Scotus Ord 1 D.1 Prologue
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!1 This translation of the Prologue of the Ordinatio (aka Opus Oxoniense) of Blessed John Duns Scotus is complete. It is based on volume one of the critical edition of the text by the Scotus Commission in Rome and published by Frati Quaracchi. Scotus’ Latin is tight and not seldom elliptical, exploiting to the full the grammatical resources of the language to make his meaning clear (especially the backward references of his pronouns). In English this ellipsis must, for the sake of intelligibility, often be translated with a fuller repetition of words and phrases than Scotus himself gives. The possibility of mistake thus arises if the wrong word or phrase is chosen for repetition. The only check to remove error is to ensure that the resulting English makes the sense intended by Scotus. Whether this sense has always been captured in the translation that follows must be judged by the reader. So comments and notice of errors are most welcome. Peter L.P. Simpson [email protected] December, 2012 !2 THE ORDINATIO OF BLESSED JOHN DUNS SCOTUS Prologue First Part On the Necessity of Revealed Doctrine Single Question: Whether it was necessary for man in this present state that some doctrine be supernaturally inspired. Num. 1 I. Controversy between Philosophers and Theologians Num. 5 A. Opinion of the Philosophers Num. 5 B. Rejection of the Opinion of the Philosophers Num. 12 II. Solution of the Question Num. 57 III. On the Three Principal Reasons against Num. 66 the Philosophers IV. To the Arguments of the Philosophers Num. 72 V. To the Principal Arguments Num. 90 Second Part On the Sufficiency of Revealed Doctrine Single Question: Whether the supernatural knowledge necessary for the wayfarer is sufficiently handed on in Sacred Scripture. Num. 95 I. On the Truth of Sacred Scripture Num. 99 II. Principal Response to the Question Num. 120 III. To the Principal Arguments Num. 121 Third Part On the Object of Theology Question 1: Whether theology is about God as about its first object. Num. 124 Question 2: Whether Theology is about God under some special Idea Num. 133 Question 3: Whether Theology is about Everything by Way of Attribution of them to its First Subject Num. 139 !3 I. Preliminary Remarks Num. 141 II. On the Necessary Part of Theology A. To the First Question, speaking of Theology in itself. Num. 151 B. To the Second Question, speaking of Theology in itself Num. 158 C. To the First Question, speaking of Our Theology Num. 168 III. On Contingent Theology Num. 169 IV. On Christ as First Object Num. 172 V. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question Num. 183 VI. To the principal Arguments of the Second Question Num. 192 VI. To the Third Question A. Opinion of Others Num. 196 B. Scotus’ own Response Num. 200 VII. To the principal Arguments of the Third Question Num. 207 Fourth Part On Theology as a Science Questions 1 and 2: Whether theology in itself is a science, and whether it is subaltern-ing or subaltern-ed Num. 208 I. To the First Question Num. 208 II. To the Second Question Num. 214 Fifth Part On Theology insofar as it is a Practical Science Question 1: Whether theology is a practical or a speculative science Num. 217 Question 2: Whether a science is called practical per se from order to action as to its end Num. 223 I. What Action [Praxis] is Num. 228 II. How Practical Knowledge is Extended to Action Num. 236 III. From what Source Knowledge gets its Extension to Action Num. 239 IV. To the Second Question Num. 265 V. To the First Question A. The Opinion of Others Num. 270 B. Scotus’ own Opinion Num. 314 VI. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question Num. 345 VII. To the Principal Arguments of the Second Question Num. 356 !4 !5 Prologue First Part Single Question: On the Necessity of Revealed Doctrine Whether it was necessary for man in this present state that some doctrine be supernaturally inspired. 1. The question1 is whether it was necessary for man in this present state that some special doctrine, namely one which he could not reach by the natural light of the intellect, be supernaturally inspired. And that it was not necessary I argue thus: Every2 power having something common for its prime object is naturally capable of whatever is contained under that object just as it is capable of the per se natural object. This is proved by the example of the prime object of sight and of the other things contained under it, and thus by induction it is proved in the case of other prime objects and powers. It is also proved by reason, because the prime object is said to be that which is commensurate with the power; but if its nature, that is, the nature of the prime object, 1 Interpolation: “Desiring something etc. [quoting Peter Lombard ad loc.]. Concerning the prologue of the first book there are five questions. The first is about the necessity of this doctrine: whether it is necessary for man in this present state that there be some supernaturally inspired doctrine for him. The second concerns the genus of the formal cause of the same, and it is: whether the supernatural knowledge necessary for the wayfarer is sufficiently handed down in Sacred Scripture. The third pertains to the genus of the material cause, and it is: whether theology is about God as about its first subject. The fourth and fifth pertain to the genus of final cause, and the fourth is: whether theology is practical; the fifth: whether a practical science is so called per se from order to praxis and end.” 2 Text marked by Scotus with the sign a. !6 were in something about which the power was unable to be active, the power would not be commensurate but the object would exceed the power. The major premise, then, is plain. But the prime natural object of our intellect is being insofar as it is being; therefore our intellect is naturally able to be active about any being whatever, and thus about any intelligible non-being, because the negative term is known through the affirmative term. Therefore, etc. The proof of the minor is in Avicenna Metaphysics 1.6 (72rb): “Being and reality are imprinted in the soul on first impression, and these cannot be made manifest by other things;” but if there were some prime object other than them, they could be made manifest by the idea of that prime object; but this is impossible.3 2. In addition,4 the senses do not need, for this present life, any supernatural cognition; therefore neither does the intellect. The antecedent is plain. The proof of the consequence is: “Nature does not fail in things necessary,” On the Soul, 3.9.432b21-22; but if it does not fail in things that are imperfect, much more does it not fail in those that are perfect; therefore if it does not fail in the inferior powers as to what is necessary for them to accomplish their acts and attain their end, much more does it not fail in what is necessary for the higher power to attain their act and end. Therefore etc. 3. In addition, if some such doctrine is necessary, it is because the power in its pure natural state is not commensurate with the knowable object as such; therefore it must be made commensurate by something other than itself. But this something other is 3 Note by Scotus: “In this question note a, b, c for the principle; next, for the difficulties, d, e, f, g; they are done in the second question [n.95]. Note, a is valid for distinction 3 [I d.3 p.1], and c for question 1 [ibid., qq.1-2]; b and the following are common in supernatural matters; d, e for the question about the science of theology for us [n.124].” 4 Text marked by Scotus with the sign b. !7 either natural or supernatural; if it is natural then the whole thing is incommensurate with the prime object; if it is supernatural, then the power is incommensurate with that supernatural thing, and thus the power must be made commensurate to it by something else, and so on ad infinitum. Therefore, since an infinite process is impossible, Metaphysics 2.2.994a1-b31, one must stop at the first stage by saying that the intellective power is commensurate with everything knowable and in every way of its being knowable. Therefore, etc. 4. To the opposite: 2 Timothy 3.16: “All doctrine divinely inspired is useful for reproof…” In addition, in Baruch 3.31-32 it is said of wisdom: “There is none who knows her ways, but he who knows all things knows her;” therefore no one else can have wisdom except from him who knows all things. This, then, as to the necessity for it. But about the fact he subjoins, v.37: “He handed it on to Jacob his son and to Israel his beloved,” as to the Old Testament; and then follows, v.38: “After this he is seen on earth and conversed with men,” as to the New Testament. I. Controversy between Philosophers and Theologians 5. On this question there seems to be a controversy between philosophers and theologians. And the philosophers maintain the perfection of nature and deny a !8 supernatural perfection; but the theologians acknowledge a defect of nature and a necessity of grace and a supernatural perfection.5 A. Opinion of the Philosophers A philosopher might say, then, that no supernatural knowledge is necessary for man in this present life, but that he can acquire all knowledge necessary for himself from the activity of natural causes.