Robust Policing and Defiant Identities:

A Social Identity Study of the Greater 2011

A thesis submitted to The University of Manchester for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Humanities

2018 Dermot S. Barr School of Law

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Abstract

This thesis explores the intergroup dynamics during the development of rioting at two sites in in 2011, Pendleton, in Salford, and Manchester city centre. The primary theoretical contribution of this thesis is to the Elaborated Social Identity Model of the development of conflict (ESIM, Drury & Reicher 2000). Through detailed analysis of how the intergroup dynamics informed the development of the two riots, and participants’ subjective experiences, the thesis confirms and extends the ESIM understandings of the social psychological processes involved in escalating intergroup conflict. In doing so, this thesis also contributes to Waddington et al’s (1989) ‘flashpoints’ model. Through specifying the different processes, this thesis further elucidates ‘flashpoints’ interactional level by detailing the relationship between different intergroup dynamics and the development and character of rioting observed. The thesis also contributes to Baudains et al (2013b) account of the spread of rioting in by outlining the social psychological processes involved in the escalation of rioting.

Furthermore, through analysis of novel police, fire service, , and participant interview data, this thesis makes an empirical contribution to the literature on the 2011 riots. Triangulated multi-source accounts of the development of rioting at both sites are produced that contribute to understanding the extent to which secondary riots in 2011 were post- political, consumerist riots, or political, grievance-based riots.

Findings confirm and extend the ESIM account of the intergroup dynamics in developing riots. Different policing tactics were observed at the two sites which correlated with different intergroup dynamics and elicited different behavioural outcomes. In line with ESIM’s understanding of undifferentiated 3

police action on crowds, Salford rioters became a unified group in opposition to the police. Through this unity rioters were empowered to expel the police from Salford. Rioters in Manchester city centre did not violently confront the police in the same manner as in Salford. Instead, looting began without the need for an anti-police . The more defensive policing in Manchester saw the crowd becoming unified through a different process. Supporting Stott et al (2018), it is argued that a positive feedback loop united and empowered the crowd. The crowd increasingly realised their power as initial riotous actions demonstrated the police’s inability to control the situation.

In line with the ESIM, experiential outcomes correlated with the different processes observed at each site (Drury & Reicher 2005). Dis-united Manchester city centre rioters reported limited experiences of empowerment which was further curtailed by the criminal justice response. However, effusive accounts of empowerment were noted in accounts of rioting in Salford. One particular account of empowerment was notable for enduring even after imprisonment. The implications of this thesis’ findings for explanations of secondary rioting in 2011, public order policing, and the ‘spread’ of rioting are discussed.

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Contents

0. Introduction 9 1. Official reports 16 2. Independent reports 52 3. The social identity approach to understanding collective action 88 4. Methodology 107 5. Contextualising rioting in Greater Manchester 131 6. The development of rioting in Salford 157 6.1. Intergroup dynamics and participant experiences in the Salford riot 2011 176 7. The development of rioting in Manchester city centre 209 7.1. Intergroup dynamics and participant experiences in the Manchester city centre riot 2011 243 8. Discussion 326 9. Conclusion 359 10. Bibliography 365 11. Appendices 391

Word Count 86,244

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List of figures Figure 1 Map of riot hit areas – Source: Home Office 2011 17 Figure 2 Recorded riot related crimes between 6th–10th August 2011 18 Figure 3 Crimes committed in most affected local authority areas 19 Figure 4 Types of commercial premises targeted in the disorder 21 Figure 5 Types of disorder according to police service area 22 Figure 6 Types of disorder according to lower tier local authority 23 Figure 7 Proportions of defendants of known ethnicity brought before the courts for offences relating to the public disorder between 6th and 9th August 2011, by self-defined ethnicity and region 25 Figure 8 Defendants brought before the courts in Greater Manchester for riot related offences by self-defined ethnicity and local area 26 Figure 9 Criminal histories of all suspects involved in public disorder 6th-9th August 2011 27 Figure 10 Criminal histories of suspects involved in public disorder in Greater Manchester 6th-9th August 2011 28 Figure 11 Number and percentage of arrested participants in Greater Manchester and nationally by age bracket 29 Figure 12 Riot charges according to area level decile in Manchester 30 Figure 13 Average custodial sentence length (months) by court type for riot related offences 32 Figure 14 Participants and their actions 115 Figure 15 Manchester City IMD map 133 Figure 16 Greater Manchester IMD map 134 Figure 17 Salford IMD Map 136 Figure 18 Greater Manchester rioters’ residence map 148 Figure 19 Greater Manchester riot incidents before 16:00 149 Figure 20 Greater Manchester riot incidents 16:00-17:00 150 Figure 21 Greater Manchester riot incidents 17:00-18:00 150 Figure 22 Greater Manchester riot incidents 18:00-19:00 151 Figure 23 Greater Manchester riot incidents 19:00-20:00 151 6

Figure 24 Greater Manchester riot incidents 20:00-21:00 152 Figure 25 Greater Manchester riot incidents 21:00-22:00 153 Figure 26 Greater Manchester riot incidents 22:00-23:00 153 Figure 27 Greater Manchester riot incidents 23:00-00:00 154 Figure 28 Greater Manchester riot incidents 00:00-01:00 154 Figure 29 Frequency of riot incidents in Salford 157 Figure 30 Police recorded incidents in Salford 158 Figure 31 Types of premises attacked in Salford 164 Figure 32 Grouped types of premises attacked in Salford 164 Figure 33 Types of premises attacked in Salford 165 Figure 34 Types of attacks on types of premises in Salford 165 Figure 35 Types of attacks on premises in Salford 166 Figure 36 Incidents the Fire Service responded to in Salford 167 Figure 37 Incidents where the Fire Service was attacked in Salford 168 Figure 38 Frequency of riot incidents in Manchester 209 Figure 39 Police recorded incidents in Manchester 210 Figure 40 Map of Piccadilly Gardens and New Cathedral Street in Manchester city centre 212 Figure 41 Map showing proximity of the two riot sites 214 Figure 42 Grouped types of premises attacked in Manchester 227 Figure 43 Premises attacked in Manchester 228 Figure 44 Types of premises attacked in Manchester 229 Figure 45 Type of attack on types of premises in Manchester 230 Figure 46 Types of attack on premises in Manchester in Manchester 230 Figure 47 Incidents the Fire Service responded to in Manchester 241 Figure 48 Incidents where the Fire Service was attacked in Manchester 242 Figure 49 Types of attacks on premises in Manchester and Salford 328 7

Declaration No portion of the work referred to in the thesis has been submitted in support of an application for another degree or qualification of this or any other university or other institute of learning Copy right statement i. The author of this thesis (including any appendices and/or schedules to this thesis) owns certain copyright or related rights in it (the “Copyright”) and s/he has given The University of Manchester certain rights to use such Copyright, including for administrative purposes. ii. Copies of this thesis, either in full or in extracts and whether in hard or electronic copy, may be made only in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (as amended) and regulations issued under it or, where appropriate, in accordance with licensing agreements which the University has from time to time. This page must form part of any such copies made. iii. The ownership of certain Copyright, patents, designs, trademarks and other intellectual property (the “Intellectual Property”) and any reproductions of copyright works in the thesis, for example graphs and tables (“Reproductions”), which may be described in this thesis, may not be owned by the author and may be owned by third parties. Such Intellectual Property and Reproductions cannot and must not be made available for use without the prior written permission of the owner(s) of the relevant Intellectual Property and/or Reproductions. iv. Further information on the conditions under which disclosure, publication and commercialisation of this thesis, the Copyright and any Intellectual Property and/or Reproductions described in it may take place is available in the University IP Policy (see http://documents.manchester.ac.uk/DocuInfo.aspx?DocID=2442 0), in any relevant Thesis restriction declarations deposited in the University Library, The University Library’s regulations (see http://www.library.manchester.ac.uk/about/regulations/) and in The University’s policy on Presentation of Theses

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Acknowledgments

I would like to thank and the University of Manchester for funding this thesis. I’d particularly like to thank Elisa Bullen and Sarah Henry, and Dr Jon Shute and Professor Judith Aldridge, for facilitating this PhD and helping me through this process. Jonathan Bradley at Greater Manchester Police has been crucial in his help with gathering statistics. I’d like to thank the Community Change Foundation, Salford Unemployed and Community Resource Centre and the Northern Police Monitoring Project. I’d like to thank Dr James Morgan for making me aware of this opportunity, helping explore my ideas, and proof reading. I’d like to thank my sister, Dr Una Barr for helping me settle into Manchester, supporting me through this PhD, proof reading drafts and putting up with the jams. I’d like to thank Tom Raven Martin for the jams and not asking me about my thesis. I’d like to thank my sister Eimear, and my parents, Sean Barr and Paula Barr, for their inspiration and support. I’d like to thank my girlfriend, Samantha Sloan, for putting up with me, and helping me stay sane. I’d also like to thank all the participants who trusted me enough to take part in this study.

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0.0 Introduction

The killing of Mark Duggan by police on Thursday 4th August 2011 on Ferry Lane, , led to the most severe rioting1 in for a generation. The resonance of the circumstances precipitating these riots meant comparison with English urban rioting in 1980’s was inevitable. Tottenham experienced riots in 1985, on the estate, after Cynthia Jarret died in her home during a police raid. A week earlier, also saw riots after the police shooting of Cherry Groce. These victims were all from Black and Minority Ethnic (BAME) communities. Riots emanating from antagonism between the police and Black British communities in , , Leeds, and Manchester were also witnessed in the 1980’s.

The campaign group Inquest reported that since 1990 there have been 1639 deaths following police contact, a disproportionate number are from BAME communities (Inquest 2017a; 2017b). Inquest have also noted that

‘Since 1990, there have been nine unlawful killing verdicts/findings returned by juries at inquests into deaths involving the police and one unlawful killing finding recorded by a public enquiry, none of which has yet resulted in a successful prosecution.’ (Inquest 14th March 2017c)

Accordingly, the killing of Mark Duggan may be viewed, not as an isolated incident, but as the latest incident in a living history of the police service killing, disproportionate numbers of , with apparent impunity.

1 Rioting is used to denote a variety of actions including criminal damage, looting, and violent confrontation with police. 10

Furthermore, several studies highlight racial disproportionality in the use of stop and search tactics by British police (Release 2013; Lammy 2017). The Equality and Human Rights commission (2010) report that

‘Since 1995, per head of population in England and Wales, recorded stops and searches of Asian people have remained between 1.5 and 2.5 times the rate for White people, and for Black people always between 4 and 8 times the rate for White people.’ (P.13)

The disproportionate use of stop and search tactics on Black communities was found to have contributed to the Brixton riots (Scarman 1981). Similar complaints of subjectively illegitimate stop and search tactics were also made in 2011 (RCVP 2011), continuing historical parallels.

However, the speed at which these riots spread around the country was an important departure from previous riots (Newburn 2015a). Greater Manchester’s riots occurred four days after the initial riots in Tottenham, North London. The Riots Communities and Victims Panel (RCVP) understood these riots as a series of discrete events, each with its ‘own DNA’ (2011 p.7). The ‘DNA’ of these secondary riots are not well understood.

While the fatal police and the initial riots in London are connected to the secondary riots, this thesis’ focus is on the disturbances in Greater Manchester on Tuesday 9th August, four days after the initial outbreak of violence in Tottenham on Saturday 6th August. The fatal police shooting, and initial outbreak of rioting, has been analysed elsewhere (Reicher & Stott 2011; Stott et al 2017; MPS 2012; IPCC 2015).

The secondary riots, after Tottenham, have been understood as post- political consumerist riots (Treadwell et al 2013; Hall & Winlow 2014; Miles 2014). However, close analysis of the development of secondary riots in 11

Hackney (Stott et al 2017) and the curtailment of rioting in Leeds and Bristol (Newburn 2015b) suggest a simple consumerist explanation of rioting is inadequate. Differences in rioters’ actions in Greater Manchester’s riots have been noted, not least by the former Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police (GMP):

‘Certainly, most of it in Manchester was about getting goods, breaking into places and stealing things. Salford, I think was slightly different. It was more about attacking us and the fire services.’ (Fahy 2011 quoted in Clifton & Alison 2011) Greater Manchester is therefore considered a privileged arena to study 2011’s secondary riots. This thesis aims to understand (A) the development of rioting, and (B) the experience of rioters, at two sites in Greater Manchester - Salford and Manchester city centre. This is achieved through establishing accounts of the development of rioting activities for each site and analysing participants’ experiential accounts.

Chapter one reviews the official accounts of the riots. These accounts detail the sites where disorder was seen, the type of disorder, and who was involved. These accounts are criticised as stationary, atheoretical snapshots, which overlook important information on the site-specific development of rioting. These criticisms inform recognition of outstanding issues not adequately addressed by official accounts, namely:

(i) What motivated riot participants at each site? (ii) Which theoretical model can credibly underpin riots analysis? (iii) How did the riots develop at each riot site? (iv) What were the experiential outcomes for participants? 12

Having found the official accounts of the riots wanting, the extent to which independent studies address these outstanding issues is reviewed in chapter two. While they make significant contributions to the literature, most independent studies are criticised as static, unitary, and lacking mechanisms through which background grievances, or consumerist tendencies, found expression in such patterned riots. Stott et al (2017) and Newburn (2015b) are considered to have most adequately addressed these outstanding issues. These papers offer contextualised, theoretically informed, developmental accounts of rioting in Tottenham & Hackney, and avoidance of major rioting in Leeds and Bristol. Accordingly, the case is made for a theoretically informed, contextualised, developmental approach to understanding rioting at each site in this thesis.

Waddington et al’s (1989) ‘flashpoints’ model is recognised as the most prominent social scientific model for analysing rioting. However, with some notable exceptions (Newburn 2015a; 2015b) it has been largely overlooked in analyses. Newburn (2015b) establishes that the interactional level of analysis provides insights that can explain how major rioting was avoided in Leeds and Bristol. Waddington et al’s (1989) background conditions are briefly analysed in relation to Greater Manchester in chapter five to contextualise the main analysis. However, it is argued that the interactional level of analysis is key to achieving this thesis’ research aims (Waddington et al 1989; Newburn 2015b).

Newburn (2015b) recognised the social identity approach (Reicher 1984; Drury & Reicher 2000; Stott & Drury 1999; Stott & Drury 2000; Stott & Reicher 1998a; 1998b) to understanding collective actions as providing valuable insights into the processes that operate at this interactional level of the flashpoints model (Waddington et al 1989). The ‘Elaborated Social 13

Identity Model’ (‘ESIM’, Drury & Reicher 2000; Reicher 1996a, 1996b; Stott & Drury 1999; Stott & Drury, 2000; Stott et al 2018) forms a central aspect of the social identity approach to understanding rioting. It has previously examined the processes through which the development of rioting can be understood. Accordingly, it is forwarded as the theoretical framework that is best suited to analysing the development and experiential outcomes in the 2011 Greater Manchester riots.

Chapter four outlines the novel pragmatic methodology necessary in establishing triangulated multi-source accounts of the development of disorder in Salford and Manchester. Approaches to accessing participants, interview, and analysis techniques are also defended in chapter four. The accounts are not intended as theoretically based analyses but the base from which theoretical analyses can be understood. A set of analysis questions, informed by ESIM (Drury et al 2005), examines the intergroup dynamics and experiences of rioting in two sites in Greater Manchester2:

A. How did participants and police define riots and each other (categorical representations)? B. Was there an original fragmentation of the crowd? C. What were the initial legitimate actions crowd members were trying to engage in? D. What was the police’s understanding of legitimate crowd actions? E. What were power relations like between the groups? F. How did participants talk about the legitimacy of their action after the outgroup imposition of power (legitimization of opposition)?

2 Although there were isolated incidents of rioting recorded in Tameside and Trafford (Home office 2011 P.22), this thesis is concerned with the two central riot sites, Pendleton (Salford) and Manchester city centre. 14

G. How did participants then talk about relations both with each other and with the outgroup (i.e. was there a more inclusive social identity)? H. What were the experiential outcomes? In particular, after the event, (how) did participants talk about empowerment, victory and/or defeat, their emotions, and their rationales for involvement in future riots?

These analysis questions explore the intergroup dynamics in the development of rioting and participants subjective experiences. In doing so they facilitate answers to the study’s central research questions:

1. What premises were targeted by rioters? 2. What motivated riot participants at each site in the Greater Manchester riots? 3. How did intergroup dynamics operate during the development of Greater Manchester’s riots? 4. How did the intergroup dynamics relate to variations in rioting between the two riot sites? 5. How can intergroup dynamics explain the involvement of some study participants in riotous activity while others remained spectators? 6. Did participants experience empowerment as a result of their involvement in the riots? If so, how and why?

These central research questions and are addressed directly in chapter eight. The ESIM understanding of intergroup conflict is confirmed and extended in this thesis. The Salford riot largely confirms ESIMs understanding of the intergroup dynamics involved in the escalation towards intergroup conflict. Support is found for Stott et al’s (2018) proposed extension to ESIM to explain the unification and empowerment processes, in the intergroup 15

power dynamics in Manchester city centre. Accordingly, this thesis offers a theoretical contribution to ESIM (Drury & Reicher 2000) and Waddington et al’s (1989) ‘Flashpoints’ model through specifying how the different intergroup dynamics related to different forms of conflict. Furthermore, the social psychological processes observed contribute to understanding the spread of rioting (Baudains et al 2013b). Let us now examine the official reports into the 2011 riots.

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1.0 Official reports

Introduction to reports The aims of this thesis are to understand (a) the development of rioting, and (b) participants experiences, in the Greater Manchester riots. These aims evolved from deficits in both official and independent reporting on the riots. However, official accounts do provide an informative account of where rioting took place, what type of offences were committed, who took part, and how they were policed (MOJ 2011;2012; Home Office 2011; RCVP 2011;2012 HMIC 2011; MPS 2012). Through reviewing knowledge established by official accounts, this chapter identifies knowledge gaps that inform the study’s aims.

Official report findings The Ministry of Justice (MOJ 2011;2012) provided a series of statistical bulletins in the immediate aftermath of the disturbances. As cases progressed, the statistical bulletins were updated. The figures reported here reflect the most up to date reports available. These bulletins and the Home Office (2011) report examined three main areas: (i) where disturbances were seen, (ii) the type of crimes involved in the disturbances, and (iii) who was involved.

Sites of disorder Disturbances occurred in 66 local authority areas, with between 13-15000 people participating nationally (RCVP 2011). However, just 15 local authority areas saw the clear majority (71%) of all crimes during the disturbances (Home Office 2011). Figure one maps the ten police force areas that saw large scale disturbances.

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Figure 1: Map of riot hit areas (Home Office 2011 P.9)

Source: Home Office 2011 P.9 18

Overall 5,112 riot related crimes were recorded from Saturday 4th August to the morning of Wednesday the 10th August (Home Office 2011). Most of these crimes were recorded on Monday 8th August - see figure 2.

Figure 2: Recorded riot related crimes between Sunday 6th– Wednesday 10th August 2011 (Home Office 2011 P.8)

Number of recorded crimes

3000 2727

2500

2000 1500 1500

1000

Recorded Crimes 454 278 500 153 0 6 August to 7 August to 8 August to 9 August to 10 August to morning of 7 morning of 8 morning of 9 morning of 10 morning of 11 August August August August August Date

Notes:

1. Data are shown for the ten police force areas where disorder was most extensive 2. Shows local authority are where disorder-related crimes occurred between 00:00 on 6th August and 07:29 on 11 August Source: Home Office 2011 P.8 Judging by volumes of crime, the disorder was not equally intense in all affected areas. Over two-thirds (68%) of all riot related offences were recorded in London. The second highest proportion (11%) of riot related crimes were reported in Greater Manchester, followed by the (10%) (Home Office 2011). In terms of the total number of crimes committed in each local authority area, figure three shows Manchester recorded the second highest number of crimes (386), with recording the highest (430). 19

Figure 3: Crimes committed in most affected local authority areas (RCVP 2011 P.26)

TOTAL NUMBER OF CRIMES IN EACH LOCAL AUTHORITY AREAS WHERE 40

OR MORE CRIMES WERE COMMITTED

430

386

363

314

303

279

219

213

188

182

172

156

152

146

129

103

90

RECORDEDCRIMES

84

81 81

74

69

59

58

57

50

48 48 48

46

LEEDS

EALING

BARNET

SALFORD

E N F I E L D

M E R T O N

NEWHAM C A M D E N

BROMLEY

LAMBETH

CROYDON

H A C K N E Y

HARINGEY

SANDWELL

LEWISHAM

LIVERPOOL

REDBRIDGE

I S L I N G T O N

GREENWICH

MANHESTER

SOUTHWARK

BIRMINGHAM

CITY OF BRISTOL

TOWER HAMLETS

WALTHAM FOREST

CITY OF

CITY OF WESTMINSTER

BARKING AND DAGENHAM

CITY OF KENSINGTON AND CHELSEA LOCAL AUTHORITY AREA

Source: RCVP 2011 P.26

Major disorder was mainly confined to English cities, but not all English cities experienced disorder. There was a skew towards the affected areas being areas of high crime and high deprivation. Of the 66 local authority areas that experienced large scale disorder, 61% were in the top quartile for crime rates, and 42% were among the top quartile of the index of multiple deprivation (IMD) (Home Office 2011). However, this was not always the case. It is noted that not all areas of high crime and high deprivation saw disturbances. 20

In addition to a patterned occurrence and intensity, there was also a pattern in the specific areas of the local authority areas affected. Over 40% of crimes (2,199) were recorded as having taken place within the boundaries of a defined ‘Area of Town Centre Activity’. Of these, 46.4% (1,020) were recorded within defined retail cores within these town centres. However, 57% of recorded crimes (n=2,913) were recorded as occurring outside town- centre or retail core boundaries (Home Office 2011).

The dispersal of sites of disorder provides a compelling impetus for this study. To understand why Greater Manchester experienced disorder while others did not, it is necessary to understand the site-specific development of rioting in Greater Manchester.

Types of disorder Having established where and when disorder was seen, it is also necessary to note the character of the disorder. Acquisitive crimes were most common, accounting for 50% of all recorded crimes while criminal damage accounted for 36% (Home Office 2011). Figure 4 details the types of premises targeted. Individuals were also victims of acquisitive crimes. 13% of all crimes were reported against individuals. The Home Office describe these crimes as typically robbery or assaults. Vehicles also became targets for some riot participants with a further 19% of crimes committed against vehicles. Perhaps surprisingly for a riot, only 6% of all crimes during the 4-5 days of rioting were recorded as being against the police (Home Office 2011).

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Figure 4: Types of commercial premises targeted in the disorder (Home Office 2011 P.14) Type of Premises Number %

Retail 1,385 61 Electrical 1. 265 12 Clothing 2. 233 10 Small independent retailers 3. 213 9 Supermarket 181 8 Jewellers 93 4 Other retail 4. 400 18

Services 893 39 Restaurants and Cafes 5. 219 10 Financial 6. 101 4 Gambling 152 7 Public House 61 3 Hair and Beauty Salon 65 3 Service Station 42 2 Other Business Premises 7. 253 11

Total 8. 2,278 Notes:

1. Includes electrical hardware, mobile phone and digital media retailers (computer games, Music CDs, DVDs). 2. Includes general/fashion clothing and sportswear retailers. 3. Includes convenience shops, newsagents and off licences. 4. 4. Includes amongst other establishments – charity shops, pawn shops, pharmacies and car salerooms 5. 5. Includes restaurants, fat food outlets and cafes (not internet cafes). 6. Includes banks, building societies, exchanges, and cheque cashiers. 7. Includes miscellaneous services such as estate agents and post offices. 8. Indicates the number of commercial premises targeted for which data where available. Source: Home Office 2011 P.14 Accordingly, the national statistics reported by the Home Office (2011) tell a story of disturbances characterised largely by material acquisition. However, there were local variations within this national picture. 22

Nationally the proportion of acquisitive crimes reached 50% but half of the ten most affected police forces recorded the proportion of acquisitive crimes to be less than 20% (Home Office 2011).

Figure 5: Types of disorder according to police service area (Home Office 2011 P.14)

TYPES OF DISORDER (%) ACCORDING TO POLICE SERVICE AREA

Acquisitive Criminal damage Disorder Violence against the person Other

GRAND TOTAL 50 36 3 7 4

HERTFORDSHIRE 24 61 9 6 0

NOTTINGHAMSHIRE 9 79 6 3 3

AVON & SOMERSET 27 68 222

THAMES VALLEY 6 83 8 22

LEICESTERSHIRE 11 77 2 4 6

WEST YORKSHIRE 8 73 9 10 0

MERSEYSIDE 15 72 8 31

WEST MIDLANDS 49 41 3 5 2

GREATER MANCHESTER 45 36 2 13 2

METROPOLITAN 57 30 2 7 4

Notes:

1. Includes crimes occurring between 00:00 on 6th Authust and 07:29 on 11 August 2. Data are shown for the ten police force areas where disorder was most extensive 3. ‘Aquisitive’ offences include burglary, theft, handling stolen goods and robbery. 4. ‘Criminal damage’ offences include criminal damage and arson. 5. ‘Disorder’ offences include violent disorder and public order offences. 6. Violence against the person offences include murder, wounding, grievious bodily harm, assault and possession of weapons. 7. ‘Other’ offences include drugs offences, driving offences and a range of other miscellaneous offences. Source: Home Office 2011 P.14 23

Greater Manchester saw the third highest proportion of acquisitive crimes after London and the West Midlands. While Thames Valley, and saw the smallest proportions of acquisitive crimes. As is evident in figure 5, Greater Manchester recorded the highest proportion of violence-against-the-person crimes. The evidence of local variation becomes even more pronounced when statistics are organised according to local authority areas rather than the larger police force areas.

Figure 6: Types of disorder according to lower tier local authority (Home Office 2011 P.11)

Notes:

Includes crimes occurring between 00:00 on 6th Authust and 07:29 on 11 August

‘Aquisitive’ offences include burglary, theft, handling stolen goods and robbery.

‘Criminal damage’ offences include criminal damage and arson.

‘Disorder’ offences include violent disorder and public order offences.

Violence against the person offences include murder, wounding, grievious bodily harm, assault and possession of weapons.

‘Other’ offences include drugs offences, driving offences and a range of other miscellaneous offences. Source: Home Office 2011 P.11 24

Figure 6 illustrates important differences between the two main sites of disturbance in Greater Manchester; Salford and Manchester city centre. A high proportion of acquisitive crimes were recorded in Manchester 48% and Salford 41%. However, just 6% of Manchester’s recorded riot related crimes were violence-against-the-person offences, while 26% of Salford’s recorded riot related offences in Salford were violence-against-the-person offences. Manchester also recorded more criminal damage offences (39%) than Salford (29%) (Home Office 2011). There were important local variations within the larger national disturbances, necessitating localised analyses. The local variations in character recorded by crime statistics suggest the 2011 riots should be considered a series of discrete yet connected events. As the RCVP’s (2011 P.7) interim report states, ‘Each riot area had its own ‘DNA.’ To understand these differences this thesis offers localised analyses of (A) the development of rioting, and (B) rioters’ experiences.

Who rioted? The composition of a rioting crowd can point to possible motivations, if not already articulated. Accordingly, official reports also examined who participated in the riots. The ethnicities, criminal histories, age, and gender, of arrested participants were central dimensions for the MOJ (2011; 2012) and Home Office (2011). Levels of were also reported in the RCVP report (2011).

As the disturbances developed from the killing Mark Duggan, a man with an ethnic minority background, it might be expected that riot participants would be largely people from ethnic minorities. The ethnic composition of those arrested was a central subject in government reports. Nationally, 39% of those brought before the courts by 8th September 2012 (MOJ 2012) for riot related offences self-defined as Black, 25

12% as Mixed an 7% as Asian, 2% defined as Other. Accordingly, most participants brought before the court were from minority ethnic backgrounds. However, a large proportion (41%) were from the majority White ethnic background and comprised the largest single ethnic group of riot participants. The ethnic composition of rioting crowds varied by region.

Figure 7. Proportions of defendants of known ethnicity brought before the courts for offences relating to the public disorder between 6th and 9th August 2011, by self-defined ethnicity and region (Home Office 2012 Table 1.9b)

Region Ethnicity London West Greater Merseyside Other Midlands Manchester Total White 33% 38% 37% 78% 73% 76% 41% Black 46% 34% 33% 11% 13% 13% 39% Asian 7% 14% * 1% 3% 2% 7% Mixed 12% 13% 29% 9% 8% 8% 12% Other 2% 1% 2% 1% 3% 1% 2% Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% Source: Home Office 2012 Table 1.9b

Examining these statistics in further detail in reveals further smaller scale local variation within Greater Manchester. Figure 8 shows some differences in the ethnic composition of those brought before the courts in central Manchester and other areas of Manchester. However, the most significant difference observed in the ethnicity of those brought before the courts was between Salford where 94.29% were white and central Manchester were 68.57% were white. The significance of Mark Duggan’s death and the ethnic disparities in Stop and Search for the overwhelmingly White Salford rioters is unclear. These statistics suggest that the 2011 riots were not simply ‘race riots’. However, the notion of ‘race riots’ itself is complicated. For example, 26

Hirscheler (2012) has shown that in the 1981 UK riots, widely understood to emanate from police racism, two-thirds of those arrested were white.

Figure 8. Defendants brought before the courts in Greater Manchester for riot related offences by self-defined ethnicity and local area

Source: MOJ 2012: Table 1.12

Again, local variations in the composition of riot participants suggest that the various riot sites had their own distinct character which reflected the ethnic composition of the local areas, more than specific ethnic groups.

The extent of participants’ criminal histories was another major focus for official reports. The Home Office report noted that a majority of those arrested had previous convictions: ‘Just over three-quarters (76%) had a previous caution or conviction, including a significant proportion (26%) with more than ten previous offences.’ (2011 P.20)’. Attention was drawn to the fact that, although arrested riot participants were more likely than the 27

general population to have previous convictions, they had on average fewer convictions than offenders sentenced in 2010/11.

Figure 9: Criminal histories of all suspects involved in public disorder 6th-9th August 2011 (MOJ 2012 Table 3.1)

Source: MOJ 2012 Table 3.1

Figure 9 shows the suspects criminal histories by age and gender nationally. Figure 10 shows the proportion of suspects with previous convictions in Greater Manchester were broadly similar to the national picture with only 19.7% having no previous convictions. Also evident in figures 8 and 9, is the over-representation of men in the arrested sample. Nationally, 88.7% of those appearing in court were male and 11.3% were female. Similar figures were observed in Greater Manchester riot suspects: 88% male and 12% female (MOJ 2012). 28

Figure 10: Criminal histories of suspects involved in public disorder in Greater Manchester 6th-9th August 2011

Greater Suspects’ Criminal Histories by Age and Gender Manchester Juveniles Adults All Persons Previous Offences Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total

None 36.4% 30.0% 35.4% 11.9% 27.8% 13.6% 18.4% 28.6% 19.7% 1 12.7% 20.0% 13.8% 6.6% 11.1% 7.1% 8.3% 14.3% 9.0% 2 12.7% 20.0% 13.8% 5.3% 0.0% 4.7% 7.3% 7.1% 7.3% 3-5 18.2% 30.0% 20.0% 15.9% 16.7% 16.0% 16.5% 21.4% 17.1% 6-10 9.1% 0.0% 7.7% 14.6% 11.1% 14.2% 13.1% 7.1% 12.4% 11-14 1.8% 0.0% 1.5% 7.9% 11.1% 8.3% 6.3% 7.1% 6.4% 15-49 9.1% 0.0% 7.7% 25.2% 16.7% 24.3% 20.9% 10.7% 19.7% 50 or more 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 12.6% 5.6% 11.8% 9.2% 3.6% 8.5%

Total 55 10 65 151 18 169 206 28 234 number of offenders (100%) Source: MOJ 2012: Table 3.6a A considerable proportion of the arrested riot participants were juveniles. Figure 11 shows similar variation in the ages of defendants in both Greater Manchester and nationally. The greatest differences were between the older age brackets. Nationally 21-39-year olds made up 41.4% of the arrested participants, while in Greater Manchester, they made up only 36.9%; (2) the 40-plus age bracket who, nationally, comprised 5.3% of all arrests but in Greater Manchester, comprised 10.8% of arrested participants (MOJ 2012).

29

Figure 11. Number and percentage of arrested participants in Greater Manchester and nationally by age bracket (Figures sourced from MOJ 2012 Table 1.10) Area Age band Total Percentage Greater 10-17 71 28.50% Manchester 18-20 59 23.70% 21-39 92 36.90% 40+ 27 10.80% Total (Greater 249 100% Manchester) Total 10-17 847 27.30% 18-20 807 26% 21-39 1,286 41.4% 40+ 163 5.30% Total (National) 3,103 100% Source: MOJ 2012 Table 1.10, (Figures selected from larger table) While local variation in the ethnic composition of riot suspects have been observed, defendants were similar in age and criminal histories. As previously noted, there was a skew towards the disturbances occurring in areas of high deprivation. This area-level analysis is supported by individual level analyses of participants appearing in court - ‘42% of young people brought before the courts were in receipt of free school meals (compared to 16% of pupils in maintained secondary schools) and 64% of young people appearing in court lived in one of the 20 most deprived areas in the country - only 3% lived in one of the 20 least deprived.’ (Home Office 2011 P.5) Similar disproportionality was found amongst the adults appearing in court too. 35% of adult defendants claimed unemployment benefits in comparison to 12% of the national working age population (Home Office 2011). Further evidence of social exclusion experienced was reported by the RCVP (2011). Two thirds of the children brought before the courts had Special Educational Needs (RCVP 2011 P.11). Riot defendants were more likely to have been excluded from school at least once, and only 11% had achieved 30

five or more A*-C GCSE grades including English and Maths. Furthermore, 71% of the areas where riot participants lived were within the decile with the lowest levels of social cohesion (RCVP 2011 P.62). Lightowlers & Shute (2012) study found similar area level and individual links between deprivation and rioting as national level analyses. Over half (51.1%) of those charged with riot related offences were from within the 20% most deprived areas.

Figure 12: Riot charges according to area level deprivation deciles in Manchester 50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

Total Charged Total Charged With Burglary Total Charged With Criminal Damage

Figure 12: Source: Lightowlers & Shute 2012

Early statistics showed that 28% of those arrested for riot related offences in London were gang members (House of Commons Home Affairs Committee 2011b; reply to Q84). However, as more arrests were made this 31

reduced to less than 20% (MOJ 2011). The proportion of gang related defendants varied, 19% in London but just 5 % in Manchester. Eventually, the Home Office admitted that ‘where gang members were involved, they generally did not play a pivotal role.’ (Home Office 2011 P.5). Statistics reviewed so far suggest that the riots were not principally orchestrated by gangs. Neither were they considered mainly youth, nor race riots. Instead they were a complex, multi-faceted phenomenon that require localised analysis of the development of each riot and the subjective experiences of participants.

By August 10th, 2012, 3,103 people had been brought to court nationally, regarding riot related offences. Of these, 2,646 (85 per cent) had reached a final outcome. 508 were acquitted or had the charges dismissed (MOJ 2012). In Greater Manchester 249 people had been brought to court regarding the disturbances: 105 in Manchester, 109 in other areas of Greater Manchester, and 35 in Salford; 24 were dismissed or acquitted (MOJ 2012).

Figure 12 shows the average sentences given out in Magistrates courts were two and half times longer than sentences for similar offences the previous year. In Crown court, sentences overall were around four and a half times longer than for similar crimes the previous year. The difference between the riot related sentences and the previous year’s sentences varied according to crime type and court. For example, the sentence for robbery during the 2011 disturbances at crown court was 29.8 months but the previous year the average sentence for robbery at crown court was 10.8 months. All but one crime type received longer sentences than sentences for similar offences the previous year. Magistrates court sentences for criminal damage during the 2011 disturbances averaged 3.8 months whereas the previous year sentences for criminal damage from the magistrates’ court averaged 6.8 32

months (MOJ 2012). The lengthy sentences illustrate the extraordinary criminal justice response.

Figure 13: Average custodial sentence length (months) by court type for riot related offences (MOJ 2012 Table 1.6)

Court type/Offence Completed court England and Wales Category cases relating to the 2010 (based on disorder similar offences) Magistrates Court Burglary 7.2 4.4 Robbery 10.0 8.8 Criminal Damage 3.8 6.8 Theft 4.6 2.0 Violent Disorder (1) 7.7 3.1 Other disorder 4.5 3.1 offences (2) Total 6.6 2.5

Crown Court Burglary 17.4 16.2 Robbery 29.8 10.8 Criminal Damage 17.5 7.7 Theft 10.0 6.6 Violent Disorder (1) 30.6 9.9 Other disorder 18.5 7.6 offences (2) Total 19.6 11.3

All courts 17.1 3.7

To note: Crown Court data for 2010 are based on cases that were found guilty at the magistrates’ courts and committed for sentence at Court in order to give the most reliable comparison with disorder cases which have been sentenced so far.

(1) Violent disorder (includes following offences: Violent disorder, Riot, Affray, Summary causing intentional harassment, alarm or distress, Summary harassment, alarm or distress, Assault with intent to resist apprehension or assault a person assisting a constable, Common assault offences, Assaulting a constable and offences under Public Order Act and Justice of the Peace Act (2) Other disorder offences (includes following offences: Having an article with a blade or point in public place, Possession of offensive weapons without lawful authority or reasonable excuse. Having possession of a controlled drug (Cannabis) 33

In summary, the Home Office (2011) MOJ (2011) and RCVP (2011; 2012) reported a national picture of the disturbances characterised by acquisitive crime and criminal damage. These were committed in specific areas, largely by people that could be characterised as deprived and socially excluded. These crimes were committed, largely by young men from a variety of ethnicities, the majority of whom had prior convictions, and largely by those who were not gang members. The extraordinary criminal justice response saw participants sentenced to up to 450% longer sentences than similar offences the previous year.

A central premise of this study is that the events that were seen across four days over 66 local authority areas were discrete but connected events. This premise finds agreement in the HASC report (2012) which recognised that this ‘was a series of events, and not just one riot’ (P.16). There are several reasons for accepting this as a premise for the study. Perhaps the most compelling reasons for this assertion is the difference in the type of offences across different riot sites and the temporal and physical distance between riot sites. Events in Greater Manchester took place on Tuesday 9th August, four days and over 200 miles away from the initial disturbances arose in Tottenham on Saturday 6th of August. Following the outline of the national statistics in relation to where disturbances were seen, the type of offences and who was involved, this review will now examine the Riots Communities and Victims Panel report (2011; 2012).

Riot affected communities In addition to the quantitative nature of official reports, the Riots Communities and Victims Panel offered a qualitative report providing a voice for the communities affected by the disturbances. In contrast to then Prime Minister ’s (2011) tautological ‘criminality pure and simple’ 34

explanation for the disturbances, the panel found the riots to be a complex phenomenon. RCVP (2011) acknowledged that participants were not a homogeneous mass and that different people played different roles during the disturbances. Describing when participants got involved, what they did when they got involved, and how prepared they were, participants were categorised by RCVP as ‘organised criminals’, ‘violent aggressors,’ late night shoppers’, ‘opportunists’ and ‘spectators’.

RCVP (2011) categorised some participants as ‘organised criminals’, who conformed to some if not all the following characteristics: they often came from outside the riot hit area; they mainly engaged in acquisitive crimes, although some also confronted the police; they arrived prepared with tools to break into shops and clothing to hide their identities; they targeted high value goods and had vehicles ready to transport their loot. It is reported that they often were involved in the first instances of disturbances and set off a ‘chain reaction’ (P.37). There is no suggestion as to what proportion of the participants fitted in this category although it is notable that this category is reported first.

The second ascribed category of participant was ‘violent aggressor’. RCVP (2011 P.37) reported this was a smaller group than ‘organised criminals’, with different levels of preparation. Some were very prepared, reportedly arriving with ‘firebombs’ to pass out to other participants. They were reported to have engaged in the most serious violent acts against the police and acts of arson. The third, ‘late-night shopper’ category was reportedly comprised of people who deliberately travelled to the riots to loot and often engaged in confrontation with police.

‘Opportunists’ was the fourth category. RCVP (2011) note that these people did not deliberately travel to the riot site to loot but instead ‘just got swept 35

along with the crowd’ (P.36). They are reported to have been unprepared with little effort made to hide their identities. The items stolen were often less valuable than the high-end goods more organised participants targeted. The final group to be reported was also reportedly the most numerous: ‘spectators’. RCVP (2011) reported that some were already at the riot sites while others travelled to watch. The report notes how the police felt this was an unusual aspect of these riots and highlighted how little aggression there was from riot participants towards the spectators (P.37).

In addition to a typology of rioters, RCVP (2011) also outlined the sequence of events that described the riots. Two main accounts of the development of riots were offered; the first is a specific account of rioting in Tottenham, and the second is what they call an ‘anatomy of a riot’.

Some points are worth emphasising and summarising here. The central explanations for the initial riots offered by the RCVP are: (a) the (mis)handling of the death of Mr Duggan by the police and IPCC; (b) the existing antipathy between ‘some members of the Black community and the police’; and (c) the assassination myth. RCVP (2011) go on to report that

‘The vast majority of people we spoke to believed that the sole trigger for disturbances in their areas was the perception that the police could not contain the scale of rioting in Tottenham and then across London.’ (P.10)

Thus, the central explanations for the initial riot and the spread of rioting is largely reported to be police incompetence and the effects of such inadequacies.

The ‘anatomy of a riot’ is a more generalised, 13-point account of rioting that the 66 affected areas experienced (RCVP 2011 P.45-47). A brief 36

summary of the account is offered here rather than an in-depth examination of each of the 13 points. In contrast to the initial Tottenham riot and the spread of rioting, where police incompetence was reported as the central causal factor, the RCVP reports that the starting point was the convergence of individuals and groups in an area. This was followed by ‘Initial damage to business premises or an exchange with the often-limited police presence’ (2011 P.45).

These initial interactions were said to embolden others to participate. Importantly, no causal mechanism is offered for this empowerment. The ‘spectator’ group reportedly played an important role in both allowing the main participants to slip in and out of the crowd and impeding police control of the situation. No explanation is offered as to why some remained spectators while others participated.

RCVP (2011) emphasise the limited ability of the police to prevent rioting or to control rioters. This failing, in combination with social and broadcast media reports, is considered responsible for increasing ‘waves’ of participants joining the initial rioters. This forced the police to retreat and call for reinforcements. After a period of unimpeded rioting, the police were reported to eventually regain control of the initial site, but this reportedly displaced rioters to secondary sites.

Eventually rioters were reported to have been forced to disperse, with some returning to primary sites. The police reportedly became more capable of controlling and supressing the riots through force of numbers. This more generalised account suggests that people who already intended on rioting perceived the opportunity to do so because of limited police control capabilities. It offers little explanation for the rioters who engaged in violent confrontation with police. 37

The panel reported that there was no single cause, and therefore no single solution, to the 2011 riots. Instead, RCVP (2012) identified seven themes and made recommendations on those themes. The identified themes were; ‘children and parents’, ‘personal resilience’, ‘hopes and dreams’, ‘brands’, ‘usual suspects’, ‘police and the public’, and ‘community engagement’, ‘involvement’, and ‘cohesion’. These themes largely emphasise individual and family deficits over structural pressures and background grievances. Furthermore, they tell us little about the development of rioting in specific sites across the country. Places with poor educational attainment under similar consumerist pressures did not riot. Accordingly, they fail to establish a mechanism linking these background pressures to the pattern of rioting observed.

Although some environmental pressures were recognised, the riots were understood primarily as the actions of immoral people, lacking responsibility due to poor parenting, taking advantage of policing deficits. The RCVP reports did comment on the perception of policing, however, they were keen to report that an analysis of policing tactics was beyond their remit.

‘At the outset it is important to explain and clarify our remit. The panel has not been established to address the tactical decisions made by police forces across the country; these will necessarily be the subject of other investigations.’ (RCVP 2011 P.106)

It is to reports with policing decisions within their remit that we now turn.

Policing reports Policing was an issue raised by both riot participants and riot-hit communities. The IPCC report (2015) examined the fatal police shooting. The Metropolitan Police Service report (2011) analysed how that incident was 38

handled, and how subsequent disturbances in London were policed. Poor communication, slow responses, and too few officers, were cited as concerns. Accordingly, improved communication strategies and facilities to enable arrests without removing officers were recommended. Calls for the use of and baton rounds were also acknowledged. MPS (2011) reported that steps were being taken to make these more readily available. However, they also recognised the need for a national debate on their use.

Official reports were in agreement that the perception the police couldn’t control the situation facilitated the ‘spread’ of rioting. (MPS 2011; HMIC 2011; RCVP 2011;2012). The Home Affairs Select Committee (‘HASC’, 2011) concluded that the police service needed to improve the way it polices public order situations, not least because the perception of people being able to loot with apparent impunity was considered to have brought people into the disturbances.

‘The single most important reason why the disorder spread was the perception, relayed by television as well as new social media, that in some areas the police had lost control of the streets.’ (Home Affairs Committee 2011 Paragraph 47)

In addition to the scale of the disturbances, the police service was also confronted with a challenge in the form of the dynamic tactics used by riot participants. The ability of riot participants to withdraw, regroup and act elsewhere, in response to police presence is not a new phenomenon. However, the advantage that mobile communications provided participants over police was considered novel. Several analyses of the riots pointed to the widespread use of social media and encrypted messaging to explain the success of the dynamic adaptive tactics employed by riot participants (HMIC 2011; RCVP 2011; Guardian/LSE 2011). This was not a situation the police 39

were adequately prepared for. The Home Affairs Committee (2011) recognised this stating that they were ‘not convinced that the public order training for commanders, and for individual officers, is adequate at present.’ (Paragraph 40). Addressing a criticism that the public felt ‘let down’ (MPS 2011 p.9), MPS reported the re-introduction of plain clothed officers and new ‘Go Forward’ tactics.

HMIC (2011) recognised the mobile, co-ordinated, dynamic nature of the disturbances as posing a problem for police tactics meant for single site set- piece confrontations between protesters and police. The need for faster, more dynamic, and more robust, mobilisation was recognised. However, these recognitions were often couched in terms of inadequate equipment, training and insufficient numbers. This suggests that had the police the required capability their response would have been much more robust. Yet, HMIC (2011) also recognised that ‘punitive force’ can quickly change the public mood’ (p.8). The report suggests a new understanding of the ‘rules of engagement’ is necessary. HMIC (2011) argued this would enable officers to act more robustly with confidence that they are within the law and have public support. Accordingly, the report recognises the call for more robust action to be taken, but cautions the police need better resources as well as legal and public support.

Despite these criticisms, the HAC report (2011) did praise the police for eventually restoring order. This achievement was recognised to result from the sheer numbers of police in the final days of the disturbances. To ensure this end in future, a review of the ‘mutual aid’ system was recommended. Mutual aid is the process whereby police services can request back up from other police services. The report notes that the service worked quite well in that all police forces that requested police support units received support. 40

However, concern was raised that the scale of the disorder and associated requests left some services vulnerable. It was noted that Greater Manchester Police provided mutual aid to the Metropolitan Police the day before Manchester saw significant trouble. Indeed, HMIC (2011) report that GMP were requesting support from other police forces to help deal with trouble in Manchester at the same time that they themselves were sending forces to support the Metropolitan Police.

Accordingly, the perceived loss of control, inadequate training, insufficiently robust tactics, and problems with mutual aid, were reported as police failings that contributed to the riots. However, the unprecedented scale and scarce police numbers were used to explain and to some extent justify police tactics.

Criticisms of the official reports Official reports helped shape a discourse that understood the riots as primarily the actions of inherently criminal, immoral, and irrational people capitalising on inadequate policing. It is argued that a unitary approach to understanding discrete yet connected events; based on a reliance on police statistics, inadequate engagement with participants, and an acceptance of the benefits of ‘robust’ policing, has resulted in an atheoretical, static understanding of the riots. This understanding is facilitated by an unscientific understanding of crowds as inherently pathological. Through criticism of this discourse, this section establishes outstanding issues resulting from deficits in official accounts.

Four criticisms are explored -

• Criticism 1. Reliance on police statistics misrepresents the composition of the rioting crowd. 41

• Criticism 2. Reliance on statistics ignores the intentions behind actions. • Criticism 3. Uncritically accepting a ‘contagion’ metaphor is an inadequate explanation of the patterns of events. • Criticism 4. Emphasis on the need for more robust policing to prevent rioting ignores the iatrogenic potential of such tactics.

Let us now consider each of these criticisms in turn.

Criticism 1. Reliance on police statistics misrepresents the composition of the rioting crowd. Attempts to understand illegal actions primarily through official statistics inevitably leads to problems. The statistics represent only a subset of those who took part in the disturbances. Greater Manchester Police Assistant Chief Constable Gary Shewan reported seeing ‘… swarms, hundreds, in fact, thousands of people intent on criminal violence coming into the city centre’ (BBC News 10th August 2011). 383 people were arrested in Greater Manchester for riot related offences, a fraction of those involved. The extent to which these arrested participants are representative of the rioters is unclear.

Ball & Drury (2012) have drawn attention to problems of (mis)interpretation following from an over-reliance on arrest data. These authors argue that ‘commentators including government ministers’ (p.4) misinterpreted these statistics in a manner which propagated popular yet discredited explanations of riots: convergence and submergence. Criticism one relates to convergence accounts while criticism two relates to submergence accounts. Let us first consider criticisms related to the convergence account of rioting. 42

‘Convergence’ represents explanations of rioting whereby ‘uncivilised’ people come together to do what they would do anyway en masse. This simplistic circular explanation informed the work of Lombroso, Sighele and Floyd Allport (Drury & Stott, 2017). It was apparent in 2011 throughout politician’s descriptions of the riots as ‘criminality pure and simple’ (Cameron in The Telegraph 2011).

Ball & Drury (2012) argue that an over reliance on C.C.T.V. footage as a principle tool of investigation led to inherent biases within the statistics and support for convergence. Those who were already known to the police and had their face uncovered were the easiest to apprehend. Accordingly, the police arrested them first. This tactic led to claims such as ‘nine out of ten rioters were already known to the police’ (RCVP 2011, p. 11).

Informed by initial arrest statistics, politicians spoke of most participants as ‘known criminals’ and ‘gang members’ (Cameron 2011; May 2011). This was accepted as evidence that gangs were orchestrating the disturbances. This heralded a knee jerk response that promised a “concerted, all-out war on gangs and gang culture" (Cameron, 2011 in The Telegraph).

However, Ball & Drury (2012) point to the fact that the police will have arrested known gang members first, as they are known to the police and easiest to apprehend. Indeed, Acting Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police reported that this was what happened.

‘Most of the gang members we do in fact know. Most of the gang members we have active investigations against, so they were the ones that we scooped up first off, which is why the percentage was higher at the beginning’ (House of Commons Home Affairs Committee (2011b; reply to Q87) 43

This lead to backtrack on earlier assertions that gangs were driving the riots, admitting “the majority of people involved were not individuals who've been involved in gangs” (May 2011). Furthermore, problems defining gangs and gang membership mean that even the revised figures are highly speculative (Shute 2016).

Ball & Drury (2012) point to the use of problematic circular data, with which ideological arguments were made portraying riot participants as uncivilised others. They recognise these arguments as ideological justifications for simplistic crime control responses. To avoid the problems resulting from an over reliance on arrest data, this thesis engages with both arrested and non- arrested participants.

Criticism 2. Reliance on statistics ignores the intentions behind actions Ball & Drury (2012) continued their criticisms of the ideological use of data in discredited submergence explanations of the 2011 riots. The submergence account of rioting reflects the unsubstantiated understanding that once in a crowd people lose control of themselves. This idea was ‘developed into ‘crowd science’ by Taine and Tarde and popularized by Le Bon’ (Ball & Drury 2012 P.5). It is also reflected in the appeals to the effect of anonymity within a crowd in Zimbardo’s (1969) deindividuation theory.

Following the logic of the submergence explanation, riot participants were often described as ‘mindless’ (Reicher & Stott 2011). Their actions were characterised as indiscriminate attacks (Stott & Drury 2017). Ball & Drury (2012) argue that commentators have used statistics to forward this idea of a mindless crowd indiscriminately attacking random premises and people, in submergence explanations of rioting. 44

Despite evidence of selective targeting of large stores, particularly electrical and clothing shops (Home Office 2011, MOJ 2011, Guardian/LSE 2011), some media accounts have uncritically reported the targeting of local businesses (Adegoke & Lewis 2011). The national statistics show small independent retailers making up 9% of the premises attacked (Ball & Drury 2012 P.16). Although this proportion was small, media accounts have emphasised the riots impact on local businesses (Adegoke & Lewis 2011).

Furthermore, Ball and Drury argue that the statistics on small independent retailers that were attacked was skewed by actions in wealthy areas of London such as

‘, Pimlico, Sloane Square and Notting Hill (Aufheben, 2011). What marked these particular events was the widespread destruction of commercial properties and cars which, within those districts, was far less selective and clearly not based purely on appropriation of commodities.’ (2012 P.17)

Rather than indiscriminate acquisitive attacks on rioters’ own communities, the authors argue that these were expressive targeted attacks on wealth. The conflation of these attacks on wealth with acquisitive crimes obfuscates rioters’ motivations. This arguably lead to a mischaracterisation of attacks on small independent retailers. As such, the geographical context, which is often lost in attempts to provide a national picture of the riots, is recognised as an important factor in understanding riots.

Furthermore, Ball and Drury (2012) argue that a report in the ‘Guardian’ (Meikle 2011) of over 100 families made homeless mis-represented the dwellings as the primary targets. They argued that these figures were skewed by two large fires: one in ‘Carpetright’ in Tottenham; and the other 45

in ‘Reeves Furniture Store’ in Croydon. It was argued that the large number of dwellings could thus be considered collateral damage rather than outright attacks on family homes. Clearly, if a family’s home is destroyed by a fire, they may not be overly concerned with whether the fire was a primary or secondary fire. However, the deliberate targeting of family homes is a different act than the deliberate targeting of a business. Again, close attention to the local context is needed to fully understand the riots.

RCVP (2011) uncritically report accounts of the ‘mindless nature of the riots’ (P.6), further propagating the ideological submergence explanation. However previous riots research (Reicher 1984, Fogelson, 1971) has shown that riot activities are often patterned and targeted. There are limits to crowd’s actions. These limits and patterns challenge the idea of mindless actions. Indeed, RCVP (2011) implicitly recognise these limits and patterns within their typology of rioters and their targets. Some were prepared and targeted their actions specifically, while others resisted engaging in any criminal actions.

However, the submergence explanation is reproduced in one of the typologies of rioters offered by RCVP (2011), the ‘opportunist’ category. The characterisation offered for this category of participant is that they were unprepared and ‘got swept along by the crowd’ (p.37). RCVP’s (2011) first three participant typologies; ‘organised criminals’, ‘violent aggressors’, and ‘late night shoppers’, pose problems for submergence explanations. The defining characteristics of these categories was the level of preparedness and targeting that they engaged in. Participants in these groups made deliberate choices that the submergence explanation cannot account for.

RCVP’s (2011) final, and largest, riot participant category was ‘spectators’. This category also poses problems for submergence explanations, as 46

participants in this category were defined by their ability resist any potential submergence effect of the crowd. As such, submergence explanations are ill equipped to explain the varied actions of riot participants.

The skews in the statistics because of inherent biases in police data, and a lack of local context in coding and categorising actions, are problematic. To understand the 2011 riots, it is necessary to pay attention to the local context of each riot site. The official reports (MOJ 2011, Home Office 2011, RCVP 2011; 2012) all acknowledge the differences between the riots sites. However, official reports left the specifics of each site under-analysed. Treating all actions in the 2011 riots as one single riot overlooks important site-specific differences. A detailed study of the targets of Greater Manchester’s riots is missing from the literature. This thesis makes empirical and theoretical contributions by providing a detailed analysis of the targets of Greater Manchester’s riots in chapters six and seven.

Newburn (2015a) noted that the RCVP was set up reluctantly. He reported former Prime Minister, David Cameron’s initial rejection of the need for an inquiry to uncover the meaning or motivation behind the riot participants’ actions.

‘This was not political protest, or a riot about protest or politics it was common or garden thieving, robbing and looting, and we do not need an inquiry to tell us that.’ (Cameron 2011 in Hansard 11 Aug 2011: Column 1075)

The RCVP was eventually set up but with a limited remit to -

‘listen to views of communities and victims about the riots.’ (RCVP 2011 P.9) 47

Accordingly, although the panel did hear some participants’ voices, it was mainly focused on ‘victims’. Limited and unbalanced investigations can only produce limited and unbalanced findings. Cameron’s statement and the panels limited remit meant that rioters motivations would remain largely assumed in official accounts. This limited understanding of why rioting developed.

The RCVP report recognised that the typology of rioters does not capture the dynamic nature of the events fully.

‘many rioters fit into more than one of the types of rioter explained on the following pages and some may have moved from one type to another during the course of a riot or several riots.’ (RCVP 2011 P.35)

Despite this acknowledgement, there is a limited attempt at understanding the processes that led to participation. Furthermore, these categories are offered as a general typology of participants found in a multitude of events that all have their own distinct character. As such, the report does not categorise riot participants at specific riot sites and offers little explanation of the processes that underlie the dynamic nature of rioting. To avoid problems posed by over reliance on official statistics, this thesis engages with participants about their actions.

Criticism 3. Uncritically accepting the contagion metaphor is an inadequate explanation of the patterns of events. RCVP (2012) uncritically reports the spread of riots using the unsubstantiated contagion metaphor.

‘In talking with local commanders in London and across the country all believed that the ‘contagion’ would not have spread if Tottenham had been contained.’ (P.106) 48

Newburn (2015a) agrees with the RCVP (2012) in considering the spread of disturbances, from Tottenham on Saturday the 6th August to over 66 different local authority areas by Tuesday 9th August, to be an historically unique feature of the 2011 riots. However, Newburn also acknowledges that riots have ‘spread’ before. After the three months between riots in Brixton and Toxteth in 1981, disorder was seen in five cities in England within a week. The series of riots witnessed in 2001 also spread. However, it took weeks from their inception in Oldham in May to their conclusion in Bradford in July. The 2011 riots were not the first time that rioting in one part of England, spread to other parts of England. Although, the speed and extent of the spread of riots in 2011 can indeed be considered unique.

However, the word ‘spread’ suggests a passive, linear, microbial contagion (Warren & Power 2015). Rioting did not spread in a linear fashion. There was a patterned distribution of riots and rioters. Participants were not passive hosts but active agents acting in specific contexts. The contagion metaphor is prominent in crowds’ discourse. Drury (2002) argues that this discourse serves to pathologize the crowd. Rather than this pathologizing terminology, Drury (2002) suggests using empirically supported notions of social influence to understand the social psychology of crowds, rather than unsupported, regressive, atavistic, notions of contagion.

The contagion metaphor is an insufficient atheoretical explanation of the ‘spread’ of rioting. As discrete events, each riot site requires a specific explanation. Starting over 200 miles away and 4 days after the initial Tottenham riot, the Greater Manchester riots were among the last in a series of riots. To begin to understand the ‘spread’ one first must understand how specific riots developed at each site. 49

Criticism 4. Emphasis on the need for more robust policing to prevent rioting ignores the iatrogenic potential of such tactics. The initial police response was widely criticised as too timid in the media and by politicians. Newburn (2015a) recognised politicians’ criticism of policing in the wake of the 2011 riots as a departure from historical responses to riots. Theresa May (2011) and David Cameron (2011) called for more ‘robust’ policing. Furthermore, and Sir called for the use of water cannons. However, the then Home Secretary Theresa May refused to authorise their use (Telegraph 2011).

The assumed ability for more robust policing to contain this contagion was prevalent in riots discourse. HMIC (2011) recognised the need for more robust action but within the tradition of policing by consent. The RCVP report was limited in its remit; however, they did report that, ‘The thin blue line evaporated.’ (RCVP 2011 P. 106)

Sir Hugh Orde, one of the few police officers to have experience of ordering the use of water cannon, supported May’s rejection of water cannon use as being ‘the wrong tactic, in the wrong circumstances’ (2011). HMIC concluded that this was the correct decision as

‘such use could have escalated and inflamed the situation further. The lessons learned in the past in over such equipment should not be lost on policing in the mainland when rioting occurs. Water cannon in particular are an indiscriminate weapon and could have affected innocent bystanders, as well as rioters.’ (HMIC 2011 Paragraph 32)

The emphasis on ‘robust’ policing is overly simplistic and neglects the role that subjectively illegitimate policing actions play in rioters’ motivation for 50

rioting (Guardian/LSE 2011). This type of crime control discourse is enabled by a regressive, atavistic, notion of crowds which has been discredited by close examination of participants’ actions and experiences (Drury 2002). Social identity approaches to public order policing recognise the potential for undifferentiated police actions to unify crowds and empower them to confront police (Drury & Reicher 2000; Stott & Drury 1999; Stott & Drury, 2000; Drury et al 2005). Calls for more ‘robust’ police action ignores this theoretically informed, empirically supported, understanding of intergroup dynamics.

Summary of criticisms of official reports The official reports have helped shape the discourse on the 2011 riots. Initially, they appeared to provide evidence in support of convergence and submergence accounts of rioting. However, on further inspection, the initial statistics were flawed. As a result of over generalised coding, the statistics obfuscate important variations in actions. Official reports’ reluctance to engage with participants has left a gap in the literature where an engagement with riot participants could provide a detailed developmental account of how people became involved in the disturbances at each site.

Despite the flaws, a host of enlightening data is provided on the location, character, and demographics of the riots (MOJ 2011; Home Office 2011). The reports eventually provided an important reality check on interpretations of the extent of gang involvement in the disturbances. Some insight into possible explanatory factors was provided by the RCVP report (2011; 2012) and the MPS (2011) HMIC (2011) and IPCC (2015) provide a basis for understanding the role of the police in the disturbances. However, most official reports suffer from a national focus that miss important local factors in the development of riots, dismiss rioters’ motivations and experiences, 51

and accept the ability of more robust policing to constrain riots. As a result, official reports primarily understand the riots as the actions of inherently criminal, immoral, and irrational people taking advantage of inadequate policing. This atheoretical, static understanding of participants’ moral lacking, is an adequate mechanism to explain the pattern of events constituting the 2011 riots.

Four outstanding issues are recognised as inadequately addressed by official reports.

(i) What motivated riot participants at each site? (ii) Which theoretical model can credibly underpin riots analysis? (iii) How did rioting develop at each riot site? (iv) What were the experiential outcomes for participants?

To address these outstanding issues, it is necessary to engage with both arrested and non-arrested participants on how they came to be involved in the disturbances. Engaging with both sanctioned and non-sanctioned riot participants this thesis will provide a further contribution in understanding the experience of the riots ‘in the round’ (Newburn 2016 P.540). Chapter two now examines the extent to which independent reports and academic studies address these issues and provides the rationale for the current study.

52

2.0 Independent reports

This thesis’ overarching aims are to understand the development of Greater Manchester’s 2011 riots and participants’ subjective experiences. These aims are informed by central research questions, and those in turn are informed by more specific analysis questions. Both research and analysis questions are informed by gaps in the literature on the 2011 riots. To establish these gaps, the thesis now reviews the extent to which independent reports filled gaps left by ‘official’ accounts.

Several independent reports and a plethora of academic research analysed the riots. Media representations of the riots were criticised by a range of scholars (Bowman 2014; Milburn 2012; Cavanagh & Dennis 2012; Murer 2014; Taylor 2012). The focus on families as the locus of immorality has been criticised (Ashe 2014; Coopoosamy 2016). It is neither possible, nor desirable, to review all commentary on the riots. As such, this review is limited to analyses which addressed the outstanding issues identified in the previous chapter (P.51). The extent to which independent reports and academic analyses answers these four outstanding issues is now considered. In doing so, the rationale for this thesis is established.

(i) What motivated riot participants? The absence of explicit investigation of rioters’ motivations in official reports left independent reports to uncover participants’ motivations.

The Guardian newspaper and London School of Economics’ (LSE) ‘Reading the Riots’ study (Guardian/LSE 2011) interviewed sanctioned and non- sanctioned riot participants; addressing a major deficit in official reports. Five themes arose from participant interviews: ‘policing’, ‘gangs’, ‘inequality’, ‘shopping for free’, and ‘social media’. Participants and non- 53

participants differed markedly on several issues thought to be motivating rioters. This highlights the importance of engagement with participants. For example, 75% of non-participants blamed gangs for the disturbances while only 32% of riot participants did (Guardian/LSE 2011). Gangs, or at least gang members, were certainly present in many riot sites. However, attributing an orchestrating role to gangs overplayed their significance. Clearly, one should be alive to the defensive accounts that participants may provide for their actions. However, ignoring participants’ experiences does not aid understanding of the riots.

‘Reading the riots’ (Guardian/LSE 2011) reports participants’ accounts that emphasised issues of economic and social inequality and injustice. Through engaging with participants, this qualitative approach uncovered issues that the quantitative nature of the initial reports could not. Anger and frustration at treatment by the police, in particular, stop and search practices, were widely cited as motivating factors. However, the report also found widespread anger amongst riot participants at a broader range of issues; from the tripling of university fees, withdrawal of educational maintenance allowance (EMA) grant, to the closure of youth services. Anger at the killing of Mark Duggan was also repeatedly mentioned in participants’ accounts. Reading the riots (Guardian/LSE 2011) also reported that many participants took part because of sheer opportunism and the ability to get ‘free stuff’. This report suggests that rather than one simple motivating factor, a range of complex issues motivated rioters. This complexity was also acknowledged by the Home Affairs Select Committee report (2012 P.31 Paragraph 81)

‘if anybody hoped that we would find specific causes, they will be disappointed.’ 54

The Reading the Riots study (Guardian/LSE 2011) provided an initial challenge to the prevailing simple criminality explanations touted in the immediate aftermath of the riots. Engaging with participants revealed a broad range of economic, social and political grievances. The orchestrating role of gangs and social media was found to be exaggerated and more complex than originally perceived by politicians and media commentators. Finally, acquisitive crimes statistics were argued to represent more complex phenomena than simple greed. Through these challenges, the report made a significant contribution to understanding the 2011 riots.

Riot participants had a multitude of background grievances. However, many more people suffer similar hardships and did not riot. The link between background grievances and engaging in riotous collective actions is not a simple deterministic relationship. As one respondent in the RCVP report asked -

‘How does not having GCSEs give you the right to riot?’ (2011 P.11)

While it is important to acknowledge the associations between issues of structural injustices and rioting, it is insufficient to simply point them out. The processes and mechanisms that link background grievances and riotous actions is often missing from accounts that acknowledge participants’ grievances as motivating factors.

Akram (2014) identified a potential mechanism linking background grievances to foregrounded actions. Akram (2014) offered Bourdieu’s (1977) sociological construct ‘the habitus’, as a link between background grievances and riotous actions. She argued that participants’ grievances and motivations remain at a preconscious level until there is a triggering event that ruptures the habitus and brings grievances and motivations to the 55

surface. Because of the longstanding process that defines one’s habitus, Akram argued that grievances and motivations for actions may not be articulated in cogent ways. Rather than a single event, Akram argues the riots should be understood as the end product of a political process.

For Akram (2014) the personal is political. Akram does not suggest that all social relations are political but rather

‘The social is political where there is “(uneven) distribution of power, wealth and resources” that does not occur in all social relations, but will in some, which can therefore be described as being political.’ (Akram 2014 P.377)

Akram (2014) suggests that rioting contests inequalities and should therefore be considered political acts.

The attempt to deal with the interplay between structure and agency with reference to Bourdieu’s (1977) habitus is a welcome addition to the literature. Through linking the habitus to the actions of riot participants, Akram links structural, political, ideological, cultural and contextual factors to participants’ actions. However, there are many people who share similar background grievances who did not riot. Akram’s (2014) paper fails to account for the variation in areas that experienced rioting. The mechanism Akram offers for linking background grievances to foreground riot actions is individualistic, while rioting was collective. Akram’s (2012) individual sociological mechanism is speculative, lacks engagement with participants, and fails to offer a sufficient explanation for the collective nature of the patterned actions in 2011’s riots.

The NatCen report (2011) offered a more localised approach. This report used a qualitative methodology that engaged with young participants and 56

non-participants, leading to insights as to the motivating and inhibiting factors during the disturbances.

Like the RCVP reports (2011,2012), NatCen (2011) categorised different people at the disturbances. The initial categories, ‘watchers, rioters, looters and non-involved’ were broken down further. Watchers broke down into ‘Bystanders’ (who happened to be there) and ‘The Curious’ (who chose to be there). Rioters broke down into ‘Protestors’ (who had a specific set of grievances), ‘Retaliators’ (who acted against the police or the ‘system’), and ‘Thrill-seekers’ (who were looking for excitement). Looters were also broken down into ‘Opportunists’ (who took a rare chance to get free goods), and ‘Sellers’ (who planned their involvement to maximise profits). Finally, the ‘non-involved’ category broke down into ‘Wannabes’ (who would’ve like to have been involved) and ‘Stay-aways’ (those who chose not to get involved) (NatCen 2011).

NatCen’s (2011) report categorised these participants’ according to different motivations including ‘excitement’, ‘free stuff’, ‘getting back at the police’. These themes are also explored in Reading the riots (Guardian/LSE 2011) and RCVP (2012). However, the NatCen (2011) report also offered a more detailed approach to explaining rioters’ motivations, outlining a range of facilitating or inhibiting factors.

The report organises these facilitating or inhibiting factors according to their reported source. Situational, individual, family and societal categories were used to describe these factors. Again, these categories were broken down further. Facilitating situational factors comprised of ‘group processes’, ‘peer pressure’, ‘information’, ‘circumstances’ and the ‘presence of an authority figure’. The same labels were also used to categorise inhibitory situational factors along these five dimensions. 57

A central theme in ‘group processes’ was the dis-inhibitory factor of seeing other people break the law with apparent impunity, repeating a central argument of RCVP (2011; 2012). NatCen (2011) suggest that the decisions of those who witnessed people acting with impunity, but decided not to participate, rested on their ability to

‘counter impulsive “here-and-now thinking”, with thoughts about their future plans or long-term goals, and what they had to lose.’ (P.35)

‘Peer pressure’ was also recognised by NatCen (2011) as influencing young peoples’ decisions on participation. Some reported a constant barrage of messages asking them to come to the riot, while others reported not having the type of friends who would be involved.

‘Let me put it this way: most of my friends are not into that [rioting, crime], but if I had friends that were into it, then I probably would be into it. But most of my friends, if I linked into them and said: “Oh, let’s go rob a store!” they ain’t gonna do it, so it would be me alone. So, I am not going to do it.’ (NatCen 2011 P.39)

‘Circumstances’, such as where events were happening and what the young person was doing, were also held to be important factors in young peoples’ participation. The lack of structure in many young peoples’ lives was present in many accounts of the riots. Again, this chimes with accounts in the ‘Reading the riots’ study.

‘One young Salford man put it succinctly: “If I had a job I wouldn’t be here now, yeah? I’d be working.”’ (Guardian/LSE 2011 P. 25)

However, a simplistic notion of providing more facilities for young people as silver bullet was rejected as people acknowledged a low level of engagement 58

with existing facilities. NatCen (2011) report that a lack of trust in authorities, and an absent sense of ownership, were barriers to this engagement.

The layout of certain cities or boroughs in London led some to feel that rioting was possible, or, on the other hand, too risky. Planning out riots has been a concern of city planners since the Paris 1848 June revolt was crushed. Napoleon III employed Baron Hausmann with a view to prevent riots on easily barricaded narrow streets (Stott & Drury 2017). Perhaps unwittingly, one participant in NatCen’s study reflected Haussmann’s attempt to design out riots, when they observed the inhibitory effect of the limited access and wide-open streets of Canary wharf.

‘I think [Canary Wharf] is too open. … Places like that got looted is one big place, so you could have 1000 people looting. … You could walk away with a telly on your back and the police aren’t taking no notice because you’re one person. Canary Warf … all you’ve got is four roads to get out of there; someone is going to notice some moron with 40-inch plasma on their shoulder and CD player under their arm.’ (NatCen 2011 P. 37)

The importance of the layout of the city centre in deterring major disturbances in other cities has been recognised (Waddington 1989; Newburn 2015b) and will be returned to later in the review.

‘Poor parenting’ as a causal factor was cited as ‘very important’ by 86% of non-rioters and 40% of rioters, (Guardian/LSE 2011). NatCen (2011) also cited poor parenting in the disturbances, another central argument of RCVP (2011; 2012). It is questionable how much control a parent has over older children in the immediate moment. NatCen (2011) acknowledge this point, 59

and also that parents were often at work in the evening. Ashe (2014) and Coopoosamy (2016) criticised analyses which blamed the parents; in particular, single mothers, as side-lining more pressing structural concerns and de-politicising analyses. Perhaps more importantly, most participants were not children. However, the NatCen report was explicitly concerned with young peoples’ participation, so, examination of the parents’ role would seem warranted in this report.

‘Situational factors’ were important in understanding young people’s perceptions, actions, and understandings of the disturbances. However, they were not the sole influence. Individual, family, and societal factors were also acknowledged as shaping young people’s perceptions, actions, and understandings. These factors largely reflected rioters’ background grievances. Antagonistic relationships with authority, previous criminality, alienation from politics, and a lack of prospects, reportedly facilitated involvement in rioting.

‘Family factors’ included ‘family attitudes and behaviours’ and the ‘influence of a community with pro- or anti-social attitudes’ (NatCen 2011). A neighbourhood effect, related to pro or anti-social community attitudes, was evident in many young people’s accounts of the disturbances. The impact of anti-social community attitudes and behaviours, such as low-level criminality, was cited as facilitating riot participation. This was particularly evident in accounts from Salford.

‘Some of the youths near him encouraged him to join in, saying: “Come on, come on ... just pick up a brick, throw it at the police. Come on, come on. For Salford, for Salford.”’ (NatCen 2011 P.21) 60

However, NatCen (2011) also report evidence of communities with pro- social attitudes influencing young people’s decisions not to participate. Communities, even gangs, were reported to have acted together to prevent riots in some areas. Accordingly, young peoples’ participation was found to be facilitated, or inhibited, by anti-social, or pro-social, community attitudes.

The impact of factors outside the individual was evident in what NatCen (2011) describe as ‘societal factors’ - ‘Belonging – having a stake in society’ and ‘Poverty and materialism’. These societal factors ultimately find expression in the individual, family, and community; as such, they relate to factors already discussed. A sense of alienation was apparent in these accounts. A lack of opportunities and activities were cited as causal factors in this alienation. Respondents criticised the government’s austerity program and drew attention to the criminogenic pressures resulting from insufficient benefits.

NatCen (2011, P.8) report that many participants did not know why they had made the decisions they made. To some extent they were unconscious decisions made in the moment, rather than deliberative conscious choices. Those that could discern their thinking process reportedly considered two factors; ‘beliefs about right and wrong’ and ‘assessing the risks’.

NatCen’s (2011, P.8) report places young people’s ‘beliefs about right and wrong’ into three categories: an absolutist account that labelled all criminal actions as unacceptable; a relativist account that recognised some actions as worse than others; and a third that justified rioting. Mirroring the individual and family factors; ‘personal characteristics’ and ‘upbringing’ were cited as influencing a perception that criminality was simply wrong. While relativist accounts rested on the opportunity for people in poverty to get something for free, or the legitimacy of attacking particular premises. 61

The justificatory responses were not simply based on the shooting of Mark Duggan, but also on broader factors, such as, policing, corruption, and inequality.

Further to beliefs about the morality of actions, young people who were able to report their decision making also reportedly assessed the risks, reflecting rational choice theories of crime (Cornish & Clarke 1986). Some participants didn’t view arrest as a serious consequence; either because of having little to lose, or because their actions were one small part in a bigger event. Others took the risk of arrest seriously but mitigated against it by selling goods immediately or covering their faces. The apparent absence of an effective guardian also reportedly influenced young people’s decisions, reflecting a routine activities theory (Cohen and Felson 1979) explanation of crime.

The qualitative nature of the report provided useful insight into the motivations and decision making of riot participants. However, there are several problems that arise from the reports remit and reporting style. Despite offering accounts of mediating factors influencing young people’s decision making, a clear, dynamic, theoretically grounded, empirically supported link between background grievances and riotous actions was not provided.

Furthermore, the report conflates young people’s accounts. This assumes young people in Salford had comparable experiences to young people in Tottenham, and elsewhere. Differences between Tottenham and Salford in; distance, timing, targets, culture, and population, suggest this assumption is tenuous. Finally, NatCen (2011) doesn’t explicitly analyse Manchester city centre’s riots; a particularly pertinent omission for this study. 62

‘Reading the Riots’ (Guardian/LSE 2011) and NatCen (2011) also engage with the widespread belief that the 2011 riots were ‘shopping for free’. As the initial statistics revealed, the most common offences were acquisitive crimes (MOJ 2012). Several commentators offered consumerist self-interest as the motivating factor in the 2011 riots (Williams 2011; Bauman 2011; Treadwell et al 2013). ‘Reading the riots’ (Guardian/LSE 2011) was equivocal on the matter. It recognised participants’ structural and political grievances and also that some participants stated the disturbances were simply ‘a free shopping trip for everyone’ (p.28). Again, the ‘shopping for free’ motivation was replicated in NatCen’s (2011) report.

The debate over whether the 2011 riots were political or consumerist riots is central to the academic discourse on the riots. Stott et al (2017) describe a divided literature on the riots; one section viewing the secondary riots after Tottenham High Road as consumerist ‘copycat’ riots devoid of political grievances (Moxon 2011; Treadwell et al 2013; Winlow & Hall 2015), and another that emphasises background grievances (Akram 2014; Waddington 2012; Moran and Waddington 2015). This division was also present in some participant accounts.

‘everyone started forgetting why they were doing it and just started doing it for fun and stuff’ (17-year old male, London) (Newburn et al 2016).

Treadwell et al (2013) argue the disorder was explained by depoliticized individuals advancing selfish consumer and financial interests. They support Bauman’s (2011) assertion that participants’ actions reflected the dominant ideology of our time – unbridled individualistic consumerism. The absence of a unifying ideology underpinning the riots was asserted, as was rioters failure to - 63

‘locate or articulate the objective structural and processual causes of their marginalization. Neither could they clearly recognize or ethically censure their structural antagonists.’ (Treadwell et al 2013 P.1)

However, several of Treadwell et al’s (2013) respondents voiced anti-police sentiments, describing getting “payback” against the police, and exclaiming “fuck the police!”. While this may not be a well-formed manifesto for change based on incisive political analysis, it recognised the participants’ immediate antagonists, the police. However, these sentiments were challenged by the interviewer in favour of a consumerist explanation which the participants were happy to provide. While Treadwell et al (2013) argue participants’ inability to articulate their concerns, they dismiss the consistent complaints voiced by participants in the ‘Reading the riots’ study (Guardian/LSE 2011) over stop and search, university fees, withdrawal of EMA, the closure of youth services, and anger at the killing of Mark Duggan. The ability for riot participants to provide post-hoc rationalisations in the language of a social worker is rightly questioned (Zizek 2011), however, the same scepticism should be retained for arguments that dismiss participants’ politicised accounts of their actions.

The lack of explicit ideology and focus on looting informs post-political consumerist interpretations.

“It is very clear that in the latest incidents, looting was the main, if not sole, rationale. And what united the youths involved in 2011 was not a shared ideology, but rather their taste in footwear (Nike trainers) and electrical goods (plasma TV screens). In other words, to some extent at least, the main – unconscious – focus was on their identity, as consumers.” (Durodie 2012 P.351) 64

Post-political explanations rely on looting to inform their consumerist assessment. However, the focus on looting may lead researchers to overlook evidence that challenges the consumerist hypothesis. Treadwell et al (2013) briefly mention the shots fired at the police and the killing of three men of Asian descent in Birmingham but quickly brush these events aside in favour of a consumerist focus. They fail to mention the firebombing of a police station in Nottingham. Nor do they mention GMP’s Chief Constable, Peter Fahy’s (2011 in Clifton & Alison 2011) assertion that that disorder in Salford was about attacking the police rather than looting. These were not consumerist acts.

Newburn et al (2015) also warns of the dangers of focusing too much on looting. Although the extent may be novel, looting was not unique to 2011. Platts-Fowler (2013) questions whether looting was even the main feature of the riots. She points out that looting made up only a third of the riot incidents. Accordingly, consumerist motivations in the 2011 riots may be overstated.

In agreement with Newburn (2015b), Stott et al (2017) question the understanding of looting as a non-political act of individual greed. The authors point to the exhortations to ‘grab some missiles’ (P.974) to demonstrate how looting can also form part of anti-police actions. Furthermore, the authors highlight the fact that the police are responsible for preventing property damage. As such, the authors argue it is impossible to ‘separate the attacks on property from power relations with the police’ (p.977). Miles (2014) accepts that looting can be considered a form of protest but questions the strategic utility of this protest to an anti-capitalist resistance. Highlighting a problematic lack of engagement with rioters, Miles assumes that rioters’ intentions were anti-capitalist. This erroneously 65

conflates rioters and anti-capitalist movements such as ‘occupy’. There is little evidence that this was the case.

Consumerist explanations suffer from a similar explanatory deficit as background grievances explanations. People with similar consumerist desires and similar experiences of structural grievances did not riot. This inability to explain variation in riot sites is a problem for both consumerist, and grievance-based accounts. Overlooking variations in rioting ignores a consistent finding that each riot had its ‘own DNA’ (RCVP 2011 P.7). Ball & Drury (2011), offered a typology of three different kinds of riot; community anti-police riots, commodity riots, and riots based on attacking wealth. Overarching explanations of the 2011 riots as one phenomenon are inadequate. It is necessary to provide localised analyses of each riot site to examine variations in rioters’ motivations.

The Greater Manchester riots were amongst the final disturbances witnessed in 2011. Variation between the two central riot sites in Greater Manchester, Salford and Manchester city centre, was noted by the then Chief Constable of Greater Manchester police Sir Peter Fahy.

‘Certainly, most of it in Manchester was about getting goods, breaking into places and stealing things. Salford, I think was slightly different. It was more about attacking us and the fire services.’ (Clifton & Alison 2011) As such, Greater Manchester provides a privileged arena to examine the extent to which the secondary riots were post-political consumerist riots or political grievance-based riots.

A central deficit in the debate on whether secondary rioting in 2011 was motivated by background grievances or post-political consumerism is a 66

sound empirical basis. Furthermore, explanations of secondary rioting as motivated by background grievances or post-political consumerism both lack a sound theoretical mechanism linking motivations and actions.

This section has established a need to develop a nuanced, localised, empirically based understanding of rioters’ motivations at secondary riot sites. This entails detailed analysis of participant accounts, intergroup dynamics, and targets. This thesis engages with arrested and non-arrested participants and provides novel empirical police data on secondary rioting in Greater Manchester. In doing so, this thesis contributes to understanding rioters’ motivations in secondary rioting through close examination of development of rioting in Greater Manchester, the premises targeted, and participants’ accounts.

(ii) Which theoretical model can underpin analysis of rioting? Official reports and many independent studies (e.g. RCVP 2011; Guardian/LSE 2011; Treadwell et al 2013; Akram 2014;) lack a credible theoretical underpinning to their accounts of rioting. The theoretical perspective adopted in this thesis is examined in more detail in chapter three. However, the lack of a credible theoretical underpinning independent analyses necessitates a preliminary theoretical discussion.

NatCen’s (2011) focus was to describe what happened and explicate young people’s decision making regarding involvement in the riots, rather than to provide a theoretical explanation. Despite this focus, some explanatory theories of interest were offered. NatCen’s situational factors cite group processes as both facilitator and inhibitory factors. This acknowledgement that group processes can inhibit as well as facilitate engagement in riots appears to be a change from the pathologizing of collective action evident in early work on the crowd (Le Bon 1895). However, NatCen’s (2011) report 67

relies on Zimbardo’s (1969) de-individuation thesis. The NatCen report (2011) describes de-individuation as the

‘process whereby individuals ignore their own individuality and social norms. When deindividuation occurs, people are presumed to be less susceptible to feelings of guilt and fear, and less concerned with “accepted social standards” and the consequences of ignoring them.’ (p.62)

De-individuation (Zimbardo 1969) is an intuitively attractive explanation of how people behave differently in crowds than when alone. However, Postmes and Spears’ (1998) meta-analysis of experimental social psychology research on ‘de-individuation’ shows that this view is flawed. The authors found no generic behavioural effects of de-individuation. Rather than being motivated by anonymity to ignore social norms, people in crowds were found to adhere to the shared norms of the crowd they identified with. This is not a loss of control (C.F. Le Bon 1895; Allport 1924), but a shift in the locus of control from an individual identity to social identity. These social identities are replete with descriptive and prescriptive norms that delineate expectations crowd members have of each other, and outlines the limits of acceptable group actions.

While rioters may hide their identity from the police, their identities are often known to other crowd members. For example, in an analysis of ostensibly ‘recreational’ rioting by young people in Belfast, Leonard (2010) notes the ability of young rioters to enhance their status within their in- group through rioting. One respondent noted how they held another boy in high regard because of his rioting. 68

‘See Freeman, like he’s afraid of nobody. You want to see him rioting. He’s class.’ (Leonard 2010 p.42)

Riot participants were known to other participants. They acted according to perceived social norms and expectations, rather than ignoring them. The deindividuation hypothesis (Zimbardo 1969) fails to account for the difference in behaviour between NatCen’s (2011) different categories. Nor can it explain movement between categories. Deindividuation is an inadequate explanation for participants’ behaviour during the riots.

NatCen (2011) also highlight the self-threat model (Campbell and Sedikides 1999) as a theoretical model of interest. The self-threat model (Campbell and Sedikides 1999) describes how self-serving attributions are used to justify illegal behaviour to protect self-esteem. NatCen’s report does not offer an in-depth analysis of this theoretical perspective in relation to the riots, however, it does offer some examples of self-serving attributes.

‘Common examples of self-serving attributions to justify antisocial behaviour are rationalisations that “I was not the only person to do X” or “seeing others behave like Y made me feel it was OK to behave that way also”’ (2011 p.62)

These are examples of self-serving attributions; rather than specific claims made by people they spoke to. Researchers should be alive to participants’ defensive accounts of their actions. However, rather than explaining participants’ behaviour, this theory explains participants’ accounts of their behaviour. Furthermore, the question of why some engaged in behaviour that was justified through self-serving attributions, while others, who could appeal to the same justifications, did not, still stands. Accordingly, the self- 69

threat model (Campbell & Sedikides 1999) is also an unsatisfactory explanation of the disturbances.

The most prominent theoretical account of urban rioting is Waddington et al’s (1989) ‘flashpoints’ model. This model aids understanding which areas are likely to experience rioting and is therefore relevant to analysing rioting at specific sites.

Waddington et al’s ‘flashpoints’ model (1989) consists of 6 levels; the ‘structural’, the ‘political/ideological’, the ‘cultural’, the ‘contextual’, the ‘situational’ and the ‘interactional’. These levels range from the first four higher order levels that consider the material circumstances of riot hit areas (structural), the relationships between social groups and the state and its institutions (political/ideological), social groups understanding of the world (cultural), and the long and short-term context for disorder (contextual), for example relationships with the police or other out groups. The model considers the more immediate spatial and social determinants of disorder in the situational level, and the assessment of the immediate dynamics between groups involved in the riot, in the interactional level.

Official reports implicitly engage with several levels of the flashpoint model (Waddington et al 1989). The RCVP reports (2011;2012) highlight the material deprivation of riot participants and riot hit areas. However, they also note that not everyone within these areas rioted, and that not all deprived areas experienced rioting. As such, official reports acknowledged some level of structural influence but deny a simple causal role.

The contextual level of analysis is flirted with by RCVP’s (2011) report when they discuss the problems with stop and search. However, it is through reports (Guardian/LSE 2011; NatCen 2011) that we really get a 70

sense of the political, cultural, and contextual conditions in the 2011 riots. Yet, these analyses do not explicitly engage with the most prominent model for understanding rioting. Other than the initial events in Tottenham, the development of which are discussed in some detail, the situational and interactional levels of Waddington et al’s (1989) ‘flashpoints’ model are largely overlooked by both official and independent reports. It may be unreasonable to expect these reports to analyse the situational and interactional conditions for each riot site in 66 areas. However, it is only through fine-grained analysis of riot sites that a satisfactory explanation of the secondary rioting can be offered.

Waddington et al’s (1989) ‘flashpoints’ model offers these levels of analysis in an attempt to impose some coherence on a messy social phenomenon. Bagguley & Hussain (2008: 12) criticise ‘flashpoints’ for ‘imposing a false level of coherence and unity on the masses involved in the disorder’. However, any attempt to impose some analytic order on messy social phenomena is open to this criticism.

Waddington et al (1989) do not claim the model predicts when and where riots will happen. It is also acknowledged that not all levels are necessary for rioting to break out. Rioting can for example break out in areas of relative affluence. Furthermore, even if some of the higher order conditions are present this does not mean riots are inevitable. For example, many deprived areas with a history of police community antagonism did not riot in 2011. As such the model is not a deterministic mechanism for predicting riots, however, it does provide a systematic approach to the analysis of riots.

Newburn (2015b) used Waddington et al’s (1989) ‘flashpoints’ model to analyse why riots do not develop. Leeds and Bristol were used as case studies of how large-scale disturbances did not develop in areas where one 71

may have expected them to develop. The specifics of how large-scale rioting was avoided will be dealt with in answer to the subsequent question. For now, it is sufficient to note that Newburn emphasises the importance of the interactional level of the ‘flashpoints’ model in avoiding large-scale rioting. Newburn also uses a second theoretical approach that focuses on the processes and dynamics of this interactional level of analysis, the social identity approach (Reicher 1984; 1996; Stott and Reicher, 1998).

Interactions between the police and participants were found to be fundamentally important in explaining the absence of large scale rioting in Newburn’s (2015b) study. Dynamic intergroup interactions were also found to have been instrumental in the development of large scale rioting in Tottenham and Hackney (Stott et al 2017). The ‘Elaborated Social Identity Model’ (‘ESIM’, Drury & Reicher, 2000; Drury et al 2005; Drury & Reicher 2005; Stott & Drury, 2000; Stott & Reicher, 1998a, 1998b) provides an empirically supported, dynamic account of how intergroup interactions escalate towards conflict. Accordingly, it explicates the processes alluded to in ‘flashpoints’ interactional level of analysis (Waddington et al 1989). It is particularly adept at explaining the observed patterns of rioting through the intergroup dynamics of developing riots. Furthermore, it provides an empirically supported link between background concerns and foreground actions. The ability of Waddington et al’s ‘flashpoints’ model (1989) and the ESIM to explain the patterns of rioting observed in 2011 means they are considered strong theoretical models through which rioting can be understood.

The social identity approach to collective actions was misunderstood by Akram (2014) as a regression to the crowd mind approach of Le Bon (1895), and Allport (1924). Aiello & Pariante (2012) also misunderstood the social 72

identity approach in their broadly consumerist explanation of rioting. However, Aiello & Pariante (2012) write from a clinical psychology perspective. They offer a highly speculative attempt to extrapolate an individual psychopathological construct to group behaviour. They assume the pathological nature of individual rioters, characterise rioting as mindless, and explain the spread of rioting as social contagion. The empirically supported social identity approach to collective action has successfully refuted these atavistic assumptions (Stott & Drury 2017). Furthermore, they fail to engage with participants and offer no analysis of the premises targeted. Further in-depth discussion of the social identity approach is offered in chapter three.

This thesis’ primary theoretical contribution to ESIM is through exploring how intergroup dynamics operated in Greater Manchester’s 2011 riots. In doing so it further elucidates how the interactional level of Waddington et al’s (1989) ‘flashpoints’ model operates. The ESIM account of how intergroup dynamics escalate towards conflict is discussed in answers to subsequent questions and in further detail in chapter three. Let us now return to the question of how rioting developed at specific sites.

(iii) How did the riots develop at each riot site? Newburn recognised the spread of rioting in 2011 as a significant historical departure (Newburn 2015a). Accordingly, the question of how rioting developed at each site is fundamental to understanding the 2011 riots. An approach to understanding how and why rioting developed in certain places is aided by an understanding of how and why large-scale rioting was avoided where it may have been expected. Newburn (2015b) offered such an approach. 73

Newburn (2015b) analysed interactions between a potentially riotous crowd, and police, to explain the absence of large-scale rioting. It was argued that Chapeltown, (Leeds) and St. Pauls (Bristol), had characteristics that Waddington et al’s ‘flashpoints’ model (1989) argued were conducive to rioting. Both areas had riot-facilitating structural, political and cultural properties such as high levels of deprivation, antagonistic relationships with police, and a history of riots (Newburn 2015b). Additionally, in Chapeltown, a young Black man was shot on 8th August, ostensibly by Asian youths (Guardian 2011), providing a further riot-facilitating context. Furthermore, the initial police response was problematic. Officers initially showed up prepared for a riot, rather than a murder investigation. These police tactics had the potential to inflame an already tense situation. To make matters worse, a police dog bit an innocent onlooker, another incident with the potential to incite violence. However, large-scale violence was avoided in Leeds despite the tension.

Newburn (2015b) acknowledged that there were several features within the political, cultural and contextual and situational levels of Waddington et al’s ‘flashpoints’ (1989) model that may have ameliorated riot risks: increased investment in Chapeltown; increased democratic participation including a culture of peaceful political marches to air grievances; and the absence of multinational shops in Chapeltown. However, Newburn argued the interactional level of analysis was the ‘crucial, explanatory level in these particular cases’ (Newburn 2015b P.137 emphasis in original). The social identity approach explicates the dynamic processes in Waddington et al’s (1989) interactional level of analysis.

The absence of large scale rioting in Chapeltown was attributed to the de- escalation of tensions. Reicher et al (2004) developed four key features of 74

public order policing from the social identity approach to collective actions, to avoid escalating tension. It was proposed that police should: (1) educate themselves about the cultural norms and legitimate practices within the crowd they police; (2) facilitate legitimate behaviour; (3) be capable of communicating their intentions clearly; and (4) differentiate between groups and individuals within the crowd to avoid indiscriminate actions.

Newburn (2015b) argued that adhering to these four features of good public order policing was fundamental in avoiding large-scale rioting. The leader of Leeds city council recognised the importance this approach.

‘The difference was that the police listened, and changed what was originally a confrontational approach and changed to a neighbourhood-supporting role. That was decisive. And they did that as a result of people saying to them, ‘you are actually provoking young people, and not calming them’. And suddenly they changed the profile of the way they were policing. The elder leaders of the churches, of the community, of the mosques, also played an incredibly positive role. And so did the youth workers.’ (P.138)

The change of tactic decreased perceptions of illegitimate police action that may have unified the crowd and legitimated transgressive actions. In doing so, motivation for riotous actions within the crowd was minimal and not supported by the crowd as a whole. Thus, serious disorder was prevented.

Leeds did not escape the 2011 riots unscathed. However, large scale disturbances were avoided. Newburn’s (2015b) analysis draws attention to the importance of immediate intergroup dynamics between the police and a potentially riotous crowd. This fine-grained approach is important in understanding the presence or absence of rioting. 75

In Bristol, similar riot-facilitating features were present. The St. Pauls area has a largely deprived population and a history of antagonism with the police. It also has a history of riots: in 1980, riots resulted from a police operation against a café (Reicher 1984). In April 2011, the opening of a Tesco and, later, the eviction of a nearby squat in another area of the city, Stokes Croft, both led to rioting (Taylor 2011). Accordingly, rioting may have been expected here too. However, interactional and situational features of Waddington et al’s model (1989) were understood to have influenced the absence of large scale rioting.

In Bristol, the more deprived estates are further away from the central shopping area. As such, the police, informed by their earlier experience of rioting, were largely able to effectively prevent potential rioters from reaching potential riot sites. While firm policing in preventing potential rioters reaching shopping districts was important, the police also reportedly de-escalated tension.

‘I saw a particular incident where … a senior officer ordered younger officers to calm down. And you could feel what had been a previously tense crowd watching this relax as well. Rather than getting heavy handed, that one officer managed to dissipate a lot of tension. And that’s how Bristol police operate. (Community activist)’ (Newburn 2015b P.139)

Congruent with accounts of the success of Leeds community workers’ communication with a tense crowd, community workers in Bristol also reported calming potentially riotous crowds. In summary, Newburn found

‘clear evidence that a number of ‘interactional’ factors or, more particularly, matters that look rather like some of Reicher et al.’s 76

(2004) key principles derived from the Social Identity Model, played a significant role in the de-escalation of tensions and the mitigation of the potential for disorder.’ (2015b P.140)

Newburn’s (2015b) study found support for social identity based understanding of the intergroup dynamics in Leeds and Bristol. The de- escalation of police tactics and the ability of youth workers to communicate effectively with the crowd were found to be largely responsible for preventing a riot where one may have been expected. This finding emphasises the importance of intergroup dynamics when explaining the avoidance of serious rioting. It also challenges the assumption that more ‘robust’ policing would prevent rioting.

Stott et al (2017) used the social identity approach to examine why riots did occur, at the initial riot in Tottenham on Saturday 6th August, and a secondary event in Hackney on Monday 8th August. The authors emphasised the significance of intergroup interactions in the development of both riots. In so doing they challenged structural determinist explanations of rioting (Akram 2014; Waddington, 2012; Moran and Waddington 2015). Furthermore, through close examination of rioters’ targets they question the individualistic consumerism explanations (Moxon 2011; Treadwell et al 2013, Winlow & Hall 2015).

The authors outline 4 points of significance in the Tottenham riot: First, the riot took place 48 hours after the shooting of Mark Duggan and the following lack of communication with the family. Second, violence began after a series of interactions in which the police were perceived to have acted illegitimately against crowd members. Third, there was a systematic patterning of collective actions focused around the police, criminal justice system property, while attacks on businesses tended to be limited to 77

‘outsiders’ businesses. Fourth, there was evidence of changed power relations which changed the significance of attacking businesses.

The authors argue that a similar intergroup dynamic unfolded in Hackney on Monday 8th. Despite the similarities between the Tottenham and Hackney events, there was one glaring difference, the temporal order. Stott et al (2017) argued that the Tottenham riot changed the context within which the Hackney riot took place. People therefore already had a

‘heightened sense of grievance, a sense of empowerment and an unwillingness to tolerate encounters with the police that they experienced as oppressive’ (Stott 2017 P.976).

It is argued that in both sites, the police acted in an illegitimately aggressive manner. Furthermore, participants considered these police actions to be symbolic of shared experiences of illegitimate policing. A series of symbolic interactions took place at each site, however, two in particular were highlighted. In Tottenham, the critical incident was when a 16-year-old girl was reportedly manhandled. In Hackney, it was the stop and search of two Black men. The authors argue these incidents united the crowds in opposition to the police. Stott et al (2017) argue that the riots were not simply the inevitable outcome of pre-existing structural determinants and that the Hackney riot was not simply a copycat riot. Instead the importance of intergroup interactions is emphasised. The authors demonstrate how a series of actions, initiated by the police, increased tensions. The symbolic nature of these actions was argued to have united a crowd of previously differentiated people into a coherent entity that empowered crowd members and legitimated transgressive actions. 78

While the authors reject simple structural determinist explanations (Akram 2014; Waddington, 2012; Moran and Waddington 2015), they do not deny the importance of these shared grievances. Stott et al (2017) point to the perception, and reality, of the heavy use of stop and search, particularly on Black people, in both Tottenham and Hackney. They also point to the closure of youth services which led young people to be in increased contact with the police. However, rather than a static account, Stott et al (2017) offer a dynamic developmental account of rioting. These shared negative experiences of policing provided the basis for understanding foreground police actions. This shared understanding unified the crowd in opposition to the police. The more unified crowd provided support for transgressive actions that empowered others to confront the police. As such, the actions of rioters in Tottenham and Hackney may be understood in the context of a shared social identity. However, this social identity was not static but emerged through the immediate intergroup dynamics. This argument is congruent with the observed, patterned, rioting.

Social identity, legitimacy, and interactions are identified as key features through which the emergence, and limits, of collective violence can be understood. Social identity is considered the mediating mechanism between the background social relations, the foregrounded intergroup dynamics and the contours of collective violence. This crucial mediating link is largely missing from grievance-based accounts of rioting.

Newburn (2015b) used previous interviews with participants from the ‘Reading the riots’ study (Guardian/LSE 2011) as background material. However, he states that the 35 interviews carried out in Leeds and Bristol comprised of ‘a combination of residents in the local communities concerned, `community leaders’ and respondents from the local police 79

service and local council.’ (P.128). As such it is not clear how these interactions were experienced by participants. Similarly, Stott et al’s (2017) analysis primarily uses a triangulated account of secondary sources as substitutes for primary in situ data. While this data is arguably more faithful to the context and sequence of events than post hoc data, analysis of participants’ experiential outcomes, particularly in the light of the extraordinary criminal justice response (Lightowlers & Quirk 2015), also requires analysis.

Baudains et al (2012; 2013a; 2013b) offered a series of papers examining how rioting spread within London. In the first paper Baudains et al (2012, p.29) demonstrated that ‘riot events clustered and diffused spatially.’ This is an important formal mathematical recognition of both the rationality of rioters in identifying riot sites, and confirmation that rioting did indeed spread. The premises established in this initial analysis were developed in subsequent papers.

A second paper tested three explanatory theories; Crime Pattern Theory (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1993), Social Disorganisation (Shaw and McKay, 1969), and Collective Behaviour and Contagion (Bernasco 2006; Wortley 2001; Johnson 2008). The authors found that ‘rioters were more likely to engage in the disorder close to their home location and to select areas that contained routine activity nodes and transport hubs, and they were less likely to cross the Thames River.’ (Baudains et al 2013a p.252). Accordingly, the authors interpret these findings as support for the explanatory and predictive utility of Crime Pattern Theory even in extreme circumstances such as riots. Furthermore, the presence of riot events on one day increased the likelihood of that site witnessing further riot events the next day. This observation was cited as support for Collective Behaviour and 80

Contagion explanations. Social Disorganisation explanations were not well supported.

With rationality and spread established, Baudains et al (2013b) went on to examine the ways in which rioting spread and considered the effect of the police. The authors differentiated between ‘four spacetime signatures: “flashpoints” of disorder which appear out of nowhere, “containment” where already affected areas experience further events, “escalation” whereby rioting continues in affected areas and spreads to those nearby, and “relocation” whereby the disorder moves from one locality to those adjacent.’ The analysis also employed a median split over the four days of the London riots in order to examine the impact of the vastly increased police numbers towards the end of the riot.

Using mathematical modelling the author’s found evidence to support the containment and escalation in the first half of the analysis; whereby rioting persisted in a given location and also spread to nearby sites. The authors interpret this as evidence of spatial contagion. Furthermore, the authors also found evidence of ‘flashpoints’, where riot events appeared at sites where none had taken place in nearby spatial or temporal dimensions. The authors allude to the potential of organisation via social media to explain these flashpoint riot events.

In contrast the second half of the analysis found no evidence of containment, escalation, flashpoints or relocation. The authors report that riot events took place where expected given the previous finding that some areas and times where more attractive sites than others. Accordingly, the authors suggest that ‘the police not only suppressed the overall level of the disorder, as has been argued by various re-ports since the riots (e.g. House of Commons (2011)), but also suppressed the role of contagion processes 81

(e.g. escalation and flashpoints) which was a feature during the first half of the disorder.’ (Baudains et al p218).

While the formal mathematical recognition of the rationality and the typology of spread the authors propose is an important contribution, problems remain at the heart of their analyses. Firstly, the conflation of all riotous activity is problematic. Ball & Drury (2012) reported a typology of riots that included anti- police rioting, consumerist rioting and anti-wealth rioting. The different forms of rioting are quite likely to involve different motivations and decision-making processes. Secondly, the role of the police is uncritically assumed to be an unalloyed deterrent to rioting. The role of the police in the death of Mark Duggan, and the intense anti-police violence witnessed at several sites, should clarify the authors view of the police as simply deterring rioters is problematic. Thirdly, the statistical methods the authors employ ignores the voice of the participants. While there is merit in such a statistical approach, it is limited by this selective analysis of evidence. Specifically, the subjective understandings and dynamic intergroup processes are overlooked. Citing Myers (2000), the authors emphasise that contagion should not be considered rioters’ loss of free will as they are swept along in the crowd. Instead they emphasise rioters rational decision-making abilities in line with Berk (1974) and Mason (1984). However, the rationality that they emphasise is a narrow rationality based solely on the individual divorced from their social group. While the recognition of rational actors is welcome, the focus on individual rationality, divorced from the group context, blinds the authors to the potentially rich source of influence group membership involves. This thesis addresses these limitations through paying close attention to the specific riot actions, participants subjective 82

understandings, group processes, and the role of the police in the development of rioting across two sites in Greater Manchester.

Study of rioting in Greater Manchester has been limited. As mentioned Lightowlers & Shute (2011) analysed the link between deprivation and rioting. SARF (2012) offered a policy orientated response to rioting in Greater Manchester. This response largely assumed the causes of rioting to be located within deficient individuals and ignored the interactions in the development of rioting. Valluvan et al (2013) offer a critique of consumerist interpretations of rioting as obfuscating structural grievances, relying on a racialised discourse, and legitimating regressive policy responses. Pieri (2014) offered an analysis of the post-riot policing practices. While these studies make valuable contributions to the literature, they lack engagement with participants and overlook the development of rioting itself.

The development of rioting in Salford has been studied in more detail. NatCen (2011) offer a timeline of Salford’s riot. Outlining the sequence of events is crucial to understanding the development of rioting. However, NatCen’s (2011) study of Salford’s riot omits detailed analysis of the interactions which escalated into rioting. Jeffery & Jackson (2012) offer a political sociology of Salford’s riot emphasising the effect of gentrification on Salford. Jeffery & Tufail (2015) demonstrated that the police were the primary target, while looting was a secondary activity. However, the authors omit an explicit theoretical examination of the development of rioting. This thesis contributes to the literature through offering a detailed account of the development of rioting in both sites in Greater Manchester’s riots. This account is analysed in relation to ESIM’s understanding of how intergroup dynamics escalate towards conflict. As such, it makes significant empirical and theoretical contributions to the literature. 83

Both Newburn (2015b) and Stott et al (2017) provide accounts of the variation in riots according to riot site. However, there was also substantial variation in activity within the riot sites. Rioting did not develop amongst all attendees. Both NatCen (2011) and RCVP (2011) report spectators to be the most numerous people in attendance. The question then arises of why some people were empowered to transgress the law while others were not. An absence of theoretically informed, in-depth engagement with participants has meant that their subjective experiences understood within a theoretical analysis of the development of rioting in Greater Manchester is missing from the literature. As such, in addition to a triangulated account of the development of rioting in Greater Manchester, this thesis will make a theoretical contribution to the ESIM (Drury & Reicher 2005) account of understanding riots by exploring participants’ subjective experiences.

(iv) What were the experiential outcomes for participants? Experiential outcomes of collective actions are argued to be important for two reasons: first, they provide insight into the meaning of participants’ actions (Newburn et al 2015); second, experiential outcomes influence further participation (Drury et al 2005). Accordingly examining participants’ experiential outcomes can contribute to the debate on whether secondary rioting was political grievance-based rioting or post political consumerist rioting.

Studies which engaged with participants often reported participants finding joy in overturned power relations.

“that first day it happened will always be the best day of my life” (Lewis 2011)

This joy was reportedly a result of a sense of freedom, power and control. 84

‘We had total control of the precinct. There’s a massive police station there, and they couldn’t do anything. It was ours for a day.’ (Clifton 2011).

Newburn et al (2016) argued that

‘the rioters’ descriptions of what it felt like for them to be there begins to shed light on what it meant for them to be there.’ (emphasis in original P.16).

Not everyone will feel joy at the police impotence. For some, it was a terrifying experience because it meant something different for them.

Newburn et al’s (2016) paper is perhaps the most significant contribution to understanding rioters’ subjective experiences. In addition to positive emotions, participants’ anger, fear, disappointment and empowerment were also reported. Riot participants who were empowered by this temporary overturning of power relations felt so because they were previously on the receiving end of unequal power relations. In Newburn’s words,

‘The fleeting experiences reported by the rioters – of excitement and exhilaration, of power, of togetherness in the crowd and of an intensified sense of self – all served to highlight what ordinarily was missing. In short, the rioters’ accounts of their experiences reeked of alienation.’ (Newburn et al 2016 P.17)

The reports of excitement, power, togetherness and intensified sense of the self are congruent with the social identity explanation of experiential outcomes of collective actions. Drury et al (2005) explain the experience of empowerment through ‘Collective Self-Objectification’ (CSO), actions that 85

bring the world into line with one’s social identity, demonstrating that one’s social identity is powerful.

Conversely, the re-imposition of out-group power is understood to be a disempowering experience. The extraordinary criminal justice response that followed the riots constitute a re-imposition of outgroup power. Accordingly, this should be perceived as disempowering. Lightowlers and Quirk (2015) have demonstrated how at every stage of the criminal justice process there was an inflationary ‘uplift’ effect. This uplift effect resulted in people: being arrested for actions they may not have normally been arrested for; being charged for more serious offences than was strictly necessary; being heard in Crown rather than Magistrates courts; being sentenced to custody where they may have otherwise avoided custody; and serving on average sentences 3 times as long as people served for similar crimes the previous year. Understanding the impact of these extraordinary criminal justice sanctions is fundamental to understanding participants’ experiences. Accordingly, this study engages with both sanctioned and non-sanctioned participants.

Study Rationale Through this review, gaps in the literature have been established that inform this study’s research aims. Official reports were limited, largely by not engaging with participants, and attempting to explain the riots as one phenomenon. This led to the identification of several outstanding issues. The limited extent to which these outstanding issues were answered by independent reports and academic studies informs the studies central research questions.

A central debate on the 2011 riots is considered to be the extent to which secondary rioting was political, grievance-based rioting or post-political 86

consumerist rioting. Deficits in explanations on both sides of the argument have been identified. Both sides lacked a localised empirical basis. This study makes an empirical contribution to the literature by addressing this issue through analysis of novel participant accounts, police, and fire service data on rioting in Greater Manchester. Furthermore, both sides of the debate lacked a sound, empirically supported, theoretical basis for their arguments. Waddington et al’s (1989) ‘flashpoints’ model and the ESIM (Drury & Reicher 2000) are argued to be strong theoretical models for understanding the riots. Analysis informed by these two models enables a significant contribution to the development and meaning and experiences of secondary rioting in 2011.

This thesis’ primary theoretical contribution is to ESIM (Drury & Reicher 2000) through an examination of how intergroup dynamics operated in two riot sites in Greater Manchester. Furthermore, analysing the intergroup dynamics of Greater Manchester’s riots contributes to understanding how the processes in Waddington et al’s (1989) interactional level of analysis relates to the type of rioting observed in the two sites. These aims are represented in the study’s central research questions:

1. What premises were targeted by rioters? 2. What motivated riot participants at each site in the Greater Manchester riots? 3. How did intergroup dynamics operate during the development of Greater Manchester’s riots? 4. How did the intergroup dynamics relate to variations in rioting between the two riot sites? 5. How can intergroup dynamics explain the involvement of some study participants in riotous activity while others remained spectators? 87

6. Did participants experience empowerment as a result of their involvement in the riots? If so, how and why?

The social identity approach to understanding collective action and, particularly, the Elaborated Social Identity Model (Drury & Reicher 2000; Stott & Drury 1999; Stott & Drury 2000; Drury & Reicher 2005; Drury et al 2005) is central to these research questions. The subsequent chapter now returns to a more in-depth discussion of this theoretical framework.

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3.0 The social identity approach to understanding collective action

This chapter provides an in-depth discussion of this thesis’ central theoretical approach, the social identity approach to understanding collective actions. In doing so, the origin and development of the approach, are examined. This discussion is not intended as a comprehensive review of all social identity research. Instead it is intended to establish the relevance of the social identity approach in understanding the development, meaning, and experiences if rioting in Greater Manchester on 9th August 2011. Exploring this approach leads to a set of analysis questions that facilitate answering the central research questions.

The social identity approach to understanding collective actions is based on of two theories; social identity theory (SIT) (Tajfel & Turner 1979) and self- categorisation theory (SCT) (Turner 1982; 1991; Turner et al 1987; 1994). Both theories are concerned with the ways in which individuals perceive themselves and others, and are perceived by others, as members of social groups. The definition of a certain person as a member of a social group e.g. ‘Irish’, is what is meant by their social identity. These groups exist on many levels e.g. nationality, gender, sexual orientation, profession, class etc. The relative importance of these different groupings at different times is discussed further in the following sections. For now, it is sufficient to note that social identity is defined as -

‘the individual’s knowledge that he [or she] belongs to certain social groups together with some emotional and value significance to him [or her] of this group membership.’ (Tajfel 1972 P.13) 89

A core contribution of social identity theory is the transformation of the concept of identity from a purely individual identity, to a continuum of identity. This approach considers a group’s social identity as equally as important as a narrow individual identity. These identities are argued to be fundamental to understanding thought, behaviour, and affect.

Social identity’s concern with similarity and difference makes it a relational term (Reicher et al 2010). One’s social identity is shared with others and provides a basis for collective social action. The meaning of one’s social identity is informed by a collective history and present. Accordingly, Reicher et al (2010) argue social identity is a ‘pivot between the individual and society’. (P.2)

The importance of the group had been demonstrated in classic social psychology studies (e.g.; Sherif 1961; Asch 1956). The horrors of the Holocaust, where millions of people were killed because of group membership, informed much of post-war social psychology. However, findings were often explained in terms of individualist notions of conformity, self-interest, or material gain. The group was thought to impair the individual’s judgement. However, the minimal group studies (Tajfel et al 1971) produced observations that could not be explained by appeals to ‘objective’ self-interest or material gain. Accordingly, the importance of social identity began to be realised. These studies are referred to as the minimal group paradigm (MGP).

In these studies, participants were assigned to one of two groups, apparently on a preference for paintings, but in reality, assignment was random. Participants did not meet anyone from their own group (in-group) or from the other group (out-group). There was no history or conflict between the two groups. They had no knowledge of their in-group or the out-group, other 90

than their membership in one. Their task was to assign rewards to two other fictional people, one from their in-group and one from the out-group. The findings indicated a large degree of in-group favouritism. The key finding was that participants tended to maximise their in-groups relative gain at the expense of absolute gains for their in-group. That is, participants chose to allocate less total reward when this was offset by a larger difference between the in-group and out-group. These findings could not be explained by existing theories of individual self-interest, since the allocator would not benefit. Indeed, the allocator’s group often received fewer rewards in the pursuit of relative positive differentiation. Tajfel et al (1971) argued that the findings could only be understood if one accepted that participants defined themselves not as an individual in relation to other individuals, but as an in- group member in relation to an out-group.

The minimal nature of these studies was designed to study the minimal conditions under which intergroup bias could be elicited. In the real world there are many comparison groups and many dimensions of comparison, such as; intelligence, wit, looks, income, skills etc. However, in the MGP lab there was one out-group and one dimension of comparison. The study created the perfect conditions for intergroup competition. Discrimination was the key response in these particular conditions. The minimal design increased the power of these conditions. Accordingly, the often-made interpretation that simple division into groups was sufficient to elicit intergroup competition is incorrect. Discrimination is not the inevitable outcome of belonging to a group, but it is the outcome the MGP design favours. The various forms of differentiation outside the lab rely on a host of contextual factors within the wider social world. When the wider social world is stripped back to the minimal factors, discrimination was observed 91

response. As such, Reicher et al (2010) stated the minimal group studies were better described as ‘maximal, not minimal group studies’ (P.10).

In the real social world, various responses are available. Three hypothesised responses are: social mobility, where a group member leaves a devalued group and join a higher status group; social creativity, where a low status group member finds an alternative dimension of comparison or makes a downwards comparison with an alternative group; and social competition, where a low status group member challenges the dominant out-group through in-group bias (as in the MGP), intergroup conflict, or collective action. To understand which strategy is adopted, one must consider the social context (Tajfel & Turner 1979).

If group boundaries are permeable, a member of a low status group can opt for a strategy of social mobility. However, this strategy is not always available. For example, it is difficult, if not impossible, to change racial groups or national groups. Accordingly, if leaving one’s low status group is not an option one may look to social creativity or social competition to achieve positive group differentiation. Through social creativity one may accept that one is a member of a lower status group on a specific dimension e.g. income, but value that dimension less, or highlight their higher status on another dimension e.g. honesty. Another social creativity strategy is that of a further downward comparison with another out-group, e.g. ‘we may not have as much money as group A, but at least we have more than group B’. Social competition is more likely when one cannot leave their in-group because of impermeable group boundaries, and when social creativity cannot achieve positive differentiation. Furthermore, this strategy is argued to be more likely when intergroup relations are perceived to be illegitimate and unstable. If intergroup relations are perceived as legitimate one may 92

accept their lower status position. When intergroup relations are stable, there may be little prospect of achieving positive group differentiation, leading to resignation and acceptance of lower status. Accordingly, the legitimacy and stability of intergroup relations, and the permeability of intergroup boundaries, are thought to influence the range of strategies available for positive group differentiation (Tajfel & Turner 1979).

Perceptions of boundary permeability, legitimacy, and stability may be affected by one’s individual belief systems. Tajfel (1975) differentiated between a social mobility ideology and a social change ideology. If one strongly believes in social mobility they are likely to believe that with the enough effort an individual can achieve social mobility. If an individual strongly believes in social change they may perceive more rigid boundaries, and more illegitimate status differences, leading them towards social creativity or social competition. Members of high status groups generally have little need to pursue such strategies, as their high status is evidence of their positive differentiation. However, they may act to defend their position, if the legitimacy, stability, or permeability of intergroup status differentials are in question. Perceptions of permeability, legitimacy and stability have also been found to be affected by group status (Terry & Callan 1998; Bachman 1993). Accordingly, ideology and group status also affect strategies for positive differentiation.

The pursuit of these different strategies is an inherently political one as it requires an understanding of social power relations that recognises and assesses the position of one’s in-group and out-group, and the mechanisms through which one may achieve positive group differentiation. Social identity theory poses a challenge to the dominant culture of individualism by forcing one to accept that people do not exist in isolation. The theory 93

questions the dominant Western understanding of human rationality, that of individual self-interest, and instead acknowledges our social nature. Furthermore, the theory is also political in the sense that in order to act on the basis of group membership, one must understand the meaning of social identities. The meanings of people’s social identities are a culmination of a shared past and present, replete with shared experiences, understandings, descriptive, and injunctive norms. Social identity theory can be understood as the pivot around which social change can occur and discrimination can be resisted. It is an inherently political theory, ‘a theory of social-power’ (Reicher et al 2010 P.15).

Self-Categorisation Theory The social identity approach to understanding riots is also informed by self- categorisation theory (SCT) (Turner et al, 1987; Turner et al., 1994). SCT is concerned with the processes and mechanisms through which groups influence behaviour, affect, and cognition. These processes were left largely under-theorised by social identity theory. Reicher et al (2010) argue that SCT ‘broadens the remit of social identity research from intergroup relations to group behaviour (and, potentially at least, social behaviour) in general.’ (p.16).

SCT argues that a psychological group is a cognitive construct fundamentally distinct from an aggregate of individuals interpersonal bonds and attachments (Reicher et al 2010). As previously mentioned, a multitude of social identities are available to us. Some will fit the context more than others and become salient. The extent to which a particular social identity influences affect, behaviour, and cognition varies in accordance with the salience of that particular group in the specific context. 94

The salience of a given group may vary, both within and between people, and across time and context. People may not be nationalistic until nationalism becomes an important feature of the social context. For example, recent referenda have made national identity categories more salient to a wider range of people than would normally emphasise national identities. Others may identify very strongly with their nation consistently, if this is a chronically accessible social identity. Equally a cultural sub-group identity may have been more important as a youth than in middle age. The dynamic nature of the salience of each social identity is a function of its accessibility, or the perceiver’s readiness to use the social identity. This readiness to categorise in a particular way is informed by a perceiver’s prior expectations, goals, and theories (Haslam 2004). The stronger the identification with a given category (e.g., ‘English’), the greater the accessibility of this category, and the greater the perceiver’s readiness to categorise and act on that basis. Indeed, Kelly & Kelly (1994) found that a strong identification with a trades union was the only predictor of engaging in costly union activities, a finding replicated by Veenstra & Haslam (2000).

Some groups, such as football fans, may be categorised using ‘normative fit’ (Oakes 1987, Oakes, Haslam & Turner, 1994) whereby knowledge of the social identity content specifies relevant similarities and differences in a specific context. Going to a match, wearing a team’s shirt, and singing team songs, all fit the expectations of a football supporter, so group boundaries are clearly defined. This high level of normative fit enhances a category’s salience and so is likely to be the basis of categorisation and therefore the basis of (social) action.

However, we do not always have ready-made categories into which we can easily place ourselves. In more complex, dynamic situations people exercise 95

agency, constructing boundaries and placing themselves within a relevant category. Here ‘meta-contrast’ processes operate to determine group boundaries and where one places oneself. This is a process of comparative category fit rather than normative category fit. One can self-categorise along various degrees of abstraction which operate according to meta-contrast principles. A group of criminologists may categorise as criminologists in the presence of psychologists, but the same criminologists and psychologists may self-categorise as social scientists in the presence of novelists. The appropriateness of the category to the social context may determine self- categorisation (Oakes 1987; Oakes, Haslam &Turner 1994).

Through the operation of normative and comparative category fit one can quickly define who is friend or foe, making salient our knowledge, beliefs, and expectations of people based on group membership. Categorisation of, and identification with, a salient social identity, combined with knowledge of the meaning of the social identity, enable self-stereotyping. Self- stereotyping allows collective action between people who do not know each other personally, without formal organisational structures. Only where one identifies with a group, will one act according to the norms of that group (Reicher & Haslam 2006).

Some argue categorisation processes occur because of our limited cognitive abilities (Taylor 1981, 1998). However, self-categorisation theory does not see this as a mere by-product of cognitive limitation but argues that categorisation reflects the social reality of how groups are organised in society (Oakes, Haslam & Turner 1994). Categorisation is intimately bound up with the dominant ideology (Reicher 2001). An understanding of groups and their social identities represents a political understanding of social relations at a given socio-historical time and place. 96

The consequences of this cognitive definition of a psychological group are that we treat people as members of their salient social group. This applies to both in-group members and out-group members. In-group members are perceived as similar to each other, but a distinct from out-groups. Out-group members are perceived to conform to a group stereotype. Stereotypes are also applied to our own in-group and indeed ourselves. The depersonalisation that occurs when acting according to our social identities allows people, including ourselves, to become interchangeable exemplars of their (our) groups (Turner 1982). This depersonalisation has consequences for our behaviour. When one is uncertain of how to act, one asks oneself, ‘what would a stereotypical member of my group do in this situation?’ The salient social identity informs ones’ behaviour.

Collective actions The social nature of the self, established through social identity theory, combined with the dynamism inherent in the interactionist nature of self- categorisation theory, leaves the social identity approach well positioned to understand collective actions. The approach challenges decontextualized approaches to crowd behaviour stemming from Taine (1876), Le Bon (1895), and Allport (1924). These approaches regarded crowd actions as an expression of collective pathology, a regression to primitive instincts, and were considered meaningless. Adhering to these assessments closed these early crowd researchers to investigating subjective meaning. Such approaches divorced individual action from the societal context, silenced the voice of the crowd, inhibited examination of structural grievances, and justified repression (Reicher 2001).

The arguments of these early crowd psychologists echo in the work of de- individuation theorists (Festinger et al 1952; Prentice Dunn and Rogers 1989; 97

Zimbardo 1970). These theorists argued that anonymity, afforded by the crowd, leads to a loss of self-control and regression to immoral behaviour. However, experimental psychology reveals that there are no generic effects of anonymity (Postmes & Spears 1998). Instead, anonymity leads to more normative understanding of appropriate action based on group membership.

Despite refutation of such work within social psychology, the ideas of early crowd psychologists were influential in media and political commentators’ explanations of the 2011 riots. Tottenham’s MP and Metropolitan Police Commander Adrian Hanstock were among many who decried participants as ‘mindless’ (Stott & Drury 2017). This pathologizing of participants was also present in the government’s ‘Troubled Families’ policy response and informed the policing of the disturbances (Stott & Drury 2017). Accordingly, participants’ actions were dismissed as meaningless actions of pathological individuals. This precluded investigation of legitimate grievances. In contrast, the social identity approach sees crowd action as rooted in social conditions, meaningful, normatively limited and open to investigation.

Reicher (1984) demonstrated how action within crowd events is patterned and meaningful. He argued that the limits of acceptable action during the 1980 St. Paul’s riot in Bristol were defined by the rioters’ shared social identity. The actions of riot participants were not irrational actions of pathological individuals. Instead, shared experiences of racist policing and economic marginalisation, evident in participants’ explanations of the event (Reicher 1984), were argued to have delineated legitimate targets for participants according to their social identity’s normative limits. Targets of the riot were mainly restricted to actions against the police, the bank, and 98

symbols of the state. Overzealous youths were encouraged to keep to specific targets by respected elders in the community. St. Paul’s rioters came to understand themselves as a group in opposition to the heavy-handed tactics of a racist police force. This shared social identity is argued to have defined acceptable actions and established expectations that others would act collectively in common cause. Through this understanding, rioters were empowered to act in concert to actively oppose police actions. As such, actions were not random or irrational but targeted against specific out- groups.

The Elaborated Social Identity Model Reicher’s application of the social identity approach was an important step in understanding crowd behaviour, however, it was still fairly static. The importance of the dynamic intergroup interactions that characterise demonstrations and riots was not fully realised in Reicher’s (1984) study. However, The Elaborated Social Identity Model of crowd behaviour (ESIM Reicher 1996; Stott 1996) built upon the approach, taking account of the dynamics of intergroup interactions. Incorporating dynamic intergroup interactions into the social identity approach enabled investigation of questions of change.

The potential for change in crowd events exists along several dimensions; the change from an initially peaceful gathering to violence is one such change. Another related dimension of change is the psychological dimension, where participants’ identities may be transformed through participation. A further dimension of change is the potential transformation of social reality. One’s social identity can change, and be changed by, the intergroup interactions inherent in the development of intergroup conflict. Since one’s social identity is an understanding of the social reality of 99

intergroup relations and informs behaviour, the three dimensions are intimately linked and underpinned by the psychological dimension.

Of fundamental importance in the process of change within crowd events is the asymmetrical categorical definitions of each group. In a riot situation, there are (at least) two groups: the crowd and police. These groups define themselves and each other differently. There is also, however, an asymmetry in power. As the organisation with the monopoly on the use of force, the police’s understanding of the crowd is (usually) more powerful than the crowd’s understanding of the police. As such, the police can position the crowd as a function of their understanding. If the police view the crowd, as a whole, as potentially riotous and treat them as such, then there is the potential for a formally fragmented crowd to unify under the police’s undifferentiated perceptions and actions. As a result of depersonalisation, an attack on one group member is perceived as an attack on all group members. This unity empowers the crowd as a whole. The newly unified crowd members expect and receive support for opposition to subjectively illegitimate police action. Accordingly, the formally fragmented crowd repositions itself in the face of the illegitimate imposition of police understandings and actions, as a unified oppositional crowd. Thus, transgressive actions, previously considered illegitimate under one social identity, are newly legitimised and supported under an emergent social identity. The perception of the crowd as an undifferentiated oppositional mass becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy through the imposition of police power.

The Elaborated Social Identity Model (ESIM) of crowd behaviour has formalised this understanding of how dynamic intergroup interactions escalate towards intergroup conflict (Drury & Reicher 2000). ESIM therefore 100

provides an insight into the social-psychological processes that occur in Waddington et al’s (1989) interactional level of analysis. The process of escalation operates as follows.

1) The existence of an asymmetry of categorical representations between crowd participants and an out-group, often the police. This asymmetry often takes the form of the crowd believing their actions are legitimate but the police perceiving these actions as a threat to public safety. 2) The crowd are initially a heterogeneous, fragmented group. 3) The existence of an asymmetry in power relations. The police are (usually) able to impose their definition of proper practice upon the crowd. This may take the form of curtailing their actions, movements, or attempts to force dispersal. 4) Police assumptions of a homogeneous crowd, and undifferentiated action upon an initially heterogeneous crowd, result in the crowd facing a common fate. This leads to the crowd becoming more unified. The newly unified crowd experiences a psychological change. This psychological change is a change in the understanding of social relations and provides expectations of support in opposing the illegitimate police actions. This psychological change elicits behavioural changes where crowd members are empowered to defy, challenge, and confront the police.

To summarise, acting on the basis of one social identity that understands the crowd’s actions as legitimate, the crowd are repositioned by the police, who have a different understanding of the crowd and their actions. With the power to impose their definition of the crowd upon crowd members, the actions of the police then change the crowd’s understanding of their 101

position. The crowd then adopt a second, newly unified, oppositional social identity empowered by expectations of support, and come to a new understanding of social relations accompanied by new definitions of legitimate practice. The new definition of legitimate practice may involve confrontation with the police resulting in conflict. Crowd members now have a new situationally-evoked social identity, and a new understanding of their relationship to the police. Through treating the crowd as an undifferentiated mass engaged in confrontational practices which risk public safety, the police elicit the exact situation they feared: a homogeneous oppositional crowd that engages in confrontational activities. This common pattern has been established through close examination of student protests, anti- protests and football crowds (Reicher 1996b; Stott & Reicher 1998a; 1998b).

A prime example of the success of the insights the social identity approach to understanding collective behaviour, is its application to football crowds. From the reduction of violence by supporters of particular clubs (Stott et al 2012), to international football championships (Stott & Adang 2004,2009), the insights from social identity theory have been successfully applied to prevent social disturbances by informing public order policing tactics. These insights include the need for the police to educate themselves about the cultural norms of the crowds. This knowledge informs the police of actions the crowd perceive as legitimate. The police should facilitate these legitimate forms of conduct. The police should also clearly communicate police intentions to the crowd and differentiate between different groups and individuals within the crowd. This differentiation should help avoid indiscriminate actions upon the crowd as a whole (Reicher et al 2004).

Accordingly, the social identity approach to crowd events is well placed to explain the development, meaning and experiences of Greater Manchester’s 102

2011 riots. The following analysis questions, taken from Drury & Reicher’s (2005) analysis of empowerment processes, are used to explore the intergroup dynamics and participants subjective experiences of conflict at the two sites.

A. How did participants and police define riots and each other (categorical representations)? B. Was there an original fragmentation of the crowd? C. What were the initial legitimate actions crowd members were trying to engage in? D. What was the police’s understanding of legitimate crowd actions? E. What were power relations like between the groups? F. How did participants talk about the legitimacy of their action after the outgroup imposition of power (legitimization of opposition)? G. How did participants then talk about relations both with each other and with the outgroup (i.e. was there a more inclusive social identity)? H. What were the experiential outcomes? In particular, after the event, (how) did participants talk about empowerment, victory and/or defeat, their emotions, and their rationales for involvement in future riots?

Stott et al (2018) have recently proposed an extension to ESIM to account for events were power relations do not favour the police. Rather than illegitimate police actions uniting a crowd in opposition, they propose a self- reinforcing process where the crowd comes to realise their power through dynamic interactions with an ineffective police force. This is proposed to facilitate more proactive, rather than reactive, rioting. This proposed extension to ESIM keeps intergroup power dynamics at the heart of its 103

understanding. It is therefore consistent with the features of the social identity approach outlined so far, however, it is embryonic. Accordingly, this thesis uses the more developed, ESIM informed, analysis questions. These analysis questions facilitate theoretically informed answers to the central research questions. The subsequent section reviews the potential for enduring empowerment to result from participation in collective actions.

Empowerment The social identity approach sees the possibility of psychological change and changes in social power relations resulting from collective actions (Drury & Reicher 2009). Accordingly, this approach is considered a dynamic theory of intergroup social power relations. Empowerment has been defined as

‘positive social psychological transformation, related to a sense of being able to (re)shape the social world, that takes place for members of subordinated groups who overturn (or at least challenge) existing relations of dominance.’ (Drury & Reicher 2009 P.2)

Drury et al (2005) argued that the empowerment experienced as part of a unified oppositional crowd is a potent motivating factor for involvement in further collective actions aimed at changing social relations. The cumulative effect of involvement in crowd events, empowerment from crowd events, and subsequent further involvement in crowd events, provides the possibility for lasting social change.

ESIM scholars do not suggest that all crowd events result in empowerment. Drury & Reicher (1999) outlined the necessary intergroup dynamics for empowerment to be experienced. First, the authors point to the necessity of an original fragmentation of the crowd. Where the crowd is overly 104

homogeneous, there is less likelihood of a novel sense of unity emerging. However, an initially heterogeneous crowd has the possibility of developing a new more inclusive in-group in opposition to the out-group. Second, the authors point to the necessity of an asymmetry of categorical representation between the in-group and out-group. That is, the police (out-group) and crowd members (in-group) must have different understandings of the character of the crowd and the legitimacy of their actions. Where both groups understand the crowd and their actions in identical ways, the potential for empowerment is lost. Finally, the police (out-group) must have the power to impose their understanding of the crowd and legitimate action upon the crowd.

Furthermore, Drury & Reicher (1999) argue that not all participants will experience empowerment even if the necessary intergroup conditions are met. Where in-group members already have an expectation that the police (out-group) will behave illegitimately towards the crowd (in-group), then if this behaviour materialises, it will not challenge their expectations and they will have no impetus to change their understanding of social relations. Furthermore, if in-group members already believe that the in-group will act in a united manner, or that a fragmented crowd can effectively overcome the police (out-group), then there is a ‘ceiling effect’. Crowd members who are already radical and oppositional are less likely to experience empowerment through unfolding intergroup dynamics (Drury and Reicher 2000).

Furthermore, Drury & Reicher (2009 P.711) argued that empowerment is ‘an emergent process and not simply a variable which is either present or absent.’ This process is dependent upon the ways in which categories and 105

outcomes are constructed, contested, and identity relevant (Drury & Reicher 2009; Barr & Drury 2009).

Drury et al (2005) argue that while the conditions for empowerment as laid out by ESIM are necessary for empowerment, divergent experiential accounts suggest that they are not sufficient. In a paper specifically addressing the experience of empowerment, Drury et al (2005) found that collective self-objectification (CSO), unity and support were the most common explanations for experiencing empowerment. Accordingly, in addition to the necessary intergroup conditions for empowerment laid out by ESIM, collective self-objectification is also necessary for empowerment enduring.

The preconditions for CSO are argued to be ‘in-group unity and hence expectations of in-group mutual support for in-group-normative action’ (Drury et al 2005 P.29). The intergroup dynamics of crowd events provide the potential for these preconditions to develop from historical interactions. CSO has been defined by Drury et al (2005, P309) as “action that actualizes participants’ social identity against the power of dominant groups”. The conceptual features of CSO as laid out by Drury et al (2005) are (a) context change as self-change through (b) novel and (c) subjectively legitimate actions that are (d) provisional.

Factors beyond those predicted by ESIM were also implicated in the experience of empowerment. The sense of movement potential, overcoming the police, impunity, and the size of the crowd, were also cited as factors conducive to experiences of empowerment. However, overall CSO was the most frequently cited explanation of empowerment (Drury et al 2005). Accounts of disunity and failures to achieve CSO were cited as disempowering experiences. Experiencing empowerment through achieving 106

CSO is accompanied by feelings of joy, while anger accompanied experiences of disempowerment (Drury & Reicher 2005). The link between overturning power relations and positive affect is also evident in Newburn et al’s (2016) study of emotion in the 2011 disturbances.

Chapter Summary As discussed chapter two, the social identity approach to understanding collective actions has informed several studies into the 2011 riots (Stott & Reicher 2011; Ball & Drury 2012; Stott et al 2017; Newburn 2015b). However, to my knowledge, there has not been a social identity based study of the intergroup dynamics of the Greater Manchester riots. Accordingly, this thesis contributes to the literature through an examination of the ESIM account of the development of conflict and participants’ subjective experiences at both riot sites in Greater Manchester. The following chapter examines the methodology used to achieve these aims.

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4.0 Methodology

There are two interconnected aims of the current study. The first is to understand the development of rioting in both Salford and Manchester city centre in relation to the ESIM of how intergroup dynamics escalate towards conflict. The second aim of the thesis is to examine participants’ subjective experience of participation the riots. The two aims are complimentary. They are achieved through the set of six central research questions (P.86-87).

While the sequence of the Salford riot has been outlined by NatCen (2011) and Jeffery & Tufail (2016), these accounts do not analyse the social psychological processes in the development of rioting. To my knowledge, the development of rioting in Manchester city centre has not been charted. Accordingly, establishing this developmental account makes an important empirical contribution to the literature on the 2011 riots. Furthermore, exploring participants’ subjective experiences facilitates exploration of social psychological processes in the development of rioting, making a theoretical contribution to ESIM (Drury & Reicher 2000).

Accordingly, this methodology chapter is split in two: the first section outlines the methods used to establish a detailed account of the development of rioting; the second outlines the methods used to explore participant’s subjective experiences.

Studying rioting Studying the development of rioting poses considerable research challenges: riots are rare, fast moving, and it is almost impossible to guarantee a researcher’s presence. To contextualise the approach taken here, a brief review of the history of studying riots is offered. 108

Historical analyses of rioting were hampered by analyst’s outsider perspectives. Participants were often illiterate, so could not write their own accounts. Additionally, participants were often ignored, instead, the accounts of the powerful were privileged. Accordingly, there was a heavy reliance on impressionistic accounts, largely devoid of empirical evidence (Stott & Drury 2017). Classical crowd analysts (e.g. Le Bon 1895) forwarded ideological accounts of rioting. These accounts ignored participants’ understandings and the normative limits of crowd actions. Crowds were therefore viewed as irrational, atavistic threats to civilisation (Drury 2002). However, as Stott & Drury (2017 P.9-10) note

‘…across the social sciences, different researchers in multiple disciplines began highlighting the inadequacy and limitations of classical theory and the need to analyse the perspective of crowd members in their historical context (Barrows, 1981; Nye, 1975; Reicher, 1982; Rudé, 1959, 1964; Turner et al., 1987).’

Addressing this deficit led to the development of ‘history from below’ (Rude 1964). This new form of analysis established patterns in crowd events that demonstrated the normative limits of collective actions. Thompson’s (1971) analysis of empirical evidence of food riots of the 18th Century pointed toward a moral economy that the classical approach overlooked. Tilly et al (1975) also re-examined empirical evidence and pointed to the normative limits of rioters in 19th Century France. Classical crowd theory was unable to account for such limits. In contrast to the decontextualized crowd and participants’ apparent loss of self, reported by Le Bon (1895), Taine (1876), and Allport (1924), the social identity approach to collective actions re- contextualises the crowd and inserts the self as understandable object of investigation. 109

Realisation of the importance of ‘history from below’ introduced researchers to the rich experiences of rioters, complete with the complex and contested meanings of such events. However, the difficulty involved in researching such dynamic, fast moving, and potentially dangerous events meant that formal analyses relied heavily on post-hoc accounts. Indeed, Stott et al (2017) claim post hoc accounts form the basis of the central literature on the 2011 riots (e.g. Guardian/LSE 2011; Treadwell et al 2013; Newburn et al 2015). These accounts are open to criticism as post-riot ideology (Waddington 1991) that involved self-protective accounts of rioters’ actions (NatCen 2011; Winlow et al 2015).

However, researchers in the social identity tradition have long been alive to such charges. To add credence to analyses that relied heavily on post-hoc accounts, social identity analyses supplemented participant accounts with campaign literature, in vivo audio-visual recording, and newspaper accounts (Drury & Reicher 1999; Drury & Reicher 2000). The inclusion of multiple sources allows for the construction of composite accounts of events, triangulated through cross-checking multiple perspectives (Denzin 1989). The construction of a triangulated account is of primary interest to social identity researchers as it enables intergroup interactions to be analysed in a dynamic developmental manner.

The proliferation of social media and mobile phone technology has provided crowd researchers with another source of evidence for triangulation. The ubiquity of mobile phones with recording facilities means large crowd events in the developed world are documented as they unfold by participants and eye witnesses. This has produced a wealth of media capturing the development of events in detail from the perspective of the crowd. This new data source strengthens composite accounts (Stott et al 2017). 110

While recordings are made and distributed selectively, according to what the cameraperson believes to be important or practical, the sheer numbers of people recording events reduces the impact of these biases. One can, then, without being present, trace the development of rioting with considerable confidence that the constructed account is an adequately accurate representation of the events. This strategy has been successfully used before (Stott et al 2017). It is considered stronger than a simple re- examination of historical accounts (e.g. Thompson 1971; Tilly et al 1975) or over-reliance on post-hoc accounts (Guardian/LSE 2011) and is therefore adopted here to produce a detailed account of the development of Greater Manchester’s 2011 riots.

Constructing the triangulated sequential accounts of the development of rioting in Greater Manchester Data Sources Initially, official reports were analysed for accounts of the sequences of events. A timeline of the events in Salford was provided in NatCen’s (2011) report. This served as the basis for developing a more detailed account of the events. Further detail was added through examination of the HMIC (2011) report into the policing of the riots. Throughout the evening of 9th August 2011, the local newspaper, The Manchester Evening News (M.E.N. 2011), ran a live feed of the disturbances as they happened. These tweets were time stamped and added further detail to accounts provided by official sources.

As the Greater Manchester riots took place four days after the initial rioting in Tottenham, traditional news media were present and, in some cases, broadcasted live from the disturbances. On occasion, participants and eye witnesses were interviewed by these sources, providing in-situ insights into 111

rioters’ perceptions, actions, and experiences. The time stamped nature of these broadcasts provides further confidence in the constructed accounts. These traditional media accounts were also supplemented by amateur media organisation who were often more willing and more capable of getting closer to the disturbances than traditional media. Additionally, participants and eye witnesses recorded the development of the disturbances on their phones and uploaded them to ‘YouTube’, making them public. In many cases the uploader of recorded data also stated what time the events captured took place again adding confidence to the constructed account.

Finally, as a virtue of Manchester City Council funding the current research, I had privileged access to data gathered by Greater Manchester Police (GMP) and the Fire Service. These data sources were used to examine the buildings targeted and the nature of the attacks on them. There are well documented problems with a reliance on police data (Ball & Drury 2012), as there are with an overly heavy reliance on data from any one of these sources. However, when used to construct a triangulated account of the events in conjunction with the alternative sources, these problems were reduced. Where events have not been covered by multiple sources or where two sources contradict each other, this is raised in the analysis. One can therefore have a large degree of confidence in validity of the constructed account.

In constructing the account of what happened in Salford, the current research analysed 95 tweets. These tweets were selected from the M.E.N. live Twitter feed on the basis of containing behavioural reports on what was happening. These tweets were mainly composed of M.E.N. journalist tweets but also included tweets from GMP and a small number of eye witness tweets from the public. Epistemological concerns about journalists’ 112

motivations to exaggerate or sensationalise activity are valid. However, these concerns are offset by using the tweets as part of a triangulated account, rather than as a single source.

67 ‘YouTube’ videos relating to the Salford riots were analysed. These were accessed using the search term ‘Salford riots 2011’. In addition to the links produced through this search, the posters uploading history was also searched for further riot videos once one was found. Time stamps were used to cross reference videos with time-stamped tweets. Where time stamps were not available, videos were examined for logical consistency with other videos. However, some timings could not be deduced and were either excluded from analysis or recognised as such in the account. NatCen (2011), HMIC (2011), Reading the riots (Guardian/LSE2011), and Jeffery & Tufail (2016), also provided further sources for establishing the sequence of events. Only two interviewed participants in the current study were present during the events in Salford. The problems in obtaining interviews from Salford participants is discussed further below. Data from these interviews were also cross-checked with existing data to allow relevant quotes to be embedded amongst the sequence of events. Original data from GMP was collected. This included data on the frequency, time, and location of incidents police attended, the nature, time, and location, of premises attacked and the nature of these attacks. The Fire Service provided further original data on the time, location, and type of incidents they attended. In total, these sources formed the basis for constructing the triangulated account of the disturbances in Salford. They formed the basis for the analysis of the ESIM account of the development of conflict.

The same methodology was used in constructing the account of what happened in Manchester city centre. The development of Manchester city 113

centre’s disturbances was not documented in the same detail as the Salford disturbances in the academic literature or official accounts. However, the disturbances were covered more comprehensively by traditional and new media. Accordingly, the starting point for constructing the account was the M.E.N. tweets, as they were time stamped. From this skeleton, information from news interviews was added, starting the process of triangulating a multi-source composite account.

In addition to the more comprehensive news media coverage, there were considerably more clips uploaded to ‘YouTube’. Helpfully, the central point for the development of conflict in Manchester city centre was around Market Street where there is a large clock outside the Debenhams store. This clock was often seen in the ‘YouTube’ clips and could therefore be used as a further source of time stamped data, as well as the clip posters description. Where clips were not time stamped, the order was inferred by triangulating the order of events with other videos, participant accounts, tweets and news sources. Furthermore, occurring in the city centre, many riot actions were caught on CCTV. A time lapse video of Oldham Street, close to Market street also helped orient the analysis. The same police and fire service data was also used in the case of Manchester city centre’s disturbances. Finally, study participants’ (admittedly post-hoc) accounts of their actions and reflections were included in the composite account.

In constructing the account of what happened in Manchester city centre, 211 M.E.N. tweets were analysed. These were selected from the larger collection of live tweets on the basis of them providing behavioural reports on events. Accordingly, they have a similar composition to the Salford riot tweets. Epistemological concerns over sensationalist journalistic accounts were again offset by triangulation with a variety of sources. 114

178 ‘YouTube’ videos related to Manchester city centre rioting were analysed. These were accessed using the search term ‘Manchester riots 2011’. Additionally, the posters uploading history was searched for further riot videos. The timing and sequence of video material was cross-checked and deduced in the same manner as the Salford timeline. 16 interviewed participants in the current study were present during the events in Manchester city centre. Original GMP and Fire Service data was used in the same manner as in the Salford account. These sources provided the basis from which a triangulated account of the disturbances in Manchester city centre was constructed.

In total 278 YouTube clips were viewed, 45 were selected for inclusion in this study on the basis of (a) their relevance to the development of rioting, (b) presence of speech and (c) their ability to triangulate data through time stamps. These are listed in appendix A. 306 tweets covering both sites were selected from the M.E.N. Twitter on the basis of them providing behavioural reports. 26 are included in this thesis on the basis of (a) their relevance to the development of rioting, and (b) their ability to triangulate data.

The constructed account is the basis for the analysis of the ESIM account of the intergroup dynamics and participants’ experiential outcomes. More specifically, ESIM derived questions (Drury & Reicher 2005) outlined in chapter three (P.102) guided analysis of the triangulated, sequential accounts of the development of rioting, and participants’ interviews, in pursuit of the six research questions (P.86-87).

Participant accounts 15 participants were interviewed twice and three were interviewed once. Interviews lasted for one-two hours. The cohort was composed of nine people who were arrested and nine who were not arrested. All the arrested 115

participants were found guilty, eight went to prison and one received a non- custodial sentence. Participants’ ages ranged from 19-50. Five had come to Manchester for university, four of these five came from middle-class backgrounds, one from a working-class background. Thirteen were born or lived most of their lives in Greater Manchester and came from areas of high deprivation. Two male participants were present in the Salford riot and 16 (14 men, two women) at the Manchester city centre riot. In total, there were 16 men (eight arrested, eight not arrested) and two women (one arrested, one not arrested). The riot activities and criminal justice outcomes are noted in figure 14.

Figure 14. Participants and their actions

ctator

Participant Political Activist or journalist Broke into a shop Entered a shop Handled stolen goods Provided medical support Spe Rioter Arrested Custodial Sanction

John ✓ Fred ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Tiago ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Sam ✓ ✓ ✓ Edee ✓ ✓ ✓ Tony ✓ ✓ ✓ Arron ✓ ✓ Jason ✓ Philip ✓ ✓ ✓ Derren ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Harry ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Charlie ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Paul ✓ ✓ ✓ Linda ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Michael ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Kevin ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Sol ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Simon ✓ ✓ Source: Participant accounts

The aim of the interviews was to give a voice to participants. The importance of subjective accounts in establishing how complex and contested events develop is well documented (Barrows 1981; Nye 1975; Reicher 1982; Rudé 116

1959; 1964; Turner et al 1987). Participants’ perceptions, motivations, actions, and experiential outcomes would not be understood if their accounts were not prominent in the research. As such, the participant accounts contribute to answering all six research questions. The subsequent section discusses how access to these hard to reach participants was gained.

Access Accessing participants engaged in illegal behaviour is risky and raised ethical issues. Before attempting to gain access to participants, an evaluation of the potential risks was undertaken, and a submission made to the University’s research ethics committee (UREC). After a written research proposal and verbal interrogation of how risks and ethical concerns would be handled, the study was given ethical approval. This section discusses the strategies used to access hard-to-reach participants and the ethical questions involved in gaining access.

Researching involvement in illegal activities poses inherent problems to the researcher, especially if (s)he comes from outside the sample community, which I did. Participants are understandably guarded in their willingness to admit to involvement in illegal activities to a stranger. Some participants were wary of the potential for me to be an undercover police officer. Indeed, I was accused of this several times during the fieldwork. This fear is not unfounded: British police routinely use undercover operatives to infiltrate and report upon the (legal and illegal) activities of groups considered a threat to the status quo (Lubbers 2015; Bonino & Kaoullas 2015; Loadenthal 2013).

Building rapport with participants was therefore important in overcoming distrust and gaining sensitive information. This was initially gained by appeal to my own background. By virtue of growing up in Derry, Northern Ireland 117

during the Troubles, I had experience of riots. I relayed this information in efforts to build trust and gain sensitive information. This approach may be criticised as biased, however, the acknowledgement of bias as a research strategy has been recognised as essential in gaining trust amongst participants engaged in risky behaviour (Drury & Stott 2001, Fantasia 1988, Green 1993). The ability to establish my personal experience of rioting and the inadequacy of official accounts (for example, citing the 1972 Widgery report into ) enabled me to distance myself from the authorities and establish the rapport necessary to gain information on illegal activities. However, to minimise interviewer influence, I kept accounts of my experiences neutral, merely stating what I had seen and experienced as objectively as possible. It is through a combination of this reflexivity, empathy, and theory that the intersubjectivity in the interview dyad emerged (Gillespie & Cornish 2010). The shape of the intersubjective space within the dyad forms the basis upon which knowledge is produced and understood. Accordingly claims to any form of truth are kept to a minimum. What is reported in the results section claims only to be one form of truth that has emerged as a co-production of researcher and researched interacting in a particular context. Without admitting bias and using it to inform my research strategy, it is unlikely participants would have been so candid. This approach was only possible with the 15 participants I interviewed twice. Three open narrative interviews with arrested participants’ (Kevin, Linda and Michael) were completed by my supervisor were also analysed. These interviewees were contacted through probation and were not subject to the same rapport building. Issues surrounding accessing participants varied between the two main routes I adopted in seeking participants: the informal, personal and 118

community route; and the formal criminal justice route. These issues are discussed in the following sections.

Informal access routes to participants The manner in which participants were approached was a central concern to both the methodological and ethical aspects of this project. Participants may have received unwanted police or peer attention if recruitment to the study was obvious. Accordingly, due care was taken to recruit participants in private.

The main problems in approaching participants are artefacts of the author’s position as an outsider. Insights from Valdez and Kaplan (1999) informed my aim to be a visible member of the affected communities. I made myself visible to the research group through several respected community groups within the target communities. Through volunteering and participating in groups such as the Northern Police Monitoring Project, Community Change Foundation, The Broughton Trust and the Salford Unemployed and Community Resource Centre, I gained the trust of respected leaders within the target communities. In some cases, these respected leaders then acted as gate keepers to the target community.

Following Wright et al (1992) and Atkinson & Flint (2004), recruitment ‘snowballed’ from a small number of contacts identified through personal links and participation in the aforementioned community groups. Gatekeepers were requested to privately approach riot participants known to them through their work and invite participation, along with details as to what was involved. This approach was particularly important for those involved in the riots but not arrested. Key guarantees of voluntariness, confidentiality, anonymity, and the right to withdraw from the study at any point were presented clearly to the potential participants. Where 119

guarantees were relayed informally by gatekeepers, they were reiterated by the author. These issues were explained by the author with the use of written participant information sheets and consent forms outlining the project’s ethics and the participants’ rights in a jargon-free language (appendices B and C). These were re-emphasised verbally before the interview.

In addition to snowballing from relatively formal organisational contacts, I used a range of personal contacts. As with participants accessed via gatekeepers, guarantees of voluntariness, confidentiality, anonymity and right to withdraw from the study at any point were presented clearly to the potential participants from the start. Despite my status as an outsider, serendipitous personal links to participants via friends were also available.

There are obvious pitfalls to avoid when operating in this way. Monetary rewards were left out of the initial conversations with participants so that people were not incentivised to falsely claim involvement for financial gain. However, participants were reimbursed for their time with shopping vouchers; £15 for the first interview and £25 for the second. Following Watters and Biernacki (1989) suggestions, I employed targeted-sampling techniques (Braunstein 1993) to ensure representation of participants from different areas and subgroups, (Wright & Decker 2005). The snowballing strategy is also biased towards accessing the most cooperative participants. To minimize drawbacks of selection bias I followed the suggestions of Valdez and Kaplan (1999). I (a) avoided institutional references, (where possible) (b) maintained high visibility with the target population, (c) made frequent social contacts within the target community, and (d) used community gatekeepers. 120

Snowballing was an effective procedure for developing contacts in hard to reach populations. It is difficult to give further information on how I gained access to participants without revealing their identities or the identities of others who were not involved. However, it is important to note that four participants came from what could be described as left-wing activist circles, five from friends of friends, and one from community organisation links. The other eight were gained through formal organisational links.

Formal organisational links Manchester City Council (MCC) co-funded my PhD. This arrangement provided for inside access to MCC’s data on participants. This included data gathered by the MCC ‘public intelligence team’, as well as Greater Manchester Police (GMP), and Greater Manchester Probation Services. This semi-insider status is beneficial for a range of reasons, chief amongst them being the vicarious access to participants’ contact data.

Community group contacts did not prove sufficiently productive regarding arrestees, providing only one participant. Attempts to enlist probation officers to recruit participants personally were unsuccessful. During the recruitment stage, the probation service was in the process of being privatised. Understandably, probation officers had too little time to recruit participants. Attempts to interview participants in prison via solicitor’s letters were also unsuccessful. Therefore, potential participants were approached using GMP data. The standard letter of invitation was sent out in a SAE, with the address added confidentially by Manchester City Council. In total seven participants were recruited through MCC data and eleven through a combination of community groups and personal links. Accordingly, this constitutes a convenience sample. 121

Data Gathering To maximise researcher safety, data quality, and ensure participants were safe and felt at ease, interviews took place in public locations convenient to the participant. Community groups provided their offices as a safe space in which interviews could take place. To ensure safety and data quality, the exact location of the interview venue was agreed with the participant to take account of any worries they had.

In an attempt to make the interview seem less formal, a mobile phone was used as a digital recording device. A mobile phone has the benefit of familiarity, the absence of a conspicuous red recording light, and is quite often left on tables. As such, it lacks association with police interviews and was considered less likely to arouse defensive reactions from participants.

Data security Since Edward Snowden (2013) revealed the extent of government electronic eavesdropping, problems associated with data security, including access, recording and analysis have become more apparent. To combat the potential for unwanted intrusion, all identifiable participant data was anonymised at the point at which it was transcribed. This meant assigning false names to participants at the moment of transcription and coding references to identifiable actions. The only identifiable data were written consent and participant information forms which were stored in a locked university cabinet. Conversations conducted via phone were kept deliberately vague and avoided reference to the riots and interviews. The anonymity of my participants was the basis of the trust upon which participants agree to take part. As such, it was of paramount importance to preserve and protect. 122

Participants’ anonymity could also have been endangered by electronic data recording and analysis. A virtue of electronic data is that it is easily copied and shared. However, when dealing with sensitive and potentially incriminating data this virtue quickly becomes a vice. Aldridge et al (2010) estimated a data source may be reproduced 24 times throughout the course of a research project. The ease with which data proliferates is proportional to the amount of security measures that must be taken to preserve and protect participants’ anonymity. With this proliferation in mind, Aldridge et al (2010) suggested fourteen measures for ensuring data security. In following these guidelines, such as anonymising, encrypting and password- protecting the data, I minimised the possibility of data security breaches and ensured the anonymity promised to my participants to the best of my ability.

Personal Safety Personal safety of the researcher also presented an ethical issue. To minimise risks the University of Manchester’s Lone Worker Policy was adhered to. As a precaution, I

• Kept a responsible person informed of my whereabouts, and ‘called in’ to that person when the interview was completed and established a protocol for that person to contact relevant people (community centre, police, etc.) should I not do so.

• Kept a mobile phone with me.

• Carried out the research in a safe environment that was not isolated, e.g. by organising interviews in public settings.

• Was aware of the area in which the research is taking place and access routes.

• Avoided carrying or wearing valuable items. 123

• Dressed appropriately for the setting.

Fifteen participants were interviewed twice and a further three completed one. The initial interview was informed by a self-narrative approach. This was followed up by a secondary semi-structured interview informed by both participants’ self-generated concepts and theoretically informed concepts from the social identity approach to collective action. The combination of two interview techniques, recommended by Holloway and Jefferson (2000), allowed rapport to be established in the first interview, while also providing the basis for a more in-depth secondary interview.

Problems gaining access to Salford participants Considerable difficulties were faced in gaining access to participants in the Salford riot, despite various formal and informal approaches. This difficulty was also experienced by researchers embedded within Salford (Jeffery & Tufail 2015). The first issue was my status as an outsider. Despite volunteering in community projects, I was clearly perceived as an outsider asking for incriminating information and was therefore distrusted. Accordingly, I failed to establish the social capital necessary to recruit further participants. However, Jeffery & Tufail (2016) both lived and worked in Salford and had substantial social capital through their more sustained presence. Nonetheless, they too failed to gain the trust of riot participants and based their study largely on non-involved spectator accounts. Accordingly, it was not just my status as an outsider that prevented me from gaining participants from the Salford riot.

There is a strong injunction against talking to authorities about crime in central Salford (Jeffery & Tufail 2015). This injunction has been witnessed in recent years on a number of occasions. In one such occasion, just over a month after the riots, a man was shot and killed in a packed pub in Ordsall, 124

around 1.5 miles from the riot site. While several patrons spoke to the police, no-one admitted witnessing the incident. Lacking in witnesses, GMP offered £50,000 for information leading to the gunman’s arrest. DCI John Chadwick stated -

‘We know without a doubt that there are still people out there who know the truth but haven’t come forward… It is very unusual to offer such a large sum, but we understand people are worried about their safety when speaking to the police.’ (Keeling 2011)

In a more recent incident, in 2015, a mother and her seven-year-old son were deliberately shot in an apparent dispute between rival organised crime groups. The two gunmen did not hide their faces with masks or balaclavas but wore baseball hats. Again, appeals were made by GMP for witnesses to come forward but to my knowledge none were forthcoming. Despite not having their faces hidden Deputy Chief Constable Ian Hopkins described coming up against a ‘wall of silence’.

It is clear from the two preceding examples that many people in Salford do not talk to the authorities. This difficulty has meant that a more comprehensive qualitative analysis of the differences in participant’s subjective experiences between the two sites was unfeasible. Because of this problem, a pragmatic decision was made to include secondary sources of interview data.

Interview Technique Pasupathi & Weeks (2010, P.32), argue that “Autobiographical reasoning within narratives may be of particular importance for identity” they “outline how self-event relations, one type of autobiographical reasoning, can provide for a sense of identity”. The interpretation of events and the 125

autobiographical reasoning processes involved in making sense of events are argued to reflect stability-maintaining, change-engendering, or equivocal effects, upon one’s identity. Maruna (2001) also considers personal narratives to be of importance in structuring offenders and ex-offenders’ self-concepts. Through analyses of how participants speak about the events in relation to themselves, one gains access to the elusive concept of identity and the processes informed by it. Accordingly, the narratives that people tell about their life and significant self-event relations were an appropriate method for investigating participants’ identities in relation to the riots.

Wahler & Castlebury (2002), argue that narratives can address the “why” questions of human conduct through linking events and actors. “More than recounted experiences of the past, personal narratives may provide us with information to guide us in interpreting and responding to new experiences (Applebee 1978). Through narrative we synthesize episodes from personal experiences, enabling us to address the ‘‘why’’ of human conduct and therefore to chart our understanding of the social ecosystem (Brooks 1984; Ricoeur 1983).” (P.298) Despite addressing the “why” of human conduct, the self-narrative approach does not ask questions of the “why?” format. When asking people why they did something or why they responded in a certain way, the interviewer is asking the interviewee to intellectualise and ‘psychologise’ their actions. However, in asking for narratives, the interviewer undercuts the intellectualising demands of the ‘why’ questions and accesses more directly the concepts, links, and attributions that the interviewee makes when narrating their stories. This approach also helps minimise interviewer influencing participants’ accounts. 126

Combining the insights from Maruna (2001), Pasupathi & Weeks (2010) and Wahler & Castlebury (2002), self-narratives were considered an appropriate method for analysing participant’s social identities. That is, one can examine the processes at work in the interpretation of, and response to, significant events in terms of a socially embedded self. Self-narratives are intimately related to social identities as they are based in social realities. Self-narratives are constructed within specific historical, cultural, political, and economic contexts. As such, they emerge from the social context participants find themselves in and represent an understanding of one’s position within society. Accordingly, the methodology resonates with social identity theory.

Limitations of the self-narrative methodology One criticism of this methodology is that people are rarely able to fully explain the reasons for their actions. Social influence is often under- estimated (Cialdini 2005). Memories are unreliable composites of what we think happened. They are open to dispositional and social influence. However, the lack of precision of detail in one’s narrative, and the social influences one neglects to acknowledge, may not be such an extreme obstacle as they first appear. Even if the recall of events is incomplete, flawed and open to social influence, it still possesses a character and shapes the participant’s interpretation and responses to events.

Pasupathi & Weeks (2010) focus their discussion on individual differences in self-narrative construction. However, it may be foolish to concentrate too heavily on the individualistic nature of self-narratives at the expense of the social context (Holloway & Jefferson 2008). Indeed, Bakhtin (1981) questions the extent to which narratives are personal. Instead, narratives are viewed as a shared construct. 127

The concept of narratives being shared constructs may seem to undermine any objectivity a narrative may purport to possess. Rather than viewing the communal nature of narratives as a weakness, however, the social nature of narratives is viewed as a strength. People construct interpretations and responses to events according to the context they are in and the meaning given to events because of that context.

“Our narratives are inseparable from the social context in which they are formulated and to some degree they can never be completely ours. Who we are can only be understood within the context of a community that defines us, our narratives on some level always existing as a shared creation or co-construction.” (Wahler & Castlebury, 2002, P.304)

Although the interviews provided space for participants to tell their story, it must be acknowledged that the interviewer imposed a theoretically informed agenda. This was more apparent in the second follow-up interview.

Follow-up interview Following Holloway and Jefferson’s (2000) suggestion, a second interview further explored the ESIM concepts in relation to participants’ experiences. The week (sometimes fortnight) between each interview allowed for the first interview to be transcribed and analysed for interesting themes, omissions, contradictions, etc. The follow-up interview required greater researcher input in the production of knowledge and, as such, could be considered a cross between the narrative and semi-structured format. Questions were designed to be open and to elicit narratives like the first interview. However, the second interview was used to further explore points raised by the first interview and cover theoretically important points that 128

were overlooked or only briefly mentioned in the first interview. To avoid creating pressing demand characteristics, the semi-structured questions avoided direct or suggestive lines of questioning.

Both open narrative and semi-structured techniques may be criticised as fragmentary. However, they provide an opportunity to establish what is significant to participants and as such allow access to the subjective experiences of participants (Lawler 2002). The two techniques may also be criticised as collective accounts that are negotiated through conversation and comparison with significant reference groups. However, this understanding is the basis upon which participants interpret and respond to the world, and accessing it was a central aim of the thesis.

Through the discussion of sensitive issues in the interviews, participants may have experienced negative emotional responses. This potential was counterbalanced by the potentially beneficial effects of talking about issues in a non-judgemental atmosphere. Philips et al (2012) found that the process of remembering and telling stories was empowering and productive for many participants. Indeed, Scarman claimed ‘The story of the disorders themselves has proved to be itself a therapy’ (1981 p.159–61). However, in the event of distress the interviewer reinforced the assurances of anonymity, confidentiality, and reminded the respondent that they were not obliged to answer any questions and were free to stop the interview at any time. A list of contact numbers for organisations providing help, support, and advice were provided at the end of the interview.

Data Analysis The analysis of these interviews consists of a mixture of Thematic Analysis (e.g. Hayes 1997; Kellehear 1993 pp. 38–42) and Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (e.g. Smith et al 1997; Willig 2001 pp. 53–69). 129

Both forms of analysis involve coding data according to the presence of both emergent and theoretically-informed themes. This form of analysis shares many of the features of grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss 1967) but also acknowledges the role of the researcher in the production of meaning through the researchers’ quest for specific information.

Both sets of interviews were coded allowing themes to emerge for each group. Following insights from holistic psychosocial analysis (Holloway & Jefferson 2000), interview data was understood as a whole. Codes were considered in relation to a picture built up over both interviews, and recoded where necessary. Emergent themes were then organised according to theoretically informed analysis questions derived from Drury & Reicher (2005) which were identified in chapter three (P.102). The central research questions (P.86-87), were then addressed using answers to these analysis questions. Epistemological concerns Epistemological concerns about participants accounts being mere post-riot ideology are valid concerns. This is especially true in the case of the left- wing activists in the study sample. However, their accounts are still worth exploring. Winlow and Hall (2014) noted the lack of fringe political groups involvement in the riots and noted this as evidence of the post-political nature of the 2011 riots. Accordingly, inclusion of these activists’ accounts is relevant to this debate. Furthermore, considering these riots where widely understood as a new qualitatively different form of rioting (Winlow & Hall 2014), it is worth exploring participants’ experiences in apparently novel forms of rioting. However, it is still necessary to be aware of their political outlook when interpreting their accounts. Their pre-existing 130

politicised outlook is noted in figure 14 outlining the participants’ involvement.

Analyses which rely solely on post-hoc participant data are particularly open to this epistemological criticism. However, following Stott et al (2017), this study constructed a triangulated account from multiple data sources, including novel police data, fire service data, social media data. Each of these data sources raises epistemological concerns surrounding their particular motivations in recording and sharing data. However, their strength as part of a triangulated account allays these concerns and provides confidence in the composite accounts. Accordingly, recognising the political outlook of activists, and triangulating accounts with multiple data sources, mitigates against criticism on epistemological grounds.

Summary Central to this research project is participants’ subjective experiences of the intergroup dynamics of conflict. I have critically reflected upon and adopted a range of methodological positions and approaches that are most beneficial in achieving the project’s central aims. As with all approaches, certain compromises have been made in the pragmatic pursuit of reliable, authentic data, reflective of the true experiences of the participants. Care has also been taken to acknowledge and outline the researchers’ role in the collaborative production of knowledge and understanding. Furthermore, left-wing activists pre-existing politicised identities have been noted in order contextualise their accounts. Accordingly, throughout each stage of the research, reflections were made as to the researcher’s role in the production of knowledge. Through a brief examination of Waddington’s et al’s (1989) background levels of analysis, the following chapter contextualises rioting in Salford and Manchester on 9th August 2011. 131

5.0 Contextualising rioting in Greater Manchester

To understand the Greater Manchester riots, it is necessary to pay close attention to the context in which they occurred. The national context in which the Greater Manchester riots took place has been outlined in chapter one. However, the local context for each riot site has not yet been examined. This is especially true in relation to the Manchester city centre riot which remains understudied. Accordingly, this chapter explores Waddington et al’s (1989) ‘flashpoints’ model in relation to both Salford and Manchester.

The purpose of this discussion is twofold. The first is to facilitate a contextualised analysis of rioting in Greater Manchester. Waddington et al (1989) forward six levels of analysis as a systematic framework for analysing riots. The first four levels - structural, political/ideological, cultural, and contextual - can be considered background conditions while the situational and interactional levels may be described as foreground levels of analysis. This section briefly explores the background and situational levels of analysis in Greater Manchester to contextualise the 2011 Greater Manchester riots.

The second aim is to explore Newburn’s (2015b) assertion of the relative importance of the interactional level of analysis in explaining the stunted development of rioting in Leeds and Bristol, in relation to the development of rioting in Salford and Manchester. The background levels of analysis for both Salford and Manchester are therefore compared to identify factors which may help explain Sir Peter Fahy’s assertion that rioting in Salford was more focused on attacking the police and fire service, while rioting in Manchester city centre was more focused on looting. (Fahy 2011 in Clifton & Alison 2011). This discussion begins with the structural level of analysis.

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Structural level Manchester experiences widespread deprivation. The State of the Wards’ report (Manchester Partnership 2011) noted that

‘The IMD 2010 ranked Manchester as the fourth most deprived local authority out of 326 in England…45% of the city’s local areas were in the most deprived 10% in England.’ (P.29)

In the years preceding the 2011 riots, almost half of Manchester was considered seriously deprived. Waddington et al’s ‘flashpoints’ model (1989) suggests that poor material conditions increase the likelihood of an area experiencing rioting. Indeed, the link between deprivation and rioting has been recognised, to some extent, by official reports (MOJ 2011; 2012; Home Office 2011; RCVP 2011; 2012) and has been established in Greater Manchester (Lightowlers and Shute 2012). With almost half the city’s local areas in the IMD’s (2010) most deprived decile, there were many areas that Waddington et al’s (1989) model suggest would be prone to rioting.

Deprivation is widespread across Greater Manchester. However, it is concentrated in particular areas. The most deprived areas are in North and East Manchester and in parts of Wythenshawe (Manchester Partnership 2011). Deprivation is entrenched in parts of Manchester. 51% of the areas in Manchester are classified as ‘Isolate' under the MIER classification system (State of the wards 2011). ‘Isolate’ describes areas where

‘people from deprived backgrounds live or move to. This results in a degree of entrapment for poor households that are unable to break the cycle of living in a deprived area.’ (P. 13)

Deprivation was widespread and in a significant number of areas, severe and entrenched. 133

Figure 15 shows a visual representation of deprivation in Manchester city at the lower level super output area. Figure 16 illustrates this distribution for Greater Manchester, including Salford.

Figure 15: Source: Manchester Partnership 2011 P.32 134

Figure 16: Source Manchester Partnership 2011 P.30 135

Rioting in Manchester was concentrated in the city centre. The city centre is less deprived than many areas in Manchester, however, the deprived areas in north and east Manchester are largely within walking distance of the city centre. Wythenshawe, in Sharston, is not.

Salford is a separate city to Manchester; however, it is a short distance from Manchester city centre to Salford. Just 2.1 Miles separate Manchester’s central shopping centre, The Arndale Centre, and Salford’s main commercial centre, Shopping City, in Pendleton, Salford.

As can be seen from figure 17 (overleaf), Salford also has areas of severe deprivation. 33% (47) of Salford’s Lower Super Output Areas (LSOAs) were amongst the most deprived decile in 2010 (DCLG 2011). This significant deprivation is concentrated in the area to the east, adjacent to Manchester.

Kersal, Ordsall, Riverside Irwell and Langworthy are particularly deprived areas. The later area contains Pendleton, the site of rioting in 2011. Jeffery & Jackson (2012) point out that

‘It is not only the extent of inequality but also the close proximity of disparities in income and wealth that characterises inner-city Salford.’ (P.18)

The close proximities of disparities in income and wealth are clear on this map with the Salford Quays development, in Ordsall, belonging to the 70% least deprived areas while immediately to the north in Langworthy, the scene of the riot, are areas within the 1% most deprived areas in England.

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Figure 17: Source: Salford City Council

Both Salford and Manchester experienced significant and, in particular areas, severe deprivation. Salford’s riot took place in an area of severe deprivation while Manchester city centre is an affluent area in comparison to the deprived areas surround it. The structural level of analysis of the 137

‘flashpoints’ model (Waddington 1989) diverge according to riot site, however, intense inequalities are evident in both areas.

Political/ideological level The second level of analysis in Waddington et al’s (1989) ‘flashpoints’ model is the political/ideological level. As the world’s first industrial city, Manchester was of fundamental importance to the development of working class politics. A central organising technique, in an age before communications technology was widespread, was the mass rally. As a display of strength in itself, and the revolutionary politics espoused, these mass gatherings posed an unacceptable challenge for the powerful. As such, these mass gatherings were often literally ‘read the ’ and attacked. Accordingly, Greater Manchester has experienced numerous instances of political riots.

Perhaps the most famous event was in St Peters Fields which is now in Manchester city centre. The gathering came to be known more famously as the 1819. The massacre was of fundamental importance in the battle for democracy and birthed the Trade Union movement. The food riots between 1775-1800 were also important both in Manchester’s history, and in the history of rioting. Thompson’s (1971) observation of the moral economy in riots stemmed from analysis of these food riots.

Salford also has a history of working class political gatherings being attacked by law enforcement. One infamous event known as ‘The Battle of Bexley Square’ occurred on October 1931 when the National Union of Unemployed Workers attempted to present a petition to their elected representative in opposition to means testing, were attacked. ‘Instead, [they were] forced to defend [them]selves against an armed and well-fed enemy.’ (McColl 1990) 138

Salford was home to Fredrich Engels for almost 30 years from 1842. Written while living in Salford, he published ‘The Conditions of the Working Class in England’ in German in 1845 and in English in 1887. Engels wrote ‘The Communist Manifesto’ with Karl Marx and published in 1848. Greater Manchester has a radical political history which is intertwined with many instances of rioting.

The attacks on organised workers mentioned above were not the only types of riot Greater Manchester has experienced. Reactionary, sectarian, and race riots also have a history in Greater Manchester. More recently, in 2001 the Greater Manchester town of Oldham experienced riots between White nationalists and people of South Asian descent. Historical rioting in Greater Manchester has not always been remembered as proudly as the Peterloo Massacre is commemorated.

More recently, the 1981 Moss Side riots have been remembered as ‘more than just a riot’. In his book, argued they were an uprising against racist policing (John 2011). The Strangeways prison riots (1990), and Salford’s 1992 riots, are more recent examples of the history of rioting in Greater Manchester.

Greater Manchester’s industrial past and associated levels of deprivation amongst the working class have made it the sight of struggle between the powerful and powerless. As a major population and former trading hub, it is home to a multitude of ethnicities which at times have come into conflict with each other and the police. Some riot events are now held in greater esteem than others. However, it must be acknowledged that riots have been an integral part of Greater Manchester’s history. 139

Some may consider these instances of rioting a series of one off events rather than a continuous ideology of confrontation with authority. However, it is clear that a defiant oppositional culture exists within both Salford and Manchester. From the Chartists and the Trade Unionists, to Feminists and Communists, Greater Manchester has long been a home to anti- establishment politics. Furthermore, struggles against police racism and antipathy between the working classes and police are within living memory. This is clearly not an exhaustive account of rioting in Greater Manchester. Rather, it is a brief account intended to establish that within Waddington et al’s (1989) political/ideological level of analysis both Salford and Manchester as areas with histories of rioting.

Cultural level A culture within some working-class communities in Greater Manchester exists where people have an antagonistic relationship with authority. Jeffery & Tufail (2015) report an anti-police sentiment that is still very much alive in Salford, a fact acknowledged by police.

‘Certainly, for our area you have got pockets of people that are very anti-police, their parents were anti-police, their grandparents were anti-police and that's just the way it is, that's the way it goes (Jade, mid 20’s, police community support officer).’ (P.49)

Jeffery & Tufail (2015) also point to an existing antagonism between locals and middle-class gentrifiers. Jackson and Jeffery (2011) point to this graffiti from Ordsall Community Arts woman’s photography project 1989 to illustrate the longstanding nature of this antagonism 140

In the 1970s and 80’s a similar antagonistic relationship between the police and the Black residents of Moss Side. This spilled out into riots in 1981. Moss Side could also be said to have had an underground culture in the 1990’s when a series of shootings earned the city the nickname ‘Gunchester’. However, in recent years this reputation has subsided somewhat.

Manchester’s ‘gangs’ have provided a rich source for sensationalist accounts of organised crime (Walsh 2005; MacIntyre 2007). More considered approaches have emphasised problems with vague definitions (Shute 2016) and racial disparities in police defined affiliation (Williams 2014). However, it is clear that an underground anti-establishment culture existed in both Salford and Manchester in 2011. As such, conditions argued to be conducive to rioting in the cultural level of Waddington et al’s (1989) ‘flashpoints’ model existed in both Salford and Manchester.

Contextual level Sir Peter Fahy, Chief Constable of GMP at the time, characterised the disorder in Salford as a concerted attempt by organised criminal factions to 141

attack the police following large-scale police operations (Spicer 2011). This organised crime ‘payback’ theory is disputed by Jeffery & Tufail (2015) in favour of a longer-term antagonism with the police resulting from contestation over space between working-class residents and incoming gentrifiers.

The short-term context of policing operations against organised crime may not have been necessary to elicit anti-police feeling within Salford. Jeffery & Jackson (2011 P.19) argue that the police in Salford are engaged in ‘a project of policing the return of capital to the inner-city.’ The authors argue the police ‘are not a tension-management device but instead a cause of friction, antagonism and conflict.’ As an area close to the centre of Manchester, East Salford has been the site of what some call regeneration and others call gentrification. The land that is currently populated by some of the poorest people in England is prime real estate. House prices in Salford have risen by almost double the national average - rising by 13.1% in 2016 in comparison to 7.2% nationally (Smithers 2017). Although these figures are from five years after the riots, the process of regeneration/gentrification was well under way by then.

The cornerstone of the regeneration/gentrification project is ‘Media City’, home of the BBC in the North. Its construction was under way by 2007. Jeffery and Jackson (2011) point to the selective use of dispersal orders on working class youth and parallel non-integrative development, as being a source of contention between locals, newcomers, and police. Accordingly, the development has been the source of a marked increase in inequality as affluent media workers are perceived to push locals out of their own area.

In addition to the practical effects of regeneration/gentrification, is a more symbolic effect. The name Salford is steadily being removed. For example, 142

the home page of Media City makes no mention of Salford. Instead its relationship to Manchester is emphasised (mediacityuk.co.uk 2017 overleaf). Indeed, the Salford Star (Kingston 2017b) now offers a ‘Disappearing Salford’ award for developments in Salford that ignore the Salford location in favour of emphasising Manchester. In this context, the specific policing operations targeting organised crime could be considered an exacerbating rather than causal factor of anti-police sentiment.

(Anon 2017) Furthermore, rioting occurred in the context of the Government’s austerity program. Both Manchester and Salford were subject to a series of cuts. In January 2011, it was announced that 2000 council jobs would be lost in Manchester City Council as the government cut 20% of its funding (Taylor 2011). In March, Manchester City Council voted through a budget with £109 million pounds worth of cuts. In doing so Taylor (2011) noted that 143

‘almost every service was cut, with closures of libraries, sports facilities, youth centres and public toilets, the end of weekly bin collections and the end of free Sunday parking in the city.’

Kranz (2011) reported that ‘Manchester City Council has decided to disband the entire Youth Service’. A somewhat prescient quote ends Kranz’s report,

‘“We all remember that in 1981 desperate and angry young people rioted in Manchester,” said a spokesperson from Manchester Coalition Against the Cuts. “Young people from across the city will be welcomed on the march in London on the 26th. Our aim is to build a movement strong enough to reverse these unnecessary closures,”’

It is difficult to establish a direct link between cuts and rioting. Many areas facing cuts did not riot. However, instances of large scale disorder have been shown to increase during times of budget cuts (Ponticelli & Voth 2011), and when rising expectations are followed by steep declines in economic prosperity (Davies 1969). Indeed, in November 2010 Chief Superintendent Derek Barnett, pleaded with the then Home Secretary Theresa May to protect the police budget from cuts so that officers could respond to ‘widespread disorder on our streets’ ( 2010). Cuts in services provided the medium-term context in which rioting took place.

The most pressing contextual issue, however, was the ongoing riots. Three days of widespread rioting had occurred by 9th August. There was a perception that riots were spreading. This must be acknowledged as an important contextual factor in the Greater Manchester riots. This context was salient to the emergency services and the wider public. As will be discussed in the analysis, one participant went looking for a riot on Monday 8th August, others planned involvement, and some expected to see rioting in 144

Manchester after rioting occurred in Liverpool. The context of widespread rioting clearly influenced potential participants and the police.

At 9am on Monday 8th August 2011, Operation Valiant was launched by Greater Manchester Police (GMP) to prepare for any escalation in the Greater Manchester area (HMIC 2011). Birmingham and Liverpool witnessed disturbances on Monday 8th August, while Greater Manchester remained relatively quiet. It was apparent that disorder could be seen outside London. Preparations were made by GMP in case of rioting in Manchester. As such, the police were on a riot footing, with all the preparations and expectations that entails. Furthermore, as Stott et al (2017) point out,

‘the pressure on officers was to be more, rather than less, interventionist. In such a climate, it was all too easy for mutual distrust and expectation to turn into the dynamics of conflict.’ (P.973)

The images of rioting that were repeatedly broadcast on rolling 24-hour news provided vivid examples of what could happen in cities across England. This context has the potential to influence rioting in several ways. Firstly, as Stott et al’s (2017) analysis of rioting in London points out,

‘the foregoing riots changed the context and the self-understanding of rioters in Hackney. They began with a heightened sense of grievance, a sense of empowerment and an unwillingness to tolerate encounters with the police that they experienced as oppressive.’ (P.976)

Although their analysis comes to a different understanding of the events, HMIC (2011) also claim the context of previous riots informed actions of subsequent riot participants. 145

‘The single most important reason why the disorder spread was the perception, relayed by television as well as new social media, that in some areas the police had lost control of the streets.’ (HMIC 2011 Paragraph 47)

GMP were clearly aware of call for robust policing (Cameron 2011). It was in this context that Assistant Chief Constable Sweeny addressed the potential for rioting in Manchester on the morning of the 9th of August. In a 3 minute 43 second video, (v1); he used the word ‘robustly’ four times.

The video was clearly meant to reassure concerned citizens and deter potential rioters. However, the video may have unintentionally informed potential riot participants that GMP would be understaffed. ACC Sweeny confirmed that after being contacted by the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) on Monday 8th of August, GMP sent ‘a single’ police support unit (PSU, 25 officers) to assist. He went on to say that the initial PSU was followed up with more officers on the morning of Tuesday 9th August, however, the exact number was undisclosed. GMP indicated that there was evidence some rioters knew that they were understaffed in messages sent by people arrested for riot related offences.

‘At least one BBM message also noted that GMP officers had been sent to London to help with the riots there, and indicated that this meant there would be fewer police available in Manchester.’ (Email communication with GMP contact Jonathan Bradley 8th July 2017)

The national context of rioting informs both sites in the Greater Manchester riots. However, it must also be acknowledged that Salford’s riot preceded rioting in Manchester city centre. This adds an extra contextual effect in which rioting in Manchester city centre should be understood. 146

The contextual level of analysis forwarded in Waddington et al’s (1989) ‘flashpoints’ model suggests a variety of factors conducive to rioting were present in Greater Manchester. However, the background issues discussed so far are not unique to areas that did witness large scale disorder. To understand why certain areas saw rioting while others did not and indeed the character of those riots, it is necessary to turn to more proximal levels of analysis.

Situational level The situational level of analysis in Waddington et al’s (1989) ‘flashpoints’ model considers spatial and social conditions. Manchester’s city centre is within walking distance of several severely deprived areas. Furthermore, it is home to a variety of high end shops. Designer clothing, electrical and jewellery shops are in abundance. It also has myriad side streets and alleyways.

Manchester’s city centre is an affluent contrast to Pendleton’s shopping city. As Jeffery & Jackson (2011) point out

‘Salford Precinct, or Salford Shopping City to give it its proper name, is not Manchester’s Arndale Centre or King Street; no Bang and Olufsen, no Footlocker and no Pretty Green, but instead a rather limited range of pawn-brokers, pound-shops and other low-cost retailers such as Wilkinson’s, Bon Marché and Lidl.’ (P.18)

The geography of the riot sites is important. Ball & Drury (2012) draw a distinction in their typology of the 2011 riots according to whether rioters travelled to commercial hubs or stayed within their own residential areas. Manchester city centre is clearly a commercial area. Pendleton does have a 147

limited range of discount shops. However, it is not the commercial hub that Manchester city centre is.

A central difference between the riots at the two sites was the distance participants travelled to take part in the disturbances. As noted in previous sections Manchester city centre is a much more affluent area than Pendleton. Congruent with this difference is the notion that people travelled from less affluent areas of Manchester to the city centre to participate. While the Pendleton riot is considered to have had many more local participants with less distance to travel to the riot. Jeffery & Tufail (2015) point to a variety of sources including - ‘Reading the Riots’ researchers’ Rogers and Prasad (2011), local police officer interviews, and arrest data - that left them with the impression of

‘a more fragmented body of rioters in Manchester, who we know from arrest data (problematic as this is) were drawn from across the Greater Manchester conurbation (though predominantly from multiply deprived inner-city neighbourhoods). Salford by contrast appears to have been a much more localised riot in the sense that participants were overwhelmingly drawn from the neighbourhoods that constitute Central Salford and that they acted more cohesively as a group.’ (P.45)

Indeed, the pattern of rioters’ residences plotted by the BBC against deprivation data illustrates this pattern. There is a clear skew in that rioters were listed as resident in the more deprived areas. The absence of arrested rioters from Manchester city centre is also visible in figure 18 overleaf. 148

Figure 18: Source: BBC 2011 149

A triangulated sequential account of the development of rioting is offered for both sites in the subsequent chapters. However, addressing Waddington et al’s (1989) situational level of analysis, a series of police incident maps are provided here. These maps are novel data provided by GMP for this study. They report incidents of riotous activities reported by the public. They do not necessarily mean that police attended the incidents. Eighteen different types of incidents, as abstract as ‘information’ and as concrete as ‘attacking premises’, were included in the excel document that informs these maps. These data sets can be made available on request. These maps are argued to illustrate the more situationally focused riot activities in Salford and more disparate riot activities in Manchester city centre.

In the first map reporting incidents before 16:00 on Tuesday 9th August shows incidents occurring in Salford.

Figure 19: Source: Novel GMP data

150

From 16:00-17:00 incidents were recorded around Manchester but had not yet reached the city centre

Figure 20: Source: Novel GMP data From 17:00-18:00 police recorded incidents were more heavily concentrated in Manchester city centre and continued to take place in Pendleton

Figure 21: Source: Novel GMP data 151

From 18:00-19:00 incidents were again heavily located in the city centre. However there appears to be different pockets of activity in different areas of the city while in Salford incidents remain largely in Pendleton

Figure 22: Source: Novel GMP data From 19:00-20:00 incidents again clustered in the city centre and continued in Pendleton

Figure 23: Source: Novel GMP data 152

From 20:00-21:00 Incidents continued to be recorded in Manchester city centre. There is less clustering visible in Salford at this point. As will be discussed further in subsequent chapters, this period coincides with the police retreat from Salford.

Figure 24: Source: Novel GMP data

From 21:00-22:00 (figure 25 overleaf) Salford is relatively incident free, while pockets of activity continue in different areas of Manchester city centre. 153

Figure 25: Source: Novel GMP data

Between 22:00-23:00 Salford appears to be free of police recorded incidents while several pockets continue in Manchester city centre.

Figure 26: Source: Novel GMP data 154

The incident map for 23:00-00:00 continues this pattern of relative quiet in Salford and pockets of incidents in Manchester city centre.

Figure 27: Source: Novel GMP data

After 00:00, riotous activities were much less common. The final map clusters incidents after 00:00. In this map, further pockets of incidents are visualised. Presumably as participants left the centre of the two riot sites.

Figure 28: Source: Novel GMP data 155

The preceding series of police recorded incidents maps support Jeffery & Tufail’s (2015) impression of fragmented bodies of participants in Manchester evading the police in efforts to engage in acquisitory crime, while Salford saw a more coherent group of participants, acting together in a more localised area.

The preceding section has established that there were some differences between the first five conditions Waddington et al’s (1989) points to as conducive to rioting in Manchester and Salford. Analysis of the structural level highlights the fact that the Salford riot was in an area of severe deprivation, while Manchester’s city centre is an area of relative affluence surrounded by deprived areas. The contextual level of analysis also highlighted some differences between Salford and Manchester. The regeneration/gentrification process ongoing in Salford has resulted in increased Salford youth coming into increased conflictual relationships with the police. A crackdown on organised crime in the weeks (Spicer 2011) prior to the riot also exacerbated these tensions. This particular context was not present in Manchester. However, both Salford and Manchester experienced severe cuts to services as a result of the austerity program and both were subject to the ongoing national riot context. Features at the situational level of analysis were interlinked with the differences in the structural level. Manchester city centre is home to more high-end shops in comparison to the limited range of discount shops in Salford. Salford rioters appear to have come from areas in or close to the riot site, whereas no arrested participants had a Manchester city centre address.

While the analysis highlights important contextual differences between the two sites, it lacks a mechanism to link background differences to riot actions. Nor is it capable of explaining the development of rioting, nor differences in 156

targets. As such, the levels analysed are considered relatively static. The time coded incident maps included in the situational level of analysis indicate the dynamic nature of events. However, they do not explain observed variations. To understand how background conditions link to foreground actions, it is necessary to examine how the intergroup dynamics developed over time (Newburn 2015b). This interactional level of analysis is explored in chapters six and seven. A triangulated account of the development of rioting in Salford followed by an ESIM informed analysis of the intergroup dynamics and participants’ subjective experiences is offered in chapter six. This is repeated in chapter seven for Manchester city centre.

157

6.The development of rioting in Salford 2011

The proceeding triangulated account of the development of rioting in Salford establishes a detailed account of events. This is achieved through a pragmatic approach to multiple data sources. However, because of the range of activities involved in such dynamic multi-faceted events, some incidents were necessarily left un-examined. Novel police recorded data, acquired from GMP, provides an overview of the event. 360 incidents were recorded by GMP with a peak of 63 incidents recorded between 17:00 and 18:00. Figure 29 provides an overview of the development of riot related incidents.

Frequency of incidents in Salford recorded by GMP 70 63 60 55

50 41 40 36 30 27 28 30 24 26

20 Numberincidents of 9 9 10 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 01 02 04 05 09 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 00 01 02 03 09/08/2011 10/08/2011

Figure 29: Source: Novel GMP data A diverse range of incidents were recorded from ‘information’ to ‘rioting’. These are presented in more detail in figure 30. Overall, the most common recorded incidents were ‘groups on the move’ (122 incidents), ‘attacking or entering premises’ (98 incidents) and ‘damaging vehicles’ (30 incidents). 158

Figure 30. Police recorded incidents in Salford

Figure 30: Police recorded incidents in Salford -Source: Novel GMP data 159

The first incidents of rioting occurred in Salford on Tuesday 9th August 2011. There is some disagreement over exactly when the first incident occurred. NatCen (2011) suggests that disorder began at 14:00 when Timpson’s window was smashed in the ‘Shopping City’ complex, which was advised to close. Jeffery & Tufail (2015) support this assertion. However, HMIC (2011) state disorder began variously at 15:19 (P.23, P.69) and 15:20 (P.121). GMP record the first incident of attacking shops between 16:00 and 17:00, however, one ‘other’ incident is recorded at 14:00 (Figure 30).

Although the smashing of a window is a relatively minor incident, NatCen (2011) report this led to 10 Tactical Aid Unit (TAU) vans being dispatched in response. HMIC do not mention this incident nor this deployment. In a different context the smashing of a shop window would not elicit such a response. However, GMP were on a riot footing since 9am the previous day and were keen to be seen to be taking a robust approach (V1).

Jeffery & Tufail (2015) report around 40-50 police in riot gear being deployed, initially around Salford precinct (Shopping City), before moving on to Brydon Close, a social housing estate. The documentary ‘In their own words – The Police’ (BBC 2012) also supports this assertion that riot police were present before rioting.

‘Anticipating trouble in Salford, GMP send elite squads of riot trained officers to the Precinct and nearby estates’ (V2 48.24-48.32)

The expectation of a riot and the commitment to deal with potential rioters robustly led the police to take a series of actions before rioting had developed. Simon reported that the precinct area was sealed off before rioting occurred. 160

‘they sealed off the top of the road, the entrance way to the precinct. But

there was nothing, nobody was throwing anything, nobody was doing

anything. There was just a few local kids stood near the, the old library, it’s

now a housing office.’ - Simon (spectator)

This thesis considers the initial steps in the development of rioting in Salford to have begun at 14:00, with a minor incident at Timpson’s in the ‘Shopping City’ complex, which led to the deployment of riot police. It is considered that HMIC (2011) and GMP reported more developed riot incidents.

Sol reported the shopping precinct was not the primary target.

‘All they done at first was they cornered the precinct off, thinking everyone

was gonna target the precinct, but they didn’t hit the precinct, but they hit

the police.’ – Sol (arrested)

After deployment at ‘Shopping City’ the police moved on to Brydon Close, , where some youths had thrown some bricks (Clifton & Allison 2011). This is captured in footage from a block of flats (V3). Five TAU vans are visible and another police car. Around 30 police officers, several with dogs, line up in formation on the outskirts of the estate. The shouts coming from street level are somewhat incomprehensible. However, someone in the vicinity of camera person shouts ‘it’s starting! It’s starting!’, suggesting that this was the first major incident and that it was to some extent expected. 20-30 people are seen approaching the police from the estate. Some missiles are thrown from the crowd. The police make a running incursion onto the estate. The crowd that had been approaching the police scatter. 161

Eye witness interviewees also point to the presence of police before rioting had started,

‘Just riot police, just marching through, almost like an army y’know, and there were people there just watching, and little kids there, and you didn’t know what was going to happen, and it could have gone off at any time at that point [...] The lads weren’t rioting at that time, although they were facing the police (Malcolm, public sector worker, early 50s, Jeffery & Tufail 2015)’

An interviewee in Jeffery & Tufail’s (2015) study also pointed to the police presence as provocative,

‘[...] they had the armoured van on the corner. And it was just really interesting, because it’s almost like [a] red rag to a bull, you know what I mean?’ (Julie, early 60’s, volunteer with local charity) (P.42)

The BBC showing footage from street level reported that tension began building on the afternoon of the 9th in Salford that afternoon as ‘a crowd confronted the police and threw stones’ (V4) One man interviewed on the estate at the time was evidently annoyed by the police’s actions.

‘it’s not a police state, this. We’re free to roam the streets. We can do what we want. It’s a free country’ (V4)

Another said the youths throwing stones was ‘most out of character for this estate’.

Other than dispersing people, it appears the police did not have an appropriate plan for what to do once on the estate. Julie, an interviewee in Jeffery &Tufail’s (2015) study said 162

‘There weren’t enough of them to do anything and they had to retreat’ (Julie) (P.42)

The police retreat was also captured on two videos (V5, V6). Someone is heard saying ‘they don’t know what to do now, they’re getting it from everywhere’. The retreat is hasty. TAU vans get in each other’s way as they come under heavy sustained attack. Plenty of missiles are available from nearby building works. A voice is heard saying ‘They’ve abandoned it! Precinct now’. As the police retreat, ‘Salford!’ is shouted and the stones are thrown at the eight retreating TAU vans (V6). The rallying cry of ‘Salford’ was also described by Sol.

‘The police just got absolutely outrun, they were say 10-15 riot vans and

they was all backing off. Every riot van got backed off by a crowd of 3-400

people charging at em “Salford! Salford! Salford!” it was absolutely… they

shit themselves, absolutely shit themselves.’ – Sol (arrested)

After the police retreat from Brydon Close, Jeffery & Tufail (2015) report events unfolded in quick succession.

‘as the police withdrew people began targeting shops at the Precinct (The Money Shop, Cash Convertors, Cash Generators, Bargain Booze and Timpson’s, amongst others)’ (P.42)

HMIC (2011) reported that between 15.20 and 16.55 looting occurred in Salford and that a section 60 and 60aa was authorised force-wide for 24 hours at 15.55.

HMIC (2011) also report thirty people threw bricks at police in Salford between 15.20 and 16.55. These two actions, attacking the police and looting are linked in this report, and it may be that they overlapped. 163

However, reports indicate that looting only started after the police retreated.

‘the looting only happened in Salford when the police fucked off. That was

only when the looting happened. They was fighting, all the Salford lads

wanted was a fight and they got their fight, they won the fight, police

fucked off and so they thought “Fuck it. We’ll do what we want now.”’ –

Sol (arrested)

Jeffery & Tufail (2015) note that the police were the primary targets. The Media City Chaplain reported being shielded from missiles.

‘Bizarrely, whenever it came near me, one or other of the brick throwers would halt fire until I was somewhere safe - on occasion even escorting me and physically shielding me from rocks - before giving the OK for more missile throwing’ (Matthews, 2011, Jeffery & Tufail P.46)

Some independent shops were targeted (Pivaro 2011). However, the impression Jeffery & Tufail (2015) were left with was

‘not one of 'mindless criminality', but violence targeted firstly at the police and secondly at the commercial premises at the Precinct (once the police had withdrawn).’ (P.46)

Novel data acquired for this study shows GMP recorded 80 premises were attacked in Salford. Figure 31 (overleaf) shows the most frequent attacks in Salford were on offices (11) supermarkets (8) Café/Restaurants (7) and clothing shops (7). 164

Types of premises attacked in Salford 12 11

10 8 8 7 7

6 5

Frequency 4 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

0

Gym

Hotel

Office

Street

Courts

Vehicle Market

General

Car Park Car

Jewellers

Footwear

Bike shop Bike

Bookshop

Takeaway

University

Postoffice

Food store Food

Restaurant

Residential

Newsagent

Technology

Hairdresser

Betting shop Betting

Supermarket

Clothing shop Clothing

Car Showroom Car

Cashconverter

Café / Restaurant / Café

Under renovation Under Departmentstore Bar / public house Barpublic /

Figure 31: Source: Novel GMP data

Grouped types of premises attacked in Salford 40 37 35 30 25 20 16

15 11 Frequency 10 3 3 5 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 0

Figure 32: Source: Novel GMP data

Figure 32 shows that chain shops were the main targets (37) followed by independent shops (17) and offices (11). Figure 33 shows GMP records show the most frequently recorded attack on premises was retail premises (35). 165

Types of premises attacked in Salford

40 35 35 30 25 21 20 13

15 11 Frequency 10 5 0 Office Other Retail Services

Figure 33: Source: Novel GMP data

Note. Other includes Car park (2), Courts (1), Residential (3), Street (1), Under renovation (1), Vehicle (3), University (1) 21 service premises were attacked and 11 offices. It should be noted that Salford’s MP’s office was one of those attacked (Salford Star 10th August

2011).

Types of attack on types of premises in Salford 30 25 25

20 Burglary in a building other 15 14 than a dwelling 12 Criminal damage and arson

Frequency 10 10 9 offences 7

5 2 1 0 Office Other Retail Services

Figure 34: Source: Novel GMP data

Note Other includes Car park (2), Courts (1), Residential (3), Street (1), Under renovation (1), Vehicle (3), University (1) 166

Figure 34 shows that more burglaries took place on retail premises. More criminal damage and arson attacks took place on services, offices and other premises.

Indeed, figure 35 shows that overall, criminal damage and arson were more common types of attack (45) than burglaries (35) in Salford.

Types of attack on premises in Salford 50 45 45 40 35 35 30 25

20 Frequency 15 10 5 0 Burglary in a building other than a dwelling Criminal damage and arson offences

Figure 35: Source: Novel GMP data

As a result of the uncertainty inherent in such fast-moving events, GMP were unable to provide exact times for the attacks on these premises. However, GMP did provide a data sheet estimating the times that these attacks were likely to have taken place (appendix F). Spikes in attack were observed at 17:00-18:00, 20:00-21:00 and 02:00-03:00. GMP also provided a data sheet containing the time span when each attack could have taken place (appendix G)

In a video of relevance to Jeffery & Tufail’s (2015) argument that antagonism over regeneration/gentrification was a motivating factor in the riots, Salford Home Search was set on fire (V7). The poster of this video notes that the 167

attack started at ‘around 5pm’, making it one of the first targets after repelling the police from Brydon Close. Some police in riot gear are seen in the video of the arson attack on Salford Home Search walking towards the fire fighters. The fire service record coming under attack several times in Salford and a M.E.N. journalist tweeted at 18:23

‘Riot police arrived to protect the firefighters’ (M.E.N. Twitter 2011)

Figure 36 shows the 30 incidents the Fire Service responded to in Salford

Type of incident fire fighters attended in Salford 5

4 4 4

Dwelling - Deliberate Primary Fire

3 NonResidential - Deliberate Primary Fire Outdoor - Deliberate Secondary Fire

Frequency 2 2 2 OutdoorStructure - Deliberate 2 Secondary Fire RoadVehicle - Deliberate Primary Fire RoadVehicle - False Alarm - 11 1 11 1 111 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Good Intent

0 18 19 20 21 22 23 00 02 03 04 05 09/08/2011 10/08/2011

Figure 36: Source: Novel Fire Service data 168

Figure 37 shows the 6 incidents where fire fighters were attacked

Frequency of incidents firefighters attended and when they were attacked (Salford) 8 7 7 6 6 5 4 3

Frequency Fire fighters attacked 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Fire fighters not attacked 1 0 18 19 20 21 22 23 00 02 03 04 05 09/08/2011 10/08/2011 Date and Time

Figure 37: Source: Novel Fire Service data

As will be discussed later, between 17:00 and 18:00 disturbances began to be seen in Manchester city centre. GMP gold command requested mutual aid (back up from other forces) between 17:19 – 18:54 (HMIC 2011).

Further videos show The Money Shop being broken into at around 18:00 (V8) and Cash Converters being looted (V9). The Cash Converters event is not time stamped.

A BBC Manchester Radio car was overturned and eventually burned at 18:45 (NatCen 2011). One video (V10) shows the car being turned over while the camera woman recoils in horror, wondering ‘what do people gain from this?’

NatCen (2011) record Lidl being attacked at 20:00, Jeffery & Tufail say 19:00, while a live Twitter feed by the Manchester Evening News reports the looting of Lidl on a Tweet timed at 20:06. Before the supermarket was broken into, 169

looted and ultimately burned, participants were engaged in a sustained attack on the police. Around 20-30 police officers in riot gear and at least three TAU vans are forced to retreat as a crowd advance, throwing missiles sourced from nearby construction sites (V11). From another angle on the ground people are heard laughing as the police are forced to retreat again (V12). Overhead footage shows advances and retreats being made by both rioters and police, yet ultimately the police were forced to retreat and abandon the Salford riot site. HMIC (2011) described officers facing ‘a sky turned black with bricks’ (p.27). Further videos show the severity of the attack on the police (V13). The poster of this video notes -

‘Police left Salford shortly after this, Then the looting started.’

It was in the aftermath of severe anti-police violence that Lidl was looted and ultimately burned. In an article that was condemned even by its own staff for striking ‘the wrong chord’, the Salford Star reported on the atmosphere at Lidl.

‘This was more of a party than an angry riot as youngsters handed old people packs of cigs, and tins of Carlsberg freshly liberated from LIDL, which is situated across the road from Salford Precinct and less than a stone’s throw away the Urban Splash Chimney Pot Park upside down houses. By 8.30 this evening around 300 people of all ages and races had gathered in Lidl’s car park and beyond, cheering as explosions boomed from a burning car and balley-ed up kids let off fire-extinguishers. Women struggled down the street with loaded Lidl bags. Beer from smashed bottles literally flowed down the road. Pretty girls in white dresses filmed the whole spectacle on their mobile phones, older lads skinned up, the local community hung out 170

of their tower block windows to get a good glimpse [...] all that was missing was the DJ. This was a very Salford riot’ (Kingston, 2011a).

The wisdom of such a celebratory report being posted on the day of the riots may well be questioned, yet it is likely that it accurately reflects the atmosphere amongst rioters in Salford who had overpowered and repelled the police on several occasions.

The police withdrew from Salford for around an hour after being forced to retreat from Fitzwarren Street, the street next to Lidl. Jeffery & Tufail (2015) report,

‘[...] the Greater Manchester commanding officer took the brave decision to withdraw from Salford to ensure the safety of his officers [...] (Hanson, 2012).’ (P.42)

Aside from the ferocity of the attacks on the police in Salford, GMP were overstretched and under pressure. In addition to responding to events in Salford, disturbances began in Manchester city centre. As such GMP were dealing with disturbances in two cities and had already sent reinforcements to London. In a tweet from the Manchester Evening News live blog of the disturbances a member of the public wrote at 20:12

‘These photos are horrendous. Where are the police?? oh yeah, London.’ (Ollie, M.E.N. live blog)

Accordingly, it was public knowledge that GMP had sent officers to London to reinforce the Metropolitan Police Service.

GMP’s Assistant Chief Constable Gary Shewan reported that there were 1,000 officers on the streets of Greater Manchester on 9th August 2011. At 20:43 HMIC (2011) report that the Police National Information Coordination 171

Centre (PNICC) received a request for 25 PSU’s to be sourced immediately to Greater Manchester Police. The request for 25 PSU’s (a further 625 officers) indicates just how understaffed GMP considered themselves to be. Despite requesting assistance GMP continued to assist the Metropolitan Police Service.

‘on 9[th] August, when GMP were taking steps through their regional arrangements to secure help from neighbouring forces, they sent three of their own PSUs to London through the national arrangements.’ (HMIC 2011)

Between 21:00 -21:15, West Yorkshire Police deployed 2 PSUs to GMP (HMIC 2011). Accounts of Welsh police arriving in Manchester city centre have also been reported, however, the level of reinforcements was below the 25 PSU’s requested.

The police did return to Salford precinct. An M.E.N. reporter tweeted of their return at 20:47 (Robeson M.E.N.). However, they were incapable of deterring further looting. Further M.E.N. tweets at 21:33 report

‘A group of young lads in scarves about to have a go at Tesco metro in Salford precinct’ (SteveRobsonMEN M.E.N. 2011)

Then at 21:40 ‘Riot van just arrived - police got out and chased away youths. Gave one a bit of a beating with a baton when he tried to object.’ (SteveRobsonMEN M.E.N. 2011)

Evidence from a variety of accounts suggest the police were unable to contain the situation in Salford and were providing a reactive response to small groups of looters after the initial pre-emptive deployment was overpowered earlier by rioters. The overwhelming majority of accounts 172

report that looting was a secondary activity in Salford. Confrontation with the police was the primary objective.

At 23:19 a M.E.N reporter tweeted that there was ‘another stand-off brewing at Salford’ (SteveRobsonMEN). This was followed by another tweet at 23:34 by another M.E.N. reporter ‘Hard core groups of youths are still on the streets of #salford bricking the police’ (johnscheerhout M.E.N. 2011)

Sol described the attacks on the police around this time.

‘They come back 10-11 o’clock, late at night. And come back and was

battling then with the gangs. They was actually battling. I was watching it

from me window. Seen a gang of lads up there fucking raiding and

whatever, and the police used a tactic to wait and move forward then wait

and move forward again. But cause the Salford lads, Swinton lads, whoever

they was, they know our area and they know the routes, and the police got

blocked in this big stretch here, and there’s bollards here and bollards here,

and they got pushed into there and the police were in the middle and they

were stuck. They was getting it from this end, they were getting it from that

end and cause it was our area they couldn’t get out and I think if I was a

police officer that day I woulda shit meself, I woulda absolutely fucking shit

meself. There were bricks, you could see the bricks that was getting threw,

it was horrendous wow! Full bricks bouncing off coppers heads. It’s sick. It

is sick, but it happened.’ – Sol (arrested) 173

Footage of these battles (V14 11.26-34.04) shows clashes on the roundabout at the end of Heywood Way not far from the overturned radio car and the original clashes at Brydon Close. Three TAU vans are visible. Burning barricades have been erected. Small groups of looters (4-5) are seen entering some open shops, however, the main activity is anti-police violence. As Sol reports, the police are penned in between barriers between the Precinct and the road while a group of at least 30 rioters mount a sustained attack on around 15 officers in riot gear. The camera man reports ‘They’re only really after the cops… These cop shields are taking a full-on battering’. Someone on a moped passed and gloated over his loot ‘I got a new PlayStation…’. The barriers provide protection for the rioters enabling them to stand as close as 2 metres away from the police while throwing missiles in what the cameraman describes as ‘full on wars’. When a police officer falls, the rioters increase the ferocity of their attacks. The cameraman reports that ‘they’ve not managed to arrest or grab hold of one protestor yet’. After around ten minutes of severe sustained attacks around seven TAU vans eventually arrive and the rioters scatter.

It is unclear if this is the last incident of serious anti-police rioting in Salford. Sol report attacks on the police till early next morning.

‘there was still battles till 1-2-3 in the morning. There was still battles. I seen

one when, and they actually got a kid, the police, and they fucking battered

him. They absolutely battered him. They didn’t nick him they just wanted to

beat him up. That’s all they wanted to do.’ – Sol (arrested)

The M.E.N. Twitter feed also reported that serious rioting had dissipated in the early hours of Wednesday 10th. However, at 02:18 a tweet stated 174

‘Last thing I saw in l'worthy was thugs in hoods leaving William hill's. One tried to stop my car.’ (mikekeeganmen M.E.N. 2011)

Another at 02:20 reported that the journalist

‘Drove past Salford precinct on way back. Bricks all over the road. Timpson’s wrecked.’ (mikekeeganmen M.E.N.)

A clear up operation was launched on the morning of Wednesday 10th August at 9am. Some of Jeffery & Tufail’s (2016) respondents criticised the response as being more of a photo opportunity by local politicians than a concerted clean up.

‘I mean, I think what was really sad was, everybody that didn't do any brushing got their photograph taken, and everybody that did do the brushing didn't. So, all the councillors and that, they did a photo- shoot with Barbara Spicer and everybody holding their brooms as if they'd been brushing away there' (Julie)’ (Jeffery & Tufail 2016)

Jeffery & Tufail (2016) report that

‘GMP swamped Central Salford in the immediate aftermath of the riot’ (P.50)

Sol reported violence occurring the next day.

‘The next day the police had come round looking for fights […] They just

wanted to batter people cause of what they got earlier on. And the day after

they’ve done the same, just picking on anyone. “Come here” Bam! Fucking

batter ya. “You from round here? Yeah?” Bam! Bam!’ – Sol (arrested)

The reports of police-initiated violence on Wednesday 10th August were not reported by other sources and so should be treated with caution. 175

It is possible that this operation prevented further rioting. The police were present and making arrests. Sol reported the arrest of one man after an interview on BBC News where he linked the riots to concerns over Polish immigration. In the video, you can also hear the man speak about war, however, this part of the interview was unclear (V15). Sol reported that the man was imprisoned and committed suicide.

While the police were present in large numbers on Wednesday 10th August, many felt the poor weather on Wednesday was a more important influence in deterring rioters.

‘It’s just a melting pot, it would have happened again, but for the rain’ (Malcom) (Jeffery & Tufail 2015 P.43)

This assertion was also present in other accounts

‘As one unemployed 27-year-old Salford woman said: "The police said … we did this, we did that, we stopped them, but it wasn't … It was purely because it was pouring down with rain."

A 21-year-old Salford man agreed. "I believe the rioting would've continued if it wasn't for the rain the following day," he said. "People don't come out in the rain, they don't!"’ (Clifton & Allison 2011)

The subsequent section analyses the intergroup dynamics, and participants’ experiences in conjunction with the contextualisation provided in chapter six, through analysis questions informed by ESIM. 176

6.1 Intergroup dynamics and participant experiences in the Salford riot

Chapter five contextualised rioting in Greater Manchester while the previous section provided a triangulated sequential account of the development of rioting. This section now explores the intergroup dynamics of conflict and participants’ experiences through the ESIM informed analysis questions outlined in chapter three (P.102).

A. How did participants and police define riots and each other (categorical representations)? Examining how the different groups define each other before an intergroup encounter reveals how they expect each other to act. This expectation informs their actual interaction. In the case of this riot the two main groups are the police and the participants. In answering this question, participants’ categorical representations of police are examined first, followed by police’s definitions of participants.

Participants’ view of police As previously outlined, Jeffery & Tufail (2015) and Jeffery & Jackson (2012) have argued that the rioting in Salford were informed by a poor relationship between the police and residents in the context of a controversial regeneration project. The small sample size in this study prevents strong generalisable conclusions about participants’ categorical definitions of the police. However, to understand study participants’ experiences, it is worth examining their categorical definitions of the police.

Sol initially reported a mixed view on the police. He recognised their necessity but also complained about their behaviour. Sol revealed that his views of the police had hardened over the years. Unnecessary stop and 177

searches were reported as the prime influence on Sol and his friend’s poor opinion of the police.

‘Think it was when we was growing up basically. Cause like I said we were

good kids. We weren’t doing much trouble but when they stop ya every

single day, and they know, they used to know us. They used to pull ya, check

ya, “what you checking us for” “knives” “I’ve never been caught with a knife.

What you checking us for?!” and that’s where they got their bad reputation

from. By pulling us when they had no need to.’ – Sol (arrested)

In addition to recognising the difficulties and problems with police, Sol also reported direct experience of dishonest policing.

‘They was just trying to make it worse for me. If they had just stuck to the

story I woulda got a little slap on the wrist or a little charge or whatever,

but because they lied, I got away with it. And I was in the wrong that day,

but because they was lying, I got away with it! And there’s bent coppers,

obviously we all know that, everywhere in the world, they’re all bent.’ – Sol

(arrested)

The perceived lack of procedural justice and ineffective actions influenced the interactions Sol had with the police. In one account Sol recalled being shot at by an unknown assailant. The shots missed Sol but penetrated his clothing. Sol reported he did not think of going to the police about this incident until I asked him about it. Sol defined a significant section of the police negatively and the organisation, as a whole, as ineffective. 178

Simon was more positive about the police. He praised Salford’s community police but reported having some negative experiences on demonstrations.

‘I’m not anti-police – we’ve worked a lot with the police. The community

police are really good round here you know? [Referring to his website] It’s

not an anti-police thing. I’ve had a few bad experiences. Anyone that’s been

on a demo has had a few bad experiences with the police for God’s sake.’ –

Simon (spectator)

Two participants’ accounts are clearly insufficient to form a generalised account of how participants categorised the police. However, Jeffery & Tufail (2015) report longstanding antagonism between Salford youth and police because of the police’s role in the regeneration/gentrification process. This assessment of young Salford residents attitude to the police is informed by years of ethnographic research performed while living in Salford. Simon’s more positive view of the police may be informed by the fact he ‘lives in the nice bit’ and is older than Sol. Sol lived within sight of the riot and was in his early 20’s. His definition of the police, informed by his experiences, are closer to Jeffery & Tufail’s (2015) assessment.

Police view of participants As a result of the focus on participants’ experiences this study did not explicitly seek police definitions of participants. However, we can infer GMP’s definition of participants from multiple contemporaneous data sources.

The context of rioting apparently spreading throughout England informed GMP’s understanding of potential rioters in Salford. The media accused the police of being too soft on participants (Lewis & Quinn 2011). Unusually, this 179

criticism also came from politicians (Newburn 2015a). Police forces were encouraged to engage in more ‘even more robust police action’ by former PM Cameron (Cameron 2011). GMP began preparing for the possibility of disorder in Greater Manchester from 9am on Monday 8th August when ‘Operation Valiant’ was launched (HMIC 2011). GMP posted a ‘YouTube’ video on the morning of the Greater Manchester riots clarifying their intent to deal with rioters and anyone thinking of becoming involved ‘robustly’ (V1). Section 60 and Section 60AA of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act (1994) were invoked force wide on Tuesday 9th August at 15.55 (HMIC P.121). The invocation of these blanket powers meant GMP did not need reasonable suspicion to stop and search or demask people. The blanket powers enabled frontline officers to treat anyone as a potential rioter.

Salford has a reputation associated with organised crime and a history of antagonism with the police. Simon referred to the poor opinion the police have had of Salford youth in the past

‘It’s only 8 years ago but at the time it was rife. The chief constable came

out and said Salford is full of feral youths. And you know, , and there

was a massive backlash against the kids. And I think that contributed to the

riots absolutely no ends. Definitely, yeah’ – Simon (spectator)

The officer Simon refers to is former Chief Superintendent David Baines. His comments were made in 2005 (Butt in 2005) However, the phrase used ‘feral youths’ resonates with commentary on riot participants and is indicative of the history of antagonism between the police and local youths. This antagonism remains. 180

‘Certainly, for our area you have got pockets of people that are very anti-police, their parents were anti-police, their grandparents were anti-police and that's just the way it is, that's the way it goes (Jade, mid 20’s, police community support officer).’ (Jeffery & Tufail 2015, P.49)

This account was taken after the riot. However, the multi-generational nature of the comment implies that this impression of Salford was held by police officers before the riot too. Simon also reported that this negative view of the Salford residents is prevalent among a variety of authority figures.

‘…it’s like what I keep trying to say about the gap between the authorities

and it’s not just councillors, its senior officers, police officers, health

officials, you know central government, youth workers maybe. It’s

everybody. Anybody who’s got that position, MPs, people in positions of

power... And they tend to see the community as a threat. And this is nothing

new. It’s been going on for years’ – Simon (spectator)

GMP’s ‘YouTube’ communication (V1) suggests that the police were expecting a riot. Simon reported receiving multiple texts about the possibility and surmised that the police would also have been aware of such a possibility.

‘…so they were kind of expecting it. Like I said before, if I got 3 texts about

it from people I know, and I aint one of the kids, I aint got no ins with

gangsters and all that sort of shit, if I got 3 texts, then they would’ve known

about it. - Simon (spectator) 181

The lack of direct engagement with GMP on this issue necessitates caution in asserting the police view of participants. However, the pre-emptive police actions, starting with Operation Valiant being launched on Monday 8th August, continuing with their ‘YouTube’ commitment to ‘robust’ policing, the invocation of section 60 and section 60AA, and participant/witness accounts, clarify that GMP were expecting to deal with rioters. Accordingly, it can cautiously be inferred that GMP categorised the gathering crowds as potential rioters.

Riots Simon reported that the Salford riots had little to do with Mark Duggan being shot in Tottenham. Instead, Simon reported the existence of local tensions for weeks before the riots started in Tottenham.

‘Boiling point, weeks before …before Tottenham went up or anything like

that. You could just sense it.’ – Simon (spectator)

Simon reported some organisation and the effect of rioting in Liverpool in Salford.

‘People were talking about it for days before, that it would spread around

the country and when it spread to Liverpool, cause it was Liverpool that

kicked the Salford one off. Cause I think it started in Liverpool first and then

people, you could say it was copy-cat. It probably was copy-cat’ - Simon

(spectator)

The limited relevance of Mark Duggan to Salford’s riot was also claimed by Sol. 182

‘…it wasn’t cause he got shot dead in London. It weren’t cause, well, it was

cause they hate the police. That’s the main thing in Salford, cause a lot of

em hate the police. They wanted to war with the police and they got it, and

they won. And we fucked them off and I think that’s all it was for Salford

people really. It weren’t about that kid getting shot. 90% of the people don’t

know that kids name who got shot in London, they don’t even know him’ –

Sol (arrested)

The impact of Mark Duggan’s killing on Salford’s riots was indirect. Sol reported that participants had little idea of who Mark Duggan was. While Simon reports tensions rising well before Mark Duggan’s death. The riots that followed his death destabilised the social power relations between the police and the policed. The riots provided an example of just how possible large-scale disorder was. It is argued that it was primarily through the destabilisation of social relations and the example that other riot sites set, that Mark Duggan’s death influenced Salford’s riot.

B. Was there an original fragmentation of the crowd? The blurry, ill-defined, group boundaries at such spontaneous organic events mean it is difficult to delineate the contours of the original crowd to assess its fragmentation. Anyone present that wasn’t in police uniform could be considered to be a constituent of the original crowd. The groups of youths on the precinct when the police arrived could be considered the most radical element in the original crowd. As Reverend Matthews reported, when the police moved on to Brydon Close some of these youths had stones in their hands. ‘YouTube’ footage of the police incursion onto Brydon Close (V3) showed a small group of youths throwing stones. Also reported by Reverend 183

Matthews, was the presence of residents that came out to see why the police had arrived on their estate. Other accounts report the presence of children and people just watching, in addition to the group facing the police (Jeffery & Tufail 2015). Accordingly, multiple sources suggest the presence of a second group, that were not involved in criminal damage at Timpson’s, in the original crowd. This group was composed of smaller groups of: children, parents, older people, and younger people uninvolved in previous incidents. The original crowd was therefore heterogeneous. This constitutes an original fragmentation of the crowd, satisfying a condition ESIM proposes is fundamental to understanding the escalation towards intergroup conflict.

C. What were the initial legitimate actions crowd members were trying to engage in? Social identity research has often focused on how demonstrations escalate from peaceful protests, where participants are adamant of their legitimate right to protest, into riots (Reicher 1996b; Stott & Reicher 1998a; 1998b). Aside from the march by Mark Duggan’s friends and family to Tottenham police station, the 2011 riots saw an absence of any official demonstration or direct action that participants could take part in. There was no obvious ‘legitimate’ collective action that people were trying to engage in. There was no attempt to hold a rally, block a road, occupy buildings, or any of the more conventional forms of protest. Rioting had occurred for the previous three days in a variety of locations across England. There was an expectation that rioting could be seen in Greater Manchester. Indeed, rumours that rioting had already occurred in Greater Manchester where prevalent enough for GMP to directly address them (V1). As such, the question of the legitimacy of crowd members initial actions is a complicated one. 184

The dynamic nature of the start of rioting in Salford complicates matters further. As detailed in the chronological account of Salford’s riots, several small-scale disturbances occurred between 14:00 and 15:19, when more sustained rioting developed. The question of what initial legitimate actions crowd members were trying to engage in is therefore complicated by the fact that the crowd at this point was not fully composed as an entity at 14:00. Crowd members were spread across time and space in the initial steps in the development of rioting. Some crowd members were present at the first signs of trouble at Timpson’s in Salford precinct, while others joined later once the police had moved on to Brydon Close, where more sustained rioting developed. The paucity of participant accounts further complicates analysis of what initial legitimate actions crowd members were trying to engage in. This analysis recognises the limits in what the data can reveal about the initial legitimate actions, however, it is worth exploring what the data does reveal.

Before 14:00 shoppers and workers were going about their daily business in the precinct. At 14:00 Timpson’s window was smashed, and the precinct was ordered to close. Accordingly, there was a disruption to people present at the shopping precinct’s legitimate daily routine. This disruption was reinforced by the arrival of ten TAU vans carrying police officers who proceeded to block off the roads around the precinct. While the absence of participant accounts or social media reports from this time prevents confident assertion of the initial legitimate actions of crowd members, it can be said that people present at this point had their legitimate right to gather and shop in their local shopping precinct curtailed. However, it is not clear how many people legitimately gathered in the shopping precinct went on to 185

become riot participants. This confusion further complicates analysis of crowd members initial legitimate actions.

Simon went to the Shopping precinct after receiving text messages stating that there would be a riot there. He reported a group of ‘local kids’ present at the precinct while the roads were blocked of in the absence of rioting. However, it is unclear whether the ‘local kids’ were present as a result of their legitimate daily business, or if they were also present in anticipation of witnessing if not engaging in a riot. The presence of spectators at many riot sites has been noted (RCVP 2011). This raises the question of how legitimate it is to gather where a riot is expected to take place even if the intention is simply to witness a riot rather than engage in rioting.

The police subsequently followed a group of missile throwers on to Brydon Close. In this secondary location the crowd grew, and more serious rioting developed. There were now at least three groups present. The first group who were present in Salford precinct and had engaged the police in missile throwing eliciting the police incursion on to Brydon Close. A second group could be considered the residents of Brydon Close who had not been present at the shopping precinct. The legitimate actions that this group were trying to engage in were simply going about their daily business. One resident reported his view of the police incursion as curtailing residents right to gather and move freely where they live,

‘It’s not a police state, this. We’re free to roam the streets. We can do what we want. It’s a free country’ (V4)

The police were described as marching though ‘like an army’ by one eyewitness (Jeffery & Tufail 2015). This ‘army’ were perceived as attempting 186

to curtail residents’ legitimate freedom of movement and assembly of people on Brydon Close.

Sol reported that the presence of police in central salford led to people encouraging others to attend. The third group could therefore be considered to be those that came to Brydon Close in the expectation of rioting. Again, the question of whether or not it is legitimate to attend a riot site in the expectation of rioting, is raised. It is not clear how many of those that came to witness a riot joined rioters as full active participants. It could be argued that the crowd composed of spectators was separate to the crowd engaged in rioting.

Defining the initial legitimate actions crowd members were trying to engage in is therefore a complicated question. The gradual development of rioting over several sites, including Timpsons, the roads around the shopping precinct, and Brydon Close, makes it difficult to define both who the crowd members were and what their initial legitimate actions were. However, shopping, free movement, and free assembly are considered the legitimate actions of people around the riot site prior to the development of sustained rioting. It is unclear how many crowd members experienced these legitimate actions being curtailed and how many arrived in expectation of rioting. Some residents of Brydon Close clearly perceived that they had a legitimate right to gather and move freely. The right to free assembly is enshrined by law under European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) Article 11. Freedom to express identity is also enshrined in Article 10. Protocol 4 of the ECHR contains the right to free movement; however, this has not been ratified by the UK (Donald et al 2012). However, there was a clear perception that people had a legitimate right to move as they please. The lack of direct 187

participant accounts necessitates caution, but the evidence suggests participants viewed their assembly and movement to be legitimate.

D. What was the police’s understanding of legitimate crowd actions? ESIM suggests that if the police understand crowd actions to be illegal or a potential threat to public order, then the police act on this understanding and curtail what the crowd perceive as legitimate actions. This asymmetry in the definition of legitimate action is at the core of the ESIM account of the escalation of intergroup conflict. However, in this case, aside from the small group that were engaged in criminal damage at Timpson’s and subsequent interactions with the police, the people in Brydon Close were simply going about their daily business. It is difficult to see how GMP could perceive this as illegitimate.

However, in the context of national rioting, it is likely that GMP understood the legitimate actions of those going about their daily business as a secondary consideration. GMP were primarily concerned with the group that were engaged in criminal damage and subsequent interactions. The lack of regard for this previously uninvolved group led to robust police actions becoming an undifferentiated incursion on to the estate, rather than the selective targeting of ‘trouble-makers’. Accordingly, in the interest of ‘robust’ policing, GMP understood the legitimate actions of the crowd as of secondary importance to the pursuit of ‘trouble-makers’.

Furthermore, while the right to free expression, assembly, and movement are enshrined in ECHR (Article 10 & 11, Protocol 4 Article 2(Donald et al 2012)), they are conditional rights that may be restricted to prevent public disorder. Accordingly, in the interests of curtailing public disorder, GMP appear to have attempted to curtail participants’ perceived rights to free movement and assembly. 188

E. What were power relations like between the groups? The documentary ‘In their own words – The Police’ (2012) reports that riot police were dispatched before rioting.

‘Anticipating trouble in Salford, GMP send elite squads of riot trained officers to the Precinct and nearby estates’ (V2 48.24-48.32)

Jeffery & Tufail (2015) also report eye witness accounts that riot police were dispatched before significant rioting broke out.

At the outset then, it appeared as though GMP, with their public order protective equipment, numbers, and dogs, had power to impose their understanding of the character and legitimacy of the crowd and their actions. The police appeared to be better equipped than those involved in criminal damage. They appeared to have sufficient numbers to deal with those involved. Indeed, those involved in criminal damage and stone throwing initially evaded police.

However, Sol reported that initial police actions escalated the situation.

‘I’m not saying it was the police’s fault but how they reacted in the first

place where there was no trouble starting. They’ve sort of escalated it.

“Wow there’s hundreds of police get down to Salford quick!”’ – Sol

(arrested)

Accordingly, police actions appear to have precipitated rather than responded to instances of large scale rioting by a larger more unified group than the original small group of ‘troublemakers’. It soon became clear to both police and crowd members that the police did not have sufficient power to fully control the growing crowd. Despite the ten TAU vans, Julie, 189

an interviewee in Jeffery &Tufail’s (2015) study spoke of police (in)actions on Brydon Close.

‘There weren’t enough of them to do anything and they had to retreat’ (Julie) (P.42)

The protective clothing and embryonic violent confrontations meant GMP were unable to effect targeted arrests on the small number of people initially engaged in violent interactions.

‘they could only hit people at the time they weren’t allowed to nick em. All

they was allowed to do was disperse, that’s all they were trying to do. Cause

they had all the gear on they didn’t want to try and nick anyone. Just try to

twat ya, get you outa the way.’ – Sol (arrested)

Sol also spoke of GMP being outnumbered.

‘They really weren’t ready. We was outnumbering them 4 to 1 and they

weren’t expecting that. So, I think all their training and practicing went out

the window straight away then. I think their heads just went. I think they

were just trying to control the situation as best as they could, and they just

couldn’t just couldn’t control it at all. So, all their training, their pathetic

training what they got involved in, just didn’t, they didn’t deal with it. Their

training musta been for 10 people, how to disperse 10 people not how to

disperse 400! So, they was just caught on the back foot straight away.’ Sol

(arrested) 190

The speed at which participants’ numbers swelled led to a reversal of the original power imbalance, this time in favour of the participants. The strength of the violent reaction to the incursion on to Brydon Close is evident in ‘YouTube’ footage of the forced retreat by the police (V6). This forced retreat was followed up with further confrontations on Fitzwarren Street which ended in GMP abandoning Salford. Simon reported that there were police officers present in the local police station 0.6 miles away.

‘I was on my way back and at the Pendleton roundabout, it overlooks

Pendleton Police Station, and what you saw there was the police locked in

there, in the car park, just sat watching it. Watching, you can actually see

it, the smoke rising from Lidl, I’ve got a brilliant picture which doesn’t come

out well on the internet cause the pictures are only that big. They’re just sat

there with their uniforms on in the car park eating their lunch in the TA[U]

vans watching what was going on and they wouldn’t move out of the police

station, it was hilarious.’ - Simon (spectator)

Police reported that they retreated ‘purely to ensure that nobody was seriously hurt or killed’ (V2 49.26-49.29).

As the riot was developing in Salford, disorder was also developing in Manchester city centre. Both areas are covered by GMP. GMP had already sent officers to London to assist the Metropolitan Police Service and therefore had fewer officers to deal with disorder in Greater Manchester. GMP had now been forced to withdraw from Salford’s streets. It is unclear if Salford would have been abandoned without GMP attending riots in Manchester and London. The usual power imbalance had been reversed. The police had much less power than the citizens they normally policed. 191

The primacy of the attack on the police has been noted (Clifton & Alison 2011; Guardian/LSE 2011 etc). Jeffery & Tufail (2015) emphasise that the main riot activity was attacking the police. Participants reversed the usual power dynamics by expelling the police. Sol reported a more relaxed atmosphere after the police retreat.

‘As soon as the sirens went, everyone just did what they wanted. So, you

could walk about then cause there was no rioting.’ Sol (arrested)

Without a target the rioting effectively stopped. However, the police retreat allowed looting to take place relatively unhindered. Looting was secondary to the Salford riot. It was after the police withdrew from Salford that the looting started. In contemporaneous ‘YouTube’ footage the order of events is clear from a witness’ commentary, ‘They’ve abandoned it. Precinct now’ (V5).

The absence of the police allowed a wide range of people to engage in the disorder.

‘a good 5-600 people were there all night and thought “Salford’s ours’. We

can do what we want.” And it’s never happened before so people started

getting excited. You’d see families running in places like ‘Lidl’. Mams and

dads, and kids! Shopping trolleys full of fucking food coming out thinking

“It’s free! We can do what we want”, and to see things like that and

‘BlackBerry’, ‘’, everyone’s thinking “Wow! We can go and do

what the fuck we want. If we want a telly, if we want a fucking bracelet,

some money, we can go get it now. We can do what we want, lets go and

fucking do it”. And because they’ve never seen it before I think a lot of 192

people got excited. The police were nowhere to be seen. They got absolutely

outrun, they got battered and they didn’t have an answer and the people of

Salford thought “We’ve won!” And they took over the city. They done what

they wanted. It’s not good. I’m not saying it’s good, but it’s happened now.

It’s done, it’s all done. But like I said it was crazy, absolutely crazy. It weren’t

just gangs of lads, it was mams dads, granddads, nanas running in places

getting things, crazy.’ – Sol (arrested)

The initial power relations were such that the police attempted to impose their understandings of the crowd as a threat to public order through pre- emptive ‘robust’ policing. However, power relations were overturned. The initial small group of people engaging the police with stones became hundreds of people expelling the police, initially from Brydon Close, eventually from Salford altogether. With the police confined to their police stations, or, dealing with disorder in Manchester city centre, or London, the Streets of Salford were left un-policed for several hours. During this time looting occurred.

F. How did participants talk about the legitimacy of their actions after the outgroup imposition of power (legitimization of opposition)? News reports suggest that people on Brydon Close were incensed by the police incursion on to the estate (V4). The reference to a ‘police state’ and with the police described as ‘like an army’ by residents of Brydon Close suggests some viewed the action disrupting the lives of people trying to go about their daily business. Anticipation of serious trouble in Salford, because of the national context and information provided by the public, combined with calls for robust policing, led to undifferentiated action by GMP. The 193

move on to the residential area by police in riot gear was reported to have functioned as ‘a red rag to a bull’ (Jeffery & Tufail 2015). This incursion was viewed as illegitimate by residents and provoked a reaction from people who were not yet involved in any riotous behaviour.

Sol reports the attacks on the police as a response to their incursion.

‘I think it sounds daft, but I think the police escalated it. By what they

brought, nothing was happening, but because the police got told something

was happening the amount of force they sent, it got everyone excited and I

think that’s what majorly kicked it off. If police hada kept it to a couple of

vans, I’ve just been watching videos a minute ago, vans vans riot vans riot

vans, just constant constant and then it’s got everyone excited and when

the police started getting attacked everyone from Salford’s thought we’ve

got the upper hand here’ - Sol (arrested)

Although Sol was not involved in the rioting, he reported the motivations present in the crowd

‘It wasn’t for nicking goods in Salford. People done it, but it wasn’t for that.

A lot of that was to get the police, that’s what a lot of it was for, “We want

payback. All the years you’ve caused us shit, all the shit you’ve give us. We

want payback”, and that’s what a lot of people’s mentality was, “Fuck the

shops! We don’t want to loot”, obviously there was looters, most of it was

“we don’t want to loot we just want to get the police back” and a lot of em

did. Civil justice they say.’ - Sol (arrested) 194

The police were clearly the primary target; however, looting did take place after attacks on the police. Simon spoke of how participants viewed the targets as legitimate.

‘people were saying like, “Well, yes, we did smash up Cash Converters, to

get our Telly’s back that the bastards had virtually robbed off us anyway.”’

– Simon (spectator)

He suggested this looting would be perceived as legitimate had it happened in another country.

‘I mean, if it was, had it happened somewhere else, had it happened in

another country or another world or something like that, people would say

“Well, multi-national supermarket, pawn brokers, people that were

charging extortionate rates of interest, and things like that are legitimate

targets. Multi-nationals, department stores, legitimate targets.”’ - Simon

(spectator)

Simon was not present during the battles with police, however, he was outside Lidl after the police had been repelled.

‘There was people breaking into Lidl and coming out, but what struck me,

and there is a photo of it, was, the women coming out of there, they weren’t

carrying booze and all this. They were carrying tins of soup, you know? That

was poverty. It was women kinda running down the street with bags of Lidl

shopping and it wasn’t. You could see through the bag you know it was tins, 195

it wasn’t, it just wasn’t this consumer frenzy. It was poverty.’ Simon

(spectator)

It was not only large multi-national shops that were attacked. Smaller independent shops were attacked as well. Simon did not witness these attacks and they were not legitimised. Simon blamed these attacks on outsiders.

‘I didn’t see […] them smashing up the little grocery store there and that

was not people from the area. That was people from outside that had come

in.’ - Simon (spectator)

Simon understood the riots in the context of severe, entrenched poverty.

‘Well, we had an article on the website about two weeks before it actually

kicked off showing the figures round here. And the poverty figures round

here were, I think Langworthy was 40% male unemployment, Child Poverty

– the highest in Salford which is massive, in some areas near the precinct. I

think it was 70% something like that, child poverty. So, if you look at Salford,

Pendleton, particularly and Lower Kersal where a lot of the kids came from.

They’ve got the highest rates of poverty in Salford you know? And to me

that’s why it kicked off here. Not, it didn’t happen in Swinton. It didn’t

happen in Walkden. It didn’t happen in Eccles, and you’ve got to say well

why is that? If it was a copy-cat riot, you know, why the fuck did it happen

here and not down there? You know, if it was just about looting and

consumer goods and all that, there’s plenty of consumer goods in Swinton. 196

There’s plenty in Walkden and places like that, it didn’t happen there. It only

happened here. And that has got to be because that’s the centre of Salford’s

poverty.’ Simon (spectator)

The limited range of shops on offer in Salford precinct has been noted (Jeffery & Jackson 2012). Sol also pointed to the difference in looting potential between Salford and Manchester city centre.

‘in Manchester they’ve got the big-name brands. They’ve got all the ‘Clas

Olsen’s’, the big money shops, the Armani shops, the big money shops.

Salford precinct you’ve got ‘Cash Generator’, fucking ‘Lidl’ round the corner.

That’s why people targeted Manchester because of the fucking money.

That’s why the looting was happening in Manchester. There was more

rioting in Salford cause people wanted to fight in Salford. They didn’t want

to loot. The people in Manchester realised, “Fucking hell! We could earn

here”. Obviously, it’s Manchester, it’s got every shop you need. Everything’s

money up there and down here there’s not many big shops so that’s why

the not much happened really.’ Sol (arrested)

Attacks also took place on BBC journalists and their radio car was set on fire. Along with the riot site being in Salford’s most deprived areas, Simon also viewed these attacks as some of the most revealing aspects of the riot

‘the very fact that in the same way they saw the police as the enemy or

authority as the enemy, they saw the media as part of that. You didn’t see

the media coming down to report look at the social conditions that have led

to this. They knew what the media was gonna do.’ Simon (spectator) 197

The poor representation of deprived communities fed a hatred of mainstream media for Simon. However, it must be noted that Simon is an independent journalist and is especially attuned to complaints about mainstream media. Whether or not the attack on the media was informed by a considered criticism of media coverage or because of the media gathering potentially incriminating evidence is difficult to resolve due to the lack of direct participant accounts. However, Simon perceived the attacks as more targeted than simply an attack on anyone gathering evidence.

‘I think it was more than that. I really do. Because there was people taking

pictures. Everybody had their smart phones out taking pictures, yet they

didn’t get beaten up or anything. It was when they were identified as press

i.e. The GMR car, Manchester radio car, there was other journalists,

anybody with like a long lens, paparazzi or whatever. They were the ones

that were targeted. And that was interesting […] it was me kid’s birthday,

so I wasn’t dressed normally, and somebody came up to me and said, “What

you taking pictures of?” And I said, “Oh I’m from the Salford Star”, “Oh,

alright”, haha different attitudes’ – Simon (spectator)

Further limits to participants’ actions were also evident. Further normative limits were expressed in an account in Lewis (2011).

"I heard someone say, 'Let's burn the bingo down,' and I heard someone say: 'I can't burn that, my mam will kill me.'"

Accordingly, the attacks on the police were legitimised both in short term and medium-long term contexts. First, in response to the initial heavy handed undifferentiated imposition of power by GMP, and second by the 198

years of perceived harassment. As reported previously, Reverend Matthews was deliberately kept out of the firing line by rioters (Jeffery & Tufail 2015). These attacks were not indiscriminate but targeted attacks bounded by normative limits informed by anti-police social identity. While these are secondary accounts from spectators, the desire for payback on the police and a denial of victimhood directed at multinationals and poverty profiteers is consistent with previous findings (Guardian/LSE 2011). Furthermore, attacks on the press were not indiscriminate attacks but within the normative bounds of subjectively legitimate targets. Spectators and local independent journalists taking pictures were not legitimate targets within these normative bounds. There were attacks that participants did not perceive as legitimate, particularly attacks on independent shops. However, where collective attacks were legitimised this was done within the normative bounds of a defiant anti-police Salford social identity attacking poverty profiteers.

G. How did participants then talk about relations both with each other and with the outgroup (i.e. was there a more inclusive social identity)? ESIM’s understanding of the intergroup dynamics of collective action suggest that the imposition of police understandings should elicit a more inclusive crowd unified in common opposition to the shared perceptions of illegitimate police action. The fact that the initial crowd quickly swelled to 300-400 suggests that there was a unity of purpose shared amongst those initially involved in engaging the police and previously uninvolved and dispersed crowd members.

An attempt was made to use ‘Salford’ as a unifying rallying cry. This is evident in a ‘YouTube’ clip (V6), Sol also reported the same rallying cry. 199

‘There’s a gang, 400 of us, walking towards the police and the police have

got about 100 of em, walking towards us and they’ve realised when they

got close, we’re fucking outnumbered, outnumbered. And they was back

tracking and someone shouted “Salford! Salford!” And then everyone done

it, fucking crowd of 3-400 people, “Salford! Salford!” And it felt like a film,

felt like something you’d see in a movie. And the police must have heard

that, saw it walking towards em and thought, fuck me! And that’s when

they fucking legged it, they got in the vans and they got off’ - Sol (arrested)

These findings support NatCen’s (2011) perception that rioting was perceived as Salford against the police. As such, the anti-police sentiment present in an existing rebellious Salford identity was marshalled to unify the crowd. This was not necessarily a brand new social identity that had never existed before but could be considered an emergent social identity on that day, in that context.

Clearly many people in Salford were disgusted by the disturbances, as the comments on the Salford Star’s celebratory article on the riots show (Kingston 2011a). It is unlikely that these people would endorse an anti- police aspect to their own definitions of a Salford social identity. However, anti-police sentiment is evident in police officer’s views of Salford, it is evident in the graffiti proscribing grassing, the omerta that follows shootings, and numerous other instances. For some people in Salford, anti- police sentiment informs their social identity. As such, the shouts of ‘Salford!’ intended to unify those people with existing anti-police sentiment and those without an anti-police stance. 200

This attempt could be considered successful to an extent. The numbers of people engaged in repelling the police from Brydon Close were much greater than were involved in the earlier criminal damage and stone throwing. Sol estimated the crowd that repelled the police to be between 300-400; much larger than the 20-30 that were involved in the initial criminal damage and face off. The initial ‘trouble-makers’ were therefore supported by a growing crowd united in their opposition to the police.

After the expulsion of the police some shops were targeted by some participants in what Simon reported as a peaceful party atmosphere. I challenged this characterisation of rioting as peaceful.

‘No, but in the context of what it was, it was peaceful, because people

weren’t fighting amongst themselves. The fighting had probably been done

already with the police in the afternoon. I wasn’t aware at the time, cause

as I said I wasn’t there. And it was just very very peaceful. Nobody was

arguing with anybody, nobody was fighting with anybody, there was people

there from all different backgrounds, Black, White, Asian whatever. There

was no animosity or anything. Everyone was in it together. If you were

there, you were part of it. Whether you were actually going into Lidl and

taking stuff or just watching or just cheering or just taking photos, you were

part of it and you were one of them. You know? Kinda all together’ Simon

(spectator)

A surprising range of people that were involved in the looting after the police were repelled was also emphasised by both Sol and Simon. 201

‘It weren’t just gangs of lads, it was mams dads, granddads, nanas running

in places getting things, crazy.’ – Sol (arrested)

Attacking the police is a strenuous activity that is perhaps best suited to young able-bodied people with the strength and speed to throw missiles and run when necessary. Clearly the range of people Sol reports would not be suited to this activity. However, the fact that this range of people engaged in the subsequent looting suggests that the people attacking the police were supported by a wide range of people.

Further accounts of unity within the crowd arise from accounts of participants sharing loot with homeless people.

‘around the precinct there’s a lot of homeless people hang out around there

and there was loads of em, you know? You could tell they were homeless.

Just sat there in the street. And there was kids of 17 giving them packets of

fags and food. And it wasn’t this nasty, there was no nastiness in it at all,

and that’s what struck me. More than anything, was how friendly it was,

you know? And everyone was cheering. It was like everyone knew each

other. Imagine a mass street party, that’s exactly what it was like.’ - Simon

(spectator)

The idyllic picture of a street party where looters redistributed goods to the homeless was not the whole story. Sol reported accounts of young looters being robbed of their loot by older people.

‘Yeah, yeah, haha. Seen plenty of it. Plenty of it. See young’uns going off

with ‘iPads’, ‘Macs’, and all that, “What have you got there? (mimes taking 202

it) Nice one” the older ones, “Get off it ya little shit! You aint having that.

I’m having that. Think you’re having that £400 computer? Get out of it.”

People were robbing people, yeah.’ – Sol (arrested)

Aside from isolated reports of looters being robbed, the crowd were friendly towards each other. They shared looted goods in a celebratory atmosphere indicating a more inclusive social identity.

‘All I saw was people being very very friendly. We’re in it together. Everyone

was in it together. That’s all you can say about it really.’ – Simon

(spectator)

In sum, the ESIM (Drury & Reicher 2005) account of how intergroup dynamics escalate towards conflict is supported in accounts of the Salford riot. Pre-emptive, indiscriminate police actions imposed the police’s definition of legitimate actions upon an initially heterogeneous crowd. In contrast to the recommendations of Reicher et al (2004), the police did not differentiate between groups, nor did they facilitate the legitimate actions of the uninvolved section of the crowd. The crowd then unified through shared perceptions of illegitimate police actions. These immediate intergroup dynamics, in combination with existing anti-police grievances, legitimised anti-police violence. The newly unified crowd swelled and repelled the over-stretched police force from Salford, reversing power dynamics. Once the police were repelled, looting took place by a wide range of people who may not have had the physical attributes necessary to engage in confrontation with the police but who supported the confrontational crowd’s actions. Experiential outcomes resulting from the riot are now considered. 203

H. What were the experiential outcomes? In particular, after the event, (how) did participants talk about empowerment, victory and/or defeat, their emotions, and their rationales for involvement in future riots? Limits of the current study must be acknowledged before answering this question. Neither Sol nor Simon report being involved in the rioting. Sol was arrested for handling stolen goods but was only a witness to rioting. Simon, too, was a spectator. As a local independent journalist, Simon was present to witness the initial police presence but missed the anti-police violence. He returned to the site and witnessed the looting after the police abandoned Salford. The extent of their involvement was therefore limited, as is the extent to which they can speak for participants. Nonetheless their experiential outcomes aid understanding the wider intergroup dynamics and spectators’ experiences.

Even as a spectator, Sol spoke effusively about the power he felt while watching normal power relations being overturned.

‘They couldn’t do nowt and watching them retreat thinking, “we’re scared”.

It’s a big overwhelming feel of power and you say, “Fucking hell! We’ve got

rid of the police. Police can’t do fuck all to us”. And we felt strong. You did!

Just made them look weak.’ Sol (spectator)

He explained his vicarious feelings of empowerment through reference to past experiences of perceived police harassment.

‘Cause they’ve got it every day. They show it every day. They show their

force. We could be walking down the street, fucking grab us, throw us

against the wall, twist our arm up. Put it up the back and we can’t say nowt

about it. Can’t do nothing. We have to accept it. So, they had to accept us 204

that night. They got put through what we get put through every fucking

day. Walking the streets getting pulled. They realised how we, how strong

we was, and we realised how strong we was. And it just made you feel

great. It did make you feel good. Really did. They was gutted. They was

gutted. They fucked off to Manchester. Haha’ - Sol, arrested

Sol experienced the re-imposition of normal power relations directly, through his imprisonment for handling stolen goods. However, the normality of going to prison amongst his peers meant Sol was not initially deterred by prison.

‘It might sound daft, but I always wanted to go jail. To see what it was like.

I always, since I was younger and that was me taster and that’s me saying

I never want to do it again.’ – Sol (arrested)

Rather than prison deterring Sol’s full involvement, it was his familial responsibilities that deterred Sol from participation.

‘Would’ve loved to have joined in, don’t give a shit what anyone says. I

woulda loved to have joined in. I think it was me kids though. I had me kids.

I needed to get me kids home. About time everyone started fighting, I was

at home with me kids so, me kids were me first choice there really. If I didn’t

have any kids I woulda been there, woulda been on front line. Front line. I

was with me kids, so I couldn’t.’ - Sol (arrested)

When asked if the lengthy sentences would be an effective general deterrent Sol was sceptical. 205

‘Will they fuck! As soon as they hear that riots happening they’ll be on the

phone texting “where are ya? Where we meeting up?” No one will give a

shit about that. They might think it’ll be a deterrent, but it won’t be.’ – Sol

(arrested)

Sol also reported the limited specific deterrence effect prison had on him.

‘I’ll be there. Haha. It wouldn’t surprise me if I was there. I’ve been told that

I’m not gonna be there, but I’ll find it hard not to.’ – Sol (arrested)

Simon perceived the participants to have had a liberating experience.

‘…basically, they said it was the best day of our lives. They said they don’t

regret it. They don’t regret anything because it was freedom, you know?

Because we’re being told what to do at school. We’re being told what to do

here. Told you can’t do this, you can’t do that, you can’t do the other.

They’ve had the police heavying them just for walking down the street in a

group and it was like this pressure cooker had gone off. It really was. It

needed it. No, I shouldn’t say that, ammm I don’t mean it needed to have a

riot, but it needed something to happen because it was like a pressure

cooker.’ - Simon (spectator)

He reported that the effects of this liberating experience would empower participants and spectators.

‘Those people who participated or sat and watched or cheered the cars

going up know their power now. They felt they knew what it was like to be 206

on the streets with nobody breathing down their necks. It was just like

weird, like freedom. […] Salford will never be the same again because

people have taken it over and I don’t think the authorities don’t know that.’

– Simon (spectator)

Simon and Sol both reported the overturning of power relations to be an exhilarating, empowering experience for participants. While not involved himself, Sol vicariously experienced this empowerment through watching people like him doing things he would’ve liked to have done. Simon reported that further riots were a distinct possibility, but he expected the next riots to be much more overtly political.

‘People have now said, particularly because of the Bedroom tax and things

like that, we’ve got old women saying “If the riots happened again

tomorrow we’d be there, because... We’d make it political this time because

we’ve had enough.” And I think, you can say what you like about the first

riot. It was about breaking into shops and you know? Looting, or anti-police

or whatever, and people will say it wasn’t political. Maybe it wasn’t. It was

political in a metaphorical sense that poverty caused it and all this. But it

wasn’t overtly political. And I do believe from what people have said that

you know that the next one will be political and very very political. And to

be honest if it happens they fucking deserve it.’ - Simon (spectator)

Salford’s rioters experienced a victory over the police. This was interpreted as an empowering experience that overturned existing power relations. Rather than being at the mercy of police power, participants expelled the 207

police from Salford. Unfortunately, the small sample size prevents confident generalisation. Study participants also had limited involvement in the rioting. These limitations necessitate cautious interpretations. They should be read as the accounts of study participants with limited involvement in the riots.

However, the findings are consistent with the ESIM understanding of the intergroup dynamics of conflict in collective actions. There was an asymmetry of categorical definitions between participants and police. This led the police to impose their understanding of the crowd as possible rioters upon a heterogeneous mass of people. Some of this mass had already engaged the police in violent confrontation. However, it was the undifferentiated police action in moving on to Brydon Close that recruited new participants to the small number of people already confronting the police. Actions were legitimated in respect to the immediate actions of the police but were also fuelled by longer term resentment. The primary activity was anti-police violence. Actions had normative limitations. Violent actions were taken against mainstream media, but spectators and local independent journalists were left alone. Care was taken to avoid missiles hitting the Media City Chaplain. Actions were patterned and within normative bounds.

Looting was a secondary riotous activity that participants engaged in after the police were violently confronted and expelled from Salford. The atmosphere after this expulsion was celebratory. Study participants reported feeling togetherness. Loot was shared. Some robbery was reported amongst riot participants; however, the main impression was of a party atmosphere. Attacks on multi-national shops and poverty profiteers were 208

justified in relation to exploitation. Attacks on smaller independent shops were not legitimised and were blamed on outsiders.

The overturning of normal power relations was reported as empowering. This empowerment was perceived to have the potential to endure and change Salford. Indeed, even the re-imposition of power by the authorities in the form of imprisoning Sol wasn’t sufficient to put him off attending another riot.

‘It was great, it was, it was mint. We had control. We felt strong. We was

powerful. And it was good. It’s good to feel that power. That’s the power

the police have got over us every day. Every single day, that’s what they’ve

got over us. And for us to have it for one day, felt like superman. Haha,

Mint!’ – Sol (arrested)

209

7. The development of rioting in Manchester city centre 2011

Manchester city centre’s riot began after Salford’s riot. Accordingly, it is possible to describe a spread of rioting from Salford to Manchester, akin to the spread Baudains et al (2013b) describe. However, the thesis has only limited data with which to analyse any possible spread. As a data led thesis, interdependence is acknowledged, but the Manchester city centre riot is analysed separately. This is discussed further in subsequent sections.

In a similar manner to the account of rioting in Salford, this chapter provides a detailed description of the development of rioting in Manchester city centre. Again, with such diverse multi-faceted events it is not possible to cover every incident. However, an overview of the 864 incidents reported to police is visualised in figure 38.

Frequency of incidents in Manchester reported to GMP 200 187 180 160 151 134 140 116 114 120 100 80 60 45 44 40 30 Frequencyof incidents 13 20 2 3 2 1 2 1 7 6 2 4 0 01 02 11 12 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 00 01 02 03 04 09/08/2011 10/08/2011 Time

Figure 38: source: Novel GMP data

210

Figure 39: Police recorded incidents in Manchester

Figure 39: Source: Novel GMP data 211

A more detailed breakdown of the diverse range of incidents reported to the police is included in figure 39. As with the Salford data, these incidents are diverse. The most common recorded incidents are ‘attacking or entering premises’ (316 incidents), followed by ‘groups on the move’ (284), and rioting (45 incidents). The high frequency of rioting incidents is surprising given the common understanding that Manchester city centre was primarily a commodity riot (Fahy 2011 in Clifton & Alison 2011).

Police Federation representative Ian Hansen reported arriving at GMP’s control room around 16:00 and seeing ‘a significant number of people making their way into the city centre.’ (V2 47.40-48.01). Clifton & Allison (2011) reported that, ‘by 4pm hooded gangs had started gathering in Piccadilly.’

Tiago reported police actions around this time.

‘…they were being very hostile as well and asking everyone what they were

doing and just kind of like, “can you take your hood down, can you take your

hat down, you do know what’s happening here tonight don’t ya? Is that why

you’re here?” But there was not much they could do at that point because

nothing was happening, there was literally just like police everywhere, there

was riot police over at one point and there was amm, yeah just a big group

of people I knew just chilling and they were all like “Yeah, its gonna happen,

its gonna happen”, but we was there for about an hour, an hour and a half.

Just seeing what was happening. Nothing really seemed to happen.’ –

Tiago (rioter, non-arrested)

Harry reported an attempt by the police to disperse the crowd. 212

‘And then as I got into Piccadilly everybody started congregating and the

police wanted to move them off. And they did start to move off but then

they started going down Market Street.’ – Harry (rioter, arrested)

There were several different movements of people down Market Street. This video shows quite a large number of people on Market Street without the presence of police (V16). One man is seen attempting to break the window of a shop called Esprit before running to the entrance of the Arndale Centre, where around 30 people kick down the doors before briefly running in and out. Unfortunately, the video is not time stamped, however, the presence of such a riotous crowd in the absence of police suggests it took place early in the proceedings as there is evidence of riot police on Market Street soon after this event (V17).

The Arndale Centre manager reported the first premises, Ugg, was attacked at 17:30 on New Cathedral Street (V18). Attacks on JD Sports, and Foot Asylum reportedly followed (V19). He reported the centre itself being breached by 100 youths.

Figure 40: Source: Google maps 213

As illustrated in figure 40, Ugg is on the opposite end of Market street to Piccadilly Gardens. Harry reported being met at the bottom of Market Street by people from Salford

‘yeah, a lot of em at that time were congregating from Salford. That’s what

I heard. That a big crowd’s coming up from Salford and it was gonna kick

off in Manchester, but I didn’t believe it at first you know. And then at the

bottom of Market Street, they were coming from Salford, were coming up

from the bottom end, and then they all merged together, and it was just

chaos. Just chaos. It was mad, it was mad.’ – Harry (rioter, arrested)

The claim that people from Salford attended the Manchester city centre disturbances is supported by two different sources.

‘…all my lot, the Salford lot, had marched through Salford and gone sick and

then gone to town. D’y’know what I mean? They was the soldiers of the

whole thing. Man, they fucked up the precinct and then went all the way

into town and that’s like a 2-3 mile walk haha’ – Fred (rioter, non-

arrested)

It is not clear exactly when Fred is referring to when he describes people from Salford coming to Manchester. Despite some uncertainty as to the timing and significance of the numbers coming from Salford, the two events can be said to overlap.

214

Figure 41 illustrates the proximity of the two sites.

Figure 41: Source: Google maps

Three study participants reported the first riot acts they saw were on Market Street. Participants were divided on the detail of the act but all report that one participant-initiated action precipitated more widespread actions.

‘One window goes and then people are just kicking the fuck out of the doors

in the Arndale. People are smashing up everything. Everything’s getting

mad. All the riot police and that are coming with the fucking things and

that. Like straight away, it’s on, d’y’know what I mean?’ – Fred (rioter,

non-arrested)

‘It was whoomph! It was gone mate, know what I mean? That’s all it took.

Just one knob head to start kicking the door and then somebody else, and

somebody else’ – Harry (rioter, arrested) 215

‘everyone was just stood around and then it seemed like this is not gonna

happen like everyone’s just shit scared of the police. It’s not gonna happen.

Then like a quite well known notorious gangster came in threw a brick at a

window and then the second he done that, mayhem everywhere. Like

literally that’s how it happened’– Tiago (rioter, non-arrested)

The Manchester Evening News (M.E.N.) live blog began at 6pm. One of the first tweets posted was at 18:20 showing a cracked window in Thomas Cook on Market Street.

216

As such we can be confident that some riotous activity occurred on Market Street before 18:20. Footage of fluorescent jacketed officers running down Market Street is reported to have been taken at 17:20 (V20) just before the Arndale Manager reports the attacks at 17:30. The footage of unimpeded attempts to smash the ‘Espirit’ window and the brief entry to the Arndale centre suggests that this was the first early surge before riot police began attempts to block Market Street.

Another attempt by riot police to move people from Piccadilly Gardens was tweeted at 18:22.

‘Groups hanging round Piccadilly Gardens now being cleared by riot police, verbally #manchester’ (tombrookspolloc M.E.N. 2011)

However, the attempts to move people from Piccadilly Gardens met with some resistance

‘Some are gradually dispersing. Still scores of young people not doing so #manchester’ (tombrookspolloc M.E.N. 2011) However, the M.E.N. blog reported that another large movement down Market Street happened at around 18:33 as this tweet was posted

‘Woah. Lots of police and kids just legged it down Mkt St and left down Exchange St towards St Ann’s Sq #manchester’ (tombrookspolloc M.E.N. 2011)

The police had now begun threatening force to clear the streets. Another tweet at 18:40 reported

‘Police wielding batons ordered up to 100 kids back #manchester’ (tombrookspolloc M.E.N. 2011) 217

In addition to actions spawning from the principal gathering point in Piccadilly Gardens, other incidents were occurring elsewhere around the city centre. A tweet posted at 18:21 reported that

‘There are understood to be 3 small groups in city centre. Riot police in Piccadilly gardens’ (Deblinton M.E.N. 2011)

In another area of town, Deansgate (another central shopping and dining area of the city centre) windows were also smashed around this time. A tweet posted at 18:47 on the M.E.N.’s blog reported that

‘Patisserie Valerie window on Deansgate smashed. No-one here now #manchester‘ (tombrookspolloc M.E.N. 2011)

It was around this time that Paul decided to leave.

‘Yeah so, I decided to leave, I think maybe if it had been more of a political

feeling to it then maybe I would’ve stayed to maybe get my voice heard or

something, but I could tell that it wasn’t turning out like that. So yeah, I

kinda like stood around that area of Market Street for a while and then

walked up towards back towards Piccadilly Gardens thinking if I walked into

Piccadilly Gardens I could walk round and down back on to Deansgate to

just like miss out the police. And go down and grab my bike and get off

home.’ – Paul (arrested)

However, Paul confronted the police about perceived illegitimate behaviour and was arrested. YouTube footage of what appears to be this incident shows a brief glimpse of a clock that shows the time to be around 18:40. Police are already in riot gear. The footage shows one man on the ground being arrested as the police try to disperse the crowd from in front of 218

Debenhams between Piccadilly Gardens and Market Street. A few seconds later a man is relaying information about another man being arrested.

‘three of em [police] sat on him. Old man. White fucking beard.’

A group gathers and look agitated. Someone is heard saying

‘nobody is gonna do shit at the end of the day innit.’

Then a man (possibly Paul) shouts

‘…fucking protecting the government, who are ruining your jobs, and our jobs, and everybody else’s jobs. You’re fucking scum mate. All of ye’

From behind someone shouts ‘Takedown! Takedown!’ The camera spins around and the man (possibly Paul) is seen being arrested forcibly by two police officers in riot gear (V21). Some members of the crowd were clearly prepared to confront the police over perceived illegitimate behaviour. However, no reference to Mark Duggan’s killing is made (C.F. Stott et al 2017) (V22)

A video taken (V23), at the top of Market Street, between Jessops and Debenhams, shows police in riot gear setting up a line. This is the second of a series of three clips. A man is heard remonstrating with the police. The full contents of his remarks are unclear; however, some parts can be heard. He points at the police and says, ‘you’re working class people’. He encourages the police to take their protective gear off and join the crowd. He makes some reference to the 1819 Peterloo massacre, however, again, the exact content of his message is unclear. In the third video (V24), mounted police are seen advancing up Market Street. Several lone voices are heard to shout ‘Fuck the police!’ and ‘Our streets!’ However, they are not supported, and 219

this does not develop into crowd chants. The exact order of these videos is unclear; however, the third video shows Debenham’s clock at around 18:50.

Separate footage (V25) taken shortly after shows the riot police that had been holding a line at the top of Market Street, between Jessops and Debenhams, start moving down Market Street towards the bottom where the entrance to the Arndale shopping centre is. Some chanting is heard; however, it is not clear who is chanting or what is said. The cameraperson moves between officers over to the Piccadilly Gardens area where another line of police in riot gear forms. Debenham’s clock shows 18:55. There are still shoppers and commuters present at this point.

To summarise so far, a main group gathered in Piccadilly Gardens, while smaller groups initiated criminal damage around Deansgate, and others attacked the Arndale Centre. The main group was then forced to move by police with batons drawn. Some resisted direction by the police and ran onto Market Street merging with another group, possibly from Salford. Meanwhile, Paul attempted to intervene in an arrest on Market Street and was himself arrested.

Between 19:00-20:00, there was an increase in the number of incidents recorded by GMP (113). The most frequent remained groups on the move (44) and attacking shops (29) (Figure 39). Four incidents involving petrol bombs were recorded at this time. Between 19:16-19:39, HMIC reported looting in the city centre and a petrol bomb was used against police. GMP incident data corroborates this, with petrol bombs also reported in Ancoats and Clayton, the city centre and Miles Platting and Newton Heath. Males were reportedly seen with machetes. 300 people were reportedly involved. Surprisingly for such dramatic incidents, no study participants refer to petrol bombs or machetes, nor have social media searches found footage of such 220

attacks. Accordingly, the thesis is unable to offer further analysis or verify GMP’s claims.

In possibly the most iconic incident in Manchester city centre’s riot, Miss Selfridges (clothing shop) was set alight at around 19:00. The arsonist, with a lighter, calmly sets on fire the clothes of a shop-window mannequin (V26). No police are present. No one challenges the arsonist, nor tries to put the fire out. Someone does shout ‘Fuck off!’ to a woman who was shouting something unintelligible, but it is unclear if it is related to this act. For a few minutes people are still able to walk down Market Street (V27). A smashing sound is heard as and someone shouts ‘0161!’ – the Manchester dialling code. Eventually, police in riot gear arrive and move the crowd back up Market Street (V28). Debenham’s clock is between 19:05-19:10

221

The M.E.N. Twitter feed reported this incident at 19:13. This event was a beacon for one study participant to come into town.

‘People started tweeting “OMG there’s a shop on fire on Market Street” and

that’s when I decided to leave and go down. And I got down to Piccadilly

gardens, there was already police blocking off Market Street and it was like,

“ok somethings happening “. I saw a big crowd of people running around

and I thought “Ok, that’s the riot”. And started following them and I saw

some comrades from [a political group] there, younger people. It was really

funny because we all just knew to be there I suppose. There was nothing

organised, you know.’ – Tony (spectator)

In a video taken shortly after (V29) the riot police have established clear space in front of Debenhams. A woman is heard saying ‘It’s just going to get worse and worse’ and then a few minutes later she says, ‘It’s Miss Selfridge!’ One man is heard shouting ‘Fuck the cops! Loot!’ An officer addresses crowd ordering them to disperse.

‘Batons may be drawn. No further warning will be given.’

A shout of ‘Whose streets? Our streets!’ finds some support but does not develop into consistent chanting. Debenham’s clock is between 19:10-19:15 (V29).

Riot participants in Manchester city centre were now spread out around several different areas; Piccadilly Gardens, Market Street, King Street, Deansgate and Oldham Street.

Piccadilly Gardens then became an area where premises were targeted. Edee reported that a bar was one of the first targets in Piccadilly Gardens. 222

‘the first thing that happened when people had been pushed back into the

Piccadilly Gardens area, somebody decided to smash up Kro Bar which I

thought was just an amazing pun. It was really funny, and that glass was

hard to break… finally he managed to break in and people ran in and I was

like “oh yes great, Kro Bar!”, the beer costs like 4 quid, “take everything!” –

Edee (spectator)

This incident was caught in several videos (V32) (V33) (V34) (V35). Support is shouted for those that break in. However, the shouts are unclear and lack the attempts at a political frame other shouting had. Indeed, someone is heard saying ‘That’s where all the good shit is’ (V36), presumably a reference to looting potential. It appears to be only two to three people that actually break in and what looks to be around twenty people who also enter once entry has been secured. The sound of sirens elicits an evasive response rather than a confrontational response.

Kro is on one side of Piccadilly Gardens. However, it is a few hundred metres from Debenhams at the top of Market Street. The police held a line in front of Debenhams while Kro was being attacked.

‘amm so it’s like ok…he’s kicking in a door but there’s police over there all

protecting Debenhams. But what about Kro? Does that not get any aid or

what? I mean this could be clearly stopped here. But it wasn’t’ – Arron

(spectator)

The other side of Piccadilly Gardens contains a bus stop and more shops. It is further away from Market Street and therefore further away from the police. 223

‘after that they just sort of moved up and they started breaking all the shop

fronts along the bus stop area which is, you know, great. I was like ‘get

Marks and Spencer’s, get Marks and Spencer’s yeah, oh they got it!’

Piccadilly is just all these crappy convenience stores and gambling places

and people were just running out with these huge fistfuls of like 5p and 1p

coins like haha’ – Edee (spectator)

The move from the Kro side of Piccadilly Gardens across the bus lanes to the other shops is captured on this video (V37). Some people came prepared with gloves, and face coverings. However, it appears that the vast majority in Piccadilly Gardens are spectators, rather than fully involved participants. Sirens continue to elicit evasive responses. A girl is heard saying

– 'I love it. I can’t believe it.’

She asks the cameraman - ‘Can you believe what’s happening?’

- ‘No way’

- ‘Everyone knew it would be...'

- ‘I know. It’s going to get worse and worse’

Clearly, there was an expectation that this would happen and that activities would escalate. The Spar (mini-market) was looted first, then Piccadilly Amusements (a gambling arcade). Two men walk away singing ‘Manchester is Wonderful’. After describing how the police drove straight past without stopping because they don’t have enough numbers, the camera man estimates there to be 500-1000 people in the Piccadilly Gardens at this point. After Spar and Piccadilly Amusements, Ladbrokes was the next to be attacked. It was not the next occupied unit in the line, but it was the next to 224

be attacked. The cameraman questioned what could be looted from Ladbrokes and says The Camera Exchange next door probably has better targets for looting. After smashing up Ladbrokes riotous activity continued further down the line of shops before the footage ends.

Several videos capture the activity around this point. In this video (V38) the cameraman speaks to some people stood watching in apparent disapproval.

-So, you put it down to then?

-Absolutely. Thirty years of it. From an ex-miner.

Without further context it is difficult to confidently interpret their comments. However, they clearly put the riots in a political context.

Once the row of shops in Piccadilly Gardens, including; Spar, Piccadilly Amusements, Ladbrokes, Quality Save, Cow, Marks and Spencer’s had been looted, the crowd split up. Some went down Mosely Street, where further premises are attacked. After some time, (it is difficult to be certain, V38 shows at least three minutes passing) one TAU and two smaller police vans drove down Mosely Street and the crowd ran off. While this was happening, others turned around and went towards Dawson’s music shop on Portland Street.

‘when they got to the end of the row...ah then there was a wall of police at

the end of the row, so they turned around and went back to the beginning

and smashed up Dawson’s.’ – Edee (spectator)

In a tweet posted at 19:59 an M.E.N. journalist reports staff closing a bar opposite Dawson’s after seeing it looted. Accordingly, this attack appears to have occurred briefly before 19:59. 225

The mobile nature of the disturbances posed a problem for the police. Attempts to disperse people was described as a game,

‘the police would sort of make a rush towards people and people would go

“woahh!” and it just looked like a game of tig’ – Edee (spectator)

None of this study’s participants spent much time in Deansgate or King Street at this point but John was on Oldham Street. Time-lapse footage (V30) from Oldham Street shows that until around 20:20 the street was relatively clear. At 20:30, around 4-5 TAU vans drive down Oldham Street and a police line is established at 2035.

‘I'd gone back via Oldham street, I seen people trying to rip the front of Cash

Converters and when I'd circled back round that way I'd seen that the front

had been pulled up. So, they'd managed to sort of rip it up so it was bent up

and there was a gap underneath where I remember seeing people crawl out

of and people shoving out TVs and things like that from underneath this grill

at crash converters’ John (spectator)

‘YouTube’ footage of this incident (V31) shows people walking off with TVs and breaking open a cash register. The footage also highlights the presence of Dominic Noonan, who features in the documentary ‘A Very British Gangster’ (MacIntyre 2007). There are no confrontations with the police in this footage.

Edee described a change in atmosphere when the police pushed the crowd back from Oldham Street into Piccadilly Gardens. 226

‘then there was this push were the police sort of pushed people down out

of Oldham Street and everybody who had been doing that back into

Piccadilly Gardens so suddenly the atmosphere in Piccadilly Gardens… it

gets a lot more crowded and suddenly the energy changes from being a

really chilled out summer evening to being, “right, ok, this is a riot”’ – Edee

(spectator)

Several study participants reported some level of targeting in participants’ actions. When someone appeared to target a charity shop, Tiago intervened.

‘Yeah yeah yeah, I stood in front of an (Charity shop) at one point, like “no

no no”, cause someone was looking to do it in.’ – Tiago, non-arrested

Tony reported a very similar intervention. It is unclear if both participants are referring to the same event or if this instance of crowd self-policing occurred on different occasions. Another participant in the current study also reported trying to influence the crowd.

‘When possible, I was trying to not do that or say to people oh maybe not

that one, that one.’ – Charlie, non-arrested

However, the extent to which the crowd shared study participants definitions of legitimate targets is questioned by novel GMP data. GMP recorded 168 premises attacked in Manchester city centre. The most common types of premises attacked were ‘Chain’ shops (80) independent shops (37) and offices (17). 227

Grouped Types of premises attacked

90 80 80 70 60 50 37 40

Frequency 30 17 20 6 10 1 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 1 2 2 2 1 1 3 0

Figure 42: Source: Novel GMP data

Figure 43 (overleaf) shows a wide range of premises were attacked in Manchester. The most frequently attacked premises were; offices (17), clothing shops (17) and supermarkets (13).

228

Figure 43. Premises attacked in Manchester

Premises attacked in Manchester 18 17 17 16 14 13 12 10 10 8 8 8 7 6 Frequency 6 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

0

Mall

Bank

Hotel

Office

Music

Street

Travel

Courts

Casino

Tattoo

Luxury

Charity

Garage

Market Vehicle

College

General Nursery

Chemist

Car Park Car

Jewellers

Footwear

Bike shop Bike

Bookshop

Town Hall Town

Takeaway

Cosmetics

Postoffice

Off licence Off

Food store Food

Household

Restaurant

Residential

Newsagent

Sportswear

Technology

Hairdresser Warehouse

Concert Hall Concert

Charityshop

Betting shop Betting

Supermarket

Filling station Filling

Clothing shop Clothing

Car Showroom Car

Cashconverter

Café / Restaurant / Café

Under renovation Under

Departmentstore

Bar / public house Barpublic /

Community CentreCommunity

Amusement arcade Amusement Motorbikeaccessories Premises attacked

Figure 43: Source – Novel GMP data 229

Grouping these premises according to sector rather than type of ownership reveals that retail premises were most frequently targeted in Manchester city centre

Figure 44 Types of premises attacked in Manchester

Type of premises attacked in Manchester 90 78 80 70 60 49 50

40 Frequency 30 21 20 17

10 3 0 Charity Office Other Retail Services

Figure 44: Source: Novel GMP data

Note. Other Includes Car Park (3), College (1), Community Centre (2), Concert Hall (1), Courts (1), General (2), Household (1), Nursery (1), Residential (1), Street (2), Town Hall (1), Under renovation (1), Warehouse (1), Vehicle (3)

Burglary attacks on retail premises were more common than criminal damage or arson. However, services, offices, and others had more criminal damage and arson attacks than burglary. 230

Types of premises and types of attack in Manchester

60 54

50

40 Burglary in a building other 27 than a dwelling 30 24 22

19 Criminal damage and arson Frequecncy 20 14 offences

10 3 1 2 2 0 Charity Office Other Retail Services

Figure 45: Source: Novel GMP data

Note. Other Includes Car Park (3), College (1), Community Centre (2), Concert Hall (1), Courts (1), General (2), Household (1), Nursery (1), Residential (1), Street (2), Town Hall (1), Under renovation (1), Warehouse (1), Vehicle (3) Overall, criminal damage and arson attacks were more common in Manchester city centre than burglary.

Types of attack in Manchester 90 86 85 82

80

75

70

Frequecncy 65

60

55

50 Burglary in a building other than a dwelling Criminal damage and arson offences

Figure 46: Source: Novel GMP data 231

The data for figures 30-44 is reported from police data which I had access to through my privileged links with Manchester City Council. The full spreadsheets can be made available on request. GMP were unable to provide exact times for the attacks on these premises. However, GMP performed aoristic calculations of when each attack was likely to have taken place. These calculations informed an analysis of the temporal distribution of these attacks. This analysis estimates that attacks on premises peaked between 19:00 and 20:00 (appendix H). The time spans in which attacks could have occurred are also included in appendix I.

While Salford witnessed large crowds of people confronting and repelling the police, in Manchester smaller crowds were roaming around the city centre actively avoiding the police.

‘Loads of different crowds in different parts of town. Like one in Deansgate,

one in the Arndale, dada dada, then one near the NQ then one in Oxford

road, one in Princess street, know what I mean? There was loads of different

ones.’ - Philip (rioter, arrested)

There is little evidence of rioters in Manchester city centre attacking the police. Attacking premises is therefore considered the primary activity in Manchester city centre.

In one incident that occurred further away from Piccadilly Gardens, attempts were made to break into a Tesco cash machine on Oxford Road (V39). After being challenged on filming the cameraman state 'nah I'm doing it for my Facebook'. He is talking to someone off camera as he says, ‘we’re looking to make history though innit.’ The camera man is celebratory in tone when talking to participants. 232

'Yes Manchester! ye get me…Shit is live out here though…yeah yeah yeah that’s the cash point nigga'.

He encourages participants, ‘Yo pimp! Rep your hood man!' The cameraman is adamant that the actions aren’t mindless 'calling this mindless?! This aint mindless'. He encourages a shout of 'Casino!' and asks 'Where the money at?'

In conversation with someone off camera he reports that 'They got like 7000 people in town.' Someone else says, 'They shouldn't be doing what they're doing though.' However, the camera man seems more concerned that the true scale of Manchester’s rioting wasn’t being reported.

'Nah but on telly though, they're not showing this shit. Know what I mean? They're just saying like Manchester is just like some lame ting but big tings a gwarn though. Ya get me? Its Gunchester big tings a gwarn.'

Someone else says 'they'll introduce shoot to kill laws', he replies, 'Nah, this is England man.’

Philip had joined the riot to loot clothes, however, he was unable to achieve his objective.

Instead of designer clothes he ended up in a supermarket.

‘I didn’t know what to do. I ended up in the shampoo isle. It was just daft.

Like everyone, like as soon as everyone ran in. like there was like 30 people

in front of me or something. I was like 31st or something daft. By the time I

got in everyone had crowded round the spirit section, everyone was going

for spirits and cigs, all the cigs were gone, there was none there, and all the 233

spirits were there so everyone was grabbing that so by the time I woulda

got there, there woulda been nothing there anyway. So, I ended up in

another isle finding Strongbow and that… stupid.’ – Philip (rioter,

arrested)

Despite intending to target clothes shops, Philip stole alcohol. Kevin reported being in the city centre for a health appointment, however, he also got involved, stealing alcohol and cigarettes.

‘I was just stood watching it all go off. But before you know it, you see a

shutter going up, people coming out with three bottles of Ace, packs of

ciggies, this that, the other. This fella starts passing me half a bottle of Jack

Daniels, I had a drink of that. Then I’ve gone loopy sort of thing and thought

‘well, I’ll have a few bottles of that myself’. So, I’m in the shop myself sort

of thing, grafting what I can. And then, walking down, big gang of us, and

we can get into any shop we want, you know what I mean, cos there’s glass,

and the shutters are coming up so easy, it’s unreal. It were just like a free-

for-all basically, you know? And I were just filling up carrier bags full of

ciggies, err, bottles of Jack Daniels, brandy, putting it in the bushes, coming

back, filling up more, you know, for a later date’ – Kevin (rioter, arrested)

Alcohol and tobacco appear to be the most commonly looted items although even more minor items were also stolen.

‘People were looting everything like. This is some of the things, some of the

things I haven’t read, when I’ve read about the riots. People were like 234

sacking a Spar, the Spar in Piccadilly Gardens and they were, I mean the first

things that came out were the alcohol items, starting with the most

expensive spirits. After 10 minutes of that and all the cigarettes were gone,

people were just taking like multi-packs of Walkers crisps and I’m sure they

didn’t even want them. I think it was just being part of, being part of it you

know.’ – Tony (spectator)

‘Yeah, there were a lot of people running about. Just taking stuff like bread.

It was just the buzz for a lot of people of going into a shop and stealing

something. It happened quickly. People were in there for five minutes then

moved on to another store’ – Michael (rioter, arrested)

The looting of low cost items in Manchester city centre is a recurring theme in participants’ accounts. Charlie reported that it helped him gain confidence to get more involved.

‘I was very nervous when I did that I just went in and grabbed something,

guys coming in with holdalls getting bags of booze and I kind of ran in and

got some Kit-Kats and ran out like “Waa!” But then I built up my confidence

a bit and then we walked round the corner and walked to… I think we

walked to Piccadilly and I got a bottle of champagne, you know

immediately, helped smash a window open and got a bottle of champagne,

popped it and was really happy’ – Charlie (rioter, non-arrested)

This increased level of involvement led to Charlie engaging not just in acquisitory crimes but criminal damage on symbols of inequality. 235

“We found an estate agent’s that had you know like loads of big houses and

we smashed the windows and were ripping the monitors off the thing and

that was really good because there was some scally guys outside going

“he’s just smashing that shop for the sake of it! Let’s have a go” and they

came in and I was like “yeah this is what it’s about! Not bloody nicking it,

smash this shit up!” – Charlie, (rioter, non-arrested)

The majority of the videos on ‘YouTube’ have very little audible and comprehensible vocalisations. However, several videos do interview people during the riot. interviewed some young people present in the city centre at night time. In the edited footage (V40), one man, who has his face covered says

- ‘[I] come out for money and just

- So, it’s not anger it’s just…

- Yeah and anger cause the police nick ye for stupid things mate…. this is our payback cause they can’t do nothing to us today’ (2.49)

An unedited version of this interview was broadcast live at 22.18 (V41). Where he is heard to continue, ‘The police can’t do nothing so it’s like a freedom act, like do whatever you want today’. When the reporter presses him on what he was doing, he replies, ‘getting pissed mate’.

Another man without his face covered says

‘people are just pissed off. You know what happened in town, in London. Just angry people d’y’know what I mean? They’re just taking their anger out, you get me?’ (V40) 236

He goes on to admit that smashing windows and looting is wrong but says

‘they’re trying to make money cause they can’t get to college, know what I mean? There’s no employment, like I can’t get a job’ (V40 3.12)

Another man again without his face covered says people are taking out their frustrations because

‘everyone’s got no, no future to be honest. No one can see a future’

Another news report, this time from an amateur film crew, also interviews some rioters (V42).

- Why are people rioting? Cause there’s nothing there’s no shit to do bro. Nothing. See people getting laptops. That’s what I’m getting. - So, what about the consequences and that? - Fuck the consequences! Fuck the feds - Fuck Everything

The interviewees complain there’s no jobs.

- ‘No one’s putting money in my pocket, so I’ll make my own’

They also say that the last time there was riots was when the Conservatives were in and that the Conservatives are in again now.

- They don’t do anything for the ethnic minorities only for the middle classes. - Conservatives need to fuck off and Labour need to get back in. - The government don’t do shit for us - The police are the worst thugs, that’s who I hate the most, the police. Fuck the police! 237

- So how do the police treat you round here? - They stop and search me cause I’m Black. Every day I get stop and search, every day bro, every day. Every day for nothing, walking, just on the way here getting gripped up for nothing. 5-0 want it? They can have it bro? They can have it

These in-situ interviews with rioters indicate present evidence of rioters with a range of political grievances, not well articulated but straight to the point. The grievances are mainly centred around illegitimate policing but also the perceived lack of future prospects.

Study participants reported leaving the riot for different reasons. Derren left after looting a jeweller’s. Participants reported that the initial party atmosphere changed to a more a more frightening one, encouraging their departure.

‘ammm no I was getting a bit scared, I wanted to get home. I basically, it

was getting a bit too out of hand for me. I’d done what I wanted to do. Or

should I say not wanted to do. And then I just wanted to go. And I went

home and then watched the coverage on the news and that.’ – Harry

(rioter, arrested)

Some had seen all they wanted to see and were weary of how serious it was getting or could get.

‘I just kind of dotted around town and then would see different spots of

activity I guess until, until the point where I was like well things have gotten

a bit too serious and I thought I'd go home.’ – John (spectator) 238

Tiago reported that the police had received back up, were getting a handle on the events, and approaching the operations in a more co-ordinated manner.

‘I think the reason why we left was because like, the Welsh police had come

as well, and there was literally a wall around town there was like nowhere

to go in town. I think everyone was being pushed further out, so I think that

was like the main reason why we left…’ – Tiago (rioter, non-arrested)

The presence of Welsh police was also noted by two M.E.N. reporters at 23.07 and 23.08 (M.E.N. 2011). Reinforcements also appear to have been sent from Staffordshire as their vans appear in this video (V43).

As participants left with their loot, and police reinforcements arrived, the ratio of participants to police shifted so that there was no longer the safety in numbers that enabled rioters to commit crimes unimpeded.

‘You could see it was winding down a bit as we left. I say winding down,

basically going a bit crazy round the streets until there was not enough

people left to escape the police, and as I said, those last few people probably

got a real hiding’ - Sam (spectator)

Sam’s speculation that the last few people ‘got a real hiding’ is supported somewhat by this video (V44). It is not clear what has happened immediately prior to this incident but police in riot gear attack some people on bikes with batons on Jutland Street (a residential street under Piccadilly train station). They make no attempt to arrest or detain the people they assault. It was reported that no complaint was made, and no officers were censured for this act. (V2 53.24 - 54.40) 239

Participants passed the police on their way home.

‘Yeah there were police on Oxford Road near Oxford Road station and there

where quite noticeably, kind of amm not road block but a kind of check

point. That’s where people were kind of being stopped and asked stuff.’ –

Tony (spectator)

While others reported additional less official check points, including rioter on rioter violence.

‘I walked through, there was two police near Piccadilly train station cause

we were trying to get a taxi, and like I say, I just walked past ‘em, they didn’t

do nothing mate but like I say I seen a couple of people getting hit by some

lads and taking stuff of them what they’ve nicked and that’s what started

happening.’ – Harry (rioter, arrested)

An M.E.N. reporter tweeted that Piccadilly Gardens was empty at 22:57 (pbainbridgeMEN M.E.N. 2011). Another posted that Piccadilly Gardens was ‘deserted’ at 23:08 (tombrookspolloc M.E.N. 2011). However, at 23:37 another reporter was prevented from getting to Piccadilly Gardens by the police who told him there were still ‘firebombings’ going on (mikekeeganmen M.E.N. 2011). At 23:37 the M.E.N. live blog reported that GMP had made 47 arrests. By 00:43 another reporter managed to get to Piccadilly Gardens where she reported

‘Much calmer in pic gardens now. Lot of police still around but no disorder I can see.’ (amyglendinning M.E.N. 2011) 240

Evidently events were confusing and fast moving. However, at 00:49 GMP tweeted that things were ‘quieting down in city centre’ (M.E.N. 2011). In contrast to Salford where severe anti-police rioting continued into the small hours, actions in Manchester around this time appear to have been much more disparate actions that avoided confrontation with the police. At 00:53 an M.E.N. reporter tweeted that

‘Gangs of lads in hoods and tracksuits still roaming the northern quarter but no sign of trouble as we go past.’ (amyglendinning M.E.N. 2011)

Riot related incidents continued into the morning of Wednesday 10th August. The fire service report attending their last incident of deliberate fire setting in Manchester at 02:06 in Miles Platting and Newton Heath.

There were more fire incidents recorded in Manchester than Salford. Figure 47 (overleaf) shows the frequency and type of incident fire fighters attended in Manchester. Although firefighters attended more incidents in Manchester, they were attacked less than in Salford. This supports Former Chief Constable Sir Peter Fahy’s assertion that rioters in Salford attacked firefighters more than in Manchester. Figure 48 shows the frequency of fire incidents and where fire fighters were attacked. 241

Frequency and type of incident fire fighters attended in Manchester 4.5

4

3.5 Dwelling - Deliberate Primary Fire Dwelling - False Alarm - Good 3 Intent NonResidential - Deliberate Primary Fire 2.5 NonResidential - False Alarm - Good Intent OtherResidential - Deliberate

Frequency 2 Primary Fire Outdoor - Deliberate Secondary Fire 1.5 OutdoorStructure - Deliberate Secondary Fire RoadVehicle - Deliberate 1 Primary Fire RoadVehicle - False Alarm - Good Intent 0.5

0 16 18 19 20 21 22 23 00 01 02 13 16 18 21 09/08/2011 10/08/2011

Figure 47: Source: Novel Fire Service data 242

Frequncy of incidents fire fighters attended and when they were attacked (Manchester) 8 7 6 5 4 Fire fighters attacked

Frequency 3 Fire fighters not attacked 2 1 0 16 18 19 20 21 22 23 00 01 02 09/08/2011 10/08/2011

Figure 48: Source: Novel Fire service data

HMIC (2011) reported a group of men entering Manchester city centre on Wednesday evening being warned under section 60 and section 27 but report the tension indicator was reported as normal. No further disturbances were witnessed on Wednesday. One potential reason for the lack of disturbances on Wednesday 10th was a perennial feature of Greater Manchester, the rain (Clifton & Allison 2011). Despite the lack of further trouble, section 60 and section 60AA powers were not rescinded till Sunday 14th August at 21:03 (HMIC 2011).

Through the use of multiple sources, this chapter has established an account of the development of rioting in Manchester city centre, including references to study participants’ actions. The subsequent chapter analyses the intergroup dynamics in this account in combination with further participant interview data.

243

7.1 Intergroup dynamics and participant experiences in the Manchester city centre riot

This section now explores the intergroup dynamics of conflict and participants’ experiences through the ESIM informed analysis questions outlined in chapter three (P.102).

A. How did participants and police define riots and each other (categorical representations)? Police definitions of participants As the thesis didn’t engage with police directly it is difficult to confidently state the categorical definitions the police had of participants. However, reviewing multiple sources can provide some insight.

GMP had launched ‘Operation Valiant’ at 9am on Monday 8th August. As such GMP were preparing for the possibility of disorder in Greater Manchester. GMP’s ‘YouTube’ video posted on the morning of the Greater Manchester riots (V1) offers a contemporaneous account of GMP’s understandings of the potential for disorder. It is notable that the video was posted on the same morning that former PM David Cameron called for more robust policing (Cameron 2011). This call is reflected in the video. ACC Sweeny used the word ‘robustly’ four times. Furthermore, the ACC Sweeny warned that robust action would be taken to deal those considering engaging in disturbances. ‘Robust policing’ would therefore extend not just to those that have engaged in disturbances but would also extend to those that consider joining in.

The blanket powers invoked (Section 60 and Section 60AA Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994) reveal the authorising officer viewed gathering crowds as a threat to public order. This provided frontline officers the 244

discretion to treat anyone as a rioter. In-situ video evidence of how the police interacted with the crowd offers further evidence of how the police acted towards the crowd. Police federation representative, Ian Hanson, reported seeing large numbers of people heading towards the city centre from the GMP control room around 16:00 and fearing for his colleague’s safety as a result (V2). While a lack of direct engagement with GMP on this issue necessitates caution, multiple sources suggest GMP defined the crowd as a whole as a threat to public order and indeed officer’s lives.

Despite this relatively undifferentiated categorical definition, Jason’s account suggests that GMP expected gangs to play a central role in the disorder. ‘we was in court and gang squad walked in and took a picture of me in

court, like in the waiting room. So, I was going mad, like “what the fuck you

taking pictures for?! ra ra ra” and he was like “what do you know about this

so-called riot that was gonna take place?” I was oblivious to it all to be

honest’ – Jason (spectator)

Furthermore, there is evidence of ‘specialist anti-gang units’ in plain clothes intervening with people engaged in public disorder (V2 53.08-53.10). The gang orchestrated explanations of the riots were yet to be debunked at this point and appear to have guided policing in Manchester city centre to some degree. In this sense, there was some attempt to discriminate between rioters and spectators. However, most of the available footage shows uniformed officers dealing with the crowd as a whole.

Before the warning issued at 19:10, the police appeared to be attempting to deal with incidents of criminal damage and looting reactively. However, from 19:10, GMP took a more generalised approach towards the crowd as a 245

whole. That is, they treated those present in the city centre as an illegitimate presence and threatening force to disperse them. The crowd are told (V29), ‘This is a police warning. Disperse now or batons may be used. No further warning will be given.’

Accordingly, evidence from multiple sources suggest the police started the day defining the potential for disorder as serious. GMP witnessed riots begin in Salford and smaller incidents begin in Manchester city centre. After some selective targeting of smaller groups engaged in the initial actions, they increasingly defined people present in the city centre as a threat to public order. Increasingly generalised tactics targeted the crowd as a whole. GMP invoked blanket powers to deal with the crowds. The definition of the crowd, as a whole, as a threat to public order, grew to the point at which they threatened to use force indiscriminately on people present in Piccadilly Gardens after 19:10. Let us now consider the categorisation of the police by the participants. Participants’ definitions of the police Most participants defined the police in negative, adversarial terms. Study participants who took an active part in the disorder described multiple experiences of procedural injustice informing their definitions. Study participants who remained spectators also had negative definitions of the police. However, the basis for these definitions came from more abstract political understandings, or their experiences on demonstrations, rather than everyday intrusions on their lives. Fred described a host of procedural justice (Tyler 1990) issues as to why he disliked the police.

‘I really don’t like the police. I hate the way they speak to ya. I hate the way

they stereotype. I hate the . I hate the stop and search. I hate 246

their attitudes. I hate the little throw away comments they say to try and

have a laugh. They’re trying to have a laugh with someone they’re

arresting. They’re taking your liberty and they want to make jokes about it

in the back of the van and I just think “who the fuck are you to do that?”’ -

Fred (rioter, not arrested)

Fred, and the vast majority of participants, recounted multiple concrete instances of behaviour they perceived as illegitimate. Fred related his experiences of policing to the killing of Mark Duggan. ‘[…] Anyway, they stopped us, and my mate goes, “that’s armed response,

he’s got a strap on his”, he had a strap there, a gun. And I said to him “yeah,

but it’s not loaded” and then he gets the gun out points it at me pulls the

fucking clip out and shuts it and goes “yeah it is, and I’ll fucking pull the

trigger as well.” and then put it away. And I thought “Yo! to a 19-year-old

kid!” […] he pointed a fucking gun at me, d’y’know what I mean like? What

the fuck?! I wasn’t scared because they’re not gonna shoot me but

testament to a guy getting shot down South for pulling his phone out,

d’y’know what I mean?’- Fred (rioter, not arrested)

Not all participants recounted stories that related to Mark Duggan’s killing. However, Tiago pointed to constant instances of humiliating stop and searches. Interestingly, Tiago, one of three Black participants, perceived the negative stereotypes police in Manchester employ, to be more economic and geographical than race based. However, Jason and Linda both pointed to instances of racist policing. 247

Kevin reported an instance of police corruption in a domestic abuse case he experienced as a child. Charlie reported threats of assault by police officers as a teenager. As a long-term heroin addict, Harry reported continuous negative interactions with police, including experiencing police violence. Linda also reported negative interactions with police from her teenage years. Derren too, reported arrests from an early age. Paul reported an initial defence of police officers when presented with the ‘All Cops Are Bastards’ expression, however, his feelings changed as he recognised the institutional role of the police which he defined as ‘to protect the rich’ (Paul).

Undoubtedly, many of these stops and searches, and arrests were justified. As Fred admits, his friend was selling drugs when the police officer pulled out his gun. Jason too, had reasons for the police to be interested in him.

‘I had the police raid my house when I was 15 and took just under 50 grand

from under my bed…’ - Jason (spectator)

For someone who had perhaps the most intense conflictual relationship with the police, Jason reported a relatively benign view of the police.

Int: So, what’s your opinion of the police?

‘They’re just doing their job. It’s one of em. They was doing their job, I was

doing mine. It happens. Can’t really fault em for doing their job.’ – Jason

(spectator)

Arron was the only study participant without a negative view of the police before the riots. 248

‘I’ve never had any experience with the police, amm, none whatsoever, not

before that night I guess, which was the first time, really.’ – Arron

(spectator)

There was a significant degree of difference between the negative views of the police voiced by participants as a constant feature of everyday life and the accounts of negative definitions of police by spectators, five out of six of which were activists.

‘I didn’t have any major problems with the police before I started becoming

involved in activism.’ – Sam (spectator)

Sam reported dismay with ineffectual policing and a perception that his white skin afforded him preferential treatment compared to people of colour. John recounted stories of his friend’s experiences with illegitimate police stop and searches. Tony and Edee reported negative adversarial categorical definitions of the police when on political protests.

‘I think that the police are there to defend property and the status quo. I

think that they may sort of accidentally be useful for people in other

situations but yeah, I’ve had to call them after burglaries and things and it

always felt very weird. My experience of them had mostly been at protests

and things where it’s like “well, they’re obviously the enemy.” There’s just

absolutely no pretence that they’re anything other than your enemy and

you see them being as nasty as you like’ – Edee (spectator)

Accordingly, the participants in the current study defined the police as an illegitimate agent of social control whose actions, sometimes legitimate, 249

often illegitimate, humiliated participants. There were some exceptions noted for individual officers. However, overall, study participants defined the police as corrupt bullies, acting illegitimately to serve the powerful. This definition was informed by concrete daily experiences for participants and in more abstract terms for the activist spectators.

Riots The context in which participants defined the meaning of the riots also varied, largely according to the activist spectator/non-activist participant divide. The activist spectators placed the riots in a political context.

‘It was exciting because… I think putting it in context as well like you just

had, like, I think, a big public demonstration against austerity and cuts and

then that was followed by huge and very militant demonstrations and

occupations around the country and the storming of Milbank. So, I think it

was in that context, a big kind of wave of rebellion against the Tories and

the cuts. So, in my mind it was all mixed up with that and of course there

was other issues about amm metropolitan police and police racism’ – Tony

(spectator)

The political contextualisation the activist spectators engaged in was also accompanied by assertions that riots had been important in achieving political goals in the past. Tony pointed to the historical precedent set by the riots role in bringing down the government and the Brixton riots in reducing police racism as evidence of the potential for riots to provoke social change. 250

‘The thing is, it’s rioting that brought down the poll tax. It wasn’t just rioting,

but that was a big part of it. It brought about a better approach, it’s still

really racist, the metropolitan police I think but it’d be worse had there not

been riots in Brixton, I think.’ – Tony (spectator)

Accordingly, the activist spectators defined the riots in a political context. They saw the potential for riots to bring about political change. They also offered political justifications for rioters’ actions. The activists therefore defined the riots politically.

While the activist spectators placed the spreading riots in an overtly political context, participants dismissed the political context. Fred reporting talking to his friend who attempted to put the riots in a political context

‘He was talking a load of shit about…he’s me mate as well like I think you

might interview him. He was like, he was getting a bit dramatic with it as

well, he was like “yeah fuck em! They’re holding down the people innit.

Revolutions coming!” and all that.’ – Fred (rioter, not arrested)

Some participants did offer political definitions of the riots at times. Tiago varied in his definition of the riots. At times he described them as an ‘uprising’ while at other times he dismissed their political nature. Charlie also described the riots as political. However, overall rioters downplayed the politics of the riots.

Mark Duggan’s killing was acknowledged by most as the precipitating event, but both spectators and participants agreed that by the time riots erupted in Manchester, the disturbances weren’t simply about the killing of Mark Duggan. 251

‘you could tell in Manchester that it wasn’t about Mark Duggan. Obviously,

like it was “riots are happening and now we can riot.”’ – Edee (spectator)

The view Edee (a spectator) reports in this quote was reinforced by Harry (a participant).

‘Amm with what it was to do with, with Mark Duggan being shot by the

police amm it was more, to tell you the truth it was more a copy-cat thing

you know? I think people just took advantage really. Not rioting because of

that. I think because nobody had money and the system was changing.

People were getting took off the dole. This, that, and the other. They had

no money and they seen it as an opportunity to take liberties really. That’s

the way I look at it, you know?’ – Harry (rioter, arrested)

There was a difference in the extent to which the activist spectator section of the cohort and the participant section of the cohort defined the riots, with the activists offering a more politicised definition. However, both defined the Manchester riot as having little to do with the police killing Mark Duggan. The riots were defined by participants as emanating from the fatal police shooting but had become about wider issues and opportunities. For the activists, it presented an opportunity to fulfil an aspect of their politicised identities. For the participants, it presented opportunities to engage in confrontation with police, collective symbolic destruction of property, and profit from the authorities’ loss of control. 252

B. Was there an original fragmentation of the crowd? The crowd at the Manchester city centre riot could be considered to have originally been fragmented in terms of their awareness of the riot, the context they placed the riot in, and their intentions in attending the riot.

Most study participants had expectations of a riot occurring and travelled to the riot site on that understanding. Other participants (Harry, Kevin) had little expectation of rioting, yet found themselves in the city centre while the riot was escalating. Furthermore, the crowd was fragmented in their original intentions in attending the riot; some reported wishing to spectate and others had come to riot. Further fragmentation within the crowd could be seen from the outset between those who initiated the criminal damage and looting, those that took part once disorder ensued on a larger scale, and those who remained mere spectators. The crowd were fragmented along several dimensions of analysis.

This study’s participants classified other participants in differing ways. The presence of people in Piccadilly Gardens at the outset who Fred regarded as potential instigators increased Fred’s expectations that disturbances would arise.

‘I saw a couple of people I knew, and everyone’s on Piccadilly Gardens, and

everyone’s like, “shit! There’s a couple of guys here, you know? It might go

off” – Fred (rioter, not arrested)

However, Tiago reported the people he was with as unlikely to make the first move.

‘none of those people at that time seemed like they were ready to be the

person that was gonna run towards…’ – Tiago (rioter, not arrested) 253

Paul reported not wanting to stay in the city centre for long because he didn’t feel it was going to be a politically motivated riot. He pointed to the composition of the crowd as evidence of this.

‘I’ve been on demonstrations before in town and I know the kind of, I know

groups of people that go to it and it was none of those people there for a

start. So, it was like a completely different kinda crowd that I didn’t feel that

comfortable in. I know that sounds kinda bad cause I don’t really like to view

people on the way they dress and that, but I wasn’t in the mood for, like I

said there was, what’s his name? Gangster guy there, and I just thought this

is dodgy as fucking hell man.’ – Paul (arrested)

Paul and Fred reported that the crowd was composed of people with the potential to start a riot while Tiago perceived the crowd to be unlikely to start a riot. Jason reported diversity in the composition of the crowd.

‘Everybody. Everyone. From gang members to people that work in the shops

themselves.’ – Jason (spectator)

As did Tiago

‘There were all sorts of people there. Certain people there were just coming

out with their girlfriends to have a look or whatever. There was anarchists,

a lot of like people from the hood or whatever were there, gangs, amm just

general sort of people. Scallies, if you wanna say that. But yeah there were

just all sorts of people there. There were posh people there, I know a guy

who was there who was like an heir to quite a big big business d’y’know

what I mean? He wasn’t, he said he was fighting for the underclass or 254

whatever. Loads and loads of different types of people were there.’ – Tiago

(rioter, not arrested)

However, Jason did not feel that this composition was conducive to the types of activity that he wanted to engage in.

‘Everybody, people, just freeloaders that’s all I can say. No one there with a

purpose.’ – Jason (spectator)

Jason’s assessment of the crowd differed to most participants’ accounts in that he perceived the crowd to be less deprived than other accounts.

‘That’s what I mean, remember I’d say about 70% of the people that was

rioting wasn’t from a poor background though. That’s what you gotta

remember.’ – Jason (spectator)

This is in stark contrast to Fred’s account,

‘there wasn’t no rich people there or if there was they was the minority

innit. It was all, mostly lads and mostly kids from like…oh but the thing that

was beautiful about it as well was that it was kids from all the ghetto areas

all over Manchester’ – Fred (rioter, not arrested)

Fred’s assessment of the composition of the crowd is more representative of participant accounts where derogatory terms such as, ‘scallies’ and ‘chavs’, were often used to describe the crowd. Harry perceived a crowd composed of a large amount of drug users

‘it seemed to be more the younger people you know than my age if you

know what I mean? Like I say, I think quite a lot of em where users or users 255

of maybe whatever they use, substances, and they just thought it was a

chance to make money, rather than have a peaceful protest and the fact

that an unarmed man got killed you know?’ – Harry (rioter, arrested)

Participants’ accounts suggest that there was an original fragmentation of the crowd along several dimensions. While some participants contextualised the riots in terms of a wider wave of rebellion others overlooked this context. Study participants perceived the riots to be precipitated by the killing of Mark Duggan but had moved on to more general concerns. Some people were aware of the riots and some planned to participate while others were not party to this planning. Others were unaware of the possibility of rioting. Most participants in the current study reported attending with the intention of watching a spectacle, while several admitted their intention to loot, and one reported his intention to engage in violent confrontation with the police. However, despite some fragmentation on different levels the crowd were generally united in expecting a riot.

C. What were the initial legitimate actions crowd members were trying to engage in? Analysis of Manchester city centres’ participants’ initial legitimate actions faces similar problems as the Salford analysis. In contrast to the events in Tottenham, there was no ‘legitimate’ demonstration that crowd members were attempting to engage in. Full scale rioting developed gradually from a series of small-scale disturbances, so it is difficult to confidently state what initial legitimate actions ‘crowd members’, as an entity, were attempting to engage in.

Similarities can be drawn with Salford by observing the different groups present as the riot was developing. The first group could be considered the 256

shoppers, workers, and people enjoying the city centres amenities. Accordingly, this first group could be considered those who were going about their legitimate business in the city centre. A second group were the crowd that had begun to gather in Piccadilly Gardens from around 16:00, many of whom travelled to the city centre in the expectation of experiencing a riot. Furthermore, a third group of people present in the city centre could be delineated as those who had already begun to engage in sporadic riotous activity, before the riot fully developed. As such, the analysis of what the initial legitimate activities crowd members were attempting to engage in is complicated.

Several interviewees reported being in the city centre for legitimate non- riot reasons. Harry, Kevin, and Paul reported being in the city centre for reasons other than attending a riot.

‘Oh, amm I was in a place called [x]. It’s a service where you get

something to eat and a coffee and that. And then when I came out I heard

someone saying that it was kicking off in Salford. And I didn’t believe it

really at first. And then as I got up to Piccadilly Gardens there was like a

big sort of… like people were gathering’ - Harry (rioter, arrested)

‘Seen it on the news for a few days, thought ‘crazy’, you know what I

mean? You’ve got to be mad to do all that, but I had an appointment to

get a blood test done, get me thyroids checked, so that’s the reason I was

in the city centre that day’ – Kevin (rioter, arrested)

‘I just remember thinking it’s probably not gonna come to Manchester and

I didn’t really follow too much of the rest of it. And then I went to town to 257

meet my mate, who’d come from [x] or [x] I think. Anyway, we were sat in

town and we’d had a few drinks together and we went and chilled by [x] in

town and my mate text me and said there’s loads of people in Piccadilly

Gardens and I was like, well I wanna go see what it’s about but I don’t

wanna get involved in it’ – Paul (arrested)

These participants were enjoying the amenities and using services in the city centre when they heard about the potential for rioting from friends or came across the gathering crowds. They perceived their presence as legitimate.

Jason was in the city centre to attend court. The police informed him of the impending riot.

‘I was with my friend. He was in court for assaulting a police officer. We

walked out of court. No, we was in court, and gang squad walked in and

took a picture of me in court, like in the waiting room. So, I was going mad,

like “What the fuck you taking pictures for?! ra ra ra” and he was like “What

do you know about this so-called riot that was gonna take place?” I was

oblivious to it all to be honest. “What the fuck do you mean riot? Are you

fucking stupid? Me?” I was going mad. And as we come out of court my

friend was telling me “yeah yeah yeah, everyone’s supposed to be coming

to town. Cause It was on Blackberry and I’m not into all them kind of things.

I don’t like Blackberry and all them things. He was like “yeah yeah yeah”

That’s what the police were like “If we see you there, we took a picture of

what you’re wearing, we’ll arrest you ra ra ra” …ended up going home,

getting changed, come back to town haha.’ - Jason (spectator) 258

Jason’s initial presence in the city centre was legitimate, however, his intentions when he came back into town were to engage the police in violent confrontation.

Several participants had legitimate reasons for being at the site of an expected riot. However, other than these participants, the majority of study participants came to the city centre to witness, if not participate in, rioting. Indeed, some people were looking for a riot on Monday 8th August.

‘it was happening in Birmingham and I seen all these like greedy guys just

like robbing telly’s and all that. So, I was just thinking, yo this shit, I have to

admit, I’m not lying, I thought this shit was funny. I was like “Fuck! like...ra

some guy in London’s died, some people in Birmingham are robbing telly’s

and getting away with it!” I was like “Fuck that! I‘m gonna go to town”. I

went to town the first day, on the day Birmingham ones were going

in…nothing, d’y’know what I mean?’ – Fred (rioter, non-arrested)

Fred was keen to at least witness any disorder as soon as he heard it was a possibility. Another participant, Tiago, also reported being in town and meeting people looking for a riot on Monday 8th August.

‘The day before I was walking through town and like a guy that I knew was

walking into town and he’s like “Where are these riots?” or whatever, and

I’m just like, “They’re not happening mate.” So, I’ve gone home or whatever

and then I thought, “it looks like they’re gonna happen soon if people are

actually walking into town.”’ – Tiago, (rioter, non-arrested) 259

It was clear that the ongoing national context led some people to expect that Manchester would see disturbances. Conversations between friends increased the expectations that riots would happen. Additionally, some people had been planning disturbances on social media.

‘I heard about it a couple of days before because everyone in Manchester

was talking about doing it. Like through BBM and stuff, Facebook. But on

the sly because people that were posting that got arrested. So, we were

doing it through inbox, like I said BBM or stuff like that. We were keeping it

quiet, but we were planning to do it for a couple of days.’ - Philip (rioter,

arrested)

Most study participants reported travelling to the city centre with the intention of attending a riot. As such, most were not intending to engage in some legitimate actions and ended up in a riot. Most travelled to experience rioting. Again, the question of whether gathering in the expectations of a riot is legitimate arises. Piccadilly Gardens is a public space (Byass 2010). People have a right to assemble (Article 11 ECHR), express identity (article 10 ECHR) and move freely (Protocol 4 Article 2 ECHR). Tiago reported his perception that people were free to gather in Piccadilly Gardens prior to the disturbances beginning.

‘there was not much they could do at that point because nothing was happening’ – Tiago (rioter, non-arrested)

While Tiago does not claim it was a completely legitimate gathering, he reported that the police were unable to prevent people from gathering prior to any disturbances. This logic was also seen at play later when rioting was underway. One YouTube clip records someone off camera saying, 260

‘you’ll be alright if you’re not doing anything. You just have to go like that. That’s what I did before, and the copper left me alone’ (V45)

This clip suggests that crowd members who intended to spectate perceived their presence as being on the edge of legitimate actions. Indeed, it is argued that gathering in anticipation of rioting was bordering on a transgressive act.

Other participants joined the crowd once rioting had started. Sam perceived his attendance to be not only legitimate but a duty of a history student.

‘I was kinda getting psyched cause as well as a history student, cause I like

to study history. If there is history going on in town, you should be there to

see it. No matter what, you know?’ – Sam (spectator)

Edee and Arron attended as medics.

I’ve had some training and experience as an action medic. So, I was like

“right, that’s gonna be my role. I’ll bring my kit and so there I have my

excuse, my justification for being there. I’m not just a tourist.”’ - Edee

(spectator)

Edee was clearly concerned that she needed a justification for being present at the riot. However, it is not clear exactly who she was justifying her presence too. Acting as a medic could be considered to be aiding the rioters and may not be a fully legitimate reason for attendance in the eyes of the law. It is possible that she was more concerned with justifying her presence to herself and other rioters. 261

The question of legitimacy is clearly a complicated question. Harry, Kevin, and Paul, all had legitimate reasons for being present. Those that came as spectators felt their presence was legitimate as long as they were not committing criminal actions. This perception seems to have maintained the presence of large numbers of people who were there to witness rather than engage in rioting.

Some participants did attend with the express intention of engaging in legally illegitimate actions. Philip was the only participant to report wanting to loot consumer goods from the outset.

Int: So, what was the main factor in you thinking it was a good idea?

‘Free stuff! Cause all the stories about everyone getting this, this pair of

shoes, this pair, this top, this this and obviously, I don’t know, college was

coming round, I would like to have some nice stuff for college.’ Philip

(rioter, arrested)

Charlie also reported wanting to participate in rioting from the outset. However, his intentions were more symbolic than.

‘You know towns a disgusting place you know? Huge buildings with poor

people right underneath, and I think we felt that, you know? This is a

chance to smash up some of that ugly shit’ – Charlie (rioter, not

arrested)

Harry, Kevin, Paul, and Jason, all reported being in the city centre for legitimate reasons before knowing of the disturbances. However, once they found out about them they all joined the gathering crowd. Other than these 262

participants, study participants came to the city centre to witness, if not participate, in rioting. While free expression, assembly, and movement are enshrined as human rights in the ECHR, these rights may be restricted to prevent public disorder. Participants reported that if they were not engaged in crime their presence was legitimate. However, their presence facilitated others engaging in crime. Accordingly, gathering in anticipation of rioting was itself a transgressive act.

D. What was the police’s understanding of legitimate crowd actions? While many members of the crowd believed their presence in the city centre and their right to free movement within the city centre to be legitimate, the evidence suggests that the police did not. ACC Sweeny’s ‘YouTube’ announcement that those considering disorder would be dealt with ‘robustly’ suggests that one would not have to engage in disorder to be dealt with ‘robustly’. The powers invoked through section 60 and section 60AA of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 suggests that the authorising officer understood the gathering crowds to be a threat to public order. Police interactions with Jason and Tiago indicate they were perceived as potential riot participants. The warning given to the whole crowd at 19:10 from the top of Market Street suggests anyone present afterwards was not considered to have a legitimate reason to be in the city centre. While the right to free expression, assembly and movement is enshrined in the ECHR (Article 10 & 11, Protocol 4 Article 2 (Donald et al 2012)), these rights can be restricted in the interest of preventing public disorder. As the police were expecting a riot, it is argued that they understood participants right to free expression, assembly, and movement as being subject to restriction in the context of potential rioting. It must be acknowledged that the police understanding of the legitimacy of crowd actions is limited by the lack of 263

primary data from the police. However, evidence suggests that the police did not consider the crowd to have a right to assemble in Piccadilly Gardens or walk down Market Street. As such, they attempted to force people to disperse and prevented them from walking down Market Street.

E. What were power relations like between the groups? The ESIM understanding of the intergroup dynamics and participants’ experiences are based around situations where the police generally have the power to impose their definition of proper practice upon the crowd. Through their monopoly on legitimate force, training, equipment organisation, and powers of arrest, the police generally have more power than participants. Participants have no legitimate power to use force on police officers. They are not formally trained for instances of disorder. They are not issued with shields, batons, dogs and protective clothing. Nor do they have the power to arrest officers. Accordingly, there is a power imbalance at the heart of the ESIM understanding of the process of escalation and the experiential outcomes for participants. However, the usual power imbalance did not favour the police during the Manchester city centre riot.

GMP were in a relatively weak position by the time disorder erupted in Manchester city centre. There are several reasons for this weak position. First, because GMP provided reinforcements to police forces facing riots elsewhere, particularly in London, they were under-staffed. Second, GMP were overstretched, with violent disturbances already taking place in Salford, also served by GMP. Third, and a direct consequence of the first two points, GMP were outnumbered. Fourth, participants out manoeuvred the police. Perhaps most importantly, GMP suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of Salford rioters earlier in the day. Evidence for these points comes 264

from multiple sources and points to an unusual lack of power on the part of the police. GMP provided reinforcements to support the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) in bringing London under control after three nights of serious rioting (V1). HMIC (2011) reported that GMP sent further reinforcements to London on Tuesday 9th August as they were requesting reinforcements themselves. A confusion between national and regional arrangements was blamed for this contradictory action. ACC Gary Shewan reported that there were 1000 officers on the streets of Manchester on the night of the riots. The composition of these officers is unclear. HMIC (2011) report a request being made for 25 police support units (PSU’s), a total of 625 officers. ‘YouTube’ clips, HMIC’s (2011) report, and participant interviews provide evidence of reinforcements coming from West Yorkshire, Staffordshire and North Wales to assist GMP. Seven different forces responded to GMP’s request (V2). The requests for reinforcements is evidence that GMP considered themselves to be under-staffed. Data gathered from GMP suggested that some participants knew that GMP were understaffed. ‘At least one BBM message also noted that GMP officers had been sent to London to help with the riots there, and indicated that this meant there would be fewer police available in Manchester.’ (Email communication with GMP contact Jonathan Bradley 8th July 2017)

It is unclear when participants became aware that GMP were sending reinforcements to London. However, ACC Sweeny’s ‘YouTube’ communication on the morning of 9th August, confirmed that GMP had sent reinforcements to London (V1). Furthermore, a tweet at 20:12 appeared on the M.E.N. live Twitter feed bemoaning the fact that GMP officers had been sent to London. Accordingly, it is clear from a range of contemporaneous 265

sources and official reports, that GMP were understaffed and members of the public were aware of this. Several participant accounts support this perception.

‘the police couldn’t do anything about it because people knew that they

were in London.’ – Tony (spectator)

‘all the Greater Manchester Police were in London’ – Sam (spectator)

As the participant interviews are post-hoc it was unclear to what extent participants were aware of this at the time. However, the contemporaneous data suggests that this was public knowledge and some riot participants would also have been aware of this. Participants were also aware of the fact that riots had also erupted in Salford and reasoned that this had left GMP over stretched.

‘No, I don’t think they had the resources. Because it was happening in 2

places. I don’t think they had enough officers because I think other officers

had been drafted to other areas as well to control it. So, they left

Manchester open you know. That’s my opinion but…yeah even when it was

going on there wasn’t many police. I would say there was maybe 10-20 in

Piccadilly and the odd one or two walking up and down but then they

suddenly went. It was as if they all got whatever and went.’ – Harry (rioter,

arrested)

A combination of the national events drawing officers to London, policing two riot sites, and the sheer number of people coming into the city centre, meant that GMP were outnumbered. 266

‘There was so many people about as well. People out numbered the police

that day. I’m saying 5 to 1…easily.’ – Fred (rioter, not arrested)

Fred’s estimate of the ratio is clearly not an authoritative account. However, it is one amongst many with the same consistent message that GMP were understaffed and therefore lacked power.

The consequences of being outnumbered were seen in the tactics that GMP were able to use. HMIC (2011) states that the police need to

‘outnumber rioters by three or five to one if they are to make arrests and disperse groups – a much higher level than is needed to hold the line and protect territory’. (P.7)

Accordingly, because of being understaffed and overstretched, the police were outnumbered and had a more limited range of tactics at their disposal. Participants became increasingly aware of this power imbalance. A central feature of the vast majority of participants’ accounts noted the police’s inability or unwillingness to act ‘robustly’.

‘They didn’t come near us. They didn’t come near us. They were just…there

wasn’t enough of that detail of the police to do anything. Had there been,

everyone would have got their heads smashed in. But they were too scared

to confront the crowds. Cause partly, I think that they knew that they were

part of the target really.’ – Tony (spectator)

Edee describes the few confrontations she witnessed as ineffectual posturing. 267

‘The police had no power to disperse it. They were just trying to flex their

muscle and they knew that they’d do well not to do anything other than

pushing people forward, you know? Pushing the line a bit. I don’t mean

pushing. I didn’t see much in the way of physical force. People would just

run away because they knew it didn’t matter.’ - Edee (spectator)

While Edee perceived these actions as inconsequential posturing, others described the police tactics on that night as an understandable allocation of scarce resources. Tony reported a move by a section of the crowd towards the courts was met with stiffer resistance.

‘The police had feigned to turn up at various points and people just ran off

and looted in other streets. To the extent that they were present, they were

present only to look like they were present, rather than actually do

anything. But towards the end some people decided to loot, ransack the

central court of justice and that was genius because if they had got that

then no one would have gone to prison. But that time shitloads of police

turned up. So, there were police, apart from the ones pretending to do

policing, in reserve I think for the main institutions of the state, if you like.

Which you can understand from a tactical point of view. But my god, I saw

about 30 vans turn up, so they were there alright.’ – Tony (spectator)

Fred also reported certain areas of Manchester city centre being protected with more determination than others. 268

‘…it’s in like one of the spots in town where the police sorta had it on lock

down d’y’know what I mean? Like Deansgate and that posh sorta bit. There

wasn’t no looting there.’ – Fred (rioter, not arrested)

GMP’s lack of resources meant that they were understaffed. This led to a perceived inability to challenge participants during the riot and a perception that tactical decisions were made to protect certain areas and buildings. A tactical decision was made by GMP to rely on the extensive CCTV network within the city centre. It took some time for participants to realise this police tactic.

‘The impression I had at the time was “haha the police can’t do anything”,

and then the impression I got later on was, “they’re just waiting for the

C.C.T.V. and they’re gonna mop up later.” So, you know, if you arrest

somebody in the middle of the crowd, then that has the potential to amm

create a situation where people start resisting. So, maybe it’s easier not to

arrest anybody at all then.’ – Edee (spectator)

As Edee outlines, the potential for ‘robust’ interventionist policing leading to resistance and confrontation is significant. The wisdom of not engaging in such robust interventionist policing may have been more keenly perceived by an outnumbered police force. The repeated calls for reinforcements to other police forces, combined with an earlier commitment to ‘robust’ policing of anyone considering criminal damage, suggests that the policing tactics were influenced by unusual power dynamics.

The reliance on CCTV was problematic for the police, as this tactic requires that people’s faces were visible. A significant proportion of the participants 269

had covered their faces. Charlie reported an attempt to demask participants using powers provided under section 60AA of the Criminal Justice Public Order Act 1994.

‘We decided to walk through one of the alleys you know Piccadilly? Through

there, and the police kettled, they sort of kettled us. But they weren’t

kettling us into a place where they were arresting us. They were... it was all

part of a bigger plan to demask everybody who had masks on. Who were

probably the people doing the most damage.’ – Charlie (rioter, not

arrested)

Despite the potential for arrests to be made at this point Charlie managed to escape from this kettle and indeed a second kettle. Accordingly, the lack of resources available to GMP appears to have limited their ability to effect arrests during the riot.

The police were understaffed, overstretched, and outnumbered. This limited the use of tactics they could safely employ. In addition to holding lines to protect property, the police made use of the extensive CCTV network. These tactics may not have been the first choice for a police force committed to ‘robust’ policing. However, they were necessitated by GMP’s weak position. GMP received support from other police forces, however, they lacked geographical knowledge. Participants were able to make use of their superior geographical knowledge and enjoyed the game of cat and mouse. Overall, the police had less power than one would normally expect. Unusually, the balance of power favoured participants. This became increasingly clear to participants throughout the development of the riot. 270

F. How did participants talk about the legitimacy of their actions after the outgroup imposition of power (legitimization of opposition)? The police were unable to effectively impose their power upon participants. Accordingly, the answer to this question deals with how participants legitimised participants actions in general. However, it should be noted that there was an increase in riotous activity after the police cordoned off Market Street at 19:10. Only Paul legitimized his actions in relation to the imposition of police power. Most participants legitimized their behaviour through arguments that had little to do with the specific events of that day or week.

Rioters were, for the most part, keen to legitimise their actions, and spectators also legitimised certain participant actions. As previously mentioned, participants did not believe the Manchester actions were simply about the police killing Mark Duggan. Accordingly, no participant mentioned this as legitimating their actions. Some, such as Fred, could relate his own experiences to the killing. However, it was never a major feature of participants’ legitimising accounts. Instead, the legitimization of opposition focused on long standing grievances. Tiago reported that the person who smashed the first window did not give any legitimising account of their actions. ‘I’m pretty sure if it was in London or something we would have been very

aware it was about Mark Duggan, d’y’know what I mean? But yeah, no I

didn’t really feel like there was any similarities to a demonstration there.

There wasn’t even, when that person had threw that brick, he didn’t even

say a little word first as to why this was happening. He just seemed like he

wanted chaos.’ – Tiago (rioter, not arrested) 271

A generalised desire to overturn power relations based in long-standing grievances provides space for apolitical, nihilistic, and consumerist assessments of participants actions (Treadwell et al 2013). Especially when participants accounts are dismissed. However, Akram (2014) has argued the lack of verbal articulation of long-standing grievances does not mean that background motivations are absent. Charlie reported the assertion that the riot was simply looting unfairly undermined the political importance of the riot.

‘I talked to a couple of guys at work about it and one guy was having a big

go saying it was just people looting for no reason. I had to stop myself cause

I thought, ‘I’m just gonna have a big fucking go at you’. But you know I

thought “It wasn’t just that mate” and “People don’t just riot for no fucking

reason.” It’s like “Don’t dumb it down!”’- Charlie (rioter, not arrested)

Participants were keen to stress that the riot was not simply mindless criminality. ‘I mean people say, the big tag line was “mindless criminality” but it wasn’t.

Because I remember very distinctly going down Oldham Street and before

then every commercial outlet, pretty much, had been ransacked and the

police where nowhere to be seen. Literally every unit of every shop for

several streets. But I remember distinctly the independent shops and

especially charities were left alone. And I think someone through a brick at

Oxfam and then someone, people stopped them. So, I think there was am…

there was… I don’t know to what extent but there was definitely like a… 272

there was a moralism about it, that you would call political, I think.’ Tony

(spectator)

One of the central legitimising notions amongst participants was that rioters were attacking multi-national ‘chain’ shops. These chain shops were considered legitimate targets because they were not considered Manchester’s shops. Manchester was perceived to have had little direct benefit from such shops.

‘People were saying like you’re smashing up your own city innit. But them

shops are not really our city innit? They don’t belong to Manchester. The

money’s not gonna go to Manchester, d’y’know what I mean?’ - Tiago

(rioter, not arrested)

Participants reported the perceived distance between those profiting from such shops and participants, as legitimising their actions.

Tiago reported that in Piccadilly Gardens people were delineating what they saw as legitimate targets to attack. He reported that there was a widespread feeling that independent shops were to be left alone while chain shops were legitimate targets. These discussions in Piccadilly Gardens took place before Market Street was blocked off. Illegal actions were therefore considered legitimate before imposition of police power.

‘Like the people I was speaking to as well, which… were pretty sure, because

of what had been on the news the day before, that they wasn’t gonna try

and hit up like independent places. That seemed like a big big general vibe.

Amm…I know like one guy was going on about the courts and shit and

everyone was like “calm down mate that’s too crazy of a plan” But no one 273

was… like no charity shops no, thingy shops, everyone seemed to be making

little plans and stuff’ – Tiago (rioter, not arrested)

Study participants pointed to a variety of legitimising notions for looting. None of which were based on the immediate or proximal events. Participants questioned the morality of multi-national’s business models.

‘These companies who claim to say, “oh we do all this, create all these jobs,

do this and do that”, actually they just rinse, they give people shit jobs that

are really low paid, zero-hour contracts and then they sell food which is

from thousands of miles away that can be farmed locally. And it is farmed

locally, and these farmers can’t sell it because Marks and Spencer’s is too

busy buying tomatoes from wherever, South America…I just think that

there’s this thing of these companies rinsing everybody and somehow

making a profit out of making everyone else poor” – Charlie (rioter, not

arrested)

Prohibitive pricing was also used to justify attacks.

‘I was like “oh yes great, Kro Bar”, the beer costs like 4 quid, “take

everything!”’ – Edee (spectator)

As was the perception that the shops would be insured.

‘I knew that they’d be insured. Like that kind of was... with all of this I

thought “They’re insured. It’s fine. There’s really no, there’s no particular

loss. Go get yourself a violin”’– Edee (spectator) 274

Accordingly, there was a perception that looting wouldn’t seriously affect them.

‘Isn’t 1 in every 10 pounds in this country spent in Tesco? Ha! There you go

innit? One night’s looting is not really gonna affect them at all.’ – Tiago

(rioter, not arrested)

The legitimising notions that participants provided for attacks on multi- national ‘chain’ shops were also accompanied by a rejection of attacks on independent shops.

‘I hope it’s not like a little independent shop. We hope it’s… we hope it’s...

you know, I want Tesco [large multi-national supermarket chain] to get it,

or I wanted Kendall’s or House of Frazer [upmarket department store] you

know’ – Charlie (rioter, not arrested)

Tiago spelled out the differences he perceived in attacking ‘chain’ shops as opposed to independent shops

‘Cause they’re just like normal, normal people with normal businesses who

would actually get hurt by it. Because everyone seen what happened on the

TV and stuff, I don’t think anyone wanted to cause anyone to… cause

anyone any problems. I don’t think anyone actually thinks like you go into

Tesco or you go into, d’y’know what I mean? Or you go into Sainsburys or

something, that you’re actually going to affect somebody’s life. I don’t think

you would, d’y’know what I mean? At all. So, I think that’s why people were

saying it …’ - Tiago (rioter, not arrested) 275

However, it was not only the multinationals that were attacked. Quantitative data provided by GMP undermine these claims. Despite claims that independent shops wouldn’t be targeted, a significant number were. This is interpreted as evidence of some disunity within the crowd regarding legitimate targets.

Fred recounted his initial sympathy with the owners of such shops, however, this sympathy quickly waned beside an assessment of the relative affluence of the petit bourgeoisie.

‘I love this city but at the same time I don’t like all these fucking brands in

the Arndale making loadsa money. I don’t give a fuck about them. I might

have cared about a few of the independent ones in the Northern Quarter

but at the same time “raas man! Who gives a shit about you? Who really

cares?” D’y’know what I mean? “You’ve got a business innit! You’re not on

an estate! You’re not fucking broke! You’re not living in some hostel like I

was. Who gives a fuck about you? You’ll be alright.” Cause everyone was

alright, d’y’know what I mean? Maybe, maybe there was some shop

somewhere that went out of business, you know all these little paper shops

that got smashed up and that, I feel for them’ – Fred (rioter, not arrested)

The significant number of independent shops that were attacked detailed in figure 42 should be considered in relation to Fred’s dismissal of the petit bourgeoisie.

Fred related his actions back to experiences of deprivation and the norms that these shared experiences provided. He links these background 276

experiences, which he shared with other ‘ghetto kids’, to the foregrounded context.

‘If you’ve been about it in in some point in your life then its fucking it’s in ya,

d’y’know what I mean? You get it. You’ve been part of it and you’ve been

about with other heads that are like that. So, of course, when something

like that happens your gonna dust off you… your gonna go back to it.’ –

Fred (rioter, not arrested)

The instability in intergroup relations, demonstrated through the spread of riots throughout England, provided an opportunity and presented the possibility to potential participants of fulfilling long-standing desires to riot.

‘I’d always known I’d wanted to go to a riot.’ – Charlie (rioter, not

arrested)

Both participants and spectators offered similar criticisms of unethical business practices that legitimised participants’ actions.

‘I don't like Cash Converters anyway. It’s an organisation that prey on

people that, you know? People are encouraged to consume in this society

and then they do. And they'll borrow money to do so. And then it will get to

a point where they've got to sell their possessions to get money back for

you know x y. You know maybe the bills, the rent, whatever. And it’s an

organisation set up just to basically take control of that, that loop, that sort

of cycle that people without much money go through. And you know, so I've 277

never been keen on them, so I don't, I wasn't sort of annoyed that they'd

got into Cash Converters.’ – John (spectator)

Despite reporting similar legitimising claims as participants, John did not participate in rioting. ‘a lot of big business and a lot of profit that comes out of big business is as

a result of some unethical practices so therefore I wasn't particularly pissed

off that what was going on was going on. It’s not something I choose to

take part in because at the end of the day amm...that’s not the way I wish

to express my views.’ – John (spectator)

John maintained his pre-existing definitions of proper practice and abided by them. He did not report anything that happened that day or since Mark Duggan was killed that legitimised actions that were not consistent with his pre-existing definitions of proper practice. John attended as a spectator and remained a spectator, regardless of police or participant actions. Neither the police imposition of power, nor a specific event in the longer chain of riot related events legitimised illegal actions for him. He was, however, relaxed about other people engaging actions against businesses he viewed as unethical. Spectators did not legitimise all participants’ actions. Both John and Arron, reported attacks on Dawson’s music shop as illegitimate. John explained his indifference at Cash Converters being looted compared to disappointment at Dawson’s being looted. ‘Dawson’s is the music shop in Manchester. Obviously [you] can go in and

[try the products] and things like that. And I’ve got a bit of a personal

connection to [it]. Whereas, Cash Converters, like the comparison you drew 278

before, I have a personal sort of, or ethical obligation against their business

practice.’ – John (spectator)

The personal connection that John felt with Dawson’s and the perception of Cash Converters illegitimate business practices was key to explaining John’s different assessments of the two shops being looted. There were limits to what study participants viewed as legitimate actions. These limits were informed by evaluations of the ethics of the business practices’ and the connection which study participants felt towards the shops. The ethical evaluations and connections spectators had, were not changed by the intergroup dynamics of the day.

Spectators often agreed with the legitimising notions of the participants. These legitimising notions did not emerge from within the intergroup dynamics of the situation. Instead, they are well worn anti-capitalist arguments about exploitation. The spectators were well versed in, and approving of, these arguments.

‘One of the most revolutionary acts you can do in a capitalist society is not

pay for something.’ – Sam (spectator)

These arguments enabled sympathy and, to some degree, support from spectators. Yet, illegal actions were not legitimised for them.

The assertion that multi-national ‘chain’ shops were legitimate targets was not voiced by all study participants. Jason did not accept these legitimising notions.

‘Well, what are you gonna do when Tesco decide to pick up and leave?

You’re gonna have to go further out to do your shopping. You’re gonna have 279

to go here to do this and here to do that. What’s the point in destroying

things that’s on your door step? All’s your gonna do is bring down the

money, that can potentially fuck up your own area. If your mum works in

Tesco, why are you gonna destroy it?’ – Jason (spectator)

Jason also rejected stealing from ‘chain’ shops as simply not worth it.

‘What the fuck do I need to be robbing JD for or Vans £40 £50 trainers? The

local shop. What’s the point? I’d rather go and rob the jewellers and get

£200,000 worth of stuff and go jail and do the same 7 years you’re gonna

do for robbing trainers. So at least I’d come out to £200,000 instead of broke

without a penny.’ – Jason (spectator)

It wasn’t the morality or legality of theft that bothered Jason, but the inadequacy of the reward compared to the risk. In comparison to other study participants, Jason did not report the same problems with prohibitive pricing. Proceeds from former gang activity meant Jason was more than able to afford to buy the products on offer in these shops.

‘Fucking hell I was 14 spending 2 grand in JD. I’m definitely not robbing JD.

Pointless.’ – Jason (spectator)

While Jason felt no economic compulsion to engage in looting, other participants legitimised their actions in terms of economic deprivation, often coupled with drug addiction.

‘When you’re on a basic income of £80 a week, 160 a fortnight, then you’re

getting £20 taken off for [incomprehensible], you’re left with 140, straight 280

away about 60 of it’s going on food for two weeks, then you’ve got another

£20 to go on your electric, £10 on your gas. That’s without buying your

tobacco or getting any clothes, or having a drink, or getting any drugs. I just

thought it’s be a nice pay day, basically, you know?

Int: So, you were thinking of selling on?

‘Yeah, yeah, to fund me drug habit basically…’ - Kevin (rioter, arrested)

Linda blamed the effects of alcohol on her participation.

‘I was so drunk, I can’t even remember going into a store, [repeats

emphasising each word, incredulous & with shame] I can’t remember-

going-in-a store I was so drunk. And I was horrified when I up in a

police station.’ – Linda (rioter, arrested)

Fred’s defence of his actions along economic lines suggests that he doesn’t fully blame alcohol for his actions, yet there were mentions of being drunk littered throughout his account.

‘we seen this kid and he was like “Yo, do you wanna buy a bottle of whiskey

for a fiver” and I was like “Yeah, too right mate.” Fucking…Cause I had a bit

of dough on me as well like. So, I was thinking I’ll just buy bare shit but then

I thought “Right, if I get caught with this shit it’s the same as doing it

anyway.”’ – Fred (rioter, arrested)

Once Fred had realised he was now guilty of handling stolen goods, he realised that he had crossed the line from being a mere spectator to being a 281

participant in the riot. This ‘in for a penny, in for a pound’ mentality coupled with being drunk led to further involvement. ‘Didn’t do fuck all but we went for a drink and we drank this whiskey and I

was a bit pissed and I was like ra ra ra and then am… I can’t remember at

what point but I just started getting fully involved, d’y’know what I mean?

Like booting down windows and fucking smashing up shops and that with

everyone else. But it was stupid though. Cause I was doing daft shit and that

like, robbing liquor and cigarettes and giving out the cigarettes’ - Fred

(rioter, not arrested)

Aside from the legitimisation of looting from multi-national ‘chain’ shops, other attacks also occurred. Charlie justified his criminal damage upon an estate-agent’s through appeal to a perception that they were agents of inequality.

‘I think when it’s so blatant that you’re running an estate agent’s that sells

luxury suites in… in tower blocs in the centre of Manchester for fucking 500

grand! Like that’s really rubbing it in your face like, “you’re poor, we’re

rich!” That’s what it feels like.’ – Charlie (rioter, not arrested)

Charlie’s attack on the estate-agents was the only reported explicit symbolic attack on wealth. It involved no looting nor any other conceivable personal gain, other than the fun of smashing equipment. Other attacks on ‘chain’ shops may be legitimised as attacks on the rich. However, this was the only attack in study participants’ accounts that was an overt attack on a symbol of inequality and had no personal gain for the attackers. Quantitative data provided by GMP (figure 45) shows that a significant number of criminal 282

damage attacks on offices occurred. These attacks appear to be expressive rather instrumental acquisitive actions. Indeed, GMP’s quantitative data shows that the majority of attacks on premises in Manchester were criminal damage and arson rather than acquisitive.

Paul was the only participant who reported his actions as legitimate in relation to the events of that day. Paul justified his actions in shouting at the police as they arrested someone as an attempt to intervene in an illegitimate arrest.

‘…that’s when I saw somebody being dragged out of a doorway and he

was a homeless, could tell he was kinda homeless. My first reaction was,

well, he’s homeless. He’s basically just been sat in a doorway. He hasn’t

really… there’s no way he’s done anything d’y’know what I mean? and so I

watched it and I saw what the police were doing to him. So, I shouted out

about him saying “You‘re bang out of order! It’s disgusting” kind of thing.

And I was arrested for it. Just shouting. I was swearing yeah, and I was

shouting quite loud, but I wasn’t shouting at any passers-by or anything

else that they said I’d been, they tried to make out that I’d done. Like

telling kids to go here, there, and everywhere and ordering children, kids

about. Just completely a pack of lies basically.’ – Paul (arrested)

There are several important points in answering this question. First, participants legitimised actions against multi-national ‘chain’ shops but rejected (for the most part) attacks on smaller independent shops and charities. This demonstrates the limits to acceptable actions for study participants. However, a significant number of attacks on independent 283

shops did occur. This could be evidence of some dis-unity within the crowd or an example of desirability bias. Second, legitimisation of attacks on premises were mainly based on arguments that were not specific to the events of the day, nor indeed from when Mark Duggan was killed. As such, the legitimising notions for the attacks were overwhelmingly based on long- standing grievances. Third, the majority of study participants legitimised the attacks in reference to the ethics of capitalism. However, a substantial minority of participants legitimised the attacks through economic deprivation and drug addiction. Fourth, participants were selective in what they considered to be legitimate. Jason did not perceive looting to be serious enough to be considered legitimate, while attacks on Dawson’s music shop were also regarded by some as illegitimate. Participants reported limits to their definitions of legitimate actions. Other than Paul’s attempted intervention in a subjectively illegitimate arrest, the contours of legitimate action were defined in relation to notions consistent with participants immediate in-groups. The intergroup dynamics did not facilitate psychological re-categorisation for all study participants. Accordingly, their definitions of legitimate actions remained defined by their salient social identities. For spectators, who were keenly aware of their lack of shared experience with other rioters, this was their more immediate in-groups.

G. How did participants then talk about relations both with each other and with the outgroup (i.e. was there a more inclusive social identity)? The development of a more inclusive ingroup is central to ESIMs explanation of escalating intergroup conflict and participants experiences of empowerment. ESIM (Drury & Reicher 2005) demonstrated that the indiscriminate or illegitimate imposition of police power upon a crowd, can unify previously disparate crowd members. The establishment of this more 284

inclusive ingroup through intergroup dynamics leads to expectations of support for novel actions which oppose the police, and potentially overturns power relations. Accordingly, the extent to which a more inclusive ingroup developed amongst the crowd is an important element in exploring the ESIM’s explanation of escalating conflict.

As we have already seen, the police were in a relatively weak position to start with, and their attempt at imposing their power on participants was perceived as ineffectual. Furthermore, participants mainly legitimised their actions through long-standing grievances. Accordingly, there are good reasons to believe that a unified ingroup was not established through the processes previously identified by the ESIM of escalating conflict.

However, crowd members did report increased inclusiveness. Both spectators and participants reported that people were chatting with relative strangers in Piccadilly Gardens. ‘there were just these little short casual exchanges and I got the impression

that that was happening quite a lot within the crowd. So, there was a lot

more, there wasn’t massive social interaction, but there was a lot more than

you would normally get down in Piccadilly Gardens between random

strangers’ – Edee (spectator)

‘Everyone was chatting to each other as well. Guys you wouldn’t chat to

d’y’know what I mean? Normally people don’t go on safe like that in

Manchester.’ – Fred (rioter, not arrested)

The crowd eventually became a series of smaller crowds, each acting relatively independently. 285

‘there was like 8 different crowds in town that day, going for different stuff.

I was with in there with the ones that was hitting all the liquor shops and

stuff like that. Trying to get cigs and all this crap’ - Phillip (rioter, not

arrested)

This assertion is supported by GMP incident maps which show concurrent incidents in different areas of the city centre. Charlie reported participants moving freely between the crowds. This provided a cross pollination of riot participants between different groups. While there may not have been one single unitary crowd, the groups were drawing from the same pool of participants. ‘everybody was hanging out with other people and joining groups up and

splitting off again and, so it wasn’t like you know “that’s your group” and

it’s more like people were just mingling’ – Charlie (rioter, not arrested)

Accordingly, participants report a central group of participants that were mingling, freely chatting to strangers and embarking on joint actions. This suggests the existence of a more inclusive in-group than normal.

This increase in sociability was reported within the larger group in Piccadilly Gardens. This was a fairly stationary period within the riot. Tiago reported that the more dynamic evasion of police by groups running through town, forced people to make a choice as to what their role was. ‘I didn’t have any intention of getting involved that much. What was weird

was that when you were there, you had to run, […] Once everyone started

running it started getting really scary because it was like ok we’re all just 286

trapped here now. Yeah, yeah, yeah, we… we’re either in it or we’re not.’ -

Tiago (rioter, not arrested)

Derren expanded on the reasons for running, even if not (yet) engaged in illegal activity.

‘There was a crowd of people and if you stood and the police were running

at ya you’d be hit by them or get arrested or get trampled on’ - Derren

(rioter, arrested)

The perceived common fate that awaited both spectators and rioters left people with little option but to join the crowd and run from the police. These dynamics further increased the inclusiveness of participants’ in-group. Phillip reported the automatic expectation of friendship, help and support for those within the group.

‘I knew so many people there. It was jokes, like just random people, like

“alright mate. What’s going on?” stuff like that. But even the people we

didn’t know were still being friends. Like if you were part of the group then

you were automatically friends and would help each other out. Like people

were helping each other. Like “pass us that”, “there you go”, stuff like that.

So, for that reason I do believe that it was good. The way it brought

everyone together and stuff’ - Philip (rioter, arrested)

Phillip reported experiencing exhilaration once he joined the crowd. 287

‘Literally as soon as I got to the crowd it was cheering and chanting and

stuff like that. Adrenaline, energy possessed me or something.’ – Philip

(rioter, arrested)

The exhilaration Philip reported is accompanied by reports of cheering indicative of the crowds’ support for normative actions. Chanting has been shown to increase group affiliation (von Zimmerman & Richardson 2016) and appears to have increased affiliation during the disturbances.

Philip’s accounts of helping behaviour were also mirrored by multiple accounts of sharing behaviour between crowd members. Tiago reported that the amount of sharing meant that participation in looting was unnecessary.

‘We was running and someone was like, “oh, do you want a hat?” I was like

“oh, right, yeah whatever.” I didn’t know him personally but amm yeah

there was so much sharing going on it was just mad, you didn’t really have

to do anything’ - Tiago (rioter, not arrested)

Edee also reported sharing behaviour amongst strangers.

‘When people were handing the booze from Kro and the pennies from the

betting shop I had the impression that they were giving them out pretty

much at random. So, like first to their friends sure but then to whoever was

there. It was nice.’ - Edee (spectator)

It is unclear if the sharing behaviour took place as a result of the more inclusive ingroup or contributed towards a more inclusive ingroup. However, participant accounts are consistent with research demonstrating increased 288

prosocial behaviour in more inclusive groups (Levine et al 2005; Drury et al 2015).

Many participants reported handling stolen goods through sharing or buying before engaging in looting. Furthermore, loot procured by more organised participants was distributed among less organised participants around the same time they were being encouraged to engage in looting.

‘I remember at one point we saw the same guy again, the same guy that

started it, and he kinda suggested that we went into a certain shop and we

got a little bit excited because of who he was or whatever and kind of like,

but he was like with his gang boys or whatever, he just kind of smashed it

through and then started giving us shit as they came out’ - Tiago (rioter,

not arrested)

The sharing of alcohol lowered people’s inhibitions and made them more amenable to participation. Fred, Kevin, and Linda, all report drinking looted alcohol before engaging in the disturbances.

‘Some of the rioters give us a drink, and you know when you drink, it’s

enticing so we drank…’ - Linda (rioter, arrested)

Furthermore, having handled stolen goods and seen just how possible it was to loot goods with apparent impunity, crowd members who had not participated in looting yet had fewer reasons to abstain from looting. The sharing behaviour therefore could be viewed a gateway into becoming a rioter, both in terms of actions and group membership. While spectators reported the sharing of loot, none reported receiving any. This contrasts with the majority of participants, who handled this loot. 289

A cynical interpretation of the sharing activity may view this as rioters’ attempts to recruit further participants or get rid of incriminating evidence. In either case pro-social helping and sharing behaviours within the crowd are indicative of a more inclusive identity. This more inclusive identity was also reflected in a reduction in hostilities between crowd members.

‘When I first saw it, I thought “whoa, this is pretty fucking scary”, but then

after a bit I was thinking “this is actually really chilled out. People aren’t

really even looking at each other. They’re more just looking at the shops

and going “Free Cigarettes!” and throwing cigs around it for everyone.” […]

he had loads of packets of cigarettes and he threw them everywhere, haha

and went “It’s all free tonight mate!” and gave me a hug, like a proper scally

guy and I was like “wow great” haha’ – Charlie (rioter, not arrested)

Accounts of a lack of rioter on rioter violence, reported by most participants, were often accompanied by accounts of cooperation between riot participants for a larger goal.

‘I found it weird – for some reason, I just assumed people would be violent

towards each other. It was sad to see in that what was going on – everyone

who was getting involved and kind of smashing things up was working

together and have all come together as such a big group to do such a

negative thing.’ - Michael (rioter, arrested)

The lack of violence was perceived to be a welcome break from what Philip perceived as normal. 290

‘It was good for most things, cause like the violence that goes around

Manchester all the time is so bad. People get shot all the time, but that day,

nothing. Everyone just stopped. You saw people from different groups

helping each other. That would never happen, that would never happen on

a normal day. So, for that, it was good.’ – Philip (rioter, arrested)

Philip reported his main motivation for joining the disturbances as being to get ‘free stuff’. Fred’s assessment of why riot participants didn’t come into conflict with each other also reflects a more inclusive in-group.

‘I think everyone just sort of realised it’s us against them innit. It’s like all

the broke people, all the hood people against… against the police, against

society.’ – Fred (rioter, not arrested)

This feeling of being on the same side was also reported by Tiago

‘I think it was the cit... the normal citizens against the police. Yeah yeah

yeah, everyone was just on one team. There was no way anyone was gonna

fight anyone else at that point’ – Tiago (rioter, not arrested)

The ease of communication, mingling, pro-social behaviours and lack of hostilities reported in these accounts are consistent with the development of a more inclusive ingroup. Some of these indications were present in the more stationary phase in Piccadilly Gardens. However, participant accounts suggest that they increased in the more mobile, chanting crowds. The intergroup dynamics of evading the police arguably increased the inclusivity of participants’ in-group. 291

However, not all participants viewed the lack of hostilities positively. Jason was previously an active gang member and viewed the cessation of hostilities negatively.

‘And that’s another thing that pissed me off. I’ve if I’ve got a problem with

you I’m not the kind of person that would beat up your brother for

something I’ve got with you. I’d wait till I see you. So, when I’ve seen people

that I’ve got problems with at the riots I’m like “come here. I’m gonna knock

you out.” Regardless of what’s going on around me, I’m gonna knock you

out here. So, when I seen people running around and laughing with people

that they’ve got so called problems with… it’s not serious.’

Int - But even in London they called a truce

‘That’s London. It’s irrelevant to what happened up here to be honest. No

offence, but it’s like Londoners rioted. They rioted. I can understand it. If

we’re all going for the police I probably would be like, “do you know what?

Fuck it, I’d rather knock out a police officer than knock you out”, so I don’t

mind. But if everyone’s just robbing, no. I’ll leave you laid out and let the

police officer arrest ya.’ - Jason (spectator)

One explanation for Jason’s adverse reaction to participants’ accord was the failure of the crowd to instigate actions he wished to see. For Jason, the harmony that Philip reports was not warranted by the actions of riot participants. Jason wanted a violent confrontation with the police. The crowd’s actions did not reflect this desire. Accordingly, Jason did not identify 292

with the crowd. As previously mentioned, Fred and Jason’s perception of the crowd were at odds with each other.

‘There wasn’t no, no, there was maybe a few rich kids there for like the buzz

off it and that, but it seemed like it was poor people innit’ – Fred (rioter,

not arrested)

Jason made an almost diametrically opposed assessment of the crowd’s composition

‘That’s what I mean, remember I’d say about 70% of the people that was

rioting wasn’t from a poor background though. That’s what you gotta

remember.’ - Jason (spectator)

Fred found joy in ‘all the ghetto kids’ taking part. However, Jason derided them as ‘freeloaders’. Accordingly, Fred and Jason differed substantially in their assessment of the crowd’s composition, the extent to which they identified with it, and the benefits of reduced hostilities within the more inclusive crowd.

While most study participants reported a lack of violence between crowd members, both Harry and Kevin did report such violence.

‘People there were letting people go in shop, bringing the stuff out, and they

were knacking them, taking the stuff off them! They were fighting. The

rioters were fighting each other, you know, for the stuff and all that. Oh, it

was crazy…’

Int- Fighting each other? 293

‘There was no organisation, everybody was just out for themselves. There

might have been 4 or 5 lads who all knew each other, probably had some

plans going on, you know what I mean? But there were no transit vans

pulling up and getting filled up and then driving off. People were just getting

shutters up, getting free stuff, then moving on to the next shop, you know

what I mean?’ – Kevin (rioter, arrested)

It is unclear if these incidents of rioter on rioter violence were simply isolated incidents that other participants did not see. However, it is notable, that both Harry and Kevin had engaged in looting, were older than the majority of the crowd, had serious heroin addictions, and, in Harry’s case, were quite frail. ‘I went back at the night time and then the police were chasing crowds up

and down the street beating them with their sticks and I thought “Fuck

that!”, because with my health… I was on Warfarin’s as well at the time, if

I’d got one of them sticks it probably would’ve killed me you know? So, I

ended up doing one mate.’ – Harry (rioter, arrested)

It is possible that these participants were particularly attuned to the potential for themselves to be robbed by other riot participants. These two accounts of rioter on rioter violence were not widely shared. The majority of both participants and spectators reported feeling at ease within the larger rioting group. This ease was reportedly a result of the common target. ‘Yeah, absolutely fine because there was a sense of what the target was,

which was amm… which was the city really. People weren’t sort of mugging 294

each other. It’s just that part of, I don’t know it felt like, you know ants sort

of thing? Where there seems to be a goal. Some sort of I don’t know,

unspoken thing which is happening, where everybody seems to know

what’s going on? I don’t know. It’s very odd now that I think about that. So,

no I didn’t feel afraid of these people I just felt that they were just part of

the gang or the tribe’ - Arron (spectator)

Other participants did not feel as at ease within the crowd. Tony’s dis-ease was based upon a perception that his southern accent would reveal his outsider status. ‘I was a lot more careful than I would normally be about speaking to people

because I thought well, the thing was that there were non… I mean I wasn’t

a rioter, and by the way I don’t think it was a riot I think it was mass looting.

I think a riot suggests violence and I didn’t see any violence at all. But

anyway yeah, I was a bit weary of opening my mouth, cause I’ve got a bit

of a Southern posh accent. I didn’t wanna be confused for someone who I

wasn’t, because really like, if someone wanted to beat you up or something,

then that would be a good place to do it. Good opportunity. So, I was a bit

careful about that I would say.’ - Tony (spectator)

John was also weary of revealing his lack of shared experiences and intentions with other riot participants.

‘I put that boundary in place myself I guess, by going out to watch things

unfold rather than people that had gone out to, with whatever intentions

they had, am and maybe shared those intentions amongst the larger group 295

of people that were there, whereas I didn’t. And that’s where I guess that,

yeah, that’s where I wouldn’t have felt comfortable because it’s kind of like,

they might know that I’m not there with that shared experience’ - John

(spectator)

After an initial pang of apprehension based on not feeling part of the group, Sam eventually came to feel more comfortable because of the common target. ‘I was a bit worried that if I went down there in like, looking like I do I might

look a bit out of place with everybody, easier to spot by the coppers, “Hey,

he looks like someone who shouldn’t be here” or just people wouldn’t be as

receptive to me being down there. But really everyone was just having a

good time, friendly, happy to see other people down there. To be honest,

it’s probably the nicest atmosphere I’ve seen in Manchester after dark, you

know what I mean? In terms of people being inclusive and not giving each

other grief, the only people they’re giving grief to are the cops and that’s

fine, innit.’ – Sam (spectator)

Concern that spectators middle class backgrounds may be given away by their speech was not unfounded. Arron and Edee reported an encounter with someone that attempted to hide his class identity through the adoption of slang. However, they found the act unconvincing. ‘he was like panicking a little bit, so we were talking to him a little bit and

he was like this middle-class guy and was like “this is crazy man, I need to

go home and get tooled up.” Which was kinda funny…but yeah, I remember 296

talking to Edee about him and she was like “what a fucking knob” …middle

class cunt sort of thing.(…) He was putting on the slang a little bit, yeah. He

was trying to get in with that. This was new to him, but he was trying to… I

don’t know. He was using language which you know was outside of his

[lexicon] yeah’. – Arron (spectator)

Charlie was also aware of the information an accent can convey. However, the crowd were not as antagonistic to middle class participants as Sam, Tony, and John worried.

‘There was this bike lying on the floor in the middle of the road, really nice

bike. These lads were like ‘wow!’. Fair enough it’s lying on the bloody middle

of the floor. They picked it up and this guy came over, looked like a student,

posh voice, and was like “oh that’s my bike” and they went “alright mate

there you go, sorry”. And I thought that’s really weird. Cause I mean that

could’ve quite easily gone the other way. But they gave it back to him. That

doesn’t seem really like a riot.’- Charlie (rioter, not arrested)

The extent to which people perceived a more inclusive ingroup also varied amongst study participants. Perceptions of unity; ‘everyone was on one team’ (Tiago), it was ‘us against them’ (Fred) and ‘Everyone was all one’ (Phillip) were informed by easy interactions, sharing, helping and the reduction in hostilities. These perceptions were stronger among the participants than spectators. The initial fears of being given away as an outsider by a middle-class accent reveals the assumed identity of the crowd for these participants. However, these fears subsided as participants 297

realised the more inclusive in-group that was established through the disturbances.

Despite the sense of solidarity Sam reported, the riot, and the rioters, remained removed from him.

‘I felt a real sense of solidarity with the people that were there when I was

doing it, in a weird way because I’m not in the…, you get different types of

solidarity you know? Solidarity – I have sympathy with your cause. It’s

actually solidarity because you let me come down to your violent riot just

like “yeah man, come in.” It was that kind of atmosphere, you know? People

being accepting of you.’ – Sam (spectator) (Emphasis added)

People were perceived as welcoming, but Sam was under no illusions that this was his riot. He was allowed to come to the riot. While these participants did perceive a more inclusive ingroup, they were still on the outside.

‘And I dunno, possibly, it felt tribal, it felt like a group, but it also felt like

there was tiers within that. So, I was on the far extreme of cluelessness but

still having an idea of what’s going on. But yeah, I suspect that there was a

group within the group that was more connected to some sort of I dunno,

more organised basically within the group.’ - Arron (spectator)

These participants empathised with the rioters but did not identify with them.

‘They weren’t people like me, middle class ex-students, they were mainly

people from the housing estates around the city centre’ – Tony (spectator) 298

It is notable that these were spectators. They did not participate in rioting. They perceived most of the looting to be legitimate for others but not for themselves. This legitimacy was based upon existing political beliefs about capitalist exploitation rather than upon the intergroup dynamics of the day.

This spectator and participant division was littered throughout the participants’ accounts, and is evident in ‘YouTube’ videos.

‘I guess the biggest division that I noticed was of the people who were just

standing back laughing. Saying “I can’t believe this is happening!” Just sort

of passively celebrating more like we were. That was a lot more likely to be

teenage girls, so I think there was probably gender division. Yeah that’s the

division I noticed the most’ - Edee (spectator)

In summary, a more inclusive social identity was reported by participants. The ESIM previously demonstrated how perceptions of an illegitimate imposition of police power elicited unity and empowered participants to oppose the police. Because GMP were under-resourced, over-stretched, reeling from defeat in Salford, and outnumbered, the normal power imbalance between participants and police was absent. The police were unable to impose their power upon participants. Participants appealed to issues external to the dynamics of the day to legitimise their actions. Accordingly, participants were not unified and empowered by an imposition of police power.

However, a more inclusive in-group was still reported. It is argued that because power relations had already changed to favour participants, the police imposition of power was not necessary to unite the gathering crowd. Instead, the crowd united and empowered themselves through a type of 299

positive feedback loop that unfolded as the riot developed. First, in the context of ongoing national rioting, reports of rioting in Salford and different parts of the city made it clear that rioting was possible in Manchester. Second, gathering (with questionable legitimacy) in numbers in Piccadilly Gardens in expectation of rioting made clear to attendees the size and potential of the crowd. Third, these shared intentions led to behavioural and psychological changes such as an unusual ease in sociability, a reduction in hostilities, and a delineation of legitimate targets. This demonstrated increased unity within the crowd, empowering the crowd. Fourth, the encouragement shouted for early actions and the perceived inability of GMP to prevent or control such actions further unified and empowered the crowd. This was further confirmed by the influx of victorious rioters from Salford which reportedly catalysed embryonic riot actions. Fifth, as the police attempted to intervene people ran with crowds of active participants, reinforcing this unity through sharing and helping behaviours. These findings support Stott et al’s (2018) assertion that a self-reinforcing positive feedback loop can unite and empower crowds in the absence of concerted police actions.

Although, there was a somewhat graded definition of the more inclusive social identity. While rioters generally spoke effusively about the unity within the group and spectators felt more at ease than they thought they would, the spectators were still clear that they were attending someone else’s riot. They empathised with the more active rioters but did not identify strongly with them. Furthermore, not all group members welcomed or recognised this more inclusive ingroup. It is argued that the strength of identification with the main crowd, informed by shared experiences of 300

deprivation, influenced the divisions between rioters and spectators and the graded impression of unity.

H. What were the experiential outcomes? In particular, after the event, (how) did participants talk about empowerment, victory and/or defeat, their emotions, and their rationales for involvement in future riots? How people experience involvement in collective actions can tell us what the collective action means for them. ESIM research has shown how positive experiences of collective action can result in enduring empowerment (Drury et al 2005). ESIM researchers argue that victory is not a given outcome to be achieved or remain unfulfilled. Instead the meaning of success is contested and interpreted in relation to participants’ social identities (Barr & Drury 2009). Accordingly, studying participants’ experiential outcomes reveals the nature of participants’ social identity and what the disturbances meant to them, which may influence their participation in future riots. Study participants’ accounts of experiential outcomes vary from joy to alienation. In answering this question, we explore study participants’ reported emotions, both during and after the disturbances, the attributions they made for these emotions, and the effect they report the experience had on them. Let us first consider the positive emotions.

Positive experiential outcomes ESIM suggests that joy is experienced when collective action overturns power relations, as a result of collective self-objectification (CSO). In Fred’s account we see this emotion and his attributions for it. ‘At first, everyone was running off from them and then a few guys were like

“don’t run! Don’t run!” and they’re fucking running from us after long

d’y’know what I mean? Running down the road and that, I was like, “Mate! 301

This is fucking beautiful! It’s sick man! Fuck the police innit? Fuck the

police!” I really don’t like the police, innit?’ – Fred (rioter, not arrested)

Fred reported a long-standing antagonism towards the police. He criticised racial profiling, stop and search, the implementation of unjust laws, and what he perceived as police officers bullying those less powerful. The joy evident in his account is a result of experiencing overturned power relations between the crowd and the police. This was the first time Fred, as part of a collective, had more power than the police. He felt joy in the fact that it was the ‘ghetto kids’ from Manchester who overturned subjectively illegitimate power relations. Through novel, subjectively legitimate, unified actions, with a group he strongly identified with, Fred instantiated his collective social identity and experienced joy as a result. In this example we see how ESIM accounts for the joy experienced through collective-self-objectification (CSO) made possible through the intergroup dynamics of collective action.

The conditions for CSO as laid out by Drury et al (2005) are (a) existing power relations are overturned through (b) novel and (c) legitimate actions and are (d) provisional. The potential for unity to arise during collective actions is also thought to be fundamentally important in collective self-objectification. Charlie reported joy at the fact that the actions he would take part in included ‘scallies’.

‘We got the idea that it was mainly scallies causing trouble and that kind of

gave me this great feeling of like, yeah that’s really good though, because

scallies often don’t do, get involved in any political event and it was, I

thought it was really good that it was, there was this kinda show of force of 302

like, you know? There’s loads of poor people everywhere’ – Charlie (rioter,

not arrested)

The inclusion of ‘scallies’ in what he perceived to be a political event, made his in-group more inclusive. This ‘show of force’ objectified his collective’s social identity.

Charlie reported several examples of instantiating his social identity. His proudest moment was attacking an estate-agent’s.

‘That was my proud[est] moment, I think. I was very proud of that, cause I

sort of thought, estate agent’s in town around Deansgate, that represents

everything I don’t like. And to smash that up was, you know? Just quite a

nice thing to do. There’s nothing I reckon anyone could say that would make

that seem like a bad thing.’ – Charlie (rioter, not arrested)

For Charlie the estate-agent’s represented wealth and the mechanisms through which

’wealth [is] being taken away from the poor and being given to the rich.’ –

Charlie (rioter, not arrested)

Smashing up the estate agent’s provided no personal profit for Charlie. Instead the joy he experienced was through the collective symbolic destruction of instruments that exacerbate inequality.

Tiago’s account also challenges the idea that people were participating purely for personal profit. He does not deny that some people came with the express intention of looting for personal gain, but he also emphasised 303

sharing behaviour that occurred within the crowd. Furthermore, he emphasised the celebratory aspect of the disturbances.

‘It was just actually like, once the looting was put to one side, it was just

one big party, and everyone was just getting pissed. Yeah yeah yeah, that’s

basically what happened. I don’t think people were even interested in

having a new top or having… some people did come with that intention

innit, like, clearly with that intention. They had a van or a car they were

shifting everything in. But I think the majority of the people just came for

that sort of craic, if you wanna say. So, yeah for whatever, didn’t wanna

miss out sort of thing.’ – Tiago (rioter, not arrested)

The shock, horror and outrage that was evident in the public, media, and politicians accounts is at odds with this account of a party atmosphere, however, it is prevalent in many accounts.

‘We saw the guy who had laughed at the joke at the tiny cop and we saw

him again and sort of “hey” you know? Sort of, greeted him really warmly

and felt happy. So, I guess it was sort of festival, celebratory, you know?

Initially a little bit tense because we weren’t sure of what we were coming

into. And then once we realised that it was very relaxed, just enjoying it.’ –

Edee (spectator)

I challenged Edee to explain how a riot could be perceived as relaxed. I suggested that my mother would not have described the riot as relaxed. 304

‘…if I was somebody who felt most comfortable within the sort of normal

state of affairs in the city centre, then I would be uncomfortable. Because

there be a very clear break from that. Because there would be large groups

of people there for no commercial purpose and you know for social purposes

that are not conventional. You know they hadn’t come to socialise by

drinking or anything, yeah? But at the same time, you know? Your mother,

if she got close enough, got into the crowd, in Piccadilly gardens at that

point, I think she would’ve seen that people were laughing and smiling and

wondering around enjoying this warm summer evening and were not there

wasn’t an aggressive or tense atmosphere there...’ – Edee (spectator)

Following Edee’s explanation of how the disturbances could be perceived as relaxed. We can assert that this positive emotion was experienced because she was not comfortable with the normal state of affairs in the city centre and did not feel nervous about confrontation with the police, as they were relatively powerless in this situation. The powerlessness of the police in the face of such a crowd may be terrifying for people who recognise the police as a legitimate force, but for those with existing resentment towards the police, the overturning of power relations was enjoyable.

Positive emotions were not just aroused through symbolic destruction and overturning power relations with the police but also through the more utilitarian route of looting.

‘Oh, it was excellent, one of the best days of my life, honest. Free stuff! You

know? Everybody enjoying themselves, all having a laugh, police weren’t 305

bothering us, you know? It was great. Like a free party.’ – Kevin (rioter,

not arrested)

Again, the celebratory aspect of the disturbances was clear in Kevin’s account.

The experience of the riot differed significantly for Arron, depending on his and the crowds’ actions. Positive emotions were reported when watching the attack on Kro Bar and also while acting as a medic.

‘I guess it was just like also amm everyone felt I guess as one a little bit. So,

to be part of that white blood cell within what felt like an organism. I don’t

know, it felt like you’ve got a place if you were doing something. So, if I was

smashing something up, I would feel part of the organism. Whereas, if I was

helping someone who was part of that, then again, you feel part the group.

So, I don’t know, maybe something tribal there. Something fundamental I

don’t know. Yeah It fulfilled something.’ - Arron (spectator)

Arron previous reported that he liked to ‘help people’ rather than engage in destruction. As such, acting like a medic was something that was congruent with his pre-existing social identity. Along with Edee, Arron was able to instantiate this definition of legitimate practice through acting as a medic. This form of instantiating his social identity is understood as collective self- objectification, and indeed, was experienced positively. The positive emotions he reports were also linked to feelings of unity. When his actions reflected his definitions of legitimate practice he felt part of the group and reported positive emotions. 306

For Sam, his (limited) participation in the disturbances fulfilled an aspect of his pre-existing revolutionary political social identity.

‘… I think for a few of the other socialist type people, a bit like myself, it had

just felt nice to go down and see one of these things that’s not a peaceful

protest actually looks like. And, so you know? Everybody had already

politicised it in their heads. Probably to fit into whatever ideals they want

to put on it…’ - Sam (spectator)

Sam described himself variously as a revolutionary socialist, communist, and anarchist. His political identity led him to believe that the desired collapse of the existing social order would be initiated by working class revolution. In the previous three days he had watched the riots spread from Tottenham where state forces had killed an unarmed member of an historically oppressed group, Mark Duggan. His political identity impelled him to at least witness, if not participate in, the resulting backlash from this perceived abuse of state power. Accordingly, Sam enjoyed fulfilling an aspect of his revolutionary identity through attendance and (limited) participation.

Tony had a similar motivation for attendance at the riot. He pointed to the historical precedent set by the role in bringing down the Thatcher government and the Brixton riots in reducing police racism as evidence of the potential for riots to have positive political consequences. Tony had previously put the riots in the context of the and the student attack on Millbank. As such he viewed the riot as politically significant. As a revolutionary, he was impelled to attend. 307

Sam perceived an ineffectual elitism on the left that didn’t engage with the people they sought to protect. As such, the organic rebellion by the very people his politics supposedly represents was inspiring for him.

‘To see people rise up and do something that I think was inherently political

like that, that was probably the most inspiring thing about them. I think to

see that people… that there is a point where people, even at the bottom

rung, will not take anymore and will kick back and do it in a much more

spectacular and probably more effective way haha than me mates have

been doing before. So, yeah, it was kinda inspiring but then I think a lot of,

everybody that got left in the lurch I think that failure to engage with real

working people is still there. You see that in the rise of UKIP and the EDL and

stuff like that, because these are the people who will engage with those

people.’ – Sam (spectator)

Through attending the riot, Sam and Tony were able to achieve collective self-objectification of their pre-existing political social identities. Aside from aligning themselves with the ‘people at the bottom rung’, they did not appeal to the intergroup dynamics of the day to explain their involvement but to the political context that they had access to by virtue of politicised identities. Their attendance and positive emotions were informed mainly by fulfilment of the prescriptive norms of their politicised social identities.

Negative Experiential Outcomes Negative emotions were also present in participants’ accounts. The attack on Dawson’s music shop was experienced negatively by Arron, John, and Edee’s friends. 308

‘We approached Dawson’s and seen it completely smashed in, with people

running throughout the store, holding up Saxophones, beautiful

saxophones. I remember being a bit disgusted because, you know? If you’re

going to take this thing, just treat it with a bit of respect or… and I think at

this point that I was losing, I wasn’t supporting this anymore, cause I saw

people in Dawson’s kicking pianos. These sort of beautiful instruments and

just kicking them, slamming their feet down on the keys and I thought this

is disgusting you know?’ – Arron (spectator)

The attack on Dawson’s was a turning point for Arron. Arron previously reported the looting of Kro Bar as ‘funny’ and ‘fantastic’. However, he clearly perceived this attack as illegitimate. This attack did not reflect his social identity. Accordingly, there was discrimination in what was perceived as a legitimate target. Arron was with Edee and their friends at this point. Arron’s perception of the attack on Dawson’s was shared with their friends. However, there was a clear divide between Edee and Arron and their other friends.

‘There was a dude kicking a piano which haha…and we saw this one dude

wondering away with this giant Tuba haha and I thought it was surreal and

fantastic and funny and my other friends were all just nearly in tears like,

“How can you smash a music shop? It’s music! This is art! This is culture!”

It’s like they were watching, in their minds they were seeing the rioters

destroying and attacking culture.’ - Edee (spectator) 309

The lack of shared definition of legitimate actions demonstrated a lack of unity and was experienced negatively by Edee.

‘It was, in the end, a very alienating experience, going. It really made me

feel like I saw this massive gap between what I believed, and you know I

sort of thought that my friends believed and what they actually felt. This

really got them in the guts. It got all of us. It was visceral, even though we’re

watching it. And what I saw was a lot of fear and mistrust and the idea that

if things aren’t pure and controlled then they’re dangerous and should be

rejected. And I think gradually through talking about it they sort of changed

their minds a little bit.’ – Edee (spectator)

The importance of collective self-objectification in eliciting empowerment is clear in this account. While Edee personally perceived the attack as ‘surreal and fantastic and funny’, the fact that her friends did not share this perception elicited negative emotions. For Edee, the difference in experience between her and her friends was an example of an in-group divided by opposing definitions of legitimate practice. This account demonstrates the divide within Edee’s in-group but also demonstrates how definitions of legitimate practice had not changed as a result of intergroup dynamics. Actions previously considered illegitimate, remained illegitimate for Arron and his friends.

Jason also reported negative emotions as a result of not sharing definitions of legitimate actions with the rest of the crowd. While others were happy to engage in collective destruction of property, looting, and experienced the powerlessness of the police as positive, Jason perceived the riot as ‘pointless’. Jason had an extensive history of serious gang activity. Through 310

his gang activity he routinely threatened, challenged, and confronted the police. For him, getting a chase from the police was not enough. He wanted to be engaged in serious violent confrontation with the police.

‘It wasn’t what I wanted it to be. I wanted it to be everyone fighting the

police and stuff like that and it wasn’t. Everyone just wanted to loot. And

one thing I am is not a thief. I am not a thief. Unless it’s a drug dealer haha

but nah I’m not a thief. So, I was looking at it and I thought I’m going home.’

– Jason (spectator)

The lack of serious confrontation with the police meant Jason was unable to achieve collective self-objectification. Again, the account suggests that some participants’ pre-existing definitions of legitimacy endured. Jason perceived looting to be beneath him. This belief was tied to his definition of himself as ‘not a thief’. The weak attempts at imposing police definitions of the crowd’s character and legitimate actions meant that his friends were not drawn into violent confrontations with the police as he would’ve liked. As such he was unable to achieve CSO and experienced the disturbances negatively.

Further influences on Jason’s experiences came from his lack of identification with the crowd. While Fred found beauty in the crowd being composed of all the ‘ghetto kids’, Jason perceived them as ‘freeloaders’. Jason had a strong belief in the potential for individual social mobility to lift people out of poverty. His pursuit of individual social mobility involved illegal actions, and, as a strategy for escaping his low status group, had paid off. Through his gang activities he had earned money. He looked down upon others who did not do whatever was necessary to get themselves out of the low status group they were in. As such, he did not identify with the rest of the riot participants and did not participate in the riotous actions. 311

It is argued that because of the police’s inability to impose their definition of the crowd and legitimate practice upon participants, that a different process elicited a more graded form of unity within the crowd than ESIM had previously outlined (Drury & Reicher 2005). Supporting Stott et al’s (2018) extension of ESIM, it has been argued that a positive feedback loop that developed over the course of the event that unified certain sections of the crowd. Participants who identified with the ‘ghetto kids’ gathering in Piccadilly Gardens came to realise that power relations had been overturned and that they could act with relative impunity. It is argued that identification with the initial crowd was necessary for this dynamic empowerment process to occur. Those that did not identify with the crowd perceived more inclusiveness but continued to act according to existing definitions of legitimate actions.

The extent to which participants identified with the crowd and perceived unity, influenced their ability to objectify their collective self and was associated with variation in experiential outcomes. Some participants, for example Fred & Charlie, had their definitions of legitimate practice reinforced by a crowd that they identified with. Accordingly, they participated fully in riotous actions and experienced positive emotions through collective self-objectification. However, others, e.g. Arron, John, and Sam, did not identify fully with the crowd nor did they fully share their definitions of legitimate practice. Accordingly, they experienced some positive emotions from the increased inclusivity but were limited in achieving collective self-objectification. While Edee shared the crowd’s definition of legitimate practice and was happy to see power relations over turned, the ineffectual police actions did not encourage her in-group to unify with the other riot participants. As such, their pre-existing definitions of 312

legitimate practice, which diverged significantly from hers, maintained, and illustrated disunity amongst her more immediate in-group. This disunity was experienced as alienation. Jason outright rejected the crowd as ‘freeloaders’, who were unable to help him achieve collective self- objectification through violent confrontation with the police. He reported the actions to be ‘pointless’. Accordingly, it is argued that the strength of identification affected attendees’ perceptions of unity and empowerment, in turn influencing the extent to which they could achieve collective self- objectification. This influenced the experiential outcomes for non-arrested participants.

Arrested participants’ experiential outcomes Thus far we have considered the experiences of non-arrested participants. ESIM postulates that the re-assertion of outgroup power should be perceived as a disempowering experience. The extraordinary criminal justice measures against riot participants following the riot constitutes such a re- assertion. Therefore, ESIM suggests that those that experienced such an imposition should have negative experiential outcomes.

Paul was one of the first to be arrested in Manchester. He outlined the emotions he experienced through this out-group re-assertion of power.

‘Pain, humiliated, anger, ah….and just…like…like panic, like sheer panic.

And then my mind was racing trying to keep up with it all. Thinking what to

do next what to do next what to do next…just fucking…didn’t stop until I got

out of jail.’ – Paul (arrested)

Paul reported a violent arrest and what he described as ‘shock and awe’ tactics to force him to provide information. He reports police officers poking 313

his eyes and using pressure points to force him to give his details. Accordingly, the pain that he reports is physical pain as well as emotional.

In addition to the negative experience of arrest, Paul reported that his solicitor advised him to submit ‘no comment’ answers to interrogation in the police station, however, in court this solicitor was absent. His abandonment by his solicitor, who was supposed to protect him from abuses of power, left him seething with anger. While Paul reported his anger at his situation two years after his release, at the time he felt unable to express this anger.

‘I was a bit numb for a lot of it. Just like, I just wanted to get so angry about

everything, but I couldn’t do it. I couldn’t do it d’y’know what I mean? You

can’t do it in jail. Didn’t wanna spend any more time there than I’d already

been given[...]I just felt really fucking… really numb.’ – Paul (arrested)

Paul reported anger at the intense acceleration of the criminal justice process during his interview.

‘Well, being arrested on the street one day and taken into court within hours

later and being sent to jail is not the way a criminal justice system works.

Maybe it is in places like, fucking Vietnam or somewhere like that, but it’s

not the way it should be’ – Paul (arrested)

The speed of the criminal justice system response was a major factor in his disempowerment.

‘I felt weakened by it. And I felt horrified by the fact that someone can

actually treat you in such a way that means that you pretty much shut down

and start to survive on your instincts and stuff like that and then by the time 314

that, it’s… like the dusts settled and you’re in jail…you’re in jail and there’s

nothing you can do about it.’ – Paul (arrested)

Other participants that were arrested also experienced negative emotions. However, it is unclear if it was the arrest, conviction, or imprisonment, that provoked these negative emotions. Linda felt ashamed because her face was in the local paper and she was labelled a rioter. Derren reported regretting attending the riot because he now knew the consequences. However, he had been in prison several times before and knew the consequences of committing crime.

Michael resigned himself to the fact that he would be going to prison after being identified and asked to appear at a police station. However, the knowledge that the criminal justice system would come down hard on him prepared him for receiving a longer sentence than he got. ‘Half of me knew I was going to get quite a big sentence for what I’d done,

even though what I’ve done was small, because they have to punish people

severely in these situations to make people in the future not want to do it

again. So, I was pretty content with the fact that…to be fair, I thought it was

gonna be longer than I actually got. I was kind of happy with it in the end.’

– Michael (rioter, arrested)

The relief Michael experienced is also present in Harry’s account. Harry had a serious heroin addiction and reported that prison was ‘a bit of a break’. However, Harry also felt resentment at his perception of an illegitimate sentence. ‘I thought it was pretty harsh because if it would’ve been a normal burglary

which would’ve been classed as a commercial burglary, I’d only have got 3 315

month, maybe 6-month tops and I got 16 month. Which, thinking of some

other sentences that were handed out, I think I done pretty well. But I still

think I got slammed on the same side’ – Harry (rioter, arrested)

The mix of resentment and resignation was also present in Kevin’s account. He related emotions to the tangible effects it had on his life outside prison. ‘Lost me flat, I had me own tenancy with NACRO I got a glowing report from

H my project worker. Model tenant for nearly three years. Lost that. Lost all

me clothes, electrical items, I’ve been put in men’s shared accommodation,

sharing showers and toilets, God it’s disgusting. It’s made it even harder to

get a job now, cos now I’ve got to put on most application forms that I’ve

just come out of prison, err, my money’s been changed – I was on Income

Support before I went in, now it’s ESA so I’m only on £60 a week now. It’s

had a massive, massive impact on me…

Int - How do feel about being involved in it all now?

‘I have regrets about… a lot of things, you know, that I’ve done in my life.

But I was stitched up in a way, but at the end of the day, I shouldn’t have

been there, you know what I mean? So, I’ve only got myself to blame.’ –

Kevin (rioter, arrested)

Through the threat of imprisonment, the shock and awe of actual imprisonment, being publicly labelled as a rioter, and the tangible impact, the criminal justice response reasserted their power. The arrested rioters experienced disempowerment as a result. The criminal justice system’s 316

reassertion of out-group power provoked fear in participants who weren’t arrested too.

‘Yo boy I was scared. Start seeing these faces on the side of vans and fucking

all the shit and you got all these websites and I’m hearing about people

getting arrested, people I knew and that, getting arrested, and I was like

“Fucking hell! It’s not worth it”’ - Fred (rioter, not arrested)

The public nature of the criminal justice response demonstrated how risky their actions were.

‘…definitely when he was on the telly and stuff, like David Cameron and

stuff, I was fucking terrified, yeah yeah yeah. I did feel something from it at

that time. Yeah where I thought about it like what could happen next, was

it worth it? Why was I there? Definitely questioned it.’ – Tiago (rioter, not

arrested)

Intention to riot again The experiential outcomes of study participants varied. ESIM suggests that the joy of collective self-objectification is an empowering experience that can lead to further participation in collective actions. However, it is not clear that there was a direct correlation between those that experienced joy as a result of their involvement and intentions to get involved in further riots. Charlie’s situation had changed by the time of the interviews. He had a new job which was congruent with his political outlook and was wary of the possibility of losing it.

‘Well because I’ve got this probationary period [in his new job] I don’t know.

I don’t know because I could lose my job there. And I don’t wanna lose my 317

job there and I think maybe what I do know is that it’s really important, not

as important as going to a riot again. I’d probably go but I wouldn’t cause

any trouble you know. Just go and watch, but maybe I’d get tempted. So, I

don’t know.’ – Charlie (rioter, not arrested)

The importance of study participants’ current situations were important factors in influencing whether they reported a willingness to go another similar riot.

‘if there was a riot now, no I probably wouldn’t riot now, if there was

another riot now I wouldn’t have it in me to go riot again.’

Int- Why not?

‘Consequences, my life’s in a different place now like…’ – Fred (rioter, not

arrested)

While Fred reported he wouldn’t go to another riot, his feelings are clearly mixed.

‘Whenever anyone talks about the riots, I get defensive about people going

on about them and if I wasn’t there, I wouldn’t get defensive. And it’s almost

like I’ve created a social stigma for myself. And there’s another part of me

that doesn’t regret anything it’s just like what happened, happened, innit?

D’y’know what I mean? I’m glad I didn’t get arrested.

Int - So tell me a bit more about this idea that you created a social stigma

for yourself… 318

So, like if someone started talking about the riots now, about how bad it is.

I’m not going to say that, I’m going to back it the other way. And its gonna

make people think of me in a certain way, d’y’know what I mean? “Fucking

scally cunt!” D’y’know what I mean? And like I’ve assigned myself to like,

it’s like a major event, d’y’know what I mean? And so, I picked my side

d’y’know what I mean?’ – Fred (rioter, not arrested)

Fred reported picking his side and was motivated to defend his actions but at the same time he was relieved he didn’t get arrested and didn’t want to put himself in the position where he experiences the consequences of arrest.

Similarly, Tiago reported positive emotions at the time, but stated he wouldn’t attend another similar riot. He did leave open the possibility of involvement in a riot that he fully understood and knew the people involved though.

‘I don’t think I would ever get into a thing like that. Especially when I had

the sly reason to go because that guy had been killed or whatever. In fact,

unless I understand what I’m fighting for 100%, because I woulda been in

prison for 5 months or 8 months. I wouldn’t have felt like a martyr or

something. I would’ve just felt like an idiot. So, in that sense, yeah, I think I

learned my lesson. I think if there was another one I wouldn’t go, I’ve seen

it, I wouldn’t go.’

Int - You wouldn’t go if there was another one like that one…

‘Nah, I just wouldn’t go to another riot. I think if I was in a certain situation

though, if I was out at a rave or something and the police started attacking 319

all the ravers, I’d probably fight with them. I know them people, I know what

they’re about, d’y’know what I mean? But something like that, where it’s

just all the random people getting together in town and even though there

was quite communal things, feelings going on there, I just don’t think it was

actually worth it, to be totally honest. And I don’t think anyone really

learned anything. At the end of the day, the government and stuff can just

turn round and go “Well, yous are just absolute knob heads, you never

proved your point.” And we’re still saying the same about them. So,

nothings actually changed at all for me. That’s what I think.’ – Tiago

(rioter, not arrested)

His reference to the ‘sly reason’ is consistent with his assessment that the Manchester city centre riots had little to do with Mark Duggan’s killing.

‘I think that the actual reason that they said it was for, or whatever they

were rioting for in Tottenham for Mark Duggan, I don’t believe that’s what

the rest of England was rioting about. But I think the rest of England saw

them rioting about that and kind of standing up for themselves and just

going “raaaaa” d’y’know what I mean?’ – Tiago (rioter, not arrested)

Sam expressed surprise that riots hadn’t occurred again. He didn’t say if he would go to another similar riot, but he reported that he would feel more comfortable engaging in violence at a demonstration as a result of his experience.

‘I think it’s meant that I maybe if I’m on a political march that turns like that

at some point, I was always, I always wondered how much I’d shy away 320

from that, if I was somewhere where it was kicking off like that in one of the

major marches or something like that. I think I know now that I’d be pretty

comfortable with that.’ – Sam (spectator)

Unlike Sam’s increased willingness to take part in more violent actions at protests, John reported that he would attend but in a similar way to his attendance at the 2011 riot.

‘Probably in the same way as before, am…you know I reacted that way

because of the way that I view things or the way that I think and feel and

that’s, that’s not changed I guess.’ -John (spectator)

Edee reported a willingness to go to another riot, as her experience left her less frightened

‘If something were happening again I would feel, you know not that I would

expect every riot to be like that. I think that’s probably pretty strange, but I

would feel less automatically frightened or you know nervous about going

into the situation. So, I’ve had one experience, it was fine, I am ready to go

and have another experience. – Edee (spectator)

Edee’s experiential outcomes were appeared to have had more of an impact on how she viewed her own ingroup.

‘They’ve made me a little bit more cautious of activists. Ammm they’ve

made me aware of you know my own sort of difficulties that I find getting,

you know? Throwing myself into the flow of the situation that, you know?

Ok, right, I know that if there is a riot going on that I’m more inclined to 321

watch or take a supportive role, ammm even if I approve, ah…I think it

probably, probably, you know, radicalised my beliefs in some ways as well,

you know? Making me confront and pin down some things that I’d believed

but hadn’t really had to say out loud, and maybe I had been able to assume

other people believed too and they didn’t.’ -Edee (spectator)

Tony was adamant that riots will happen again, however, he perceived the outgroup reassertion of power and austerity’s effects on specific groups as preventing them from occurring.

‘But yeah why haven’t there been more riots? I think firstly like the way that

the rioters were dealt with, not just by the courts but by the media as well.

I think that was very important and quite effective. But the way the cuts

have been implemented as well has meant that, it’s been quite clever as

well, because its tended to target different social groups at different times.

So, the EMA was one of the first. But now we’re looking at commuters this

month being hit by doubling the price rise in train fares in Manchester and

other places. And you know next month, or two month time or something

it’ll be universal credit and it’ll go back to different sections of the lower

classes if you like.’ – Tony (spectator)

Arron’s experience didn’t put him off taking part in another riot. However, he reported that next time he would hijack it for his own cause.

‘I thought the shooting was awful, but it didn’t make me wanna smash

anything up, but right now there’s something happening which is even 322

worse than that and that does make me want to riot. So, my feeling would

be to hijack it for you know, yeah.’ – Arron (spectator)

Jason reported that he would ‘stay at home’ if another similar riot occurred.

‘I wouldn’t even put my telly on. I wouldn’t want to see any of it. Unless they

give me a real reason to riot. It’s pointless, you’ve got to have a reason

behind it. There’s no point in doing something for no reason. Cause that’s

just stupidity. If you’ve got a problem with the system, then go against the

system. If you’ve got a problem with the area, then riot over the area

d’y’know what I mean? Don’t just do it just to loot.’ – Jason (spectator)

Phillip reported that, despite being glad that he went to the riot, he wouldn’t go to another one.

‘Obviously, I shouldn’t have done it. But I’m glad I did, because it’s one of

them, you know if I was older, “imagine if I went.” You know what I mean?

I’ve went, experienced it. I wouldn’t go again cause obviously I wouldn’t get

away with it next time, you know what I mean? I wouldn’t get away with it

so easily. I was so lucky to get away with it. Amm but like I’m glad I did

cause I’m glad, obviously, I seen everything that was going on’ – Phillip

(rioter, arrested)

Derren reported he would stay at home because he now knew the consequences. Harry also reported a desire to avoid the consequences of arrest at another riot. However, he reported that he would be avoiding arrest rather than avoiding the riot. 323

‘I’d think about covering me face next time. That’s it. You think about

correcting the wrongs that you did last time. So next time around you make

sure you do it properly, know what I mean?’ – Harry (rioter, arrested)

Paul reported an initial desire to avoid potentially riotous crowds but said, he recently got more confidence back.

‘I was in Greece as well when they’ve been having demos pretty much every

day and stuff like that, and it freaked me out a bit whilst I was over there.

And I, my mate who I was staying with, I was just like, “I don’t feel

comfortable anymore let’s just go back to mine.” But I’ve started feeling a

bit more comfortable around those situations, yeah. I was, for quite a long

time, not keen on it at all but I feel much more confident now.’ – Paul

(arrested)

Consistent with ESIM’s understanding of the experience of involvement in collective actions participants spoke of joy when recounting events that were congruent with their social identity. For some such as Fred this was demonstrated most clearly through overturned existing power relations evident in the police running from participants. Fred was one of the few participants that attributed their positive emotional experience to the intergroup dynamics. Others such as Charlie joy at symbolic actions that achieved collective self-objectification. However, Fred and Charlie reported that their new employment and living situations may prevent them from attending any future riot.

Arron reported joy and unity when engaging in actions that he defined as legitimate but reported disgust at actions defined as illegitimate. The 324

definition of legitimate action did not change as a result of intergroup dynamics for him. He reported that in a future riot he would attend and act according to a different political motivation. The difference in experiential outcome while observing the attack on Dawson’s illustrated a lack of consensus in Edee’s friendship group and was experienced as alienation. Evidence of this division was disempowering for her. However, she reported that she was ready for another riot experience. It is argued that Edee’s politicised identity provided motivation for further involvement despite the alienation she reported. For Sam and Tony, mere attendance at the riot fulfilled imperatives demanded by their pre-existing revolutionary social identities. Likewise, John’s first-hand observations satisfied his desire to bypass a distrusted news media. These participants reported intentions to join future riots with similar intentions of limited involvement.

The reassertion of out-group power through arrest, conviction, and imprisonment, elicited a range of negative emotional outcomes. Paul was weakened by the shock and awe of the extraordinary criminal justice system response. Linda was horrified at the stigma attached to her as a rioter. Derren experienced regret because of the consequences of his actions. Kevin reported anger at what he perceived as an illegitimate conviction and the tangible impact this had on him. A mixture of resignation and regret pervades Michael and Harry’s accounts. While Philip was thankful that he was not imprisoned for his actions. Experiencing the re-imposition of outgroup power through arrest meant most of these participants reported no intention to join another riot. However, Harry simply reported he would make more effort not to get caught. The extraordinary criminal justice response also had an effect on participants that weren’t arrested. Fred and 325

Tiago both reported fearing arrest and re-evaluating their involvement following the disturbances.

In summary, participants reported joy when achieving collective self- objectification through collective actions congruent with their salient social identities. It is argued that because of the weak position the police found themselves in, they were unable to impose their definition of proper practice upon the crowds to an extent which fully united the crowd. For those who were keenly aware of their lack of shared experience with other rioters, their immediate ingroup provided a more salient social identity than the crowd as a whole. Where participants’ social identities were not reflected in collective actions, they were unable to achieve collective self-objectification and experienced negative emotions. Accordingly, the proposed extension to ESIM that explains the unity and empowerment participants experienced through a positive feedback loop (Stott et al 2018), also supports the centrality of collective self-objectification in explaining experiential outcomes. However, in addition to the capacity for riots to achieve participants collective self-objectification, participants’ intentions to riot again were also influenced by the re-imposition of outgroup power, their political outlook, and their current employment and living situations. These findings are consistent with the social identity approach to understanding collective action and its experiential outcomes.

326

8.0 Discussion

This thesis has offered accounts of the development of rioting in both Manchester and Salford. A detailed empirical account of rioting at two sites was constructed from multiple data sources. This enabled a theoretically- informed analysis of the intergroup dynamics of rioting and participants’ experiences. This preliminary analysis facilitated answers to the central research questions (P.86-87). This chapter now answers each question in turn. Limitations of the study are acknowledged, and implications of the findings are discussed.

8.1. What premises were targeted by rioters? Before discussing the premises targeted by rioters at each site, it is important to note that while commercial premises were attacked at both sites, the primacy of the attack on the police in Salford constitutes an ‘anti- police riot’. Manchester city centre saw less anti-police violence and more premises targeted, however, it is not clear that this was simply a ‘commodity riot’. These issues are discussed further in the following sections.

80 premises were attacked in Salford. The most frequent attacks in Salford were on offices (11, 13.75%), supermarkets (8, 10%), Café/Restaurants (7, 8.75 %), and clothing shops (7, 8.75%). ‘Chain’ shops were the main targets (37, 46.25%), however, independent shops (17, 21.25%) and offices (11, 13.75%) were also attacked. 35 retail premises were attacked (43.75%), 21 service premises (26.25%), 11 offices (13.75%), and 13 other premises (16.25%). It should be noted that Salford’s MP’s office was one of those attacked (Salford Star 10th August 2011). Criminal damage and arson were more common (45, 56.25%) than burglaries (35, 43.75%) in Salford. 327

168 premises were attacked in Manchester city centre. The most frequently attacked premises were offices (17, 10.1%), clothing shops (17, 10.1%) and supermarkets (13, 7.7%%). ‘Chain’ shops (80, 47.6%) were the main targets, however, independent shops (37, 22%) and offices (17, 10.1%) were also attacked. 78 retail premises (46.4%), 49 services (29.17%), 17 offices (10.1%), and 24 other premises (14.29%) were attacked. Again, criminal damage and arson were more common types of attack (86, 51.19%) than burglaries (82, 48.81%) in Manchester city centre.

Accordingly, Manchester city centre’s rioters targeted more premises and a wider variety of premises than Salford, yet the proportion of chain (46.35% in Salford, 47.6% in Manchester city centre) and independent shops (21.25% in Salford, 22% in Manchester city centre), and retail (26.25% in Salford, 29.17% in Manchester city centre) premises were roughly similar. A larger difference was observed in the number of services targeted and services (13.75% in Salford, 29.17 % in Manchester city centre). At both sites ‘arson and criminal damage’ (56.25% in Salford, 51.19% in Manchester) were more common than ‘burglary’ (43.75% in Salford, 48.81% in Manchester). It should be noted that some criminal damage attacks may have been foiled attempts at burglary and indeed some arson attacks may have occurred after shops were looted. Nevertheless, these findings present a problem for purely consumerist explanations of Greater Manchester’s riots. 328

Type of attacks on premises in Manchester and Salford 100

90 86 82 80

70

60 Burglary in a building other 50 45 than a dwelling Criminal damage and arson Frequency 40 35 offences 30

20

10

0 Manchester Salford

Figure 49: Source novel GMP data

The main premises targeted in both riots were ‘chain’ shops. This is congruent with a ‘commodity riot’. However, Police records of attacked premises show more attacks on ‘chain’ shops than independent shops. Although Manchester’s rioters sympathised with owners of independent shops, they also noted the disparity in their life experiences. Independent businesses were attacked by some, despite claims that participants had intended to avoid attacking them. This indicates dis-unity within the crowd were regarding definitions of legitimate targets.

The legitimising notions for attacking premises were mainly based around inequality and anti-capitalist arguments of exploitation. However, problems surrounding addiction and mental health were also evident. Furthermore, a denial of victimhood, resulting from the distance perceived between those who profit from chain shops and the public, and financial insulation via 329

insurance, was also used to legitimise participants’ actions. Only one study participant reported a desire for consumerist status symbols from the outset.

A significant number of offices were also targeted. These are understood as expressive rather than instrumental. Isolated attacks on more overtly political targets, like Manchester’s courts and Town Hall and Salford’s MP’s office also. These attacks challenge a purely consumerist understanding of rioters’ actions and the lack of unifying political symbolism reported by Treadwell et al (2013). Indeed, less than half of the attacks on premises were burglaries. The primacy of attacks on commercial premises in Manchester in the absence of the anti-police violence witnessed in Salford is discussed in subsequent sections.

8.2 What motivated riot participants at each site in the Greater Manchester riots? The killing of Mark Duggan did not appear to play a direct motivating role in Greater Manchester’s riots. No participant explained their actions in terms of this killing. Only one ‘YouTube’ clip reported a reference to the killing. The IPCC admitted that Mark Duggan did not fire upon police on the same day as the riots (IPCC 2011). Yet, this was not mentioned in any participant accounts. If the Greater Manchester rioters were motivated by concerns about this shooting, one would have expected actions to be legitimised in relation to this killing, or the spread of the shoot-out untruth in the media. However, it played a central role in other ways.

Mark Duggan’s killing played an indirect role. It precipitated widespread rioting that de-stabilised social power relations between the police and the policed across England. It made salient participants’ defiant social identities. This influenced the context in which Greater Manchester’s riots took place. 330

It put GMP in an unenviable position of being under pressure to take robust interventionist action, while at the same time being acutely over-stretched. Furthermore, the scenes of rioting across the country demonstrated the potential people have to overturn power relations through collective actions. Accordingly, there were expectations on both sides that rioting could erupt in Manchester. In some cases, especially in Manchester city centre, this led potential participants to seek out rioting before it had started. The context created by Mark Duggan’s death and subsequent rioting had a greater influence on rioting in Greater Manchester than Mark Duggan’s death.

The Salford riot appears to conform to the community/anti-police typology of riots outlined by Ball & Drury (2012). The primary targets of Salford rioters were the police. Rioting took place in a residential area, meaning many participants did not travel far to take part. While this thesis lacks primary data from rioters, it is worth exploring the primary data from witnesses and secondary data.

Sol reported collective longstanding antagonism between the police and the rioters as motivating the violence. He complained of routine stop and searches being perceived as harassment by him and his peers. Spicer (2011) reported that recent GMP actions against organised crime in Salford had motivated a desire for payback. This thesis was rejected by Jeffrey & Tufail (2015) in favour of more longstanding antagonisms between the police and local people as a result of the regeneration/gentrification process. These long standing anti-police attitudes were brought into sharp relief as GMP sent ten TAU vans to deal with a broken window. Officers closed down the shopping precinct and followed stone throwing youths on to Brydon close. Several residents (perhaps unaware of the initial broken window and stone 331

throwing) reported this as provocative (Jeffrey & Tufail 2015, V4). In addition to these explanations of participant motivations, the social media data quite clearly shows the police facing serious targeted attacks. Some care was taken to avoid collateral damage, for example, the Media City Chaplin reported being protected from stone throwers. These ferocious attacks forced the police to withdraw first from Brydon Close then Salford altogether. Accordingly, it can be stated that anti-police attitudes motivated the initial part of the Salford riot.

After the police had been defeated, rioters’ targets changed. Although, there were still limits to these new targets. Mainstream media journalists were attacked but independent journalists and others taking pictures were left alone. A more diverse crowd engaged in looting in a celebratory atmosphere after the police left. However, the people involved (families, younger and older people) and the loot acquired (food from a discount supermarket, TV’s from the local pawn shop) suggests that this was not a consumerist orgy but looting motivated largely by deprivation. Above all, this was primarily an anti-police riot.

The Manchester city centre riot appears to conform to the commodity riot typology outlined by Ball & Drury (2012). It took place in a commercial area of the city, participants travelled to the riot site, confrontation with police was avoided, and attacking premises was the primary activity. These arguments could well be marshalled to explain rioting in Manchester city centre as mere apolitical opportunism. However, the fact that overturned social relations were perceived as exhilarating and empowering among certain people makes clear the corrosive effect of the normally stable and impermeable intergroup status differentials. Treadwell et al (2013) point out that rioters’ actions occurred in the absence of an alternative political 332

ideology. However, their actions emanated from a political context and demanded a political response. In this sense, rioters’ actions were political, despite the apparent absence of a coherent, unifying meta-narrative through which an alternative future could be imagined.

A variety of motivations were apparent in Manchester city centre participant’s accounts. Only Philip reported acquisition of consumerist status symbols as a motivating factor. Several participants reported theft to feed drug addictions. Mental health problems were also present. However, the majority were motivated by desires to experience power relations being overturned.

The activist spectators had a strong belief in social change informed by their politicised identities. Accordingly, attending a riot in the wake of a fatal police shooting was something that they were impelled to do. This is argued to have helped them achieve an aspect of their political revolutionary identities. However, they empathised with the crowd without identifying with them and participated in a very limited manner. The importance of identification with and corresponding perceptions of support within the crowd were important factors in participants’ empowerment.

Charlie was motivated by inequality. He perceived the main participants to be ‘scallies’. However, their inclusion in what he perceived to be a political event was perceived as signalling a more inclusive ingroup. This enabled him to engage in symbolic destruction of wealth, as well as some theft. Fred and Tiago said they were not initially motivated by looting but joined in petty looting once present. These participants wanted to enjoy power relations being overturned by their in-group. Fred took delight in seeing the police on the run and Tiago reported not wanting to miss out on an historic occasion. 333

These participants identified with the crowd’s ‘ghetto’ identity. They justified their actions largely in terms of inequality and the exploitative business practices of ‘chain’ shops. They reported limits to their definitions of legitimate actions, thus demonstrating rationality in their actions. Tiago reported protecting a charity shop and intentions not to loot from independent shops as they were not considered legitimate targets. However, novel empirical data from GMP indicates that although fewer independent shops were attacked, a significant number were.

Two points may explain the difference in what was claimed and what was observed. First, the study sample is not likely to represent all rioters. Different groups of participants had different motivations. Initially describing the crowd as all the ‘normal citizens’, Tiago later said that he wouldn’t join a similar riot as it was all the ‘random people’ and he didn’t fully know their motivations. While Tiago’s friends had planned to avoid independent shops, others did not. Second, the idealisation of independent shops may obscure participants true feelings about attacking them. Fred’s initial empathy with independent shop owners was quickly contradicted by a comparison between their life and his.

Jason rejected the crowd as ‘freeloaders’. In contrast to the social change beliefs of the activist spectators, he had a strong belief in individual mobility. This belief was reified through his previous gang activities which enabled him to partially leave this group he devalued. He was motivated by the potential for violent confrontation with the police but was unable to fulfil this aim. Accordingly, although anti-police sentiment was never far from the surface, there were a mix of motivations in Manchester city centre’s participants and spectators. In answer to Kalsi’s question as to whether those involved were 334

“opportunists, criminals, or protesters” (2011), we are faced with the answer that Manchester city centre’s riots contained and remained all three.

The ‘official’ narrative described in the early part of this thesis primarily understood rioting as the actions of inherently criminal, immoral others, who took advantage of inadequate policing while submerged in the madness of the crowd. Rather than providing an adequate explanation of the events this explanation has an ideological function which serves to de-politicise the events. This explanation locates problems of immorality and irresponsibility within deficient families, thus closing down debate regarding more fundamental structural problems. Despite a critique of neo-liberalism, post- political consumerist accounts (Treadwell et al 2013; Winlow & Hall 2014) have a similar outcome which is to de-politicise events and hinder examination of structural motivations.

In Salford, there was a clear shared anti-police social identity brought into focus through undifferentiated police action in a residential area in the midst of regeneration/gentrification. The main target were the police. These were clearly not primarily consumerist riots. They were primarily anti-police riots. Looting occurred afterwards in a celebratory atmosphere. In Manchester city centre, looting occurred largely in the absence of severe anti-police violence. The shared social identity was less clear and less coherent, arguably as a result of the defensive police tactics necessitated by the reversal of power relations. However, the main activity was not consumerist acquisitive crime. Those that took part in rioting had consistent background grievances involving negative experiences of police. Targets were legitimised through appeals to alienation, unethical business practice, and problems associated with inequality such as addiction. 335

In both cases looting took place, however, explanations of rioting as motivated solely by consumerism are insufficient to explain either riot. Consumerist explanations cannot explain the primacy and ferocity of the attacks on the police in Salford. However, looting did occur once the police had been defeated. Some rioters in Manchester city centre clearly came to loot, however, most appear to have attended primarily to enjoy power relations being overturned. As Newburn et al (2015c) and Stott et al (2017) point out, looting is a more complicated act than the simple financial enrichment of the self. Choosing to be on the side of the defiant crowd overturning power relations was a political choice. In this sense the 2011 riots were politically motivated.

Neither riot forwarded a new progressive alternative vision of society. Yet, both challenged the stability of subjectively illegitimate social power relations. Rather than neo-liberal consumerist riots advancing the financial interests of the self, the Greater Manchester 2011 riots should be understood as alienated groups motivated by a variety of grievances acting in concert to defy authority and overturn illegitimate power relations. Once power relations had been overturned a variety of types of looting (Mac Ginty 2004) took place in a celebratory atmosphere. The joy evident in these overturned power relations is the counterpoint to severe and entrenched alienation. Collective actions which challenge alienation are political. Despite the absence of a clearly articulated political agenda these riots are argued to have been based in political motivations. 336

8.3 How did intergroup dynamics operate during the development of Greater Manchester’s riots? The analysis questions (P.102), based upon processes previously outlined by ESIM (Drury & Reicher 2005), were designed to explore the intergroup dynamics of conflict. These processes were:

1) A categorical asymmetry exists where participants and police have opposing categorical definitions of themselves the other group and the event. 2) There is a fragmentation within the participant’s group 3) There is an asymmetry of power where the police have the power to impose their understanding of the crowd and their definitions of legitimate practice upon the crowd. The imposition of this power by police is perceived illegitimately by the crowd. 4) The crowd is unified by perceptions of illegitimate police action, eliciting behavioural and psychological change. Behavioural and psychological changes facilitate support for actions opposing the outgroup. Processes specified by ESIM as being fundamental to the escalation towards conflict were observed at both riot sites. However, it is argued that intergroup dynamics changed over time. The changed power relations necessitated different policing tactics at each site and resulted in different processes of escalation. The Salford riot developed according to the processes specified in ESIM in an almost textbook like fashion. However, different processes are argued to have escalated the situation in Manchester city centre. Let us now compare the processes by site. 337

1) A categorical asymmetry exists where participants and police have opposing categorical definitions of themselves the other group and the event.

The widespread rioting throughout England provided a very specific context in which these riots should be understood. Although other English riots have ‘spread’, the speed at which they ‘spread’ in 2011 was unprecedented. This created a unique policing environment. Because of widespread rioting and rumours about impending riots in Greater Manchester, GMP perceived the possibility of rioting in both sites as realistic. In both cases then GMP were expecting a riot and had prepared for that eventuality.

In the absence of an explicitly organised demonstration and without knowledge of participants’ intended actions, GMP acted pre-emptively and somewhat indiscriminately, treating anyone within the Salford precinct area, and then Brydon Close, as a potential rioter. Although the initial group of ‘trouble-makers’ had engaged in illegitimate actions before the police incursion on to Brydon Close, the residents of Brydon close had been engaged in legitimate actions, simply going about their daily business when riot police entered their estate. These people had not sought out a riot, the riot came to them. Accordingly, despite the actions of the majority of Salford riot participants before the police incursion being legitimate, the undifferentiated police actions treated many more people as acting illegitimately. Accordingly, there was an asymmetry of categorical definitions between the police and the crowd and indeed over the event itself.

The categorical asymmetries that ESIM proposed were conditions for empowerment were more complex in Manchester city centre. Although some participants were in the city centre for legitimate non-riot reasons, the 338

majority of participants appear to have travelled into the city centre in anticipation of a riot. While many of these attendees intended only to witness a riot, others clearly came to participate. Participants expressed beliefs that their attendance was legitimate, if they were not directly participating in rioting. However, they still ran when the police advanced.

In contrast to more organised events that develop into rioting, participants categorical definitions of themselves as a legitimate presence was not as clear as attendance at a football match or organised political demonstration. It is argued that there was a categorical symmetry in between the police and participants in terms of defining the event and each other. Both groups were present in anticipation of a riot. However, as some attendees were intent on witnessing, and not participating, they generally perceived their attendance as (somewhat) legitimate. In contrast, as V1 (3.32-3.35) makes clear, GMP intended to deal with rioters and ‘people considering disorder’ robustly. It is likely therefore that GMP officers had difficulty distinguishing between riot participants, spectators, and those considering disorder. The categorical definitions GMP had of those who were to be dealt with robustly included those there merely to witness the potential riot. As such, there was a more subtle asymmetry of categorical definitions between the police and the crowd in Manchester city centre than Salford.

Participants at both sites had a wealth of prior negative experiences with the police. Study participants mainly saw the police as instruments of government oppression, a constant source of personal harassment. Accordingly, some asymmetries of categorical definitions existed at both sites.

2) There is a fragmentation within the participant’s group 339

In addition to opposing categorical definitions of outgroups, some fragmentation within participant groups also existed at both sites. In Salford this fragmentation consisted of the original small group of ‘trouble-makers’ that had broken Timpson’s window and had engaged the police in violent confrontation. This small group of ‘trouble-makers’ were also joined by people that had not been involved in any criminal damage before the pre- emptive police assertion of power through the cordoning of Salford precinct and the incursion on to Brydon Close. More participants joined these ‘radicals’ in violently confronting the police once on Brydon close. Accordingly, there were at least three broad groups within Salford: those who engaged in criminal damage and the initial violent confrontation with the police; the residents of Brydon close; and people from elsewhere who joined the ‘radicals’ in violent confrontation with the police.

In Manchester, there were several small groups engaging in criminal damage before the police imposition of power through the cordon at Market Street at 19:10. These groups were committing criminal damage and looting before concerted police actions took place. There were another group who had gathered in Piccadilly Gardens and did not start their riotous actions until later. A final group consisted of those who remained spectators. There were also commuters, shoppers, and office workers present throughout the day, but these people had mainly left or joined the spectators as semi- participants by 19:10. Again, fragmentation within crowds at both sites was apparent. Although, the crowds gathering in Manchester in expectation of rioting were more united in their expectations than in Salford.

3) There is an asymmetry of power where the police have the power to impose their understanding of the crowd and their definitions of 340

legitimate practice upon the crowd. The imposition of this power by police is perceived illegitimately by the crowd.

The asymmetry in power relations usually favours the police. The training, organisation, equipment, and their legal powers, means they are normally capable of imposing their understanding of crowds and definitions of legitimate action upon crowds. However, in the context of national rioting, GMP had depleted their roster of available officers. Furthermore, with disorder developing at two sites, GMP were understaffed and over- stretched. Participants were aware of these depleted resources. This tipped the imbalance of power in favour of participants who quickly outnumbered the police.

The two sites diverged according to police actions, reflecting changed intergroup dynamics. In Salford, GMP attempted to intervene ‘robustly’ and proactively before any major disorder developed. Contrary to Reicher et al’s (2004) suggestions for public order policing; legitimate behaviour was not facilitated, police intentions were not adequately communicated, and police actions were not sufficiently differentiated. The national context of widespread rioting and the calls from media and politicians for more robust policing appears to have influenced the abandonment of these principles of public order policing. The pre-emptive imposition of police power was seen as illegitimate by Brydon Close residents.

The imbalance of power relations was experienced more acutely in Manchester, as the intergroup dynamics had changed. Police in Manchester city centre had little capacity to police ‘robustly’. Instead they were limited to tactics suited to their depleted resources. Aside from a small number, 341

participants in Manchester city centre did not complain of illegitimate police actions. Instead, the vast majority reported their inability to act.

4) The crowd is unified in opposing perceived illegitimate police action, eliciting behavioural and psychological change. Behavioural and psychological changes facilitate support for actions opposing the outgroup.

The pre-emptive imposition of subjectively illegitimate police power in Salford, led to radical instigators being joined by previously uninvolved participants. The swelling numbers, united in opposition to the police, enabled Salford riot participants to successfully repel the police first from Brydon Close, then later from the streets of Salford altogether. Although there are no direct participant interviews to confirm the perception of increased unity, multiple sources report the rallying cry of ‘Salford!’ being repeated amongst the crowd. Indeed, NatCen (2011 P.21) reported an explicit attempt to recruit rioters with reference to a defiant Salford social identity. “Some of the youths near him encouraged him to join in, saying: ‘Come on, come on ... just pick up a brick, throw it at the police. Come on, come on. For Salford, for Salford.’”. This initial crowd of mainly young men who successfully expelled the police were then joined by a wide range of people when looting began after the police had been confronted. Feelings of togetherness were reported in a generally peaceful party atmosphere. Despite the lack of primary participant interview data, secondary evidence suggests that this crowd was indeed more inclusive and unified than the originally fragmented crowd. The intergroup dynamics changed in Salford over the course of the riot. The police initially were more powerful, but the rioting crowd quickly overturned these dynamics. 342

The lack of police power in Manchester and the questionable legitimacy of gathering in anticipation of rioting makes the Manchester riot site a particularly interesting riot. Participants were not united by illegitimate police actions. Yet there were clear reports of increased unity. The question is, how did the crowd achieve this unity? It is argued that the intergroup dynamics in Manchester were changed by events in Salford. First in the context of ongoing national rioting, reports of rioting in Salford, and different parts of the city, it was clear that rioting was possible in Manchester. Second, gathering in anticipation of a riot, where legitimacy of attendance was in doubt, provided a transgressive unity of purpose. The numbers of people gathering in anticipation of rioting began to empower the crowd. Behavioural and psychological changes accompanied this unity; easier social interaction was reported, plans for which premises to target were discussed, and a clear reduction in hostilities between former rivals was reported. These interactions were the third step in unifying and empowering the crowd by clarifying their intentions. Fourth, the encouragement and support shouted for early riotous actions further unified the crowd. Perceptions of GMP’s inability to control the crowd were confirmed by the influx of victorious rioters from Salford, which reportedly catalysed embryonic riot actions. Fifth, and finally, running with crowds of active participants promoted helping and sharing behaviours, reinforcing the unity and empowerment within the crowd. Accordingly, this thesis supports Stott et al’s (2018) assertion that a self-reinforcing, positive feedback loop, can unite and empower crowds in the absence of concerted police actions.

ESIM processes were observed in both sites. However, the processes followed different trajectories according to the different intergroup 343

dynamics at each site. Salford participants initially faced robust indiscriminate policing. This elicited an angry reactive unity. Manchester’s participants faced a defeated and depleted force incapable of intervening in such a robust and indiscriminate manner. This elicited unity within the crowd through a positive feedback loop as participants realised their power (Stott et al 2018). The dynamics of intergroup power relations are fundamental in understanding the development of rioting at the two sites. Despite diverging from previous ESIM accounts of empowerment, the empowerment process in Manchester city centre retains the focus on intergroup power. Accordingly, the central premise of the ESIM understanding of intergroup conflict is confirmed and extended by these findings. Following this exploration of divergent processes at the two sites, let us return now to the fourth central research question.

8.4. How did the intergroup dynamics relate to variations in rioting between the two riot sites? The central differences in riotous activity between the two sites was the level of anti-police violence. Salford’s rioters violently confronted and successfully expelled the police from Salford. It was not till after the police had been defeated that looting began in Salford. In contrast, participants in Manchester city centre did not face the same robust undifferentiated police actions and did not seek out violent confrontation with the police. Instead, participants actively avoided the police and attacked premises. Demonstrating how powerless the police were could be considered a defiant assertion of power, but it was qualitatively different from Salford rioters’ expulsion of the police.

The different dynamics of intergroup power relations and corresponding psychological processes of unification help explain the differences in riotous 344

activities at each site. The Salford riot participants faced pre-emptive, undifferentiated policing that was much more ‘robust’ than in Manchester city centre. This is argued to have created a unified group of rioters united by anger at illegitimate policing. This unified group reasserted their power by violently confronting and successfully repelling the police. While unity was observed in Manchester city centre the unifying process is argued to have been a positive feedback loop amongst participants in the absence of robust illegitimate policing. Accordingly, the different intergroup dynamics led to different unifying processes and elicited different reactions. Police actions in Salford elicited a group united in support for anti-police violence. In contrast, police actions in Manchester city centre were not perceived to be so illegitimate that they redefined participants’ definitions of legitimate and possible actions to include anti-police violence. Instead police actions were perceived to be so ineffective that participants perceived the possibility of proactive rioting, also known as looting.

This explanation is aided somewhat if we view the Manchester city centre riot as an escalation of the Salford riot. Viewing the riot in such a manner is congruent with Baudains et al (2013b) delineation of the spread of rioting observed in London. While it is not claimed that the Manchester city centre riot would not have occurred without the Salford riot, there are reasons to believe the two are not independent events. Firstly, while Salford and Manchester are two different cities the two riot sites are within walking distance of each other. Several participants reported people coming from Salford into Manchester city centre. Secondly, GMP cover both Salford and Manchester. Therefore, the same stretched and depleted police force was responsible for responding to both riots. Accordingly, what had previously 345

been considered two riots could be seen as two interlinked riots spreading both in terms of geography and targets.

The Salford riot changed the intergroup dynamics in Manchester. As Reicher and Stott have noted (2011), you can have an anti-police riot without looting, you cannot have looting without an anti-police riot. Salford had an anti-police riot followed by looting. It is possible that the more consumerist rioting observed in Manchester was made possible by successful anti-police rioting in Salford. As such, the Manchester riot may be viewed as an escalation of the Salford riot (Baudains et al 2013b).

Another feature of the two riot sites necessitates acknowledgement in explanation of riot site variation. Manchester city centre is home to a wide range of high end consumer goods shops. Salford, meanwhile, is home to a range of discount shops, pawn shops and betting shops. The lack of looting opportunities in Salford presented less inviting targets to those that simply wanted to loot. Although some looters in Manchester gained financially from their actions, it is hard to see serious financial benefits to stealing, penny sweets, beer, bread or toilet rolls. Such petty looting in Manchester city centre suggests looting was not simply an instrumental advancement of participants’ financial interests.

To understand the looting observed in Manchester, it is necessary to think beyond purely instrumental understandings of looting, towards the more expressive functions. Engaging in looting was argued to have been a way to demonstrate power over the police (Newburn et al 2015c; Stott et al 2017)). It allowed participants to actively perform their social identities; it was a way to join in, to be more than a mere spectator, to actively overturn power relations. These motivations could be fulfilled in Salford without the presence of high-end shops. It is argued that, although Manchester city 346

centre presented better looting opportunities, this difference was not sufficient to fully explain the variation between the two sites. Rather than participants’ differing degrees of consumerism explaining variations in actions at riot sites, it is argued that the difference in intergroup power dynamics at each site is largely responsible for the different actions observed at each site.

While both groups sought to overturn power relations, Salford’s riot participants had to fight to overturn these power relations. By the time serious disorder emerged in Manchester city centre it was clear that power relations had already been overturned. Reports of other looting actions from different parts of town illustrated the police’s inability to control participants. This was clarified by the inability of GMP to prevent people from entering Market street on several occasions, one of which was reportedly met by a victorious crowd from Salford. Another resulted in the Miss Selfridge arson attack. Both events demonstrated that the police were no longer in control and were reported to have catalysed the disorder in Manchester city centre. Consistent with ESIM, the initially angry emotions observed in Salford’s anti-police violence gave way to reports of joyous celebration and unity once the police were beaten. In contrast, in Manchester the atmosphere was described consistently in positive celebratory terms.

Accordingly, the central difference between rioting in Salford and Manchester city centre can be understood when both sites are considered as interdependent. The primarily anti-police violence in Salford gave way to looting once the police were beaten. Participants in Manchester city centre had no need to attack the police as it became clear power relations had 347

already been overturned. Instead they demonstrated their power over the police by engaging in criminal actions in full view of the police.

While the processes involved in unifying the crowds at the two sites diverged both are consistent with the intergroup power dynamics at the heart of the ESIM explanation of rioting. However, the Manchester riot site allows for extension of ESIM from an understanding of reactive participant unification and empowerment in response to police violence to include processes of proactive unification and empowerment in the absence of police power. Again, this supports Stott et al’s (2018) findings. The explanation of the difference in riotous activity is based on the dynamics of intergroup power relations at each site.

8.5. How can intergroup dynamics explain the involvement of some study participants in riotous activity while others remained mere spectators? Factors specific to an individual’s situation (Morrell et al 2011) undoubtedly played a part in whether or not people participated or watched. For example, Sol reported he would have been on Salford’s ’front line’ if it wasn’t for his responsibilities to his children. Simon too, had to return to family obligations. Accordingly, social bonds could be argued to have prevented their participation, although Simon did not express a wish to be involved. Furthermore, the specific riot activities required specific attributes. For example, anti-police violence is ill suited to the families reported to have engaged in looting Lidl. However, there were people who had no social bonds preventing participation and who had the necessary attributes to participate. Therefore, why people participated or spectated requires further explanation.

Insufficiently nuanced understandings of the influence of the group on individuals (LeBon 1895; Zimbardo 1970) are ill- equipped to explain why 348

some attendees participated while others remained spectators. However, the social identity based understanding of collective action suggests the strength of identification with the active group is fundamental to participation in collective action (Kelly & Kelly 1994).

The primacy of anti-police action in Salford and the explicit attempts to unite the crowd through reference to an anti-police Salford identity suggests participants with a stronger anti-police identity were more likely to take part. However, it must be acknowledged that this study is limited in its ability to answer this question for the Salford site by a lack of direct participant accounts.

Identification with the crowd is also argued to be key for explaining some participants’ riotous actions in Manchester city centre, while others remained spectators with limited involvement. Rather than police imposition of power eliciting a reactive, angry, form of group unity, it is argued that the intergroup dynamics necessitated more defensive policing tactics and resulted in a more unified group emerging through a positive feedback loop. This unified and empowered those gathering in anticipation of rioting, as attendees increasingly realised power relations had been reversed. Accordingly, this process amplified the initial group’s power.

It was the study participants who most clearly identified with the initial group that were empowered to participate. It is notable that those who did engage in rioting in Manchester city centre came from much more deprived areas and had myriad prior experiences of negative police encounters. They shared serious background grievances with other ‘ghetto kids’ and were empowered through the unity that they perceived. 349

While Jason shared a similar background to many participants, he rejected them as ‘freeloaders’. His lack of identification with the crowd and strong belief in individual social mobility is argued to explain his lack of participation. Others did participate through a central motivation to profit. Other than Philip, the only participant reportedly motivated by acquisition of consumer goods, these participants had problems with addiction and mental health.

Despite the empathy the activist spectators had with participants, they had far fewer negative police encounters, less experience of deprivation, and identified less with the crowd. Other than attending the potential riot site, they lacked a shared history and experience with the initial crowd and were keenly aware of it. Empathy with participants’ shared grievances did not legitimise further participation for these activist spectators. Their more immediate ingroup was made salient and guided their actions. These participants did not experience sufficient psychological change to become full participants.

The changed power relations necessitated defensive police tactics in Manchester city centre. This empowered the initial crowd, as they increasingly realised they were more powerful than the police. It is argued that this specific process of empowerment also unwittingly limited the pressure for spectators recategorize as rioters. Consistent with a social identity approach to collective action, the involvement of some Manchester city centre riot attendees and not others can be explained through the degree to which they identified with the initial group seeking to overturn power relations. 350

8.6. Did participants experience empowerment as a result of their involvement in the riots? If so, how and why? The strongest account of empowerment was from Salford. Sol reported strong feelings of empowerment just watching the police being successfully repelled from Salford. His account of empowerment was clearly linked to the unity observed when Salford’s rioters repelled the police. This vicarious empowerment is even more remarkable because Sol was imprisoned for handling goods stolen in the riot. ESIM predicts that the re-imposition of outgroup power should be disempowering. However, Sol’s empowerment endured, as he reported that he would attend future riots.

The consequences of Salford’s anti-police rioters’ actions were significant. For a police force to abandon a city, even for a few hours, is a major defeat. The existence of (temporary) no-go zones for the police is not a tolerable situation for authorities as it signifies a loss of power in a very concrete way. Imposition of police power is often experienced as oppressive. Social identity theory emphasises the potential for oppression to be resisted through group unity. Simon reported that young local rioters spoke of the liberating experience of rioting. Simon reported that this would endure and alter society. He surmised that Salford would never be the same again because participants experienced their collective power. Accordingly, it is suggested that Salford rioters experienced empowerment through the unified crowd defeating a subjectively oppressive police force.

The fact that the strongest account of empowerment came from the Salford site, and the finding that the Salford rioters were a more coherent unified group (Jeffery & Tufail 2015) is important. Pre-emptive, subjectively illegitimate police action enabled the emergence of a strong, unified social identity in opposition to the police. The unified social identity that emerged 351

in Salford, as a result of undifferentiated, subjectively illegitimate police action, enabled successful novel and subjectively legitimate, group action which overturned power relations, and objectified the emergent collective social identity.

Sol reported his experience of empowerment directly to past experiences of illegitimate policing. As such the actions of rioters in repelling the police was a collective objectification of an anti-police Salford social identity. This anti- police social identity, has its roots in shared historical antagonisms that were brought into focus by the undifferentiated, subjectively illegitimate actions of the police on 9th August 2011. As such, the empowerment he experienced was tied to both existing background grievances and the immediate intergroup dynamics of the day. This study supports the assertion that social identity is the social psychological mechanism that links shared background grievances with immediate intergroup dynamics and enables collective action.

Sol’s account of empowerment through watching a unified group that one strongly identifies with overturning power relations, has implications for the ‘spread’ of rioting. It is postulated that, rather than a passive ‘contagion’ spread, participants who actively identified with unified rioting groups overturning power relations were also empowered to challenge illegitimate power relations. Conversely, those who did not identify with that group were not empowered to challenge power relations. As such, this may help explain the inception of riots in different parts of the country by similar groups of people. However, this is speculation. Further research on the potential for the social identity approach to collective actions to explain the ‘spread’ of rioting is needed to explore such speculation. 352

Accounts of empowerment from the Manchester participants were less effusive. Manchester city centre did not experience the same undifferentiated, pre-emptive police tactics as Salford. Accordingly, it is argued that although the group was more inclusive, demonstrating group power by attacking shops with apparent impunity is less empowering than the physical struggle to overturn power relations is. This is consistent with previous empowerment studies where the importance of the struggle to overcome police power has been reported (Drury et al 2005).

It is argued that merely through attendance at the riot, activist spectators fulfilled an aspect of their aspiring revolutionary social identities. They experienced positive emotions because they felt closer to the group their politics supposedly represents. However, definitions of legitimate practice did not change much for these participants. They mainly reported that rioters’ actions were legitimate for rioters but not for themselves. As such, spectators acted according to their pre-existing social identities. Positive emotions were only experienced when engaging in behaviour congruent with their existing social identities.

Arron reported positive emotions when acting as a medic but rejected the attacks on Dawson’s music shop. This attack was not consistent with his pre- existing social identity informed definition of proper practice. John also rejected this attack and remained constrained by pre-existing definitions of proper practice. Edee reported experiencing alienation rather than joy. The dis-unity in definitions of proper practice amongst her immediate in-group was laid bare. Her friends recoiled in horror at the attack on Dawson’s that she perceived as surreal and fantastic. The lack of support for sanctioned participants Sam recounted tempered his initial positive emotions. Accordingly, despite the self-reinforcing positive feedback loop that 353

increased the inclusivity of Manchester city centre attendees, this mainly empowered those that identified strongly with the initial ‘ghetto’ identity. Other people who were very aware of their outsider status were less empowered and only engaged in actions consistent with their pre-existing definitions of legitimate action.

Some perceived that the game of ‘tig’ with the police demonstrated the crowd’s power. However, Jason rejected this claim outright, stating the police had control of the riot despite their apparently defensive actions. In line with Drury and Reicher’s (2000) finding that ‘radicals’ did not experience empowerment through the same actions that moderates perceived as empowering Jason did not experience empowerment. Jason was previously an active gang member and expected the crowd to violently confront the police. He did not identify with the crowd and their actions did not meet his expectations. This demonstrated the lack of the support necessary to objectify his social identity. Accordingly, CSO was not achieved and empowerment was not experienced by Jason.

Fred and Charlie reported the strongest experiences of empowerment in the Manchester participants. For them participants’ actions in overturning power relations by having the police on the run, and through symbolic attacks on wealth, were consistent with their pre-existing social identities. They perceived the greatest unity within the crowd. Identification with the crowd as a whole was also strongest for these participants. Strength through identification with the group, and perceptions of unity within the group, was empowering. However, in contrast to Sol, they were hesitant about attending a similar future riot. The fear aroused by the extraordinary criminal justice response informed this caution. Accordingly, the re- imposition of outgroup power was experienced as disempowering. 354

Arrested Manchester city centre participants experienced disempowerment. This was strongest for Paul who experienced a direct reassertion of outgroup power through arrest and imprisonment. Paul’s experience of the criminal justice response disempowered him. Other arrested participants were disempowered by the reassertion of out-group power too. Linda was mortified by her public labelling as a rioter. The tangible effect on Kevin’s life was also experienced as disempowering. The threat of imprisonment was sufficient to disempower Philip, who reported that he would not attend another riot. The reassertion of outgroup power was experienced by most as disempowering.

Harry experienced a direct reassertion of outgroup power and was imprisoned for his actions. He had an extensive history of previous imprisonment. Furthermore, He had a serous heroin addiction and perceived prison as a form of rehabilitation. Sol was also imprisoned. He reported that he had always wanted to see what jail was like. The re- imposition of outgroup power meant something different to them than other participants. Both participants reported that they would correct their mistakes in future by not getting caught.

In sum, the defensive police actions required by an under resourced, overstretched, outnumbered police force, limited the emergence of unity within Manchester city centre’s rioting crowd. Accordingly, some participants’ definitions of proper practice remained constrained by their more immediate ingroups definitions of legitimate action. This is argued to have limited the emergent unity necessary to experience the enduring empowerment evident in Sol’s account. Furthermore, the successful struggle to overturn power relations is argued to be more empowering than simply demonstrating your power over an already defeated police force. The 355

reassertion of outgroup power was disempowering for most. However, some reported motivations to avoid future arrest rather than avoid future rioting. This study finds support for the social identity account of empowerment through collective self-objectification in collective actions and highlights the importance of struggle in achieving enduring empowerment.

8.7 Limitations There are clear limitations to this study. As with any empirical study on messy and rapidly unfolding real-life phenomena, a pragmatic approach was necessary in the light of these limitations. Most obviously, presence at the events would add insight that desk-based research cannot. That said, the abundance of contemporaneous sources through social media was a helpful corrective to this limitation. Secondly, the inability to obtain sufficient direct participant accounts from Salford rioters is considered a severe limitation. Despite concerted efforts to gain trust within Salford, I was clearly seen as an outsider asking questions about illegal activities. Even with sustained ethnography while living in Salford, Jeffery & Tufail (2015) were unable to gain direct participant interviews. Trouble obtaining participant accounts could be an indication of the extent to which participants experience alienation. It could also be a sensible precaution by people who were engaged in serious illegal activities.

8.8 Implications The analysis of intergroup dynamics was found to support ESIM’s account of the development of conflict in Salford. The pre-emptive and undifferentiated police actions appear to have united a previously disparate crowd with shared background grievances and empowered them to violently oppose subjectively-perceived illegitimate police actions. A more 356

complex picture was seen in Manchester city centre that confirms the importance of intergroup power dynamics but necessitates an extension to explain the emergence of unity and empowerment at that site. Stott et al (2018) proposed that in addition to the reactive unity elicited through subjectively illegitimate police actions, crowds are also able to unify and empower themselves in the absence of effective policing through the positive feedback loop that demonstrates the reversal of power relations. This is argued to facilitate more proactive rioting (looting and criminal damage) rather than reactive rioting (anti-police violence). This argument is consistent with the actions and emotions observed at both sites.

Rather than two independent riots the two sites are best understood as interlinked. When the Manchester city centre riot is viewed as an escalation of the initial Salford riot it becomes clear that the anti-police riot that is necessary for a consumerist riot (Reicher & Stott 2011) had already taken place in Salford. In response to the question of why Salford saw such serious anti-police violence in comparison to Manchester city centre, one answer is that the police were already defeated by the time serious disorder occurred in Manchester city centre.

The more defensive tactics appears to have prevented a more concerted violent confrontation with police taking place. The clear difference in policing tactics as a result of changed power relations correlated with very different riotous activities. In agreement with Stott et al (2018), these differences confirm and extend the ESIM understanding of the intergroup dynamics of conflict. The emphasis on the need for more robust policing (HMIC 2011, Cameron 2011; May 2011) neglects the likely iatrogenic effect of having scores of police in riot gear confronting crowds with existing antagonistic relationships with the police. In addition to proposed changes 357

to police training on dealing with mobile riots included in HMIC (2011), the potential for undifferentiated, pre-emptive, policing tactics to provoke and facilitate more violent rioting should be considered.

While the killing of Mark Duggan and racial disparities in criminal justice outcomes were not directly used to justify participants’ actions, the existence of antagonistic relationships with the police were never far from participants’ accounts. The proposed increase in stop and search tactics in response to an increase in knife crime (Weaver 2017) has the potential to further alienate communities. These legal inequalities, combined with economic inequalities, drug addiction, and mental health needs, underpinned the background grievances that made study participants desire the overturning of power relations. The failure of the Troubled Families initiative (DCLG 2016) arguably demonstrates that locating problems within individual families is an insufficient method for addressing problems with a basis in shared experiences of deprivation.

Furthermore, the regeneration/gentrification process underway in Salford must be acknowledged as increasing alienation for many ‘residualised’ residents. It provided literal and metaphorical ammunition for rioters to recruit others to fight ‘for Salford’. The legitimacy with which most participants ascribed attacks on ‘chain’ shops has implications for the extent to which city centres and areas of regeneration/gentrification become homogenised retail parks. Independent shops were attacked less frequently than chain shops. Where attacks did take place, they were not widely supported and acknowledged as largely illegitimate. It is argued that the perceived distance between those that profit from ‘chain’ shops and participants, enabled a psychological distance sufficient to enable a denial of (commercial) victimhood. This is further enabled by perceptions of 358

illegitimate exploitative business models. Independent shops have less distance between owners and participants and were less likely to be accused of exploitative business models. Thus, they were mainly not considered legitimate targets.

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9. Conclusion

This thesis has made a theoretical contribution to ESIM (Drury & Reicher 2000, Stott et al 2018) and in doing so further elucidates the social psychological processes at work in the interactional level of Waddington et al’s (1989) ‘flashpoints’ model. Informed by Newburn (2015b) and Stott et al’s (2017) analyses, this thesis explored the intergroup dynamics of rioting in Salford and Manchester city centre. Two distinct forms of policing were observed at each riot site which correlated with the dynamics of intergroup power relations throughout the day.

Salford experienced pre-emptive, undifferentiated, ‘robust’ police actions. Rioting in Salford was primarily reactive anti-police violence. Rioters succeeded in expelling police, first from a social housing estate, and then from Salford altogether. Participants overturned power relations and went on to demonstrate their power by looting premises in a celebratory atmosphere. As a result of the overturned power relations, policing in Manchester city centre was initially more reactive and targeted. More undifferentiated actions eventually took place; however, they lacked the robust, aggressive nature that characterised initial policing tactics in Salford. Rioters in Manchester city centre did not violently confront the police to the same extent as rioters in Salford. Instead, they demonstrated their power by attacking premises in full view of police.

The difference in processes of escalation at the two sites supports Stott et al (2018) in confirming and extending the ESIM understanding of escalating intergroup conflict. The pre-emptive undifferentiated police action in Salford was reported to have escalated initial smaller scale confrontations. Some residents on the social housing estate viewed the tactics as illegitimate provocative actions. This is argued to have unified a previously fragmented 360

crowd in opposition to the police. Shared background grievances with illegitimate policing tactics were brought into focus through the immediate intergroup dynamics. Rioting was reportedly encouraged with reference to an anti-police Salford identity. This unified crowd was empowered to expel the police from their area. This confirms the processes involved in the intergroup dynamics of escalating conflict outlined in the ESIM (Drury & Reicher 2000; Drury & Stott 1999).

In contrast, the overturned power relations necessitated more defensive policing in Manchester city centre. This meant different processes were involved in unifying and empowering the crowd. It is argued that in the absence of the police imposition of power, the crowd unified and empowered themselves through a positive feedback loop, as their collective power was realised. Rather than a reactive anti-police riot, this empowerment enabled a proactive riot, where participants demonstrated the changed power relations by illustrating the powerlessness of the police. This supports the proposed extension of ESIM by Stott et al (2018).

However, this process amplified a particular ‘ghetto’ identity that unified and empowered some in the crowd but left others acutely aware of their ‘otherness’. While those that strongly identified with the ‘ghetto’ identity experienced a psychological recategorization sufficient to legitimise and empower them to engage in riotous activities, others lacked this shared history. The lack of identification with this ‘ghetto’ identity made salient the activist spectators immediate ingroup. The activist spectators acted according to this social identity and therefore failed to achieve collective self-objectification through the crowds’ collective actions. This further confirms social identity as the mechanism linking shared background grievances with foregrounded riotous actions. 361

However, a participant with a similar background to riot participants also rejected the crowds’ actions. Again, consistent with the social identity understanding of collective action, this participant had a strong belief in individual social mobility (Tajfel 1975). As such, he had already rejected the low status social identity of the ‘ghetto’ rioters and was not empowered by the increased unity.

The differences in intergroup dynamics correlated with different processes of escalation. While the processes of unification and empowerment differed, the intergroup power dynamics at the heart of the ESIM remained crucial in explaining empowerment. Accordingly, this thesis confirms and extends the ESIM understanding of the intergroup dynamics of escalating conflict in line with Stott et al (2018). In doing so the thesis also elucidates the psychological processes and their behavioural correlates in the interactional level of analysis of the ‘flashpoints’ model (Waddington et al 1989). This is thesis’ primary theoretical contribution.

A further contribution made by this thesis was to Baudains et al’s (2013b) study of the spread of rioting. Salford rioters imposed a defeat upon GMP who were also responsible for policing Manchester city centre. This changed the intergroup dynamics. Furthermore, participants reported that people coming from Salford catalysed the Manchester riot. However, people began gathering in Manchester city centre in anticipation of experiencing a riot and indeed sporadic looting occurred before the defeat of GMP in Salford. Accordingly, it is not clear that rioting Manchester city centre was dependent on the Salford riot; however, the two events clearly overlap. It is argued that the Salford riot overturned power relations, and, in doing so, influenced the processes and primary targets in the Manchester city centre riot. This thesis therefore extends Baudains et al’s (2013) mathematical 362

observation of the ‘escalation’ typology of spread by outlining the psychological processes involved in such spread.

Limitations with this contribution must be acknowledged. The study established a sequence of events in Salford that correlates with the ESIM understanding of the intergroup dynamics of escalation toward conflict. However, the specific interactions between the initial group of ‘trouble makers’ and the pre-emptive deployment of riot police could only be observed from afar in social media clips, secondary eye witness testimony, and just two, primary, post-hoc interviews. Close analysis of the actual interactions was not possible. However, the triangulation of multiple data sources converged to provide support for the ESIM’s understanding of the processes leading to conflict.

Furthermore, the disparate nature of rioting in Manchester city centre has meant that close examination of the development rioting in several different parts of the city was not possible. However, the triangulation of a multitude of social media video clips of the central gathering point, Piccadilly Gardens, and the actions that emanated from there, in addition to in-vivo Tweets, CCTV footage, post-hoc participant accounts, and novel police data provides confidence that the developmental accounts were accurate representations of the events.

It has been argued that the secondary rioting after inception in Tottenham, North London, were primarily commodity riots (Treadwell et al 2013). Congruent with Stott et al’s (2017) account of the primacy of attacks on police and police property in Tottenham, Salford’s riot was primarily a grievance based anti-police riot. This clearly refutes the assessment that secondary rioting was consumerist rioting devoid of politics. Mark Duggan’s death was not reported to have been a central motivating factor, however, 363

experiences of subjectively illegitimate policing was the central motivation. This was borne out by the ferocity of the attacks on the police. Looting was experienced after the police were defeated in Salford, however, it is not clear that this was simply a consumerist frenzy. The food looted from the discount supermarket, the attack on a Salford MP’s office, and the continuing battles with police suggest that consumerist explanations are inadequate.

A different picture was observed in rioting in Manchester city centre. Rioters did not attack the police in the same manner as in Salford. Rioting took place in a commercial centre. The primary activity was attacking premises. GMP data also shows that a high proportion of attacks on premises were burglaries on retail shops. Study participants reported shared intentions of only attacking chain shops. However, GMP data showed a significant number of independent shops were attacked. Thus, evidence suggests that the Manchester city centre riot conformed to Ball & Drury’s (2012) outline of a ‘commodity’ riot. Participants travelled to a commercial district, avoided the police, and mainly attacked premises.

However, it is argued that a purely consumerist account of rioting in Manchester city centre simplifies complex events. GMP recorded more criminal damage and arson attacks than burglaries. It must be acknowledged that records of criminal damage could be records of foiled burglaries, or arson occurring after burglary. Nonetheless empirical police data suggest that acquisitory crimes were not the main activity. There were a small number of symbolic attacks on the Town Hall and Courts, however, these were heavily outnumbered by less politically significant targets. A significant number of attacks on offices were recorded. One study participant reported his attack on an estate-agents was motivated by a symbolic attack on wealth 364

and the agents of inequality. Furthermore, study participants mainly reported the theft of alcohol, cigarettes and petty goods. These attacks do not conform to consumerist motivations for the acquisition of conspicuous status symbols. Only one participant reported going to the riot with a consumerist desire for status symbols. It must be acknowledged that these reports could be an artefact of the study sample. A significant number of people clearly intended to advance their financial interests in this riot. Social media footage recorded participant exhortations to loot, accounts of intentions to acquire laptops, and attempts to break into a cash machine. However, it is argued that many of the attacks on premises were expressive attacks demonstrating power and celebrating overturned power relations, rather than instrumental attacks to financially enrich the self.

Post-political, consumerist interpretations of secondary rioting (Treadwell et al 2013, Hall & Winlow 2014) have decried he riots as apolitical consumerism devoid of an alternative political ideology. The Manchester city centre has been shown to be more complex than untethered consumerism in action. Salford rioters unified in opposition to subjectively illegitimate policing and expelled the police from their area. This was not apolitical consumerism. However, it is not clear that the Salford riot met Treadwell et al’s (2013) definition of a political riot as it forwarded no alternative political ideology. It is argued that ideology is not necessary for rioting to be political. Riots are argued to be reactive rather than progressive actions. They draw attention to problems in society rather than forwarding a vision of the future. They are assertions of power by people who only have power through weight of numbers. Asserting power through collective action is political.

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Appendices

Appendix A YouTube clips

Appendix B Consent form

Appendix C Participant Information Sheet

Appendix D Narrative Interview Schedule

Appendix E Semi Structured Interview Schedule

Appendix F Aoristic calculation of when attacks on premises in Salford were likely to have taken place

Appendix G Time span in which attacks on premises in Salford could have taken place

Appendix H Aoristic calculation of when attacks on premises in Manchester were likely to have taken place

Appendix I Time span in which attacks on premises in Manchester could have taken place.

392

Appendix A

‘YouTube’ clips

V1 - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7XztMQTrXQA

ACC Sweeny addresses rumours of rioting

V2 - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_qktOvVNXwc

In their own words – the police

V3 - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZoxLxGN_tr8

Move on to Brydon Close from flats

V4 - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h6vOKV7H6_o

Brydon close from ground BBC NW

V5 - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W0qxq8PsbNw

Retreat from Brydon Close

V6 – https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pbP_VbUHQbY

Alternative angle of retreat

V7 - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1c02CXlRXrs

Salford home search

V8 – https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a9dpf7SJLWw

The Money Shop attack on news

V9 - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UhKVzBstuq0

Cash Converters

V10 - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=olvOGvZ_74w 393

BBC reporter’s car attacked

V11 - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PD1PVlgmNRY

Police retreat from Fitzwarren street

V12 - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oQ82KdQFT78

Police retreat from Lidl

V13 - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DXNIbsklItU

Police repelled from Fitzwarren St

V14 - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5hIcvga-bZY

Riot night documentary

V15 - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7A7mPh8CuvY

BBC Interview footage overlaid with offensive text.

V16 – https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bHzUbwwTg40

Espirit on Market street and Arndale break in

V17 – https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bk7MxLaow3U

Arrest at bottom of Market street

V18 – https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q0XoszA0qzg

News report with Arndale Manager giving overview

V19 - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0x3hpFlsbPo

Foot asylum looted

V20 – https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xbsW49vG_k0

High visibility officers run down Market street 394

V21 - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SvoQ6KpiQRA

Arrest at top of Market street

V22 - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3WmMhircZOc

Hackney riot Vice

V23 – https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rw3vEqVrUSs

Top of market street

V24 - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JgDAf-rrj9s

Top of Market street 3 of 3

V25 - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=orgktY5EejA

Line of riot police walking down Market street

V26 – https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GOKfGCtFe2o

Miss Selfridge set on fire

V27 - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DHAVnx0Ehcs

Still able to walk down Market Street

V28 – https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D4R56euPPI8

Police arrive at Miss Selfridges

V29 – https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v9ekh9P90zc

Police threaten batons at top of Market Street

V30 – https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bw1X5SOq2eg

Time lapse CCTV footage of Oldham Street

V31 - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wld9sS23uKU 395

Overhead footage of Oldham Street

V32 – https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hZgld50aXv8

Kro Bar 1

V33 - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GrIDxGju5YA

Kro Bar 2

V34 - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U6UBaNHiSUo

Kro Bar 3

V35 -https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XrPvXKlz- Ng&index=22&list=PLEF846C8FFBDB14D7

Kro Bar 4

V36 - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BpDrmtfKtgs

Kro Bar 5 clearest

V37 - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9-UhO6pqoqE

Move from Kro to Spar

V38 - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fcrYwqjmgog

Raw cut Piccadilly and elsewhere

V39 - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4zCSXqTtSs0

Oxford Road Cash Machine

V40 - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dC9Ewtej1XU

Sky News in situ Interviews (Edited)

V41 - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ygtSs8VTzTA 396

Live sky news interviews

V42 - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8iaTfcXBYY4

Real Talk productions

V43 - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x1nL0UE2Nuw

Staffordshire police vans spotted

V44 - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3tiEBlLNCiA

Police attack people on bikes Jutland Street

V45 - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fHPlEX32yl4

Spectator thinks police will leave him alone if he is not doing anything

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Appendix B

Research Title: Participants experiences before, during and after of involvement in the 2011 “riots” in Manchester and Salford.

If you are happy to participate, please complete and sign the consent form below

1. I confirm that I have read the information sheet on the above project, have had the chance to think about it, ask questions and have them answered.

2. I understand that my participation in the study is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time without giving a reason and with no ill consequences.

3. I understand that all information will be treated as strictly confidential unless I talk about current or planned offending.

4. I understand that the interviews will be audio-recorded.

5. I agree to the use of anonymous quotes when the research is written up.

6. I agree that any data collected may be passed to other researchers. I agree to take part in the above project

Name of Date Signature participant

Name of person Date Signature taking consent

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Appendix C

Research Title: Narrative accounts of the causes and consequences of involvement in the 2011 Greater Manchester ‘riots’’.

Participant Information Sheet

You are being invited to take part in a research study on the Greater Manchester ‘riots’. Please read the following information carefully and feel free to discuss any part of it with me.

What is the research for? We are interested in participants’ experiences of involvement in the 2011 riots. Too often we hear explanations of what happened and why from people who were not involved. We would like to hear how the people that were involved in the riots explain their experiences before, during and after the event.

Who will carry out the research? Dermot Barr from the University of Manchester Law School. The project is joint funded by the University of Manchester and Manchester City Council, however, please remember I DO NOT work for the police, probation, or social services.

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Why have I been chosen? You have been chosen as you were involved in the riots and we are interested in hearing your experiences, thoughts and stories.

What happens during the interviews? There will be two interviews. Each interview will last about 1 hour. In the first interview I will ask you about your experiences of the riots and your life more generally. In the second interview I will ask you to elaborate on some of the points you mention in the first interview or points I thought were missed out. Each interview will be recorded with your permission.

What happens to the information collected? After each interview, I will listen to the recording and transcribe (type up) what has been said so I can re-read and analyse it. Whilst transcribing the interview I will also anonymise the data by giving you a false name. The audio recordings will be destroyed immediately after transcription. The typed-up interviews will be stored on a password protected computer. The consent form will be the only thing that uses your real name and that will be kept in a locked filing cabinet at the university and separate from the actual interview. Otherwise I will only refer to you by a code number and will not use your name in any presentations or written publications that may result from the study.

How is confidentiality maintained? The information you give is confidential. This means I will keep your information safe and you will not be named or be able to be identified when I write up the research. The only people to listen to your interview will be me and my university supervisor (who is also independent). Please note that I am very interested in what you have to say and as a researcher, I have an ethical duty to keep anything you say about 400

past activity confidential. However, I do have an obligation to notify the police should you discuss crimes you are currently involved in or are planning, so please do not do this. If you begin to discuss any current or future plans to commit crime, I will interrupt you and remind you of my ethical obligations and ask you to change focus. The same obligations apply if you discuss the current or future offending of any of your friends.

What happens if I do not want to take part or if I change my mind? It is completely up to you whether or not you wish to take part and you can withdraw from the research at any time without giving a reason.

Will I be paid for participating in the research? If you decide to take part you will be given a £15 high street voucher after the first interview, and a £25 voucher after the second interview.

Where will the research be conducted? At a time and place that is convenient for you, for example, a local community centre.

Will the outcomes of the research be published? The findings and anonymised quotes will be published in my PhD thesis and may be included in publications later on.

What happens if I’m upset or have a problem I need help with? As a part of the interview I will give you a list of contact details for help, advice and support in case you become upset during the interview or want help with a problem you talk about.

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What if something goes wrong? It is very unlikely that something should go wrong, or you should feel unhappy with the research. But if you do have concerns or wish to make a complaint about any arm of the research, the university complaints procedures and names of contacts will be made available to you. To make a formal complaint about the conduct of the research you should contact the Head of the Research Office, Christie Building, University of Manchester, Oxford Road, Manchester, M13 9PL (email [email protected]; tel 0161 275 7583 or 275 8093).

Contact for further information If you have any questions about the research please feel free to contact myself or the project leader.

Dermot Barr Tel: 07935342855 e-mail: [email protected]

Project leader, Jon Shute Tel: 0161 275 4789 e-mail: [email protected]

Thank you for taking the time to read this. If you are happy to take part in this study, we would like you to complete the research consent form.

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Appendix D Narrative Interview Schedule

Brief

Introductions: emphasise researcher status, no links to police, probation, social service

Purpose of the study: We are interested in participants’ experiences of involvement in the 2011 riots. Too often we hear explanations of what happened and why from people who were not involved. We would like to hear how the people that were involved in the riots explain their experiences before, during and after the event. Go through participant information sheet & consent form, emphasise - Anonymity - Confidentiality - Right to not answer & withdraw

Timeframe: ~1h Setting the scene

I would like you to imagine your life as string of events and experiences, thing that you have done, things that have happened to you, people that you know and who affect your life. The Greater Manchester riots that happened August last year is one such event. We are interested in hearing about your experiences and stories you can tell about your life before the riots, during the riots and after the riots. 403

The first part of the interview will focus on your life and background in general, the second will ask about your experiences during the riots, and the last part will want to know about what’s been happening after the riots.

General guidance

Listen, listen, listen Stay flexible Avoid why questions as these invite intellectualisation/abstraction Follow up using interviewee’s ordering and phrasing: active listening, note- taking Do not interrupt or otherwise discourage long answers Attentiveness and responsiveness, gently probe for clarification • And then what happened? • How does/did that make you feel?

Funnelling, linked questions, opening up topics

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Questions/Prompts

Background/General – Before the riots

Brief: We’ll get to the riots a bit later but first I would like to ask you some questions about you and your background and life in general.

Everyone has a life story. Tell me about your life, in about twenty minutes or so if you can. Begin wherever you like and include whatever you wish.

Tell something about your past that is most important to you – that is, something that has had the most influence your life Describe a memory that you have been thinking about lately. How would you describe yourself when you were younger?

What have been the most important moments or events in your life? Tell me about the happiest moments in your life. What about something that was difficult to deal with?

Imagine your life as a story. Besides you, who would the other key characters be? The people who have been most important in your life, in good or bad? Can you tell me an example of how XX has influenced your life?

Tell me something about your family How do you feel about them? Tell me something about your friends How do you feel about them? 405

Can you tell me about the neighbourhood you live in? What was it like being a kid growing up in...? What is it like living in... now?

Have you ever gotten into trouble before the riots? How/What happened?/Tell me about that... Tell me about a time you had dealings with the police before the riots

Tell me about a time when you were in school

Do you have a job or are in training/education? What is it like being a/working at/studying for...? Are you looking for a job/place in education/training? What is that like? How does that make you feel?

Have you ever had dealings with any council services, like the social services? What is that like? How did that make you feel?

Can you tell me about a good/positive experience with them? How about a bad/negative experience?

What is most important/significant to you in your life? Foreground – During the riots 406

Brief: Now I’d like to talk about your experiences during the riots in August 2011. First, I’d like you to tell me the story of that day... Probes, if necessary: • How did you hear that something was going on? • How did you end up going along? • What happened next...? • How did the day end?

What was it like being involved in the riots? What happened? How did that make you feel? What do you remember most about the riots? How did that make you feel? Can you give me an example of something that happened/you did/other people did/police did... How did that make you feel? Tell me about any encounters with the police... What happened? How did that make you feel?

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Consequences – After the riots

Brief: Finally, I want to talk about your life after the riots, what kind of impact, if any, did it have on your life.

What happened after the riots? How did you feel about the riots afterwards? Did you get into trouble because of your involvement in the riots? Tell me the story of the arrest What were the consequences of that? Tell me about your court appearance? Tell me about your time in prison? Do you think being involved in the riots changed your life in any way? How? How do you feel about the riots now? What direction do you think your life is headed now? What plans do you have for the future? How are you planning on achieving those? How would you describe yourself now? What does your life look like from where you are at now? How are feeling about life at the moment? What has been in your mind recently? Any worries, hopes, plans...? If you could change the past, what, if anything, would you do differently?

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Appendix E

Semi-Structured Interview Schedule

Brief

Introductions: emphasise researcher status, no links to police, probation, social service

Purpose of the study: We are interested in participants’ experiences of involvement in the 2011 riots. Too often we hear explanations of what happened and why from people who were not involved. We would like to hear how the people that were involved in the riots explain their experiences before, during and after the event. Go through participant information sheet & consent form, emphasise - Anonymity - Confidentiality - Right to not answer & withdraw

Timeframe: ~1h

Setting the scene

I would like you to imagine your life as string of events and experiences, thing that you have done, things that have happened to you, people that you know and who affect your life.

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The Greater Manchester riots that happened August last year is one such event. We are interested in hearing about your experiences and stories you can tell about your life before the riots, during the riots and after the riots.

The first part of the interview will focus on your life and background in general, the second will ask about your experiences during the riots, and the last part will want to know about what’s been happening after the riots.

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Background/General – Before the riots

Brief: We’ll get to the riots a bit later but first I would like to ask you some questions about you and your background and life in general.

Tell me about where you live, what’s it like?

Do you think XX is a good place to live in? Why/why not? Do you think anyone is doing anything to improve things? Who/why/why not? What do you think could be done to improve things? What’s the best thing about living in your area? What are the people in your area like?

Can you see yourself living elsewhere? Where would you like to live? What job would you like to have? Can you see yourself getting that job/living in that place? Why/why not?

Tell me about your mates. What are they like?

What is your family like?

Have you had any contact with the police before the riots? Why? For what kinds of things? Was the experience negative or positive? Why? What do you think about the police? 411

Have you been in prison before? How did your friends and family react? What was it like when you got out? Do you know anyone else who has gone to prison?

Have you ever had any dealings with the council services like the social services? Why? What do you think about them? Helpful/not helpful? Why?

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Fore ground During the riot

Brief: Now I’d like to talk about your experiences during the riots August 2011.

When did you see the riots kicking off? What was your first reaction? When did you know it was going to kick off here? Why did you get involved in the riots? Why do you think other people got involved?

What did you do during the riots? Where did you go? Why? Did you take something? Why? Did you do any damage? Why? Did you have a plan of what you wanted to do? How did participants choose their targets?

Can you describe the participants for me? Who were you with? Why these people? Who else did you interact with?

Did participants see themselves as one group? Did you relate to other participants? Did they help other participants? How did participants interact?

Did you interact with the police? How/why?

What did you see other people do?

Did anything change throughout the day? Were participants engaged in the same activities at the end as they were at the start?

Why did you stop and go home?

Why did other people stop? 413

How did you feel during the riot? What did the riot achieve? Was there any difference between what happened in Manchester and Salford?

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Consequences – After the riot

Brief: Finally, I want to talk about your life after the riots, what kind of impact, if any, did it have on your life.

Who did you speak to straight after the riot? What was their reaction? How did your friends and family react to the riot? How did you feel straight after the riot?

Did you get caught for your actions during the riots? Why/why not? How did you get caught? How were you arrested? How did your friends and family react when you were arrested?

When were you tried? What was the trial like? Did you get to choose your solicitor? What advice did the solicitor give you? How did your friends and family react at your trial?

Did you receive a sentence? How do you feel about the sentence you received? Why do you think you got that sentence?

What was prison like? Where were you held? Were you held with other rioters? How did you get on with the other prisoners and other rioters?

When did you get out? What was it like when you got out? How did your friends and family react when you got out?

What do you think have been the consequences of the riots to...? - You, e.g. job/training? - Your family - The community at large

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Do you think there will be more riots? Why? When?

Do you feel positive or hopeful about the future? Why/why not?

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Appendix F

Aoristic calculation of when attacks may have occurred in Salford

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Appendix G

Time span in which attacks on premises in Salford may have occurred

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Appendix H

Aoristic calculation of when attacks may have occurred in Manchester 419

Appendix I

Time span in which attacks on premises in Manchester may have occurred

420