MASARYKOVA UNIVERZITA FAKULTA SOCIÁLNÍCH STUDIÍ
Katedra mezinárodních vztahů a evropských studií
Odbor Mezinárodní vztahy
German Participation in NATO PSO
Magisterská práca
Bc. Jana Šidlíková
Vedúci práce: doc. PhDr. Zdeněk Kříž, Ph.D. UČO: 415008 Odbor: MV Imatrikulačný ročník: 2016 Brno, 2018
Čestné vyhlásenie
„Vyhlasujem, že som túto magisterskú prácu vypracovala samostatne a uviedla v nej všetky použité zdroje.”
V Brne dňa 8.5. 2018 ______
Bc. Jana Šidlíková
2
Poďakovanie
Na tomto mieste by som rada poďakovala doc. PhDr. Zdeňkovi Křížovi, Ph.D., vedúcemu mojej diplomovej práce, za cenné a odborné rady a pripomienky, ktoré mi v priebehu písania poskytoval a v predovšetkým za jeho trpezlivosť a ochotu počas celého procesu.
3 Table of Contents
List of Shortcuts 6 1. Introduction 7 2. State of the Research and Selection of Variables 9 2.1. Overview of Literature 9 2.1.1. Universalist Motives 10 2.1.2. Motives of Material Gains 13 2.2. Selection of Variables 16 3. NATO Peace Support Operations (PSO) 17 3.1. NATO Doctrines on Peace Support Operations after 1989 17 3.2. Definition and Operationalization of NATO PSO 19 3.2.1. Article 5 and Non-Article 5 Operations 19 3.2.2. Types of NATO PSO 20 3.3. General Characteristics of NATO PSO 23 3.4. Selection of Cases 24 4. General Tendencies Impacting the German Participation in NATO PSO 28 4.1. Political Culture and Normalization of the Foreign Policy 28 4.2. Development of the Legal Framework 32 4.3. The Reforms of Bundeswehr 35 4.4. The Changes in Defense Budget over Time 39 5. German Participation in NATO PSO 43 5.1. Turkey (Kuwait/Iraq) 43 5.2. Former Yugoslavia / Bosnia and Herzegovina 44 5.3. Kosovo 46 5.4. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 49 5.5. Afghanistan 50 5.5.1. Fight against International Terrorism 50 5.5.2. International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 51 5.5.3. Resolute Support 54 6. Important Military Operations in which Germany did not participate 56 6.1. Iraq 56
4 6.2. Libya 57 7. Methodology 61 7.1. Qualitative Comparative Analysis 61 7.1.1. Mill’s Methods and the QCA System Designs 63 7.1.2. Boolean Algorithms 64 7.1.3. The Necessary and the Sufficient Condition 67 7.2. Operationalization of Variables 67 7.2.1. Security Threat 68 7.2.2. Pressure from International Allies 70 7.2.3. Economic Interests 70 7.2.4. Humanitarian Crisis 71 7.3. Calibration of Variables 72 7.3.1. Security Threat 72 7.3.2. Pressure from International Allies 74 7.3.3. Economic Interests 75 7.3.4. Humanitarian Crisis 76 8. Analytical Section 79 8.1. Analysis of German Participation in NATO PSO 79 8.1.1. Analysis of a Necessary Condition 79 8.1.2. Analysis of a Sufficient Condition 80 8.2. Analysis of German Non-Participation in NATO PSO 86 8.2.1. Analysis of a Necessary Condition 86 8.2.2. Analysis of a Sufficient Condition 87 8.3. Interpretation of the Results 90 9. Conclusion 92 Bibliography 94
5 List of Shortcuts BAMF Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge) bpb Federal Agency for Civic Education (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung) csQCA crisp set Qualitative Comparative Analysis EU European Union fsQCA fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis IFOR Implementation Force ISAF International Security Assistance Force KSK Special Forces Command (Kommando Spezialkräfte) mvQCA multi-value Qualitative Comparative Analysis NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NVA National People’s Army (Nationale Volksarmee) QCA Qualitative Comparative Analysis PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team PSO Peace Support Operation SFOR Stabilization Force UN United Nations USA United States of America WB World Bank WHO World Health Organization
6 1. Introduction
The German behavior in the field of foreign and security policy can be described as rather unusual compared to other European powers of a similar size and economic strength. The effects of the loss of World War II and the experience of the so-called “Stunde null”, or a zero-hour of German history, are to this day reflected in the foreign and security policy, especially in the reticence towards the use of military force, its strong constitutional delimitation as well as in the debates on what role Germany should play in the conflicts emerging outside of its territory, which came as a result of the redefinition of NATO role after the end of the Cold War. After a decision of the Federal Constitutional Court in 1994, Germany started sending its troops into an increasing range of out of area operations, but the rhetoric of a civilian power1, as described by Hanns Maull is still largely present, and the use of military force is strongly resented. On the other hand, there are also academics that see German involvement in international military operations through the prism of strategic interests and the effort to present oneself as a reliable partner in the eyes of international allies.
This thesis is going to have a closer look at the German participation in NATO PSO since the reunification of Germany in 1990 until 2018. Its main aim will be to determine what conditions are necessary and/or sufficient for the German participation/non-participation in these operations using the method of crisp set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (csQCA). Based on the necessary and sufficient conditions identified by the analysis, the thesis will also attempt to answer the question whether in its decisions about the use of military force within the framework of NATO PSO Germany follows universalist motives or the motives of individual gains. Thanks to the use of the csQCA method, which combines the advantages of quantitative methodology and in-depth knowledge of cases, and therefore allows for observing all NATO PSO, it will also contribute to the existing research of German foreign policy behavior connected to the use of military force, which is mostly conducted using
1 In connection with the use of force, a civilian power follows universalist reasoning. It is an active player in the international field but its motives arise from an effort to “civilize” the international relations and to achieve “higher good” instead of looking at individual gains (Kříž 2011, 177). For more information on the concept, see Chapter 2.
7 qualitative methods and only considers the most significant NATO PSO. Due to the limited scope of this thesis, the aim of this research will not be to confirm or to refute any of the larger theories put forward by the academics in connection with the German use of force, such as the theory of civilian power, the theory of medium-sized power or the theory of trading state.
Considering the structure of the thesis, the following chapter is going to present an overview of existing literature on the German participation in out of area military operations, which is going to serve as the basis for the selection of independent variables (conditions). The third chapter is going to present the selection of observed cases, based on a definition of NATO Peace Support Operations. The fourth chapter is going to outline the central tendencies influencing the German participation in out of area military operations, in particular the historical background and the discussions on the possible “normalization” of the German foreign and security policy, the development of the legal framework over the years, the reforms of Bundeswehr as well as the trends in the German defense spending. That will be followed by a methodological section explaining the selected research method, csQCA, as well as operationalization of variables (conditions) and the calibration criteria for each of the conditions. Last but not least, the csQCA analysis is going to be conducted which will lead to answering the central research question of this thesis, namely what conditions are necessary and/or sufficient for German participation/non-participation in NATO PSO and whether Germany follows universalist motives or the motives of individual gains in its decisions about the deployments of its armed forces in NATO PSO.
8 2. State of the Research and Selection of Variables
The first part of this chapter is going to present the state of the existing research on German participation in NATO PSO and the ways in which some the most influential German foreign policy theoreticians explain the motives behind the decisions to take part/not to take part in NATO PSO or other important peacekeeping missions. As most authors do not distinguish specifically between the motives for participation within the framework of UN peacekeeping, NATO PSO or the operations led by the EU, this literature overview is going to follow the same logic. Moreover, taking into account the activities within all of the main relevant peacekeeping fora can provide a more complex understanding of the incentives behind the German participation in NATO PSO. The following subchapter is going to present the selection of independent variables (conditions), which will be observed in connection with the outcome (German participation in a given PSO). This selection is going to be based on the motives that are most commonly identified by the existing research.
2.1. Overview of Literature
There has been a substantial body of literature created around Germany and its use of force as well as the motives behind the decisions to send or not to send the armed forces to out of area operations within the framework of international organizations such as the United Nations, NATO or the EU. In their argumentation, the authors can be divided between the following two groups: (1) the proponents of a civilian power2 theory stemming from the constructivist approach to International Relations and liberalism and (2) the ones looking at the German motives from the (neo)realist perspective of national interests. The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of these two main approaches to the German motives behind the use of military force, which is going to serve as a background for this research and the selection of independent variables. As most academics only analyze the German motives for participation/non-participation in the most significant NATO out of area operations (e.g., Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq), an emphasis is going to be put on the way in which they explained the German actions in these cases.
2 The civilian power reasoning is used mainly as an archetype demonstrating the dominance of universalist principles. However, the thesis is not aimed at reaffirming/refuting the validity of the theory itself.
9 2.1.1. Universalist Motives
The proponents of the first approach see Germany as a civilian power following universalist reasoning. Such power is an active player in the international field but its motives arise from an effort to “civilize” the international relations, aiming at achieving “higher good” instead of looking at individual gains. Some of the most renowned proponents of this approach are Hanns Maull, Sebastian Harnisch, Knut Kirste and Dieter Senghaas (Kříž 2011, 177).
The typical objectives of a civilian power include the dissemination of human rights and democracy, building of international institutions or enforcement of international law (Kirste 1998, 53). However, that does not necessarily mean that the civilian powers would completely resign on the pursuing their national interests. States operating in a system of international relations, in accordance with the role of civilian power, also pursue their national interests, but these interests are defined by superior values and norms, often perceived as universally valid for the whole of mankind (Kříž 2007, 62). In terms of means to achieve these goals, a civilian power strongly prefers the use of non-military tools, but as Kirste notes, it does not automatically mean that the instruments of power politics have to be completely omitted (Kirste 1998, 53). Another important feature of a civilian power’s behavior is multilateralism. However, it is by no means a pragmatic multilateralism (Kříž and Urbanovská 2014, 18). Instead, multilateralism is associated with the core values that a civilian power professes.
Hanns Maull is an author or editor of many journal articles and monographs on the topic of Germany and the use of military force. He is also the author and one of the strongest proponents of the civilian power theory in the German context. In connection to the use of military force, he argues that as a result of the new challenges after the reunification of Germany and the end of the Cold War, the German security posture has shifted to a state which in principle accepts the need for participation in out of area military operation, however, the pursuit of humanitarian objectives still remains the main motive for such action (Maull 1999, 1). In 1999, the German participation on the NATO mission in Kosovo, which did not possess a mandate from the United Nations Security Council, became a widely discussed issue in connection to the civilian power theory. Maull responded to critics by an
10 article Germany and the Use of Force: Still a 'Civilian Power,' in which he argues that this event does not represent a fundamental departure from the German identity of a civilian power. In his view, during the crisis in former Yugoslavia, Germany was confronted by a situation in which two of its core foreign policy principles, legality and human rights, clashed. In the end, Bonn chose the promotion of human rights over the desire to avoid the use of force in order to halt the atrocities in Kosovo. He concludes that despite the lacking mandate, the decision to participate in the air attacks was primarily motivated by humanitarian considerations, although a role has also been played by the fears for the credibility of Western institutions as well as the stability of the European order (Maull 1999, 28-30).
In a monograph Germany and the Use of Force, Kerry Longhurst analyzes the development of German foreign and security policy through the concept of strategic culture. She argues that despite some changes, the German thinking about the use of force demonstrates signs of significant continuities with the past, largely because of the prevailing role and influence of the state’s distinctive strategic culture (Longhurst 2006, 137). Similarly to Maull and other proponents of the civilian power theory, she uses the German inclination to universalist values and restraint to the use of force to describe the German behavior in connection to the decisions to take part in peacekeeping operations within NATO and the UN. The increased activity in these missions after the unification in 1990 is explained mainly through the changes in the international security environment and the pressure from international partners who expected Germany to assume a more active role instead of relying on cheque- book diplomacy and hiding behind increasingly questionable constitutional claims (Longhurst 2006, 148).
In a book chapter “Understanding Germany: The Limits of ‘Normalization’ and the Prevalence of Strategic Culture”, Harnisch and Longhurst argue that there is a strong continuity with the post World War II German strategic culture that uses the military force as a tool of last resort, and if so, such force must be multilateral in nature with clear objectives and an exit strategy planned (Harnisch and Longhurst 2006, 58). In their view, this strategic culture has acted as both a driver of change, in the case of Kosovo war, and as a restraining factor in the case of the Iraq war in 2003 (Harnisch and Longhurst 2006, 50).
11 Kosovo was in this sense an exceptional case as it was a distinctly humanitarian mission with clear objectives and overwhelming moral obligation on the German side, which necessitated in the use of military force (Harnisch and Longhurst 2006, 54). Moreover, the presence of Germany’s diplomatic efforts prior to the use of military force should be seen as a force of continuity rather than a symbol of change and normalization of security policy. The conflict in Kosovo is then put into contrast with the US policy in Iraq, which used preemptive military force, which Germany strongly opposed (Harnisch and Longhurst 2006, 58).
In his article Kontinuität durch Wandel: Eine „neue “deutsche Außenpolitik written in 2004, Thomas Risse analyzes the changes in the German foreign policy and the politics of the Red- Green government compared to its predecessors. He follows the most important decisions in the policy areas: European policy, foreign deployments of the Bundeswehr and transatlantic relations and their connection to the civilian power theory (Risse 2004, 24). He concludes that in most policy areas Germany still fulfills the criteria of a civilian power and the German foreign policy can be characterized more by continuity than by change. However, it can be argued that in recent years it has been more strongly influenced by domestic political developments than before. In his opinion, the increasing participation of German soldiers in foreign missions, including combat missions, comes as a response to changing global political conditions and can scarcely be interpreted as a "militarization" of German security policy, especially considering the defense budget of 1.5 percent of GDP (Risse 2004, 31). Germany becomes more aware of its responsibility against the backdrop of new, asymmetrical wars, ethnic cleansing and genocide, as well as new security threats such as the denationalization and privatization of violence and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which as he points out, does not clash with the identity of a civilian power. On the other hand, as far as the Balkan wars are concerned, Risse criticizes the German government for acting rather reactively only after the genocides and ethnic cleansing had already taken place. There can be no talk here of an active-design policy of preventive peacekeeping, not even in Kosovo. In addition, most of the cases of Bundeswehr foreign deployments involved specific requests from NATO or the United States (Risse 2004, 29).
12 2.1.2. Motives of Material Gains
In contrast to that, the (neo)realist wing of academics highlights an incentive of some form of material gain behind the decisions to participate in peacekeeping operations abroad. It is important to note, that according to many authors, this view does not necessarily clash with the humanitarian motives mentioned above but rather serves as a contributing factor in the decisions. Some of the particularistic motives that are commonly mentioned in connection to the German activities in the out-of-area peacekeeping operations are: economic rationales (such as free trading routes or significant trade interests in the conflict area), keeping the image of a good ally (fulfilling the expectations of international partners to secure good bilateral or multilateral relations), strengthening the country’s international profile (for instance when Germany was aiming for a non-permanent seat in the UN security council) or institutional interests (such as gaining relevant operational experience for the Bundeswehr). These authors also suggest that there is an ongoing trend of making the decisions to send the armed forces abroad on a case-by-case basis rather than following a long-term strategy.
In her monograph Shaping German Foreign Policy - History, Memory and National Interest, Leithner analyzes the motives behind the German decision to participate in the NATO operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan and not to take part in the war in Iraq. Firstly, she describes the historical background shaping the German collective understanding of international security. Then she applies content analysis on the parliamentary debates about the deployments of Bundeswehr in Kosovo and Afghanistan by which she identifies the main motives that may have played a role in the decisions. Even though, she acknowledges the universalist reasons, such as the support of human rights and prevention of large-scale atrocities, she also finds strong emphasis on the incentives of helping international allies, Germany’s own security interests (in case of Kosovo or Afghanistan), economic interests (for instance in the case of Afghanistan) or the lack of national interests in a given area and the domestic opposition that prevented Germany from participation in the case of Iraq (Leithner 2009, 126-131).
13 In the Czech academic environment, Kříž can be considered one of the most active academics specializing in the relation between the German use of force and the theory of civilian power. In his article Toretický koncept civilní mocnosti a použití vojenské síly (The theoretical concept of civilian power and the use of force), he looks at the concept of civilian power in view of the German engagement in the Kosovo crisis. In his analysis, he disagrees with the explanations provided by Maull or Longhurst and finds the interpretation of the German policy on the Kosovo crisis through the civilian power rationales rather problematic. He agrees states that Maull’s interpretation would be acceptable if the enforcement of human rights in Kosovo was the main objective for the German participation in the conflict by means that would be in accordance with the international law. However, the available sources suggest that besides humanitarian motives, Germany also had other incentives to engage in the Kosovo conflict. One of them is without a doubt the fear of a refugee influx from Kosovo. Following this logic, Germany would aim for maximization of its gains by avoiding a massive intake of refugees and the associated costs. As he concludes, such behavior would then be better explainable by the realist or neorealist approaches to international relations, rather than through the concept of a civilian power (Kříž 2007, 74).
Oppermann also puts forward a differring argument: Since the unification of Germany in 1990, the traditional role concept of a civilian power has gradually worn off, and Germany became more normalized (Oppermann 2012, 507). That is apparent in the newly found sense of self-confidence in the foreign policy decision makers. In the words of the former chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder, Germany is now “a grown-up nation, which has to feel neither superior nor inferior to anyone.” This increase in self-confidence fits into a role conception of a “normal” country, which deems it appropriate to conduct foreign policy in the name of explicitly defined national interests (Oppermann 2012, 507). At the same time, governments come to accept that post-unification Germany increasingly faces legitimate international security demands (Oppermann 2012, 513). As a result of these changes, the approach to multilateral cooperation becomes more selective, more pragmatic and more instrumental, weighing off the requirements of alliance solidarity against more specific and short-term goals (Hoese and Oppermann 2007, 48-50). In his interpretation, this pattern of behavior makes more similar to the foreign policy practices of other Western powers in a comparable geopolitical setting, most notably the United Kingdom and France (Hoese and
14 Oppermann 2007, 43). This new normalcy has been manifested in the fact that Germany is now able to choose which conflicts are of interest on a case-by-case basis and only send the Bundeswehr troops where it is deemed of importance. In his view, German foreign policy now tends to put relatively less weight to the expectations of its international partners and is more driven by domestic politics, which makes it less predictable. This has been demonstrated for instance on the reluctance to support the NATO mission in Libya which would otherwise fulfill all of the criteria for German participation (Oppermann 2012, 502) or to oppose the United States, one of its most significant international allies, in the invasion of Iraq (Oppermann 2012, 513).
Another differing view on the German motives for participation in out-of-area military operations is offered by Koops. Analyzing the German participation in UN peacekeeping operations, he argues that Berlin has since the early 1990s pursued an instrumentalist approach to peacekeeping operations abroad. In his view, the motives behind the German troop contributions range from bilateral partnerships and multilateral pressures to the effort to strengthen the country’s international profile within the discourses of ‘assuming more responsibility’, advancing the ‘normalization’ in foreign and security policy as well as reinforce the existing internal and external bilateral security cooperation schemes (Koops 2016, 652). He makes an interesting argument about the role of institutional objectives as demonstrated on the participation on the UN operation in Somalia (UNISOM), which provided the Bundeswehr with much needed operational experience in conducting and logistical support of such mission across vast distance (Koops 2016, 666). Similarly, humanitarian objectives aside, the disproportionately large troop contribution to the UN mission in Mali (MINUSMA) has been fueled by the factor of the Dutch-German ‘bilateral partnership’ and the ongoing processes of deepened integration and cooperation in the areas of security and defense (Koops 2016, 671). However, he concludes that while efforts have been made to gradually adapt the German strategic culture of restraint to the new realities of the international environment, the pacifist public opinion and the political culture privileging non-military instruments have a strong inhibiting effect to the decision to participate on peacekeeping operations as well as the nature of the tasks performed by the peacekeeping force. Similarly to Oppermann, he argues that when it comes to the military engagements within the UN peacekeeping, Germany can be expected to continue its
15 evolution as a careful troop contributor that commits on a case-to-case basis and while accompanied by key NATO partners (Koops 2016, 652-654).
2.2. Selection of Variables
Based on the existing research on the German participation in NATO PSO presented above, a set of independent variables (also called conditions in the QCA) is going to be selected. In the csQCA research, it is recommended to keep the number of conditions relatively low as the number of possible combinations grows exponentially with the number of conditions and can quickly outgrow the number of observed cases3 (Berg-Schlosser and De Meur 2009, 27). In this research it has been opted for four causal conditions that were the most commonly mentioned in the existing research presented above, namely the conditions of (1) security interests, (2) economic interests, (3) pressure from international allies and (4) the presence of a serious humanitarian catastrophe in the area in which the NATO operation is conducted4. The first three of the conditions represent the logic of material gains in the decisions to participate in NATO PSO while the last condition represents universalist logic.
3 The connection between the number of conditions and the number of their possible combination is explained in more detail in the methodological section of this thesis (Chapter 7). 4 The operationalization of these conditions will follow in Chapter 7.2.
16 3. NATO Peace Support Operations (PSO)
The term “peace support operations” has been used rather frequently in a variety of different contexts by the professional public (Zůna 2002, 9) as well as by many civilian agencies working in the environment of complex humanitarian emergencies5 (NATO Unclassified 2001, 2-1). The widespread use of the term necessarily leads to a problem with its clear definition. For that reason, the following section of this diploma thesis is going to address the issue and provide a definition based on the characteristics of Peace Support Operations used within NATO. This definition is then going to serve as a tool for the choice of cases, which will be considered in the analysis of the sufficient and the necessary conditions for German participation in NATO Peace Support Operations and their further implications, which is the main objective of this thesis.
3.1. NATO Doctrines on Peace Support Operations after 1989
With the end of the Cold War and the bipolar division of the world, NATO faced a challenge to redefine its main objectives. From an alliance protecting its members against an external threat, it turned into an organization addressing complex emergencies outside of its defined territory. This has also been reflected in an adaptation of NATO strategy to the new era. To be able to respond to the changing threats and correspond with the new security environment, NATO adopted a number of strategic documents and guidelines. This strategic adaptation, coming into existence in the 1990s also represents the beginning of NATO Peace Support Operations in the sense in which it is currently used. Since 1990, NATO has developed theories and practices of using force in response to new forms of threats and the need to ensure security and stability in its area of interest (Zůna 2002, 9). In terms of their scope, the number of persons involved and the complexity of the military and civilian activities, the NATO PSO obtained a dominant position in the field of peacekeeping operations over the years (Zůna 2002, 46). The shift to Peace Support Operations in their modern sense can be observed on two levels. Firstly, it is connected to the extension of the
5 Complex emergencies are defined by WHO as “situations of disrupted livelihoods and threats to life produced by warfare, civil disturbance and large-scale movements of people, in which any emergency response has to be conducted in a difficult political and security environment” (WHO 2012, 12).
17 territory on which NATO members conduct their activities. The second change is connected to the indoctrination of PSOs in their new context and the adaptation of an operational code of conduct for these types of missions.
First of the changes came in 1991 with the publishing of a new Strategic Concept. The new document differed significantly from its predecessors in its content and form. Even though the territorial defense of NATO’s members remained the fundamental basis of the Alliance, it was also combined with an obligation to work towards improved and expanded security in Europe through partnership and cooperation with former adversaries (NATO Handbook 2006, 20). On July 4, 1992, the NAC expressed a political consent to provide support to peacekeeping operations under the mandate of the UN and the OSCE on a case-to-case basis. This process culminated in a meeting in Athens on June 10, 1993, where the principles and conditions under which NATO would provide support for peacekeeping operations were approved. The following day, the NACC adopted a set of definitions and principles that apply for cooperation in peacekeeping. On the basis of this decision, NATO issued a directive to begin the preparation of corresponding doctrines. The leading principle in this effort was that the NATO Peace Operations Doctrine must correspond to the UN Charter and any NATO activity must be carried out on the basis of a mandate of the UN Security Council (Zůna 2002, 8). 1999 brought yet another change to the NATO Strategic Concept, committing the Allies not only to common defense but to the peace and stability of the wider Euro-Atlantic area. In doing so, it adopted a broad approach to security, encompassing the political, economic, social and environmental factors in addition to the defense dimension of the Alliance (NATO Handbook 2006, 20).
The term “Peace Support Operations” has been used within NATO since 1995, when the process of indoctrination of peacekeeping operations began. In 1995 NATO published drafts of the following doctrines: NATO Multinational Joint Operational Doctrine, ACE Doctrine for Peace Support Operations and Functional Planning Guide for PSO. At the same time the operations IFOR (1996) and SFOR (1997) in the Balkans served as a means of verifying the process of crisis management, the adoption of basic military-political decisions, consultations between NATO members and its partners, as well as the period of practical verification and the creation of new doctrinal procedures. The process of indoctrination of
18 PSO was finalized in 2000 with the publishing of the documents AJP 3-4 Operations other than War, AJP - 3-4-1 NATO Peace Support Operations and AJP 3-4-1-1 Tactics Techniques and Procedures for NATO Peace Support Operations (Zůna 2002, 8-9).
3.2. Definition and Operationalization of NATO PSO
3.2.1. Article 5 and Non-Article 5 Operations
The updated NATO Strategic Concept approved by the heads of State and Government in April 1999 recognizes two types of NATO military operations: Article 5 - Collective Defense Operations, and non-Article 5 - Crisis Response Operations (CRO), with Peace Support Operations (PSO) continually developing within the context of CRO (NATO Unclassified 2001, xi). CRO can include Support to Civil Agencies, Peace Support Operations and Military Combat Operations (Zůna 2002, 35). The role of NATO in the non-Article 5 NATO crisis management developed over time and would comprise the conflicts breaking out outside of the territories of the Allies in which the aggression was not directed against the Allies themselves. This understanding was expanded in 1993 when the Defense Planning Committee (DPC) in view of the conflicts in the Balkans decided that the concept of “crisis management” should refer to both Article 5 and non-Article 5 scenarios. As Frantzen notes, the post-Cold war understanding of crisis management differed from its predecessor and became used as a framework for the use of military power in order to end conflicts involving state and non-state actors outside the territory of NATO (Frantzen 2005, 65).
In relation to Peace Support Operations, the events of 11 September expanded the content of Article 5 Operations into a new dimension. On the evening of September 12, 2001, the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization invoked the treaty’s mutual defense guarantee for the first time in its 52 years existence. Article 5 clearly states that “an attack on one ally ‘shall be considered an attack against them all” (Gordon 2007, 89-91). Invoking this article illustrated that under certain conditions (in this case a terrorist attack) Allies might have to intervene in another state, which is either unwilling or incapable of controlling non-state groups within its territory. Such action would then qualify as an Article
19 5 Peace Support Operation (Frantzen 2005, 76), even though, as mentioned above, the original definition only worked with PSO as a part of Non-Article 5 operations.
3.2.2. Types of NATO PSO
NATO defines Peace Support Operations as “multi-functional operations, conducted impartially, normally in support of an internationally recognised organisation such as the UN or Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) involving military forces and diplomatic and humanitarian agencies.” It also stresses that these operations are “designed to achieve a long-term political settlement or other specified conditions” and can “include Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement as well as conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace- building and humanitarian relief” (NATO Unclassified 2001, 1). Conflict prevention includes both diplomatic and military activities, such as the preventive deployment of forces, monitoring, inspections, consultations and other activities to prevent escalation of a dispute into an armed phase. Instruments used in conflict prevention may also include the imposition of embargoes and sanctions (NATO Unclassified 2001, 2-3 - 2-4). From the military point of view, it is essential that the PSO maintain their multifunctional character which allows for smooth transition of the allocated forces between the individual types of operations and provide for a comprehensive action in the area of interest with all of the activities being conducted on a continuous basis and complementing each other (Zůna 2002, 37).
Peacekeeping
Peacekeeping operations are generally conducted by NATO to ensure the implementation of a peace agreement and to oversee its compliance with all parties to the conflict. By their nature they should be carried out in accordance with the principles of Chapter VI of the UN Charter. A limitation of peacekeeping is that there is a need for an agreement from all parties to the peace process. A loss of consent and a non-compliant party may, therefore, limit the peacekeeping force’s ability to act and even threaten the continuation of the operation. Some of the guiding characteristics present in peacekeeping missions are the
20 requirement to remain impartial, limitation of the use of force to self-defense and maintaining and promoting consent (NATO Unclassified 2001, 2-4).
Peace Enforcement
If a consensus cannot be reached, peacekeeping can enter into a peace enforcement phase. The aim of peace enforcement is to induce the parties to the conflict to act in order to establish peace or to maintain it, which requires the deployment of more robust military capabilities. The basis for the implementation of peace enforcement operations can be found in Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In the conduct of peace enforcement, there must be an extremely close link between the military and political objectives. It is necessary to note that the aim of a peace enforcement operation is not the defeat or destruction of an enemy, but rather to compel, coerce and persuade the parties of a conflict to comply with a particular course of action (NATO Unclassified 2001, 2-4). As Zůna states, the experience from NATO’s military engagement in Peace Support Operations so far demonstrates that every PSO shows some signs of peace enforcement or is directly conducted as a peace enforcement operation (Zůna 2002, 42).
Conflict Prevention
Conflict prevention can be understood as a set of activities performed in accordance with Chapter VI of the UN Charter. The military actions in conflict prevention may include early warning, observing, monitoring, training, consultations as well as programs aimed at reforms in the military sector in a given area, inspections or preventive deployments of armed forces. As Zůna states, a preventive deployment of armed forces may be considered one of the strongest signals demonstrating the willingness of the Alliance to engage in resolving an emerging crisis (Zůna 2002, 41-42). Military capabilities used for conflict prevention should, in general, focus mainly on providing support to the political development and efforts to mitigate the sources of social tensions and unrest before the commencement of a conflict. As an aid to the conflict prevention, sanctions and embargoes may also be conducted by the Alliance. Sanctions can also be used as a part of a PSO,
21 enforced with varying degrees of military, economic and political pressure (NATO Unclassified 2001, 2-3).
Peacemaking and Peacebuilding
Peacemaking and peacebuilding by NATO are activities aimed at peaceful ending and settling of disputes and establishment of peace after the commencement of a conflict. Peacemaking is usually done with the help of diplomatic instruments with the aim of establishing a cease-fire or a rapid, peaceful settlement. However, if the situation is serious and requires a more robust solution, it is possible to resort to military support either indirectly (e.g., staff support or planning) or in the form of direct involvement of military units. On the contrary, in the context of peacebuilding, mechanisms other than diplomacy are applied with a similar intention, establishing a long-lasting peace between the parties to the dispute. Such instruments may include mechanisms to identify and support structures, which tend to induce the consolidation peace, foster a sense of confidence and well-being and support economic reconstruction. Peacebuilding comes onto scene especially after the end of a conflict, especially a civil war, and addresses issues such as the dysfunctionality of basic infrastructure, inoperability of civil and political institutions or hatred that stayed deeply embedded in the minds of former adversaries. Peace-building actions are constructed to cement a fragile peace and provide for long-term stability by encouraging reconciliation. The military involvement, in this case, provides mainly for a secure environment that allows civilian agencies to focus on the reconciliation and peacebuilding processes (NATO Unclassified 2001, 2-7 - 2-8).
Humanitarian Relief
The last of the listed activities, which are included in PSO, is the humanitarian relief, which encompasses activities aimed at alleviation of human suffering. NATO mostly provides humanitarian assistance in cooperation with international, humanitarian or other organizations, with the focus on military support for humanitarian activities. However, as NATO states, the prime responsibility for the provision of humanitarian aid and assistance rests with the specialized civilian, national, international, government or non-government
22 organizations and agencies. At the same time, NATO is committed to helping people who have been displaced as a result of an ongoing conflict, primarily in coordination with organizations dealing with refugee issues. If the situation requires so, NATO is also eligible to provide humanitarian aid directly and support the military route without cooperation with humanitarian or other agencies. Such activities may be conducted independently or as a part of a PSO (NATO Unclassified 2001, 2-8).
3.3. General Characteristics of NATO PSO
By their definition, NATO PSO fall into the category of Military Operations Other than War and deal with a vast variety of the use of force in the times of peace, conflict, and post- conflict. The difference between NATO PSO and war is the impartial role of the peace support force and careful consideration of compliance with the peace agreements by the actors of a conflict. However, on the tactical level of command, the actions may in some situations be identical with combat activities (Zůna 2002, 38-39).
Several characteristics distinguish Peace Support Operations from other forms of military operations. First of all, Peace Support Operations strictly follow the principle of impartiality. The Peace Support Force is neither in support of nor against any particular party in a conflict, and its primary objective is to create a secure environment in which a self- sustaining peace can be built. However, impartiality is not used as a synonym for neutrality in this context. Secondly, they are supported by a mandate from an international authority and authorized by a decision of the NAC (NATO Unclassified 2001, 2-1). The mandate from a corresponding international authority (UN, OSCE) and the decision of the NAC should distinguish NATO PSO from war and other types of armed combat in which the adversary is clearly defined (Zůna 2002, 40). Moreover, the objectives should be aimed at the restoration of peace and security, and support for the principles of the UN and International Humanitarian Law, not in order to achieve a victory in the conflict (NATO Unclassified 2001, 2-1). Last but not least, the use of force must always be appropriate and proportional in relation to the objectives and restraint must be applied whenever the circumstances allow for it. Limits to the use of force and the means by which it may be used may be established in mission’s mandate as well as by international law, domestic law of the force providers
23 and, under certain circumstances, host nation law (NATO Unclassified 2001, 3). Throughout the operations, the NAC retains full control over the armed forces assigned to them. Close cooperation takes place between the civilian and military components of the missions with the tasks being clearly defined and coordinated throughout their entire duration (Zůna 2002, 37).
Measuring the success of a Peace Support Operation is rather difficult. From the military point of view, the establishment of a secure environment, limitation in armed capacities, demobilization, the creation of control mechanisms and trust-building measures can be considered a favorable outcome (Zůna 2002, 44). From the political view, the objectives can be achieved by the establishment of a secure, stable and self-sustaining environment for the local population. The achievement of such end-state is considered a necessary criterion for the success of the entire operation. As NATO notes in its documents, the achievement of the security-related military objectives should usually only serve as a precursor, or a milestone on the way to achieving the political end-state and the real or actual success of the mission should be measured by the improvement of the daily circumstances of the local population in the former conflict area where the ‘conflicts are no longer solved using force’ (NATO Unclassified 2001, 2-2).
3.4. Selection of Cases
Taking into account the above-mentioned criteria, the following 41 operations (Table 1) have been chosen for the analysis of motives contributing to the German participation/non- participation in NATO PSO. The criteria for selection of cases were rather loose as the aim of the thesis is to include as many relevant cases as possible to achieve a degree of scientific objectivity. Due to the focus on military operations, several humanitarian missions such as operations conducted in response to humanitarian emergencies or the humanitarian aid operations following the break-up of the Soviet Union6 were omitted from the selection. In addition to that, NATO Training Missions (NTM in Afghanistan, NTM in Iraq, Kampf gegen den Islamistischen Staat) were also omitted, as they do not fit the PSO criteria (bpb 2018,
6 For a complete list of humanitarian operations conducted under NATO see https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_117757.htm.
24 n.p.). As one of the conditions for an operation to qualify as a PSO is a corresponding mandate from international authority such as the UN or the OSCE (Zůna 2002, 40), the operation “Allied Force” conducted in Kosovo in 1999 without a UN Security Council mandate (Leithner 2009, 21) was also excluded from the list. Moreover, five borderline cases (Anchor Guard, Ace Guard, Display Deterrence, Active Fence and Eagle Assist) were included in the observed set. These operations are slightly problematic as they were conducted on the territory of NATO member states and therefore would not fit a strict definition of PSO that were originally defined as non-Article 5 operations conducted outside the NATO territory. However, as mentioned above, the definition of “crisis management” (part of PSO) was expanded already in 1993 to include both Article 5 and non-Article 5 scenarios (Frantzen 2005, 65). In relation to PSO, following the September 11 attacks, it was determined that Article 5 scenarios could also be included (Frantzen 2005, 76). The exact criteria for these operations are however not clearly defined by the primary literature. After careful consideration, a decision was made to include all NATO military operations conducted within the territory of NATO member states as well if they were carried out in response to a conflict outside of the NATO territory and to all instances of Article 5 operations7. The main reason for following this extended definition of PSO is that it provides larger variety on the outcome end as in case the strict definition of PSO was followed the data would only show 4 operations in which Germany did not take part (see Table 2), which does not provide enough variation to allow for relevant analysis of the sufficient and necessary conditions. Moreover, the operations are qualitatively rather similar to PSO defined in the strict terms, which should allow for their inclusion without negatively affecting the results of the analysis. Considering the time frame, the research is going to include all NATO PSO operations taking place since the reunification of Germany in 1990 until 2018. The complete list of selected cases can be found in Table 1.
7 The operations in Turkey were carried out in response to a threat from Iran during the Gulf war, the second Gulf conflict as well as to the Syrian war (NATO 2016a, n.p.) while operation Eagle Assist was an Article 5 operation following the September 11 attacks.
25 Table 1: Selection of cases No. Country Operation Beginning End 1. Turkey Anchor Guard 10.8.1990 9.3.1991 2. Turkey Ace Guard 3.1.1991 8.3.1991 3. Central Agile Genie 1.5.1992 19.5.1992 Mediterranean 4. Former Yugoslavia Maritime Monitor 16.7.1992 22.11.1992 5. Former Yugoslavia Maritime Guard 22.11.1992 15.6.1993 6. Former Yugoslavia Sharp Guard 15.6.1993 2.10.1996 7. Bosnia a Sky Monitor 16.10.1992 12.4.1993 Herzegovina 8. Bosnia a Deny Flight 13.4.1993 20.12.1995 Herzegovina 9. Bosnia a Deadeye 30.8.1995 31.8.1995 Herzegovina 10. Bosnia a Deliberate Force 30.8.1995 20.9.1995 Herzegovina 11. Bosnia a Joint Endeavour (IFOR) 20.12.1995 20.12.1996 Herzegovina 12. Bosnia a Decisive Endeavour (IFOR) 21.12.1995 20.12.1996 Herzegovina 13. Bosnia a Joint Guard (SFOR) 21.12.1996 19.6.1998 Herzegovina 14. Bosnia a Deliberate Guard 21.12.1996 19.6.1998 Herzegovina 15. Bosnia a Joint Forge (SFOR II) 20.6.1998 2.12.2004 Herzegovina 16. Kosovo Determined Force 13.10.1998 23.3.1999 17. Kosovo Eagle Eye 30.10.1998 24.3.1999 18. Kosovo Joint Guarantor 4.12.1998 20.3.1999 19. Kosovo Determined Guarantor March 1999 11.6.1999 20. Kosovo Allied Harvest 9.6.1999 26.8.1999 21. Kosovo Joint Guardian (KFOR) 12.6.1999 April 2005 22. Kosovo Allied Harvest II 8.4.2000 2000 23. Kosovo Joint Enterprise (KFOR) April 2005 ongoing 24. Albania Allied Harbor (AFOR) 16.4.1999 30.8.1999 25. Macedonia Essential Harvest 27.8.2001 27.9.2001 26. Macedonia Amber Fox 27.9.2001 16.12.2002 27. Macedonia Allied Harmony 16.12.2002 31.3.2003 28. Turkey Display Deterrence 20.2.2003 16.4.2003 29. Turkey Active Fence December 2012 2015 30. USA Eagle Assist Oct 2001 May 2002
26 31. Afghanistan Enduring Freedom (OEF) 16.11.2001 1.6.2010 32. Afghanistan International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 22.12.2001/11.8.20038 28.12.2014 under NATO command 33. Afghanistan Resolute Support 1.1.2015 ongoing 34. Sudan NATO Support to African 23.6.2005 31.12.2007 Union mission in Sudan 35. Somalia NATO Support to African 7.6.2007 ongoing Union mission in Somalia 36. Indian Ocean Allied Provider 24.10.2008 12.12.2008 37. Indian Ocean Allied Protector 24.3.2009 17.8.2009 38. Indian Ocean Ocean Shield 17.8.2009 15.12.2016 39. Libya Unified Protector 31.3.2011 31.10.2011 40. Mediterranean Sea Active Endeavour 26.10.2001 15.7.2016 41. Mediterranean Sea Sea Guardian 1.10.2016 ongoing Source: NATO 2016a, n.p; GlobalSecurity.org, n.p.
8 ISAF started as a UN-led operation in 2001. At the request of the UN and the governmnet of Afghanistan NATO took command of it in August 2003 (Sperling 2010, 56).
27 4. General Tendencies Impacting the German Participation in NATO PSO
The following chapter is going to address a number of factors that have an impact on the German defense policy as well as the participation of Germany on NATO PSO. These factors include (1) historical background and the idea of normalization of the German foreign policy, (2) the development of Germany’s legal framework in relation to sending troops into operations outside of the standard territorial defense, (3) the reforms of Bundeswehr after the reunification of Germany and (4) the changes in the federal defense budget over the years. Due to the scope of the thesis, this listing is not going to be exhaustive and should only serve as a basis for understanding the setting in which the decisions to send the German troops abroad are taking place.
4.1. Political Culture and Normalization of the Foreign Policy
German foreign policy has for decades been, and to large extent still remains, shaped by the learning process from the past. In an attempt to come to terms with the experience of World War II and to learn from their mistakes, Germans opted for a dramatic shift in their political culture. The new strategic culture emerged out a combination of the collective and physical moral trauma in West Germany, represented in the notion of Stunde Null (zero hour) and the expectations of the Western powers in the setting of the coming Cold War (Longhurst 2006, 2). The mottos “nie wieder Krieg“ (never again war), “nie wieder Auschwitz“ (never again Auschwitz) and „nie wieder allein“ (never again alone) (Kříž and Urbanovská 2014, 111) began to dictate the course of the German foreign and security policy for the upcoming decades. As Maull states, “this revolutionary change originally owed as much to necessity as to choice.” After the defeat, Germany was devastated both physically and morally, was disarmed, divided and occupied by the four winning powers. Its two halves were absorbed by the two opposing superpowers and their borders became the frontline of the Cold War, which resulted in significant security challenges for both “Germanys”. Thus, West Germany ́s security policies reflected the necessities of its security situation as well as its post-war political evolution and the preferences of the German political elites (Maull 1999, 3).
28 The new political culture was defined by the rejection of the past German ”Sonderweg” (special path) and all its implications such as anti-Western orientation, the tendency towards authoritarian or even totalitarian politics, as well as inclinations towards the use of military force as a means of pursuing national interests (Maull 1999, 4). To this day, Germans pride themselves on having learned the lessons of history and therefore being unlikely to repeat past mistakes. Leithner even considers it the single most important element of their historical memory. Derived from that the general lessons coming from the World War II experience are responsibility, reliability, multilateralism, predictability, and antimilitarism (Leithner 2009, 8). In the area of defense, this has been manifested especially in the legally restricted role of the armed forces, the reintroduction of conscription, the tight integration into multilateral defense institutions and the German reluctance towards the use of force outside the scope of territorial defense (Longhurst 2006, 2). The newly constructed Bundeswehr also followed a so-called “citizen in uniform” philosophy (in German academic literature also described with the term “Innere Führung”). According to this concept, a soldier is primarily seen as a “fully fledged member of society imbued with full rights of political participation and responsibility.” This new approach was meant to prevent the separation of the military from the civilian society and prevent its misuse for political goals (Longhurst 2006, 42).
The realities of the Cold War, however, did not allow for a completely passive Germany. As Western Europe and West Germany were facing an extremely powerful military threat, which Germany could not counter on its own, the only way for Germany to protect itself was to receive protection from the United States9. And the only means for America to defend Western Europe was through protection of Germany (Maull 1999, 5). This need resulted in rearmament of Germany and its accession to NATO in 1955. The integration of Bundeswehr into NATO also gave rise to the debates about the issue of participation in Western out-of-area operations. During the Cold War, the question was remote, but it was not wholly absent. With the integration into NATO, the United States asked for a symbolic German military support during several crises (such as in the Vietnam war, the Cyprus
9 To support its alliance commitment with the West and receive extended nuclear protection from the United States, Germany agreed on the deployment of various NATO combat forces on its territory (including up to 100.000 US troops) during the Cold War (Harnisch 2013, 75).
29 conflict or in the Middle East). Germany took part in some of the operations until 1982, after which Bonn rejected all such requests on constitutional grounds based on a decision of the Federal Security Council (Maull 1999, 7). Exceptions were purely “technical” Bundeswehr missions such as disaster relief or transport tasks for UN peacekeepers, which, according to German constitutional understanding, are not subject to the exercise of powers in the context of official authority (Meiers 2010, 204).
The reunification of the two German republics in 1990 led to numerous discussions about the new role of Germany in today’s world and the possibilities of the so-called “normalization” of the German security policy. First of all, it is necessary to define, what such “normalization” means as the understanding of the behavior of a “normalized power” differs between individual academics. Most of the proponents of the normalization thesis, such as Philip Gordon, John Mearsheimer, Volker Rittberger and Geoffrey van Orden, used the neo-realist logic to predict the post-1989 German behavior. They claimed in various ways that German defense policy, which has been ‘unnaturally constrained for 40 years’ can now benefit from the new balance of power in Europe and aspire to a normal great power activity, assertively pursuing national interests which may differ from those of its allies even by the threat of force (Longhurst 2006, 6-7). Even an argument was advanced that Germany would seek to acquire nuclear capabilities and leave its existing ties with international partners. Yet, none of these assumptions came into reality and the post-Cold War behavior remained shaped by what Malici calls “Venutian values”: a high level of moderation, restraint and circumspection, multilateralism, a focus on cooperative institution building along with further integration, and international law (Malici 2006, 38). As Risse points out, in the 21st century an active foreign policy cannot mean ignoring existing interdependencies and succumbing to the fiction that a foreign policy based on the national state framework is still possible. On the contrary, it means accepting and actively helping to shape these interdependencies as the basis of foreign policy action (Risse 2004, 26).
Years later, Wagener defines normalization (or normal power) in terms of behavior similar to that of most other states. Germany as a strong middle-sized power with considerable territorial, economic and demographic potential cannot be compared to the United States or Russia but it can be on an even standing with the two leading powers in Europe, France
30 and the United Kingdom. Germany could be characterized as a normal power if it utilized its resources and showed a determination to take part in the military operations under the auspices of the United Nations, NATO or the European Union in a similar way as Paris or London (Wagener 2006, 79). One of the fronts on which Germany is often compared with France or the United Kingdom is their view of the concept of national interest and a need for a strategy that would lead to its pursuit. Many academics agree that despite a series of security policy documents, Germany still misses a standard security strategy, which was also confirmed by the former minister of defense, zu Gutenberg, in October 2010. As Kříž and Urbanovská state, when it comes to the German national interest, the most significant problem is the notorious reluctance of the political elite to give it an explicit definition (Kříž and Urbanovská 2014, 97-98). Throughout the Cold War and during most of the 1990s, German foreign policy was justified mostly in terms of responsibility, the lessons of history, and humanitarian interests, as opposed to national interests. The German politicians seem almost afraid to even hint at an interest-based foreign policy as talk about interests is invariably linked to the painful memories of the past (Leithner 2009, 9) and if they do, they are only defined in terms of norms and values such as close integration with the West or the desire to uphold universal human rights (Maull 1999, 8).
The fact that the discourse about national interests remains problematic can be demonstrated for instance on an incident which resulted in a resignation of the then Federal President, Horst Koehler, in 2010. His remark in a radio interview given on his return from a tour of German military bases in Afghanistan, that “a large economic power like Germany, with its significant global trading interests, must be willing to deploy its military abroad” and the mostly pacifist German public was finally coming to recognize that their country could no longer avoid involvement in military missions, which helped “protect [German] interests, for example, free trade routes, or to prevent regional instability, which might certainly have a negative effect on [German] trade, jobs and income”, was followed by a large wave of criticism (Connolly 2010, n.p.). Until recently, there have also been significant limits as to where Germany could pursue such interests. As Leithner points out, any area in which soldiers of the Wehrmacht had been engaged during the World War II remained off-limits irrespective of the situation (Leithner 2009, 10).
31 Over the years Germany transformed from a net beneficiary to a net producer of security in Europe (Longhurst 2006, 2). The reunification of Germany and its regained sovereignty brought greater demands from the international partners, especially when it comes to taking over more international responsibility. Still, only a few would describe it as a “normal power” in the sense described above. According to Dyson, in the case of Bundeswehr, it became apparent that “normalization” did not mean a structural transformation into a professional, war-fighting army. The change in German security and defense policy did not result in an effort to project power at the international and European levels but rather in a complex adjustment to changes in domestic and international conditions (Dyson 2008, 35). As Maull stresses, when it comes to the participation of the Bundeswehr in military operations outside the traditional alliance context after the reunification of Germany, the governments accommodated the demands of the allies as and the new realities of the international environment with visible reluctance and after a considerable “soul searching” (Maull 1999, 1). Even though Germany appears to be on the road to normalcy, at least with regard to its views on the practice of foreign policy, the changes remain incremental and as Leithner points out, where the German policy has been in the past still defines where it can go in the future and how quickly it can get there (Leithner 2009, 2).
4.2. Development of the Legal Framework
As mentioned above, the legal framework and its changes throughout the years played an important factor in the decisions about the deployments of the Bundeswehr abroad. The German Constitution (The Basic Law) provides the main regulatory framework when it comes to the use of armed forces by the Berlin republic and was often cited as the main obstacle to the German ability to use force outside territorial defense. At the time of its creation, right after the end of the Second World War, the constitution skipped the defense issues completely with the exception of the prohibition to launch a war of aggression - Article 26 (Gotkowska 2012, 8). It was not until the processes of rearmament and the German accession to NATO were concluded that a mass of security and military-related laws were incorporated into the Basic Law in March 1956 (Longhurst 2006, 28). The German accession to NATO in 1955 resulted in an Amendment to the Basic Law stating that “The Federation shall establish Armed Forces for purposes of defense” Art. 24 Para. 2 then
32 specifies: “With a view to maintaining peace, the Federation may enter into a system of mutual collective security; in doing so it shall consent to such limitations upon its sovereign powers as will bring about and secure a lasting peace in Europe and among the nations of the world” (Basic Law, n.p.). Bundeswehr is by its nature a “parliamentary army.” The parliamentary control and oversight over the armed forces are reinforced by Article 155a, which states that each deployment of the Bundeswehr requires a two-thirds majority of the Bundestag (lower chamber of parliament) votes as well as the consent of the second chamber, the Bundesrat (Basic Law, n.p.). In the times of the Cold War, such constitutional restrictions were understandable as Germany found itself right in the middle of the Cold War East-West division with the physical and symbolic line running through it. Under such conditions, neither Germany nor its allies had any interest in establishing new German offensive capacities and for decades there has been a long-standing consensus about the interpretation of constitutional constraints when it comes to out of area deployments.
The end of the Cold War and the regaining of full sovereignty brought new questions about what role the Bundeswehr should play in the future and what responsibilities Germany should have as a member of NATO, that was also about to redefine its purpose. In the context of possible German participation in the crisis in Yugoslavia, a question arose whether such operation would be in accordance with the Art. 24 Para. 2 of the Basic Law, which authorizes the Federal Republic to enter a system of mutual collective security. Out of a membership in such organization then necessarily derives the right and the duty to participate on measures for restoration or maintenance of peace and security (Gießmann and Wagner 2009, 127). The discussions ended in a decision of the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) from July 12, 1994. The court recognized in its ruling that the tasks resulting from Germany’s membership in the systems of collective security and collective defense are compatible with the Basic Law (Gotkowska 2012, 11). As noted by many German authors, the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court created the conditions for the deployment of the Bundeswehr abroad and gave a political space for negotiations back to the government. Although, it is worth pointing out that the creation of the necessary legal basis for Germany's foreign engagement did not derive from the political authorities within the executive and legislative branches, but the judiciary (Kříž and Urbanovská 2014, 104).
33
The most recent change in the German out or area debate has been brought by the Parliament Participation Act (Parlamentsbeteiligungsgesetz) of 2005, which formalizes the parliamentary oversight over the Bundeswehr. It states that any deployment of troops abroad with the expectation of combat requires prior approval of the Bundestag. The requests coming from the government must include detailed information on the projected size, capabilities, employment period, and cost of the contingent (Haass 2017, n.p.). The new law also creates a simplified procedure for minor involvements and emergency situations. The non-combat operations, such as planning and preparatory measures as well as humanitarian aid and assistance no longer require a parliamentary approval. Since the Parliamentary Participation Act came into force, the German Bundestag has given its consent to more than 70 requests of the Federal Government for the deployment of the Bundeswehr troops abroad, or the extension of such mandates, and has not rejected a single application (Brose 2013, 5).
At the moment, there are ongoing discussions about a reform of the Parliament Participation act connected to the need for strengthening the European Union's ability to act in the changing international security environment. Although the Bundestag has never prevented a deployment of the Bundeswehr, international partners identify the parliamentary reservation as a problem for Berlin's ability to form a coalition (Major and Mölling 2016, 34). These discussions have first been initiated in 2012 by two members of the Bundestag. Roderich Kiesewetter (CDU) and Andreas Schockenhoff (CDU) proposed to make the German decision-making system more flexible10 (Kříž and Urbanovská 2014, 109). In 2014, the Bundestag established a commission chaired by the former Defense Minister, Volker Rühe, with the aim to “examine how to secure parliamentary rights through progressive alliance integration and despite the diversification of tasks.” The Greens and the Left, being afraid of a restriction of parliamentary rights with regard to the foreign deployments of the Bundeswehr, refused to cooperate with the commission set up by the CDU/CSU and the SPD. The commission published its first report on June 16, 2015 (Dewitz 2015, n.p.). Its recommendations focused mainly on simplifying the authorization
10 For more information see: http://www.roderich-kiesewetter.de/uploads/media/20120530-GSVP-Papier.pdf.
34 procedures for tasks such as training missions and support operations but as Mölling and Voss note, more fundamental questions leading to the establishment of the commission have been left behind (Mölling and von Voß 2016, n.p.). In January 2016, a draft amendment to the Parliamentary Participation Act (BTDrs 18/736011) following the recommendations of the Rühe commission has been presented by the coalition but the reform has been suspended for the time being (Gauseweg 2017, n.p.).
4.3. The Reforms of Bundeswehr
Analyzing the German participation in out of area operations, it is also important to bear in mind that for a long time, the Bundeswehr could not be considered a standard modern army and its capabilities remained largely limited to territorial defense. In order to be able to fully participate in the alliance operations, the Bundeswehr had to come through several reforms over the years. These changes gave the German armed forces a new identity of a crisis-reaction, mission-oriented army, competent to take on international responsibilities and participate in a variety of crisis management and humanitarian action operations (Dyson 2008, 24) but as many academics point out, there are many limitations to the capabilities of the Bundeswehr that prevail to this day.
One of the main changes brought by the unification was the dramatic decrease in the number of troops that Germany possessed. During the cold war, the Nationale Volksarmee (NVA)12 comprised of 175,000 troops, whereas the Bundeswehr numbered around 500,000 troops. The Two Plus Four Treaty between the two German states and the four wartime Allies set a ceiling on the upper limit at 370,000 to be met by 1994. That resulted in a radical reorganization of the armed forces. The NVA was largely downsized13 and absorbed into the Bundeswehr, following its “citizen in uniform” philosophy (Dyson 2008, 36). The participation in various stabilization missions in the 1990s revealed substantial deficits in actual capabilities of the Bundeswehr. As von Krause notes, many of these deficits became known already in 1992. However, due to political reasons, they were not addressed until
11 Available at http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/073/1807360.pdf. 12 The army of the German Democratic Republic (East Germany). 13 Only around 3000 officials of the former NVA were taken over by the Bundeswehr (Kříž and Urbanovská, 2014, 197).
35 2000 when the new comprehensive reform of the armed forces commenced (von Krause 2013, 346).
Already in 1998, the new red-green coalition agreed in their coalition agreement that a commission on Bundeswehr reform should be established. In 1999, the findings of the commission were published in a document titled “Bestandsaufnahme der Bundeswehr an der Schwelle zum 21. Jahrhundert” (Inventory of the Bundeswehr on the threshold of the 21st century). In the spring of 1999, a commission “Gemeinsame Sicherheit und die Zukunft der Bundeswehr” (Common Security and the Future of Bundeswehr) led by the former federal president, von Weizsäcker, was formed. The final report of the commission published in 2000, determined that even though Germany possessed a massive army, its crises reaction forces were rather weak, which made the fulfillment of the foreign policy commitments impossible. The Bundeswehr still maintained its Cold War structures aimed at territorial defense against large-scale attacks. In addition to that, nearly half of the ground force manpower was conscripted and, therefore, unsuitable for out of area deployments. Moreover, the declining defense spending had strictly curtailed the modernization of existing and procurement of new equipment, jeopardizing the Bundeswehr’s capabilities to cooperate with international partners even further (Huber and Schmidt 2004, 350-351). The Weizsäker Commission, as it came to be known, was later joined by a further investigation led by Hans-Peter von Kirchbach. A third report and set of recommendations were created by Defence Minister Scharping himself14. While this report corresponded to some extent with the other two, it was quite distinct and later served as a framework within which the defense reforms were accomplished (Longhurst 2006, 105). But as Crawford notes, only a few changes were accomplished during Sharping’s term as Defense Minister (Crawford 2007, 97).
The following transformation of the German army took place between 2003 and was supposed to be completed by 2006. (Kříž and Urbanovská 2014, 201) This time, the impulse for change was brought by the events of September 11 and the War on Terrorism. Despite
14 As Longhurst concludes, the rationale for the three reports came from the fact that the recommendations from the Weizsäker report were considered too radical by Scharping while more realistic and doable Kirchbach’s recommendations were far too conservative in his view.
36 the German aversion to the war in Iraq, by 2003 Berlin was overstretched by the large numbers of troops deployed in peacekeeping operations. Moreover, the capabilities were limited by further cuts in public spending. The new reform was supposed to follow the new Defense Policy Guidelines (Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien) issued by Sharping’s successor, Peter Struck. The main thesis of the document was that the concept of defense should exceed responses to conventional attacks and should also include conflict and crisis prevention and the joint crisis management (Longhurst 2004, 112-113). The reform led to restructuring the Bundeswehr into a 35,000-strong Rapid-Reaction Force (Eingreifskräfte) suited for higher-intensity warfare, 70,000 stabilization troops for low to medium-intensity operations and 147,500 support/logistical forces (Dyson 2011, 246).
The most recent reform and restructuring which has yet to be completed has been initiated in 2010 and has been in the stage of implementation since 2012. Motivated by austerity and the ambition to resolve capability gaps and operations problems, the reform has encompassed significant budget limitation, base closures, personnel reduction, the move to a professional force, and a restructuring emphasizing flexibility and a broad spectrum of capabilities. Following the operational needs, one of the reform’s targets is guaranteeing the permanent availability of 10,000 combat-ready troops for overseas deployments (Haass 2017, n.p.) while the number of military personnel has been reduced to 170,000 (von Krause 2013, 330). In 2011, the Ministry of Defense also published updated Defense Policy Guidelines (Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien) following the above-mentioned reform proposals. One of the most significant changes to the structure of Bundeswehr was the shift towards professional force (German Ministry of Defence 2011, 30) and the end of conscription, which only came in July 2011 as a reaction to operational needs of the new types of missions (von Krause 2013, 330). As Longhurst points out, in comparison with other Western European countries, Germany was rather slow on the trend to shift towards a smaller professional armed force as conscription played an important part in legitimizing the democratic character of the military and was understood as the best means to preclude the Bundeswehr’s isolation from society and to guard against the emergence of the military as a state within a state (Longhurst 2004, 44).
37 On June 14, 2012, the Bundestag adopted the so-called Bundeswehr Reform Implementation Act (Bundeswehrreform-Begleitgesetz) putting many of the measures proposed by the reform into practice, however, several problems, such as financing, site closures, military equipment programs or recruiting remained to be resolved (Kříž and Urbanovská 2014, 204-5). In 2016, the updated White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr has been published. It again puts emphasis on the need to adapt the Bundeswehr to be able to respond to new forms of threats and hybrid warfare at short notice (German Ministry of Defence 2016, 88). However, in reaction to the Russian annexation of Crimea, it also returns to the need of territorial defense capabilities. Overall, it can be said that Germany is slowly going in the right direction, but as Crawford points out, over twenty years after unification, the Bundeswehr remains one of the least “deployable” NATO’s armies (Crawford 2010, 173). With the ability to deploy only around 10 percent of its troops, the German army falls far below the NATO average and the 50 percent deployability goal set for NATO forces (Sperling 2010, 55). Even though the Bundeswehr troops are involved in a number of peacekeeping and crisis management operations around the world as a part of multinational units, the rules of engagement limit their ability to use force far more than for any other NATO countries (Crawford 2010, 173-4).
The current security policy debate in Germany is focused mainly on the possibilities of strengthening the European wing of NATO and increasing the effectiveness of defense cooperation as also outlined in the 2016 White Paper on Security Policy. In this sense, Germany is a strong proponent of the Framework Nations Concept15, which it introduced into NATO in 2013. This strategy would require the European NATO members to pool their capabilities forming multinational capability clusters and arranging themselves into larger units (German Ministry of Defense 2016, 67) resulting in improved operational capabilities and increased sustainability. If the Framework Nations Concept was implemented, it would necessarily also have an impact on the state of Bundeswehr and might contribute to resolving some of the limitations it is currently facing (Major and Mölling 2014, 1-2). Although, as Major and Mölling note, so far, there have been no visible results and implementation of such concepts takes time (Major and Mölling 2016, 35). Another topic
15 For further information on the concept see Major and Mölling 2014.
38 that largely resonated in the German media in the past few weeks (as of May 2018) is the need for strengthening the territorial defense capabilities that had already been outlined in the 2016 White Paper on Security Policy. The Defense Minister von der Leyen (CDU) wants to reduce the focus on foreign missions - in favor of state and alliance defense so that the Bundeswehr dedicates itself to both tasks are “on equal footing.” These changes are outlined in a draft of a policy paper that is already available to the Bundestag and should be published in June (Werkhäuser 2018, n.p.).
4.4. The Changes in Defense Budget over Time
As hinted above, another significant factor distinguishing Berlin from the other two medium-sized European powers pointed out by Wagener is the overall defense spending. Even though the Bundeswehr is expected to participate in an increasing number of operations abroad, the government is ready to allocate the necessary resources only to a limited extent. From the very beginning, the Finance Ministry has put obstacles to planning and prevented the Bundeswehr from meeting its NATO commitments and served as an important source of pressure to change the NATO and EU agenda of pooling military capabilities and privatization (Dyson 2008, 26-27), which would bring more cost-efficiency into the military cooperation. Since 1997, the German defense spending has never overreached 1.5 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) and has been more or less on a steady decline since 2009. The development of the German defense budget since the reunification in 1990 is presented in Chart 1 below.
39 Chart 1: German military expenditures (1990-2016)
Source: WB 2018.
In absolute terms, Germany ranks third among the major EU member states (after France and the UK) in each category of defense spending. However, when comparing the national shares of total defense expenditures with the national share of GDP, the differences become more significant (Sperling 2010, 55). For comparison, in 2016, the German defense budget equaled for roughly 1.2 percent of the GDP, whereas in France and the United Kingdom the defense spending accounted for 2.3 percent and 1.8 percent respectively (WB 2018, n.p.). This inconsistency in Germany’s proclaimed security policy goals and the Bundeswehr’s actual capability is also stressed by Longhurst who identifies the financial uncertainties as one of the main obstacles in reforming the Bundeswehr to make it more fit to contemporary security challenges (Longhurst 2004, 98).
The issue of defense budget has been a sore point for the relations with NATO allies, especially with the United States. The international partners called for a well-trained and well-equipped army ready to participate in crisis management tasks. Already in 1999, the US Secretary of Defense complained that Germany failed to restructure its military for the challenges of the post-cold war era and let its defense budget drop down to 1.5 percent of the GNP (Meiers 2010, 210). The pressure from international allies had escalated even more over the years. As a result of the NATO Wales summit in 2014, Germany pledged to reach 2 percent target by 2024, at least on the rhetorical level. According to Deutsche Welle, such
40 an increase would require Germany to raise its defense spending from 37 billion Euros in 2017 to over 70 billion Euros in 2024 (Werkhäuser 2017, n.p.).
With the election of Donald Trump, the US has been showing more reluctance than ever to be the guarantor of European security, putting Berlin under more pressure to take on more of the burden. The issue of taking over more responsibility has been present in German politics already since 2014 when German political leaders in a string of speeches at the Munich security conference declared the country’s readiness to play a more active role in the military affairs (Buck 2018, n.p.). Angela Merkel has later reaffirmed this stance in 2017 after a G7 Summit during which Trump publicly criticized NATO allies for not spending enough on defense and called Germany “very bad.” In a speech at a meeting of the Bavarian CSU, she stated that “the era in which [Europe] could fully rely on others is over to some extent” confirming that Europe (and Germany) should take its security into its own hands (Paravicini 2017, n.p.), which would necessarily mean investing more into the military. The need for a sustainable funding and adequate financial resources for Germany “to continue to play an active and substantial role in security and defense policy” was also highlighted in the Defense White Paper from 2016 (German Ministry of Defense 2016, 117).
As shown by the election campaign in 2017, the question of defense spending remains very controversial. The chancellor candidate of the SPD, CDU’s main rival and currently a partner in the so-called “Grand Coalition,” called the goal unrealistic and wrong, as it would make Germany the biggest military power in Europe. The SPD representatives repeatedly stressed that they would rather invest in crisis prevention and humanitarian aid, which should in their opinion be understood as an integral part of the overall defense expenditure. There also remains a disagreement between the parties on whether the NATO resolution is binding. Whereas the SPD views the 2 percent as an orientation mark, the CDU sees it as an obligation (Werkhäuser 2017, n.p.). What remains clear is that there is a need for change in the way the defense budget has been handled as the financial deficits and outdated military equipment are severely affecting German ability to carry out military operations in cooperation with its partners.
41 As for the current developments, the Union and the SPD are still bitterly arguing about how much money the Bundeswehr should receive in the coming years (Werkhäuser 2018, n.p.) even though in the coalition agreement, the parties have agreed to approach NATO's two percent target by 2024 (CDU/CSU 2018, n.p.). The pledges of Finance Minister Olaf Scholz (SPD) are far below what the defense minister calls for, to fill up the "hollow structures," which were created by the years of austerity measures (Werkhäuser 2018, n.p.). Despite the gradual increase in the defense budget, the quota will still be a meager 1.24 percent of the GDP in 2018 and overall the Bundeswehr would only receive around 20 percent of the €12 billion needed by 2021 (Gebauer 2018, n.p.). However, there are speculations that von den Leyen is planning to use the new policy paper, mentioned in the previous section, in the argumentation for increased funding because while individual foreign missions may be dispensable, deficiencies in national and alliance defense are hardly acceptable (Werkhäuser 2018, n.p.).
42 5. German Participation in NATO PSO
The chapter going to present some of the foreign operations that had the most significant impact on the development of German foreign and security policy over the years. The aim of this chapter is to put the Bundeswehr participation in out of area operations into a better perspective and serve as an addition to the data on which the QCA analysis is going to be based. It begins with the missions responding to the first Gulf War that represents strong continuation with the course foreign policy taken during the Cold War, while the subsequent missions in the Balkans and in Afghanistan represent an important development. As will be seen, accompanied by the reforms of Bundeswehr mentioned in Chapter 4.3, the German deployments in out of area operations became more professionalized and more robust over the years.
5.1. Turkey (Kuwait/Iraq)
The post-unification history of German participation in out-of-area military operations began in the wake of the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War. The attack and the subsequent occupation of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein's Iraq in August 1990 took place when the Federal Republic of Germany was in the final phase of the "two-plus four-talks" and the political elites were mainly concerned with the reunification. As Crawford stresses, when hostilities commenced in August 1990, all Germany’s partners, even Turkey, called for the deployment of German troops, if only to provide logistical support (Crawford 2007, 88). However, due to the serious domestic opposition and prevailing disagreements on the constitutionality of the use of force abroad, Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Genscher opted for the traditional role of a paymaster during the crisis, donating about $12 billion U.S. dollars directed at management of the conflict (Harnisch 2013, 82). In total, Germany paid for almost one-third of the overall war costs in financial contributions and military material (Hacke 2011, 51). Besides financial support, it also responded to the crisis by sending 212 troops to protect NATO partner Turkey in January 1991 as a part of operation “Ace Guard” (Rauch 2006, 100). However, there were fierce discussions in Germany about how it would respond in case of an Iraqi attack on Turkey and activation of the Art 5 of the NATO-treaty (von Krause 2013, 169). Overall, Germany has been harshly criticized by its allies for the way it handled the
43 situation and for using “checkbook diplomacy” (Meiers 2010, 204) instead of taking responsibility and actively participating in resolving the crisis.
5.2. Former Yugoslavia / Bosnia and Herzegovina
Following the breakup of Yugoslavia, violent ethnic conflicts emerged in its former constituencies. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the political conflict was caused especially by the ethnic and religious division of the population into three groups that have been living scattered around the territory for hundreds of years (Rauch 2009, 305). The humanitarian situation reached an alarming point in the spring of 1992. According to the data from the Bosnian government, around 670,000 people had been expelled from their homes or had been fleeing from the renewed violence. Five weeks later, this number grew to 30,000 people missing and 1,4 million refugees or internally displaced persons. One-third of all housing units had already been destroyed and a humanitarian catastrophe took off. Since May 30, 1992, Sarajevo has been besieged by Serbian troops and shot at with heavy weapons (Wölfle 2005, 58).
Up to summer 1992, NATO played a rather marginal role in the management of the crisis in Yugoslavia. It was only on July 4, 1992, that the North Atlantic Council (NAC) expressed its willingness to support peacekeeping activities under the supervision of the CSCE on a case- by-case basis and in accordance with its own procedures. A month later, it decided to undertake an operation monitoring the compliance with Security Council Resolutions 713 and 715, which imposed a general embargo on all deliveries of weapons to the territory of former Yugoslavia as well as comprehensive sanctions. In the operation “Maritime Monitor,” NATO forces were conducting surveillance, identification, and reporting of maritime traffic in selected areas in international waters in the Adriatic sea16 (Gazzini 2001, 392). The Bundeswehr had been engaged in the operation since July 1992 (Longhurst 2004, 60) but as its nature changed on November 18, 1992, the German Government announced that its naval forces would not participate in any activities involving the application of coercive measures (Gazzini 2001, 393).
16 From June 15, 1993, the operation continued jointly with the WEU under the name “Sharp Guard” (Wölfle 2005, 58).
44
Since April 12, 1993, the Alliance also enforced a no-fly zone above Bosnia and Herzegovina, declared by the UN, in the operation “Deny Flight.” The Bundeswehr took part in this operation as a part of AWACS. Through the UN SC Resolution 824 (1993), the UN established safe areas in Sarajevo, Tuzla, Žepa, Goražde, Bihać, and Srebrenica. In these zones, the UN blue helmet troops with the support of NATO military aircraft guaranteed the safety of the population (Wölfle 2005, 56). The UNPROFOR troops were authorized to take the necessary measures, including the use of force, in case of an attack or armed invasion into the safe zones (Gazzini 2001, 398). However, as the mandate only allowed for the use of force self- defense, the Blue Helmets were facing a strong dilemma. In July 1995 the deadliest massacre of the Bosnian war took place. As a result of a frontal attack on the city of Srebrenica on July 11, 1995, up to 8000 Bosnian Muslims in the age from twelve to eighty were killed (Rauch 2009, 305) under the passive umbrella of the UNPROFOR.
As a reaction to the Serb-led violence, UN peacekeepers requested NATO airstrikes in August 1995. Operations “Deadeye” against Bosnian-Serb air forces began at the end of the month but failed to result in their compliance with the UN demands. It was followed by Operation “Deliberate Force” targeted at the Serbian command and control installation and ammunition facilities. The NATO air campaign played a key role in bringing the Serbs to the negotiating table and ending the violence in Bosnia. The Dayton Accord negotiated in Dayton and signed in Paris on 14 December 1995 (the General Framework Agreement for Peace) put an end to the war in former Yugoslavia. NATO subsequently deployed a UN- mandated Implementation Force (IFOR) of around 60,000 troops in November 1995 in an operation “Joint Endeavour” (NATO 2016a, n.p.). The German Bundestag endorsed the participation on the operation on June 26, 1995, with 543 votes in favor, 107 against and 7 abstained (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2013, 71). The task of the IFOR was monitoring of the ceasefire and the demilitarization following the peace agreement (Rauch 2009, 306). It was followed by the deployment of Stabilization Force (SFOR) comprising some 32,000 troops in December 1996. After about nine years, NATO successfully completed its SFOR operation on December 2, 2004, handing over responsibility for further stabilizing Bosnia and Herzegovina to the European Union. Its operation EUFOR ALTHEA, following on from SFOR,
45 has been the largest EU military land operation to date (German Ministry of Defence 2013, 80).
The issue of participation in the Bosnian conflict became widely polarizing for the German political scene. It was discussed whether the constitutional restrictions allow for the Bundeswehr to take part in the NATO operations. This debate was resolved by a decision of the Federal constitutional court from 1994, which brought the debates to an end, stating that the operation was in accordance with the Basic Law17. Although Germany took part in all of the NATO operations responding to the conflicts in former Yugoslavia, the spectrum of tasks carried out by the Bundeswehr was very limited. This could be seen for instance in connection with Implementation Force (IFOR) in which Germany participated since January 1996. Even though with 4000 soldiers, it was its largest deployment so far, the Bundeswehr mainly provided medical and logistical support. Moreover, the German troops were stationed in Croatia, outside the Bosnian territory (Enskat and Masala 2015, 368). This changed with the follow-up mission SFOR to which Germany contributed 3000 soldiers. SFOR was the first operation since the Second World War during which the Bundeswehr ground combat troops were stationed abroad. The mission also marked the first deployment of German combat troops. In terms of a mandate, the SFOR mission was endorsed by an even broader majority of the Bundestag on June 19, 1998, when 528 MPs voted in favor, 37 against and 11 abstained (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2013, 73-74).
5.3. Kosovo
While the fragile peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina has been maintained with the help of the NATO-led multinational force deployed in accordance with the Dayton accords and Security Council Resolution 1031115, the situation in Kosovo rapidly deteriorated and massive violations of human rights had been recorded (Gazzini 2001, 405). The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) began to attack Serbian civilians, resulting in Serbian retaliation and escalation of violence. By the summer of 1998, the assaults in Kosovo and the streams of refugees fleeing to Macedonia could no longer be ignored (Crawford 2007, 92).
17 For more information on the legislative framework and its changes see Chapter 4.2.
46
The international community has been engaged in the Kosovo crisis since 1997 and several UN Security Council resolutions (1160, 1199, 1203) have been adopted prior to the NATO attack. These contained certain common points such as the responsibility of Yugoslavia for the humanitarian disaster in Kosovo, the condemnation of the use of excessive force by Yugoslav security forces and the terrorist activities of the Kosovo Albanians, the calls for ending the conflict, the detection of human rights abuses and the conclusion that the international community does not consider this to be a purely internal Yugoslav issue. In the resolutions, there was no authorization to the use of military force or to threaten to use military force (Kříž and Urbanovská 2014, 132). Unfortunately, all non-violent tools proved ineffective and the use of force became inevitable. The airstrikes executed by the mission “Allied Force” commencing on March 24, 1999, were carried out for 78 days. Their two main objectives: forcing the Milosevic’ regime to sign the agreement from Rambouillet, outlining a 3-year interim solution to the conflict, and preventing a humanitarian catastrophe (Leithner 2009, 44). As demonstrated by UN reports, the casualties have been massive nonetheless. Between March 25th and June 6th, 1999, 11,000 Kosovar Albanians have been killed by Serbian military and police forces, 863,000 people fled the country and another 600,000 were internally displaced. The NATO air strikes resulted in another 2000 civilian and military casualties (Leithner 2009, 31).
Germany’s contribution to the NATO-led intervention in Kosovo was labeled as a defining moment in its new security policy. It was the first major foreign policy challenge for the newly built Red-Green coalition under Chancellor Schröder (SPD) and Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer (the Greens). The Bundestag approved German participation in the crisis and the use of force in September 1998. As Germany simultaneously held the EU and G8 presidencies, German Tornado bombers participated in NATO’s airstrikes against Serbian targets in Kosovo and Serbia (Harnisch 2013, 83). The mission “Allied Force” in Kosovo commencing on March 24th, 1999, has been labeled a dramatic break with Germany’s postwar foreign policy by many observers in Germany and abroad. It was the very first instance since 1945 on which German troops engaged in an offensive combat mission. Even more, so that such step was taken without a mandate from the United Nations Security Council in a region situated outside of the area of NATO’s responsibility and with the
47 support of two government parties (SPD and the Greens) that had been known for their pacifist orientations. The nature of these commentaries ranged from those who welcomed a more assertive German foreign policy to those who warned against the threat of returning German expansionism. Most notably, the commentators were surprised by the sudden transformation as the same argumentation (mainly connected to the lessons of history) that has for years been used as an excuse for the German reluctance to participate in any foreign combat operations, has now served to justify the military presence in Kosovo (Leithner 2009, 21). In contrast to the domestic debates accompanying the Persian Gulf War and the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, there was little public opposition in case of the Kosovo war (Harnisch 2013, 83). On May 7, 1999, the Bundestag voted in favor of deployment of additional 1,000 troops as a part of the humanitarian mission “Allied Harbor,” providing aid to the refugees in Albania and protecting human rights organizations in the area (Leithner 2009, 31).
On June 10, 1999, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1244, which explicitly endorsed the G-8 declaration and the military-technical agreement and confirmed the future role of NATO and the EU in Kosovo. One day later, the German Bundestag approved the request of the Federal Government by an overwhelming majority of 505 votes to 24, with 11 abstentions, to include a contingent of up to 8,500 Bundeswehr soldiers in the multinational Kosovo Force (KFOR) on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 1244. Under the umbrella of a unified NATO command, Kosovo was divided into five areas of responsibility, of which Germany, along with France, the United Kingdom, Italy and the United States, for the first time assumed an independent leadership of a sector assigned to it (Meiers 2010, 209).
Following Kosovo's declaration of independence on February 17, 2008, KFOR remained in the country with the approval of the Kosovar government. The military and civilian presence continue to be based on UN Resolution 1244 (German Ministry of Defence 2013, 88). Following the end of the immediate hostilities between Serbs and Kosovo Albanians, the mission aims at contributing to a safe and secure environment, coordination of international humanitarian assistance and supporting the development of the Kosovo Security Force (Kaim 2017, 39). To this end, KFOR works closely with the United Nations (UNMIK) and
48 European Union (EULEX) missions in Kosovo (German Ministry of Defense 2013, 88). There are currently over 400 Bundeswehr troops deployed in Kosovo as a part of the KFOR mission (bpb 2018, n.p.).
5.4. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
Upon request from the government in Skopje to help ease increasing ethnic tension in the country, NATO implemented three successive operations in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia from August 2001 to March 2003. The objective of the Operation “Essential Harvest” was disarmament of ethnic Albanian groups operating throughout the country. It was followed by Operation “Amber Fox” which arranged protection for international staff monitoring the implementation of a peace arrangement. Lastly, Operation “Allied Harmony” commencing in December 2002 provided advisory assistance to the government to ensure stability throughout the country. NATO remains present in the area through its Headquarters Skopje, which was created as an advisory unit to support security sector reform and aid the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia with integration into Euro- Atlantic structures (NATO 2016a, n.p.).
Schröder’s government responded promptly to the possible conflict and pledged troops to the NATO-led operation aimed at collecting weapons and protecting OSCE and UN observers monitoring the political reforms in the country. The commitment called in the name of alliance solidarity as well as to prevent another Kosovo did not have the full support of the governing coalition as some members of the SPD and the Greens questioned the proposed deployment. It was claimed that there was too much emphasis placed on the use of force, which was not perceived as the best means for stabilizing the region while CDU insisted that more resources should be allocated in order to carry out the mission effectively. Finally, the German participation was achieved only through the support of the opposition parties. The Bundestag authorized the deployment by 497 votes o 130 on August 29, 2001. In the following operation “Amber Fox,” Germany was to assume the lead role, providing as many as 600 members of military personnel (the largest troop contribution in the mission). This time the request met with broad parliamentary approval. The mission was seen as a
49 significant success and a tribute to the leading role of the German army (Longhurst 2004, 78-79).
5.5. Afghanistan
Another conflict that had a defining role in the German security and defense policy was undoubtedly the war in Afghanistan commencing as a response to the September 11 attacks on the United States by the terrorist group al-Qaeda.
5.5.1. Fight against International Terrorism
The German participation in the fight against international terrorism came as a result of the promise “unconditional solidarity” to the United States, after the September 11 attacks, given by Chancellor’s Schröder’s government with the support of the majority of the Bundestag (Leithner 2009, 51). However, as Longhurst points out, the unlimited solidarity did not convert into unconditional approval for an immediate US military response to the perpetrators of the attacks. The public debate has been dominated by reticence on the use of force and the fear of US unilateralism. There was a strong concern that the US would overreact, which could lead to an uncontrollable escalation of the conflict in the wider Middle East (Longhurst 2004, 82-83). Eventually, Schröder only managed to secure the approval for the Bundeswehr deployment in Afghanistan (operation “Enduring Freedom”) in the Bundestag by invoking the vote of confidence procedure (Vertrauensfrage) and assuring the skeptics in the coalition that Germany would not join military action against Iraq. The government’s proposal included a clear restriction on the geographic scope of the mandate for the Bundeswehr forces and the promise that the German forces would only participate in the fight against international terrorism outside the territory of Afghanistan with the consent of the governments concerned (Harnisch 2001, 55). In the end, the Bundestag supported the confidence vote by 336 to 326 votes (Longhurst 2004, 86). The Federal Government was authorized to deploy up to 3 900 soldiers in this operation. The mandate for the German military engagement in the operation has later been extended several times (Kříž and Urbanovská 2014, 156). Some of the most notable activities of the Bundeswehr connected to the struggle against international terrorism were the deployment of the
50 German Navy units in the maritime area around the Horn of Africa to prevent possible terrorist movements between the Arabian Peninsula and the African coast and the deployment of 100 members of KSK (Special Forces Command) to combat dispersed Taliban and Al Qaeda force in Afghanistan from October 2003 to June 2004. In addition to that, the German Navy supported the fight against international terrorism through its engagement in the Operation “Active Endeavor” commencing on October 26, 2001. Its purpose was patrolling of the Mediterranean Sea and protecting the naval travel against terrorist attacks. In 2004, the operation was succeeded by operation “Sea Guardian” (Wagener 2006, 81-82).
5.5.2. International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
NATO only became a formal party to the stabilization and reconstruction process in Afghanistan in August 2003 when it took command of the “International Security Assistance Force” (ISAF), established under the request from Afghan authorities and a UN mandate (Resolutions 1386, 1383 and 1378) in 2001 (Sperling 2010, 56). The aim of the operation was the development of new Afghan security forces and enabling the local authorities to provide effective security across the country in order to create an environment in which functioning democratic institutions and the rule of law could be established in order to prevent Afghanistan from again becoming a safe haven for terrorists. The mission also contributed to reconstruction and development in the country destroyed by the civil war, which was done primarily through multinational Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) led by individual troop-contributing nations. ISAF has been one of the largest international crisis management missions ever conducted, bringing together contributions from up to 51 different countries. The mission came to an end by December 2014, after the process of transitioning full responsibility for security in the country from ISAF troops to the Afghan army and police forces was completed (NATO 2016a, n.p.).
With 538 votes the German Bundestag approved the mandate for the participation of 1,200 Bundeswehr soldiers in the ISAF operation (35 votes against, 8 abstentions) on December 22, 2001. Key arguments included solidarity with the Allies and the need to live up to the German obligations to the international community. Emphasis was also put on the distinction between ISAF and the OEF. The "good" ISAF, which was not primarily meant to
51 fight terror, but support the newly established interim president Hamid Karzai and stabilize the country, has long been portrayed as a contrast to the "bad" OEF and to the US war on terrorism in general (Kříž and Urbanovská 2014, 157). The need to engage in Afghanistan has also been commonly justified by German security interests symbolized by the phrase “Verteidigung am Hindukusch” (defense at the Hindu Kush), although as Kříž points out, perhaps with the exception of the fight against drug producers, Germany has no tangible security interests in the country (Kříž 2011, 195). In October 2003, the Bundestag decided to send a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) of 450 troops to the city of Kunduz in the North of Afghanistan, replacing a US contingent (Wagener 2006, 83). Due to the steady expansion of the German mission area such as the acquisition of a PRT in the north of the country and the acquisition of the regional command North the German ISAF contingent increased until the end of the red-green coalition in October 2005 to up to 3,000 soldiers (Meiers 2010, 210). In October 2008 the Bundestag voted in favor of prolonging the deployment mandate in Afghanistan with the troop limit increase to 4,500 at the event of deteriorating security environment. A considerable majority of German MPs (442 out of 570) voted in favor of extending the Bundeswehr 's presence in the north of Afghanistan (96 voted against and 32 abstained). During the debate, the Left Party was critical of NATO's role in Afghanistan, asserting that the alliance had not succeeded in substantially reducing the level of violence. Similarly, the Greens demanded more civilian resources to be deployed to stabilize the country, rather than military force (Miskimmon 2009, 571). The mandate has been extended for the last time on February 20, 2014, with 498 MPs voting in favor and 84 against (Deutscher Bundestag 2014c, 1277), authorizing the government to deploy up to 3,300 soldiers (Deutscher Bundestag 2014b, 4).
Germany has continuously been one of the largest troop contributors to the operation (German Ministry of Defense 2013, 97) with the overall costs of 8.900 Million Euros, which made ISAF the largest and the costliest German foreign military operation to date (bpb 2018, n.p.). However, Germany faced a strong wave of criticism from its allies due to the “humanitarian” nature of Bundeswehr activities and its reluctance to contribute to higher intensity operations (Dyson 2011, 244). As the German troops have been stationed in Kunduz in the north of Afghanistan, which is quite distant from Taliban strongholds in the
52 south and therefore more stable and, by Afghan standards, relatively safe for the soldiers18, the Bundeswehr troops were able to put a lot of emphasis on stability and reconstruction in the area over the years (Kaim 2008, 610). Some of their projects included construction of wells in remote villages or repairs of schools (Wiesgold 2016, n.p.). At the same time, the NATO troops in the south and the east of the country19 have increasingly been exposed to growing rebellion resulting in heavy losses on their sides (Kaim 2008, 610). The complaints about asymmetrical burden sharing came particularly from the United States, Great Britain, Canada and the Netherlands (Sperling 2010, 56). Moreover, it became a practice for the German troops to follow an operational conduct based on the principle of impartiality. The scope of military operations executed by the Bundeswehr included above all the separation of conflicting parties and the facilitation of reconstruction work in the stabilization phase of the operations. Due to the operational theatre developments in Afghanistan, the impartiality principle started eroding in the operational practice of the Afghan mission (Noetzel 2010, 487).
As of 2006, after a long, quiet phase, the attacks on German patrols started piling up. The region around Kunduz was changing from an island of stability to a place of conflict. The operation slowly turned into a war - even though the term was largely avoided in by the German officials for the time being. German allies demanded that Germany is also committed to the responsibility of the Regional Command South, but they were rejected by both the political and the military elites, which pointed to the negative consequences for the German public, which feared that thereby the risk of Terrorist attacks against Germany would be increased (Kříž and Urbanovská 2014, 167). With 5,433 soldiers, the German troop contribution in Afghanistan reached its peak in 2011 (Wiesgold 2016, n.p.). In the meantime, the domestic support for the engagement in Afghanistan was significantly declining over the years. For instance, in May 2010, only 22 percent of German citizens approved of future German participation in the ISAF operation, while 65 percent were against. What is more,
18 The level of risk can be quantified by comparison of total combat deaths for each regional command. During the period from 2001-2009, the NATO troops operating in Regional Commands Capital, North and West suffered 262 combat deaths, while those from the Regional Commands South and East encountered 955 losses (Sperling 2010, 62). 19 Regional Command South had American, British, Canadian, Danish, Dutch, Estonian and Romanian forces assigned, while American and Czech forces were assigned to Regional Command East (Sperling 2010, 62).
53 only 15 percent expressed the belief that the engagement of Bundeswehr contributed to German security, while 69 percent opposed the idea (Noetzel 2010, 489).
After years spent in the Afghanistan war, the international community started moving to gradually transferring responsibility for regional security to the Afghans, whose security forces, police and military were being built with training and money from the West. In October 2013, the Bundeswehr handed over the field camp in Kunduz to the Afghan security forces (Wiesgold 2016, n.p.).
5.5.3. Resolute Support
In 2012, the Allies and partners jointly agreed with the Afghan government to a follow-on non-combat operation “Resolute Support” in Afghanistan. This commitment was reaffirmed later at the NATO Wales summit in 2014. It was also welcomed by the UN Security Council Resolution 2189, adopted unanimously on December 12, 2014, underscoring the necessity of continued international support for the stability of Afghanistan. The mission commenced on January 1, 2015, with the participation of 39 contributing nations. The primary objective of the mission is training, advice, and assistance to the Afghan security forces and institutions across the country. As of July 2016, it was comprised of approximately 13,000 members of personnel from NATO Allies and partner countries. At a meeting of defense ministers in November 2017, it was agreed by the troop-contributing nations that the number of troops deployed would increase to around 16,000. Besides the training, advice, and assistance, Allies and partner countries also pledged to support the financing of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces and bolster practical cooperation in the areas of specific interest (NATO 2016a, n.p.).
The German armed forces participate in “Resolute Support” from its very beginning. The Federal Parliament first approved the deployment of the Bundeswehr in the operation on
December 17, 2014, with the personnel limit of 850 (Deutscher Bundestag 2014a, 4). According to the current mandate of the German Bundestag from March 22, 2018, up to 1,300 German soldiers can be deployed in the operation (bpb 2018, n.p.). Most of the German troops (around 800) are currently stationed at Camp Marmal located near the
54 Afghan city of Masar-i Sharif. It is the largest military camp of the Bundeswehr outside the Federal Republic of Germany and the base of the Train Advise Assist Command North (TAAC). In addition to that, around 150 soldiers make their service in the Afghan capital Kabul (Bötel and Müller 2018, n.p.).
55 6. Important Military Operations in which Germany did not participate
When analyzing the German participation in NATO out of area operations, it is also necessary to have a look at the operations in which the Federal Republic did not take part and what was the reasoning behind such decisions. There are two operations, which are especially important in this sense and due to the decision not to support its NATO partners, Germany became subject to a harsh criticism from the Allies as well as the international community in general. First of them was the US-led invasion of Iraq in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, the second one was the NATO operation in Libya in 2011.
6.1. Iraq
As already mentioned in connection with the operation in Afghanistan, 2001 revealed stark differences between the US and German views on the use of military force. While the September 11th attacks changed the German threat perception significantly, resulting in several domestic and international counter-terrorism measures, it did not foster a transatlantic consensus on the Iraq war (Harnisch 2013, 83). Recognizing the danger of possible destabilization of the international security system and erosion of the international legal regime regulating military force, the Federal Republic, along with France and Canada, joined the camp of opponents of the US-led invasion (Kříž and Urbanovská 2014, 128). That was visible also in the first major address of the chancellor Schröder in the Bundestag on September 19, 2001. He stated that Germany would not join any “foreign adventures” of the United States and that a prior consultation was needed for any military action within the framework of NATO (Harnisch 2013, 83).
The domestic context also played an important role in the handling of the crisis. As the Bundestag election was approaching, chancellor Schröder and the SPD used their critical position towards Washington to win the support of German voters skeptical of the escalation towards military conflict with Iraq as well as the Bush administration in general (Harnisch 2013, 85). When asked about the possibility of entering the war in Iraq, around 70-90% of the respondents of public opinion surveys over the years 2002-2003 were against the war (Kříž and Urbanovská 2014, 130). Although the chancellor left all options open
56 ahead of the beginning of the campaign for the parliamentary elections in 2002, he changed his rhetoric before the upcoming elections and made the issue of resistance to the invasion one of his program priorities. Schroeder called for a solution with the help of the weapons inspectors and clearly rejected the inclusion of Germany in the war, even if it was eventually supported by a mandate through a UN Security Council resolution. The main arguments for rejecting Germany's participation in the military intervention against Hussein were its opposition to international law, the humanitarian effects of war, and skepticism about what would follow after the fall of Hussein (Kříž and Urbanovská 2014, 129).
While Germany continued to cooperate quietly by providing access to its airspace and sharing intelligence, the public stance of the Berlin officials hardened considerably after president Bush listed Iraq as a member of the “axis of evil” in his State of the Union Address in January 2002 and declared the doctrine of preemptive self-defense later that year (Harnisch 2013, 85). The attitude to Iraq touched on German-American relations substantially. It was about the deepest diplomatic crisis between the two countries since the end of the Second World War. The cause was not the German resistance to this move, but rather the hysteria surrounding the case and the efforts of the German Left to use it in its pre-election campaign to mobilize voters (Kříž and Urbanovská 2014, 129).
6.2. Libya
When it comes to the decision to abstain in the Security Council Resolution 1973 on the no- fly zone in Libya and not to take part in the subsequent NATO operation “Unified Protector” in 2011, the criticism went even further. The result of the abstention was that Germany found itself taking a different position to its main allies, France, the United Kingdom and the USA, who were pushing ahead with the establishment of a no-fly zone, and instead voted alongside states like Russia, China, India and Brazil (Miskimmon 2012, 392). Nevertheless, the Federal Government has never shown any doubt as to the reprehensibility of the Gaddafi regime. Their concerns were "only" directed against the choice of means, that is, against the no-fly zone and the associated military intervention (Hacke 2011, 50).
57 The UN Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973 were adopted in February 2011 following the popular uprising against the Gaddafi regime in Benghazi, Libya. A series of protests by Libyan citizens were quickly repressed by Colonel Gaddafi, which led to widespread unrest across the state. It rapidly escalated to a point that EU member states installed measures to repatriate citizens (Miskimmon 2012, 395). The UN reacted by the adoption of resolutions “condemning the gross and systematic violation of human rights” and introduced active measures including a no-fly zone, an arms embargo and the authorization for member countries to take “all necessary measures” through regional organizations to protect Libyan civilians. NATO initially enforced a no-fly zone and later, on March 11, 2001, took over sole command and control of all the operations in Libya. The operation “Unified Protector” consisted of three components: “the enforcement of an arms embargo on the high seas of the Mediterranean to prevent the transfer of arms, related material and mercenaries to Libya,” “the enforcement of a no-fly-zone in order to prevent any aircraft from bombing civilian targets” and “air and naval strikes against those military forces involved in attacks or threats to attack Libyan civilians and civilian-populated areas.” The operation was terminated on October 21, 2011, after having fulfilled its objectives (NATO 2016a, n.p.).
The German decision to abstain from the vote on the UN SC Resolution stemmed from pressures on two levels. Firstly, the public view was very skeptical to any German military engagement in the conflict. Secondly, the decision was conceivably shaped by the FDP, the junior partner to Merkel’s government and the domestic political scene. The situation in Libya quickly became one of the most salient foreign policy issues in the German public discourse and in the period from March to April topped the list of most- covered political topics in the main German TV news programs. In public opinion polls, clear majorities spoke against a German military involvement in Libya. On the contrary, Germany’s abstention in the UN Security Council was supported by a solid majority of 56 percent (Oppermann 2012, 514). In the liberal-conservative government of Merkel, there were contradictory opinions regarding the intervention. The Chancellor was more in favor of German participation. Merkel emphasized that the absence of Germany was a pure result of the decision not to participate militarily in the operation in Libya and that the government fully agreed with and
58 supported the objectives of the resolution. A clear opponent of the intervention was the foreign minister Guido Westerwelle (FDP) (Kříž and Urbanovská 2014, 130-131).
In view of approaching regional elections, which were about to take place on March 27, 2011, the FDP used its control of the Foreign office to distinguish itself from the governing CDU. The significant role of the Liberals in the government decision-making has been suggested by media reports stating that foreign minister Westerwelle even went against the advice of career diplomats in the Foreign Office to vote in favor of the Security Council Resolution (Oppermann 2012, 515). The opposition also had no unified position. The Social Democrats were split on this issue and the party was unable to present a unified opinion. While this operation was conceived as a humanitarian act and an implementation of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principles, the debate showed that the German political elite was not convinced of the truthfulness of the motives for intervention indicated by Great Britain and France. The German politicians argued with internal political motives for intervention in both London and Paris, pointing to the oil interests of Britain and France in Libya (Kříž and Urbanovská 2014, 130-131). Moreover, due to the non-combat nature of former German peacekeeping deployments, the Bundeswehr was ill-prepared for participation in a humanitarian intervention like the one in Libya (Hacke 2011, 51).
As a result of the decision to abstain from the vote on the no-fly zone in Libya, Germany has been was harshly criticized at home as well as by its main allies. One of the most outspoken critics of the decision was the former German foreign minister Joschka Fischer who labeled it a “scandalous mistake” and “possibly the biggest foreign policy debacle since the founding of the Federal Republic.” The main point of criticism of Berlin’s Libya policy was that it failed to satisfy the expectations of its most significant partners, endangered Germany’s reputation as a reliable member of the western alliance and risked isolation of the country from its allies. Especially the USA, Great Britain and France made little secret of their frustration with Germany’s failure to provide support to the alliance. On the domestic political scene, the opposition parties blamed the government for its “political isolation within the European Union,” unnecessarily dropping the German support for the United Nations and for provoking “a disastrous discussion about the reliability of Germany as a partner” (Oppermann 2012, 503).
59
Merkel’s government tried to contain the negative consequences on Germany’s reputation caused by its stance on Libya by recollecting the substantial engagement of the German armed forces in other international military missions. Berlin also decided to provide up to 300 additional Bundeswehr troops for AWACS reconnaissance flights over Afghanistan in order to provide relief to NATO allies engaged in Libya and to send “political signal of alliance solidarity.” This effort, however, met with limited success (Oppermann 2012, 514).
60 7. Methodology
This part of the diploma thesis is going to present the methodology which will be used later in the analytical section. At first, the choice of the method and its advantages are going to be explained. Secondly, the reader is going to be acquainted with the step-by-step analytical procedure and its logical basis to provide a better understanding of the process. Besides that, this part will also include an operationalization of independent variables that were selected in Chapter 2 based on the theoretical assumptions as well as the existing research on the topic of the German participation in out of area military operations. The last subchapter is going to present calibration of variables that will serve as a basis for subsequent analysis.
7.1. Qualitative Comparative Analysis
In the practical part of this thesis, the method of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) is going to be used. This method has been chosen namely as it provides the possibility of observing a relatively larger number of cases (compared to qualitative approaches) while still keeping some of the advantages of qualitative methodology and in-depth knowledge of cases (Berg-Schlosser et al. 2009, 25). Moreover, QCA develops a conception of causality while leaving space for complexity. Unlike hard sciences, where complexity is usually neutralized by the experimental design, QCA opts for the concept of multiple conjunctural causation. As a result: (1) it is often a combination of conditions (independent variable), which provides for an outcome (dependent variable); (2) several differing combinations of conditions may result in the same outcome; (3) according to the context (presence of other conditions) a given condition may have a different impact on the outcome. In QCA, any type of permanent causality is rejected as causality depends on a given context and conjuncture (Rihoux 2006, 682).
While QCA is to a large extent an inductive method as it is more variable-oriented than standard small-N approaches, its main difference in comparison to statistical analysis is that deduction based on existing research and preliminary hypotheses are used in the case- selection as well as in the selection of variables. With regards to theories, QCA would be
61 best placed in the area of “medium” range theories in social research. Another advantage of the method is that both important or typical cases, as well as the more paradoxical or contrary ones, can be included. QCA also allows for “conjunctural causation” across observed cases and recognizes that different combinations of factors can produce the same result20 (Berg-Schlosser et al. 2009, 6-9).
There are three main types of the QCA technique: crisp set QCA (csQCA), multi-value QCA (mvQCA) and fuzzy-set QCA (fsQCA). In this thesis, the csQCA method is going to be used. The crisp set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (csQCA), often referred to simply as QCA21, has been developed by Charles Ragin and a programmer Kriss Drass as the first QCA method in the late 1980s. This new method represented a tool, which allowed for analysis of complex binary data, which until that point did not exist in the statistical mainstream literature. It is based on Mill’s logic as well as an adaptation of Boolean algebra, which are explained in more depth below. (Rihoux and De Meur 2009, 33). As already mentioned, csQCA uses binary data where a case is either in or out of a set, coded with 1 indicating membership and 0 indicating non-membership. (Ragin 2008, 33).
Unlike csQCA, which only uses binary data, fsQCA allows for analysis of variables that can be defined in terms of degree of membership in a defined set. On the contrary, mvQCA represents a direct extension of csQCA. The difference between the two is that mvQCA is also able to account for multi-value variables (with two possible values) (Rihoux 2006, 685). This allows an inclusion of multi-value categories for refined coding of ordinal or interval data but can represent multi-categorical nominal scale conditions such as regions (Europe, Africa, Latin America, etc.) or religion (Jewish, Muslim, Christian, etc) (Cronqvist and Berg- Schlosser 2009, 70-71). The main reason for the choice of this type of QCA is that there was no unified data set available for each of the observed conditions that would allow for the use fuzzy-set QCA as there is a need to assign a certain degree of membership to each case within each observed condition.
20 Even if a given constellation of conditions only explains a single case, it is not automatically considered of lower importance than a combination accounting for several cases as each case is considered relevant in most QCA applications. 21 In this diploma thesis, the term QCA is going to be understood as a higher-order term encompassing all types of Qualitative Comparative Analysis, while csQCA is going to refer specifically to crisp set Qualitative Comparative Analysis.
62 7.1.1. Mill’s Methods and the QCA System Designs
The logical foundation of QCA methods is based on Mill’s method of agreement and the method of indirect difference. These methods use all available and relevant data concerning the prerequisites of a specific outcome and, by analyzing the similarities and differences among relevant instances, explain its causes (Ragin 1987, 15).
Using Mill’s methods, there are two main strategies that can be used in a research design: the most similar and the most different system design. The most similar approach is based on the belief that among similar systems a number of theoretically significant differences will be found which will account for the differences in the observed outcome (a differing value in the dependent variable) (Berg-Schlosser et al. 2009, 22). In this situation, Mill’s “method of difference” where can be applied: “If an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation occurs, and an instance in which it does not occur, have every circumstance in common save one, that one occurring only in the former; the circumstance in which alone the two instances differ, is the effect, or the cause, or an indispensable part of the cause, of the phenomenon” ([Mill 391] Berg-Schlosser et al. 2009, 2).
The opposite strategy of the most different system design aims to achieve a maximal heterogeneity in the sample. It is based on the assumption that despite the differences, these systems will be connected through a small number of variables leading to the same outcome (the same value in the dependent variable): “if two or more instances of the phenomenon under investigation have only one circumstance in common, the circumstance in which alone all the instances agree is the cause” ([Mill 390] Berg-Schlosser et al. 2009, 2; 22). As Berg-Schlosser et al. conclude, both methods systematically match and contrast cases in order to establish common causal relationships by eliminating all other possibilities. A limiting factor to both of these approaches is that they attempt to establish a single common cause, or its absence, which makes them rather extreme. Therefore, Mill also created procedures combining the two approaches called “Joint Method of Agreement and
63 Difference” and “Indirect Method of Difference.”22 This method is, however, less convincing than the pure method of difference (Berg-Schlosser et al. 2009, 2). Another significant limit to these two approaches is posed by the fact that only a small number of cases (very small- N) can be considered23 (Berg-Schlosser et al. 2009, 22).
7.1.2. Boolean Algorithms
Boolean algorithms had been developed in 1950 with the original purpose of helping electrical engineers simplify switching circuits. With the help of Drass, Ragin managed to adapt these algorithms for his own research. These so-called minimization algorithms then provided an instrument for “identifying patterns of multiple conjunctural causation” and served as a tool for simplifying complex data structures in a logical and holistic way. There are several basic principles that need to be applied using the csQCA method and Boolean algorithms as outlined by Ragin in his publication The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies.
First, the method uses binary data, so the propositions are either true (value = 1) or false (value = 0). Such approach allows for substitution of verbal reasoning by genuine symbolic calculation. According to main conventions of the Boolean algebra, the [1] value is represented by an uppercase character24. A lower case character represents the [0] value25. The “don’t care” values26 are represented by a dash symbol [-] (Rihoux and De Meur 2009, 33-34). For better systematization, the data are organized into a dichotomous data table in which all of the continuous (interval-level) conditions must be dichotomized according to relevant thresholds. For the selection of such thresholds, the use of empirical (case-based) and theoretical knowledge is advised (Rihoux and De Meur 2009, 33-42). Secondly, in
22 It states that: [i]f two or more instances in which the phenomenon occurs have only one circumstance in common, while two or more instances in which it does not occur have nothing in common save the absence of that circumstance, the circumstance in which alone the two sets of instances differ, is the effect, or the cause, or an indispensable part of the cause, of the phenomenon ([Mill 396] Berg-Schlosser et al. 2) 23 In the case of MSDO (Most Similar, Different Outcome) it is only three or four cases while for the MDSO (Most DIfferent, Similar Outcome) the number can go up to 15-25 cases. 24 [A] is read as: variable A is “large, present, high,…” 25 [a] would be read as: variable A is “small, absent, low...” 26 Such value can be either present (1) or absent (0). It can also mean that the value is not known due to the fact that it is either irrelevant or missing.
64 Boolean logic, negation [~] switches the membership scores from 1 to 0 and from 0 to 1 (Ragin 2008, 33). Thirdly, in order to be able to use Boolean algebra, it is necessary to construct a truth table using a raw data matrix. After the raw data have been turned into binary nominal-scale values using the chosen calibration criteria for each of the conditions, the data has to be sorted according to their combinations of values on the independent variables (Ragin 2008, 33). A truth table organizes the different configurations, or combinations of conditions associated with a given outcome (Rihoux and De Meur 2009, 44). The lines in this table should under no condition be confused with individual cases as each line accounts for all the cases with the same configuration27 (Rihoux and De Meur 2009, 48-49). The number of rows corresponds to the number of logically possible combinations of values on the causal variables28 (Ragin 2008, 34).
Two important operations in Boolean algebra are called Boolean addition and Boolean multiplication. Addition in Boolean algebra is an equivalent to the logical operator OR. It can be expressed as: if A + B = Z and A = 1 and B = 1, then Z = 1 (in other words 1 + 1 = 1) or in logical terms: if A equals 1 OR B equals 1, then Z equals 1. The idea behind the Boolean addition is that the outcome occurs (is true) if any of the additive terms is present29 (Ragin 1987, 89). Consequently, if none of the additive terms is present, the outcome does not occur. The other operation used in Boolean algebra is Boolean multiplication. It is expressed by the logical AND, represented by the [*] (multiplication symbol). In this case, the outcome results from a combination of different conditions that are either present (written in uppercase letters) or absent (written in lowercase letters) (Rihoux and De Meur 2009, 34). Here Boolean algebra is used in the process of simplifying expressions known as "sums of products (Ragin 2008, 36).
27 At this point, the contradictory configurations are taken care of by reconsidering the selection of conditions, the selection of the particular cases or the threshold of dichotomization for a given condition. Naturally, any of the chosen strategies must be justifiable on empirical and/or theoretical grounds. For more detailed explanation of the procedure see Rihoux and De Meur 2009, 48-49. 28 For instance, if there are three binary independant variables, the thruth table will contain 23 rows = 8, one for each possible combination (presence/absence) of three idenependant variables (Ragin 2008, 34). 29 Here, it is important not to think of these operations in mathematical terms, but in terms of logic. Provided that one of the conditions is present, it is irrelevant to the result whether the other one is present or not as its value remains the same (1) in both cases.
65 The Boolean analysis is combinatorial by design is it accounts for different combinations of conditions and their presence/absence leading to an observed outcome. This feature is in accordance with the idea that cases, especially their causally relevant features, should be considered holistically (Ragin 2008, 37). Using combinatorial logic, attention should be given to all possible combinations of conditions leading to an outcome. Boolean minimization then allows for a “reduction” of a long, complex expression into shorter, more parsimonious one (Rihoux and De Meur 2009, 35-36). The rule followed by this procedure says: If two Boolean expressions differ in only one causal condition yet produce the same outcome, then the causal condition that distinguishes the two expressions can be considered irrelevant and can be removed to create a simpler, combined expression.” This process can be repeated until no further simplification is possible (Ragin 1987, 93).
The outcomes of the process of minimization of primitive Boolean expressions are so-called “prime implicants,” which are compounds of two or more simplified combinations of conditions that share the same outcome while differ only in the presence of one condition. Prime implicants subsequently enter an optional second step of minimization, which is based on the concept of implication. As Ragin explains: “A Boolean expression is said to imply another if the membership of the second term is a subset of the membership of the first.“ This allows for additional simplification of a Boolean expression with the aim to eliminate any redundancy and derive a logically minimal equation that would describe the different combinations of conditions connected to an outcome. In order to detect which prime implicants are logically essential, a minimization device known as a prime implicant chart is used (Ragin 2008, 39-41).
For cases in which it is desirable to account for negative results as well, Boolean algebra includes De Morgan's law, with which it is able to identify solutions for this type of results without having to undergo the entire process from the beginning. This is achieved by using the final solution that has been gathered for positive results through the production of the exact negation of a given logical equation (Ragin 1987, 98).
66 7.1.3. The Necessary and the Sufficient Condition
In addition to the Boolean approach, it is important to consider the necessary and the sufficient conditions (Ragin 1987, 99). A necessary condition can be defined as one, which is always present when an outcome occurs. This also means that the outcome cannot be present in an absence of this condition. On the contrary, the presence of a sufficient condition is not necessary for an outcome and while it always occurs when this condition is present, it can also occur as a result of other conditions30 (Rihoux and Ragin 2009, xix). Such distinction is essential in the context of theories. Necessity and sufficiency are usually considered jointly as their combinations are of importance. A cause is both necessary and sufficient if it is the only cause producing an outcome and it is singular (not a combination of several conditions). If a cause is capable of producing the outcome but it is not the only cause with such capability, it is sufficient but not necessary. If a condition only produces the outcome in a combination with other conditions and appears in all such combinations, it is necessary but not sufficient. Finally, a condition is neither necessary nor sufficient if it appears only in a subset of combinations that producing an outcome (Ragin 1987, 99-100).
7.2. Operationalization of Variables
In order to apply the csQCA analysis, it is necessary to operationalize the selected conditions. That means that the verbal concepts have to be converted into a binary numerical form. As the dependent variable, the participation or non-participation of Germany in a given NATO operation already has a dichotomous character a deeper operationalization is not deemed necessary. The independent variables of (1) a security threat, (2) pressure from international allies, (3) economic interests and (4) humanitarian crisis are more complex, and therefore not as easily quantifiable. Each of them will be presented in an individual subchapter bellow where the set of indicators through which they will be measured as well as the choice of these indicators will be explained and justified.
30 Rihoux and Ragin explain the difference between these two types of conditions on the example of a democratic state. While holding competitive elections is a necessary condition for a state to be considered a democracy, there are other factors, such as comprehensive civil liberties that also play a role. Therefore, the sole presence of free elections cannot be considered a sufficient condition (Rixoux and Ragin 2009, xix).
67 7.2.1. Security Threat
With the change of the international security environment after the end of the Cold War, states in the international system are facing new types of security threats that differ from the standard large-scale interstate conflict or the nuclear annihilation that could be observed in the previous eras (von Bredow 2015, 56). Numerous studies, as well as political practice, suggest that there is an increasing need for broadening the definition of security threats to include both military and non-military aspects of security (Kirchner 2005, 181). In addition to that, as a result of globalization and an increasing interconnectedness of the world, local conflicts and threats often transform into global ones (von Bredow 2015, 56). In a study undertaken by Kirchner and Sperling in 1999, based on government documents, academic literature, and survey responses from leading security experts, twelve possible security threats to the European space were identified with migratory pressures and ethnic factionalism placed at the very top of the list (Kirchner 2005, 179). The link between migration and security has later been reinforced by the events of September 11 and the implications of the involvement of foreigners and foreign networks in terrorist activity (Lahav and Lavenex 2012, 746-747). Besides criminalization of economies, narcotics trade or environmental damage, the third place in this study has been taken by domestic or international terrorism directed against commercial or state structures (Kirchner 2005, 179). Migration and international terrorism are also identified as some of the main threats to German security in the most recent Defense Policy Guidelines (Verteidigunspolitische Richtlinien) published by the German Ministry of Defense (German Ministry of Defense 2011, 8).
As all of the NATO PSO are conducted in areas that are geographically distant from Germany, it can be assumed that the German decision-makers are not primarily motivated by the fear of spillover of the conflicts onto the German territory. At the same time, there are many cases, in which the instability caused by war, ethnic unrest or complex emergencies resulted in significant refugee flows into Europe and during which Germany became the top destination for the migrants. Handling such situation necessarily means a financial burden for the host country as well as fear of increased criminality. Therefore, as often stressed in the debates on NATO PSO, it is in the German security interest to try to
68 handle these crises directly at the place of their origin, before their effects reach the German territory. For quantification of the condition, the data from three different sources are going to be combined. First of them is going to be the government argumentation concerning migration flows before the vote on the deployment of Bundeswehr in a given NATO PSO in the Federal Parliament. The obvious limitation of this type of data is that it only covers the operations that were proposed by the federal government, which automatically means that the operations in which Germany did not take part are not included. Moreover, the migration issue might not have been mentioned in each relevant case. To put the government claims more into perspective, the actual numbers of migrants coming to Germany in the year in which the operations commenced, as reported by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge), is also going to be considered.
Another indicator used in connection with the condition of a security threat is going to be the threat of international terrorism. Considering the number of terrorism-related fatalities in Germany as provided by the Global Terrorism Database of the University of Maryland for individual years since the reunifications, it is clear that the numbers of terrorism-related deaths are rather marginal and with the exception of 2016 the attacks have not been carried out by an international terrorist group based in a state where a NATO PSO was taking place (University of Maryland 2017). However, as terrorism mainly relies on the fear caused by its acts and not the harm itself (Ghetti 2008, 491), the indicator cannot simply be limited to the number of terrorism-related fatalities. What is more, a causal link was officially declared between some of the PSO and the terrorist attacks preceding them, most notably in the case of the September 11 attacks. As the extent to which international terrorism posed a threat to German security (including the level of threat perception by the decision-makers) is difficult to quantify, the government argumentation in the Federal Parliament when discussing deployments in NATO PSO is going to serve as the primary source of data for this indicator. For improved objectivity, the data will subsequently be compared to relevant secondary literature.
69 7.2.2. Pressure from International Allies
As mentioned in Chapter 2, presenting an overview of academic literature concerning the motives for German participation in international peacekeeping operations, the pressure from international allies to take a certain action is considered an important factor in the German decision-making. The source for this data is again going to be the argumentation of the government representatives before the vote of the German Federal Council (the Bundestag) on a deployment of the Bundeswehr troops in a certain NATO PSO operation. In addition to that, other relevant primary and secondary sources will be considered. It can be expected that a positive result will be present especially in cases in which the peacekeeping operation takes place in an area that had been a former colony of one of the international allies or where one or more international partners has a significant economic interest. In addition to that, pressure from international allies can also be expected on all instances of Article 5 operations and operations taking place on a territory of a NATO member state. As these operations are conducted in response to an attack on one of NATO members or as prevention before such attack happens, it can be assumed that the affected state would have an interest on German participation in given PSO.
7.2.3. Economic Interests
The condition of economic interests is going to be quantified using two indicators. First of the indicators that is going to be used is the importance of the area in which a given NATO PSO took place in terms of its share in the German foreign trade. That is going to be based on a number representing the percentage of German exports in the country in which the NATO PSO was conducted in the overall German exports in the year in which the given operation commenced. The data are going to be based on the statistics provided by the Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt), the percentage is going to be counted by the author.
Another indicator is going to be the presence of important trading routes in the area where the operations were taking place. Due to its orientation on export, Germany is largely dependent on the international economy, more than any other middle-sized or large
70 country (Deckers 2002, 161). As identified in the Defense Policy Guidelines (Verteidigunspolitische Richtlinien) from 2011, for Germany as a resource-poor export nation, free trade routes and secure supply of raw materials are vital and “disruptions of the transport routes and the flows of raw material and goods, e.g., piracy and sabotage of aviation pose a threat to [its] security and prosperity” (German Ministry of Defense 2011, 9- 12). As already mentioned above, the importance of free transport routes was also stressed by the former President Koehler in connection with the NATO operations in Afghanistan when he claimed that for a large export-oriented country like Germany, it must be legitimate to deploy its military abroad to protect its trading interests, such as free trading routes or to prevent regional instability (Connolly 2010, n.p.). Even though the interest in free transport routes was explicitly defined in a strategic document for the very first time in 2011, considering the German economy that has been oriented on export ever since the German reunification, there are strong reasons to believe that this interest has always been present which confirms the relevance of this indicator even before 2011.
7.2.4. Humanitarian Crisis
A humanitarian crisis (also referred to as humanitarian emergency) can be defined as a situation involving high levels of human suffering in which basic welfare is threatened on a large scale (Quintanilla et al. 2014, 20). A humanitarian crisis can evolve as a result of natural disasters, man-made emergencies (such as armed conflicts) or complex emergencies, which often combine the elements of man-made emergencies and natural disasters. Consequently, health, safety, security or wellbeing of a community or other large group of people comes in danger, usually over a wide area. The typical features of complex humanitarian emergencies are generally extensive violence and loss of lives, displacement of populations resulting from instability in the area, widespread damage to societies and economies, the need for external life-saving assistance and significant security risks for providers of such assistance in some areas (Humanitarian Coalition 2015 n.p.). Based on this definition, the variable of humanitarian crisis can be operationalized as the presenece of large scale suffering caused by an armed conflict, genocide, ethnic cleansing or as a result of a complex emergency. The data on the occurrence of a humanitarian catastrophe will be taken from the plenary reports in the German Bundestag as well as other relevant primary
71 and secondary sources. The variable will also be observed in the number of human losses as well as the number of refugees and internally displaced persons fleeing the conflict zones, which are typically a result of humanitarian emergencies. The number of casualties will be taken from the statistics of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) for the year in which a given operation began. The number of refugees will be based on the Refugee population by country or territory of asylum statistics published by the World Bank (WB).
7.3. Calibration of Variables
As explained in the methodological section (Chapter 7.1.2.), an analysis with the selected method (csQCA) can only be performed using binary data. For that reason, it is necessary to assign values signifying the presence [1] or the absence [0] of the observed conditions (variables) to all individual operations. In this chapter, the calibration criteria for each of the observed conditions (1) security threat, (2) pressure from international allies, (3) economic interests and (4) presence of a humanitarian crisis are going to be presented. As already mentioned, the dependent variable (outcome) is dichotomous in its character and there is no need for further quantification. In this case, the value [1] is going to be attributed to the cases where any members of the German military (or non-military) personnel took part in the mission. The remaining cases will be classified as [0], or non-participation. For the purposes of this research, no distinction will be made between non-combat and combat deployments.
The raw data table, on which the calibration was based, can be found in the attachment of this diploma thesis (Attachment 1). For a better overview, all of the assigned values will be grouped in a Table (Table 2) at the end of the chapter.
7.3.1. Security Threat
In the previous section, the condition of a security threat was operationalized as large-scale refugee waves into Germany caused by a conflict in an area in which NATO PSO is taking place or as the threat of international terrorism.
72 The calibration was based on a combination of several indicators. First of all, it was based on the minutes of the plenary sessions of the Federal Council connected to votes on the participation in NATO PSO. When a government representative mentioned the interconnectedness of security in a region where NATO PSO was taking place with the German security or the threat/presence of massive refugee flows to Germany, the condition was coded as present [1]. On instances when several NATO PSO were beginning in the same country in the same year, the condition was coded as present in all of them (unless contradicted by the raw data) as it can be assumed that situation had not changed significantly and the statement would apply to all of them. The data was also compared to the actual numbers of refugees coming to Germany from the area in which the given PSO was taking place and the number of refugees from the area that were already present in Germany. The decision to apply two different sets of data on migration was a result of the unavailability of a unified dataset for each of the operation which naturally prevented the possibility of selecting a single threshold for the presence of the condition.
Following the approach, the condition of a security threat was clearly coded as present [1] in operations “Deadeye”, “Deliberate Force”, “Joint Endeavour, “Joint Guard”, “Deliberate Guard”, “Joint Forge” and “Determined Force” in Bosnia and Herzegovina. From 1995 the German representatives repeatedly stressed that Germany took the highest number of Balkan refugees and therefore the resolution of the conflict was also in its very interest (see Attachment 1). The same applied to the subsequent operations in the former Yugoslavia – operations conducted in Kosovo, Albania, and Macedonia. As seen in Attachments 1, Germany was very well aware of the fact that any instability in the region can lead to further refugee waves. Moreover, there were high numbers of refugees already present in Germany since the times of the previous conflicts. This applied to operations “Determined Force”, “Eagle Eye”, “Joint Guarantor”, “Determined Guarantor”, “Allied Harvest”, “Joint Guardian”, “Allied Harvest II”, “Joint Enterprise”, “Allied Harbour”, “Essential Harvest”, “Amber Fox” and “Allied Harmony.” Last but not least, following this approach, the condition was also coded as present [1] for the “Support to the African Union mission in Sudan.”
The borderline cases where a decision had to be made were the three maritime operations in the former Yugoslavia and the operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina before 1995. In
73 1992, during the vote on the participation in the operation “Maritime Monitor”, there were repeated claims that Germany was ready to take refugees (see Attachment 1) which suggested that the government did not perceive refugee flows as a significant threat. Moreover, at this point, there was no strong experience of migration from the Balkans in the past few years. However, in 1992 the migration from the Balkans reached its peak with 400 000 new refugees from the Balkans coming to Germany (BAMF 2015, 14). In the end, a decision was made according to the nature of the operations. The three operations that were monitoring the maritime weapons embargo on Yugoslavia “Maritime Monitor”, “Maritime Guard” and “Sharp guard” were coded as [0] while the operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina “Sky Monitor” and “Deny Flight” monitoring and later enforcing a no-fly zone declared by the UN Security Council against flights by military aircraft of the warring parties (NATO 2016a, 1-2) were coded as [1].
As the data on terrorist attacks did not show any significant casualties in Germany in the observed timeframe caused by terrorist groups stationed in the areas where PSO took place, the quantification was based on the argumentation in the German Federal Council (the Bundestag). If this type of threat was mentioned by any of the government representatives, the condition of a security threat was be coded as present [1]. This only applied to “Operation Enduring Freedom.” While the secondary literature suggested that in reality, Germany had no security interests in Afghanistan (Kříž 2011, 195), as this operation was aimed precisely at fight against terrorism, the condition was coded as present [1]. However, for the remaining two operations “ISAF” and “Resolute Support” aimed at training of the Afghan security forces and reconstruction, the condition was coded as absent [0].
7.3.2. Pressure from International Allies
The condition of interests of Germany’s allies proved to be slightly difficult to quantify. The main sources of data, in this case, were the minutes from plenary proceedings of the Bundestag as well as secondary literature on the topic. An assumption was made that in case no mention of partners’ interest was found, it was not present. If the representatives of the government spoke about international partners or the need of Germany to fulfill the expectations that are placed on it, the condition was evaluated as present [1]. In addition to
74 that, all operations conducted in accordance with Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty or on the territory of NATO member states were automatically assigned value [1] as it can be assumed that the country, in this case, the United States and Turkey, on whose defense the operation was conducted had an interest in the participation of other member states. When it comes to secondary literature, the coding was rather simple, if a statement was found, ideally across several sources, confirming the interests of one or more allies, the condition was classified as present [1]. Following this approach, the condition was coded as present [1] in operations: “Anchor Guard”, “Ace Guard”, “Deny Flight”, “Deadeye”, “Deliberate Force”, “Joint Endeavour”, “Decisive Endeavour”, “Joint Guard”, “Deliberate Guard”, “Joint Forge”, “Determined Force”, “Eagle Eye”, “Joint Guarantor”, “Determined Guarantor”, “Allied Harvest”, “Joint Enterprise”, “Allied Harbor”, “Essential Harvest”, “Amber Fox”, “Allied Harmony”, “Display Deterrence”, “Active Fence”, “Eagle Assist”, “Enduring Freedom, “ISAF”, “Resolute Support”, “NATO Support to African Union mission in Sudan”, “Unified Protector” and “Active Endeavour.” For the remaining operations, the condition was coded as [0].
The borderline cases in calibration of this condition were some of the operations taking place in the Balkans. In these cases, if the data suggested pressure from international allies during some of the operations, the condition was coded as present [1] in the remaining operations in the same area as well.
7.3.3. Economic Interests
As demonstrated by the values obtained by operationalization of the condition of economic interests, the majority of the countries where PSOs were applied can be considered economically insignificant for Germany. This finding is not surprising as most of the countries, in which PSO are conducted have relatively small and globally insignificant economies, which have a rather small share on German exports. The only clear exception to this finding was the USA with 10,63% share on overall German exports in 2001 when operation “Eagle Assist” began. The data associated with the remaining operations ranged between 0,002% and 1,84%. In view of the data, the threshold for the presence of economic interests has been set at 0,4% of the German exports for the year in which the NATO PSO
75 commenced. Following this approach, the value [1] has been assigned to the operations three operations: “Anchor Guard”, “Ace Guard”, “Maritime Monitor”, “Maritime Guard”, “Sharp Guard”, “Display Deterrence”, “Active Fence” and “Eagle Assist.”
Concerning the second indicator, the presence of important trading routes, the value [1] has also been assigned to NATO operations, the objective of which was safeguarding maritime transport routes. As NATO states on its website, maritime operations are of special importance for NATO members as 90 percent of the total volume of goods in the world market is moved by sea (NATO 2016b, n.p.). The maritime operations for which the condition of economic interests was coded as present are “Allied Provider”, “Allied Protector”, “Ocean Shield’, “Active Endeavour” and “Sea Guardian.” For all of the remaining cases, the condition of economic interests has been coded as absent [0].
7.3.4. Humanitarian Crisis
As mentioned in the operationalization, a humanitarian crisis can be defined as large-scale human suffering requiring some degree of external aid. In this case, the value [1] was attributed to all cases of ethnic cleansing or genocide as well as to situations in which large flows of refugees and internally displaced persons were caused by the conflict in an area where a NATO PSO was taking place. The data were compared across various sources such as the argumentation of the government representatives in the Federal Council (Bundestag), the number of human losses as well as the number of refugees and internally displaced persons fleeing the conflict zones. In addition to that, secondary literature provided background information to put the numbers into perspective. During this procedure, it was also taken into account whether the specific peacekeeping operation was aimed at addressing the humanitarian situation in the given country (coded as [1], present) or whether it was conducted irrespective of it (coded as [0], absent). This distinction had to be added to the model mainly due to the fact that some of the countries in which NATO PSO are taking place (e.g., Afghanistan), are characteristic by their large degree of instability and significant refugee population that had been present there for decades and were in no way connected to the objectives of the NATO PSO conducted in the country.
76 Following this approach the condition of humanitarian crisis was coded as present [1] in the operations in the Former Yugoslavia, namely “Maritime Monitor”, “Maritime Guard” and “Sharp Guard”; in all operations in Bosnia, namely “Sky Monitor”, “Deny Flight”, “Deadeye”, “Deliberate Force”, “Joint Endeavour”, “Decisive Endeavour”, “Joint Guard”, “Deliberate Guard” and “Joint Forge.” as well as the operations in Kosovo before 2000: operations “Determined Force”, “Eagle Eye”, “Joint Guarantor”, “Determined Guarantor”, “Allied Harvest”, “Joint Guardian.” Due to the large refugee numbers coming to Albania from Kosovo and the problems with management of the situation, operation “Allied Harbor” was also coded in the same way. Last but not least, the condition was also coded as present in the “Support to the African Union mission in Sudan” and the “Support to the African Union Mission in Somalia.” In all of the cases where no mention of a humanitarian catastrophe was found, the condition was coded as absent [0].
The borderline cases in the calibration of this variable were the operations in Afghanistan. The presence of a humanitarian catastrophe in the country was clearly demonstrated by the numbers of refugee population, however, as the operations “Enduring Freedom”, “ISAF” and “Resolute Support” did not primarily address the humanitarian situation in the country, the condition was coded as absent [0].
77 Table 2: Dichotomous data table
Operation SEC ALL ECON HUM PART Anchor Guard 0 1 1 0 0 Ace Guard 0 1 1 0 1 Agile Genie 0 0 0 0 0 Maritime Monitor 0 0 1 1 1 Maritime Guard 0 0 1 1 1 Sharp Guard 0 0 1 1 1 Sky Monitor 1 1 0 1 1 Deny Flight 1 1 0 1 1 Deadeye 1 1 0 1 1 Deliberate Force 1 1 0 1 1 Joint Endeavour (IFOR) 1 1 0 1 1 Decisive Endeavour 1 1 0 1 1 (IFOR) Joint Guard (SFOR) 1 1 0 1 1 Deliberate Guard 1 1 0 1 1 Joint Forge (SFOR II) 1 1 0 1 1 Determined Force 1 1 0 1 1 Eagle Eye 1 1 0 1 1 Joint Guarantor 1 1 0 1 1 Determined Guarantor 1 1 0 1 1 Allied Harvest 1 1 0 1 1 Joint Guardian (KFOR) 1 1 0 1 1 Allied Harvest II 1 1 0 0 1 Joint Enterprise (KFOR) 1 1 0 0 1 Allied Harbor (AFOR) 1 1 0 1 1 Essential Harvest 1 1 0 0 1 Amber Fox 1 1 0 0 1 Allied Harmony 1 1 0 0 1 Display Deterrence 0 1 1 0 0 Active Fence 0 1 1 0 1 Eagle Assist 0 1 1 0 1 Enduring Freedom (OEF) 0 1 0 0 1 ISAF 0 1 0 0 1 Resolute Support 0 1 0 0 1 NATO Support to African 1 1 0 1 1 Union mission in Sudan NATO Support to African 0 0 0 1 0 Union mission in Somalia Allied Provider 0 0 1 0 1 Allied Protector 0 0 1 0 0 Ocean Shield 0 0 1 0 1 Unified Protector 0 1 0 0 0 Active Endeavour 0 1 1 0 1 Sea Guardian 0 0 1 0 1 Legend: Security interests (SEC), Pressure from international allies (ALL), Economic interests (ECON), Humanitarian crisis (HUM), Participation in the operation (PART) Source: Author
78 8. Analytical Section
In this section, the conditions or the combination of conditions leading to the observed outcomes are going to be analyzed. This chapter can be considered the core part of this diploma thesis as it is going to provide an answer to the main research question: what conditions are necessary and/or sufficient for German participation/non-participation in NATO PSO. The analysis is going to be conducted separately for each of the outcomes, German participation/non-participation. The first part is going to be devoted to examining the presence or absence of a condition necessary to the outcomes. In order to determine which conditions or combinations thereof result in the presence/absence of the observed outcomes, the following part is going to present the construction of a truth table, which is necessary for a standard csQCA analysis. The following subchapter is then going to show the standard analysis, which reveals the sufficient conditions and their combinations as well as the three solutions (complex, parsimonious and intermediate) generated by the standard analysis. Finally, the outcomes of the analysis for both outcomes are going to be presented and interpreted.
8.1. Analysis of German Participation in NATO PSO
This subchapter is going to present the analysis of necessary and sufficient conditions for instances where the outcome, German participation in NATO PSO is present.
8.1.1. Analysis of a Necessary Condition
The concept of a necessary condition has already been explained above. Now the presence of a necessary condition in the data set is going to be examined using the fsQCA 3.0. The outcome of the algorithm is an assessment of the distribution of cases across different logically possible combinations of causal conditions and the assessment of the consistency of the evidence for each causal combination with the argument that the cases with this combination of conditions constitute a subset of the cases with the outcome (Ragin 2008, 44). The analysis examining the existence or non-existence of a necessary condition should
79 be done separately before the standard truth table analysis. Table 3 presents the consistency and coverage values for the positive outcome (PART).
Table 3: Necessary Conditions, Outcome: PART Conditions tested: Consistency Coverage SEC 0.628571 1.000000 ~SEC 0.371429 0.684211 ALL 0.828571 0.906250 ~ALL 0.171429 0.666667 ECON 0.285714 0.769231 ~ECON 0.714286 0.892857 HUM 0.571429 0.952381 ~HUM 0.428571 0.750000 Legend: Security interests (SEC), Pressure from international allies (ALL), Economic interests (ECON), Humanitarian crisis (HUM), Participation in the operation (PART), Negation (~) Source: Author
In order to be able to consider a condition necessary, a given condition should have a consistency level of 0.9 or higher (Ragin 2009, 62). As demonstrated by the consistency values none of the conditions can be considered necessary for German participation in NATO PSO.
8.1.2. Analysis of a Sufficient Condition
Before commencing the process that will provide an answer to the main research question of this thesis, it is necessary to construct a truth table. Through the process of calibration, which has been presented in the previous chapter, the raw data for all of the observed conditions has been transformed into a binary form and organized into a data table. In order to be able to subject the data to a csQCA analysis a truth table needs to be constructed using the fcQCA 3.0 program. The process of creating a truth table consists of several steps. At first, a data file is created that contained both the observed conditions (security threat – in this table as SEC, interests of allies – ALL, economic interests – ECON, and humanitarian crisis - HUM), as well as the outcome (PART – German participation in the operation). Subsequently, the data is processed into a truth table (Table 4). At this stage, the truth table consists of 16 lines (24)31. In the truth table, each row represents one logical combination of all four conditions. The table also shows how many of the examined cases correspond to the
31 The index refers to the number of conditions entering the analysis, in this case four.
80 combination (“Number”) as well as the consistency of the combination (“Consistency”) (Ragin 2008, 33). The 1s and 0s in the table represent full membership and zero membership for each condition, respectively (Ragin 2008, 46). At this stage, the outcome values (PART) are left empty.
Table 4: Construction of a truth table (OUTCOME: PART): full version Line SEC ALL ECON HUM PART Number* Consistency 1. 1 1 0 1 17 1 2. 0 1 1 0 6 0.666667 3. 1 1 0 0 5 1 4. 0 1 0 0 4 0.75 5. 0 0 1 0 4 0.75 6. 0 0 1 1 3 1 7. 0 0 0 0 1 0 8. 0 0 0 1 1 0 9. 1 0 0 0 0 10. 1 0 1 0 0 11. 1 1 1 0 0 12. 1 0 0 1 0 13. 0 1 0 1 0 14. 1 0 1 1 0 15. 0 1 1 1 0 16. 1 1 1 1 0 Legend: Security interests (SEC), Pressure from international allies (ALL), Economic interests (ECON), Humanitarian crisis (HUM), Participation in the operation (PART), * – number of cases Source: Author
In the following step, the frequency threshold and the consistency threshold are going to be selected. In fsQCA 3.0 these steps are done in conjunction for each separate analysis (for presence and absence of the observed outcome). When it comes to frequency, a rule must be developed for classifying some combinations (rows) as relevant while others as irrelevant. For this purpose, a frequency threshold based on the number of cases in each row (shown in the Number column) is selected. For analyses with small numbers of cases, it is recommended to set the threshold at 1 or 2. In this case, the threshold is going to be left at 1, as default by the used software. The end result of this step is a shortened version of the original truth table from which the configurations that do not have any observation had been removed (Ragin 2008, 44-47). The combinations of conditions that do not correspond to any case, meaning that they are not represented by any empirical cases, are called logical
81 remainders (Schneider and Wagemann 2010, 15). In this case, these can be found in the rows 9 to 16 of the truth table (Table 4). Using Boolean algebra, these logical remainders can be transcribed as SEC*~ALL*~ECON*~HUM (line 9), SEC*~ALL*ECON*~HUM (line 10), SEC*ALL*ECON*~HUM (line 11), SEC*~ALL*~ECON*HUM (line 12), ~SEC*ALL*~ECON*HUM (line 13), SEC*~ALL*ECON*HUM (line 14), ~SEC*ALL*ECON*HUM (line 15) and SEC*ALL*ECON*HUM (line 16)32.
Subsequently, it needs to be distinguished, which configurations are subsets of the outcome and which are not by selecting a consistency threshold. According to Ragin’s manual, values below 0.75 indicate substantial inconsistency. The rows with consistency lower than 0.75 represent the cases in contradictory configurations, which means that for some cases they lead to a [0] outcome but to a [1] outcome for others (Rihoux and De Meur 2009, 44). In this table (Table 4), there is only one contradictory line, line 2 with consistency 0.666667 representing 6 cases: operations Anchor Guard (1.00,0.00)33, Ace Guard (1.00,1.00), Display Deterrence (1.00,0.00), Active Fence (1.00,1.00), Eagle Assist (1.00,1.00) and Active Endeavour (1.00,1.00). That means that in four cases (“Ace Guard”, “Active Fence”, “Eagle Assist” and “Active Endeavour”) the combinations of conditions leads to German participation in a given PSO while in two cases (“Anchor Guard” and “Display Deterrence”) it leads to German non-participation. As the number of contradictory cases is relatively low, it will be preceded to the next step and the contradictory cases will be explained separately at the end of the analytical section.
Using the automated delete and code command, fsQCA 3.0 is going to set the value 1 in the outcome column (PART) for every configuration with consistency level meeting and/or exceeding the threshold and the value 0 in the outcome column for every configuration with consistency level below the consistency threshold. The program automatically suggests the threshold 0.8. However, in view of the data, the threshold is going to be set at 0.75 in this case. After this step, the software is going to set the output value (PARTICIP) to 1 for all the configurations with consistency 0.75 or higher (5 configurations) and 0 to all the
32 The symbol “*” represents logical AND that signifies the combination of conditions, the symbol “~” represents an absence of the condition behind it 33 The first number signifies the presence of the given configuration, the second number signifies the presence of the observed outcome (PART).
82 configurations that failed to meet the consistency threshold (3 configurations) (Ragin 2008, 44-47). Table 5 represents the shortened truth table.
Table 5: Construction of a truth table (OUTCOME: PARTICIP): shortened version Line SEC ALL ECON HUM PART Number* Consistency 1. 1 1 0 1 1 17 1 2. 1 1 0 0 1 5 1 3. 0 0 1 1 1 3 1 4. 0 1 0 0 1 4 0.75 5. 0 0 1 0 1 4 0.75 6. 0 1 1 0 0 6 0.666667 7. 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 8. 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 Legend: Security interests (SEC), Pressure from international allies (ALL), Economic interests (ECON), Humanitarian crisis (HUM), Participation in the operation (PART), * – number of cases Source: Author
Once the truth table is complete, the sufficient condition is going to be analyzed through the “standard analyses procedure” of the software. This analysis automatically provides the user with three types of solutions: complex, parsimonious and intermediate. The basic difference between them is the way in which they work with the empirically unobserved cases, counterfactuals34. The addition of counterfactuals, or empirically unobserved configurations, is important as the occurring social phenomena are limited in their diversity and naturally, empirical evidence is not available for each of the logically possible combinations of conditions. As a substitute for absent conditions, comparative research came up with imagined counterfactual cases, the outcome of which is hypothesized based on the theoretical and substantive knowledge. In csQCA, this procedure is explicit and systematic. “Standard Analyses” procedure is strongly recommended by Ragin in this step, as it is the only way to derive the intermediate solution. In order to do that, the software “conducts counterfactual analyses based on information about causal conditions supplied by the user” (Ragin 2008, 49-50).
The software is able to generate the complex and the parsimonious solutions on its own without any input from the researcher. For the intermediate solution, an additional step is
34 See Ragin 2008, 81.
83 necessary. Once Standard Analysis is selected in the program, the researcher must select how each causal condition should theoretically contribute to the outcome to guide the derivation of the intermediate solution. If the condition is expected to contribute to the outcome when present, the option “present” should be selected. If it contributes to the outcome when absent, the researcher chooses “absent.” If it contributed to the outcome when present or absent, the option “present or absent” is selected (Ragin 2008, 51-52). As there is an expectation that the presence of each of the conditions contributes to the presence of the positive outcome (PART), the option “present” is going to be chosen. At the end of this step, the software produces a list of all three solutions differing in the way in which they incorporate logical remainders. The three solutions provided by the software can be found in Table 6.
Table 6: Sufficient Condition (OUTCOME: PART): Solutions Raw coverage Unique coverage Consistency COMPLEX SOLUTION ALL*~ECON*~HUM 0.228571 0.0857143 0.888889 ~SEC*~ALL*ECON 0.171429 0.171429 0.857143 SEC*ALL*~ECON 0.628571 0.485714 1 solution coverage: 0.885714 solution consistency: 0.939394
PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION ALL*~ECON 0.714286 0.714286 0.961538 ~ALL*ECON 0.171429 0.171429 0.857143 solution coverage: 0.885714 solution consistency: 0.939394
INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION ALL*~ECON 0.714286 0.714286 0.961538 ~ALL*ECON 0.171429 0.171429 0.857143 solution coverage: 0.885714 solution consistency: 0.939394 Legend: Security interests (SEC), Pressure from international allies (ALL), Economic interests (ECON), Humanitarian crisis (HUM), Participation in the operation (PART), Logical AND (*), Negation (~) Source: Author
The complex solution provides a line for each separate path to the outcome as well as their consistency and coverage scores (Ragin 2008, 69) with all remainders set to false (Ragin
84 2008, 81). In view of the research question, this solution can be considered the most relevant one as it best reflects the empirical reality. According to the complex solution the outcome can be provided by:
(1) The presence of pressure from international allies combined with the absence of economic interests and the absence of a humanitarian catastrophe (ALL*~ECON*~HUM) representing operations Allied Harvest II (1,1), Joint Enterprise (1,1), Essential Harvest (1,1), Amber Fox (1,1), Allied Harmony (1,1), Enduring Freedom (1,1), ISAF (1,1), Resolute Support (1,1) and Unified Protector (1,0);
(2) The absence of a security threat combined with the absence of pressure from international allies combined with the presence of economic interests (~SEC*~ALL*ECON) in present in operations Maritime Monitor (1,1), Maritime Guard (1,1), Sharp Guard (1,1), Allied Provider (1,1), Allied Protector (1,0), Ocean Shield (1,1), Sea Guardian (1,1).
And (3) the presence of a security threat combined with the presence of pressure from international allies and the absence of economic interests (SEC*ALL*~ECON) representing operations Sky Monitor (1,1), Deny Flight (1,1), Deadeye (1,1), Deliberate Force (1,1), Joint Endeavor (1,1), Decisive Endeavor (1,1), Joint Guard (1,1), Deliberate Guard (1,1), Joint Forge (1,1), Determined Force (1,1), Eagle Eye (1,1), Joint Guarantor (1,1), Determined Guarantor (1,1), Allied Harvest (1,1), Joint Guardian (1,1), Allied Harvest II (1,1), Joint Enterprise (1,1), Allied Harbor (1,1), Essential Harvest (1,1), Amber Fox (1,1).
The parsimonious solution presents the conditions that are essential in distinguishing between positive and negative cases (Ragin 2008, 70). This is done by using “any remainder that will help generate a logically simpler solution,” regardless of whether it composes an “easy” or a “difficult” counterfactual case (Ragin 2008, 81). In this case, the solution identified two conditions or combinations of conditions: the presence of pressure from international allies combined with the absence of economic interests (ALL*~ECON) and the absence of pressure from international allies combined with the presence of economic interests (~ALL*ECON).
85 The intermediate solutions, which only work with “easy” counterfactual cases35 (Ragin 2008, 70), are considered to be the most interpretable by Ragin (Ragin 2008, 81). In this case, it is also the presence of pressure from international allies combined with the absence of economic interests (ALL*~ECON) and the absence of pressure from international allies combined with the presence of economic interests (~ALL*ECON), just like in the parsimonious solution.
8.2. Analysis of German Non-Participation in NATO PSO
The same procedure is subsequently repeated for German non-participation (~PART).
8.2.1. Analysis of a Necessary Condition
First, an examination of the presence of a necessary condition is carried out. The consistency values and coverage for each of the conditions are presented in Table 7.
Table 7: Necessary Conditions, Outcome: ~PART Conditions tested: Consistency Coverage SEC 0.000000 0.000000 ~SEC 1.000000 0.315789 ALL 0.500000 0.096774 ~ALL 0.500000 0.333333 ECON 0.500000 0.230769 ~ECON 0.500000 0.107143 HUM 0.166667 0.047619 ~HUM 0.833333 0.250000 Legend: Security interests (SEC), Pressure from international allies (ALL), Economic interests (ECON), Humanitarian crisis (HUM), Participation in the operation (PART), Negation (~) Source: Author
Just like in the previous case, a condition can be considered necessary should it have a consistency level of 0.9 or higher (Ragin 2009, 62). In case of German non-participation (~PART), there is one condition, the absence of security interests (~SEC) that meets the criterion. With the consistency value of 1.0, it can be considered necessary for the outcome. As the consistency level suggests the absence of security interests can be found in all cases of German non-participation in a PSO, more precisely operations “Anchor Guard”, “Agile
35 The distinction betwen “easy” and “difficult” counterfactuals is based on the information regarding the connection between each causal condition and the outcome provided by the user.
86 Genie”, “Display Deterrence”, “Support to African Union mission in Somalia”, “Allied Protector” and “Unified Protector.”
8.2.2. Analysis of a Sufficient Condition
The following step is the creation of a truth table (Table 8) with all of the possible configurations of conditions.
Table 8: Construction of a truth table (OUTCOME: ~PART): full version Line SEC ALL ECON HUM ~PART Number* Consistency 1. 1 1 0 1 17 0 2. 0 1 1 0 6 0.333333 3. 1 1 0 0 5 0 4. 0 1 0 0 4 0.25 5. 0 0 1 0 4 0.25 6. 0 0 1 1 3 0 7. 0 0 0 0 1 1 8. 0 0 0 1 1 1 9. 1 0 0 0 0 10. 1 0 1 0 0 11. 1 1 1 0 0 12. 1 0 0 1 0 13. 0 1 0 1 0 14. 1 0 1 1 0 15. 0 1 1 1 0 16. 1 1 1 1 0 Legend: Security interests (SEC), Pressure from international allies (ALL), Economic interests (ECON), Humanitarian crisis (HUM), Participation in the operation (PART), * – number of cases Source: Author
The shortened version of the truth table (excluding the configurations without empirically observed cases) for the negative outcome (~PART) is presented in Table 9. The logical remainders, or the cases with no empirical evidence, can again be found in lines 9 to 16 representing the configurations SEC*~ALL*~ECON*~HUM (line 9), SEC*~ALL*ECON*~HUM (line 10), SEC*ALL*ECON*~HUM (line 11), SEC*~ALL*~ECON*HUM (line 12), ~SEC*ALL*~ECON*HUM (line 13), SEC*~ALL*ECON*HUM (line 14), ~SEC*ALL*ECON*HUM (line 15) and SEC*ALL*ECON*HUM (line 16).
87 Just as in case of the positive outcome (PART) in the previous section, the consistency threshold was set to 0.75 and the frequency threshold has been set to 1 case. In Table 8, there are three lines that do not meet the consistency threshold, namely line 2 with contradictory outcomes in operations Anchor Guard (1.00,1.00)36 and Display Deterrence (1.00,1.00), line 4 with contradictory outcomes in operations UnifiedProtector (1.00,1.00) and line 5 with contradictory outcome in operation AlliedProtector (1.00,1.00). In these operations, the combination of conditions led to German non-participation (~PART), while in all of the other cases in the same line it resulted in German participation in the missions (PART). These contradictions will again have to be explained individually at the end of the analytical section. The following step will be the construction of a shortened truth table applying the thresholds just like in the previous case. The shortened truth table can be found below (Table 9).
Table 9: Construction of a truth table (OUTCOME: ~PART): shortened version Line SEC ALL ECON HUM ~PART Number* Consistency 1. 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 2. 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 3. 0 1 1 0 0 6 0.333333 4. 0 1 0 0 0 4 0.25 5. 0 0 1 0 0 4 0.25 6. 1 1 0 1 0 17 0 7. 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 8. 0 0 1 1 0 3 0 Legend: Security interests (SEC), Pressure from international allies (ALL), Economic interests (ECON), Humanitarian crisis (HUM), Participation in the operation (PART), Negation (~), * – number of cases Source: Author
Subsequently, the standard analysis providing the researcher with complex, parsimonious and intermediate solutions is conducted. The difference between these three solutions is explained in the previous section (Chapter 8.1.3.). To be able to create the intermediate solution, it is again necessary to select how each causal condition should theoretically contribute to the outcome (Ragin 2008, 51-52). As there is an expectation that the absence of each of the conditions contributes to the absence of outcome (~PART), the option
36 The first number signifies the presence of the given configuration, the second number signifies the presence of the observed outcome (here ~PART).
88 “absent” is going to be chosen. The three solutions calculated by the software can be found in Table 10.
Table 10: Sufficient Condition (OUTCOME: ~PART): Solutions Raw coverage Unique coverage Consistency COMPLEX SOLUTION ~SEC*~ALL*~ECON 0.333333 0.333333 1 solution coverage: 0.333333 solution consistency: 1
PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION ~ALL*~ECON 0.333333 0.333333 1 solution coverage: 0.333333 solution consistency: 1
INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION ~SEC*~ALL*~ECON 0.333333 0.333333 1 solution coverage: 0.333333 solution consistency: 1 Legend: Security interests (SEC), Pressure from international allies (ALL), Economic interests (ECON), Humanitarian crisis (HUM), Participation in the operation (PART), Logical AND (*), Negation (~) Source: Author
In case of German non-participation (~PART), the complex and the intermediate solutions resulting from conducting the “Standard Analyses” procedure are the same. In these solutions there is one combination of causal conditions leading to the outcome (~PART), which is characterized by the absence of security interests combined with the absence of pressure from international allies and the absence of economic interests (~SEC*~ALL*~ECON). However, due to the limited number of cases with the outcome of German non- participation (~PART), this configuration only covers two operations: Agile Genie (1,1)37 and the Support to the African Union mission in Somalia (1,1). The remaining four cases of German non-participation in NATO PSO, namely operations “Anchor Guard”, “Display Deterrence”, “Allied Protector” and “Unified Protector”, are not covered by the solutions and only represent contradictions within the formulas explaining the German participation (PART) identified in the previous section. The parsimonious solution represents the absence
37 The first number signifies the presence of the given configuration, the second number signifies the presence of the observed outcome (~PART).
89 of pressure from international allies combined with the absence of economic interests (~ALL*~ECON) which can be also be found in two cases mentioned above (namely Agile Genie (1,1) and the Support to the African Union mission in Somalia (1,1)).
8.3. Interpretation of the Results
When interpreting the results of the QCA analysis, it is necessary to bear in mind that the empirical data showed very limited variability on the outcome as Germany participates in most NATO PSO, which can also be considered one of the findings of this diploma thesis. While it is possible to determine that the three combinations of conditions - ALL*~ECON*~HUM, ~SEC*~ALL*ECON, and SEC*ALL*~ECON – in most cases lead to German participation in NATO PSO suggesting that Germany would be following the logic of material gains while deciding on the Bundeswehr deployments abroad, any such judgments should be very careful due to the fact that Germany does participate in a significant majority of all NATO PSO.
What is more interesting, are the cases, which fulfill the criteria for participation (one of the above-mentioned configurations is present), but Germany did not take part in them. The most notable is the case of operation “Unified Protector” in Libya with configuration ALL*~ECON*~HUM, which led to a positive outcome (PART) in 8 other cases (Allied Harvest II, Joint Enterprise, Essential Harvest, Amber Fox, Allied Harmony, Enduring Freedom, ISAF, and Resolute Support). This finding only proves the controversy surrounded the German decision not to take part in the operation presented in more detail in Chapter 6.2. As clearly demonstrated throughout the whole thesis, the role of a responsible ally is of extreme importance for Germany, which stems especially from its historical experience and political culture constructed after the end of WWII. However, in this case, Germany decided to abstain from the vote in the UN Security Council and voted alongside states like Russia, China, India or Brazil instead of its main allies such as France, the United Kingdom or the USA (Miskimmon 2012, 392). This decision is even more surprising as the federal government made it clear that it did not agree with the reprehensibility of the Libyan regime (Hacke 2011, 50). As already explained in Chapter 6.2, the reason for such action can
90 be found in the domestic politics and the aspirations of the FDP in the upcoming regional elections (Oppermann 2012, 514).
Another contradictory case is the operation “Allied Protector” covered by the formula ~SEC*~ALL*ECON. This configuration resulted in German participation in 6 cases (Maritime Monitor, Maritime Guard, Sharp Guard, Allied Provider, Ocean Shield, and Sea Guardian. What all of these operations have in common is that they are maritime operations that are among other goals aimed at the protection of trading routes on the sea, which is of economic interest for Germany. Analyzing why Germany took part in all of the operations except for one, there is no obvious explanation distinguishing operation “Allied Protector” from the remaining ones. However, it is worth noting that in 2009 when the operation commenced, Germany was taking part in the European Union’s anti-piracy operation in the Gulf of Aden (Indian Ocean), “Operation Atalanta.” This was also the case with other NATO members such as France or Italy and overall there were only five states (Canada, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the USA) that contributed to “Allied Protector” (Garrett and Hendrickson 2009, 10).
There are also two cases of German non-participation that are not covered by any of the simplified formulas. These cases are operations “Anchor Guard” and “Display Deterrence” which combine the presence of interest of allies with the presence of economic interests and the absence of all of the remaining conditions. What these operations have in common is that they were conducted in support of NATO member Turkey during the first and second Gulf conflict. Operation “Anchor Guard” took place between 1990-1991 and its aim was to monitor the Gulf crisis and provide coverage of southeastern Turkey in case of an Iraqi attack. Operation “Display Deterrence” was conducted in 2003 providing defense to Turkey during the second Gulf Conflict (NATO Unclassified, n.p.). As the operation “Anchor Guard” took place shortly after the German reunification and before the decision of the Federal constitutional court on out of area operations that came in 1994, one of the possible explanations can be found in the domestic constraints on foreign military deployments. The non-participation in the second case is largely overlooked by academic literature, however the German reluctance to take part in the US-led Iraq war in any form (mentioned in Chapter 6.1) is worth noting.
91 9. Conclusion
The aim of this diploma thesis was to analyze the necessary and the sufficient conditions that lead to German participation or non-participation in NATO PSO since the reunification of Germany in 1990 and to answer the question whether Germany follows the logic of material gains or the universalist logic in its decisions about the deployments of the Bundeswehr in NATO PSO. In view of the academic literature on the topic of German participation in peacekeeping operations within the framework of NATO, the UN or the EU the four most commonly mentioned motives were selected as the conditions to be observed using the csQCA method. The observed conditions were (1) security threat, (2) pressure from international allies, (3) economic interests and (4) humanitarian crisis with the first three conditions representing the logic of material gains and the fourth condition representing the universalist logic. The method of csQCA was selected as it allows the inclusion of as many relevant cases as possible while still keeping the advantages of qualitative methodology and in-depth knowledge of individual cases, which is very beneficial in this type of research. The observed cases represented all NATO PSO conducted since the reunification of Germany in 1990 until 2018.
First of the findings is that Germany participates in a vast majority of the NATO PSO. Out of the 41 observed cases, there were only six instances on which Germany did not take part in a given NATO PSO. The cases of German non-participation were operations “Anchor Guard,” “Agile Genie,” “Display Deterrence,” “NATO Support to African Union mission in Sudan,” “Allied Protector” and “Unified Protector.” This finding posed a significant limitation to the informative value of the analysis, as general conclusions on German non-participation in NATO PSO cannot be derived from a sample of such limited variability.
The csQCA analysis showed that there is no necessary condition to German participation (PART) in NATO PSO as none of the conditions met the threshold of 0,9. The subsequent standard analyses demonstrated that there are three combinations of conditions that lead to the presence of the observed outcome in most cases.
92 These combinations are the presence of pressure from international allies combined with the absence of economic interests and the absence of a humanitarian catastrophe (ALL*~ECON*~HUM), the absence of a security threat combined with the absence of pressure from international allies and the presence of economic interests (~SEC*~ALL*ECON) and the presence of a security threat combined with the pressure from international allies and the absence of economic interests (SEC*ALL*~ECON). As this model covered most of the observed cases with a minimal number of cases in contradictory configurations, it can be concluded that it works relatively well in explaining the combinations of conditions that are sufficient for German participation in NATO PSO.
The analysis of German non-participation in NATO PSO (~PART) showed that a necessary condition to this outcome is the lack of German security interests (~SEC) with the consistency of 1, meaning that the security interests were absent in all cases of German non-participation in NATO PSO. When it comes to the standard analyses, the complex solution showed that there is only one configuration that leads to the outcome of German non-participation NATO PSO, which is the absence of security interests, combined with the absence of pressure from international allies and the absence of economic interests (~SEC*~ALL*~ECON). However, the small variability on the outcome variable limits the explanatory power of this finding. Moreover, this combination only covers 2 of the observed cases: operations “Agile Genie” and the “Support to African Union Mission in Somalia.” The remaining cases of non-participation in NATO PSO (operations Anchor Guard, Display Deterrence, Allied Protector and Unified Protector) can be explained as exceptions from the rules for the positive outcomes (PART).
93 Bibliography Primary Sources Alscher, Stefan, et al. Migrationsprofil Westbalkan: Ursachen, Herausforderungen Und Lösungsansätze. Bundesamt Für Migration Und Flüchtlinge, 2015. Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany. German Bundestag, 2014. Deutscher Bundestag. Plenarprotokoll 12/101. 1992, http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btp/ 12/12101.pdf. Deutscher Bundestag. Plenarprotokoll 13/48. 1995a, http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btp/ 13/13048.pdf. Deutscher Bundestag. Plenarprotokoll 13/74. 1995b, http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btp/ 13/13074.pdf. Deutscher Bundestag. Plenarprotokoll 13/149. 1996, http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btp/ 13/13149.pdf. Deutscher Bundestag. Plenarprotokoll 13/248. 1998, http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btp/ 13/13248.pdf. Deutscher Bundestag. Plenarprotokoll 14/40. 1999, http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btp/ 14/14040.pdf. Deutscher Bundestag. Plenarprotokoll 14/184. 2001a, http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btp/ 14/14184.pdf. Deutscher Bundestag. Plenarprotokoll 14/202. 2001b, http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btp/ 14/14202.pdf. Deutscher Bundestag. Plenarprotokoll 14/210. 2001c, http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btp/ 14/14210.pdf. Deutscher Bundestag. Plenarprotokoll 15/14. 2002, http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btp/ 15/15014.pdf. Deutscher Bundestag. Plenarprotokoll 15/146. 2004, http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btp/ 15/15146.pdf. Deutscher Bundestag. Gesetz Über Die Parlamentarische Beteiligung Bei Der Entscheidung
94 Über Den Einsatz Bewaffneter Streitkräfte Im Ausland (Parlamentsbeteiligungsgesetz). German Bundestag, 2005a, www.bundestag.de/parlament/aufgaben/rechtsgrundlagen/parlamentsbeteiligung. Deutscher Bundestag. Plenarprotokoll 15/178. 2005b, http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btp/ 15/15178.pdf. Deutscher Bundestag. Antrag der Bundesregierung Fortsetzung des Einsatzes bewaffneter deutscher Streitkräfte bei der Unterstützung der gemeinsamen Reaktion auf terroristische Angriffe gegen die USA auf Grundlage des Artikels 51 der Satzung der Vereinten Nationen und des Artikels 5 des Nordatlantikvertrags sowie der Resolutionen 1368 (2001) und 1373 (2001) des Sicherheitsrats der Vereinten Nationen. 2010, http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/036/1703690.pdf. Deutscher Bundestag. Antrag Der Bundesregierung Entsendung Bewaffneter Deutscher Streitkräfte Am NATO-Geführten Einsatz Resolute Support Mission Für Die Ausbildung, Beratung Und Unterstützung Der Afghanischen Nationalen Sicherheitskräfte in Afghanistan. 2014a, dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btd/ 18/032/1803246.pdf. Deutscher Bundestag. Antrag der Bundesregierung Fortsetzung der Beteiligung bewaffneter deutscher Streitkräfte an dem Einsatz der Internationalen Sicherheitsunterstützungstruppe in Afghanis- tan (International Security Assistance Force, ISAF) unter Führung der NATO auf Grundlage der Resolution 1386 (2001) und folgender Resolutio- nen, zuletzt Resolution 2120 (2013) vom 10. Oktober 2013 des Sicherheits- rates der Vereinten Nationen . 2014b, dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btd/ 18/032/1803246.pdf. Deutscher Bundestag. Plenarprotokoll 18/17. 2014c, dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/18/ 18017.pdf#P.1259. German Ministry of Defence. White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr. Bundesministerium Der Verteidigung, 2006. German Ministry of Defence. Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien: Nationale Interessen Wahren - Internationale Verantwortung Übernehmen - Sicherheit Gemeinsam Gestalten. Bundesministerium Der Verteidigung, 2011.
95 German Ministry of Defence. Die Bundeswehr im Einsatz: Entstehung, Entwicklung, Überblick. Berlin: Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 2013. Humanitarian Coalition. “What Is a Humanitarian Emergency?” Humanitarian Coalition, 6 May 2015, humanitariancoalition.ca/what-is-a-humanitarian-emergency. NATO Handbook. NATO's Public Diplomacy Division, 2006. NATO. “Operations and Missions: Past and Present.” NATO, 21 Dec. 2016a, www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52060.htm. NATO. “Operation Sea Guardian.” NATO, 27 Oct. 2016b, www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52060.htm. NATO Unclassified. “NATO’s Operations 1949 - Present.” SHAPE, NATO, shape.nato.int/resources/21/nato%20operations,%201949-present.pdf. NATO Unclassified. Peace Support Operations: AJP-3.4.1., 2001, https://info.publicintelligence.net/NATO-PeaceSupport.pdf. Statistisches Bundesamt. “ 51000-0001 Aus- Und Einfuhr (Außenhandel): Deutschland, Jahre.” Statistisches Bundesamt, www-genesis.destatis.de/genesis/online/ data;jsessionid=A72429AA349E5AD345BEFCD400BDDD63.tomcat_GO_2_2?operatio n=abruftabelleAbrufen&selectionname=51000-0001&levelindex=1&levelid= 1525795587890&index=1. Statistisches Bundesamt. “51000-0003 Aus- Und Einfuhr (Außenhandel): Deutschland, Jahre, Länder.” Statistisches Bundesamt, www-genesis.destatis.de/genesis/online/ logon?language=de&sequenz=tabelleAufbau&selectionname=51000-0003. UCDP - Uppsala Conflict Data Program, ucdp.uu.se/. University of Maryland. Global Terrorism Database, 2017, www.start.umd.edu/gtd/. WB. “Military Expenditure (% of GDP).” The World Bank, 2018, data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?locations=DE&view=chart+. WB. “Refugee Population by Country or Territory of Origin.”,data.worldbank.org/indicator/ SM.POP.REFG.OR. WHO. “Complex Emergencies.” World Health Organization, World Health Organization, 24 Aug. 2012, www.who.int/environmental_health_emergencies/complex_ emergencies/en.
96 Secondary Sources Berg-Schlosser, Dirk, Gisele De Meur, Benoit Rihoux, and Charles C. Ragin. "Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) as an Approach." Configurational comparative methods: qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) and related techniques, edited by Rihoux, Benoît, and Charles C Ragin, Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2009, pp 1-18. Bötel, Frank, and Andreas Müller. “Afghanistan: Resolute Support Und ISAF.” Bundeswehr, 9 Mar. 2018, www.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/bwde/start/einsaetze/afghanistan/!ut/ p/z1/04_Sj9CPykssy0xPLMnMz0vMAfIjo8zinSx8QnyMLI2MTANcLQwcQ02cLELcvIwM XMz1wwkpiAJKG-AAjgb6wSmp-pFAM8xxmhFiqB-sH6UflZVYllihV5BfVJKTWqKXmA xyoX5kRmJeSk5qQH6yI0SgIDei3KDcUREAAiL46A!!/dz/d5/L2dBISEvZ0FBIS9nQSEh/#Z 7_B8LTL29225PE80AU4B8TFJ20T1. bpb. “Weltkarte: Auslandseinsätze Der Bundeswehr.” Bundeszentrale Für Politische Bildung, 3 Apr. 2018, www.bpb.de/politik/grundfragen/deutsche- verteidigungspolitik/243585/weltkarte-auslandseinsaetze. Bredow, Wilfried von. Sicherheit, Sicherheitpolitik und Militär: Deutschland seit der Vereiningung. Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2015. Grundwissen Politik Brose, Ekkehard. When Germany Sends Troops Abroad the Case for a Limited Reform of the Parliamentary Participation Act. Stiftung Wissenschaft Und Politik, 2013. https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research_papers/ 2013_RP09_bre.pdf Buck, Tobias. “German Military: Combat Ready?” Financial Times, Financial Times, 15 Feb. 2018, www.ft.com/content/36e2cd40-0fdf-11e8-940e-08320fc2a277. CDU/CSU. “Deutschland Braucht Eine Starke Bundeswehr.” CDU/CSU-Fraktion Im Deutschen Bundestag, 4 May 2018, www.cducsu.de/themen/aussen-europa-und- verteidigung/deutschland-braucht-eine-starke-bundeswehr. Connolly, Kate. “German President Horst Köhler Quits over Afghanistan Gaffe.” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 31 May 2010, www.theguardian.com/world/2010/may/31/german-president-horst-kohler-quits. Crawford, Beverly. Power and German foreign policy: embedded hegemony in Europe. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. Crawford, Beverly. “The Normative Power of a Normal State: Power and Revolutionary
97 Vision in Germany's Post-Wall Foreign Policy.” German Politics and Society, vol. 28, no. 95, 2010, pp. 165–184., doi:10.3167/gps.2010.280211. Cronqvist, Lasse, and Dirk Berg-Schlosser. “Multi - Value QCA (mvQCA)”. Configurational comparative methods: qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) and related techniques. Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2009. 69-86. Dalgaard-Nielsen, Anja. Germany, pacifism and peace enforcement. Manchester University Press, 2013.https://books.google.sk/books?id=YWS92WULujwC&printsec= frontcover&hl=sk#v=onepage&q&f=false. Deckers, Wolfgang. “Germany and the Balkans: Reflections on an Uneasy Relationship.” Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, vol. 4, no. 2, 2002, pp. 157–170., doi:10.1080/1461319022000021602. Dewitz, Christian. “Parlamentsvorbehalt: Bericht Der Rühe-Kommission.” Bundeswehr- Journal, 21 June 2015, www.bundeswehr-journal.de/2015/parlamentsvorbehalt- bericht-der-ruehe-kommission-1-teil/. Dyson, Tom. The politics of German defence and security: policy leadership and military reform in the post-Cold War era. Berghahn Books, 2008. Dyson, Tom. “Managing Convergence: German Military Doctrine and Capabilities in the 21st Century”. Defence Studies 11.2 (2011): 244-270. 15 Jan. 2018, doi:10.1080/14702436.2011.590047. Frantzen, Henning-A. NATO and Peace Support Operations, 1991-1999 : Policies and Doctrines. Routledge, 2005. Cass Series on Peacekeeping. EBSCOhost. Faust, Dominik A. Effektive Sicherheit: Analyse des Systems kollektiver Sicherheit der Vereinten Nationen und Entwurf eines alternativen Sicherheitssystems. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2002. Garrett, Nathan, and Ryan HENDRICKSON. "NATO’s Anti-piracy Operations, Strategic and Political Implications." NATO Analysis papers (2009). Gauseweg, Simon. “Auslandseinsätze Der Bundeswehr: Reform-Stopp.” Legal Tribune Online, 17 Feb. 2017, www.lto.de/recht/hintergruende/h/bundeswehr- auslandseinsatz-parlamentsbeteiligungsgesetz-reform-stopp/. Gazzini, Tarcisio. “NATO Coercive Military Activities in the Yugoslav Crisis (1992-1999).” European Journal of International Law, vol. 12, no. 3, 2001, pp. 391–436., doi:10.1093/ejil/12.3.391.
98 Gebauer, Matthias. “Von Der Leyen Will Mehr Geld Von Scholz, Sie Hat Trump Als Trumpf.” Spiegel Online, 2 May 2018, www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/ursula- von-der-leyen-will-mehr-geld-fuer-die-bundeswehr-a-1205869.html. Ghetti, Michelle Ward. “The Terrorist Is A Star!: Regulating Media Coverage of Publicity- Seeking Crimes.” Federal Communications Law Journal, vol. 60, no. 3, June 2008, pp. 481–534. Academic Search Complete [EBSCO]. Gießmann, Hans-Joachim., and Armin. Wagner. Armee im Einsatz: Grundlagen, Strategien und Ergebnisse einer Beteiligung der Bundeswehr. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2009. Gordon, Philip H. “NATO After 11 September”. Survival 43.4 (2007): 89-106. 13 Mar. 2018, doi: 10.1080/00396330112331343145. Gotkowska, Justyna. Bundeswehr 3.0: The political, military and social dimensions of the reform of the German armed forces. Warszawa: Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich im. Marka Karpia, 2012. Haass, Felix. “Peacekeeping Contributor Profile: Germany.” Providing for Peacekeeping, Jan. 2017, www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/2014/04/03/contributor-profile- germany/. Hacke, Christian. “Deutschland und der Libyen-Konflikt:Zivilmacht ohne Zivilcourage“. Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte. 61.39 (2011): 50-52. Harnisch, Sebastian. “Change and Continuity in Post-Unification German Foreign Policy.” German Politics, vol. 10, no. 1, 2001, pp. 35-60., doi:10.1080/09644000412331307384. Harnisch, Sebastian and Kerry Longhurst. “Understanding Germany: The Limits of ‘Normalization’ and the Prevalence of Strategic Culture.” German Culture, Politics, and Literature into the Twenty-First Century, edited by Taberner, Boydell and Brewer Limited, 2006, pp. 49–60. Harnisch, Sebastian. “German Foreign Policy: Gulliver’s Travails in the 21st Century”. Foreign policy in comparative perspective: domestic and international influences on state behavior. 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: CQ Press, 2013. 71-93. Hoese, Alexander, and Kai Oppermann. "Transatlantic conflict and cooperation: What role for public opinion?." Journal of Transatlantic Studies 5.1 (2007): 43-61. Huber, Reiner K., and Bernhard Schmidt. "Limits of German defence reform: results of
99 parametric analyses for the commission ‘Common Security and Future of the Bundeswehr’." Journal of the Operational Research Society55.4 (2004): 350-360. Enskat, Sebastian, and Carlo Masala. “Einsatzarmee Bundeswehr. Fortsetzung der deutschen Außenpolitik mit anderen Mitteln?”. Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik 8.S1 (2015): 365-378. 02 Apr. 2018. Kaim, Markus. “Germany, Afghanistan, and the Future of NATO.” International Journal, vol. 63, no. 3, 2008, pp. 607–623. JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/40204400. Kaim, Markus. “Germany: A Lynchpin Ally?” Global Allies: Comparing US Alliances in the 21st Century, edited by Michael Wesley, ANU Press, Australia, 2017, pp. 31–44. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1sq5twz.6. Kirchner, Emil J. “Security threats and institutional response. The European context”. Asia Europe Journal 3.2 (2005): 179-197. Kirste, Knut. Rollentheorie und Aussenpolitikanalyse: die USA und Deutschland als Zivilmächte. Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 1998. Klein, Tanja. Nationale GSVP-Politiken Zwischen Kontinuität Und Wandel: Eine Rollentheoretische Analyse Deutschlands Und Der Niederlande. 1st ed., VS Verlag Für Sozialwissenschaften, 2018. Koops, Joachim A. “Germany and United Nations Peacekeeping: the Cautiously Evolving Contributor.” International Peacekeeping, vol. 23, no. 5, 26 Sept. 2016, pp. 652–680., doi:10.1080/13533312.2016.1235092. Krause, Ulf von. Die Bundeswehr als Instrument deutscher Aussenpolitik. Wiesbaden: Springer, 2013. Kříž, Zdeněk. “Teoretický koncept civilní mocnosti a použití vojenské síly”. Mezinárodní vztahy 42.2 (2007): 60-76. Kříž, Zdeněk. “Německá bezpečnostní politika: adaptace civilní mocnosti”. Německo v čele Evropy?: SRN jako civilní mocnost a hegemon eurozóny. Ed. Vladimír Handl. Praha: Ústav mezinárodních vztahů, 2011. 176-210. Print. Kříž, Zdeněk. “K některým aspektům aplikace mandátu RB OSN během operace NATO Unified Protector”. Obrana a strategie 12.2 (2012): 17-27. Kříž, Zdeněk, and Jana Urbanovská. Deutschlands Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik nach der Vereinigung: Zivilmacht, Handelsstaat oder Mittelmacht?. Brno: Masarykova univerzita, 2014.
100 Lahav, Gallya, and Sandra Lavenex. “International Migration.” Handbook of International Relations, edited by Walter Carlsnaes et al., 2nd ed., SAGE, 2012, pp. 746–774. Leithner, Anika. Shaping German foreign policy: history, memory, and national interest. Boulder: FirstForumPress, 2009. Longhurst, Kerry. Germany and the Use of Force. Manchester University Press, 2004. Major, Claudia, and Christian Mölling. "The Framework Nations Concept." German Institute for International and Security Affairs (2014). Major, Claudia, and Christian Mölling. “Von Libyen nach Syrien: Die Rolle des Militärs in einer neuen deutschen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik”. Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 66.28-29 (2016): 32-37. Malici, Akan. “Germans as Venutians: The Culture of German Foreign Policy Behavior.” Foreign Policy Analysis, vol. 2, no. 1, 2006, pp. 37–62., doi:10.1111/j.1743- 8594.2005.00019.x. Maull, Hanns W. “Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers.” Foreign Affairs, vol. 69, no. 5, 1 Dec. 1990, pp. 91–106. JSTOR, doi:10.2307/20044603. Maull, Hanns. “Germany and the Use of Force: Still a 'Civilian Power'?” Trierer Arbeitspapiere Zur Internationalen Politik, no. 2, 1999. Maull, Hanns. Germany's uncertain power: foreign policy of the Berlin Republic. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. Meiers, Franz-Josef. “Von der Scheckbuchdiplomatie zur Verteidigung am Hindukusch. Die Rolle der Bundeswehr bei multinationalen Auslandseinsätzen 1990–2009”. Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik 3.2 (2010): 201-222. Miskimmon, Alister. “Falling into Line? Kosovo and the Course of German Foreign Policy.” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), vol. 85, no. 3, The War over Kosovo: Ten Years On, 1 May 2009, pp. 561–573. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/27695031. Miskimmon, Alister. “German Foreign Policy and the Libya Crisis.” German Politics, vol. 21, no. 4, 2012, pp. 392–410., doi:10.1080/09644008.2012.739610. Mölling, Christian, and Alicia von Voß. “Parliamentary Approval: This Does Not Pave the Way for a European Army.” SWP, 25 June 2016, www.swp-berlin.org/en/point-of- view/parliamentary-approval-this-does-not-pave-the-way-for-a-european-army/. “NATO Operations.” GlobalSecurity.org, www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/int/nato-
101 ops.htm. Noetzel, Timo. “Germany's Small War in Afghanistan: Military Learning amid Politico- Strategic Inertia.” Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 31, no. 3, 2010, pp. 486–508., doi:10.1080/13523260.2010.521699. Oppermann, Kai. “National Role Conceptions, Domestic Constraints and the New ‘Normalcy’ in German Foreign Policy: the Eurozone Crisis, Libya and Beyond”. German Politics 21.4 (2012): 502-519. Paravicini, Giulia. “Angela Merkel: Europe Must Take 'Our Fate' into Own Hands.” POLITICO, 29 May 2017, www.politico.eu/article/angela-merkel-europe-cdu-must-take-its-fate- into-its-own-hands-elections-2017/. Quintanilla, Jacobo, et al. Reporting on Humanitarian Crises: A Manual for Trainers & Journalists and an Introduction for Humanitarian Workers. 2014, reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/IN140220_HumanitarianReportingH ANDOUTS_WEB.pdf. Ragin, Charles C. The Comparative Method: Moving beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies. University of California Press, 1987. EBSCO. Ragin, Charles C. User's Guide to Fuzzy-Set/Qualitative Comparative Analysis 2.0. 2008, www.u.arizona.edu/~cragin/fsQCA/download/fsQCAManual.pdf. Ragin, Charles C. Redesigning social inquiry: Fuzzy sets and beyond. University of Chicago Press, 2009. Rauch, Andreas M. Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2006. Rauch, Andreas M. "Die sicherheitspolitische Bedeutung von UNPROFOR, IFOR, SFOR und EUFOR im Kontext des Balkan-Konflikts." Armee im Einsatz. . Ed. Hans-Joachim Gießmann. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, 2009. Rihoux, Benoît. "Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) and related systematic comparative methods: Recent advances and remaining challenges for social science research." International Sociology 21.5 (2006): 679-706. Rihoux, Benoît, and Gisèle De Meur. “Crisp-Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (csQCA).” Configurational Comparative Methods: Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and Related Techniques, edited by Rihoux, Benoît et al., Vol. 51, Sage, 2009, pp. 33–68. Rihoux, Benoît, and Charles C. Ragin. Configurational Comparative Methods: Qualitative
102 Comparative Analysis (QCA) and Related Techniques. Vol. 51, Sage, 2009. Risse, Thomas. "Kontinuität durch Wandel: Eine „neue “deutsche Außenpolitik." Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 11.2004 (2004): 24-31. Schneider, Carsten Q., and Claudius Wagemann. "Standards of good practice in qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) and fuzzy-sets." Comparative Sociology 9.3 (2010): 397- 418. Sperling, James. “Germany and America in the Twenty-first Century: Repeating the Post-war Patterns of Conflict and Cooperation”. German Politics 19.1 (2010): 53-71. 14 Jan. 2018. Wagener, Martin. “Normalization in Security Policy? Deployments of Bundeswehr Forces Abroad in the Era Schröder, 1998-2004.” Germany's Uncertain Power: Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic, edited by Hanns Maull, Springer, 2006, pp. 79–92. Werkhäuser, Nina. “German Military Spending Gets Political.” Deutsche Welle, 8 Aug. 2017, www.dw.com/en/german-military-spending-gets-political/a-40016299. Werkhäuser, Nina. “Bundeswehr: Mehr Truppen Für Den Bündnisfall.” Deutsche Welle, 4 May 2018, www.dw.com/de/bundeswehr-mehr-truppen-für-den-bündnisfall/a- 43656158. Wiesgold, Thomas. “15 years Federal Armed Forces mission in Afghanistan.” BPB, 15.12.2016, http://www.bpb.de/238332. Wölfle, Markus. Die Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr und ihre Auswirkungen auf die Rolle der Bundesrepublik Deutschland im internationalen System: ein Vergleich von Rollenkonzept und Rollenverhalten unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Zivilmachtskonzepts von Hanns W. Maull. Bonn: Bernard & Graefe, 2005. Zůna, Jaromír. NATO operace na podporu míru. Brno: Vojenská akademie, 2002.
Software
Ragin, Charles C., and Sean Dave. “Fuzzy-Set/Qualitative Comparative Analysis.” 3.0, University of California, Department of Sociology, 2016.
103