Water: from Scarce Resource to National Asset

Water: From Scarce Resource to National Asset – the inaugural publication in the Singapore Urban Systems Studies Booklet Series – recounts Singapore’s remarkable water story. Although surrounded by water, the island of Singapore is one of the world’s most water-stressed countries. Singapore’s water system involves a delicate balancing act on two fronts. Firstly, the country seeks to maintain its imported water supply from Malaysia, while ceaselessly exploring alternative sources through technology and public mobilisation. Secondly, it has to balance land requirements for water catchments with competing needs for housing and industry. Demand is also calibrated to the thimbleful. As an expensive commodity, water is priced to reﬂ ect not just the high cost of storage, processing and distribution, but also its strategic value. Public education and community engagement were also used to manage demand. This study also examines how Singapore achieved a paradigm shift in its water management by using new technologies, such as membranes and desalination, new drainage and ﬂ ood control systems, as well as innovations such as building reservoirs in urban areas.

The Singapore Urban Systems Studies Booklet Series draws on original Urban Systems Studies research by the Centre for Liveable Cities, Singapore (CLC) into Singapore’s development over the last half-century. The series is organised around domains such as water, transport, housing, planning, industry and the environment. Developed in close collaboration with relevant government agencies and drawing on exclusive interviews with pioneer leaders, these practitioner-centric booklets present a succinct overview and key principles of Singapore’s development model. Important events, policies, institutions, and laws are also summarised in concise annexes. The booklets are used as course material in CLC’s Leaders in Urban Governance Programme.

The Centre for Liveable Cities, Singapore (CLC) was set up in 2008 based on a strategic blueprint developed by Singapore’s Inter-Ministerial Committee on Sustainable Development. The Centre’s mission is to distil, create and share knowledge on liveable and sustainable cities. CLC distils key learning points from Singapore’s experiences over the last half-century, while creating knowledge to address emerging challenges. It also shares knowledge with, and learns from, other cities and experts. The Centre works across three main areas - Research, Training, and Promotions. CLC’s research activities include its Integrated Urban Solutions Research, and Research Workshops, as well as Urban Systems Studies.

ISBN-13: 978-981-4416-59-7 ISBN-10: 981-4416-59-2 !((((

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Centre for Liveable Cities Ministry of National Development, Singapore

Public Utilities Board Ministry of the Environment and Water Resources, Singapore

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!"#$%"&'()*+&,-."/00!!!" 1234234!!!5647643!89 Water: From Scarce Resource to © 2012 Cengage Learning Asia Pte Ltd National Asset Singapore‘s Urban Systems Studies ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. No part of this work covered by the copyright Booklet Series herein may be reproduced, transmitted, stored or used in any form or by any means graphic, electronic, or mechanical, including but not limited to Centre for Liveable Cities photocopying, recording, scanning, digitalizing, taping, Web distribution, Ministry of National information networks, or information storage and retrieval systems, Development, Singapore without the prior written permission of the publisher. Public Utilities Board Ministry of the Environment and Water Resources, Singapore For product information and technology assistance, contact us at Cengage Learning Asia Customer Support, 65-6410-1200 Publishing Director: Paul K. H. Tan For permission to use material from this text or product, submit all requests online at www.cengageasia.com/permissions Senior Publishing Executive: Further permissions questions can be emailed to Lian Siew Han [email protected]

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!"#$%"&'()*+&,-."/00!!!"" 1234234!!!5631673!89 Editorial Committee Chief Editor : Mr. Khoo Teng Chye, Executive Director, Centre for Liveable Cities Research Advisor : Prof. Neo Boon Siong, Fellow, Centre for Liveable Cities Project Leader : Dr. Limin Hee, Associate Director, Centre for Liveable Cities Assistant Project Leader : Mr. Dinesh Naidu, Manager, Centre for Liveable Cities Editor : Ms. Serena Wong, Adjunct, Centre for Liveable Cities Researcher : Ms. Yang Wen, Manager, Centre for Liveable Cities

Centre for Liveable Cities 45 Maxwell Road #07-01 e URA Centre Singapore 069118 www.clc.org.sg/

!"#$%"&'()*+&,-."/00!!!""" 1234234!!!5644633!78 !"#$%"&'()*+&,-."/00!!!"% 1234234!!!5644634!78 Contents

List of Figures ...... vii

List of Appendices ...... vii

Public Utilities Board (PUB) ...... ix

Foreword ...... xi

Preface ...... xiii

Acknowledgements ...... xv

1 Introduction: The Journey from Scarce to Su cient ...... 1

2 The Early Days of Water Management ...... 3

3 Water Supply: From Dependence to Self-su ciency ...... 7

3.1 e National Taps 7 • e First National Tap — Domestic Sources 7 Box Story 1: Cleaning the Singapore River 9 • e Second National Tap — Imported Water 10 • e ird National Tap — NEWater 10 Box Story 2: Getting Past NEWater’s “Yuck Factor” 12 • e Fourth National Tap – Desalinated Water 13 3.2 e Water Loop 13 Box Story 3: e Marina Barrage 17

!"#$%"&'()*+&,-."/00!!!% 1234234!!!5644634!78 vi Contents

4 Managing Demand ...... 19

4.1 Pricing & Incentives 19 4.2 Reducing Unaccounted For Water 21 4.3 Public Education and Engagement 21

5 Beyond Survival Mode: Water’s Social and Economic Role ...... 25

5.1 Active, Beautiful and Clean Waters Programme (ABC Waters) 25 5.2 Birth of a Water Industry 26

6 The Next 50 Years: From 2010 to 2060 ...... 29

References ...... 31

Appendices ...... 33

!"#$%"&'()*+&,-."/00!!!%" 1234234!!!5644634!78 List of Figures

Figure 1 e Water Loop ...... 14 Figure 2 Summary of Water Tariﬀ s, 1972–1986 ...... 20 Figure 3 Water Demand Management Strategies vs Daily Per Capita Domestic Water Consumption ...... 22

List of Appendices

Appendix A Key Milestones ...... 33 Appendix B Governance Tools of Singapore’s Water Management System ...... 37 Appendix C Excerpts from PUB Seed Case Studies ...... 39 Appendix D Policy Timeline — Water Catchment Policy ...... 43 Appendix E e Production of NEWater ...... 45 Appendix F Deep Tunnel Sewerage System ...... 47 Appendix G R&D Projects in the Water Loop, 2010 ...... 51

!"#$%"&'()*+&,-."/00!!!%"" 1234234!!!5644634!78 !"#$%"&'()*+&,-."/00!!!%""" 1234234!!!5644634!78 Public Utilities Board (PUB)

PUB, Singapore’s national water agency, manages all aspects of the water cycle in an integrated manner, from sourcing, collection, puriﬁ cation and supply of drinking water, to the treatment of used water and its reclamation into NEWater, as well as the drainage of stormwater. By closing the water loop, PUB has in place a diversiﬁ ed and sustainable water supply strategy known as the Four National Taps (comprising local catchment water, imported water, NEWater and desalinated water) that ensures Singaporeans of a robust supply of water for generations to come. For more information, visit www.pub.gov.sg or www.facebook.com/PUBsg

!"#$%"&'()*+&,-."/00!!!"$ 1234234!!!5644634!78 !"#$%"&'()*+&,-."/00!!!$ 1234234!!!5644634!78 Foreword

Over the last few decades, Singapore has successfully transformed itself from a fl edgling independent state into a modern metropolis. Since independence, Singapore has been ahead of its time in prioritising issues concerning the environment and water and placing them high on the national agenda. As our fi rst Prime Minister, Mr Lee Kuan Yew, said, “Every other policy has to bend at the knees for our water survival”, attesting to the government’s commitment to ensuring Singapore’s water sustainability. e Singapore of today has an excellent water management system in place that ensures a robust and diversifi ed water supply through our Four National Taps, namely local catchment water, imported water, NEWater and desalinated water. However, our water journey has been all but smooth. Despite an abundant average rainfall of 2400mm/year, there were insuffi cient catchment areas to capture and store the rainwater in the 1970s. e water shortage was exacerbated by the polluted waterways that rendered rain water fl owing in them unfi t for treatment for drinking purposes. e open sewers, poor sanitation and seasonal fl oods further compounded the pollution problem. e Water Urban Systems Study succinctly captures how Singapore was able to turn its water constraints into a virtue, highlighting the three key principles that underpinned the eff orts of PUB, Singapore’s National Water Agency, in ensuring water sustainability– Collect every drop of rainwater, Collect every drop of used water, and Reuse every drop of water more than once. ese principles have successfully been translated into results through the government’s fi nancial prudence, foresight to plan ahead, commitment to meticulous implementation, and strong support from the people, public and private sectors. I hope that through this Water Urban Systems Study, readers will gain a better appreciation of the foresight, tenacity, ingenuity and strong public support that enabled Singapore to successfully close the water loop and provide water for all.

Tan Gee Paw Chairman Public Utilities Board

!"#$%"&'()*+&,-."/00!!!$" 1234234!!!5644634!78 !"#$%"&'()*+&,-."/00!!!$"" 1234234!!!5644639!78 Preface

e Centre for Liveable Cities (CLC) research in urban systems tries to unpack the systemic components that make up the city of Singapore, capturing knowledge not only within each of these systems, but also the threads that link these systems and how they make sense as a whole. e studies are scoped to venture deep into the key domain areas the CLC has identifi ed under its Liveability and Sustainability Framework, attempting to answer two key questions: how has Singapore transformed itself to a highly liveable city within the last four to fi ve decades; and how Singapore can be resilient to new and more complex forms of urban challenges and remain at the forefront of urban development and management. e Water Urban Systems Study is the fi rst of the Singapore Urban Systems Studies booklets. e research process involves close and rigorous engagement of the CLC with our stakeholder agencies, and interviews with Singapore’s urban pioneers and leaders to gain insights into development processes and distil tacit knowledge that have been gleaned from planning and implementation, as well as governance of Singapore. As a body of knowledge, the urban systems studies, which cover aspects such as Water, Transport, Housing, Planning, Industry and Environment, expound not only the visible outcomes of Singapore’s development, but reveals the complex support structures of our urban achievements. e CLC would like to thank PUB and all those who have contributed their knowledge, expertise and time to make this publication possible. I wish you an enjoyable read.

Khoo Teng Chye Executive Director Centre for Liveable Cities

!"#$%"&'()*+&,-."/00!!!$""" 1234234!!!5644639!78 !"#$%"&'()*+&,-."/00!!!$"% 1234234!!!5644639!78 Acknowledgements

We gratefully acknowledge the contributions of Ms. Melanie Tan and Ms. Lee Zhang Er with information and data gathering, and Mr. Ong Ho Sim, Mr. Khoo Teng Chye, Mr. Chan Yoon Kum, Mr. Yap Kheng Guan, Mr. Tan Yok Gin, Mr. Chua Soon Guan, Mr. Young Joo Chye, Mr. Harry Seah, Mr. Yeo Kheng Soon and Mr. Ngaim Hai Guan for taking valuable time oﬀ to participate in the Water Roundtable Discussion and Interview sessions.

!"#$%"&'()*+&,-."/00!!!$% 1234235!!!6751738!9: !"#$%"&'()*+&,-."/00!!!$%" 1234234!!!5644639!78 ! INTRODUCTION e Journey from Scarce to Suﬃ cient

ingapore, a small island city-state in Southeast Asia, receives an average rainfall of 2400 milli- Smetres a year, abundant by most standards, yet it also ranks as one of the countries with the greatest scarcity of fresh water in the world (170 out of 193 countries in the 2006 United Nations World Water Development Report 2 for total annual water resources volume per capita). is may seem ironic, but it is not surprising. Singapore does not have much groundwater to begin with nor many natural fresh water bodies, and its compact 710 square kilometre landmass puts a limit on the amount of land that can be allocated to capture and store rainwater. To boot, since the turn of the twentieth century, the needs of an ever-growing population and an expanding economy have consistently put a squeeze on the already scarce land available for protected water catchments. In the 1960s, ensuring a stable and adequate supply of water was a key challenge for the Singapore government. It was not always able to meet the demand for water which was around 77 million gallons a day (mgd). e waterways in Singapore were polluted and the protected water catchments did not have enough reserves to tide the country over prolonged dry seasons. Despite buttressing the domestic water supply with water imported from neighbouring Malaysia, there were still periods of drought. Water rationing was imposed in 1961 and again for almost eight months from May 1963 to January 1964. Fi y years on, the challenge and limitations of geography remain. Yet since 1979, access to clean water in Singapore has been 100 percent. is is despite the fact that overall water demand has grown ﬁ vefold to 380 mgd between 1960 and 2010. e government has been able to meet this demand through the four sources of water that PUB, the government agency responsible for water management, calls the “National Taps”, namely, water from local water catchments (e.g. reservoirs), imported water from Malaysia, reclaimed water known as NEWater, and desalinated water. Of note, the latter two “taps” which only came into existence in the 2000s, now supply enough water to meet 40 percent of Singapore’s water needs.

!"#$%&'()*+&,-./011222" 34"%4"%22256786"829: 2 Water: From Scarce Resource to National Asset

Today, Singapore’s sustainable water supply is the result of a tightly integrated water management system that uses advanced technology to mitigate Singapore’s physical limitations. Yet the philosophy behind this system can be put quite simply — every drop of rain that can be captured should be captured, and every drop of wastewater that can be safely reclaimed, should be reclaimed. e collection of rainwater in the catchments, the treatment and distribution of drinking water, the sewerage and drainage systems, and the production of NEWater and desalinated water are all part of the water loop (see Appendix A for the timeline of key water milestones). e governance of Singapore’s water management policies has also evolved over the ﬁ ve decades along with the changes in political context, national priorities and as Singapore moved from a situation of scarcity to suﬃ ciency (see Appendix B for some of the key governance tools of Singapore’s water management system). For sure, water remains an important national security matter. In the early days policy initiatives were very much politician-driven and top-down; these days, with the threat of a critical water shortage decreased and with water management systems in place, they are more institution-driven. Where the management of Singapore’s water resources had once been the sole domain of the government, the private sector and community can now take, and are encouraged to take, a more active role.

!"#$%&'()*+&,-./011222% 34"%4"%22256786";29: " e Early Days of Water Management

ingapore was a British colony from 1824 until 1959, when it became self-governed. In 1963, it Smerged with Malaya, Sabah and Sarawak to form Malaysia but, a er only two years, Singapore separated from Malaysia in 1965. At that point, one of the fi rst things that weighed on the Prime Minister’s mind was how he could ensure that the newly independent country would have enough water to survive. e separation was far from amicable — Singapore had been expelled from the federation — and Singapore was heavily reliant on Malaysia for its water. is dependency dated back to colonial times when Singapore started importing water from Johor, a state in Malaysia, through a 1927 agreement. e main domestic water sources — MacRitchie, Pierce and Seletar reservoirs — had not been able to provide enough water for the needs of a growing population and industry. Two years a er Singapore achieved self-government, the City Council of the State of Singapore signed an agreement with the State of Johor in Malaysia in 1961 to give Singapore full and exclusive right and liberty to take, impound and use all the water within the Gunong Pulai and Pontian catchments, and “Every other policy has to bend at in the Tebrau and Scudai Rivers until 2011.1 A second agreement the knees for our water survival.” was signed the following year for the supply of up to 250 mgd of water from the Johor River until 2061.2 ese became known — Lee Kuan Yew, recalling as the 1961 and 1962 Water Agreements. However, even with the early days of Singapore’s 3 water imported from Malaysia, Singapore still suff ered from independence water shortages and had to resort to water rationing in the 1960s. Before separation, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew had made sure the two Water Agreements were enshrined in the Separation Agreement with Malaysia so that it became part of the constitution of Malaysia.4 Despite the presence of this legal safeguard, Lee was told that on the very day of Singapore’s independence, Malaysia’s fi rst Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, had said to the British High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur, “If Singapore doesn’t do what I want, I’ll switch off the water supply.”5

!"#$%&'()*+&,-./0112225 34"%4"%22256786"<29: 4 Water: From Scarce Resource to National Asset

As such, almost immediately a er gaining independence, Lee Kuan Yew called up the Chief Engineer of the Public Utilities Board (PUB), Lee Ek Tieng, and asked him, “Suppose we could capture every drop of rain in Singapore — could we become self-suffi cient?”6 Lee Kuan Yew’s question to PUB was pertinent. Singapore had an average rainfall of 2400 millimetres a year but had been unable to capture much of this water. e main rivers were not suitable catchments as the rainwater collected was quickly contaminated by the large amounts of sewage and other pollutants that spilt into these rivers. Apart from ensuring a more stable water supply for domestic and industrial use, the ruling government also had another motivation for cleaning up the rivers. e polluted waters, poor drainage and open sewers meant that there were parts of Singapore that stood in stark contrast to the beautiful areas where the British used to live. For political reasons, there needed to be a more uniform standard of liveability across the island.7 As it turned out, Singapore would have to wait another decade for advancements in technology that made cleaning these rivers feasible. For the time being, PUB’s only option was to dam as many small streams as possible to capture whatever rainfall it could. Strong leadership would be critical to drive water management initiatives at a time when the government had to address the other priorities, for instance, the economy and the housing situation. As a refl ection of the importance the government placed on Singapore becoming self-suffi cient in water, for the thirty-one years that Lee Kuan Yew was Prime Minister, Singapore’s water policy was coordinated out of his offi ce. e Water Planning Unit was set up in 1971 in the Prime Minister’s Offi ce to complement the work of PUB, which had been set up in 1963. Lee Ek Tieng headed the unit and assisted by a young engineer, Tan Gee Paw, drew up Singapore’s fi rst Water Master Plan in 1972. Working closely with Lee Kuan Yew over the next four decades, these two men were the key bureaucrats leading the major initiatives that shaped the water management system Singapore has today. e master plan of 1972 had assessed that Singapore had to be 75 percent self-suffi cient in water — meaning that life could carry on without serious disruption should the supply of water from Johor fail. is level, however, quickly proved far from sustainable as domestic and industrial needs grew.8 In addition, the government had to tackle a second water-related challenge. Flooding was a common occurrence in the low-lying areas (30 percent of Singapore was less than fi ve metres above sea level), espe cially when intense rains coincided with high tides.9 Indeed, less than fi ve years a er independence, Singapore would experience one of its most serious fl oods. Following heavy rains in December 1969, 29 areas were fl ooded, with some stretches of road under two metres of water. Five people died. e fl ood damage was then estimated at $4.3 million.10 Guided by the master plan, Singapore went through a phase of expansion and construction to increase water supply, sanitation, and fl ooding, from the late 1960s through to the 1980s. To increase the water supply, PUB expanded the capacities of Seletar and Pierce Reservoirs in 1969 and 1975 respectively. At Seletar Reservoir, it set up a system to abstract raw water from seven adjacent streams and this water was pumped into the reservoir. At Pierce Reservoir, a higher dam was constructed upstream from the existing dam to increase the storage capacity of the reservoir.

!"#$%&'()*+&,-./0112223 45"65"%22278%98%"2:; e Early Days of Water Management 5

e Public Works Department (PWD) developed the Sewerage Master Plan (later renamed the Used Waters Master Plan) in the late 1960s. e was necessary as the sewerage system needed to cope with strains that a growing population, construction of public housing, industrial development in Jurong and the redevelopment of the Central Area would put on it. In 1971, only 57 percent of the population were served by the main public sewerage network. e rest depended on the nightsoil collection system or some other sewerage system.11 PWD made plans for a rapid expansion of the sewerage network, the relaying and re-routing of existing services, and the expansion of sewage treatment works. It divided the island into six used water catchment zones, each served by a water reclamation plant, and adopted the practice, in compliance with international standards, of discharging treated effl uent from the plants into the sea. e Drainage Department was set up under the Ministry of the Environment (ENV) in 1972 “ ose were the days when we were trying to to manage storm water for fl ood prevention and get people to come to Singapore, the investments alleviation. e Drainage Department, working — JTC (Jurong Town Corporation) was going with the Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA) at a really frantic pace. HDB, of course, was a boomtown because we were trying to break this and the Housing and Development Board (HDB), problem in housing. Ang Mo Kio came in, then developed a Drainage Master Plan in the 1970s. Bishan and so on. And every one of them, I said, As Singapore developed, tracts of land were was potentially a fl ood problem for us.” carved up for construction projects and as a result, — Yap Kheng Guan, more storm water was conveyed into the drainage Drainage Department, system. Areas where the drainage system could 1992–200412 not clear the water fast enough became fl ood prone. In particular, Bukit Timah and Opera Estate had bad fl ooding. Given that land had to be used for road and buildings, there was a limit to the size of drains and canals that could be built. In some case, PWD resorted to practical solutions like having covered drains, and in others, it came up with innovative systems like the “Pump Drainage System” that was used in Opera Estate. To ensure that new land developments made adequate provisions for the drainage system, the administrative procedures for planning and building control which were under the purview of the Planning Department at the Ministry of National Development (MND), required that the Drainage Department to be consulted on the technical requirements for drainage. is had to be done at every stage of any new development proposal and the Drainage Department was responsible for imposing drainage requirements in line with the Drainage Master Plan. All this early work done to improve the management of sewers and drains would have an important impact on Singapore’s water supply in the late 1990s, when Singapore began to take a serious look at water reclamation as a source for potable water. (See Appendix C for examples of the early initiatives on Singapore’s sewerage and drainage systems.)

!"#$%&'()*+&,-./011222$ 34"%4"%22256786"<29: 6 Water: From Scarce Resource to National Asset

Endnotes

1. Tebrau and Scudai Rivers Water Agreement (1961), Clauses 4(ii) and 8. 2. Johore River Water Agreement (1962), Clause 5(i). 3. Lee Kuan Yew, Public Dialogue at the Singapore International Water Week (SIWW), Singapore, March, 2008. 4. Lee Kuan Yew, interview by Asit Biswas and Cecilia Tortajada (unpublished), Singapore, February 11, 2009. 5. Lee Kuan Yew, SIWW Public Dialogue, 2008. 6. Lee Kuan Yew, interview by Biswas and Tortajada, 2009. 7. Lee Kuan Yew, interview by Biswas and Tortajada, 2009. 8. Onn, K.W. and Chua K., Quest Towards Water Sustainability (PUB SEED Case Study Series) (Singapore: Public Utilities Board, 2009). 9. Lim M.C., “Managing Stormwater in Urbanised Singapore for Flood Control” (PUB paper presented at the International Water Association Conference, Singapore, 2005). 10. PUB, “Major Flood Events in Singapore” (Records of Catchment and Waterways Department Internal Paper, Public Utilities Board, Singapore, 1980). 11. Tan T.H., “Sewerage, Sewerage Treatment and Disposal in Singapore” (PWD workshop paper II/2 presented at the Regional Workshop on Water Resources, Environment and National Development, Singapore, 1972). 12. Yap Kheng Guan, interview by the Centre for Liveable Cities, Singapore, February, 2011

!"#$%&'()*+&,-./0112223 34"%4"%22256786"<29: # Water Supply — From Dependence to Self-suﬃ ciency

3.1 THE NATIONAL TAPS

ingapore’s water sources are called the National Taps. For a long time, the country relied on Sonly two National Taps — domestic reservoirs and imported water from Malaysia. Although the 1972 Water Master Plan had recommended looking at non-conventional sources such as water reclamation and desalination, these options were put on the back burner due to high cost and uncer- tainty about the technology. It was in the mid-1990s that the government, in part pushed by political developments, began to seriously develop new National Taps.

The First National Tap — Domestic Sources

Singapore’s domestic sources of water come from the network of reservoirs and waterways, including the protected catchments like MacRitchie, Pierce and Selatar reservoirs. As Singapore developed, the land needs of the growing population and industry meant that there was less land that could be spared for additional protected water catchments. is situation forced the government to create unprotected catchments and later, urban catchments. In 1975, the ﬁ rst unprotected catchment was created by damming the Kranji, Pandan, Murai, Poyan, Sarimbun and Tengeh rivers to create new reservoirs.1 Compatible and less pollutive landuse developments — such as residential estates and light industry — were allowed near these unprotected catchments. e tension between land use for water catchments and housing would grow. In the early 1980s, HDB was issued a directive to deliver 140,000 new ﬂ ats between 1982 and 1985. New towns were

!"#$%&'()*+&,-./0112228 34"%4"%22256786"<29: 8 Water: From Scarce Resource to National Asset

proposed in areas that were unprotected water catchments, such as Bedok and Sungei Seletar. A er a long drawn-out negotiation, MND, HDB and ENV agreed on a water catchment policy that the Cabinet endorsed in 1983. e policy allowed the public and private sectors to develop land in the unprotected water catchment areas up to an “urbanisation cap” of 34.1 percent. is cap excluded the water surface area, and was subject to a pollution density limit of 198 dwelling units per hectare and adherence to pollution control.2 e fi rst urban catchment was the Sungei Seletar-Bedok Water Scheme that was completed in 1986. Pig farms were phased out from the Sungei Seletar area and the farmers given resettlement compensation. At Bedok, which was less developed, ENV and HDB tightened pollution control through various guidelines and policies. URA allocated most of the land in the catchments to public housing and light industry. Bedok Reservoir was built out of a sand quarry that HDB had used for its housing projects. Water from the network of drains in Bedok fed the reservoir. Since its inception, the water from the Sungei Seletar-Bedok Water Scheme has consistently been assessed to be as good as that obtained from protected catchments. Singapore had been fortunate as the British colonial government had le a valuable engineering legacy — the separation of the storm water and used water systems, which formed the foundation of Singapore’s water management policy. is ensured that the inland waterways, reservoirs and the sea surrounding Singapore were not polluted through the indiscriminate discharge of untreated or semi-treated used water and trade effl uent. It also prevented storm water from entering the used water systems which could cause overfl ows. Because of this system, PUB was able to harvest rainwater from the urban areas and develop water catchment areas in the urban zone. Across the country, the government cleaned up polluted waterways so that they could be functioning water catchments. e most signifi cant and ambitious project was the clean-up of the highly polluted Singapore River and Kallang Basin that began in 1977. Together, these two catchments made up 30 percent of Singapore’s land area in the 1970s. Many Singaporeans lived along the rivers and human activities on the waterfront, together with a lack of proper sewage facilities and discharge control, had turned the rivers into open sewers. With offi ce towers, hotels and a new central business district being built, there was an urgent need to clean up these waters.3 In 1977, Lee Kuan Yew challenged the Ministry of Environment (ENV) to make the rivers clean enough for fi shing. He promised to give each offi cer a gold medal if the clean-up was successful. “His objective was very clear — clean up the Singapore River,” said Lee Ek Tieng of Lee Kuan Yew. “ ough he never told you how to clean it up. He leaves it to the engineers to go and do it, and he gives his full political support.”4 e clean up was completed in 1987 (see Box Story 1: Cleaning the Singapore River). Two decades later, the cleaned-up Singapore River would become a key urban catchment that fed into Marina Reservoir which would provide 10 percent of Singapore’s water. In 1999, the urbanisation cap of 34.1 percent in unprotected catchment areas was li ed, following a study that showed that the water quality in the reservoirs had not deteriorated signifi cantly despite development in these catchment areas. In 2002, the NEA and PUB led a review of the catchment policy. PUB, JTC and EDB agreed upon a negative list of 18 industries that would not be allowed to set up near the catchments. “Strategic industries” that were on the list but considered vital to the

!"#$%&'()*+&,-./011222; 34"%4"%22256786"<29: Water Supply — From Dependence to Self-suﬃ ciency 9 BOX STORY 1 CLEANING THE SINGAPORE RIVER — Providing Alternatives, Managing Tradeoffs The master plan for cleaning up the Singapore River and Kallang Basin was drawn up in October 1977. Apart from PUB, the river clean-up taskforce also involved the Ministry of National Development (MND), Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI), Ministry of Communications & Information (MCI), Ministry of Law (LAW), and agencies such as the Housing Development Board (HDB), Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA), Jurong Town Corporation (JTC), Public Works Department (PWD), Primary Production Department (PPD), Port of Singapore Authority (PSA), and Parks and Recreation Department (PRD). Beyond the technical aspects of the clean-up, the plan also focussed on changing people’s way of life in order to reduce the sources of pollution. Approximately 46,000 squatters around the catchment areas had to be resettled. All Singapor- eans or business establishments a ected were o ered re-housing and compensation while non- Singaporeans were allowed to rent ats. Close to 5,000 street hawkers were relocated to markets and hawker centres in Boat Quay, Empress Place and Chinatown. Vegetable wholesalers were relocated to the Pasir Panjang Wholesale Market. Members of Parliament helped address many requests and sometimes unusual grievances from the resettled squatters, for instance, one complaint was about how joss sticks were burning faster at the higher oors of their new ats. However, there were no major protests against the resettlement. The highly-pollutive pig farms were phased out in 1984. PPD had wanted to protect the pig farming industry as a strategic food supply in times of war but the case for pig farming collapsed when Second Deputy Prime Minister Dr Goh Keng Swee learnt that the feedstock for the pigs was imported; he asked, “If you can import the feedstock — why not import the pork?” The removal of pig farms was di cult as many farmers were unable to adapt to apartment life. The newspapers reported that one farmer hanged himself.5 Lee Kuan Yew recalled that the farmers felt the government had destroyed their way of life and many voted against the PAP for many years afterwards.6 All bumboats were relocated to the cargo handling storage and mooring facilities at Pasir Panjang. As the bumboat operators had complained about stronger waves at Pasir Panjang, and the distance they would have to travel to Chinatown to have lunch at home, the government constructed a breakwater and set up a canteen at Pasir Panjang. Concerns that this move would have an impact on Singapore’s entrepot trade proved unfounded. The larger boatyards in the Kallang Basin were required to upgrade their operations to comply with anti-pollution requirements. Small boatyards which could not upgrade their operations were o ered alternative sites in Jurong. However, the shipyards which had been adding to pollution in the Tanjong Rhu river due to ship painting, scraping, oil, grease and discharge from un-sewered workers’ dormitories were not moved. The Economic Development Board was against relocating the shipyards to Tuas as the yards were generating revenues of $60 million a year. Besides addressing the primary pollution sources, more than 260 tonnes of existing rubbish in the rivers and river banks were collected and disposed of during a month-long operation. In 1986, the PWD also tiled the walkway along the Singapore River, while the PRD carried out landscaping work along the banks. The Kallang Basin riverbed was dredged to remove the mud at the bottom and one metre of sand was put in. To prevent further pollution, the government put in place drain covers in litter prone areas, vertical gratings at outlet drains, oat booms at rivers and canals to trap inorganic litter. The clean-up was completed in 1987 and cost the government nearly $300 million, excluding resettlement compensation. Apart from boosting Singapore’s water supply, politically, it also served a visible symbol of what was a larger clean-up in Singapore.

!"#$%&'()*+&,-./011222< 34"%4"%22256786%!29: 10 Water: From Scarce Resource to National Asset

economy were given special exemption to be sited in the catchments if there were no suitable sites elsewhere and anti-pollution guidelines were met. In 2007, the negative list was extended to cover other unprotected catchments as well. (See Appendix D for a more detailed timeline on the Water Catchment Policy.)

The Second National Tap — Imported Water

For many years, the adequacy of Singapore’s water supply was contingent on the two water agreements with Malaysia. What Singapore would do a er the expiry of the Water Agreements in 2011 and 2061 was not a question that had raised much public debate and discussion. Alternatives such as desalination were thought to be far too costly to be considered seriously. However, in the a ermath of the Asian fi nancial crisis of 1997–1998, rising tensions between Singapore and Malaysia precipitated a series of increasingly acrimonious discussions on extending the Water Agreements. As Malaysia faced the threat of water rationing in early 2000, some Malaysians felt that water from Johor should fi rst fulfi l Malaysian, rather than Singaporean, needs. As tensions mounted in 2001, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammed led a rally in Johor where thousands of UMNO members chanted, “Potong! Potong!” — an implied threat to cut (“potong”) Singapore’s water supply. Lee Kuan Yew recalled Mahathir telling him that Singapore had been undercharged for the water and the Malaysians threatened to raise the price from RM0.03 to RM8. “We were under serious blackmail,”7 Lee recalled. Given the situation, PUB intensifi ed its eff orts to establish a ird National tap to ensure Singapore would have suffi cient water in the event that the water supply from Johor could no longer be relied upon.

The Third National Tap — Introducing NEWater

PUB had experimented with treating and reclaiming water in 1974. In October that year, Singapore’s ﬁ rst pilot water reclamation plant, a joint project by PUB and the ENV, was commissioned at the Jurong Industrial Waterworks. Project advisor Tan Teng Huat of PUB’s Water Reclamation Department had drunk a glass of reclaimed water in January 1975 and declared that the water was “not bad at all”. However, the plant encountered problems such as a strong smell of ammonia in the water and was shut down in late 1975 a er the trial period. is shutdown was not made known to the public — there were no plans to continue with water reclamation as doubts remained about the reliability of the technology. However, over the next twenty years, PUB continued to keep abreast of the development of the technology.8 In the 1990s, technological advancements in water reclamation enabled more manufacturers to produce good quality membranes. e cost of membranes fell by 50 percent, and with that, reverse osmosis and microﬁ ltration became economical. e President of Dow Corning assured Lee Kuan Yew

!"#$%&'()*+&,-./011222"! 34"%4"%22256786%!29: Water Supply — From Dependence to Self-suﬃ ciency 11

that membrane technology would improve and become less expensive, and “will solve his problems” when they met for a discussion in the late 1990s.9 In 1998, Lee Ek Tieng, by then the Chairman of PUB, and Tan Gee Paw, the Permanent Secretary for ENV, started to revisit the idea of recycling water. Two engineers from PUB, Harry Seah and Goh Cheng Woon, were sent on a two-week study trip to see how water was recycled in the United States. ey visited cities in Southern California and Florida to study a full range of water recycling methods, from conventional and part-conventional, to the use of membrane technology. e trip was pivotal in Singapore’s eff orts to recycle its water. As Seah put it simply, “Seeing is believing.”10 Just two days following the assessment by the two engineers that water reclamation was feasible, Lee and Tan committed to the construction of a demonstration water reclamation plant of 2.2 mgd at Bedok to determine the feasibility of using reclaimed “We would have proceeded with NEWater water as an additional source of water. e plant started irrespective of all these political develop- its operations in May 2000. Tan took on the role of ments. ese political developments only added a sense of urgency to the issue.” Chairman of the Steering Committee for the project. (See Appendix E for details on the production process — Tan Gee Paw11 of NEWater). Two years of intensive trials followed, where more than 20,000 tests on 150 water quality parameters were carried out on the reclaimed water. e Steering Committee also conducted a comprehensive study to ensure that the reclaimed water was well within World Health Organisation (WHO) Drinking Water Guidelines and United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) Drinking Water Standards, and that there were no long term health risks. An independent panel of experts comprising both local and foreign experts was set up to ascertain the usability of NEWater, including some of the experts the PUB team had met in the US. e expert panel also verifi ed that the water was suitable as raw reservoir water for Indirect Potable Use (IPU) in accordance with international practice e PUB team had seen from the trip to the US that it would be tough to overcome the psychological barrier the population would have against drinking recycled water. In the US, the recycled water was injected into groundwater before being used for drinking, even though the quality of the recycled water on its own was good enough for direct consumption. Across the world, very few countries had successfully used recycled potable water for drinking — the “yuck factor” would be no diff erent in Singapore. Without public acceptance, NEWater would fail as an alternative source of water. Backed by the Cabinet, PUB and ENV began an extensive public education exercise in July 2002 that culminated in a high visibility event at the 2002 National Day Parade on 9 August 2002 where Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong led 60,000 people in a toast to Singapore with NEWater (see Box Story 2: Getting Past NEWater’s “Yuck Factor”). PUB and EDB also made eff orts to encourage industries to use NEWater, in particular seven wafer fabrication companies at Tampines/Pasir Ris and Woodlands. PUB absorbed the costs of connecting pipelines from the mains to the meter, and the necessary retrofi tting works from the meter to the tanks, as well as of certifi cation and corrosion studies by their specialists. PUB also built a separate pipeline

!"#$%&'()*+&,-./011222"" 34"%4"%22256786%!29: 12 Water: From Scarce Resource to National Asset BOX STORY 2 GETTING PAST NEWATER’S “YUCK FACTOR” Bringing the public on board

The NEWater Steering Committee had studied the experience other countries had to get the public to accept reclaimed water as a potable water and discovered that a large reason for failure had been due to the emotive response to used water and its association with sewers and toilets. The rst challenge was to nd a name for the product. A descriptive name like “Recycled Water” was clearly not going to work. Lee Ek Tieng, the committee chairman recalled that the committee wanted a fresh name for the product, and that was how the term “NEWater” came about, combining “New” and “Water”.13 But just having an acceptable name was not enough. PUB and ENV took the lead in a public awareness campaign, supported by a panel of experts. Singapore-based reporters were brought to the US and the UK, where they saw how recycled water that was actually of inferior purity to NEWater had been used for drinking. Initially, the plan was to have international water experts “sell” the NEWater plan to Singaporeans. However, the government soon realised that an approach that was too technical would not work and decided that o cials from the relevant government agencies, along with the Ministers and MPs, would have to front the public education exercise. Many grassroots leaders and politicians were invited to the NEWater demonstration plant in Bedok, where the discharge chamber had been intentionally painted white to showcase the purity of NEWater. This chamber was nicknamed “the Jacuzzi”. The pristine blue water inside the chamber with its clear froth bubbling against the pristine background made for a strong visual selling point. The Minister for the Environment Lim Swee Say brought three to four hundred community leaders at a time to the plant, and explained the NEWater process to them. The NEWater team felt that they had a good shot at winning the battle against the “yuck” factor when the MPs and grassroots leaders, encountering NEWater for the rst time at the Jacuzzi got excited over how clear, odourless and clean the water was.14 After winning over the media and community leaders, PUB worked to engage and educate the public. PUB pointed out that the US had been reclaiming water for drinking for more than two decades without any long-term health concerns. In addition, the quality of NEWater in many cases exceeded that of drinking water in other countries. (In fact, Lee Ek Tieng liked to tell sceptical friends that the purity of NEWater made it ideal for mixing with whiskey.) PUB produced bottled NEWater for the public to try at national events and a NEWater Visitor Centre was set up. During the 2002 National Day Parade, 60,000 participants joined Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong to toast to Singapore with NEWater. Public education on NEWater continued on into 2003 through the mainstream media and schools, and in February 2003, the Prime Minister o cially opened the NEWater Visitors Centre.

!"#$%&'()*+&,-./011222"% 34"%4"%22256786%!29: Water Supply — From Dependence to Self-suﬃ ciency 13

for NEWater and assured the companies that the plants and distribution pipelines were designed with suffi cient backup capabilities. Once industry accepted NEWater as a high quality substitute for potable water, its demand increased. e main industrial consumers were wafer fabrication plants, refi neries and petrochemical companies. Others included the power stations, electronics companies and commercial premises. With NEWater gaining acceptance, Singapore decided to let the 1961 Water Agreement lapse. In October 2002, Malaysia unilaterally called off its negotiations with Singapore. Since then, however, Malaysia has not threatened to cut off Singapore’s water supply.

The Fourth National Tap — Desalinated Water

In 2005, PUB developed a Fourth National Tap — usable water through desalination. In 1995, a team consisting of oﬃ cials from PUB, URA, MTI and the National Science and Technology Board (NSTB) had visited Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Malta to learn about desalination technology and management. In 1999, the Cabinet approved the building of a 30 mgd desalination plant. In 2003, PUB awarded a Design-Build-Own-Operate (DBOO) contract to SingSpring, a wholly- owned subsidiary of the Hyﬂ ux Group.12 is also became one of PUB’s pioneer public-private partnership projects. In 2005, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong turned on the Fourth National Tap of desalinated water. Five years later, PUB called another tender to build a 70 mgd desalination plant to enhance Singapore’s resilience to drought. is plant was to be completed by 2013 and would also be constructed under a DBOO arrangement. Hylfux was chosen from among ten companies that bidded for the project. It will use Reverse Osmosis (RO) membrane technology in the proposed plant and generate its own power on-site for the de-salination process. Excess power will be sold to the power grid. e plant will supply desalinated water over a 25-year period from 2013 to 2038.

THE WATER LOOP

e three National Taps that draw from domestic sources form part of a closed “water loop” that is the basis for a sustainable water supply. e water loop works with the limitations and opportunities of Singapore’s situation — limited land, little ground water, a colonial legacy of separate systems of sewerage and drainage, abundant rainfall and even more abundant seawater. Conceiving the water loop required a good dose of imaginative thinking on the part of the water agency oﬃ cials to complement engineering expertise. NEWater, for instance, was a signiﬁ cant water system innovation for Singapore both in terms of engineering and how the country viewed its water supply. Likewise the move to make use of every drain and canal possible to collect rainwater, as well as the intensive expansion of the reservoirs network — including the building of functioning reservoirs in urban areas — came from an unusual philosophy that more than 60 percent of the country’s land area

!"#$%&'()*+&,-./011222"5 34"%4"%22256786%"29: 14 Water: From Scarce Resource to National Asset

FIGURE 1 e Water Loop

Source: PUB website

could and should be turned into water catchments. Indeed, Singapore’s aim is to have 90 percent of land area as water catchments by 2060. With an eye to ensuring a well-integrated water management system, in 2001, PUB was transferred out of MTI and merged with the Sewerage and Drainage Departments of ENV. It also divested its functions concerning energy to be exclusively focussed on water issues. Under the Public Utilities Act (2001), it became the agency in charge all operational nodes of the entire water loop: the water catchment network, the drainage and sewerage systems, water treatment and distribution, and the production of NEWater, which at that time was close to rollout. e production of desalinated water became part of the water loop in 2005. PUB undertook several large-scale infrastructure works on the reservoirs, drains and sewers to support the capture of rainwater and the production of NEWater:

(i) Reservoirs e Reservoir Integration Scheme (RIS) that started in 2004, connected the various reservoirs by a system of pumps and pipelines so that excess water in one reservoir could be pumped to another

!"#$%&'()*+&,-./011222"7 34"%4"%22256786%"29: Water Supply — From Dependence to Self-suﬃ ciency 15

for storage. is was necessary as the catchments and reservoirs were of diﬀ erent sizes. For instance, a reservoir like Kranji has a smaller storage capacity relative to the size of its catchment, leading to frequent overﬂ ows and wastage. Dams were built across Sungei Punggol and Sungei Serangoon, creating 5,000 hectares of new catchment in north-east Singapore. e RIS was completed in 2007 at a cost of $18 million.

(ii) Drainage System As drains are an important part in the water loop, PUB and NEA work closely to ensure that the drains remain unclogged. e aim is not only to minimise fl ooding, but also to channel as much water as possible to the catchments. Flooding means that the rainwater that should have gone to the catchments did not — in other words, the water was wasted. Along with the Land Transport Authority, PUB and NEA formed the Road Drainage Improve ment Task Force to rectify fl ooding and “ponding” problems on the roads. Singapore has invested $2 billion in its drainage infrastructure since 1973. In December 2006, it received the third highest amount of rainfall in 75 years and most of the drainage system held up well. e size of fl ood prone areas in the country has been reduced from 3,000 hectares in the 1970s to 127 hectares in 2007. e goal is to bring the fi gure down to 48 hectares by the end of 2011.15 In 2005, the government embarked on its most ambitious drainage project — building the Marina Barrage. e Marina Basin sat prominently at the southern part of Singapore. e barrage had started out as a drainage project but eventually evolved into a functioning urban water catchment as well (See Box Story 3: e Marina Barrage). Despite all the improvements to the infrastructure, the fl oods that struck parts of Singapore in 2010 and 2011, particularly in Orchard Road and Bukit Timah, were a reminder that Singapore’s engineering systems can still be bettered by Mother Nature. While building higher capacity drains may seem the logical solution to reduce fl ooding, this is not sustainable in the long run in view of competing land uses, weather uncertainties and the possible impact of climate change. PUB is looking towards more adaptable, fl exible and sustainable measures to achieve the higher drainage and fl ood protection standards for Singapore. To this end, PUB will adopt a holistic approach that covers the entire drainage system, going beyond the conventional ‘pathway’ solutions (such as expanding drains and canals, and building diversion canals and detention ponds) to developing solutions at ‘source’ (where rainwater falls) to better manage storm water run-off , and at ‘receptors’ (where rainwater fl ows to) to protect buildings at the local level.

(iii) Sewers Under the Sewer Rehabilitation Programme from 1997 to 2006, PUB rehabilitated about 790 kilometres of public sewers at $270 million. In 2006 alone, it rehabilitated 300 kilometres of sewers at a cost of $153 million.16 e award-winning Deep Tunnel Sewerage System (DTSS) was conceptualised

!"#$%&'()*+&,-./011222"$ 34"%4"%22256786%"29: 16 Water: From Scarce Resource to National Asset

in the mid-1990s as a long-term solution to collect used water from homes and industries, and treat this used water before discharging it into the sea. e tunnel system runs for 48 kilometres and is 20 to 55 metres below ground (sewerage pipes are generally fi ve to six metres deep). e DTSS uses gravity to move the water, eliminating the need for pumping stations and freeing up land for other uses. e depth of the tunnels also reduced the risk of surface water pollution (see Appendix F for more details on the DTSS). Phase I was completed in 2008 and it channeled water to the Changi Water Reclamation Plant (CWRP) for treatment. e treated water is then used by the 50 mgd NEWater factory situated at the roo op of the CWRP. While technology has enabled Singapore to “close” the water loop into a largely self-sustaining water supply system, and the institutional changes to PUB have allowed a more integrated approach to managing this loop, each node is not necessarily functioning at its most effi cient. For instance, PUB sees that there is still scope to reduce the energy used for desalination (3.5 kWh/m3) and used water treatment (0.5 kWh/m3). Flash fl oods have also been a problem. As such, apart from investment in the infrastructure, PUB runs R&D projects to improve and fi ne-tune the operations of each node of the water loop, aiming to increase Singapore’s water resources; protect water quality and security; and reduce production cost. It had an annual R&D budget of $5 million from 2004 to 2009. is has since been increased to $20 million in 2010. (See Appendix G for the range of R&D projects that were ongoing as at 2010.)

!"#$%&'()*+&,-./011222"3 34"%4"%22256786%"29: Water Supply — From Dependence to Self-suﬃ ciency 17 BOX STORY 3 THE MARINA BARRAGE More Than Just a Drainage Project

In a television interview in the late 1980s, shortly after the Singapore River clean-up, Lee Kuan Yew o ered his vision of what the Marina catchment could be like in twenty years. Assuming that there were breakthroughs in technology, a barrage could be established at the mouth of the Marina, creating a huge lake, which would serve as a freshwater reserve for emergencies, and as a mechanism for ood control. Lee raised the idea repeatedly but each time, it was rejected by Lee Ek Tieng due to the poor water quality at the Basin and inadequate technology.17 But two decades later, membrane technology had been tested by NEWater and the Marina Barrage project nally looked feasible. The Barrage was originally conceived as a drainage project to prevent ooding in the Central Area. The Marina reservoir with its poor quality water was “by the way, and nice to have”. However, during the construction of the Barrage, PUB decided to create a full- edged reservoir for supplying water, not just a marginal source. Membrane technology had improved and the falling costs of operation and maintenance meant that raw water from highly urbanised catchments such as the Marina could be cost-e ectively treated for potable use. The successful clean-up of the Singapore River more than a decade ago also helped make the Marina reservoir feasible. Construction for the Marina Barrage began in 2005 and was completed in 2008. It was o cially opened by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong on 31 October 2008. On 20 November 2010, Marina Reservoir was commissioned by Lee Kuan Yew as Singapore’s fteenth freshwater reservoir. With a catchment area one-sixth the size of Singapore, the Marina reservoir met more than 10 percent of Singapore’s water demand. The Marina Barrage earned several international and local engineering awards and was featured in Discovery’s Channel’s much-watched Man-Made Marvels series in 2008. For the government, the Marina Barrage was more than just an engineering project. The Barrage was also conceived as a lifestyle attraction. Given its prominent location in the city, URA persuaded PUB to design an iconic barrage, rather than the typical “square ugly structure”.18 It was landscaped as a public area with food and beverage outlets, a water playground, an art trail, and a Sustainable Singapore gallery. Visitors could watch the crest gates being lowered and see the water gush into the sea. As the Marina Basin is una ected by the tides, its water level can be kept constant all year round, making it ideal for recreational activities such as boating, windsur ng, kayaking and dragon boating.

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Endnotes

1. Water Pollution Control and Drainage Bill, Hansard (1975). 2. Internal note from the Ministry of Environment to the Public Utilities Board, 14 July 1983. 3. Tan Yong Soon, Lee Tung Jean, and Karen Tan, Clean, Green and Blue: Singapore’s Journey Towards Environmental and Water Sustainability (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing 2009), 69. 4. Lee Ek Tieng and Tan Gee Paw, interview by Asit Biswas and Cecilia Tortajada (unpublished), Singapore, February 9, 2011. 5. “Farmer hanged himself.” e Straits Times, October 29, 1983, 10. 6. Lee Kuan Yew, From ird World to First — e Singapore Story: 1965–2000 (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Editions & e Straits Times Press, 2008), 207. 7. Lee Kuan Yew, SIWW Public Dialogue, 2008. 8. “Nothing new about NEWater, really.” e New Paper, September 6, 2002. 9. Lee Kuan Yew, interview by Biswas and Tortajada, 2009. 10. Harry Seah, Interview by the Centre for Liveable Cities, February 2011. 11. Lee Kuan Yew, interview by Biswas and Tortajada, 2009. 12. Hyﬂ ux 2003 Annual Report, 4. 13. Harry Seah, interview by the Centre for Liveable Cities, Singapore, February, 2011. 14. Harry Seah, interview by the Centre for Liveable Cities, Singapore, February, 2011. 15. Lim M.C., “Managing Stormwater in Urbanised Singapore for Flood Control” (PUB paper presented at the International Water Association Conference, Singapore, 2005). 16. Yacoob Ibrahim, (Speech presented at the Deep Tunnel Sewerage System pumping station completion ceremony, Singapore, August 28, 2006). 17. Water Roundtable Discussion with senior PUB oﬃ cers, Water Roundtable Discussion, Centre for Liveable Cities, Singapore, January 6, 2011. 18. Low, J., Leading Organisational Transformation in the Public Utilities Board (case study) (Singapore: Civil Service College, 2010).

!"#$%&'()*+&,-./011222"; 34"%4"%22256786%%29: $ Managing Demand

4.1 PRICING AND INCENTIVES THE ECONOMICS OF WATER

nlike many other countries, Singapore does not treat water as a public good and puts a price Uon water use. e government did not budge much on the principle of charging for water to, at the minimum, recover the cost of production. Even when it comes to convincing companies to set up in Singapore, by and large the high prices for water remained to push the conservation message, and the government has to ﬁ nd alternate ﬁ scal incentives to convince these companies. From as early as the 1970s to the mid-1990s, the Singapore government has attempted to manage domestic water consumption through policy instruments such as “Right from the beginning, the government the pricing system, incentive schemes and regulation. wants to get the message across to the electorate that water is vital to Singapore’s • Tiered Pricing. In the 1970s, as the demand for survival. And you have got to pay for it.” water rose, the government increased water prices — Lee Ek Tieng1 to promote conservation rather than raise revenue.2 Tiered pricing was introduced in 1973 to discourage excessive household consumption and extended to the non-domestic sector eight years later. roughout the early to mid-1980s, water prices increased three times in the face of tight supply. • Water Conservation Tax (WCT). Introduced in 1991 to discourage excessive consumption of water, a 5 percent WCT was levied on households that consumed more than 20 m3 of water a month, while a 10 percent WCT was levied on all water used by non-domestic and shipping sectors.

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FIGURE 2 Summary of Water Tariﬀ s, 1972–1986

Category / Tranche 1972 1973 1975 1981 1983 1986

Domestic: 1−20 m3 $0.35/m3 $0.24/m3 $0.53/m3 $0.22/m3 $0.30/m3 Domestic: 20−25 m3 $0.45/m3 $0.57 / m3 $0.75/m3 Domestic: 25−40 m3 $0.45/m3 $0.22/m3 $0.26/m3 $0.40/m3 Domestic: 40−50 m3 $0.75/m3

Domestic: 50−75 m3 $0.33/m3 $0.50/m3 $0.75/m3 $0.95/m3 $1.10/m3

Domestic: > 75 m3 $0.44/m3 $0.66/m3 $0.75/m3

Non-Domestic: ≤50,000 m3 $0.75/m3 $0.95/m3 $0.44/m3 $0.44/m3 $0.66/m3 $1.10/m3 Non-Domestic: >50,000 m3 $0.85/m3 $1.10/m3

Shipping $0.88/m3 $0.88/m3 $1.32/m3 $1.55/m3 $1.95/m3 $1.95/m3

• Water-saving Devices. Since 1983, water saving devices such as constant fl ow regulators and self-closing delayed action taps were made mandatory in all non-domestic premises. Low capacity fl ushing cisterns were installed in all public housing apartments in 1992 and made mandatory for all housing projects since 1997. • Water Conservation Incentives. With the non-domestic sector accounting for 40 percent of water use, PUB and EDB put in place fi scal incentives for companies to invest in water conservation facilities.

Despite the measures, both total and per capita consumption continued to increase. A pricing review in 1997 concluded that water should be priced to recover the full cost of production and supply through the water tariff , and refl ect the opportunity cost of supply by taking into account the cost of the “next drop” of water. Marginal cost pricing formed the crux of the reformed water pricing mechanism. In 1997, the “next drop” was benchmarked to water desalination. e price of water was increased to $1.52/m3 in 2000, and eventually to $2.00/m3 for domestic consumption above 40m3 per month. Of the $1.52 price, the WCT accounted for $0.35. Between 1997 and 2000, the tariff s for domestic and non-domestic consumption were also brought on par to prevent cross subsidisation between the two sectors. Subsidies in the form of Utilities Save (U-Save) rebates were given to the lower income groups.3 NEWater, introduced in 2002, was priced to encourage industries, such as wafer fabrication plants, which used signifi cant amounts of water in their production processes to switch to NEWater. However, it could not be priced too low as this would thwart PUB’s eff orts to reduce water consumption. NEWater was eventually priced at $1.30/m3, based on cost recovery, in order to balance the

!"#$%&'()*+&,-./011222%! 34"%4"%22256786%%29: WaterManaging Supply Demand — From Dependence to Self-suﬃ ciency 21

two confl icting objectives.4 It replaced desalinated water as the proxy for the marginal cost of potable water. As such, NEWater was exempted from the WCT. e tariff on NEWater was reduced to $1.15/m3 in 2005 and $1.00/m3 in 2007 due to economies of scale in its production. However, with the economic downturn in 2008, projections of demand for NEWater have fallen. Investments have also been made in NEWater infrastructure projects. is has led to an increase in NEWater tariff s, from $1.00/m3 to $1.10/m3 in October 2010.

4.2 REDUCING UNACCOUNTED FOR WATER

On the part of PUB, it reduced unaccounted for water (UFW) from 11 percent in the 1980s to 5 percent a er 1996. UFW is the diff erence between the amount of water produced and the total amount of water accounted for, and mainly consists of water lost through leaks and the under registration of meters. e fi gure for UFW can be as high as 30 percent in some countries. Beginning in 1983, in a move to reduce UFW, PUB began replacing unlined cast iron pipes with ductile iron. Each year, it has conducted 620 inspections and 280 leak detection night tests to identify and combat leakages rapidly using sophisticated leak detection equipment. Good quality meters were also purchased and installed to ensure accurate readings. PUB also works closely with HDB as well as private property owners and developers on the maintenance of private water systems (i.e. the pipes and equipment from the water meter to the tap) and has published a guide on UFW management. Legislation on the illegal siphoning of water was also put in place under the Public Utilities Act with heavy fi nancial penalties and/or jail terms for the guilty parties. Stiff penalties were imposed on those who damage the water mains. Singapore now has one of the lowest fi gures for UFW in the world.

4.3 PUBLIC EDUCATION AND ENGAGEMENT

e government tries to encourage Singaporeans to save water and practise good conservation habits through a mix of call-to-action and awareness campaigns, as well as public engagement activities. One of the earliest public education events was the “Water is Precious” exhibition held in 1972 that was launched by the then Minister for the Environment, Lim Kim San. In the following year, the government encouraged Singaporeans to voluntarily place a quota on their water consumption with the aim of reducing average household consumption by 10–40 percent so that there would not be need for another round of water rationing.5 e “Save Water” campaign was launched in 1995, following projections that Singapore would run out of water by 2001 given its water consumption growth rate of 6 percent a year. “Save Water” has become an annual campaign. PUB’s voluntary Water Eﬃ ciency Labeling Scheme (WELS) provided consumers with information to make their purchasing decisions for taps and mixers, urinals, ﬂ ushing cisterns, showerheads

!"#$%&'()*+&,-./011222%" 34"54"%22267%87"629: 22 Water: From Scarce Resource to National Asset

FIGURE 3 Water Demand Management Strategies vs Daily Per Capita Domestic Water Consumption

Today ~ 154 litres/day Targets ~ 147 litres/day by 2020; 140 litres/day by 2030 50 180

1994: Mandatory LCFCs 45 at all premises 175 40 1992: All new and 1995: Save Water Campaign upgraded HDB ats 35 installed with LCFCs 1996: Save Water Campaign 170 2003: Introduction of 30 Water Ecient Homes 1998: Save Water Campaign Programme 25 165

2006: 10 Litre 20 Challenge introduced 1997: WCT restructured to 160 15 1991: WCT Introduced. be levied from rst drop.

Water Bill for Domestic Consumption of 20m3 of Consumption Domestic for Bill Water Water tari increase. Applicable for 2009: Mandatory WELS 10 consumption over 20m3 & dual ush LCFCs at 155 new & existing premises 5 undergoing renovation (litres) Consumption Water Domestic Capita Per Daily

0 150 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 Year

Water Price Daily Per Capita Domestic Water Consumption

Source: PUB, 2008

and washing machines. PUB launched the 10-Litre Challenge in 2006 to encourage Singaporeans households to practise water conservation and reduce consumption by ten litres per capita. Singapore’s per capita consumption of water in households has been falling from 172 litres per day in 1995 to 165 litres in 2003 and 154 litres in 2010. PUB’s target is to reduce daily per capita consumption of water from to 147 litres by 2020 and to 140 litres by 2030. For the non-domestic sector, PUB runs a 10 percent Challenge to encourage commercial and public buildings, hotels and schools, to become water eﬃ cient and save 10 percent of their monthly water consumption. In recent years, PUB has created new channels to engage the public on water-related issues with a view to reduce demand and educate the public to take better care of Singapore’s sources of water,

!"#$%&'()*+&,-./011222%% 34"%4"%22256786%529: WaterManaging Supply Demand — From Dependence to Self-suﬃ ciency 23

particularly the catchments. Various public outreach programmes and initiatives were launched, for instance, the “Friends of Water Club”, the annual Watermark Award, a mascot called Water Wally and PURE magazine. In 2004, it started a consultative panel called the Water Network. Members of the network came from the public and private sectors and the community. ey included retirees, journalists, educationists and representatives from civil society. e panel meets quarterly and is briefed by PUB on its policies and programmes, while its members give suggestions and provide feedback.

Endnotes

1. Lee Ek Tieng and Tan Gee Paw, interview by Asit Biswas and Cecilia Tortajada (unpublished), Singapore, February 9, 2011. 2. “Water to cost more for those who are wasterful.” e Straits Times, October 23, 1972. 3. Ministry of Environment and Public Utilities Board. Ministry of Environment and Public Utilities Board joint press release, June 24, 2000. 4. Wah Y.H. and Yang W., “Water and Used Water Pricing” (Internal Paper, Public Utilities Board, Singapore, 2009). 5. Encik Sha’ari Tadin, (Speech presented at Keep Our Waters Clean and Prevention of Water Pollution and Wastage campaign, Singapore, June 28, 1973).

!"#$%&'()*+&,-./011222%5 34"%4"%22256786%529: !"#$%&'()*+&,-./011222%7 34"%4"%22256786%529: % Beyond Survival Mode— Water’s Social and Economic Role

ingapore’s water management policies, up to the early 2000s, had focussed almost exclusively Son ensuring a sustainable and suﬃ cient water supply for survival. However, the policies and programmes in the last eight years or so have more consciously looked at how water can also be an asset that contributes to other aspects of Singapore’s liveability quotient, namely, on the social and economic fronts.

5.1 ACTIVE, BEAUTIFUL AND CLEAN WATERS PROGRAMME ABC WATERS

e Marina Barrage was created for practical reasons — drainage and water reserve — but more than previous water management projects, it placed emphasis on the project’s aesthetic impact on the landscape, and also factored in recreational options — how people could use the space. is was indicative of a new philosophy that was starting to emerge in PUB to “bring the public closer to “In the past, we protected our water resources water.” by keeping people away from them; now we PUB started the Active, Beautiful and Clean will bring people closer to water so that they Waters Programme (ABC Waters) to transform the will enjoy and cherish it more.” utilitarian appearance of drains, canals and reservoirs into eye-pleasing streams, rivers and lakes — Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, 1 which could also be recreational sites. Khoo Teng 2007 Chye, Chief Executive of PUB from 2003 to 2011, championed ABC Waters as he believed that ensuring the long-term sustainability of Singapore’s water sources required PUB to work in partnership with the public. If Singaporeans understood

!"#$%&'()*+&,-./011222%$ 34"%4"%22256786%529: 26 Water: From Scarce Resource to National Asset

that the drains and canals were also water catchments, and if these prettied-up drains and canals made their environment more pleasant, they would be more likely to keep them clean. “It was [the] post-NEWater era and hence we could aff ord to explore improving the aesthetics of the drains, and there was tremendous political support,” recalled Khoo.2 (Note: ere had been a precursor to the ABC programme. From 1989–2000, the Waterbodies Design Panel (WDP) assisted URA in evaluating waterbodies linked to developments and to assess the aesthetic treatment of these developments along major waterbodies. Some of the projects included collaborations with ENV Drainage Department to transform the Sungei Api Api and Sungei Kallang drains.) PUB’s long-term master plan for ABC Waters, launched in 2007, identifi ed opportunities and potential projects across the island for the next ten to fi een years. PUB actively sought feedback from the community in developing the master plan. e ABC Waters programme received funding for approximately $1.2 billion from the Ministry of Finance in and PUB was encouraged to seek co- funding from community and corporate partners. As PUB saw it, ideally, the ABC Waters Programme would be integrated with NPark’s existing Park Connector Network to transform Singapore into a city of gardens and water. PUB estimated that the aesthetic and recreational enhancements to the waterways that had been proposed in the master plan would enhance the land value of adjacent areas by $1.2 billion (assuming 11 km2 of land at an average increase in value of $100 per m2). e fi rst ABC Waters demonstration pilot project, ‘Kolam Ayer ABC Waterfront’, a partnership project between PUB and NParks, was offi cially opened to the public in April 2008. Demonstration projects at popular waterbodies such as Bedok and MacRitchie Reservoirs were also in the works. Over twenty projects (including a rain garden in a public housing estate and a waterway in a new Eco-Town) were scheduled to be implemented by 2012.3 With the support of HDB, NParks and LTA, PUB implemented pilot ABC Waters projects along roads, and in the parks and residential areas, to demonstrate that ABC Waters design features were feasible and made a positive contribution to the landscape. In 2009, PUB published the ABC Waters Design Guidelines to encourage the public and private sector to adopt ABC Waters design features and integrate waterways within new land developments projects to improve the living environment. As at 2010, public agencies and private developers have initiated or implemented more than ten projects. PUB has also pushed for an enhanced “ABC Waters scoring component” in the Building and Construction Authority’s Green Mark Schemes to recognise government agencies and private developers that incorporate ABC Waters in their projects. In 2009, Ngee Ann Polytechnic started a new module on “ABC Waters Management” in its curriculum.

5.2 BIRTH OF A WATER INDUSTRY

Singapore made substantial investments in technology to ﬁ nd solutions to overcome water scarcity, particularly in developing the two latest National Taps — NEWater and desalinated water. An oﬀ shoot of this investment has been the emergence of a thriving cluster of water companies

!"#$%&'()*+&,-./011222%3 34"%4"%22256786%529: Beyond Survival Mode — Water’s Social and Economic Role 27

based in Singapore, providing services along the value chain of NEWater and desalinated water production. e Environment and Water Industry Development Council (EWI) was set up under MEWR in 2006 to promote R&D in environment and water technology. e National Research Foundation (NRF) committed $330 million for fi ve years (2007–2012). e Council’s target is to double employ- ment in the water industry to 11,000 persons, adding $1.7 billion to the economy by 2015.4 e number of water companies in Singapore has been growing, and includes local players such as Hyfl ux, Keppel Seghers, and Sembcorp, and international entities such as General Electric, Black & Veatch, Marmon Water, Pall Corporation from the US; Nitto Denko, Toray Industries from Japan; Siemens from Germany; and Veolia from France. Direct investments from these companies have increased the sector’s contribution to the economy by $409 million and created 1,550 jobs.5 In addition, global players such as Black & Veatch and CH2M Hill from the US are using the expertise they gained in Singapore for other projects around the world, including the US., while home grown fi rm Hyfl ux is building the world’s largest seawater desalination plant in Algeria. PUB also launched the Singapore International Water Week (SIWW) in 2008. Every year, SIWW brings together policy makers, industry leaders, experts and practitioners to discuss the challenges facing the water sector, showcase technologies, network and conduct business. At each SIWW, the Lee Kuan Yew Water Prize is awarded to individuals and organisations that have made outstanding contributions towards solving the world’s water problems. e 2011 SIWW attracted 13,500 delegates from 99 countries and $2.9 billion worth of business deals were transacted.

Endnotes

1. PUB, Water for All: Conserve, Value, Enjoy- Meeting our water needs for the next 50 years (Singapore: Public Utilities Board, 2010), 28 2. Khoo Teng Chye, interview by the Centre for Liveable Cities, Singapore, February, 2011. 3. Ministry of the Environment and Water Resources, “Factsheet on the ABC Waters Programme” (Pamphlet, Ministry of the Environment and Water Resources, Singapore, 2010). 4. Yacoob Ibrahim and Amy Khor, (Statement at Committee of Supply Debate 2007, Part 4, Singapore, March 6, 2007). 5. Khoo Teng Chye, (Presentation made at the Tokyo New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organisation Water Solutions Symposium and Exhibition, Japan, February, 2010).

!"#$%&'()*+&,-./011222%3 45"65"%222""7!37$829: !"#$%&'()*+&,-./011222%; 34"%4"%22256786%729: & e Next 50 Years: 2010 to 2060

n June 2010, PUB published Singapore’s long-term water supply plan for the next 50 years. IBased on projections of population growth and the increase in industrial activity, PUB esti- mates that the demand for water will reach 760 mgd by 2060, double what it was in 2010. Of this, domestic use is expected to account for 45 percent of this demand with industrial requirements making up the other 55 percent. To meet this demand, Singapore plans to triple the current capacity of NEWater production so that it can meet 50 percent of future water demand. ere are also plans to ramp up desalination capacity by almost ten times so that desalinated water will meet at least 30 percent of the demand in the long term. e capacity of the First National Tap will also be expanded. As at 2010, two-thirds of Singapore’s 710 sq km land mass are water catchments areas — there are now 17 reservoirs, 32 rivers and more than 7,000 kilometres of waterways all feeding the national water supply. e government is relying on technological solutions to enable 90 percent of Singapore’s land to serve as water catchments by 2060.

!"#$%&'()*+&,-./011222%< 34"%4"%22256786%729: !"#$%&'()*+&,-./0112225! 34"%4"%22256786%729: References

INTERVIEWS

Harry Seah, interview by the Centre for Liveable Cities, Singapore, February 2011. Khoo Teng Chye, interview by the Centre for Liveable Cities, Singapore, February 2011. Lee Kuan Yew, Public Dialogue at the Singapore International Water Week (SIWW), Singapore, March 2008. Lee Ek Tieng and Tan Gee Paw, interview by Asit Biswas and Cecilia Tortajada (unpublished), Singapore, February 9, 2011. Lee Kuan Yew, interview by Asit Biswas and Cecilia Tortajada (unpublished), Singapore, February 11, 2009. Yap Kheng Guan, interview by the Centre for Liveable Cities, Singapore, February 2011 Water Roundtable Discussion with senior PUB oﬃ cers, Water Roundtable Discussion, Centre for Liveable Cities, Singapore, January 6, 2011.

MINISTRY OF ENVIRONMENT AND WATER RESOURCES AND PUBLIC UTILITIES BOARD DOCUMENTS

Encik Sha’ari Tadin, (Speech presented at Keep Our Waters Clean and Prevention of Water Pollution and Wastage campaign, Singapore, June 28, 1973). Khoo Teng Chye, (Presentation made at the Tokyo New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organisation Water Solutions Symposium and Exhibition, Japan, February 2010). Kwa Chang Guan and Long Joey, Water: Precious Resources for Singapore (Singapore: Public Utilities Board, 2002). Lim M.C., “Managing Stormwater in Urbanised Singapore for Flood Control” (PUB paper presented at the International Water Association Conference, Singapore, 2005). Ministry of Environment and Public Utilities Board. Ministry of Environment and Public Utilities Board joint press release, June 24, 2000. Ministry of the Environment and Water Resources, “Factsheet on the ABC Waters Programme” (Pamphlet, Ministry of the Environment and Water Resources, Singapore, 2010). Onn, K.W. and Chua K., Quest Towards Water Sustainability (PUB SEED Case Study Series) (Singapore: Public Utilities Board, 2009).

!"#$%&'()*+&,-./0112223" 45"%5"%222367863429: 32 References

Puah Aik Num, “Smart Water — Singapore Case Study” (PUB Presentation made at the International Water Association, Tokyo, Japan, October 4, 2011). PUB, “Major Flood Events in Singapore” (Records of Catchment and Waterways Department Internal Paper, Public Utilities Board, Singapore, 1980). PUB, Water for All: Conserve, Value, Enjoy-Meeting our water needs for the next 50 years (Singapore: Public Utilities Board, 2010). Tan T.H., “Sewerage, Sewerage Treatment and Disposal in Singapore” (PWD workshop paper II/2 presented at the Regional Workshop on Water Resources, Environment and National Development, Singapore, 1972). Wah Y.H. and Yang W., “Water and Used Water Pricing” (Internal Paper, Public Utilities Board, Singapore, 2009). Yacoob Ibrahim, (Speech presented at the Deep Tunnel Sewerage System pumping station completion ceremony, Singapore, August 28, 2006). Yacoob Ibrahim and Amy Khor, (Statement at Committee of Supply Debate 2007, Part 4, Singapore, March 6, 2007).

LEGAL DOCUMENTS

Tebrau and Scudai Rivers Water Agreement (1961). Johore River Water Agreement (1962). Water Pollution Control and Drainage Bill, Hansard (1975).

OTHERS

“Water to cost more for those who are wasterful.” e Straits Times, October 23, 1972. “Farmer hanged himself.” e Straits Times, October 29, 1983. “Nothing new about NEWater, really.” e New Paper, September 6, 2002. Hyﬂ ux 2003 Annual Report. Lee Kuan Yew, From ird World to First — e Singapore Story: 1965–2000 (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Editions & e Straits Times Press, 2008). Tan Yong Soon, Lee Tung Jean, and Karen Tan, Clean, Green and Blue: Singapore’s Journey Towards Environmental and Water Sustainability (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2009). Low, J., Leading Organisational Transformation in the Public Utilities Board (case study) (Singapore: Civil Service College, 2010).

!"#$%&'()*+&,-./0112223% 45"%5"%222367863829: Appendices

APPENDIX A KEY MILESTONES

1961 First Water Agreement signed with Malaysia to give Singapore the exclusive rights to abstract water from the Gunong Pulai and Pontian catchments, and Tebrau and Skudai rivers until 2011

1962 2nd Water Agreement signed with Malaysia, which allows Singapore to draw up to 250 mgd from the Johor River until 2061

1963 Public Utilities Board (PUB) formed as a statutory board under the Ministry of Trade & Industry (MTI)

1966 Industrial water introduced with construction of the Jurong Industrial Waterworks

1969 Expansion of Seletar Reservoir and eight stream abstraction stations

1971 First “Water is Precious” campaign launched

1972 e Ministry of the Environment (ENV) formed First Water Master Plan introduced Bukit Timah Flood Alleviation Scheme Phase 1 completed

1974 First water reclamation pilot plant constructed at Jurong (decommissioned a er 14 months)

1975 Water Pollution Control & Drainage Act passed First estuarine reservoir with Kranji/Pandan Scheme completed Upper Peirce Reservoir & Chestnut Avenue Waterworks completed

1977 Pig Farms relocated Singapore River clean-up launched Trade Eﬄ uent Regulations introduced

1979 Bedok Water Reclamation Plant (WRP) commissioned

1980 Kranji WRP commissioned

!"#$%&'()*+&,-./01122233 45"%5"%222367863829: 34 Appendices

1981 Seletar WRP commissioned Jurong WRP commissioned Western Catchment Scheme completed (Sarimbun, Murai, Tengeh and Poyan Reservoirs) and expansion of Choa Chu Kang Waterworks First Water Conservation Plan introduced

1983 Water Catchment Policy introduced to control developments within unprotected catchments

1984 Inter-agency Road Drainage Improvement Task Force established

1986 Pig farms phased out Sungei Seletar/Bedok Scheme and Bedok Waterworks completed

1987 Singapore River clean-up completed

1990 Bukit Timah Flood Alleviation Scheme Phase 2 completed

1991 Water Conservation Tax introduced

1996 Sewer Rehabilitation Phase 1 commenced (August)

1997 Water Pricing restructured Singapore 100% served by modern sanitation system

1999 1983 Water Catchment Policy’s urbanisation cap and population density limit li ed NEWater Study commenced Deep Tunnel Sewerage System (DTSS) Phase 1 commenced Water Pollution Control & Drainage Act repealed and relevant powers streamlined into Sewerage and Drainage Act and Environmental Pollution Control Act

2000 NEWater demonstration plant at Bedok commissioned

2001 PUB reconstituted to become Singapore’s National Water Agency and transferred from MTI to ENV Sewer Rehabilitation Phase 2 commenced

2003 PM Goh launched NEWater to the public NEWater Factories at Bedok & Kranji began operations

2004 ENV renamed Ministry of the Environment & Water Resources (MEWR) 3rd NEWater Factory at Seletar began operations Reservoirs opened up for recreational activities Waterhub formed

2005 First Desalination Plant by Hyﬂ ux commissioned

2006 Environment & Water Industry Development Council (EWI) formed under MEWR (given funding by NRF of $330mil for the next 5 years to grow the water industry) Private Sewer Rehabilitation Programme commenced Sewer Rehabilitation Phase 3 commenced Active, Beautiful, Clean (ABC) Waters programme launched PUB named Water Agency of the Year at the Global Water Awards PUB launched the Water Volunteers Programme PUB won the Singapore Innovation Award

!"#$%&'()*+&,-./01122234 56"%6"%22247$"7"4289 Appendices 35

2007 PUB won the Stockholm Industry Water Award Ulu Pandan NEWater Factory commissioned Reservoir Integration Scheme completed PUB introduced the Watermark Award

2008 Inaugural Singapore International Water Week Inter-Ministerial Committee on Sustainable Development formed Kim Chuan Water Reclamation Plant phased out Institute of Water Policy under the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy (NUS) launched Marina Barrage opened e ﬁ rst Active, Beautiful, Clean Waters (ABC Waters) project at Kolam Ayer completed DTSS Phase 1 completed

2009 First-ever TV animation starring Water Wally introduced Second conventional WRP at Bedok phased out PUB introduced the ABC Waters Design Guidelines, a handbook for industry professionals to incorporate ABC design features into their developments. Changi Water Reclamation Plant opened Singapore’s ﬁ h and largest NEWater plant, the SembCorp NEWater Plant opened PUB launched the Mandatory Water Eﬃ ciency Labelling Scheme (MWELS) Sewer Rehabilitation Phase 4 commenced

2010 PUB launched long term water supply plans for the next 50 years. Marina Reservoir, Singapore’s ﬁ rst reservoir in the city commissioned Seletar WRP phased out First Water Agreement with Malaysia expired PUB patented the Variable Salinity Plant (VSP) technology

2011 MEWR appointed panel of experts to review drainage design and fl ood protection measures in Singapore Punggol and Serangoon Reservoirs (Singapore’s 16th and 17th Reservoirs) opened PUB and Hyfl ux marked ground-breaking for Singapore’s 2nd and largest desalination project Drainage Code Revised to enhance Singapore’s fl ood protection

2012 PUB rolled out 5-year plan to carry out drainage improvement projects to strengthen Singapore’s ﬂ ood resilience Bishan Park ABC Waters Project opened CCTV images made available online to improve public preparedness during ﬂ ood events

!"#$%&'()*+&,-./0112223$ 45"%5"%222367863829: !"#$%&'()*+&,-./01122234 45"%5"%222367863;29: APPENDIX B GOVERNANCE TOOLS OF SINGAPORE’S WATER MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

(I) Legal Instruments

TOOL DESCRIPTION

Water Agreements Signed between the City Council of Singapore and the State of Johor in Malaysia, both agreements between Singapore and were enshrined in the Separation Agreement registered at the United Nations when Singapore became Malaysia (1961 and independent of Malaysia in 1965. e 1961 Agreement grants Singapore the full and exclusive 1962) right and liberty to take, impound and use all the water within the Gunong Pulai and Pontian catchments, and Tebrau and Scudai Rivers, up till August 2011. is agreement lapsed in 2011 and the waterworks under this agreement were handed back to Johor by Singapore. e 1962 Agreement provided for the supply of up to 250 million gallons of water per day from the Johor River to Singapore until 2061.

Environmental Subsidiary legislation of the Environment Pollution and Management Control Act (EPMA) which was Protection and formerly part of the Water Pollution Control and Drainage Act. It governs and regulates the discharge Management (Trade of wastewater into open drains, canals and rivers, and is administered by the National Environment Eﬄ uent) Regulations Agency (NEA).

Public Utilities Act 2001 e Public Utilities Act 2001 repeals and re-enacts the then existing Public Utilities Act in order to integrate the Sewerage and Drainage Departments of the Ministry of the Environment as part of the Public Utilities Board, restructure the Board as the Water Authority and divest its role as the regulator of the electricity and piped gas industries.

Sewerage and Drainage Formerly part of the Water Pollution Control and Drainage Act. e Act and Regulations governs Act and the Sewerage the provision, operation and maintenance of the Singapore sewerage system, including the treatment and Drainage (Trade and discharge of industrial wastewater into public sewers. e Act and Regulations are administered Eﬄ uent) Regulations. by PUB.

Water Conservation Tax e tax was introduced in 1991 to discourage excessive consumption of water in both households and industries.

(II) Executive Policies

TOOL DESCRIPTION

Water Supply

Water Rationing For two years in the mid-1960s, Singaporeans experienced water rationing exercises due to serious droughts and increasing demand. e longest was an island-wide 12-hour rationing exercise introduced on 7 May 1963 and relaxed only in January 1964.

Water Master Plan e ﬁ rst Water Master Plan was drawn up in 1972. e Plan was most recently updated in 2010. e 2010 Master Plan is a 50-year long-term plan.

Industrial Water Industrial water was fi rst introduced in 1966 with the construction of Jurong Industrial Water Works Programme (JIWW) by the Economic Development Board (EDB) as a cheap source of low-quality water to industries. e objective was to help conserve potable water by reclaiming the fi nal effl uent from Ulu Pandan Water Reclamation Plant (UPWRP). e industrial water thus produced served as an alternative source of water for industries in Jurong/Tuas Industrial Estate, Tuas View, and Jurong Island.

!"#$%&'()*+&,-./01122238 45"%5"%222367863;29: 38 Appendices

TOOL DESCRIPTION

Water Pricing Policies Singapore does not treat water as a public good and charges for its use. e original tiered pricing structure was replaced in 1997 by marginal cost pricing to recover the full cost of the production and supply of water, and to reﬂ ect the opportunity cost of using an alternative form of production.

Water Catchment Negotiated among several agencies that were competing for land use at various points in time (PUB, Policy EDB, HDB and JTC), the policy initially set urbanisation cap of 34.1 percent for development in the unprotected water catchment areas. is was li ed in 1999.

Public Campaigns Awareness/education programmes and campaigns to encourage the public to conserve water by and Programmes incorporating good water practices in their daily lives. Some examples include: Water is Precious (1971); Save Water Campaign (1995); and 10 Litre Challenge (2006)

Used Water

Sewerage Master To guide the development of sewerage facilities of the entire island. Under the Master Plan, the (Used Water) Plan & government divided the land into six used water catchment zones, based on the contours of the island, Implementation each served by a centralised water reclamation plant. Used water is treated to international standards before treated eﬄ uent was disposed into the sea.

Sewer Rehabilitation e Sewer Rehabilitation Programme looked to check and rehabilitate all public sewers. Leaking sewers Programme are a cause for concern, as the used water which leak out will ﬁ nd its way into the waterbodies.

Drainage

Flood Alleviation To reduce ﬂ ood prone areas to meet the needs of rapid development. and Prevention Programmes

Others

ABC Waters e ABC Waters Programme aims to create beautiful and clean streams, rivers, and lakes with Programme community spaces for all to enjoy.

R&D initiatives e Environment and Water Industry Development Council (EWI) was set up under the Ministry of the Environment and Water Resources (MEWR) in 2006, with $330 million committed from 2007–2012 to promote R&D in environment and water technologies.

Private Public Examples: Partnerships for water – DBOO SingSpring Desalination Plant with Hyﬂ ux production – Changi NEWater and Water Reclamation Plant with Sembcorp

(III) Institutions

TOOL DESCRIPTION

Public Utilities Board (PUB) Statutory board responsible for Singapore’s water management system.

Ministry of Environment and Water Resources (MEWR) Parent Ministry of the PUB.

National Environment Agency (NEA) Statutory board under MEWR. Its role in terms of water management is preventing the pollution of the water sources.

!"#$%&'()*+&,-./0112223; 45"%5"%222367863;29: APPENDIX C EXCERPTS FROM PUB SEED CASE STUDIES:

(Source: Tan Yong Soon, Lee Tung Jean, and Karen Tan, Clean, Green and Blue: Singapore’s Journey Towards Environmental and Water Sustainability (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2009).)

(I) Bukit Timah Flood Alleviation Scheme (1966–1991)

One of the most important and complex fl ood alleviation schemes, the Bukit Timah Flood Allevia- tion Scheme, was introduced to alleviate fl ooding in the Bukit Timah Catchment. e Bukit Timah Catchment had a history of perennial fl ooding since the 1930s, due to the undersized Rochor Canal downstream and the relatively low lying areas that surrounded the Bukit Timah Canal. In the 1960s, rapid development of the Bukit Timah Catchment resulted in the regular overfl owing of the canal. Unfortunately, the Rochor area was densely built-up all the way to the edge of Rochor Canal, making it impossible to widen the Bukit Timah canal. To reduce fl ooding upstream, the only feasible solution was to channel the storm water to the sea via a diff erent route. Faced with a multitude of pressing and competing issues such as education, public health, housing and national defence, amongst others, the Government then was only willing to allocate S$7 million to the fl ood alleviation project. As such, it was decided that the scheme be carried out in 2 phases — Phase 1 to tackle the immediate fl ood problems in the Upper Bukit Timah Catchment; and Phase 2 to solve the fl ood problems in the Bukit Timah Valley. At a cost of S$7 million, Phase 1 of the Bukit Timah Flood Alleviation Scheme was implemented over a period of 6 years (1966–1972). Under the Phase 1 project, part of the storm water from 700 hectares of the Upper Bukit Timah Catchment was diverted to Sungei Ulu Pandan via a new canal. By the 1980s, new developments in the central part of the catchment necessitated the implementation of Phase 2. Heavy development that fl anked both sides of the Bukit Timah canal limited the maximum expansion that could possibly be achieved for even the most effi cient of canal designs. A second canal (4.4 kilometres long, including 2 kilometres of tunnel) diverting water from the Bukit Timah Canal to Kallang River was therefore proposed. Comprising seven separate contracts awarded to four diff erent consultants and seven contractors, Phase 2 was rolled out in 1986, and was completed a er fi ve years, in 1991, at a cost of S$240 million. Besides constructing the second diversion canal, the Bukit Timah Canal was widened and deepened. A 2.5-kilometre section of the Kallang River was also improved to increase its drainage capacity. In addition, two major subsidiary drains, the omson Road Outlet Drain and the Pelton Canal, as well as several other smaller subsidiary drains were constructed to enable more effi cient drainage of storm water.

!"#$%&'()*+&,-./0112223< 45"%5"%222367863;29: 40 Appendices

Given the dense build-up within the Bukit Timah Catchment, the ﬂ ood alleviation measures under Phase 2 would not have been possible if not for the fact that the British engineers had the foresight and safeguarded adequate land for the diversion route as a drainage reserve for the implementation of the solution.

(II) Opera Estate Outlet Drain Project

Land scarcity is a perpetual problem in Singapore, and it was no diff erent in the case of Opera Estate. Houses lined the banks of the Opera Estate Outlet Drain despite the frequent fl ooding. To avoid acquiring the land, in 1996, the Drainage Department engineers came up with an ingenious solution of a Pump Drainage System, which comprised a two-tier drain, a storage pond, and a pumping station. e total project cost was S$32.9 million. During a normal rainfall event, rainwater would be channelled via the outlet drain as was done previously. In a heavy storm, rainwater would overfl ow into an underground storage pond next to the outlet drain. e water would then be pumped back into a drain further downstream when the water level in the pond exceeded a certain level. is two-tier system would ensure minimal electricity consumption as the pump would only have to be used during heavy storms. e storage pond was built underneath a school fi eld to maximise land use, with the pumping station sited above it in a small corner beside the fi eld. e old outlet drain was replaced with a new covered drain which enabled a jogging and cycling track to be built on it. Hence, besides a fl ood-free estate, residents could also enjoy a picturesque route to East Coast Park.

(III) Sewerage Master Plan & extension of sanitation facilities to the whole of Singapore

A er Singapore gained independence, the Sewerage Master Plan (later renamed the Used Water Master Plan) was conceived in the late 1960s. It was closely linked to Singapore’s overall land-use Concept Plan, which was developed using a multi-agency approach involving urban planners, housing and economic agencies, amongst others. A key pillar for planning the management of used water in Singapore, the Used Water Master Plan guided the development of used water facilities, and enabled the projection of used water ﬂ ows in the various catchment zones. It also facilitated the detailed design of sewers and the layout of the used water facilities. Under the Master Plan, the government divided Singapore into six catchment zones, based on the contours of the island. Each catchment was served by a centralised water reclamation plant where the used water was treated to international standards before it was discharged into the sea. Within the used water catchments, pumping stations were installed to transfer used water ﬂ ows to the plants. It was recognized that the rapid industrialisation in Jurong area would require a dedicated treatment works to treat the high volume of industrial waste from factories. ese considerations eventually resulted in the construction of Jurong, Bedok, Kranji and Seletar Sewage Treatment Works, in addition

!"#$%&'()*+&,-./0112227! 45"%5"%222367863;29: Appendices 41

to the Kim Chuan and Ulu Pandan Sewage Treatment Works that had been constructed during the pre-independence days. ese plans were implemented through the 1968–73 and 1973–78 investment programmes, with assistance from the World Bank. As a condition for the loans, the World Bank required that the Government of Singapore adopt a proper charging mechanism that would suffi ciently recover costs from consumers so as to ensure sustainability. In doing so, fi nancial discipline was instilled from the outset, thus facilitating the smooth implementation of the used water plans. A total of S$1.8 billion was spent on sewerage and used water treatment infrastructure in the 1970s and 1980s. ese signifi cant investments led to the provision of a comprehensive used water treat ment network and services to about 98 percent of Singapore by 1991. By 1997, access to sanitation had increased to cover 100 percent of Singapore. is was made possible by putting in place a massive network of over 3200 kilometres of sewers, 134 pumping stations and 210 kilometres of pumping mains. e six Sewage Treatment Works, or now called Water Reclamation Plants (WRP), would serve Singapore’s sanitation needs with a combined capacity of 1.5 million m3/day. Compared to when Singapore fi rst gained independence in 1965, only 45 percent of the population had proper sanitation.

!"#$%&'()*+&,-./0112227" 45"%5"%222367863;29: !"#$%&'()*+&,-./0112227% 45"%5"%222367863;29: APPENDIX D POLICY TIMELINE WATER CATCHMENT POLICY

Timeframe Historical development / milestone

1971 Pollution Survey Unit was set up. Initially meant to serve the Kranji/Pandan Reservoir Scheme, it eventually oversaw all anti-pollution work in connection with the water supply.

1972 Ministry of National Development announced that factory farms and ﬂ atted farms would be planned to reduce the pollution of water caused by pig waste in the catchment areas of the Kranji and Pandan reservoirs.

1974 Cabinet Discussion on high-rise pig farming.

1975 Relocation of pig farms

1975 Introduction of Water Pollution Control and Drainage Bill for more eff ective protection of water resources and prevention of water pollution. Population growth and rapid industrial and economic development in the past 10 years had led to a corresponding increase in the demand for water and, with rising affl uence, a demand for a healthier and cleaner environment. In the Kranji/Pandan catchment areas, pig farms and some pollutive industries had to move to non- catchment areas. In the catchment areas, only non-polluting industries and activities were allowed. All waste water from premises, including trade effl uent, would have to be discharged into the sewers to reduce and minimise the pollution of water in streams and canals, some of which fed into reservoirs. Authority for sewerage, drainage and water pollution control was vested in the Director of Water Pollution Control and Drainage who would also have the powers to control the quality, extraction, storage and use of water in Singapore

1977 Further discussion on the resettlement of farmers issue. Sembawang Pig Farm under the Primary Production Department was aborted completely as protecting the supply of water was deemed more important than the rearing of pigs. An alternative pig farming area in Punggol was developed.

1982 Decision to phase out all nightsoil buckets by 1984 as the use of nightsoil buckets increased the hazards of infectious diseases and the workforce of nightsoil workmen was dwindling. Installation of R2 waste treatment system.

1983 Introduction of 1983 Catchment Policy, the key provisions being: • HDB allowed to develop to its normal density of 198 dwelling units/ha. • Land area developed is restricted to 34.1 percent of unprotected water catchment area, excluding the water surface. • A list of pollution control measures agreed between the Ministry of Environment and Ministry of National Development.

1983 New section 14A of the Water Pollution Control and Drainage Act prohibits the discharge of toxic substances into any inland water. Penalties include ﬁ nes and imprisonment. is came about due to the threat of water contamination of one reservoir through indiscriminate dumping of toxic waste.

1984 Pig farms phased out.

1989 PUB accommodates recreational activities in the reservoirs and catchment areas that do not pollute the waters, such as ﬁ shing and paddle boating.

1999 e Water Pollution Control and Drainage Act was consolidated together with the Clean Air Act and the Drainage Act under the new Environment Pollution Bill. Part V of the Bill deals with water pollution control. Some key points: • Under Clause 15, any person who intends to discharge trade eﬄ uent, oil, chemical, sewage or other polluting substances into any drain or land has to obtain a licence.

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Timeframe Historical development / milestone

• Clause 16 requires any occupier to treat such trade eﬄ uent before it is discharged. • Clause 17 prohibits the discharge of any toxic or hazardous substance into any inland water. • Clause 18 empowers the Ministry of Environment (ENV) to require any person who had discharged any polluting matter onto any land or into any drain or sea to remove and clean up such substance or matter within a speciﬁ ed time. • Clause 19 empowers ENV to require any person to take measures to prevent water pollution due to the storage or transportation of toxic substances or other polluting matters.

1999 Pollution Control Measures for golf courses within water catchments • Water quality of run-oﬀ closely and regularly monitored. • Use of pesticides and chemical fertilisers in golf courses regulated to prevent pollution.

1999 Review of the Water Catchment Policy concluded that water pollution control measures have been largely successful, therefore land in unprotected catchments could be opened up for other uses beyond housing. • Urbanisation level cap and population density limit also removed. • Water treatment plants upgraded to cater for water from developed areas. • Continued enforcement of stringent pollution control measures to prevent water pollution from community-based activities.

!"#$%&'()*+&,-./01122277 45"%5"%222367863<29: APPENDIX E THE PRODUCTION OF NEWATER

(Source: PUB) e fi rst stage of the NEWater production process is known as Microfi ltration (MF). In this process, treated used water is passed through membranes to fi lter out suspended solids, colloidal particles, disease-causing bacteria, some viruses and protozoan cysts, which are all retained on the membrane surface. e fi ltered water contains only dissolved salts and organic molecules. e second stage of the process is known as Reverse Osmosis (RO). In RO, a semi-permeable membrane is used, which has very small pores which only allow tiny molecules like water molecules to pass through. Consequently, undesirable contaminants such as bacteria, viruses, heavy metals, nitrate, chloride, sulphate, disinfection by-products, aromatic hydrocarbons, pesticides etc, cannot pass through the membrane. Hence, NEWater is free from viruses, bacteria and contains negligible amounts of salts and organic matters. In fact, RO is a widely recognised and established technology which has been used extensively in many other areas. is includes the production of bottled drinking water and of ultra-clean water for the wafer fabrication and electronics industries. RO is also becoming increasingly popular as one of the technologies used in the desalination of seawater for human consumption. It is also used to recycle used water for drinking on space shuttles and on International Space Stations. At this stage, the water is already of a high grade quality. e third stage of the production process acts as a safety back-up to the RO stage. In this stage, ultraviolet or UV disinfection is used to ensure that all organisms are inactivated and the purity of the water. With the addition of some alkaline chemicals to restore the acid-alkali or pH balance, the NEWater is ready to be piped off to its wide range of applications.

A comparison of NEWater and USEPA/WHO standards

!"#$%&'()*+&,-./0112227$ 45"%5"%222367863<29: 46 Appendices

Water Quality Parameters NEWater USEPA /WHO Standards

A) Physical Turbidity (NTU) <5 5 / 5 Colour (Hazen units) <5 15 / 15 Conductivity (µS/cm) <250 Not Speciﬁ ed pH Value 7.0–8.5 6.5–8.5 / – Total Dissolved Solids (mg/l) <150 500 / 1000 Total Organic Carbon (mg/l) <0.5 – / – Total Hardness (CaCO3) (mg/l) <50 Not available

B) Chemical (mg/l) Ammoniacal nitrogen (as N) <1.0 – / 1.2 Chloride (Cl) <20 250 / 250 Fluoride (F) <0.5 4 / 1.5 Nitrate (NO3) <15 10 / 11 Silica (SiO2) <3 – / – Sulphate (SO4) <5 250 / 250 Residual Chlorine (Cl, Total) <2 4 / 5 Total Trihalomethanes (as mg/l) <0.08 0.08 / –

C) Metals (mg/l) Aluminium <0.1 0.05–0.2 / 0.2 Barium (Ba) <0.1 2 / 0.7 Boron (B) <0.5 – / 0.5 Calcium (Ca) 4–20 – / – Copper (Cu) <0.05 1.3 / 2 Iron (Fe) <0.04 0.3 / 0.3 Manganese (Mn) <0.05 0.05 / 0.4 Sodium (Na) <20 – / 200 Strontium (Sr) <0.1 – / – Zinc (Zn) <0.1 5 / 3

D) Bacteriological Total Coliform Bacteria (Counts/100 ml) Not detectable Not detectable Enterovirus Not detectable Not detectable Heterotrophic Plate Count (CFU/ml, 35°C, 48 h) <300 <500 / –

!"#$%&'()*+&,-./01122274 45"%5"%222367863<29: APPENDIX F DEEP TUNNEL SEWERAGE SYSTEM

(Source: PUB) e S$3.65 billion Deep Tunnel Sewerage System (DTSS) is an effi cient and cost-effi cient solution to meet Singapore’s long-term needs for used water collection, treatment, reclamation and disposal. Conceptualised and managed by PUB, it was conceived as a cost-eff ective and sustainable solution to meet Singapore’s long-term used water needs. e mammoth 2-phase DTSS project consists of two large, deep tunnels crisscrossing the island; two centralised water reclamation plants; deep sea outfall pipes and a link sewer network. Completed in 2008, Phase 1 of the DTSS comprises a 48-kilometre long deep tunnel sewer running from Kranji to Changi, a centralised water reclamation plant at Changi, two 5-kilometre long deep sea outfall pipes and 60 kilometres of link sewer. e heart of the DTSS, the Changi Water Reclamation Plant (CWRP), is a state-of-the-art used water plant capable of treating 800,000 cubic metres (176 million gallons), or 320 Olympic-size swimming pools, of used water a day to international standards. e treated water is then discharged into the sea through deep sea outfall pipes or channelled to the Changi NEWater factory on the roo op of the reclamation plant, where it is further purifi ed through advanced membrane technologies into NEWater, Singapore’s own brand of reclaimed water.

e Deep Tunnel Sewerage System

!"#$%&'()*+&,-./01122234 56"36"%222""7!578329: 48 Appendices

Crowned ‘Water Project of the Year’ at the Global Water Awards 2009 in Zurich, Switzerland, on 28 April, the DTSS was selected as the water project which made the most signiﬁ cant contribution to water technology and environmental protection. e annual Global Water Awards are widely recognised as one of the most prestigious symbols of achievement in the global water industry.

Components of DTSS

• Link Sewer Network — e link sewers connect the existing sewerage pipes from homes and industries to deep tunnel sewers. Constructed with depths ranging from 10 metres to 30 metres underground, a trenchless method was used to minimise the disruption of activities above ground. Ranging from 0.3 metre to 3 metres in diameter, the link sewers total about 60 kilometres in length. • Deep Tunnel Sewer — Eight tunnel boring machines were used simultaneously to excavate these deep tunnels. With tunnels as wide as 3.3 metres to 6 metres in diameter and depths reaching tunnel sewers received used water from the existing sewerage system. • Changi Water Reclamation Plant — e Changi Water Reclamation Plant is the cornerstone of the ﬁ rst phase of the Singapore DTSS. Sited on 32 hectares of reclaimed land, the CWRP features a state-of-the-art, compact and covered used water treatment facility designed to treat 800,000 cubic metres per day of used water. It can be expanded to ultimately handle 2,400,000 cubic metres per day of used water. • Outfall pipes — Two 5-kilometre long deep sea outfall pipes channel the excess treated water from the CWRP for dispersal into the sea.

Benefits of DTSS

Ensuring sustainability of NEWater e DTSS is an important component of Singapore’s water management strategy, as it allows every drop of used water to be collected, treated and further purifi ed into NEWater, Singapore’s own brand of reclaimed water. NEWater is a pillar of Singapore’s water sustainability. NEWater, together with three other sources of water from local catchments, imported water and desalinated water, form Four National Taps, which are PUB’s long-term water supply strategy to ensure a robust and sustainable supply of water for Singapore. Singapore’s largest NEWater plant to date is built on the roo op of the CWRP, the fi rst of its kind in the world. Integrating the NEWater plant with the DTSS allows for effi cient, large-scale water recycling, thus ensuring the sustainability of NEWater. Opened in May 2010, the NEWater plant at Changi has a capacity of 50 mgd. With this addition, coupled with the expansion of the three existing NEWater plants, NEWater now meets 30 percent of Singapore’s total water demand.

!"#$%&'()*+&,-./0112227; 45"%5"%222367863<29: Appendices 49

Compact design and eﬃ cient land use e compact design of the CWRP requires only one-third of the land area of a conventional plant. ere is also no need for a buﬀ er zone, as the plant modules are fully covered. Phase 1 of the DTSS replaces three of the existing water reclamation plants and accompanying pumping stations, freeing up to 135 hectares of land for other development.

Growing Singapore’s industry capabilities Over 300 local and international contractors, subcontractors and suppliers have worked on the construction of the DTSS. e experience enabled them to build their track record and pitch for larger-scale projects in Singapore and overseas.

!"#$%&'()*+&,-./0112227< 45"%5"%222367867!29: !"#$%&'()*+&,-./011222$! 45"%5"%222367867!29: APPENDIX G R&D PROJECTS IN THE WATER LOOP, 2010

(Source: Smart Water Presentation by Puah Aik Nam, PUB)

!"#$%&'()*+&,-./011222$" 45"%5"%222367867!29: !"#$%&'()*+&,-./011222$% 45"%5"%222367867"29: