Yushchenko’s pot marked face bears witness to the Dioxin poisoning inflicted on him a few weeks earlier during the 2004 presidential election campaign. Photo taken by Valeri Soloviov on Nov. 26, 2004, during the negotiations to end the Orange Revolution (Photo UNIAN). System of transliterations The study uses the Library of Congress system of transliteration for Ukrainian, with exceptions in order to make Ukrainian words easier to read in English. The letter є will be transcribed as ye and not ie. -
UKRAINE Press Freedom and the Murder of Georgy Gongadze
UKRAINE Press freedom and the murder of Georgy Gongadze Memorandum to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe We, the undersigned organisations, call on the Council of Europe to launch a new inquiry into the murder of the Ukrainian journalist Georgy Gongadze. We urge the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe to join us in calling on the CoE secretariat to take this action. The Gongadze case is a touchstone for freedom of speech in Europe. Continued failure to resolve it encourages abuses of power to silence and intimidate journalists. A new CoE inquiry must widen its remit to deal with the serial failures of law enforcement, judicial and governmental procedures in Ukraine that have contributed to the non-resolution of the case. After a preliminary investigation of these failures,1 we bring to the Council's attention the following areas in which there are strong grounds to believe there have been, and are currently, serious breaches of human rights as expressed in European conventions, Ukrainian and international law: i. The catalogue of errors an inconsistencies in the case committed by the Ukrainian general prosecutor and other officials in the first stages of the investigation; ii. The recent announcement that a suspect is in custody, and the failure to bring to court, charge, or answer questions about this suspect; iii. The manner in which the conduct of the case has been misreported to the Council of Europe and to the public; iv. The Ukrainian authorities' failure to take into account in their investigations the so-called "Melnychenko tapes"; v. -
IRF Annual Report for 2009
International Renaissance Foundation Black 2009 Annual Report P349, ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL RENAISSANCE FOUNDATION he International Renaissance Foundation (IRF) is an integral part of the Open Society Institute network (established by American philanthropist George Soros) that incorporates national and regional foundations in more than thirty countries around the world, including Africa, Central and Eastern Europe and the former TSoviet Union. IRF was founded in 1990. The mission of the International Renaissance Foundation – is to promote open democratic society in Ukraine Black by providing financial and organizational support for important civil society initiatives. IRF remains one of the largest donor foundations in Ukraine, supporting civil society organizations working in areas that are part of the Foundation’s priorities. Every year, IRF provides up to $7 million in support to NGOs P349, in different regions of Ukraine. In addition to offering grants to other organizations, IRF also pursues its own (operational) activities, implementing projects in its target sectors that are also selected by public representatives. The Foundation is also well-known as an expert organization, initiator of effective projects, open discussions and catalyst of social change. Openness and transparency of donor activities, and conformity with the needs of society are the main principles that guide the work of the International Renaissance Foundation. The public is involved in the distribution of Foundation funds for the needs of building a democratic open society through participation in the Executive Board and IRF Program Boards. IRF distributes the majority of its grants to non-governmental organizations after open competitions are held for projects pursuing the program priorities set by leading representatives of local civil society The IRF Board is the main public body that forms the strategy for the entire organization. -
OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Election Observation Mission Ukraine Early Presidential Election, 25 May 2014
OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Election Observation Mission Ukraine Early Presidential Election, 25 May 2014 INTERIM REPORT No. 2 14 April–12 May 2014 14 May 2014 I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY • The presidential election is taking place in a complex political, economic and security situation, which affects the legal framework, technical preparations and the election campaign. Continued unrest and violence in the east of Ukraine, where anti-government forces have taken over numerous administrative buildings, self-proclaimed local authorities controlling some cities, and the government’s conducting an anti-terrorist operation, seriously impact the election process there. Self-proclaimed local ‘authorities’ staged so-called local ‘referenda’ on autonomy/independence in some parts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts (regions) on 11 May. These were not observed by the OSCE/ODIHR EOM to any extent. • The electoral legal framework continued to be amended during the reporting period. Parliament passed a law on temporarily occupied territories on 15 April, which states that voting will not take place on the Crimean peninsula and that citizens from these territories may register to vote in other parts of Ukraine. Given a shortfall of nominations for Precinct Election Commission (PEC) members, parliament on 6 May amended the presidential election law to reduce the minimum number of PEC members from 12 to 9. • The Central Election Commission (CEC) continues to make preparations for the election and has demonstrated an efficient, independent and collegial manner of work. The CEC formed all 213 District Election Commissions (DECs) within the legal deadline. Candidates replaced a high proportion of their nominees, which affected many DECs’ functioning. -
The Orange Revolution: a Case Study of Democratic Transition in Ukraine
THE ORANGE REVOLUTION: A CASE STUDY OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION IN UKRAINE Anastasiya Salnykova BA, National University "Kyiv-Mohyla Academy", 2004 THESIS SUBMITED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ART In the Department of Political Science @ Anastasiya Salnykova 2006 SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY Spring 2006 All rights reserved. This work may not be reproduced in whole or in part, by photocopy or other means, without permission of the author. APPROVAL I Name: Anastasiya Salnykova Degree: Master of Arts Title of Thesis: The Orange Revolution: A Case Study of Democratic Transition in Ukraine Examining Committee: Chair: Dr. Tsuyoshi Kawasaki Associate Professor of Department of Political Science Dr. Lenard J. Cohen Senior Supervisor Professor of Department of Political Science Dr. Alexander Moens Supervisor Professor of Department of Political Science Dr. Ilya Vinkovetsky External Examiner Assistant Professor of Department of History Date Defended/ Approved: April 6th, 2006 ii 2E: SIMON FRASER . &&W ~~~v~~~~nl~brary DECLARATION OF PARTIAL COPYRIGHT LICENCE The author, whose copyright is declared on the title page of this work, has granted to Simon Fraser University the right to lend this thesis, project or extended essay to users of the Simon Fraser University Library, and to make partial or single copies only for such users or in response to a request from the library of any other university, or other educational institution, on its own behalf or for one of its users. The author has further granted permission to Simon Fraser University to keep or make a digital copy for use in its circulating collection, and, without changing the content, to translate the thesislproject or extended essays, if technically possible, to any medium or format for the purpose of preservation of the digital work. -
The Ukrainian Weekly 2000, No.22
www.ukrweekly.com INSIDE:• Two new accounts of Ukraine, past and present — page 9. • Upcoming film to focus on Ukraine in World War II — page 12. • Ukrainian poet receives prestigious PEN Literary Award — page 13. Published by the Ukrainian National Association Inc., a fraternal non-profit association Vol. LXVIII HE KRAINIANNo. 22 THE UKRAINIAN WEEKLY SUNDAY, MAY 28, 2000 EEKLY$1/$2 in Ukraine AustrianT forced laborUUkraine draws nearer toW European Union by Roman Woronowycz will immediately be given associate or in the union, a prelude to eventual perma- Kyiv Press Bureau full membership,” explained Anatolii nent membership. talks progress quickly Lytvytskyi, presidential advisor to the The Ukrainian government was eager by Myroslaw Smorodsky KYIV – Successful meetings between Cabinet of Ministers, who was part of the to show that economic reforms were Prime Minister Viktor Yuschenko and Ukrainian delegation. “You can’t expect moving forward full throttle, and that it VIENNA – Representatives of five European leaders on May 22-23 may lead that all the trade problems between us was making necessary changes to meet Central and East European countries – to closer and more liberalized trade rela- would be resolved in one moment. The European trade standards. Belarus, the Czech Republic, Poland, tions that the Ukrainian side hopes will process will continue,” he noted. Along with that, Ukraine needed to Russia and Ukraine – successfully con- give it associate membership in the Mr. Lytvytskyi said that, nonetheless, convince the Europeans -
From Kuchma to Yushchenko Ukraine’S 2004 Presidential Elections and the Orange Revolution
From Kuchma to Yushchenko Ukraine’s 2004 Presidential Elections and the Orange Revolution Taras Kuzio The elections of 2004 KRAINE’S presidential election on October 31, U2004, had far greater political significance than completed Ukraine’s transition merely selecting the country’s third post-communist president. The election also represented a de facto ref- from a post-Soviet state to a erendum on President Leonid Kuchma’s ten years in European state. office, which were marred by political crisis and scan- dal throughout most of his second term. The principal scandal—Kuchma’s complicity in the murder of an op- position journalist, Heorhiy Gongadze—began in Novem- ber 2000 and has come to be known as “Kuchmagate.”1 Hostility to Kuchma helped to revive and bolster civil society and opposition groups, giving them four years to organize and prepare for the 2004 elections. Much of this groundwork became apparent during the Orange Revolution—named for Yushchenko’s campaign color—that followed the November 21 runoff between Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych and the opposition candidate, Viktor Yushchenko. In April 2001, after parliament voted no confidence in Yushchenko’s government, the locus of opposition to Kuchma shifted from the Communist Party (KPU) to Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine party and the Yulia Tymoshenko bloc. The KPU and its Socialist Party (SPU) allies had been the main source of opposition to Kuchma from 1993, when the KPU was again legal- ized as a political party, until 2000–2001, when national democrats and centrists joined forces under the Yushchenko government. Yushchenko’s shift to opposition against Kuchma and his oligarchic allies set the stage for the electoral TARAS KUZIO is a visiting professor at the Institute for European, Rus- struggles in 2002 and 2004. -
En Français (PDF)
ÉLECTION PRÉSIDENTIELLE DE 2014 EN UKRAINE MISsion d’observATION RAPPORT FINAL DE CANEOM CANEOM 411-75, rue Albert Ottawa, ON K1P 5E7 Canada www.caneom.ca Table des matières 2 PRÉFACE 4 RÉSUMÉ 8 CHAPITRE 1 : NORMES DE LA MISSION D’OBSERVATION 9 CHAPITRE 2 : SYSTÈME ÉLECTORAL ET CADRE JURIDIQUE 12 CHAPITRE 3 : CONTEXTE POLITIQUE 13 CHAPITRE 4 : ADMINISTRATION ÉLECTORALE 16 CHAPITRE 5 : ENREGISTREMENT DES ÉLECTEURS 18 CHAPITRE 6 : CONTEXTE DE LA CAMPAGNE ÉLECTORALE 19 SÉCURITÉ LORS DE LA CAMPAGNE ET DE L’ÉLECTION 20 SÉCURITÉ DES OBSERVATEURS ÉLECTORAUX 21 FINANCEMENT DE LA CAMPAGNE ÉLECTORALE 22 CHAPITRE 7 : ENVIRONNEMENT MÉDIATIQUE 24 CHAPITRE 8 : PLAINTES ET APPELS 24 PLAINTES ET APPELS AVANT L’ÉLECTION 26 PLAINTES ET APPELS LE JOUR DE L’ÉLECTION 27 CHAPITRE 9 : OBSERVATEURS UKRAINIENS ET INTERNATIONAUX 28 CHAPITRE 10 : JOUR DE L’ÉLECTION 28 PÉRIODE IMMÉDIATEMENT AVANT L’ÉLECTION (22 AU 24 MAI) 29 JOUR DE L’ÉLECTION 32 CHAPITRE 11 : DÉVELOPPEMENTS SUIVANT L’ÉLECTION 32 DÉPOUILLEMENT DES RÉSULTATS 34 CHAPITRE 12 : DÉVELOPPEMENT FUTUR DE LA DÉMOCRATIE 36 CHAPITRE 13 : CONCLUSION 37 CHAPITRE 14 : RECOMMANDATIONS 37 Administration DES élections 37 LOI électorale 38 Financement DES campagnes électorales 38 PLAINTES ET APPELS 38 Observateurs UKRAINIENS ET observateurs internationaux 39 ANNEXE 1 : UN MOT SUR CANEOM 40 ANNEXE 2 : HORAIRE DES RÉUNIONS AVEC LES INTERVENANTS ÉLECTORAUX 42 ANNEXE 3 : HORAIRE DE FORMATION DES OBSERVATEURS 46 ANNEXE 4 : OBSERVATEURS DE CANEOM ET GESTION DE LA MISSION 48 REMERCIEMENTS 49 ANNEXE 5 : DONNÉES SUR L’OBSERVATION DES ÉLECTIONS DE CANEOM RAPPORT FINAL DE CANEOM | 1 Préface Depuis son indépendance en 1991, l’Ukraine a poursuivi son évolution vers la démocratie malgré divers reculs en matière de gouvernance et de renforcement des institutions. -
The SBU – the Security Service of Ukraine
Conflict Studies Research Centre Central & Eastern Europe Series 04/25 The SBU – The Security Service of Ukraine Gordon Bennett Key Points * Ukraine's special services play an important role in protecting its national interests and are, with NATO and the EU moving westwards, an increasingly important part in the still loose coalition of special services combating transnational terrorism and crime. * The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU), the country's largest and most important special service, has been a victim, occasionally willingly, of political manoeuvring and mismanagement. * The SBU is in need of gradual and evolutionary reforms. Until recently its reforms have been neither profound enough nor focused enough, reflecting political short- termism. * President Kuchma is ultimately responsible for their performance and their erratic reforms, although his recent remarks suggest that he has been aware of the organisation's imperfections all along. * Ukraine, its allies and partners can only benefit from gradual, consistent, well-focused, apolitical, and non- partisan reform of the SBU, into an institution serving national interests, not political parties or individuals. Contents The Accidental Birth 1 Heads of the Ukrainian Security Structures 1943-1989 & Their Subsequent Careers 2 The Leaders & Shakers 3 Heads of the Ukrainian Security Service 1987-2004 4 The Structure & Principal Tasks of SBU Central Organs 6 The SBU Leadership 7 Information Support & Operations Management Department 7 Counterintelligence Department 7 Main Directorate -
Acknowledgements (12 September 2004 2330)
Acknowledgements (12 September 2004 2330) This report is the product of the hundreds of individuals who participated in the efforts of Iraq Survey Group (ISG): The Australian, British, and American soldiers, analysts, and support per- sonnel who fi lled its ranks. They carried out their roles with distinction, and their work refl ects creditably on the commitment of Washington, London, and Canberra to fi rmly support the mis- sion throughout a long and diffi cult period. Two of our colleagues gave their lives during ISG’s fi eld inspections. On April 26, Sgt. Sherwood R. Baker and Sgt. Lawrence A. Roukey died while providing security for one of the most critical ISG investigations when an explosion destroyed the facility being inspected. Their memory has been present throughout the creation of this report. The analysts and case offi cers who came to Iraq, most for the fi rst time, worked hard to develop the information to support this report. They labored long hours to develop intelligence reports and the text that became this report, a diffi cult task to which they responded with enthusiasm. This report also builds upon the work of a broader universe of people who have striven to under- stand the role of Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq during the past decade or more. United Nations inspectors and analysts around the world have wrestled with this issue trying to sort out reality and develop policies to mitigate suffering and avoid confl ict. Hopefully this report will provide some answers or at least more data for constructive review. -
Ukraine's Relations with the West: Disinterest, Partnership, Disillusionment
Ukraine's Relations with the West: Disinterest, Partnership, Disillusionment TARAS KUZIO Ukraine's relations with the West have gone through three periods of development since 1992. When relations with Ukraine have improved this has tended to be at the same time as relations between the West and Russia declined, and vice-versa. The first period is disinterest during 1992-94 when the West prioritised relations with a reformist Russia. The second period was 1995—99 when Ukraine and the West developed a strategic partnership. From 2000, Ukraine's relations with the West are best described as disillusionment due to the growing gap between official rhetoric of integration into Euro-Atlantic structures and Eurasian domestic policies. The West's foreign policy towards Ukraine has gone through three changes since the disintegration of the USSR - disinterest, partnership and disillusionment. These three changes in policy towards Ukraine have mirrored the West's changing relationship to Russia. This article is divided into these three sections - disinterest (1991-94), partnership (1995-99) and disillusionment (from 2000). The major focus of the article is on the last of these three sections - disillusionment - which deals with Leonid Kuchma's second term as president (1999-2004) and the evolution of Ukrainian foreign policy from a Western to an Eastern-oriented multi-vector foreign policy. This section also discusses the growing Western disbelief in Ukraine's declared policy of integration into Euro-Atlantic structures through Ukraine's relations with the EU and NATO. The re- orientation of Ukraine's foreign policy, as evidenced in the slogan 'To Europe with Russia!', is critically surveyed with reference to the different foreign policy objectives of Russia and Ukraine. -
Yanukovych-Gate Unfolds After Ukrainian Elections
Friday, December 3 -- Volume 1, Issue 139 YANUKOVYCH-GATE UNFOLDS AFTER UKRAINIAN ELECTIONS Taras Kuzio The first year of Leonid Kuchma's second term as president of Ukraine was marked by a scandal that eventually became known as Kuchmagate. The affair was triggered by the release of secret tape recordings made in his office by a security guard. Two years later another scandal emerged; "Kolchuga-gate" concerned Kuchma's authorization of the sale of Kolchuga military radar systems to Iraq. Now Ukraine has Yanukovychgate. This scandal involves a large number of audiotapes related to Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych. These tapes, which are of far better quality than those made by Mykola Melnychenko in 1999-2000, were made by the Security Service (SBU) and leaked to challenger Viktor Yushchenko days after the presidential runoff on November 21. The Yanukovych camp did attempt to block electronic surveillance of its activities. But their efforts obviously failed. Unlike in the Kuchmagate tapes, such an extensive operation could have only been undertaken by more than one SBU officer. The SBU has a technical operations department and does control and monitor government communications. Significantly, the Yanukovych audiotapes were accepted as evidence by the Supreme Court, which is sitting to discuss mass violations in the runoff. Ukrainian courts never accepted the Melnychenko tapes were as evidence. The SBU tapes will add to the documents intercepted by Yushchenko supporters that the authorities had attempted to smuggle out of the presidential administration building. The tapes contain hundreds of intercepted telephone conversations from Yanukovych's "shadow election headquarters" between October 30 and November 23, taking in both rounds of the elections.