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Home , African Games, Asian Games, Asian Games Federation, Commonwealth Games, GANEFO, International Army Games

The Olympic Movement’s Response to the Challenge of Emerging in : An Historical Reconsideration of GANEFO

Russell Field Assistant Professor Faculty of Kinesiology and Recreation Management University of Manitoba , July 2011

Table of Contents

Section 1: Introduction 1

1.1 : Background 1 1.2 : Scholarly significance 2 1.3: Review of literature 3 1.4: Sources and organization 4

Section 2: Events Leading to GANEFO 5

2.1: The IOC suspends the Indonesian NOC 5 2.2: The challenge of governmental/political interference in sport 6

Section 3: Preparing for GANEFO 9

3.1: announces GANEFO 9 3.2: Philosophical objection: Political nature of the invitations to GANEFO 11 3.3: Procedural objection: Unsanctioned competition against athletes from non-member states 12 3.4: Formulating an IOC position on GANEFO: Engaging the IFs, educating the NOCs 13 3.5: Articulating and communicating an official position 15

Section 4: Events in Djakarta 18

Section 5: The Response to GANEFO 20

5.1: IF efforts to assess GANEFO 20 5.2: IOC investigations into the athletes who competed at GANEFO and the nations they represented 21 5.3: Who competed, who didn’t 23 5.4: Debating sanctions 27 5.5: Meting out sanctions 29

Section 6: Aftermath of GANEFO 31

6.1: Reinstating the Indonesian Olympic Committee 31 6.2 : Efficacy of GANEFO sanctions 32 6.3: Conclusions 34 i

The Olympic Movement’s Response to the Challenge of Emerging Nationalism in Sport: An Historical Reconsideration of GANEFO Section 1: Introduction

In the early-1960s, with international sport facing the difficult challenge of integrating nations divided by revolution and war, as well as other political challenges, it was a now little-remembered sporting event in Djakarta, Indonesia, that caused some of the greatest consternation in the offices of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and various International Sport Federations (IFs). These were what IOC Chancellor, Otto Mayer, called the “‘political’ minded ‘Emergency Forces Games’.”1 Organized by the Indonesian government, led by President , the Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFO) were, in the eyes of IOC President “entirely political.”2 Hosted in 1963, and having repercussions in the Olympic community throughout 1964 in the build-up to the Olympics, GANEFO’s import was that “the Indonesia Government has thrown down a challenge to all international amateur sport organizations, which cannot very well be ignored.”3

The challenge was two-fold: GANEFO represented a political intrusion into sport that the IOC abhorred, and procedurally, with the People’s Republic of heavily involved in the event, meant that athletes who competed in Djakarta were likely to do so against countries unaffiliated with organized sport, a violation of IF rules. In a letter to the president of the Philippine Amateur Athletic Federation, Brundage made the case against GANEFO, linking these two strands, the philosophical and procedural objections: “There is such a thing as rules and regulations and these have been agreed to by over one hundred different National Olympic Committees and a score of International Federations. These rules prohibit political interference, and if they are not followed the result will be chaos.”4 In confronting the challenge presented by GANEFO, the IOC engaged supportive IFs, especially the International Amateur Athletic Federation (IAAF) and the Fédération Internationale de Natation (FINA). As the Marquess of Exeter, David Burghley, head of the IAAF, made clear, the threat of events such as GANEFO were taken just as seriously by the IFs. But what Exeter also made clear was that addressing these challenges would take a unified response from the IOC and the IFs:

The IAAF and FINA are at full stretch fighting the biggest battle that has ever been fought to save amateur sport. If we lose, the politicians will then have the gate open to destroy the authority of our sport. It would be the end of the International Federations, and how long to you think the IOC would last if the International Federations were in the hands of political interests outside?5

1.1: Background

This paper is a case study of the Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFO) and its uneasy relationship with the IOC. GANEFO was an international multi-sport event that took place in Djakarta, Indonesia, in November, 1963. Approximately 3000 athletes and officials from—but not necessarily officially representing—anywhere from 35 to 51 nations (estimates at the time varied) met in the Indonesian capital and competed in 20 athletic events (virtually all of them Olympic and Western ) as well as cultural festivities. Athletes hailed primarily from recently decolonized countries in , 1

The Olympic Movement’s Response to the Challenge of Emerging Nationalism in Sport: An Historical Reconsideration of GANEFO , and , which were labelled the “new emerging forces” by Indonesian President Sukarno in his attempt to situate his nation as a regional power. The largest teams (after the hosts), however, represented the Second , the People’s Republic of China and the (and there were athletes in attendance who travelled from Western European nations). In such an environment, GANEFO was an explicit attempt to link sport to the of anti-imperialism (although its genesis was also related to diplomatic problems that arose from Indonesia’s hosting of the IV in 1962). In response, the IOC expressed concern to the IFs that athletes might compromise their eligibility for the 1964 Tokyo Olympics by competing against athletes from non-recognized countries and, following GANEFO, athletes from Indonesia and faced such sanctions. Beyond any sporting consequences, however, Sukarno intended GANEFO to be the sporting arm of a larger unrealized political movement, but except for an Asian GANEFO hosted by in 1966, the Games themselves were never held again.

1.2: Scholarly significance

It is worth reconsidering GANEFO because it has been obscured by the higher profile struggles in the 1960s around sport and human rights in the U.S. and the South African anti- movement, and because GANEFO took place in , hidden by the more prominent glare of Western sport which has dominated understandings and histories of international sport. Yet regarding GANEFO as an Asian event is reason enough to reconsider it, both in an attempt to acknowledge the “other” within international sport and because in 1963 GANEFO was viewed as anything but a sideshow in the offices of Western institutions, both sporting and governmental. As historian Leena Laine has encouraged, Western Olympic and sport scholars need to re-evaluate how they “approach otherness … The same recognition might be necessary when one investigates the general effects of the International Olympic movement.”6

Consider also the Second World (or “communist” countries in the language of the Cold War, with the West being the First World and the emerging nations of the the Third World). During the Cold War, Second World involvement in GANEFO—as the Soviet Union and People’s Republic of China struggled over influence with the newly decolonized countries—meant that Sukarno’s Games, at least in theory, were a threat not just to the IOC’s legitimacy but also to the ’ hegemony over international sport. GANEFO is not only understood by grasping the history of the Olympic Movement, rather the history of global sporting events, including the Olympic Games, requires an understanding of moments of contestation such as GANEFO.

This case study, an historical reconsideration of GANEFO, examines a moment of political contestation in sport and adds to the scholarly understanding of contemporary debates about politics and sport. As a vehicle of protest, GANEFO was organized on the model of the global sporting event, pioneered by the modern Olympic Games. It included such symbols and rituals as a torch relay, a symbolic flame, a parade of athletes in front of the head of state, the raising of the specially designed flag of the GANEFO movement, opening and closing ceremonies, cultural exhibits, and adjudicated competitive athletic

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The Olympic Movement’s Response to the Challenge of Emerging Nationalism in Sport: An Historical Reconsideration of GANEFO events that resulted in the awarding of medals. Although GANEFO was organized in ways that suggested the global sporting event was an ideologically neutral vehicle it did so while protesting against the perceived forms of repression symbolized by similar events. Understanding the anti-colonial movements of the 1960s, their use of sport as a tool of identity promotion, and the IOC’s response to newly emerging nations furthers the Olympic Movement’s understanding late-20th and early-21st century assertions of nationalism.

1.3: Review of literature

Studies of GANEFO have focused upon the success of Sukarno’s efforts to link politics and sport. Writing after GANEFO, Pauker notes that “as an instrument of political warfare, the Games were a success,” with few diplomatic or sporting consequences as Indonesia’s Olympic Committee was reinstated by the IOC in time for the Tokyo Games.7 Sie proclaims GANEFO “a triumphant success” because “most of the emerging nations were represented, approximately 3,000 participants were reported to have taken part, and several world records were broken.”8 Lutan and Hong note that GANEFO “was intended to challenge the hegemony of Western power in sport, to divide and fragment the Olympic movement, to emphasize the political realities of the new world structure and to dramatize the political ambitions of the new and non-aligned states.” They suggest that, put to such a purpose, sport proved “an extremely valuable political and diplomatic resource.”9

Despite its success as a political tool, examinations of GANEFO are largely absent from scholarly histories of Indonesia and the period of Sukarno’s presidency. GANEFO, however, can be understood within efforts by the Indonesian president to assert Indonesian independence from the as well as a homogenized sense of Indonesian identity.10 Sukarno sought to overcome Indonesia’s ethnic and regional diversity, and the Java-centrism of his government, with what Brown labels the president’s notion of “guided democracy.”11 Despite this interventionist stance and the importance that Sukarno placed upon GANEFO, neither Brown nor Gelman Taylor make any mention of GANEFO, even as the 1963 sporting event, the massive preparations that went into it, or the planned-for conference of newly emerging nations were intended as a centerpiece of Sukarno’s efforts to assert Indonesia’s centrality among the non-aligned states.

As a sporting event, GANEFO is a footnote in Olympic history. But scholars have noted the IOC’s concerns regarding the overt mixing of politics and sport in the geo-politics of 1963. Rather than viewing this as a time when a global sporting event was a moment for alternate expressions of national identity, Torres and Dyreson’s characterization of “Indonesian strongman Achmed Sukarno, with support from and Moscow,” founding GANEFO “to counter the IOC’s ‘bourgeois’ control of world sport” suggests a Cold War frame for GANEFO.12 Otto Schantz’s history of Avery Brundage’s IOC presidency concludes that Sukarno’s “view of the relationship between sport and politics was diametrically opposed to that of Brundage. For him, sport was inextricably linked with politics, whereas Brundage regarded this standpoint as ‘an abnegation of one of the most fundamental and important principles of the Olympic Movement.’”13

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The Olympic Movement’s Response to the Challenge of Emerging Nationalism in Sport: An Historical Reconsideration of GANEFO Regardless, the IOC could not ignore GANEFO. Senn notes that “the IOC had to consider Sukarno’s challenge very seriously because the 1964 Summer Games were scheduled for Tokyo,” an attempt “to reach out to the Asian sport world.”14 So, as Kidd argues: “Perhaps it was not the most effective solution to the tremendous inequalities in the global economy and international sports, but the GANEFO Games helped place the issue of third-world participation, in terms that third-world leaders could shape, clearly on the international agenda.”15 GANEFO then was not only a moment when sport and politics were linked, but an occasion when newly decolonized countries saw the global sporting event as a forum for the expression of their redefined international status. Majumdar and Mehta have begun this reconsideration, making a compelling case that, in the decade after the emergence of the non-alignment movement, that GANEFO was a “battle for Asian supremacy between and Indonesia.”16

While a moment of assertion for the non-aligned world, GANEFO can also be understood as a site of struggle in the Second World, following the Sino-Soviet split. Riordan has detailed the geopolitical importance of sport to Soviet foreign policy, highlighted by the Soviet Union’s return to the Olympic Movement in 1951 and the role played by Konstantin Andrianov as a member of the IOC’s Executive Board.17 The People’s Republic of China, on the other hand, remained outside the Olympic Movement as debates lingered about the recognition of . Much of the funding for GANEFO was supplied by China, so that Guttmann concludes that the “impetus for GANEFO may, in fact, have come from Beijing, where the Chinese Communists were eager to embarrass the IOC.”18 China could openly support and finance Sukarno’s efforts at hosting an international sporting event. The Soviet Union, however, faced trickier diplomatic options. While hoping “to maintain their stance as the champion of the Newly Emerging Forces” the Soviet Union “would yet have to decide how they could encourage Sukarno without compromising their position within the IOC.”19

1.4: Sources and organization

While there were a considerable number of historical actors involved in GANEFO – from Sukarno and Indonesia to the Second World powers to the Western responses to the event – this paper focuses specifically on the IOC response to the event and intentionally highlights the rich archival collections of the Olympic Studies Centre in Lausanne. Featured prominently is the correspondence of IOC President Avery Brundage and IOC Chancellor Otto Mayer, most significantly their discussions with IOC Members and IF officials. Also important are the minutes of IOC Sessions, IOC Executive Board meetings, and special meetings that the Executive Board held with IF and NOC officials.

Following this introductory material are five more sections that proceed along thematic and chronological lines: (i) events that led to GANEFO, primarily the controversies that arose at the IV Asian Games in Djakarta in 1962, and the increasing challenges posed by political interference in sport; (ii) preparations for GANEFO and the IOC response to these events; (iii) GANEFO itself in ; (iv) debates surrounding the IOC and IF response to GANEFO; and (v) the impact of GANEFO on sport in 1964 and afterwards.

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The Olympic Movement’s Response to the Challenge of Emerging Nationalism in Sport: An Historical Reconsideration of GANEFO Section 2: Events Leading to GANEFO

In August 1962, Djakarta prepared to host the IV Asian Games, an event born in in 1951, at the brand-new Bung Karno sport facility. As part of the preparations for the Games, Indonesian officials sent visa and competition documentation to all the nations affiliated with the . The Games were scheduled to run from 24 August to 4 September, but when the paperwork arrived in Taipei and Tel Aviv, it turned out that the packages for the Taiwanese and Israeli athletes only contained blank cards. The intentional exclusion of athletes from these two nations in particular, revealing as it did the presence of diplomatic tensions in international sport, precipitated a chain of events that resulted in the Games of the New Emerging Forces.20

2.1 The IOC suspends the Indonesian NOC

Although the nature of the relationship between regional games, such as the Asian Games, and the IOC was still evolving in the late-1950s and early-1960s, and was not nearly as well defined as it would be half a century later, the IOC was still concerned about the organization of the prominent games of the early 1960s: the , the , the Pan-American Games, the nascent , as well as the Asian Games. So the conduct of the Djakarta organizers in 1962, in excluding Taiwan and was cause for concern in Olympic circles. The IOC president was adamant that the Indonesian NOC be held responsible for events at the Asian Games. “Unless there is some very good reason for not doing it, I am strongly in favor of suspending the Indonesian Olympic Committee,” he wrote barely one week after the conclusion of the IV Asian Games.21 A subsequent letter expanded on this position, as “it is perfectly obvious from the proceedings at the IV Asian Games,” according to Brundage, “that Olympic principles are not being observed in that country.”22 And so, at the February 1963 meeting of the IOC executive board, a motion to suspend the Indonesian Olympic Committee, “for an unlimited period,” was passed five votes to one.23 The IOC Chancellor, Otto Mayer, sent a telegram to the Komite Olympiade Indonesia notifying them of this suspension, and, with the benefit of hindsight, set in motion the events that would result in the Games of the New Emerging Forces taking place in Djakarta nine months later.24

Brundage was forced to defend this decision to members of the Olympic family from the Middle East (IOC member A.D. Touny, : “The violations of Olympic principles that took place in Djakarta at the Asian Games were so serious and so many that we had no other course but to suspend the National Olympic Committee.”) and eastern (IOC member Konstantin Andrianov, USSR: the “failure of the International Olympic Committee to take action [against Indonesia] would have seriously weakened the Olympic Movement in many parts of the world.”25 The Indonesian Communist Party countered, protesting the IOC decision by noting the “arbitrary and discriminative decision inspired by imperialists … is black stain on history of IOC which should uphold sovereignty of all nations of world in field of sport.”26 Touny suggested that the NOC had been slighted by the IOC’s actions, noting that Indonesians “were looking forward for appreciation to these efforts and to the generous budget spent for the 5

The Olympic Movement’s Response to the Challenge of Emerging Nationalism in Sport: An Historical Reconsideration of GANEFO purpose instead of that punishment” and believed the suspension to be “a severe insult” because of “the sporting spirit which dominated the Games” and what the hosts believed to have been “the full respect of every wording and ruling of the C.I.O. Rules and Regulations.”27 But the Indonesian NOC itself responded to Mayer’s telegram with one of its own, noting that “Indonesia feels no use to retain any longer IOC membership [a]nd hereby declares to withdraw from IOC.”28

Despite the protests on behalf of the Indonesian Olympic Committee, for a time it seemed as though the most significant fallout for the IOC of the suspension of the Indonesian NOC would come from the , where the Arab League threatened to boycott the Tokyo Games. Brundage even noted that the Olympic Committee briefly withdrew “from the Games of the XVIII because we suspended the Indonesian Olympic Committee.”29 However, reassurances from IOC leaders in the region, such as Touny – who asserted that there had been “no direction issued to any Arab country as such *that would+ stop Arab Olympic Committees preparing for Tokyo participation” – led Brundage to conclude that “there is no basis for the story that there would be an Arab boycott of the Olympic Games.”30 The same rumours would surface again a year later, in May 1964, as the Arab League continued its protests while the Indonesian NOC lobbied for reinstatement (discussed below), but ultimately GANEFO was the most tangible moment of protest and resistance in the wake of the IV Asian Games and the IOC sanctions against Indonesia.31

And Brundage’s stance on suspending the Indonesian NOC, from a letter to Mayer written on 22 December 1962, is instructive for understanding the ways in which first the IV Asian Games and subsequently GANEFO were, for the IOC President, elements in a larger struggle with what he perceived to be the increasingly political nature of international sport. To stem the tide of this intrusion, Brundage felt the IOC needed to exert influence where it could, even if “innocent people” were negatively impacted. As Brundage wrote:

It may be, and probably is true, that the Government was at fault, but how can we induce Governments to change if we do not take action and invoke penalties when violations occur. The only penalty we can prescribe would be against NOCs. We have no authority over either the Organizing Committee or the Government. It is amply apparent that Olympic principles were repeatedly violated. This means either (1) the NOC was not functioning, or (2) the NOC was not permitted to function. In either case, it should be suspended. It is true that this may involve innocent people. This is unfortunate, but perhaps the outcry will be sufficiently loud to let the Government know that there are such things as Olympic principles and that we intend to uphold them. The violations in this case were so outrageous that we must take action or entirely lose face in all Asia.32

2.2: The challenge of governmental/political interference in sport

International sport officials, including Brundage, were troubled by what they perceived as the increasing presence of governmental officials and political agendas in the world of amateur sport. Brundage lamented that “today governments in many countries attempt to use sport in general, and the Olympic 6

The Olympic Movement’s Response to the Challenge of Emerging Nationalism in Sport: An Historical Reconsideration of GANEFO movement in particular, for personal and partisan ends.”33 The concern for sport leaders, as the Marquess of Exeter, an IOC executive board member and the head of the International Amateur Athletics Federation (IAAF) was that:

sport is not a weapon for something else like politics, it is an end in itself, with the pleasure and happiness that it gives to competitors and spectators alike; with the fitness of the athletes, with the development of sport which flows with great waves of understanding between peoples, which is making such an outstanding contribution to the future of the world.34

Only six months later, Brundage would expand Exeter’s argument, in some prepatory remarks to the IFs, distributed as Circular Letter #279, in advance of an April 1965 meeting between the IOC executive board and the IFs:

Instead of heeding the lesson of the Olympic Games and devoting their resources to the improvement of the health and stamina of their people, are governments going to expand the cold war onto playing fields? Are we going to permit political intrigue, social distinctions, commercial manipulations, and racial discriminations on our sport grounds?35

In the late-1950s and early-1960s, many of these challenges were a result of Cold War politics and diplomacy. NATO’s Allied Travel Commission was refusing travel visas to the west in the early-1960s for many people from the Soviet bloc, which especially hampered East German participation and was part of a larger debate about how and whether to recognize two Germanys in international sport. The IOC and IFs were not only working out how to deal with two Germanys, but also two Chinas, two Koreas, and subsequently two . There was also the inherent racism of apartheid-based South African Olympic teams and the teams from countries with state-funded athletes, whose amateur status was debated in some corners. The IOC president was given to extraordinary language when considering these questions: “the entire Olympic Movement is in peril, what with the continued governmental interference, which will become worse instead of better, the South African problem, the amateur question, etc.”36

Finally, as GANEFO would reveal, the post-war era of decolonization was creating a series of suddenly independent colonies with their own national sport organizations that wished to be recognized within the world of international sport. Too often for Brundage’s liking government officials were intimately involved in sporting organizations in countries that often did not have sufficient administrative architecture to separate the two institutions in the ways that the IOC insisted upon. For example, Brundage bemoaned in 1965 that “the letterhead of the Iraq Olympic Committee indicated that it was connected with the Physical Education Department of the Ministry of Education, and probably entirely political. This will undoubtedly be the case with most of the new countries.”37

It was in Asia, indeed in many of the countries encapsulated in the “new emerging forces,” that Brundage hoped the IOC could inculcate Olympic values in the face of the concerning influence that

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The Olympic Movement’s Response to the Challenge of Emerging Nationalism in Sport: An Historical Reconsideration of GANEFO governments had over the organization of sport. The persistence of ideological influence over sport was a key feature of the IOC objection to GANEFO, as we shall see. As early as 1 October 1962, Brundage observed that “Sport in most of these countries is apparently quite firmly in the hands of the politicians.” Action could only be taken within the framework of Olympic institutions and Brundage felt the need to mobilize these to the cause of limiting political influence in sport. He wrote to Chancellor Mayer: “We must take some action and the quicker the better.”38 This action began with a special meeting of the executive board of the IOC and representatives of the IFs, called to address issues of “sport and politics,” The meeting agreed to a lengthy resolution on the issue, which included:

International sport one of the few field[s] where all participate on an equal footing cannot survive if it is used either as a tool or as a weapon for any political purposes. We hope therefore that all Governments will recognize our free and independent position, a benefit to all, a threat to none, and respect our neutrality in all fields … The I.O.C. and the I.F.’s are completely opposed to any interference in sport on political, racial or religious grounds, and particularly any which prevents the unhindered passage [of] competitors and officials between member countries.39

The question remained, however, what could the IOC and the IFs do to influence governments and prevent political interference in sport? It was not a straightforward question to answer, but Brundage believed in a particular strategic direction. “Only if we can induce the NOCs and the International Federations to stick together and work as a unit can we stop this sort of thing,” he argued, “otherwise independent International Sport is finished and the politicians will take over.”40 And it was in the cooperation of the major institutions in international sport – the IOC, the National Olympic Committees (NOCs), and the IFs – that Brundage would also find a way to address the challenge posed by GANEFO.

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The Olympic Movement’s Response to the Challenge of Emerging Nationalism in Sport: An Historical Reconsideration of GANEFO Section 3: Preparing for GANEFO

Two issues – the general concern with the intrusion of “politics” into the world of sport and the specific problems surrounding the suspension/withdrawal of the Indonesian Olympic Committee – continued to dominate international amateur sport throughout 1963 and 1964. As the dispute with Indonesia dragged on into its fourth month, Brundage lamented that “all that we have heard from Djakarta since the Asian Games have been statements denouncing the Olympic Games as imperialistic and defying the International Olympic Committee.”41 A rogue NOC might have been easier to stomach if it was not a reminder of the larger concerns with politics outlined above. The 61st Session of the International Olympic Committee gathered in Innsbruck, , in the days before the IX . As he opened the proceedings, Brundage regretted that “Certain sport meetings are forbidden, or are confined to members of politically friendly countries; other so-called sport events are politically inspired, politically organized, and politically conducted.”42

Chief among these “so-called sport events,” no doubt was the Indonesian government’s response to, in part, the suspension of its national Olympic committee: the Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFO). As will become clear, the reinstatement of the Indonesian Olympic Committee in time for the 1964 Tokyo Games and the IOC’s response to GANEFO were separate issues, but they were also at times certainly connected. And the willingness of the Indonesian government – led by President Sukarno – to organize and host Games of its own was also motivated by the response to its actions at the IV Asian Games in Djakarta. As Raja Bhalindra Singh of the Indian Olympic Association wrote to the IOC: “These Games originally were proposed to be held in defiance of the action taken by the International Olympic Committee to what happened in Djakarta during the last Asian Games.”43

3.1: Indonesia announces GANEFO

As early as January 1963, the IOC became aware of the Indonesian government’s interest in hosting their own international multi-sport event. Brundage wrote to IOC Chancellor Otto Mayer of “the developments in Djakarta, where they are apparently joining with the Red Chinese to promote the event for the so-called ‘Emerging Forces’.”44 Despite this it was not until 27-29 April, when a prepatory conference was held in Djakarta, that the nascent event began to take shape and the Games of the New Emerging Forces were born. In addition to the hosts, the countries that sent representatives to this meeting included Cambodia, China, , Iraq, , , North , the , and the U.S.S.R., with Ceylon and attending as observers.

This meeting formulated a plan for GANEFO, with a multi-sport competition to be followed by a conference intended to solidify the political unity of the new emerging forces. The meeting approved the rules and regulations of GANEFO, which included a programme of 20 sports (the vast majority of them ) and an art festival, with the “countries invited to take part in the First GANEFO in Djakarta are those accepting the Spirit of the Asian-African Conference in Bandung and the Olympic 9

The Olympic Movement’s Response to the Challenge of Emerging Nationalism in Sport: An Historical Reconsideration of GANEFO Ideals.” Finally, the representatives of the 12 countries in attendance approved the Games’ “fundamental principles.” They were to be:

“based on the spirit of the Asian-African Conference in Bandung and the Olympic Ideals and are aimed at: 1. encouraging the promotion of the independent development of sports and physical culture and of sports-movements in all countries of the New Emerging Forces 2. stimulating sport-competitions among the youth of the New Emerging Forces in order to foster and consolidate the friendly relations between the New Emerging Forces in particular and to promote friendship and world-peace in general ... [and] ... celebrated every four years in the nations of the New Emerging Forces in friendly and equal amateur sport competitions.”45

The commitment to Olympic ideals did little to placate Olympic leaders, who viewed the organizing role of the Indonesian government as indicative of political influence in sport. GANEFO was intended “more or less specifically for the emerging nations in Asia, Africa, and Latin America,” Brundage wrote to Rudyard Russell of the Association Internationale de Boxe Amateur (AIBA), and observed that “Indonesia has apparently been chosen to reorganize world sport, free from European and American imperialism.”46 Three weeks later, in a meeting with representatives from a broader cross-section of IFs, Brundage cited Western press accounts in criticizing Indonesia for “organizing Games on a rising tide of political and governmental inspiration. The Indonesian*s+ intend ‘to reorganize world sport in order to save it from American and European influence’.”47 GANEFO officials in Indonesia did not shy away from this position. Indonesian Foreign Minister, Dr. Subandrio, contended that “sport cannot be separated from politics, and Indonesia uses sports as a political tool to foster solidarity and understanding between nations.”48

The role of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), whose NOC had withdrawn from the IOC in the late- 1950s, was also problematic, both because the nation’s sport leaders were consequently not beholden to the rules of international sport and because the exclusion of athletes from the Republic of China (Taiwan/Formosa) in 1962 had been one of the precipitating events behind GANEFO. Oscar State of the Fédération Internationale d’Haltérophilie (IWF) was one of many sport leaders who observed the support that the PRC was extending to GANEFO – as Brundage had already done (above) – while using propaganda organs such as the magazine China Sport for “attacks on the I.O.C.”49

A dissenting opinion was voiced by A.D. Touny, an Egyptian who was an IOC member for the United Arab Republic (UAR). Touny was in Djakarta in April 1963, ostensibly on IOC business. While there, he “attended the formation of a new organisation.” Touny asserted that GANEFO was “not competing with any other world organisation either our C.I.O. or the International Sports Federations, yet it will undoubtedly create activities similar to those of the Olympic and Regional Games.” And he encouraged Brundage to view GANEFO as “of great importance and must not be ignored.”50 Touny was an interesting figure in the GANEFO drama. As an IOC member he offered to mediate a settlement between the IOC and the suspended Indonesian NOC, but at the same time he served as a board member for

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The Olympic Movement’s Response to the Challenge of Emerging Nationalism in Sport: An Historical Reconsideration of GANEFO GANEFO – the only Olympic official to work for both organizations at such a senior level. He justified this dual role, by suggesting that his involvement in GANEFO was an attempt “to keep those Games in a[n] Olympic spirit.”51 After GANEFO had occurred, Touny’s IOC colleagues were less than sympathetic about his role in GANEFO, and Brundage wrote to Soviet IOC member, Konstantin Andrianov, expressing both his displeasure with Touny’s involvement in GANEFO, but also summarizing his central concern with the new event:

It is quite apparent that GANEFO was politically inspired, politically organized, and politically directed, and for that reason has nothing to do with sport as we see it. This must be made plain to all members of the Olympic family. Many have expressed surprise that individuals connected with the Olympic Movement permitted themselves to participate in this enterprise.52

3.2: Philosophical objection: Political nature of the invitations to GANEFO

The IOC president was certainly not ignoring GANEFO, as Touny had cautioned against, but he saw not opportunity for the expansion of international sport to the countries of the newly decolonizing world, as Touny advocated, but focused instead, as his letter to Andrianov suggests, on the “obvious political character” of GANEFO.53 “All the statements from Djakarta,” Brundage wrote to Mayer, “reek with politics and indicate that our suspension was justified.”54 And this point was the basis of the IOC’s philosophical objection to GANEFO – the way in which the event was motivated by a particular political agenda and organized by state rather than sporting institutions. The avenues through which invitations to GANEFO were extended were an initial and tangible manifestation of this concern for the IOC.

In the communication with Russell of the AIBA, previously noted, Brundage expressed his concern that Indonesia was “inviting through political channels” athletes to GANEFO.55 While GANEFO was still in the planning stages, “the Indonesian Government has instructed its Ambassadors to get in touch with the National Olympic Committees, in order to find out whether they would be interested in the organization of a new set of Games in Djakarta.”56 After GANEFO was formally announced the Indonesian government extended invitations to GANEFO directly to state contacts in other nations, skirting the administration of international sport, which was maintained by the IOC and the IFs and from which the Indonesian Olympic Committee was suspended. In an effort to attract as many participants as possible, “All kinds of political and economic pressures have been exerted [by the Indonesian government] on on various National Olympic Committees and Federations, to induce their participation in these Games at Djakarta.”57 These economic pressures were perhaps greatest on and , and as Brundage would report to the IOC executive board following GANEFO, it was “business-men [from Japan] dealing with Indonesia [who] sent contestants.”58

Efforts by the IOC to assess who did participate in GANEFO will be discussed below, but the means by which invitations were extended meant that the IOC’s traditional contacts within the realm of international sport were able to reassure Brundage and the IOC executive board, much as the Pakistan Olympic Committee did, that “We have received no invitation even from the Organising Committee of

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The Olympic Movement’s Response to the Challenge of Emerging Nationalism in Sport: An Historical Reconsideration of GANEFO the Games of the Emerging Forces, nor has this matter been ever considered by the National Olympic Committee.”59 Moreover, in the case of the , even though “the Philippine Amateur Athletic Federation (PAAF) and the National Olympic Committee of the Philippines declined to participate in the GANEFO and had nothing to do with the sending of Filipino athletes to the GANEFO Games,” the nation was represented in Djakarta “on the initiative and responsibility of the Philippine Government.”60 But the widespread absence of NOC-sponsored international athletes did little to assuage the IOC’s and IFs’ concerns with and objections to GANEFO.

3.3: Procedural objection: Unsanctioned competition against athletes from non-member states

The late-1950s and early-1960s saw a proliferation of regional games, many of which sought official sanction from the IOC and the IFs. In 1963 and 1964, as Brundage and other IOC officials debated GANEFO, they also were confronted with issues surrounding the Central American Games, the Pan- American Games, the Mediterranean Games, and the nascent African Games. With the events from the IV Asian Games in Djakarta still unresolved, Brundage was moved to note of regional games (on more than one occasion) that “they have served their purpose” as “they only produce trouble for us.”61 Ensuring that these regional games, which were typically outside IOC control, proceeded in accordance with the rules and regulations of international sport was an ongoing concern. On the one hand, to receive official sanction, these games could not exclude participation of nations who were members in good standing of the IFs in whose sports competitions would be held, as had happened at the IV Asian Games in Djakarta and was threatening to occur at the Mediterranean Games in . On the other hand, to act in accordance with the rules of (and to obtain the sanction of) the international sport federations, athletes could not compete against athletes representing countries that were not IF members.

And it was this issue – competing against athletes from nations whose national sport federations were not members of the corresponding international sport body – that became the procedural basis for the IOC’s and IFs’ objections to GANEFO. As has been noted, the PRC supported the hosting of GANEFO by Indonesia. But the PRC was neither a member of the IOC nor of any IFs. It was the prospect of competing against athletes from the PRC (and ) that framed the IOC’s and IFs’ concern with GANEFO (and which presaged the ways in which participation in GANEFO would be policed and disciplined in 1964). What is important to note is that while the IFs became largely responsible for sanctioning athletes who participated in GANEFO, the IOC played an important role in encouraging them to do so by enforcing their rules and regulations regarding non-affiliated federations. As Brundage argued at an IOC meeting with the IFs five months before GANEFO:

Will the International Federations themselves take part in these Games? Are their national federations authorized to do so? The International Federations should take a decision on this. It is vital that world sport should be independent of politics. There are many International Federations which have a rule which states that a national federation cannot meet a federation which is not affiliated. The existence of the

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The Olympic Movement’s Response to the Challenge of Emerging Nationalism in Sport: An Historical Reconsideration of GANEFO International Federations is not justified without such a rule. It is therefore desirable that a rule of this kind should be adopted by all the International Federations.62

A pre-GANEFO test case of this stance came as the PRC invited certain Asian neighbours, including Indonesia, to send swimmers to a meet hosted in Beijing in 1963. The federations in both Indonesia and Burma notified the IF, FINA, of these invitations and their desire to participate. The All Indonesia Swimming Federation noted that the invitation was “based on a commitment, which has been made between the Indonesian Government and the Government of the People’s Republic of China, holding the exchange of sportsmen and other cultural delegations to promote the cultural relations between the two countries within the framework of the existing cultural agreement” and that the meet was being held with “the purpose of upholding the spirit and realization of international cooperation, brotherhood and friendship amongst nations, especially amongst Asian nations.”63 While noting a similar sentiment, the National Swimming Federation of Burma also observed “that the visit will benefit our swimming team greatly by providing them with first hand experience of training methods employed by other countries, of observing swimming styles used by other swimmers.” But the Burmese federation was anxious to know “whether FINA will have any objections to the proposed visit of our swimming team to one of our neighbouring countries NOT affiliated to FINA.”64

Japanese swimming official, K. Abe, honorary secretary of FINA, replied by noting that the swimming federation of the PRC had withdrawn from FINA in 1958. He counseled the Burmese federation that “an affiliated member country should have nothing whatever to do with an unaffiliated country. Violation would result in suspension.”65 Abe went on to tell the All Indonesia Swimming Federation that “International friendship is an important and nice thing to mention, only if it could be promoted with due respect of the rules that govern international sport.”66

If Abe’s responses to these inquiries upheld the official position of international sport, the subsequent reply from Indonesia reflected the rhetoric that accompanied the organizing and hosting of GANEFO. Despite FINA’s warnings, “as a national swimming federation,” the All Indonesia Swimming Federation had “to take the clear attitude of supporting consequently the policy of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia in the field of sport, striving for the ideal of building a new world and struggling in the side of the new emerging forces.” In the context of the PRC swim meet, “there was and is no other choice for our Federation but to send a delegation to China within the framework of the coming Games of the New Emerging Forces.” Finally, to both avoid sanction and assert its independence, “on behalf of the Committee of the All Indonesia Swimming Federation, P.R.S.I., we herewith state emphatically our RESIGNATION from the F.I.N.A.”67

3.4: Formulating an IOC position on GANEFO: Engaging the IFs, educating the NOCs

These debates surrounding the participation of Indonesia in the PRC swim meet foreshadowed the positions that would be taken by the hosts of and objectors to GANEFO. The Indonesians having followed the PRC lead in resigning from the IOC and FINA asserted that they could organize GANEFO however they wished and invite athletes from wherever and in whatever fashion they chose. This 13

The Olympic Movement’s Response to the Challenge of Emerging Nationalism in Sport: An Historical Reconsideration of GANEFO attitude frustrated sport leaders. On the IOC copies of the Indonesian and Burmese swimming federations’ inquiries to FINA, Brundage wrote to Mayer: “This is an open challenge! You will remember that I asked you not to re-admit them into IOC” (on the letter to Indonesia) and “smells communistic operation against us all” (on the letter to Burma ).68 Abe noted for Max Ritter, FINA president, upon the resignation from FINA of the All Indonesia Swimming Federation that he was “pleased to get rid of a naughty child.” 69 But what was perceived as Indonesian intransigence helped the IOC and IFs formulate the position they would take on GANEFO. FINA did not need to consider sanctioning the GANEFO meet, as Indonesia was no longer a member in good standing of the swimming federation and “GANEFO becomes entirely out of the question for FINA.”70

Long before GANEFO was on the horizon, Brundage had recognized that the IFs would play an important role in checking the influence of politics that he found so antithetical to the principles of international amateur sport. Even prior to the IV Asian Games, in early 1962, as the IOC debated the struggle of East German athletes to obtain travel visas to the West, Brundage acknowledged that the solution within international sport, in his mind, would have to involve the enforcement of the rules by the IFs: “If the Federations do not stand fast on matters of this kind, I mean both the visa and non-member problems, independently organized international sport is finished. The politicians will take over completely.”71 And in the wake of the problems at the IV Asian Games, he again reiterated that “the International Federations should take action. This once more emphasizes the necessity of all amateur sport organizations banding firmly together and acting in concert if we wish to avoid being destroyed by politicians.”72 Among the IFs, the IAAF had taken the lead in 1962, refusing to recognize the athletics competitions at the IV Asian Games without the participation of athletes from Israel and Taiwan, and organizers “had to leave out the words ‘Asian Games’ and replace them by ‘Djakarta Games’ after the interference of the IAAF,” which was, according to Mayer, “quite right.”73

While Brundage felt strongly that the IFs, by enforcing the rules for international sport, would check the participation of the world’s elite athletes at GANEFO, many of the members of the IOC were less clear about how they would proceed after receiving the Indonesian invitation to GANEFO (often via their national government). Brundage wrote to Mayer that he had received “inquiries from various countries about the invitations Indonesia is sending out for the Games they are trying to organize for later this year.”74 Jose Oriani, president of the Comite Olimpico Argentino, sent two letters, the first to Brundage, the second to Mayer, asking for more details regarding where the IOC stood on member nations sending athletes to GANEFO in response to the invitation from the Indonesian Government.75 These inquiries were even more germane to sport leaders in southern and southeastern Asia as they attempted to determine whether or not they could or should participate in GANEFO, which, without IOC guidance on the issue, remained an unknown quantity. Akin to the Burmese Swimming Federation’s letter to FINA requesting counsel on the PRC swim meet in 1963, the Ceylon Olympic and Association wrote to Mayer asking for a copy of the IOC Charter and other rules and statues: “This is very urgently required in connection with the Invitation sent by Indonesia for Ceylon to participate in the proposed Games of the New Emerging Forces.”76

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The Olympic Movement’s Response to the Challenge of Emerging Nationalism in Sport: An Historical Reconsideration of GANEFO Brundage strongly advocated that the “recourse against political interference is a strong combination of International Federations and National Olympic Committees.”77 And he adopted a strong stance against GANEFO, supported by the IOC executive board, which included among its members the Marquess of Exeter, David Burghley, who was also the head of the IAAF. Such ties between the IOC and one of the most influential IFs made it easier to frame the IOC’s objection to GANEFO on procedural grounds. So that NOCs who inquired as to the IOC’s position on the upcoming event in Djarkarta were warned, as Mayer explained to the Comite Olimpico Boliviano that “the national sports federations of your country might find that, in participating in those games, their athletes would no longer be eligible for participation in other international events.” The reason for this, he continued, was that “some countries will participate in Djakarta although their national federations are not affiliated to the corresponding International Federations which strictly rule that only affiliated bodies can compete [against] each other.”78 Although these were the regulations that the IOC and the IFs invoked to limit participation at GANEFO, their opposition, as Brundage and the IOC sought to articulate a position on Sokarno’s event and communicate this to IOC members, was grounded most firmly in the belief that “This politically inspired, politically organized, and politically directed enterprise is the antithesis of sport and should be avoided by all sportsmen.”79

3.5: Articulating and communicating an official position

While Brundage objected to the conditions under which GANEFO had been conceived and the ways in which it was being organized, the IOC sought to maintain its distance from events in Djakarta. As GANEFO neared and NOC inquiries increased, Brundage sent out a circular letter to all IOC members on 15 August 1963. It reinforced two key messages. First, it asserted that the IOC “has no information about these Games and no connection with them.” However, the IOC wanted its members to know that "If the Games in Djakarta are not sanctioned by the International Federations, participants will be liable to suspension, since most International Federations have rules that prohibit members from participating in unsanctioned events.”80 To reinforce this point, a second circular was distributed 10 days later. This letter was a transcript of an IAAF circular which noted that included among the countries reported in the press to be attending GANEFO were China and North Vietnam: “It must be clearly understood that competition against non-members would render ineligible for further international competition athletes from our member countries and, therefore, it is essential that before accepting any invitation to compete the latter should ensure that the meeting is confined to those countries who are members of the I.A.A.F.”81 These two themes – the IOC maintaining its distance from GANEFO while at the same time asserting that the IFs should monitor participation in the event – characterized the IOC’s stance on GANEFO. Even after the Games in Djakarta, Otto Mayer told a French journalist that the “IOC had no connection whatsoever with those political Games and it belongs to the International Federations to take their responsibilities, if any.”82

The IFs, led in particular by the IAAF (and the Marquess of Exeter and D.T.P. Pain) and FINA (Ritter and Abe), certainly believed they had a responsibility prior to GANEFO to warn their members of the dangers of competing in Djakarta. An IAAF circular in early August 1963 noted that: “It will be observed that the 15

The Olympic Movement’s Response to the Challenge of Emerging Nationalism in Sport: An Historical Reconsideration of GANEFO People’s Republic of China and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam are included, and as neither is in membership with the I.A.A.F., naturally no permit could be issued for athletic competition which included their athletes.”83 FINA circulated a similar warning to its member national federations. Abe had already learned that “Japan and the Philippines have received their invitations and I have strongly suggested the two countries not to participate.” Given that “the Indonesians are sending round the invitations to many Asian, African, Central-American and other countries beyond the iron curtain,” FINA would be “circulating among our affiliated countries shortly, warning them that evidently the non- affiliated Red China will be there and anybody who competed with non-affiliated swimmers would be suspended from the 1964 Tokyo Games and other international competitions.”84 Consequently, Abe reassured the IOC, “GANEFO is an urchin perfectly out of our blessing and I have already warned all affiliated countries not to take part.”85 It was FINA’s “hope,” as Abe expressed to Ritter that “our affiliated member countries will act properly on line with my circular warning.”86

IOC officials, although maintaining the organization’s official distance from GANEFO, were also prepared to offer cautionary warnings to member NOCs regarding the risks of sending athletes to GANEFO. Before the formal GANEFO organizing meeting at the end of April 1963, Brundage had informed those IOC members who had been contacted by Indonesia “to reply that they are not interested in dealing with governmental organizations, and that, in any event, they are quite satisfied with the program arranged by International Federations and the International Olympic Committee.”87 Mayer contended, even by the end of September 1963 (when such a position was considerably less tenable than it had been six months earlier) that “the I.O.C.’s position has not yet been officially defined.” Regardless, he advised the Bolivian National Olympic Committee to take “great care in the handling of such [an] invitation to go to Djakarta.”88

The Bolivian OC had been approached about an invitation to GANEFO that the government of had received to GANEFO, and the NOC was unsure of how this was affected by the suspended status of the Indonesian NOC. Their letter to Mayer indicates that the “warning” regarding GANEFO communicated through the IFs had not been entirely successful. It is also evidence that even though the IOC was moving to distance itself from involvement in GANEFO its member federations were looking to the IOC for guidance. In the two months immediately prior to GANEFO, the IOC leadership, primarily Brundage and Mayer took a much more active role in counselling member NOCs against sending athletes to Djakarta. It was Mayer’s position that “If some NOC’s are taking part in those political Games, we can be entitled also to stop them or to exclude them from the Olympic Games.” He encouraged Brundage to take a firm and public stance against GANEFO at the 60th Session of the IOC, which met in October 1963 in , suggesting to the president “a first warning should be given by you to the delegates in Baden-Baden.”89

The Baden-Baden Session passed a resolution detailing the terms under which the Indonesian Olympic Committee could be reinstated in time for that nation to participate in the 1964 Tokyo Summer Olympics. Meanwhile, behind the scenes, the IOC President was offering private warning to IOC officials, if their countries were associated with GANEFO in Western press accounts. Brundage wrote to Jorge 16

The Olympic Movement’s Response to the Challenge of Emerging Nationalism in Sport: An Historical Reconsideration of GANEFO Vargas of the Philippines that “I must say I was surprised and shocked by your attitude towards this political enterprise, if it is that your views have been correctly expressed by the newspapers.”90 Similarly, he observed that “In most of the publicity concerning these games, Pakistan has been included in the rather limited list of countries which approve and intend to participate.” He noted for IOC member Syed Wajid Ali that “This is a very dangerous position … I hope this defiance *on the part of Indonesia] will not lead to a serious break, but if it does, I trust we will find Pakistan on the right side of the fence.”91

Following such advocacy, Brundage was able to tell Mayer that “It looks as though we are winning that battle.”92 But as GANEFO’s opening ceremonies approached, the IOC President was equally adamant that “if any of our people participate they should be called to account in some fashion or other.”93 He was especially blunt with Japanese IOC members Ryotaro Azuna and Shingoro Takaishi, who were part of the organizing committee for the Tokyo Games. Brundage had read in the French sporting newspaper, L’Equipe, that “Japan is sending a team of 56 athletes and 100 officials in a dozen sports to Djakarta.” He quickly dispatched a letter to his Japanese colleagues, its threatening tone implicit: “What will this participation in a purely political inspired event do to your eligibility for the Games of the XVIII Olympiad in Tokyo next year?”94

The Japanese response was one of a number of letters that Brundage, based in the U.S., and Mayer at the IOC’s headquarters in Lausanne received in advance of GANEFO from NOCs eager to assure the IOC leadership that their organization had not arranged for athletes to compete in Indonesia. Just who did compete is discussed below, but the Japanese explanation of the L’Equipe story was that it was “business-men dealing with Indonesia *who+ sent contestants” to GANEFO.95 Other assurances were received from the NOCs in India (“The Indian Olympic Association does not intend to accept the invitation … we feel that the I.O.C. does not look with approval on these Games.”) and Pakistan (“Pakistan Olympic Association is neither a founding member nor a participant of that Organisation and since we are part of the Olympic Organisation of the World, we are bound by the rules and directives of the I.O.C. and there is no question of our taking any action which may violate any of the rules or circulars of the I.O.C. in this regard.”)96

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The Olympic Movement’s Response to the Challenge of Emerging Nationalism in Sport: An Historical Reconsideration of GANEFO Section 4: Events in Djakarta

With the supportive attitude adopted by the IFs and the assurances that the IOC was receiving from some of the NOCs in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, “it seems that the Federations and National Olympic Committees are being very careful and enforcing the rules,” Brundage concluded. “It will be very interesting to observe who, if anyone, participates” at GANEFO, he wrote to Mayer.97 The IOC Chancellor, for his part, was of “the opinion that it [GANEFO] will be a fiasco and that those first Games will not have a long life.”98

“According to the Press” the delegates to the 61st IOC Session were told in January 1964, “the Games were on the whole badly organized.”99 Regardless, athletes gathered in Djakarta’s Bung Karno Stadium, where a crowd of approximately 100,000 greeted them at the Opening Ceremonies on 10 November 1963. In celebrating “an occasion to confront imperialism and ... in the form of ‘exploitation de l’homme par l’homme’ in all aspects including Sports,” GANEFO’s organizers made public a summary of the final results from what they hoped would be the first of many Games of the New Emerging Forces. Athletes from 48 countries were awarded a total of 513 medals (including 166 gold medals). The People’s Republic of China (148 medals, 66 gold) led the medals table, followed by Indonesia (73, 19) and the USSR (59.5, 30). While not “official” national teams, the 48 countries in attendance participated in 20 sports. Athletics were the most popular events, with athletes from 23 countries entered in the events. The next most popular sports were cycling (16 nations), table (15), tennis (14), (13), and swimming/ (13). The hosts entered competitors in all 20 sports, while the People’s Republic of China and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea participated in 13 sports. At the other end of the spectrum, 17 “nations” competed in only one or two sports. Finally of the 48 attendees, two ( and ) were considered “observers” and two others ( and Bolivia) arrived too late to compete, which may have been, as we will see, by design.100

GANEFO was a topic of conversation at the 61st IOC Session in Innsbruck, Austria, in January 1964, the IOC gathering most proximate to events in Djakarta. At that meeting, it was reported that GANEFO “was largely a festival comprising not only sports but also music and folk dancing. It was decided to organize it every four years.” Moreover, the IOC delegates learned that GANEFO’s “charter and rules held nothing against the I.O.C. and the International Federations. On the contrary it was laid down that these games should be carried out according to the Olympic ideals.”101 Such a report begs the question: if it adhered to Olympic rules, what was the concern over GANEFO, beyond the absence of IF sanction? As it was the IOC leadership expressed a considerable amount of concern over Sukarno’s and Indonesia’s newest addition to the sporting calendar. In anticipation of events in Djakarta, Brundage opined that the “GANEFO Games might split the world of international sport asunder.”102 Two months later, on the day before GANEFO’s opening ceremonies, he wrote to Mayer asserting that GANEFO “is unquestionably the first move in a campaign to take over international sport in one way or the other.”103

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The Olympic Movement’s Response to the Challenge of Emerging Nationalism in Sport: An Historical Reconsideration of GANEFO These concerns gathered steam after GANEFO, as the IOC and IFs endeavoured to determine just how far-reaching GANEFO’s impact had been (efforts that are examined below). The Marquess of Exeter was especially adamant about the threat posed by political influence in sport, in general, and GANEFO, in particular. “Let it be quite clear to the amateur sportsmen of the world that if this endeavour by politicians to use sport not for itself but for political ends were to be successful,” he wrote in a statement on behalf of the IAAF that was shared with IF members, “it would be the end of one of the greatest contributions to the future of mankind which has ever been made throughout the history of the world.”104

GANEFO was symbolic of the intermingling of politics and sport that so concerned international sport leaders. There were also concerns – especially as so many newly decolonized countries were entering international sport as independent nations – that GANEFO would serve as a troubling model for governmental interference in sport. In 1964 the IOC was debating the merits of giving sanction to the fist African Games in , an event about which Brundage had considerable concern over governmental involvement in the planning and administration of these Games. Mayer felt of these nascent Games:

that they are entirely Governmental and political. It is impossible to give our patronage to such Games… BUT, we must pay attention: If we ignore them, they might go on the side of the GANEFO. There is a certain danger and we should better keep them on our side. 105

Even by the end of 1964, with the Indonesian NOC reinstated in time for the Tokyo Olympics (discussed below) and a considerable amount of air taken out of GANEFO’s sails, the implied threat of the event and the spectre of political interference in sport remained an issue for Brundage. The IOC president wrote to Rudyard Russell of the AIBA worried that the IOC was “not through with GANEFO yet,” and the leaders of international sport – the IOC, NOCs, and IFs – were “in for trouble, I fear, unless we work very closely together.”106

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The Olympic Movement’s Response to the Challenge of Emerging Nationalism in Sport: An Historical Reconsideration of GANEFO Section 5: The response to GANEFO

It is clear that the IOC and some influential IFs perceived GANEFO – or at the very least efforts to organize alternate multi-nation, multi-sport events outside the aegis of the IFs – as a significant challenge to the international sport order. Moreover, the Games of the New Emerging Forces demanded a response from the IOC and IFs. As Brundage wrote to Australian IOC member, Hugh Weir, the Games in Djakarta “were designed as a challenge to the Olympic Movement and they cannot be ignored.”107 His message to Konstantin Andrianov, IOC member from the Soviet Union, was similar: “The International Olympic Committee cannot very well ignore the public attacks on it and the Olympic Movement from Government officials and the Indonesian Olympic Committee itself.”108

5.1: IF efforts to assess GANEFO

The IAAF leadership, likely the president, the Marquess of Exeter, wrote to Brundage that, “in the case of the IAAF certain countries have deliberately flouted its rules, and I do not doubt that there are other International Federations in the same position.” Exeter noted that, “We do not know what the problem actually is in detail – how many governing bodies, how many athletes under their control, took part. At present we only have two or three Press reports, none of which agrees or gives the details which we must have.” So it fell to the IAAF leadership to determine who had competed at GANEFO:

When the information is to hand (and we have already asked our Federation for it), we will decide what action to take. There appear to be five categories affected:- (a) Federations which took part officially. (b) Federations whose officials took part unofficially in these Games. (c) Athletes who went to the Games without the permission of their National Federations. (d) Athletes who went with their National Federations’ permission. (e) Athletes who do not belong to Federations. I think it will prove to be that there were very few Federations indeed who took part officially.109

On the same day as this communication with Brundage, the IAAF began the process of determining which sportspeople competed in the athletics competitions in Djakarta and whether or not they did so with the sanction and/or knowledge of their national athletics federation. The IAAF prepared two letters. The first was “sent to the governing bodies of athletics in the countries which have been quoted in the press as having sent governmental teams to these games.” This lengthy list of federations included those in , , , Cambodia, Ceylon [], , , , Guinea, Iraq, , , Mali, , North Korea, North Vietnam, Pakistan, Philippines, , , , the United Arab Republic, Yugoslavia. Indonesia, having withdrawn from the IAAF was not a recipient of this letter, nor were athletics officials in China, , Saudi

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The Olympic Movement’s Response to the Challenge of Emerging Nationalism in Sport: An Historical Reconsideration of GANEFO Arabia, or , whose federations were not IAAF members. But the athletics officials of the countries that did receive this letter were asked to respond:

Press reports state that athletes from your country have been invited to participate in this meeting, which as you know has not received the sanction of the International Amateur Athletic Federation, nor indeed was such sanction sought. We shall be obliged if you will state in writing: 1.) That you have not given permission for any of your athletes to compete in these unlicensed games, 2.) Whether any athletes from your [country], outside your control, have competed.

A second letter was sent to the athletics federations in “countries where we know that its athletes went to Djakarta [and] their participation was not sanctioned by their national governing body.” These countries included Burma, , , , , , Japan, Netherlands, the USSR, , and . Although worded in slightly gentler fashion, the urgency of the IAAF’s inquiry was no less clear:

It has been brought to our notice that certain of your athletes were thinking of competing in these Games. We cannot imagine that this is correct but we shall be obliged if you will confirm in writing to us that you have not given permission for any of your athletes to compete in these unlicensed Games and advise us whether any athletes from your country, outside your control, have competed.110

At the conclusion of this process, the IAAF compiled the responses that they received into as complete a list of all competitors in the athletics competitions at GANEFO as best it could ascertain, a list that was subsequently shared with both the IOC and the Tokyo organizing committee.111 But the IAAF was not the only IF to undertake such investigations (as a precursor to the imposition of sanctions on those athletes who competed at GANEFO, discussed below). FINA uncovered that “9 affiliated nations competed in the GANEFO Games” against “4 nations that had not sanctioned participation,” which became the basis for subsequent discipline.112 And, the general secretary of FIFA wrote to Mayer, outlining the approach that the world governing body for football had taken towards the GANEFO soccer tournament:

Immediately *after+ the ‘results’ of the tournament were announced in the Press a questionnaire was sent to those National Associations affiliated to F.I.F.A. whose names appeared in the list of participants. The enquiry is proceeding but the results received to date show that the football teams which participated were, with a few exceptions, not the official representative teams of the National Associations but were ‘military’ or ‘government’ teams, delegated by their government. The teams were composed of players who were not affiliated to the National Associations in question.113

5.2: IOC investigations into the athletes who competed at GANEFO and the nations they represented

Criticism of the calibre of competition at GANEFO was one of the rhetorical devices used among Western sport officials to dismiss the event’s importance. Nevertheless, the IOC had steadfastly asserted that it was the role of the IFs (and not the IOC) to sanction competition at GANEFO prior to the Games and determine if any athletes – regardless of whether they officially represented national sport 21

The Olympic Movement’s Response to the Challenge of Emerging Nationalism in Sport: An Historical Reconsideration of GANEFO federations or NOCs – had violated the rules of international sport by competing against athletes from unaffiliated countries. While larger IFs such as the IAAF, FINA, and FIFA took the lead in assessing GANEFO’s impact, other IFs acted upon the presumption that it would be the IOC that addressed the threat posed by GANEFO. Furthermore, some of them sought guidance from the IOC on how best to deal with GANEFO athletes. The AIBA wrote to Mayer requesting “any details regarding the Boxing competition that took place” at GANEFO. “A.I.B.A. has received a few details, but these are insufficient to enable us to get a clear picture of the competition as a whole, and I am wondering if you are in possession of any boxing programmes giving names of boxers and countries participating, or any other information which you may think would be useful to us.”114 The IOC, much like the IAAF, gathered information on who competed in GANEFO, and used these details to advise IFs. At the end of February 1964, Mayer sent the Fédération Internationale de (FIV) the names of the men and women on the North Korean volleyball teams who had competed at GANEFO, in anticipation of the necessity for sanctioning these athletes prior to the upcoming FIV championship in .115

Although Brundage, Mayer, and other IOC officials maintained an official policy that it was IF rules that were violated in Djakarta and that GANEFO was of no immediate concern to the IOC, the IOC took an active role in the investigation of just who did compete. Upon the conclusion of GANEFO, Brundage noted that “it would be well to write a circular letter to the recognized Olympic Committees [whose countries press accounts had indicated were represented in Djakarta] and to our members in those countries, asking them as a matter of information to tell us who participated from their country and in what events.”116 (It is worth noting that he had already received “reports that have been sent in from half a dozen countries without solicitation,” see section 3.5 above.) Such a letter, Brundage told the IOC executive board, would request “the facts – who participated and in what events.”117 The subsequent communication, Circular Letter #252 sent to the NOCs on 15 December 1963, stated:

We have heard that athletes of some National Olympic Committees recognized by the I.O.C. have taken part at the GANEFO Games at Djakarta last month. Some International Federations had forbidden their affiliated bodies to take part for the reason that some non-affiliated federations took part. For our information, we beg to ask you who in your country has taken part in the GANEFO Games and in which events. Did you send some competitors? As we are in possession of the list of the participating countries we wish you to be so kind and to reply to our request by a next mail.118

According to Brundage, the IOC was, in sending out such a letter, “assembling this information with the intention to circulate it to all those who are interested and that possibly a general meeting will be arranged after the Innsbruck Session.”119 And, at the IOC Session in Innsbruck, the assembled IOC members learned that “Some National Olympic Committees were sounded on the matter [GANEFO], but few actually took part and then mostly in non-Olympic events. Mexico sent singers and dancers. The Philippines sent soldiers and other countries sent students. Communist China sent a large contingent.”120 The motivation for gathering information on GANEFO was not to learn about Mexican dancers and Filipino soldiers, but as Mayer told H.R. Banks of the AIBA, “It may be that the I.O.C. will have to take a stand in the near future.”121 Such a stand went a step beyond the enforcement of IF rules, 22

The Olympic Movement’s Response to the Challenge of Emerging Nationalism in Sport: An Historical Reconsideration of GANEFO but acknowledged that GANEFO had implications for the 1964 Summer Olympics, as Brundage noted when he singled out North Korea and Cuba, whose “participation in Djakarta, may have endangered their participation in Tokyo.”122 A subsequent warning to the Cuban NOC stated: “‘We are somewhat concerned about the prominent role assumed by Cuba in GANEFO at Djakarta last year. Will you please explain to us your connection with this event.”123

5.3: Who competed, who didn’t

Although Circular Letter #252 went on to note that “only Olympic Committees of countries which did not take part do not need to reply,” the dispatch generated considerable correspondence between the IOC and its affiliated NOCs. By 18 January 1964, barely a month after the circular had been sent out, Mayer had received responses from 26 NOCs.124 Documentary evidence remains from a considerable number of the NOCs that assured Brundage and Mayer that either their nation had not sent athletes to GANEFO or that their NOC had not sanctioned any athletes who had competed in Djakarta:125

NOCs that replied in the negative to Circular Letter #252:

Afghanistan Netherlands Belgium Dominican Republic Bolivia Finland Pakistan Brazil France Philippines Bulgaria Great Britain Cameroun Syria Chile Cuba Italy USSR Czechoslovakia Morocco

Unravelling the details of just who had been involved in GANEFO and whether any IOC or IF rules had been violated was complicated by the circumstances of international sport within the countries of the developing world, where individuals often held both NOC and national sport federation positions and where national sport ministries played an important role in supporting international sport, calling into question the separation of “politics” and sport that the IOC insisted upon. These relationships were further challenged by GANEFO, when the Indonesian organizers extended invitations through governmental channels rather than through sport governing bodies. Even if a nation’s Olympic-calibre athletes had not travelled to GANEFO, invitations to participate were extended to a variety of people to participate in GANEFO in a variety of ways. As Zafar Ali of the Pakistan Olympic Association wrote to Mayer: “Pakistan Olympic Association has not sent any competitor to participate in GANEFO. I was specially invited to Djakarta at the Games, but I refused.”126 Furthermore, as noted, pressure to attend GANEFO came not only through political channels, but economic ones as well, as countries with a trade relationship with Indonesia often found business interests mobilizing sport competitors. To this was added other financial inducements. The Amateur Sports Federation & Olympic Committee of Hong Kong

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The Olympic Movement’s Response to the Challenge of Emerging Nationalism in Sport: An Historical Reconsideration of GANEFO reported that “organizers even offered to cover transportation and other expenses just to have Hong Kong enter for the Ganefo Games, but to no avail.”127

The responses to Circular Letter #252, however, often went beyond mere assurances of non- participation. Some NOCs sought to, as K.S. Duncan of the British Olympic Association noted, “find out whether any of our Competitors slipped through the net and competed” in Djakarta.128 As Brundage had requested, some NOCs endeavoured to determine who from their country, if not under the aegis of the NOC or a national sport federation, had competed at GANEFO. The IOC President reported to the executive board – in very similar language to the report that appeared in the minutes of the 61st IOC Session in January 1964: “According to a two page report from Japan, the Athletic Federation there refused to participate and business-men dealing with Indonesia sent contestants. In Bolivia the athletic authorities refused to participate and some college students went. The Mexicans sent some musicians and dancers but not athletes. In the Philippines the athletic authorities would not participate but the Government sent soldier athletes.”129 There were, however, considerably more reports of this nature gathered by the IOC:

GANEFO competitors identified by NOCs:

Afghanistan: “Only one Volleyball Team and two tennis players all were students in the name of college students have participated in the said games.”130

Belgium: two affiliates of the Royal League of Belgian Athletics attended but only as journalists.131

Bolivia: “a group of university students.”132

Brazil: Competitors were sent by CBDU, a Brazilian university athletics organization, and competed in and yachting.133

Bulgaria: L’Union de la Jeunesse Bulgare, an independent social group, sent three of its members to compete in diving, , and cycling.134

Chile: “The competitors who travelled to Djakarta belong to Universities over which this committee has no tuition.”135

Cuba: “We have understood that it were Cuban workers who participated in , , volleyball and tipical [sic] Cuban dancers group.”136

Czechoslovakia: four Czechoslovakian athletes participated in GANEFO – two tennis players and two archers – but that their participation was organized by Czech youth and workers groups.137

Dominican Republic: athletes who participated in GANEFO were university students – seven in athletics, one swimmer, one weightlifter, one observer, and one journalist.138

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The Olympic Movement’s Response to the Challenge of Emerging Nationalism in Sport: An Historical Reconsideration of GANEFO Finland: “the Finnish … sports organ, “Työväen Urheiluliito r.y.”, without asking permission from Suomen Urheiluliito (the Finnish Amateur Athletic Association) which latter Association is a member of the International Amateur Athletic Federation, did send six general athletes and one manager to the GANEFO games.”139

France: 15 male competitors and 1 female competitor from the Federation Sportive et Gymnique du Travail, in cycling and other sports; 5 male competitors from the L’Union Nationale des Etudiants de France, in , athletics, and other sports.140

Italy: “There were some young Italian athletes who participated in the volleyball tournament, but these athletes were not members of organizations associated with CONI *NOC of Italy+.”141

Morocco: government of Morocco sent athletes from the Royal Army.142

Netherlands: “The composition of a team to these games has been arranged by the ‘Nederlandse Culturele Sportbond’, an organization for the youth on a political basis with a strong socialistic background.” The Dutch contingent at GANEFO was comprised of swimmers and yachters.143

Pakistan: “I hear that the Indonesian Embassy in Karachi took some professional Wrestlers and some and Table Tennis players to Djakarta.”144

Philippines: As noted, the government sent athletes chosen from among the military. A two-page list, “Philippine Delegation to the GANEFO,” included athletes in basketball (12), boxing (5), cycling (5), badminton (4), tennis (4), track & field (19), table tennis (4), volleyball (10), and shooting (4). In total, 67 athletes, all male.145

Syria: A team of 16 athletes – who competed in athletics, boxing, swimming, weightlifting, and wrestling – was comprised of government employees.146

USSR: the Committee of the USSR Youth Organizations sent a delegation to Djakarta, “which comprised actors, musicians, writers, poets and athletes as well.” The latter took part in archery, wrestling, judo, volleyball, gymnastics, shooting, boxing and tennis.147

In compiling his NOC’s contribution to this roster, J. Ph.H.E. van Lier of the Netherlands Olympic Committee noted that the Nederlandse Culturele Sportbond, which sent swimmers to GANEFO, was “an organization strongly affiliated to a political party, is not and will not be connected with our Nethlerlands Olympic Committee.” This, for van Lier, was sufficient explanation. He was comforted by the fact that “the National Olympic Federations refused cooperation” because “The essential point for us is, that only unknown athletes answered ‘the call of the east’.”148 Such an attitude may have sufficed for European NOCs, but participation in GANEFO was a more complicated prospect for countries in the developing world, for Asian sportspeople wishing to participate in a mutli-sport event hosted in Asia and for state officials in the developing world who felt some affinity with Sukarno’s project. This context explains why Japanese Olympic officials and Tokyo organizing committee members took so seriously 25

The Olympic Movement’s Response to the Challenge of Emerging Nationalism in Sport: An Historical Reconsideration of GANEFO Brundage’s inquiry into a L’Equipe report (cited above) that Japan was sending a large contingent to GANEFO. Japanese IOC member, Ryotaro Azuna, considered GANEFO and Brundage’s concerns more than just “the call of the east” and he wrote at length to Brundage to clarify Japanese participation in Djakarta:

[The] article in L’Equipe is not correct and quite misleading so far as it contends that ‘Japan is sending a team to Djakarta.’ An invitation to GANEFO was sent through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japanese Government. However, the Japanese Olympic Committee decided not to accept the invitation and, therefore, did not send any team representing Japan. On the other hand, a number of Japanese nationals at home and abroad chiefly being persuaded or inspired by the commercial firms closely connected with the Indonesian business circle, participated in their individual capacities in several sports of GANEFO. This fact, I am afraid, has been misinterpreted and reported as ‘Japan’s participation.’149

This response was motivated in part by Brundage’s question to him about how Japan could participate in GANEFO and wish to host the Olympic Games a year later. The explanation from Azuna, however, also reveals the complex set of forces beyond the rules of international amateur sport –including both governmental and commercial influences – which confronted sport leaders in the developing world. If Sukarno had the GANEFO organizers skirt international sport protocols by inviting nations through government channels to participate in GANEFO, it was not always easy for the recipients of such invitations to resist the wishes of domestic actors. Brundage recognized the awkward and sometimes untenable position in which international sport leaders were being placed:

Sukarno is sending his political emissaries all over the world, offering inducements of various kinds for participation. They go to the Government people, who are anxious to please and promise cooperation. This makes it very difficult for the sport people to refuse, as they have done in several countries.150

In Syria, the “Government formed a team that participated in” GANEFO. The Comité Olimpique Syrien assured the IOC that “Neither the syrian [sic] Olympic Committee or any of the Syrian Federations concerned had any part in choosing, sending, directing or finnancing [sic] this team.” Rather, “the 16 Syrian athletes who competed in GANEFO and the persons who accompanied them are all Government employees, and were chosen by Government authorities. The minister of Education issued Decree number 1433 which considered them all sent on official Government Mission.”151 Similarly, from Brazil came news that the country’s GANEFO participants were organized by the “Confederação Brasileira de Desportos Universitários (Brazilian Universitary [sic] Sports Confederation) which is an entity organized totally separate from the other sport bodies.” The Comité Olimpico Brasileiro reassured the IOC that:

We could not avoid their participation as we have no power to do so because they are not subordinated to us and therefore no action could be taken. This Confederation, engaged in the supervision of sports among students, is directly connected with the National Sport Council of the Brazilian Federal Government’s Ministry of Education.152 26

The Olympic Movement’s Response to the Challenge of Emerging Nationalism in Sport: An Historical Reconsideration of GANEFO Perhaps the most creative solution came from the Comite Olimpico Boliviano, which resisted the GANEFO invitation because of the suspended status of the Indonesian NOC. The Bolivian government persisted, but a compromise was reached where ultimately the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Education “sent a simbolic [sic] group of university sportsmen with the meaning of an international courtesy, knowing that the Games were nearly over and that the group could not be able to take part.” So the Comite Olimpico Boliviano was able to reassure Mayer that “No bolivian [sic] took part at the GANEFO GAMES at Djakarta last month.”153

5.4: Debating sanctions

While gathering information on who competed at GANEFO, Mayer reassured Brundage that “all sports were represented there by independent people [who] have no contact with the I.F.’s.”154 Nevertheless, in the case of the above example, Brundage reminded the Comite Olimpico Boliviano that “many of the International Federations have advised their members that those who participated would be liable to suspension.”155 Having worked to communicate the possibility of sanctions and suspensions in the event that nationally recognized athletes competed in GANEFO against athletes from countries whose national sport organizations were not affiliated with the IFs, the IOC and the IFs were left to debate these sanctions in the aftermath of the GANEFO competitions.

While the IOC supported the idea of some form of punitive action against those people who had participated in GANEFO, Brundage and Mayer were adamant that this was not an IOC matter. At the conclusion of GANEFO, Mayer asserted, somewhat surprisingly – given the documentary evidence of the I.O.C.’s warnings to its membership – that “Up to now the I.O.C. has taken no position whatsoever towards the GANEFO.”156 Brundage too, in response to queries from the IFs regarding what action the IOC would take in regards to GANEFO, answered: “Probably nothing because its *sic+ not our business.”157 But there were members of the Olympic family who believed that GANEFO was IOC “business.” In addition to notifying Otto Mayer that they had not sanctioned any Cameroonian participation in GANEFO, the NOC in Yaounde also went on to reassure the Chancellor that they fully supported the idea of the IOC conducting an investigation into which countries had “violated the and the rules of the International Federations.”158 For the Comite Olympique Camerounais, at least, participation in GANEFO was an act inconsistent with membership in the Olympic family, even if the IOC never framed it in anti-Olympic Charter terms.

Although the IOC officials argued that imposing sanctions on GANEFO participants was not the role of the IOC, that does not mean that they were not following the actions taken by the IFs. Brundage wrote that, “since action by the International Federations will affect the Games of the XVIII Olympiad in Tokyo, we are interested.”159 The Marquess of Exeter, both a member of the IOC Executive Board and head of the IAAF, wrote to Brundage that he was “in complete agreement with you as to the GANEFO Games being utterly against our principles. It is quite clear that firm action must be taken if amateur sport as we understand it is to survive.” But “the problem,” he continued, “does not appear to be as much ours [meaning the IOC] as that of the International Federations.” The IOC, Exeter contended (and it was a

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The Olympic Movement’s Response to the Challenge of Emerging Nationalism in Sport: An Historical Reconsideration of GANEFO position that would have brooked no opposition from Brundage) could not impose sanctions over GANEFO because “The IOC does not recognize these Games and therefore has no status with them and their rules do not apply. The reason for action by the IOC could only be if a National Olympic Committee has supported them and thereby brought discredit to the Olympic ideal.”160

This is not to suggest that the IOC leadership did not support the idea of strong action being taken by the IFs. But, as Brundage noted, “Some of them at least are looking to us for leadership in matters of this kind.”161High profile federations, particularly the IAAF and FINA, who were involved in the discussions concerning sanctions, had no trouble taking the lead. Yet, as correspondence with the and archery federations makes clear, not all IFs were certain about what course of action to follow when it came to GANEFO. Even before GANEFO, Inger Frith of the International Archery Federation wondered whether the IOC suspension of the Indonesian NOC meant that the IFs should be suspending Indonesian NFs.162 It was left to Mayer to clarify that “International Federations are free and independent, they need not follow the I.O.C. and suspend their members.”163 After GANEFO, the International Fencing Federation was also unclear about whether the IFs were waiting to follow IOC policy rather than act on their own, but all Miguel de Capriles of the FIE had to go on was “newspaper reports that the Organizing Committee in Tokyo will refuse admission to the athletes who participated in the GANEFO Games in .”164 Again Mayer was left to remind an IF leader that “any action should be taken by the International Federation concerned. The I.O.C. would certainly welcome any such firm actions.”165

Brundage was even stronger in his encouragement. According to the IOC President, “if the Federations do nothing everyone will think they have condoned those who have broke the rules and this can and will lead only to chaos in International and Olympic sport.” The IFs were, according to Brundage, “waiting for the results of our inquiry.” Having received this, he asserted, “Most, if not all, the Federations will want to exclude from the Tokyo Games all those who have violated their regulations in participating at Djakarta.”166 As had been the case prior to GANEFO, the IAAF and FINA were the IOC’s strongest supporters when it came to keeping GANEFO in check. The IAAF took the position that GANEFO was “clearly aimed at breeching the authority of the IOC and the International Federations” and the event’s organizers “ignored the requirement to apply to the IAAF for a license to include athletics and non- member countries were invited to take part. This creates an intolerable position.”167 The resolution passed at the 1964 IOC session in Innsbruck (discussed below) was an attempt to encourage the IFs to act, but FINA president, Max Ritter, was “disgruntled about the pussy-footing in Innsbruck in dealing with the GANEFO Games” as the resolution “simply protested which does not mean anything to the offending parties.” He remained firm that “strong actions were indicated,” which required “tough and immediate action.”168

Such action, Brundage agreed, was necessary because “most if not all International Federations do object to their members participating with non-members, who share neither the expense, the restrictions nor the responsibilities of membership.”169 He made this argument to Soviet IOC member Konstantin Andrianov, whose country was in the minority of dissenting voices when it came to GANEFO sanctions. At an October 1964 meeting between the IOC executive board and representatives of the 28

The Olympic Movement’s Response to the Challenge of Emerging Nationalism in Sport: An Historical Reconsideration of GANEFO NOCs, Roman Kisseliov of the USSR noted that he “felt that the decision of the I.A.A.F. and the F.I.N.A. to suspend those athletes who participated in the GANEFO was unfair.” Kisseliov “mentioned art. 9 of the Olympic Charter, which gave the right to everyone to participate.” To this Brundage argued: “The Olympic Games were open to all, and it was not the intention of the I.O.C. to keep athletes out. However there must be order and that was the reason for rules which must be followed by anyone who intended to participate in the Olympic Games. The I.O.C. respected the autonomy of the I.F.s.”170

Andrianov, moreover, framed his opposition to GANEFO sanctions – “we consider it would be wrong if actions are taken by International Federations and I.O.C. with regard to national sports organizations who participated in the international competitions held in Indonesia” – within a broader framework than the enforcement of rules. Rather, the “USSR Olympic Committee believes that the international sports movement should not be confined only to now existing sports organizations.” Andrianov argued that allowing “the broadest interpretation possible of the international sports movement would contribute greatly to development and popularity of physical education and sports among the peoples of the world, which, I presume, is the main aim pursued by the world sports movement and .” Indeed, the USSR was prepared to argue – and it would be naive to assume that this was without a political motive – that “the more frequently sportsmen of member-countries meet those of non- members, the more rapidly sports will gain popularity among the young generation.”171

5.5: Meting out sanctions

Andrianov’s and Kisseliov’s positions, however, were clearly in the minority. When IOC delegates gathered for the 61st IOC Session in Innsbruck in the days before the 1964 Winter Olympics, they adopted a resolution clarifying the IOC’s position on GANEFO, which was subsequently distributed to the entire Olympic family, including IFs and NOCs, as Circular Letter #255:

The International Olympic Committee considered the position arising out of the Ganefo Games. As these were not under the patronage of the International Olympic Committee, active executive actions falls essentially within the province of the International Federations, except in so far as National Olympic Committees countenanced them. This point is being actively pursued. The International Olympic Committee however notes that the Ganefo Games were admittedly political in conception and aims, openly ignored International Federations and National Federations, and included invitations to non-member countries. The International Olympic Committee states that such aims and actions are completely opposed to Olympic Ideals and threaten the very foundations of amateur sport. Under these circumstances it welcomes firm actions by International Federations concerned.172

Many IFs, following the debates outlined above, decided to impose sanctions on the athletes who competed at GANEFO against athletes from nations with unaffiliated sport federations. Following the Innsbruck meeting, and despite the reservations that he felt (discussed above), Ritter communicated to the IOC that “F.I.N.A. wholeheartedly endorses the resolution of the International Olympic Committee and will take against offending member nations such independent action which may be warranted by 29

The Olympic Movement’s Response to the Challenge of Emerging Nationalism in Sport: An Historical Reconsideration of GANEFO the wilful disregard of its rules.”173 The Marquess of Exeter, in turn, noted the IAAF’s “careful enquiries into the case of the athletes who competed” in Djakarta. While “it is already clear that only a handful, if any, were either members of the National Federations or went with the latter’s approval” and in “almost all cases the National Athletic Federation was strongly opposed to the Games,” the IAAF was prepared to act upon the warnings that it had issued prior to GANEFO. Even if “the actual competitors were from outside the world of amateur sport and were sent by Governments and other political bodies,” these athletes, by virtue of their participation in GANEFO “make themselves ineligible to compete in the IAAF world-wide family.”174

With some IFs announcing their willingness to act, as the IOC had asked, it only remained for the various aggrieved federation to impose penalties. The IAAF was adamant that “member countries of the I.A.A.F. were at once informed before GANEFO that any athletes who completed in this unlicensed and therefore under I.A.A.F. rules, illegal games, would endanger their right to compete in the I.A.A.F. type of sport.”175 Having gathered details of the participants in the athletics competition, the IAAF announced that it would “inform each of its member countries that athletes who participated in the athletic section of the ‘Games of the New Emerging Forces’ (G.A.N.E.F.O.) were no longer eligible to take part in competitions under our rules.”176 The IOC was notified of the actions taken by the IAAF in “reference to your circular letter No. 255 dated 24th February” and was provided with “a list which sets out the countries and athletes concerned.”177

While the IAAF sanction appeared to be an indefinite suspension, other federations were somewhat more lenient. The IWF wrote to Mayer that “we decided to suspend for six months all the weightlifters who competed and thus disregarded our warning that GANEFO was an unauthorized competition. The suspension period is from the 1st January to the 30th June, during which they may not take part in any international competitions or tournaments.”178 FINA determined that its penalty: the “suspension is for 12 months from Nov. 1963, and involves 8 swimmers from Argentine, 1 from Bulgaria, 7 from Cambodia, 1 from , 4 from Holland, 12 from Japan, 1 from Mexico, 2 from Syria, 9 from U.A.R. and the waterpolo team from Algeria.”179 The decision to impose sanctions was by no means uncontested within each IF. The IAAF’s indefinite penalty would subsequently be reduced to 12 months, but only after considerable debate within the IAAF. And within FINA there was only “a scant majority” in favour of a 12-month penalty, with some executive members “of the opinion that the suspension should be for 3 months at most.”180 But Ritter and others held firm “for 12 months, as a shorter suspension was considered entirely inadequate under the circumstances.”181

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The Olympic Movement’s Response to the Challenge of Emerging Nationalism in Sport: An Historical Reconsideration of GANEFO Section 6: Aftermath of GANEFO

While the IOC sought to maintain a distinction between the IFs’ stance on GANEFO and the IOC’s distance from the event, the matter of sanctions required the IOC to take a more direct role. In large part this was because the event for which IF suspension was most important was the forthcoming in Tokyo. The IAAF, for example, while wanting to enforce its suspensions had no way of communicating these to the NOCs who were determining which athletes to send to Tokyo. So the IAAF had to ask the IOC “to inform the different national olympic [sic] committees that the athletic federation of their country has been advised … of the ineligibility of the competitors … consequent upon their participation in the Games of the New Emerging Forces (G.A.N.E.F.O.) which meeting was unsanctioned by the I.A.A.F.” Even while making this request, the IAAF was clear on the IOC’s official position on GANEFO: “Please understand that we are not in any way asking you to take any stand over the position of competitors in G.A:N.E.F.O. which, as you have rightly pointed out in your recent circular, is a matter for the various international federations and not for the I.O.C.”182 Nevertheless, once certain IFs had heeded the IOCs call to sanction athletes who had competed in GANEFO, two issues dominated the imposition of these sanctions through the rest of 1964: (i) the Indonesian Olympic Committee’s request for readmission to the IOC in time for the Tokyo Olympic Games; and (ii) efforts to enforce GANEFO-related suspensions against athletes who wished to participate in the Tokyo Olympic Games.

6.1: Reinstating the Indonesian Olympic Committee

As early as June 1963, less than four months after being suspended and five months prior to GANEFO, the way was clear for the reinstatement of the Indonesian NOC, “if this committee will express its regrets and if we receive assurances that the rules and Olympic principles will be respected in future.”183 This position was codified at the 60th IOC Session, in Baden-Baden, Germany, in October 1963, one month before the start of GANEFO – which reinforced the IOC’s position that the Indonesian Olympic Committee’s suspension and GANEFO were separate incidents that needed to be addressed separately. The text of the Baden-Baden resolution read:

Seeing that the Olympic Games in 1964 will be held for the first time in Asia, it is to be hoped that all National Olympic Committees in this part of the world will be able to take part. In order that the Olympic spirit may once again prevail, the Executive Board of the International Olympic Committee would be willing to reinstate the Indonesian Olympic Committee as soon as it declares that it is prepared to respect the Olympic Rules.184

It was not until 27 April 1964, six months after GANEFO, that the Indonesian Olympic Committee sent a letter to the IOC in Lausanne expressing its desire to be readmitted for the 1964 Games. But the Indonesians took issue with the conditions of its reinstatement: “as soon as it has declared its readiness to respect the Olympic Rules and Regulations.” As no other NOCs had to make a similar declaration, in the opinion of the Indonesian Olympic Committee, it refused to accept entry to participate in Tokyo, noting that “Indonesia is only to participate in the Olympic Games at Tokyo without conditions, the 31

The Olympic Movement’s Response to the Challenge of Emerging Nationalism in Sport: An Historical Reconsideration of GANEFO other countries alike.”185 Overall, Mayer interpreted this communication as “Indonesia refuses recognize olympic rules.”186 There was a sentiment within the IOC that the Indonesian Olympic Committee should be happy to accept any conditions of reinstatement, as “the suspension had had, practically speaking, no consequences to date, and if they gave effect to the [Baden-Baden] resolution they could participate in the Tokyo Games.”187 Indeed, even on 13 June 1964, Brundage cabled those IOC members attempting to mediate this dispute, “must be careful maintain dignity ioc. door is open but we are not begging anyone participate.”188

And yet, at the 26 June 1964 meeting of the IOC Executive Board, the Indonesian Olympic Committee was reinstated “without further qualifications.”189 Part of the reason for the decision to forego official assurances that Olympic rules and regulations would be respected may have had something to do with the lobbying that they IOC and IFs were receiving on this issue in advance of the 1964 Games. These entreaties were coming not only from Indonesia’s geo-political allies, but also from the Tokyo organizers. As the Marquess of Exeter wrote to Otto Mayer of efforts to lobby the IAAF: “The pressure under which we have been from the Russians, Czechs, Indonesians and particularly North Koreans, and now some Japanese has been enormous.”190

What remained unresolved, or to some unclear, was how this reinstatement affected those athletes who had been suspended for participating in GANEFO. Was the reinstatement of the Indonesian Olympic Committee in time for the 1964 Summer Olympic Games in Tokyo connected in any way to GANEFO? The IOC was certain that it was not. The Indonesian Olympic Committee was reinstated “because the Committee had desired to participate in the Olympic Movement on the same basis as all other countries. The subsequent difficulties with certain athletes were not the concern of the I.O.C.”191

6.2: Efficacy of GANEFO sanctions

The reinstatement of the Indonesian Olympic Committee did not conclude the issue of GANEFO within international sport circles. In fact, it may have only added to the confusion of how to confront events from Djakarta, November 1963. The important nuance was that reinstatement did not affect the suspensions of athletes who competed in GANEFO. And, as Brundage wrote to Mayer: “There will no doubt be further repercussions when the Indonesians find out that we haven’t lifted the suspensions made by the International Federations because of GANEFO.”192 Semantically, it is worth noting Brundage’s use of “we” in regard to suspensions that the IOC leadership had maintained were an IF issue. But of more immediate concern, the IOC president, while bracing from “further repercussions,” perhaps did not expect them to come from within international sport.

Mayer had attempted to prepare for this eventuality when he asked Brundage: “What do you suggest should be our answer if they [the IFs] inquire as to what they should do regarding the Indonesian Sports Federations and athletes which were suspended for having participated in GANEFO*?+.”193 Ritter of FINA was especially angry, calling the reinstatement of Indonesia a “turn about face of the I.O.C.” that he “cannot fathom.” If the IOC’s readmission of Indonesia was an indication that the Olympic Movement “has forgiven them for the GANEFO Games, then the F.I.N.A. suspension of participating swimmers from 32

The Olympic Movement’s Response to the Challenge of Emerging Nationalism in Sport: An Historical Reconsideration of GANEFO , Bulgaria, Cambodia, Dominica, Holland, Japan, Mexico, Syria, and U.A.R. would be unrealistic and should be cancelled.”194 Brundage was called upon to clarify the IOC position, which he did on more than one occasion:

Now that we have lifted the suspension of Indonesia we have received letters from some of the International Federations criticizing us for betraying them by taking this action without consulting them. I had to reply that the suspension of the Indonesian National Olympic Committee is one thing and that GANEFO is another. As you know, the IOC did not concern itself with GANEFO, which was a situation to be handled by the International Federations. Even now that we have lifted the suspension of the Indonesian National Olympic Committee their athletes are not eligible for participation in Tokyo until they have been reinstated by the International Federations. This applies also to the athletes of other countries who participated at Djakarta. Moreover, some Indonesian Federations resigned from their International Federation and must be reinstated before they can participate in Japan.195

The reinstatement of the Indonesian Olympic Committee did not only cause confusion among IF officials. In July 1964, one of the IOC members from Finland, Erik Frenckell, cabled the IOC in Lausanne, asking “is discrimination of ganefosportsmen canselled”? Otto Mayer responded promptly that “ concerns international federations only.” This was a further reminder that the sanctions against the Indonesian Olympic Committee in the wake of the IV Asian Games and the sanctions against GANEFO participants, which were administered by the IFs, remained formally separate although one event could be seen to have precipitated the second.196 Brundage too sought to draw a line between these two events: “We lifted the suspension of the NOC, but this certainly had nothing to do with the actions of the Federations, which were based on GANEFO and not the Asian Games.” 197 He expressed a similar sentiment to Ritter, noting that NOC suspension was “in connection with the IV Asian Games. What happened at GANEFO was something else.”198 This distinction, while important, was not always widely recognized. The FINA secretary noted for Mayer that “It is surprising and annoying that some people including our Vice President, Jan de Vries, thinks *sic+ that the I.O.C.’s lift of suspension automatically entitled Indonesia to swimming events at the Tokyo Games.”199

But one issue on which there was agreement between the IOC and the IF senior leaders was that the suspension of GANEFO athletes who competed against athletes from non-affiliated federations should be upheld. “Apparently,” Brundage wrote to Mayer, “both the IAAF and the FINA are going to maintain their position on GANEFO.”200 These two IFs had been the most supportive of reining in GANEFO’s impact, and Ritter of FINA, even after the Indonesian NOC was reinstated, was adamant that “it had to be shown once and for all that the FINA rules must be obeyed and cannot be trifled with, if FINA wished to retain the respect of the sport’s world.”201 Such a position had important consequences for the Tokyo Olympics, as the suspended athletes, including those from the reinstated Indonesia, could not compete in the 1964 Games. The IAAF sent two letters to Tokyo organizers, dated 2 October 1964, one each listing the athletes from Indonesia and North Korea that were ineligible, in the eyes of the IAAF, to compete at the Tokyo Games.202 To enforce this IF penalty, the IAAF requested IOC assistance, “In order

33

The Olympic Movement’s Response to the Challenge of Emerging Nationalism in Sport: An Historical Reconsideration of GANEFO to avoid serious incidents in Tokyo.” The Marquess of Exeter asked Mayer to remind in particular the Indonesian Olympic Committee that suspended athletes “cannot take part in the Olympic Games, even in the Parade.” Exeter was certain that Ritter and FINA shared this opinion.203

6.3: Conclusions

Throughout the entire GANEFO episode the IOC had endeavoured to project a steady disinterest in Sukarno’s project: GANEFO was not an issue that concerned the IOC. Mayer went so far as to tell H.R. Banks of the AIBA that “the I.O.C. did not recognize those political minded Games and even ignored them.”204 And six months after the event, when Mayer wanted to publish pictures from GANEFO in the IOC Bulletin, pictures he felt would undermine the event as a serious, competitive sporting event, Brundage overruled the Chancellor: “it gives them far more importance than they deserve. Anyway, we should not put ourselves in the position of fighting them (that is beneath our dignity). Our interest is only in having our own rules and regulations respected.”205

But if the IOC felt itself above addressing the challenge posed by GANEFO, IOC leaders actively counselled IFs to take whatever disciplinary action was called for by their rules. They were aware, for example, that “the I.F.'s of Boxing, Volley-Ball and Weightlifting had taken less severe sanctions than the I.A.A.F. and F.I.N.A., and this had enabled all their athletes to participate in the [Tokyo] Olympic Games.”206 Indeed, while it was never distributed, Brundage and Mayer had prepared a draft circular letter chastising the IFs. “Their diverse reactions before GANEFO,” they were to be told, “weakened the strength of the Olympic Movement.”207 This hardly suggests that the IOC was prepared to “ignore” GANEFO. And the head of the IAAF suggested that the IFs could not act alone against GANEFO:

I am by no means trying to ‘pass the buck’ to the IOC, but we do need every bit of help [in explaining and enforcing sanctions in Tokyo] that we can get, because our joint interest is at stake… Believe me we are heading for one of the biggest rows of all time on which the whole future of amateur sport depends, and if ever there was a time when the IOC and the International Federations should show a united front, this is it. I agree that the IOC is not directly concerned with GANEFO, but it is concerned with supporting its own rules.208

This united front had succeeded in both penalizing those athletes who had competed at GANEFO, in the face of stern warnings, and welcoming Indonesia back into the Olympic family in time for the Tokyo Games. But with Indonesia “back into the fold,” Brundage counselled that it was time “GANEFO should be dropped. If it is not and persists in proceeding without the approval of the International Federations, I can see only continuous trouble.”209 This trouble would come from the continued political influence in sport. And the IOC and IFs would have to work together to prevent any future trouble. Sport leaders through were well aware that suspending athletes was addressing a symptom of the problem they hoped to cure and not the root cause. “Games players as you have said,” H. Kaser of FIFA wrote to Mayer, “are only pawns of the chessboard!”210 Ritter of FINA felt that suspensions were, in a certain light, “illogical, as the main offending parties were not the competing athletes but the sport 34

The Olympic Movement’s Response to the Challenge of Emerging Nationalism in Sport: An Historical Reconsideration of GANEFO organizations to which they belong and these should have been suspended, as they permitted their athletes to compete.”211 The IAAF also pointed to “the sponsoring bodies, for they carry a heavy responsibility for making some of their country’s athletes ineligible for the Olympic Games.”212

A genuine solution to the problem of politics in sport would have to come from concerted, redoubled efforts. According to FIFA, “Only increased vigilance and strength of purpose by the sporting organisations (CIO and the International Federations) can prevent national sport organisations from becoming ineffectual.”213 The IAAF reminded its members that “Quite deliberate action was taken by the sponsors of GANEFO to use amateur sport, including athletics, as a political weapon. They also completely ignored the International and National Federations. This is an attack on the very foundation of sport.”214 The foundation that Brundage hoped to build after GANEFO, with all the other issues of “politics and sport” swirling about the IOC, would feature a unified response from the IOC, NOCs, and IFs. The IFs had been engaged in containing GANEFO, and at an October 1964 meeting between the IOC executive board and representatives of the NOCs, Brundage laid out a plan “to safeguard the Olympic Movement,” where all the key players “must strive to convince their governments not to interfere in sport.”215

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The Olympic Movement’s Response to the Challenge of Emerging Nationalism in Sport: An Historical Reconsideration of GANEFO

NOTES All the files and sous-dossiers cited below are archived in the collections of the Olympic Studies Centre, Lausanne. My sincere thanks to Nuria Puig, Regular Cardinaux, and all of the extraordinarily knowledgeable and helpful archivists at the Olympic Studies Centre.

1 Otto Mayer to Hugh Weir, 26 August 1963, CIO MBR-WEIR-CORR: Biography and correspondence of Hugh Weir, sous-dossier 2: Correspondence, 1946-1971. 2 Avery Brundage to Konstantin Andrianov, 31 August 1963, CIO MBR-ANDRI-CORR: Biography and correspondence of Constantin Andrianov, sous-dossier 3: Correspondence, 1961-64. 3 Avery Brundage to Syed Wajid Ali, 11 September 1963, File: D-RM01-PAKIS/002, sous-dossier 4: Correspondance, 1960-1969. 4 Avery Brundage to Anthony De Las Alas, 29 August 1963, File: D-RM01-PHILI/002, sous-dossier 2: Correspondance, 1960-1969. 5 David Burghley, Marquess of Exeter, to Otto Mayer, 18 September 1964, File: Athletisme, Correspondance, 1915- 1966, Sous-dossier Correspondance, 1959-1963. 6 Leena Laine, “The IOC, the Globalisation of Sport, and Gender in the Revolutionary 1960s: A Nordic Perspective.” Unpublished keynote address, “Sport in a Global World - Past, Present and Future,” joint World Congress of the International Society for the History of Physical Education and Sport (ISHPES) and the International Sociology of Sport Association (ISSA), Copenhagen, Denmark, July 2007, p. 12. 7 Eva T. Pauker, “GANEFO I: Sports and Politics in Djakarta.” Asian Survey, 5 (4), 1965, p. 185. (Previously published under the same title in July 1964 as a report by the RAND Corporation.) 8 Swapno Sie, “Sports and Politics: The Case of the Asian Games and the Ganefo” in Benjamin Lowe, David B. Kanin, and Andrew Strenk. (Eds.). Sport and International Relations. (Champaign, IL: Stipes Publishing Co, 1978), p. 293. 9 Rusli Lutan and Fan Hong, “The politicization of sport: GANEFO—A case study.” Sport in Society, 8 (3), 2005, p. 437. 10 Jean Gelman Taylor, Indonesia: People and histories (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003). 11 Colin Brown, A short history of Indonesia: The unlikely nation? ( Crow’s Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2003). 12 Cesar R. Torres and Mark Dyreson, “The Cold War Games” in Kevin Young and Kevin B. Walmsley. (Eds.), Global Olympics: Historical and Sociological Studies of the Modern Games (Amsterdam and New York: Elsevier, 2005), p. 73. 13 Otto Schantz, “The presidency of Avery Brundage (1952-1972)” in The International Olympic Committee – One Hundred Year: The Idea, The Presidents, The Achievements, volume II (Lausanne: International Olympic Committee, 1997), p. 130. 14 Alfred Erich Senn, Power, Politics, and the Olympic Games (Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics, 1999), pp. 130-1. 15 Bruce Kidd, “Recapturing Alternative Olympic Histories” in Kevin Young and Kevin B. Walmsley. (Eds.), Global Olympics: Historical and Sociological Studies of the Modern Games, (Amsterdam and New York: Elsevier, 2005), p. 153). 16 Boria Majumdar and Nalin Mehta, Olympics: The India Story (New Delhi: HarperCollins, 2008), p. 176. 17 Jim Riordan, “Rewriting Soviet Sports History,” Journal of Sport History, 20 (3), 1993, pp. 247-58. 18 Allen Guttmann, The Olympics: A History of the Modern Olympic Games (Urbana and : University of Illinois Press), p. 109. 19 Senn, p. 132. 20 For more on the IV Asian Games, see: Swanpo Sie, “Sports and Politics: The Case of the Asian Games and the Ganefo” in Benjamin Lowe, David B. Kanin, and Andrew Strenk. (Eds.). Sport and International Relations. (Champaign, IL: Stipes Publishing Co., 1978). 21 Avery Brundage to Otto Mayer, 12 September 1962, CIO-PT-BRUND-CORR/7062, Sous-dossier 3: Correspondence, septembre-novembre 1962. 36

The Olympic Movement’s Response to the Challenge of Emerging Nationalism in Sport: An Historical Reconsideration of GANEFO

22 Avery Brundage to Otto Mayer, 24 September 1962, CIO-PT-BRUND-CORR/7062, Sous-dossier 3: Correspondence, septembre-novembre 1962. 23 Minutes of the Executive Board of the IOC, Lausanne, 9 February 1963. 24 Otto Mayer to Komite Olympiade Indonesia, 13 February 1963, File: D-RM01-INDON/006 – Recognition requests of the NOC of Indonesia (INA): correspondence and recognition, Sous-dossier 1: Correspondence, 1963. 25 Avery Brundage to A.D. Touny, 28 March 1963, File: D-RM01-INDON/006 – Recognition requests of the NOC of Indonesia (INA): correspondence and recognition, Sous-dossier 1: Correspondence, 1963; [Avery Brundage to Konstantin Andrianov, 16 May 1963, CIO MBR-ANDRI-CORR: Biography and correspondence of Constantin Andrianov, sous-dossier 3: Correspondence, 1961-64. 26 Telegram to IOC, 15 February 1963, File: D-RM01-INDON/006 – Recognition requests of the NOC of Indonesia (INA): correspondence and recognition, Sous-dossier 1: Correspondence, 1963. 27 A.D. Touny to Avery Brundage, 16 May 1963, File: D-RM01-INDON/006 – Recognition requests of the NOC of Indonesia (INA): correspondence and recognition, Sous-dossier 1: Correspondence, 1963. 28 Telegram, Komite Olympiade Indonesia to CIO Lausanne, 15 February 1963, File: D-RM01-INDON/006 – Recognition requests of the NOC of Indonesia (INA): correspondence and recognition, Sous-dossier 1: Correspondence, 1963. 29 Avery Brundage to Otto Mayer, 22 May 1963, CIO-PT-BRUND-CORR/7063, Sous-dossier 2: Correspondence, mai- août 1963. 30 Telegram, A.D. Touny to Otto Mayer, 7 March 1963, File: D-RM01-INDON/006 – Recognition requests of the NOC of Indonesia (INA): correspondence and recognition, Sous-dossier 1: Correspondence, 1963; Avery Brundage to Konstantin Andrianov, 16 May 1963, CIO MBR-ANDRI-CORR: Biography and correspondence of Constantin Andrianov, sous-dossier 3: Correspondence, 1961-64. 31 Otto Mayer to Avery Brundage, 22 May 1964, File: D-RM01-INDON/006 – Recognition requests of the NOC of Indonesia (INA): correspondence and recognition, Sous-dossier 2: Correspondence, 1964. 32 Avery Brundage to Otto Mayer, 22 December 1962, CIO-PT-BRUND-CORR/7062, Sous-dossier 3: Correspondence, septembre-decembre 1962. 33 “Speech by President Avery Brundage at the Opening Ceremonies of the 61st Session of the International Olympic Committee, Innsbruck, January 26th, 1964,” File: Jeux du GANEFO, Correspondence, 1964. 34 Statement by the Marquess of Exeter, 14 September 1964, File: Athletisme, Correspondance, 1915-1966, Sous- dossier Correspondance, 1959-1963. 35 IOC Circular Letter #279, 10 March 1965, File: B-1003-FI/021: Reunion de la CE avec les FI à Lausanne le 12 avril 1965, Sous-dossier 4: Correspondance, 1965. 36 Avery Brundage to Otto Mayer, 13 January 1964, CIO-PT-BRUND-CORR/7064, Sous-dossier 1: Correspondence, janvier-avril 1964. 37 Avery Brundage to Otto Mayer, 22 May 1963, CIO-PT-BRUND-CORR/7063, Sous-dossier 2: Correspondence, mai- août 1963. 38 Avery Brundage to Otto Mayer, 1 October 1962, CIO-PT-BRUND-CORR/7062, Sous-dossier 3: Correspondence, septembre-novembre 1962. 39 B-1003-FI/019: Reunion de la CE avec les FI à Lausanne le 8 fevrier 1963, Sous-dossier 2: Procès verbal. 40 Avery Brundage to Otto Mayer, 5 November 1962, CIO-PT-BRUND-CORR/7062, Sous-dossier 3: Correspondence, septembre-novembre 1962. 41 Avery Brundage to A.D. Touny, 25 May 1963, File: D-RM01-INDON/006 – Recognition requests of the NOC of Indonesia (INA): correspondence and recognition, Sous-dossier 1: Correspondence, 1963. 42 Avery Brundage, speech at the opening ceremonies of the 61st Session of the International Olympic Committee, 26 January 1964, File: Jeux du GANEFO, Correspondence, 1964. 43 Raja Bhalindra Singh, Indian Olympic Association, to Otto Mayer, 17 August 1963, File: D-RM01-INDE/004, sous- dossier 1: Correspondance, 1960-1965. 44 Avery Brundage to Otto Mayer, 5 January 1963, CIO-PT-BRUND-CORR/7063, Sous-dossier 1: Correspondence, janvier-avril 1963.

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The Olympic Movement’s Response to the Challenge of Emerging Nationalism in Sport: An Historical Reconsideration of GANEFO

45 “Rules and Regulations of the 1st GANEFO,” 29 April 1963, File: Jeux du GANEFO, Correspondence, 1963. 46 Avery Brundage to Rudyard Russell, 15 May 1963, File: B-1003-FI/020: Reunion de la CE avec les FI à Lausanne le 6 juin 1963, Sous-dossier 4: Correspondance, 1963. 47 B-1003-FI/020: Reunion de la CE avec les FI à Lausanne le 6 juin 1963, Sous-dossier 2: Procès verbal. 48 Cited in IOC Circular Letter #279, 10 March 1965, File: B-1003-FI/021: Reunion de la CE avec les FI à Lausanne le 12 avril 1965, Sous-dossier 4: Correspondance, 1965. 49 Oscar State to Otto Mayer, 23 April 1963, File: Correspondance de la Fédération Internationale d’Haltérophilie (IWF), Sous-dossier 3 : Correspondance, 1962-1963. It is worth noting the significant role played by the People’s Republic of China in helping to organize, promote, and fund GANEFO (to the extent of offering to pay the travel expenses of many of the nations that attended the Games), but recounting that history is beyond the scope of this paper. 50 A.D. Touny to Avery Brundage, 16 May 1963, File: D-RM01-INDON/006 – Recognition requests of the NOC of Indonesia (INA): correspondence and recognition, Sous-dossier 1: Correspondence, 1963. 51 Minutes of the Executive Board of the IOC, Lausanne, 26-27 June 1964. 52 Avery Brundage to Konstantin Andrianov, 3 January 1964, File: Jeux du GANEFO, Correspondence, 1964. 53 Minutes of the Executive Board of the IOC, Lausanne, 5 June 1963. 54 Avery Brundage to Otto Mayer, 26 February 1963, CIO-PT-BRUND-CORR/7063, Sous-dossier 1: Correspondence, janvier-avril 1963. 55 Avery Brundage to Rudyard Russell, 15 May 1963, File: B-1003-FI/020: Reunion de la CE avec les FI à Lausanne le 6 juin 1963, Sous-dossier 4: Correspondance, 1963. 56 Avery Brundage to Otto Mayer, 6 April 1963, CIO-PT-BRUND-CORR/7063, Sous-dossier 1: Correspondence, janvier-avril 1963. 57 IOC Circular Letter #243 from Avery Brundage, 23 September 1963. 58 Avery Brundage to IOC Executive Board, 30 November 1963, CIO-PT-BRUND-CORR/7063, Sous-dossier 3: Correspondence, septembre-decembre 1963. 59 Nasim Hasan, Working Vice President, POA, to Syed Wajid Ali, 21 September 1963, CIO MBR-ALI-CORR: Biography and correspondence of Wajid Ali, sous-dossier 2: Correspondence, 1958-1978. 60 Serafin Aquino, Philippines Amateur Athletic Federation to Otto Mayer, 20 December 1963, File: Jeux du GANEFO, Correspondence, 1963. 61 Avery Brundage to Otto Mayer, 29 March 1963, CIO-PT-BRUND-CORR/7063, Sous-dossier 1: Correspondence, janvier-avril 1963. 62 B-1003-FI/020: Reunion de la CE avec les FI à Lausanne le 6 juin 1963, Sous-dossier 2: Procès verbal. 63 K. Subekti, All Indonesia Swimming Federation to K. Abe, FINA, 7 July 1963, D-RM01-INDON/006 – Recognition requests of the NOC of Indonesia (INA): correspondence and recognition, sous-dossier 1: Correspondence, 1963. 64 Mg Mg Gyi, National Swimming Federation (Burma) to K. Abe, FINA, 9 July 1963, D-RM01-INDON/006 – Recognition requests of the NOC of Indonesia (INA): correspondence and recognition, sous-dossier 1: Correspondence, 1963. 65 K. Abe, FINA, to Mg Mg Gyi, National Swimming Federation (Burma), 17 July 1963, D-RM01-INDON/006 – Recognition requests of the NOC of Indonesia (INA): correspondence and recognition, sous-dossier 1: Correspondence, 1963. 66 K. Abe, FINA, to K. Subekti, All Indonesia Swimming Federation, 17 July 1963, D-RM01-INDON/006 – Recognition requests of the NOC of Indonesia (INA): correspondence and recognition, sous-dossier 1: Correspondence, 1963. 67 Letter from D. Suprajogi, All Indonesia Swimming Federation to K.Abe, FINA, 6 September 1963, File: Jeux du GANEFO, Correspondence, 1963, emphasis original. 68 Handwritten notes on K. Subekti, All Indonesia Swimming Federation to K. Abe, FINA, 7 July 1963, and Mg Mg Gyi, National Swimming Federation (Burma) to K. Abe, FINA, 9 July 1963, File: D-RM01-INDON/006 – Recognition requests of the NOC of Indonesia (INA): correspondence and recognition, Sous-dossier 1: Correspondence, 1963. 69 K.Abe to Max Ritter, 26 September 1963, File: Jeux du GANEFO, Correspondence, 1963. 70 K.Abe to Max Ritter, 26 September 1963, File: Jeux du GANEFO, Correspondence, 1963.

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71 Avery Brundage to Otto Mayer, 8 February 1962, CIO-PT-BRUND-CORR/7062, Sous-dossier 1: Correspondence, janvier-avril 1962. 72 Avery Brundage to Otto Mayer, 25 August 1962, CIO-PT-BRUND-CORR/7062, Sous-dossier 2: Correspondence, mai-août 1962. 73 Otto Mayer to Avery Brundage, 28 August 1962, CIO-PT-BRUND-CORR/7062, Sous-dossier 2: Correspondence, mai-août 1962. 74 Avery Brundage to Otto Mayer, 13 May 1963, CIO-PT-BRUND-CORR/7063, Sous-dossier 2: Correspondence, mai- août 1963. 75 Jose Oriani to Avery Brundage, 20 September 1963 ; Jose Oriani to Otto Mayer, 19 October 1963, File: Jeux du GANEFO, Correspondence, 1963. 76 P. Julian Grero, Ceylon Olympic and Commonwealth Games Association, to Otto Mayer, 13 September 1963, File: D-RM01-SRILA/002, sous-dossier 1: Correspondance, 1945-1969. 77 Avery Brundage to Otto Mayer, 29 August 1962, CIO-PT-BRUND-CORR/7062, Sous-dossier 2: Correspondence, mai-août 1962. 78 Otto Mayer to Comite Olimpico Boliviano, 26 September 1963, File: D-RM01-BOLIV/002; sous-dossier 1: Correspondance, 1936-1972. 79 Avery Brundage to Otto Mayer, 9 November 1963, CIO-PT-BRUND-CORR/7063, Sous-dossier 3: Correspondence, septembre-decembre 1963. 80 IOC Circular Letter #236 from Avery Brundage, 15 August 1963. 81 IOC Circular Letter #239 from Avery Brundage and Otto Mayer, 25 August 1963. 82 Otto Mayer to Avery Brundage, 25 November 1963, CIO-PT-BRUND-CORR/7063, Sous-dossier 3: Correspondence, septembre-decembre 1963. 83 IAAF Circular Letter from D.T.P. Pain, 2 August 1963, File: Athletisme, Correspondance, 1915-1966, Sous-dossier Correspondance, 1959-1963. 84 K. Abe to Otto Mayer, 30 August 1963, File: Natation, Correspondance, 1926-1964, Sous-dossier Correspondance, 1963. 85 K. Abe to Otto Mayer, 4 October 1963, File: Natation, Correspondance, 1926-1964, Sous-dossier Correspondance, 1963. 86 Letter from K.Abe to Max Ritter, 26 September 1963, File: Jeux du GANEFO, Correspondence, 1963. 87 Avery Brundage to Otto Mayer, 6 April 1963, CIO-PT-BRUND-CORR/7063, Sous-dossier 1: Correspondence, janvier-avril 1963. 88 Otto Mayer to Comite Olimpico Boliviano, 26 September 1963, File: D-RM01-BOLIV/002; sous-dossier 1: Correspondance, 1936-1972. 89 Otto Mayer to Avery Brundage, 17 September 1963, CIO-PT-BRUND-CORR/7063, Sous-dossier 3: Correspondence, septembre-decembre 1963. 90 Avery Brundage to Jorge Vargas, 29 August 1963, File: D-RM01-PHILI/002, sous-dossier 2: Correspondance, 1960-1969. 91 Avery Brundage to Syed Wajid Ali, 11 September 1963, File: D-RM01-PAKIS/002, sous-dossier 4: Correspondance, 1960-1969. 92 Avery Brundage to Otto Mayer, 14 September 1963, CIO-PT-BRUND-CORR/7063, Sous-dossier 3: Correspondence, septembre-decembre 1963. 93 Avery Brundage to Otto Mayer, 9 November 1963, CIO-PT-BRUND-CORR/7063, Sous-dossier 3: Correspondence, septembre-decembre 1963. 94 Letter from Avery Brundage to Ryotaro Azuna and Shingoro Takaishi, 6 November 1963, File: Jeux du GANEFO, Correspondence, 1963. 95 Avery Brundage to IOC Executive Board, 30 November 1963, CIO-PT-BRUND-CORR/7063, Sous-dossier 3: Correspondence, septembre-decembre 1963.

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96 Raja Bhalindra Singh, Indian Olympic Association, to Otto Mayer, 17 August 1963, File: D-RM01-INDE/004, sous- dossier 1: Correspondance, 1960-1965; Nasim Hasan to Syed Wajid Ali, 21 September 1963, CIO MBR-ALI-CORR: Biography and correspondence of Wajid Ali, sous-dossier 2: Correspondence, 1958-1978. 97 Avery Brundage to Otto Mayer, 26 September 1963, CIO-PT-BRUND-CORR/7063, Sous-dossier 3: Correspondence, septembre-decembre 1963. 98 Otto Mayer to Avery Brundage, 17 September 1963, CIO-PT-BRUND-CORR/7063, Sous-dossier 3: Correspondence, septembre-decembre 1963. 99 Minutes of the 61st Session of the International Olympic Committee, Innsbruck, Austria, 27-28 January 1964. 100 “Medals of GANEFO I,” GANEFO Press Release No. 118/E, 4 December 1963, File: Jeux du GANEFO, Correspondence, 1963. 101 Minutes of the 61st Session of the International Olympic Committee, Innsbruck, Austria, 27-28 January 1964. 102 Avery Brundage to Otto Mayer, 12 September 1963, CIO-PT-BRUND-CORR/7063, Sous-dossier 3: Correspondence, septembre-decembre 1963. 103 Avery Brundage to Otto Mayer, 9 November 1963, CIO-PT-BRUND-CORR/7063, Sous-dossier 3: Correspondence, septembre-decembre 1963. 104 Statement by the Marquess of Exeter, President of the International Amateur Athletic Federation, 24 January 1964, File: Jeux du GANEFO, Correspondence, 1964. 105 Otto Mayer to Avery Brundage, 16 April 1964, CIO-PT-BRUND-CORR/7064, Sous-dossier 1: Correspondence, janvier-avril 1964, emphasis original. 106 Avery Brundage to Rudyard Russell, 11 December 1964, File: Boxe, Correspondence, 1928-1964 , Sous-dossier Correspondence, 1954-1964. 107 Avery Brundage to Hugh Weir, 9 January 1964, CIO MBR-WEIR-CORR: Biography and correspondence of Hugh Weir, sous-dossier 2: Correspondence, 1946-1971. 108 Avery Brundage to Konstantin Andrianov, 3 January 1964, File: Jeux du GANEFO, Correspondence, 1964. 109 Carbon copy of letter from IAAF to Avery Brundage, 29 November 1963, File: Jeux du GANEFO, Correspondence, 1963. Given the letter writer’s tone of familiarity and association with both the IOC and the IAAF, it is likely that this letter was written by the Marquess of Exeter. 110 Cited in D.T.P. Pain to Otto Mayer, 29 November 1963, File: Jeux du GANEFO, Correspondence, 1963. 111 File: Athletisme, Correspondance, 1915-1966, Sous-dossier Correspondance, 1964-1966. 112 Max Ritter to S. Firsov, USSR Swimming Federation, 28 August 1964, File: Natation, Correspondance, 1926- 1964, Sous-dossier Correspondance, 1964. 113 H. Kaser, General Secretary, FIFA, to Otto Mayer, 9 March 1964, File: FIFA – Football: Correspondance, 1959- 1964, Sous-dossier 3: Correspondance, 1964]. 114 H.R. Banks to Otto Mayer, 19 December 1963, File: Boxe, Correspondence, 1928-1964 , Sous-dossier Correspondence, 1954-1964. 115 Otto Mayer to Fédération Internationale de Volleyball, 27 February 1964, CIO-FI-VOLLE-CORR. 116 Avery Brundage to Otto Mayer, 30 November 1963, CIO-PT-BRUND-CORR/7063, Sous-dossier 3: Correspondence, septembre-decembre 1963. 117 Avery Brundage to IOC Executive Board, 30 November 1963, CIO-PT-BRUND-CORR/7063, Sous-dossier 3: Correspondence, septembre-decembre 1963. 118 IOC Circular #252, 15 December 1963, File: Jeux du GANEFO, Correspondence, 1963, emphasis original. 119 Avery Brundage to Otto Mayer, 11 December 1963, CIO-PT-BRUND-CORR/7063, Sous-dossier 3: Correspondence, septembre-decembre 1963. 120 Minutes of the 61st Session of the International Olympic Committee, Innsbruck, Austria, 27-28 January 1964. 121 Otto Mayer to H.R. Banks, 22 December 1963, File: Boxe, Correspondence, 1928-1964 , Sous-dossier Correspondence, 1954-1964. 122 Avery Brundage to Otto Mayer, 22 November 1963, CIO-PT-BRUND-CORR/7063, Sous-dossier 3: Correspondence, septembre-decembre 1963. 123 Brundage to Mayer, 18 March 1964, D-RM01-CUBA/004, s- 1: Correspondance, 1964-1966.

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124 “List of Responses to Circular Letter No. 252 (12/15/63) re GANEFO received from NOCs & IFs,” File: Jeux du GANEFO, Correspondence, 1964. 125 File: Jeux du GANEFO, Correspondence, 1963: M. Farouk Saraj, National Olympic Federation-Afghanistan to IOC, 31 20 December 1963, J. Crahay, Comite Olympique Belge to Otto Mayer, 20 December 1963, Avery Brundage to Comite Olimpico Boliviano, 30 November 1963, A. do Reis Catnero, Comité Olimpico Brasileiro to Otto Mayer, 30 December 1963, F. Kroutil, Comite Olympique Tchécoslovaque to Otto Mayer, 20 December 1963, Axel Lundqvist, Danmarks Olympiske Komite to IOC, 17 December 1963, Juan Ulises Garcia Saleta, Comité Olímpico Dominicano to Otto Mayer, 28 December 1963, Armand Massard, Comité Olympique Francais to Otto Mayer, 17 December 1963, K.S. Duncan, British Olympic Association to Otto Mayer, 17 December 1963, A. De O. Sales, Amateur Sports Federation & Olympic Committee of Hong Kong to Otto Mayer, 21 December 1963, Kenya Olympic Association to Otto Mayer, 18 December 1963, Mario Saini, Comitato Olimpico Nazionale Italiano to IOC, 21 December 1963, Zafar Ali to Otto Mayer, 18 December 1963, Serafin Aquino, Philippines Amateur Athletic Federation to Otto Mayer, 20 December 1963, Jaime de San Román, Comité Olimpico Español to Otto Mayer, 19 December 1963, Issam Inglizi, Comité Olimpique Syrien to Otto Mayer, 26 December 1963; File: Jeux du GANEFO, Correspondence, 1964 : Vl. Stoytchev, Comite Olympique Bulgare to Otto Mayer, 15 January 1964, Ekwe Gaston, Comite Olympique Camerounais to Otto Mayer, 7 January 1964, Alberto Cumplido and Labra, Consejo Nacional de Desportes/Comite Olimpico do Chile to Otto Mayer, 7 January 1964, Manuel González Guerra, Comite Olimpico Cubano to Otto Mayer, 15 January 1964, A. Ruusuvaara, Finnish Olympic Committee to IOC, 16 January 1964, M. Benjelloun Hadj Mohammed, Comite National Olympique Marocain to Otto Mayer, 6 January 1964, J. Ph.H.E. van Lier, Netherlands Olympic Committee to Otto Mayer, 3 January 1964, New Zealand Olympic and Games Association to Otto Mayer, 16 January 1964, L.R. Blackburn, Tanganyika Amateur Sports Federation and Olympic Committee to Otto Mayer, 6 January 1964, Konstantin Andrianov to Avery Brundage, 7 January 1964. 126 Zafar Ali to Otto Mayer, 18 December, File: Jeux du GANEFO, Correspondence, 1963. 127 A. De O. Sales, Amateur Sports Federation & Olympic Committee of Hong Kong to Otto Mayer, 21 December 1963, File: Jeux du GANEFO, Correspondence, 1963. 128 K.S. Duncan, British Olympic Association to Otto Mayer, 17 December 1963, File: Jeux du GANEFO, Correspondence, 1963. 129 Avery Brundage to IOC Executive Board, 30 November 1963, CIO-PT-BRUND-CORR/7063, Sous-dossier 3: Correspondence, septembre-decembre 1963. 130 M. Farouk Saraj, National Olympic Federation-Afghanistan to IOC, 31 20 December 1963, File: Jeux du GANEFO, Correspondence, 1963. 131 J. Crahay, Comite Olympique Belge to Otto Mayer, 20 December 1963, File: Jeux du GANEFO, Correspondence, 1963. 132 Avery Brundage to Comite Olimpico Boliviano, 30 November 1963, File: Jeux du GANEFO, Correspondence, 1963. 133 Joao Havelange to Otto Mayer, 10 January 1964, CIO MBR-HAVEL-CORR: Biography and correspondence of Joao Havelange, sous-dossier 1: Correspondence, 1963-1974. 134 Vl. Stoytchev, Comite Olympique Bulgare to Otto Mayer, 15 January 1964, File: Jeux du GANEFO, Correspondence, 1964. 135 Alberto Cumplido and Alberta Labra, Consejo Nacional de Desportes/Comite Olimpico do Chile to Otto Mayer, 7 January 1964, File: Jeux du GANEFO, Correspondence, 1964. 136 Manuel González Guerra, Comite Olimpico Cubano to Otto Mayer, 15 January 1964, File: Jeux du GANEFO, Correspondence, 1964. Note: “workers” has been heavily underlined and an “!” written in the margin. 137 F. Kroutil, Comite Olympique Tchécoslovaque to Otto Mayer, 20 December 1963, File: Jeux du GANEFO, Correspondence, 1963. 138 Juan Ulises Garcia Saleta, Comité Olímpico Dominicano to Otto Mayer, 28 December 1963, File: Jeux du GANEFO, Correspondence, 1963.

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139 A. Ruusuvaara, Finnish Olympic Committee to IOC, 16 January 1964, File: Jeux du GANEFO, Correspondence, 1964. 140 Armand Massard, Comité Olympique Francais to Otto Mayer, 17 December 1963, File: Jeux du GANEFO, Correspondence, 1963. 141 Mario Saini, Comitato Olimpico Nazionale Italiano to IOC, 21 December 1963, File: Jeux du GANEFO, Correspondence, 1963. 142 M. Benjelloun Hadj Mohammed, Comite National Olympique Marocain to Otto Mayer, 6 January 1964, File: Jeux du GANEFO, Correspondence, 1964. 143 J. Ph.H.E. van Lier, Netherlands Olympic Committee to Otto Mayer, 3 January 1964, File: Jeux du GANEFO, Correspondence, 1964. 144 Zafar Ali to Otto Mayer, 18 December 1963, File: Jeux du GANEFO, Correspondence, 1963. 145 Serafin Aquino, Philippines Amateur Athletic Federation to Otto Mayer, 20 December 1963, File: Jeux du GANEFO, Correspondence, 1963. 146 Issam Inglizi, Comité Olimpique Syrien to Otto Mayer, 26 December 1963, File: Jeux du GANEFO, Correspondence, 1963. 147 Konstantin Andrianov to Avery Brundage, 7 January 1964, File: Jeux du GANEFO, Correspondence, 1964. 148 J. Ph.H.E. van Lier, Netherlands Olympic Committee to Otto Mayer, 3 January 1964, File: Jeux du GANEFO, Correspondence, 1964. 149 Ryotaro Azuna to Avery Brundage, 18 November 1963, File: D-RM01-JAPON/002, sous-dossier 5: Correspondance, 1960-1965, emphasis original. 150 Avery Brundage to Otto Mayer, 12 September 1963, CIO-PT-BRUND-CORR/7063, Sous-dossier 3: Correspondence, septembre-decembre 1963. 151 Issam Inglizi, Comité Olimpique Syrien to Otto Mayer, 26 December 1963, File: Jeux du GANEFO, Correspondence, 1963. 152 A. do Reis Catnero, Comité Olimpico Brasileiro to Otto Mayer, 30 December 1963, File: Jeux du GANEFO, Correspondence, 1963. 153 Roberto Staszeski Lucero, Comite Olimpico Boliviano to Otto Mayer, 23 December 1963, File: Jeux du GANEFO, Correspondence, 1963. 154 Otto Mayer to Avery Brundage, 23 November 1963, CIO-PT-BRUND-CORR/7063, Sous-dossier 3: Correspondence, septembre-decembre 1963. 155 Avery Brundage to Comite Olimpico Boliviano, 30 November 1963, File: Jeux du GANEFO, Correspondence, 1963. 156 Otto Mayer to Avery Brundage, 23 November 1963, CIO-PT-BRUND-CORR/7063, Sous-dossier 3: Correspondence, septembre-decembre 1963. 157 Avery Brundage to IOC Executive Board, 30 November 1963, CIO-PT-BRUND-CORR/7063, Sous-dossier 3: Correspondence, septembre-decembre 1963. 158 Ekwe Gaston, Comite Olympique Camerounais to Otto Mayer, 7 January 1964, File: Jeux du GANEFO, Correspondence, 1964. 159 Avery Brundage to IOC Executive Board, 30 November 1963, CIO-PT-BRUND-CORR/7063, Sous-dossier 3: Correspondence, septembre-decembre 1963. 160 Carbon copy of letter from IAAF to Avery Brundage, 29 November 1963, File: Jeux du GANEFO, Correspondence, 1963. Given the letter writer’s tone of familiarity and association with both the IOC and the IAAF, it is likely that this letter was written by the Marquess of Exeter. 161 Avery Brundage to Otto Mayer, 14 March 1964, CIO-PT-BRUND-CORR/7064, Sous-dossier 1: Correspondence, janvier-avril 1964. 162 Inger Frith to Otto Mayer, 9 February 1963, File: Fédération Internationale de Tir à L’Arc : Correspondance, 1935-1969, Sous-dossier 2 : Correspondance, 1955-1963. 163 Otto Mayer to Inger Frith, 14 February 1963, File: Fédération Internationale de Tir à L’Arc : Correspondance, 1935-1969, Sous-dossier 2 : Correspondance, 1955-1963.

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164 Miguel de Capriles to Otto Mayer, 20 April 1964, File: FIE-Escrime, Correspondance, 1964-1974, Sous-dossier 1: Correspondance, 1964-1969. 165 Otto Mayer to Miguel de Capriles, 23 April 1964, File: FIE-Escrime, Correspondance, 1964-1974, Sous-dossier 1: Correspondance, 1964-1969. 166 Avery Brundage to Otto Mayer, 23 March 1964, CIO-PT-BRUND-CORR/7064, Sous-dossier 1: Correspondence, janvier-avril 1964. 167 Statement by the Marquess of Exeter, President of the International Amateur Athletic Federation, 24 January 1964, File: Jeux du GANEFO, Correspondence, 1964. 168 Max Ritter to Avery Brundage, 25 February 1964, File: Natation, Correspondance, 1926-1964, Sous-dossier Correspondance, 1964. 169 Avery Brundage to Konstantin Andrianov, 3 January 1964, File: Jeux du GANEFO, Correspondence, 1964. 170 B-1003-CNO/010: Reunion de la CE avec les CNO à Tokyo le 3 octobre 1964, Sous-dossier 2: Procès verbal. 171 Konstantin Andrianov to Avery Brundage, 7 January 1964, File: Jeux du GANEFO, Correspondence, 1964. 172 IOC Circular #255, 24 February 1964, File: Jeux du GANEFO, Correspondence, 1964. 173 Max Ritter to IOC, 7 February 1964, File: Jeux du GANEFO, Correspondence, 1964. 174 Statement by the Marquess of Exeter, President of the International Amateur Athletic Federation, 24 January 1964, File: Jeux du GANEFO, Correspondence, 1964. 175 Statement by the Marquess of Exeter, 14 September 1964, File: Athletisme, Correspondance, 1915-1966, Sous- dossier Correspondance, 1959-1963, emphasis original. 176 D.T.P. Pain to Otto Mayer, 3 March 1964, File: Jeux du GANEFO, Correspondence, 1964. 177 D.T.P. Pain to Otto Mayer, 3 March 1964, File: Jeux du GANEFO, Correspondence, 1964. 178 Oscar State to Otto Mayer, 11 February 1964, File: Jeux du GANEFO, Correspondence, 1964. 179 K. Abe to Otto Mayer, 7 May 1964, File: Natation, Correspondance, 1926-1964, Sous-dossier Correspondance, 1964. 180 K. Abe to Otto Mayer, 7 May 1964, File: Natation, Correspondance, 1926-1964, Sous-dossier Correspondance, 1964. 181 Max Ritter to S. Firsov, USSR Swimming Federation, 28 August 1964, File: Natation, Correspondance, 1926- 1964, Sous-dossier Correspondance, 1964. 182 D.T.P. Pain to Otto Mayer, 7 August 1964, File: Athletisme, Correspondance, 1915-1966, Sous-dossier Correspondance, 1964-1966. 183 Minutes of the Executive Board of the IOC, Lausanne, 5 June 1963. 184 Minutes of the 60th Session of the International Olympic Committee, Baden-Baden, Germany, 14-20 October 1963. 185 W.J. Latumeten, Honorary Secretary, Komite Olympiade Indonesia to IOC, 27 April 1964, File: D-RM01- INDON/006 – Recognition requests of the NOC of Indonesia (INA): correspondence and recognition, Sous-dossier 2: Correspondence, 1964. 186 Telegram from Otto Mayer to Avery Brundage, 4 May 1964, File: D-RM01-INDON/006 – Recognition requests of the NOC of Indonesia (INA): correspondence and recognition, Sous-dossier 2: Correspondence, 1964. 187 Minutes of the 61st Session of the International Olympic Committee, Innsbruck, Austria, 27-28 January 1964. 188 Cable from Brundage to Mayer, 13 June 1964, File: D-RM01-INDON/006 – Recognition requests of the NOC of Indonesia (INA): correspondence and recognition, Sous-dossier 2: Correspondence, 1964. 189 Cable, IOC to Indonesian Olympic Committee, 26 June 1964, File: Jeux du GANEFO, Correspondence, 1964; Otto Mayer to Indonesian Olympic Committee, 30 June 1964, File: D-RM01-INDON/002 – Correspondence of the NOC of Indonesia (INA), Sous-dossier 2: Correspondence, 1964-1969. 190 David Burghley, Marquess of Exeter, to Otto Mayer, 18 September 1964, File: Athletisme, Correspondance, 1915-1966, Sous-dossier Correspondance, 1959-1963. 191 B-1003-CNO/010: Reunion de la CE avec les CNO à Tokyo le 3 octobre 1964, Sous-dossier 2: Procès verbal. 192 Avery Brundage to Otto Mayer, 16 July 1964, CIO-PT-BRUND-CORR/7064, Sous-dossier 2: Correspondence, mai- août 1964.

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193 Otto Mayer to Avery Brundage, 8 July 1964, CIO-PT-BRUND-CORR/7064, Sous-dossier 2: Correspondence, mai- août 1964. 194 Max Ritter to Avery Brundage, 10 July 1964, File: Natation, Correspondance, 1926-1964, Sous-dossier Correspondance, 1964. 195 Avery Brundage to A.D. Touny, 25 July 1964, File: Jeux du GANEFO, Correspondence, 1964. 196 Telegram, Erik Frenckell to IOC, 25 July 1964; Telegram, Otto Mayer to Erik Frenckell, 27 July 1964, CIO-MBR- FRENC-CORR. 197 Avery Brundage to Otto Mayer, 11 July 1964, CIO-PT-BRUND-CORR/7064, Sous-dossier 2: Correspondence, mai- août 1964. 198 Avery Brundage to Max Ritter, 13 July 1964, File: Natation, Correspondance, 1926-1964, Sous-dossier Correspondance, 1964. 199 K. Abe to Otto Mayer, 24 August 1964, File: Natation, Correspondance, 1926-1964, Sous-dossier Correspondance, 1964. 200 Avery Brundage to Otto Mayer, 21 August 1964, CIO-PT-BRUND-CORR/7064, Sous-dossier 2: Correspondence, mai-août 1964. 201 Max Ritter to S. Firsov, USSR Swimming Federation, 28 August 1964, File: Natation, Correspondance, 1926- 1964, Sous-dossier Correspondance, 1964. 202 File: Athletisme, Correspondance, 1915-1966, Sous-dossier Correspondance, 1964-1966. 203 Marquess of Exeter to Otto Mayer, 12 September 1964, CIO MBR-BURGH-CORR: Biography and correspondence of David Burghley (Marquis d’Exeter), sous-dossier 3: Correspondence, 1957-1966. 204 Otto Mayer to H.R. Banks, 22 December 1963, File: Boxe, Correspondence, 1928-1964 , Sous-dossier Correspondence, 1954-1964. 205 Avery Brundage to Otto Mayer, 15 May 1964, CIO-PT-BRUND-CORR/7064, Sous-dossier 2: Correspondence, mai-août 1964. 206 Minutes of the 62nd Session of the International Olympic Committee, Tokyo, Japan, 7-9 October 1964. 207 Miriam Meuwly to Avery Brundage, 8 July 1964, CIO-PT-BRUND-CORR/7064, Sous-dossier 2: Correspondence, mai-août 1964. 208 David Burghley, Marquess of Exeter, to Otto Mayer, 18 September 1964, File: Athletisme, Correspondance, 1915-1966, Sous-dossier Correspondance, 1959-1963. 209 Avery Brundage to A.D. Touny, 25 July 1964, File: Jeux du GANEFO, Correspondence, 1964. 210 H. Kaser, General Secretary, FIFA, to Otto Mayer, 9 March 1964, File: FIFA – Football: Correspondance, 1959- 1964, Sous-dossier 3: Correspondance, 1964. 211 Max Ritter to Avery Brundage, 13 April 1964, File: Natation, Correspondance, 1926-1964, Sous-dossier Correspondance, 1964. 212 IAAF Circular Letter from D.T.P. Pain, 8 September 1964, File: Athletisme, Correspondance, 1915-1966, Sous- dossier Correspondance, 1959-1963. 213 H. Kaser, General Secretary, FIFA, to Otto Mayer, 9 March 1964, File: FIFA – Football: Correspondance, 1959- 1964, Sous-dossier 3: Correspondance, 1964. 214 IAAF Circular Letter from D.T.P. Pain, 8 September 1964, File: Athletisme, Correspondance, 1915-1966, Sous- dossier Correspondance, 1959-1963. 215 B-1003-CNO/010: Reunion de la CE avec les CNO à Tokyo le 3 octobre 1964, Sous-dossier 2: Procès verbal.

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