Internationale Politikanalyse International Policy Analysis

Alfred Pfaller European Social – In Need of Renewal Nine country cases & Seven policy proposals

 Social Democratic parties throughout the more affluent, economically highly developed part of Europe have experienced a dramatic decline in electoral support over the last few years.

 This text presents the cases of nine countries in Western, Northern and Southern Europe, all members of the before Eastern En- largement. It looks at the challenges, posed by socio-economic and socio- political evolution, at the political discourse that has defined and structured political issues, and at the responses Social Democrats as well as their com- petitors have offered to these challenges.

 It is argued that fundamental changes in the way the world economy works have made it difficult for to deliver on its core promises. If it does not come up with ways to secure social inclusion under today’s conditions of globalisation and the post-industrial knowledge econ- omy, Social Democracy risks becoming obsolete.

 European Social Democracy must come up with an encompassing project of renewal, a project that is able to meet today’s challenges and that appeals to a heterogeneous majority of the population. It must forge a new coalition to »tame« capitalism and once again put its productive and creative forces at the service of human fulfilment. This paper makes seven policy proposals for the renewal of Social Democracy in Europe.

DECEMBER 2009 Ausgewählte Veröffentlichungen des Referats „InternationaleInternationale Politikanalyse“ Politikanalyse International Policy Analysis Unit

Arbeitskreis Europa Thorsten Benner, Stefanie Flechtner (Hrsg.) Chancen für eine nachhaltige Energiepolitik Demokratien und Terrorismus – Erfahrungen mit = mçäáíáâJfåÑçI=^éêáä=OMMT= der Bewältigung und Bekämpfung von Terroran- = schlägen. Fallstudien USA, Spanien, Niederlande AG Europäische Integration und Großbritannien. Plädoyer für ein europäisches Sozialmodell = cêáÉÇÉå=ìåÇ=páÅÜÉêÜÉáí, g~åì~ê=OMMT= = bìêçé®áëÅÜÉ=mçäáíáâI=^éêáä=OMMT= = = Sven Biscop Michael Sommer The International Security Engagement of the Eu- Ein soziales Europa braucht Arbeitnehmer- ropean Union - Courage and Capabilities for a mitbestimmung [also available in English] “More Active” EU. Report from the 1st mçäáíáâJfåÑçI=^éêáä=OMMT= European Strategic Forum, Warsaw 2006. = cêáÉÇÉå=ìåÇ=páÅÜÉêÜÉáíI=g~åì~ê=OMMT Bert Hoffmann Kuba in der Nach-Fidel-Ära Stefanie Flechtner cbpJi®åÇÉê~å~äóëÉI=j®êò=OMMT Demokratie ist die beste Antwort im Kampf = gegen den Terrorismus James K. Galbraith = mçäáíáâJfåÑçI=aÉòÉãÄÉê=OMMS= Maastricht 2042 and the Fate of Europe. Toward Convergence and Full Michael Dauderstädt, Barbara Lippert, = bìêçé®áëÅÜÉ=mçäáíáâI=j®êò=OMMT= Andreas Maurer Die deutsche EU-Ratspräsidentschaft 2007: Daniela Schwarzer Hohe Erwartungen bei engen Spielräumen Spannungen im Club der 13 – Reformbedarf = bìêçé®áëÅÜÉ=mçäáíáâI=kçîÉãÄÉê=OMMS= der Eurozone. bìêçé®áëÅÜÉ=mçäáíáâI=j®êò=OMMT= Jana Zitzler Plädoyer für eine europäische Mindestlohnpolitik Arbeitskreis Europa [also available in English] Gefahr für die nationale Daseinsvorsorge im = mçäáíáâJfåÑçI=kçîÉãÄÉê=OMMS= EU-Binnenmarkt? = mçäáíáâJfåÑçI=j®êò=OMMT= Jo Leinen Die Kosten der Nicht-Verfassung Jonathan Wadsworth = mçäáíáâJfåÑçI=kçîÉãÄÉê=OMMS= Mit flexiblen Arbeitsmärkten aus der Beschäfti- gungskrise? Ein Blick auf britische Erfahrungen = mçäáíáâJfåÑçI=j®êò=OMMT Diese und weitere Texte Svenja Blanke Mexikos junge Demokratie zwischen Stagnation sind online verfügbar: und Krise http://www.fes.de/internationalepolitik = cbpJi®åÇÉê~å~äóëÉI=j®êò=OMMT=

Jürgen Kahl Bestellungen bitte an: Die Mongolei im Reformtief – Dauerkrise oder Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung „zweiter Aufbruch“? Internationale Politikanalyse cbpJi®åÇÉê~å~äóëÉI=g~åì~ê=OMMT z.Hd. Ursula Müller D – 53170 Bonn

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Content

Introduction ...... 2

The Decline of Social Democracy in Europe: A Common European Pattern? ...... 2 British : the Historic »« Comes to an End ...... 2 The German SPD: Antagonising the Workers without Convincing the Middle Class ...... 3 The French Socialists: Progressive Ambitions, Pragmatic Policies, Internal Conflicts, Shrinking Constituency ...... 5 The Dutch : Competing in a Crowded and Shrinking Centre while Losing the Left ...... 6 The Austrian SPÖ: Riding the Horse of Success Away from Those Who Feed It ...... 7 Italy: Reconstituting the Centre-Left within an Unsustainable Social Model ...... 8 The Spanish Socialist Labour Party: Still the Force of in a Catching-up Society . . . . 10 The Danish Social Democrats: in Danger of Losing Their Profile in a Social Democratic Country ...... 11 SAP: the Guardian of the Highly Popular »Swedish model« but without a Political Monopoly ...... 12

The social democratic Malaise and its Causes ...... 14 The End of Social Democratic Progress ...... 14 A Socio-cultural Divide ...... 15 Where Is the Enemy? ...... 15

Towards a Project of social democratic Renewal ...... 16 Seven Policy Proposals for a Renewal of Social Democracy ...... 16

Promoting the Project of Renewal ...... 20 2 Alfred Pfaller European Social Democracy – In Need of Renewal

Introduction Based on this analysis the final chapter presents a project of social democratic renewal and its main In much of Europe, Social Democratic parties have areas of focus. Seven policies are proposed as a start- seen their share of the vote declining in recent years. ing point for such a project. They are neither all- In a number of cases the decline set in a decade ago. embracing nor complete, but they might provide an On the basis of nine country case studies, this paper* impetus for further discussions on how to secure the shows why Social Democracy has been losing elec- future of European Social Democracy and how to toral support in most of Europe and what must be advance the social democratic cause. done to reverse this development. The first part of the paper analyses the situation of Social Democracy in the , Germany, The Decline of Social Democracy in France, the Netherlands, Austria, Italy, Spain, Den- Europe: A Common European Pattern? mark and Sweden. It looks at the challenges posed by socio-economic and socio-political evolution, at the The fact that voters in polities as diverse as Britain, political discourse that has defined and structured the France, Austria, Germany and have all related political issues and at the responses Social turned away from Social Democracy suggests that Democrats as well as their competitors have offered there are more than country-specific factors at work. to these challenges. We will not pay much attention Hypotheses are readily available, but in trying to ar- to factors without lasting strategic significance, such rive at an explanation it seems advisable to take into as personalities, internal rivalries, coalition tactics, account the diversity of the various countries and not campaigning slogans, scandals etc., which often to be over-hasty in concocting a stylized pan-Euro- dominate the political discourse for some time. pean story of Social Democratic decline. This decline Even though we consider the development of So- is likely to be a complex phenomenon, exhibiting cial Democracy in the post-communist European more than one pattern of cause and effect. At the countries as very important for Social Democracy in same time, for explanatory hypotheses to be valid Europe as a whole, we leave these countries out of they must be applicable across the whole spectrum of our survey. The situation there and the challenges it countries. poses for Social Democracy are different from those in the more affluent countries of the West. The ana- lytical focus here is insufficient to provide valid rec- British New Labour: the Historic »Third Way« ommendations for post-communist Europe. Comes to an End In the second part we generalise some findings from the case studies in order to explain the general New Labour was able in the 1990s to present a pro- causes of Social Democratic malaise in Europe. Of grammatic message that appealed simultaneously to course, our analysis of what has gone wrong consti- the lower income strata and to significant parts of the tutes a simplification, or reduction to essentials of a middle class. The message was very appropriately rather diverse reality. One respect in which the nine dubbed the »Third Way«, because it distinguished countries differ is the extent to which and the way itself clearly from two extremes that constituted the the economic transformations of recent decades politically relevant alternatives at the time and that have affected social inclusion and hence the kind of had both outlived their socio-economic relevance and challenge this poses for Social Democracy. They also appeal. One of these was the radical, socially polaris- differ in the political cleavage structures they have ing neo-liberalism of the Conservative government, inherited from the past. We will take into account which even in the eyes of its erstwhile supporters had these differences and qualify our statements accord- long since accomplished its »historic mission« of ingly where we find it appropriate. revitalising the British economy. The other was old Labour’s focus on the rights of employed labour, on Alfred Pfaller is soci- ologist and economist. income equality and on Keynesian macroeconomics. He was Editor of the * This study was compiled by Alfred Pfaller, but it draws on New Labour was able to mount a powerful cam- quarterly International input provided by a team of European social democratic paign for social inclusion because large-scale social Politics and Society, thinkers, including René Cuperus, Karl Duffek, Roger exclusion was part of the Thatcher heritage. This her- has worked as a politi- Hällhag, Roger Liddle, Rocio Martinez Sampere, Martin itage had put New Labour in the politically comfort- cal analyst at the McIvor, Werner A. Perger, Wolfgang Schröder and Gorgi Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Spasov. The final version of the paper was edited by Gero able position of being able to promote social inclu- and is currently a free- Maaß and Jan Niklas Engels from the International Policy sion in a business-friendly way. There was no need lance consultant. Analysis Unit of the Stiftung. (real or perceived) to undo economically dysfunc- International Policy Analysis 3

tional rigid -state structures. The Conserva- ing this has also reduced its range of strategic choices. tives had already done this. The Third Way could In mid-2009, further significant Social Democratic simply stay away from measures that would have re- progress (after all, there is still plenty of social exclu- introduced these structures and focus instead on op- sion) seems to require a policy agenda that is not as portunities and the capability for participation. In easily sold to the middle classes as the Third Way other words, what the Third Way did was to re-estab- agenda could be in the heyday of New Labour. lish Labour’s economic policy competence in the eyes The economic crisis that unfolded in the second of the middle class while at the same time allowing it half of 2008 might have been an opportunity to take to lay renewed emphasis on . major steps towards a socially more inclusive labour While there is still some resentment on the left market and at the same time to put a more competi- concerning the Third Way departure from old Labour tive economy onto the agenda of political debate, in ideals, this resentment never constituted a political order to broaden the range of »acceptable« policies. danger, because the British electoral system does not But it seems that Labour – perhaps »mainstreamed« allow it to be articulated in a way that is politically (and to some extent corrupted) by twelve years in relevant. New Labour therefore did not have to deal power – has not taken such an initiative. After the with electoral competition from the left. initial stabilisation of the financial system, which tem- Today, Labour seems to have largely fulfilled its porarily boosted the dwindling popularity of Prime »historic mission« of reuniting British society on an Minister , British politics became dom- economically promising platform, but it is not very inated by rather temporary issues that had little to do obvious to voters where this should now lead, and with the strengthening of social inclusion. So far, the limits of the Third Way approach (the label has there is no Social Democratic project for Britain be- since been abandoned) have become more visible. At yond the Third Way that would inspire Labour politics the same time, the Conservative Party is presenting and give it a renewed orientation. itself as much more of a centrist force with sympathy for the economically weak than it did under Margaret Thatcher and her successor John Major. All this has The German SPD: Antagonising the Workers created a situation where non-ideological voters – without Convincing the Middle Class who make up the majority at elections – no longer perceive a choice between fundamentally different When the German Social (SPD) re- directions for the country to go, but rather a compe- turned to power in 1998 after sixteen years in op- tition between contenders for power who both claim position, Germany – in the meantime reunited – was competence for roughly the same middle-of-the-road in bad economic shape. The economy had been agenda. It is a situation where circumstantial factors growing extremely slowly ever since the short-lived (charisma, style, minor issues, etc.) play a larger role reunification boom. Social exclusion was on the rise, than in all the years before. Labour’s modernisation and the general malaise was highlighted by seem- agenda lost its lead. ingly intractable large-scale unemployment (much of That is not to say that the British Conservatives it long-term). The SPD won the election with signifi- have become a Social Democratic party as well. But, cant middle-class support because its Christian Dem- as elsewhere, the specific Social Democratic agenda ocratic rivals had shown no attempt to seriously cannot by itself muster majority support. It must be tackle the socio-economic malaise. The SPD had embedded in an agenda and in a narrative that ap- asked for and been granted a mandate to do the job peals to those who have priorities other than social better than the Kohl government, but the approach inclusion, justice and solidarity. The attempt (real or it took ended in disaster for the party. perceived) to pursue social justice goals at the ex- The Schröder government adopted a policy stance pense of the middle classes, for instance by raising with similar conceptual roots to the Third Way, but , does not have a good chance of political suc- the challenge it faced was entirely different from the cess. Proposals for making Britain more socially inclu- one New Labour faced after eighteen years of Con- sive must be presented convincingly as being in the servative rule. The German welfare-state arrange- interest of the middle classes as well. At the end of ments provided for more comprehensive protection the Thatcher period this was possible, because of the formally employed than was ever the case in Thatcher – with all her well-received neo-liberal re- Britain and, unlike Margaret Thatcher, Helmut Kohl forms – had distorted British society. Now, after six- had left them intact. Whereas New Labour could teen years of , normalcy has been base its drive for social inclusion on enhanced efforts restored, so to speak. New Labour’s success in achiev- to qualify people for the labour market, the dominant 4 Alfred Pfaller European Social Democracy – In Need of Renewal

view within the SPD was that the only way to proceed in the later Kohl years. Disenchanted, centrist-minded was to tackle the inflexibility of the German labour middle-class voters with a basically »bourgeois« out- market. To a certain extent (the comparison should look drifted back to them as their »natural« political not be carried too far), it saw itself compelled to do representative. Moreover, the Christian Democrats in Margaret Thatcher’s work in Germany – i.e. to intro- practice, if not in their rhetoric, actually espoused duce a dose of Anglo-Saxon flexibility into the Ger- Third Way positions as well. man system. Support for the SPD fell even further after the lost However, the SPD neither intended nor would election of 2005 to reach its lowest level since the have been able to change the German labour market founding of the Federal Republic of Germany (23 per- arrangements altogether. The rights of the insiders cent in the 2009 national elections). The background (i.e. those who had a job) were left intact. The new to this dramatic decline is more profound than any- flexibility affected those on the margins, putting pres- thing that can be said about the SPD’s handicap as a sure on them to accept very badly paid work with junior partner in the of Angela precarious working conditions. Those in regular em- Merkel or about the image of its leading personnel. ployment were affected indirectly, too, because the The topics the SPD likes to emphasise in its pro- greater availability of cheap marginal labour made it gramme (like educational reform or more equal op- easier for companies to bypass both collectively ne- portunities) are covered by the Christian Democrats gotiated wage agreements and protective legislation. as well, leaving the Social Democrats to try to argue The reforms, known by the name of one of their that the idea was originally theirs, that the intentions chief architects, Peter Hartz, were hailed by business of their rivals are not sincere, or simply that they are as a first step in the right direction. But many of the less competent. This »we-do-it-better« message does SPD’s traditional working-class supporters considered occasionally succeed, like in 1998, but it seems that them as an unnecessary sacrifice of social justice and the »bourgeois instinct« of large parts of the middle if not a betrayal of Social Democratic core values and classes would tend to favour the Christian Demo- a present to capital owners, then at least a conces- crats. sion to the market orthodoxy that had come to Nevertheless, neither of the large German parties, dominate economic policy thinking. They would not nor the small ones for that matter, currently has a buy the message that the reforms were the only way programme on offer to effectively reverse the trend to get the German economy going again. The SPD towards social polarisation and large-scale social ex- lost many votes to the newly founded Left Party (Die clusion in German society. On the level of values, the Linke), which became a significant player in German social democratic discourse may lay more emphasis politics precisely because of large-scale disaffection on social justice and inclusion, but when it comes to with the Social Democrats. presenting programmatic answers to the ever more However, the losses to the left were not compen- dismal social reality in Germany, the SPD does not sated for by gains in the centre. Many middle-class offer a credible perspective that would transcend the voters who had supported the SPD in 1998 (2002 new »iron laws« of globalised labour markets. While was a special case not discussed here) out of despair unimaginative Social Democratic »realism« vis-à-vis with the stagnation of the Kohl regime no longer saw the dynamics of the capitalist economy might appeal the Social Democrats as the modernising force Ger- to many who do not consider themselves as leftist, it many needed. This may have been partly due to the offers no compelling, non-circumstantial, reason to perception that the Hartz reforms were not all that vote for the SPD rather than for its bourgeois rival crucial for the economy as they were harsh on those (and secret twin). The message of the SPD, spelled unlucky enough not to be able to find a reasonable out in its Hamburg programme of 2007, embraces job, quite a few of them the children of the middle objectives many citizens would identify with, but it classes. More generally, increasing social polarisation does not contain a convincing road map for overcom- and poverty became a high-profile issue in the public ing the formidable obstacle economic reality puts in perception, and after the Hartz reforms the SPD was the way of these objectives. no longer seen as the political force that would do It will not be easy for the SPD to climb out of the something effective about it. On the contrary, the hole it has fallen into. If it tries to move away from reforms were perceived by many as a means of turn- the Agenda 2010 reforms and to restyle itself as the ing large-scale unemployment into large-scale pre- defender of »ordinary« people’s interests, of social carious employment. In the meantime, the Christian fairness etc. it will face a double problem: (a) it will Democrats had regenerated themselves and rid jeopardise its credibility even further, and (b) it cannot themselves of the image of stagnation they had had hope to win over segments of the middle-class large International Policy Analysis 5

enough to beat the Christian Democrats in general peal to a broad range of middle-class voters who elections. However SPD cannot stick to those policies have not been socialised into either a conservative or that were at the root of the party’s dramatic decline. a »left« political subculture. The large majority of uncommitted voters are willing to vote for a slightly leftist orientation or else for a moderate and suffi- The French Socialists: Progressive Ambitions, ciently flexible conservatism, depending on which Pragmatic Policies, Internal Conflicts, Shrinking they think is likely to be more competent. Constituency While the PS and the UMP continue to contend for the dominant position in the political middle ground The (PS) has had to digest a number of (centre-left vs. centre-right) and try to present them- defeats in national elections (presidential and parlia- selves as the more competent crew to steer the state mentary) in the last fifteen years. However, in mu- ship through the stormy sea of societal and world- nicipal elections in between the PS has repeatedly wide transformations, more radical contenders have been the strongest party nationwide. been advancing from both ends of the political spec- Since the early 1980s, when the first Socialist-led trum and have been making inroads into the support government of the Fifth Republic tried to set the bases of the big parties. The xenophobic right-wingers French economy on a »socialist« track with state of LePen’s National Front have been successful since control of strategic industries and wage-led reflation, the 1980s, and more recently the left-wing Anti-cap- politics in France has no longer been about funda- italist Party has been gaining ground. This is gradually mental decisions on the direction national develop- putting the Socialists in an awkward position. ment should take. Rather, it has focused on solving a As it tries to woo the middle-classes on whose sup- number of serious problems. The French economy port electoral victories over the centre-right crucially has not been too well for quite a while, unemploy- depend, the PS is losing support among the lower ment has remained high, youth unemployment very strata (the »couches populaires«), the majority of high, and social exclusion has been on the rise, whom used to vote for the Socialists, but to whom a though not as dramatically as in Germany and other centrist message (even if it is disguised in leftist rheto- European countries. For many people, one of the ric) cannot appeal. The loss of working-class support most serious political challenges derives from the makes it extremely difficult for the PS to win elections mass immigration of mostly North African Muslims. and threatens its identity. We see the same tendency The country’s well developed welfare-state entitle- here as in several other countries, too. The middle ments (including labour rights) are not well adjusted ground is hotly contested and shrinking, while the to the current structure of protection needs, but they working-class base of the social democrats is eroding. have generated well-entrenched vested interests. An- That working-class voters are becoming less re- tagonising these interests is more or less tantamount sponsive to the Social Democratic message has its to political suicide for any government. Therefore, origin in the subtle deterioration of their life situation neither socialist nor »conservative« governments and the outlook offered by the fundamental socio- have seriously set about introducing Third Way-type economic transformations (keywords: globalisation, flexibility into the French labour market. On the con- the decreasing economic weight of manufacturing, trary, the Socialist government of Lionel Jospin intro- the information age, the knowledge economy, slow duced measures to reduce the labour supply (the fa- average economic growth). In order to guard against mous 35-hour week) in order to tackle unemployment. misunderstandings, we refer here to a level of eco- With regard to social policy, the PS has on the whole nomic and social degradation that is above outright remained an old-fashioned Social Democratic party, social exclusion and is contained thanks to the com- even though it never was a genuine workers’ party. prehensive safety net provided by the French welfare Both the large parties – the PS and the centrist- state. bourgeois party, which is descended from the Gaullist The Socialists do not have much substantial to of- movement and currently carries the name Popular fer that would reverse this trend, nor do they have Movement Union (UMP) – offer middle-of-the-road convincing explanations that can be communicated policies that stay within the framework of the French to the public – like Social Democrats elsewhere, they version of a . Each one sets are associated with the system that has produced the different accents. The UMP stresses law and order, deterioration. Instead, they have laid emphasis on the while the Socialists emphasise . Moreo- emancipatory-liberal dimension of the Social Demo- ver, each wraps its agenda in a different narrative. cratic value canon, something that does not strike a The key point, however, is that both potentially ap- chord with »ordinary« people and their grievances 6 Alfred Pfaller European Social Democracy – In Need of Renewal

and that in several respects runs counter to their au- parties is concerned. Traditionally there has been a thoritarian and intolerant inclinations. The changes high degree of consensus over the range of accept- taking place in society now no longer conform with able policy, but the last decade has witnessed a signifi- the type of »progress« associated with the emancipa- cant radicalisation. Like in Austria, large parts of the tion of the working-class – hence the »progressive« population, especially from the ranks of »ordinary« discourse of the PS is no longer one of working-class people, have rebelled against the consensus of the emancipation, and bypasses the daily reality of many established political class, of which the PvdA is a part. workers and employees. In the course of this rebellion, both the Social The discrepancy between the Socialist discourse Democrats and their main competitor, the centrist and the life of »ordinary people« is not just a product Christian Democrats (CDA), have lost considerable of the educated middle-class (or even upper-class) political ground. On average, the decline of the Social background of most PS politicians or of an unre- Democrats has been worse, even though election flected elitist arrogance that characterises the organ- outcomes have become highly volatile. The erosion of isational culture of the PS or even of its attachment the political centre has gone hand in hand with a to a social-liberal ideology that has little bearing on surge in xenophobic populist parties (themselves very the problems lower-class people face today. Rather, it unstable) and recently a Socialist Party to the left of reflects the objective difficulty of coming up with an the PvdA. encouraging message for the »losers« of our times. Like Austria, where people also rebelled against The PS, for all its ideological emphasis on social inclu- mainstream politics, the Netherlands has fared rather sion and equality, has simply not managed to find a well in European comparison. It still has a fairly intact politically acceptable recipe for offering better pros- , so unlike in Germany, France and the pects to »ordinary« people. More than that, the PS UK, social exclusion has been kept in check so far, has avoided (with a canny political instinct, one might even though it is increasing at the margins and ine- say) engaging in a serious search for such a recipe, as quality has grown. In fact, crucial labour-market ad- this might call into question the architecture of the justments to strengthen social inclusion were made in French welfare state with its well-entrenched entitle- the 1990s in the typically consensual manner of the ments. By sticking to institutional reality, however, it Netherlands, yet with decisive input from the Social has significantly reduced the scope for »progressive« Democrats. Unemployment was brought down dras- policy-making and hence for once again broadening tically at the time and remained low in European its support base. comparison, but without the surge in precarious em- To all its objective difficulties, the PS has added ployment we saw in Germany. Seen from the outside, some home-grown ones. The party suffers from a the Netherlands is a case of successful adaptation to lack of internal discipline, which has to do with its »post-industrial« global capitalism. origins. The PS has always been an association of However, the evolution of the Dutch political political entrepreneurs and ideologues, rather than a economy did not stop there. In the not-so-distant political interest group of the working-class, which past, the PvdA has done its share to promote neo- has shaped the history of other Social Democratic liberal-inspired, though moderate welfare-state re- parties in Europe and imposed a different sort of forms, which led to a marked deterioration in public commitment to a common cause. As in most large services, exacerbating trends that had already been parties, there are partly conflicting ideological cur- visible for quite a while (e.g. in education). What rents within the PS, which are intertwined with com- made people particularly angry were cut-backs (based peting networks of political careerists and power- again on a CDA-PvdA understanding) to the gener- holders. However, in the French Socialist Party internal ous Dutch invalidity scheme, which had served as a rivalries are more liable to get out of control – to the well-endowed place to park many unemployed. The point where the party loses sight of common inter- unpopular reforms coincided with changes in global ests, in recent times to an excessive degree. conditions that negatively affected the life of many people in the Netherlands. One of these changes has to do with increasing The Dutch Labour Party: Competing in a international competition, which has put pressure Crowded and Shrinking Centre while Losing on the pay and working conditions of many Dutch the Left workers. For many years, however, the politically most salient issue has been large-scale immigration from The Dutch Labour Party (PvdA) is competing in a non-Western (largely Muslim) cultures, which has highly fragmented political arena, as the number of had a major impact on Dutch society. The estab- International Policy Analysis 7

lished parties are being reproached for not having turn-around that would allow it to overcome increas- protected the people, or even for having promoted ing social polarisation. In this respect, the PvdA is not the changes. This reproach has hit the PvdA harder in the same position as the German SPD, for instance. than the Christian Democrats, because it is associated But like other countries, the Netherlands needs a with a betrayal of Social Democratic ideals. It strikes democratic renewal that would overcome the aliena- at the party’s identity, insinuating that its »pragma- tion of many people from the world of governance. tism« is no longer guided by a value compass. With The challenge for the PvdA is not to find the magic regard to the immigration issue, the PvdA’s long-time marketing formula that would »sell« the party better, favourable stance towards a multi-cultural society is, but rather to pioneer a democratic renewal that of course, directly rooted in the party’s profoundly would take the wind out of the populist sails. Solu- liberal, emancipatory values. But this rather abstract tions to people’s problems are important, but even liberalism has neglected the dispossession and loss of more important is a different style of political com- community felt by those whose life-space has been munication to strengthen people’s stake in demo- invaded by strangers. cratic politics. Today, significant parts of the less privileged classes, at whom the traditional Social Democratic message is directed and who used to be faithful PvdA The Austrian SPÖ: Riding the Horse of Success supporters, no longer feel represented by Social De- Away from Those Who Feed It mocracy. With that part of the former Social Demo- cratic milieu eroding, the parameters of electoral The Austrian Social Democrats are in some respects success have profoundly changed for the PvdA. The (though not all) in a similar position to the Dutch party now depends crucially on middle-class votes. PvdA. Like the Netherlands, Austria has been faring But the centre segment of the political market has well economically under Social Democratic manage- shrunk, and the PvdA does not have a genuine ad- ment and has remained one of the »star performers« vantage here that could be derived from its basic in Europe. The welfare state has stayed largely intact political credo. At the same time its centrist competi- and social exclusion is still pretty low, though rising. tors are strongly entrenched here, leaving the Social The Social Democrats have embraced economic mod- Democrats to demonstrate their competence to ernisation and have actively promoted the transition tackle the issues »of the day« and to try to gauge the to a knowledge-based industrial structure that has general mood better than the other parties. One positioned itself well in the new transnational mar- would expect them occasionally to succeed (as they kets, leaving behind the old emphasis on state own- did in the municipal elections of 2006) but often ership and introducing a remarkable portion of func- enough not to. tional flexicurity into the labour market. The PvdA has neglected the »soft« elements of an Like in the Netherlands, people have started to integrated society. Its leaders have failed to sense that rebel against mainstream politics. Both big parties, for those who are not part of the »post-industrial the Social Democrats (SPÖ) and the centre-right Aus- knowledge economy« more is at stake than just pur- trian People’s Party (ÖVP), have lost a dramatic chasing power, namely a feeling of belonging, of number of votes to the parties of the reckless and shared values and of identity (the strongly communi- charismatic right-wing populist Jörg Haider, leader tarian Netherlands they had a respected place in and first of the once liberal FPÖ and then later of the split- they were proud of). off group, the Austrian Future Alliance (BZÖ). After In order to regain strength beyond the occasional the election of 2008, both together had almost as exploitation of favourable political circumstances, the many deputies in the national parliament as the So- PvdA would have to re-conquer that segment of the cial Democrats and more than the Conservatives. In political market that has fallen to the populists and to the meantime support for the SPÖ has continued to the more radical left. For that it would have to offer decline dramatically, also compared to the ÖVP. a »product« (programme, narrative, mode of com- The Social Democrats face the problem that their munication) that addresses in a credible way the ac- specific message of social justice and solidarity no cumulated discontent of the electorate. However, longer reaches many of those to whom it is primarily this cannot simply be a copy of the populist »prod- directed, the lower classes. uct«, i.e. inconsequential law-and-order, anti-globali- The explanation is in part similar to the one that sation, anti-immigration and anti-EU talk. applies to the Netherlands, but it has a very specific Unlike some other EU countries, the Netherlands is Austrian component as well. Haider’s success can be at present not really in need of a socio-economic seen to some extent as a backlash phenomenon in 8 Alfred Pfaller European Social Democracy – In Need of Renewal

response to the peculiarly Austrian version of cartel Finally, parts of the former Social Democratic mi- politics. The SPÖ has been in power or shared power lieu have become disinterested in politics and re- in »grand coalition« governments with the ÖVP al- treated into private life. They are indifferent to the most throughout the entire post-war period. This has Social Democratic message – no matter how progres- made it increasingly vulnerable to accusations of in- sive or how traditional. sider politics, privilege trading and detachment from Even if Austria succeeds in maintaining a healthy the ordinary people and their concerns. The SPÖ is economic performance, sufficient to keep social ex- clearly included in the widely accepted image of a clusion and polarisation under control, this would not self-serving political class. reverse creeping popular discontent with the course However, this is not the whole story. The populist society is taking. Therefore, governance based merely »politicians-against-the-people« message has fallen on technocratic competence, shrouded in ritual and on particularly fertile ground among »ordinary«, not characterised by unconvincing talk of solidarity, is a so well-to-do and not so educated people and be- risky course to take for Social Democracy. It makes it come a channel for their more generalised discon- highly vulnerable to alternative bids for popular sup- tent. Despite the country’s healthy economic per- port that address the reasons for discontent and are formance and not yet endangered mass prosperity, a presented with emotional appeal, charisma and per- generalised perception has spread that things are haps even visionary power. A renewed and revitalised deteriorating and that former certainties with regard People’s Party might come up with something like to pensions, and job security are disap- this and leave the Social Democrats behind. A more pearing. sophisticated version of populism that could be taken In fact, a growing segment of the population has more seriously by broad sectors of the electorate experienced a creeping decline of its economic posi- would be another scenario. Of course, things could tion, finding itself exposed to an ever less friendly also go on in the familiar way for quite some time labour market, with lower pay, less security and fewer with no party being able to gain a decisive advan- perspectives. Even though this tendency has not gen- tage, because none manages to transcend the cur- erated much outright social exclusion, as it has in rent »melange« of uninspiring technocracy and su- other countries, it has contributed to declining lower- perficial political theatre with a high media profile, class support for Social Democracy, which is no longer which both fascinates and disgusts simultaneously. perceived as the protective force for the man in the A different set of scenarios would surface if eco- street, but rather as part of the »post-industrial« nomic growth were to slow down significantly over a modernisation syndrome that is shaking old securities. longer period – whether for home-made reasons (not An additional issue successfully exploited by the very likely) or for external ones. Austria would then right-wing populists is the increasing presence in see its share of mounting social problems from which Austria of immigrants from poorer, mostly Eastern it has been spared until now. This might in turn en- European countries. The xenophobic message strikes gender a populist surge that would be in stark con- a chord within the traditional Social Democratic mi- trast to the almost six decades of extreme political lieu (as it does elsewhere, too), where many are stability. For the SPÖ an entirely new political context highly susceptible to a feeling of cultural disposses- could emerge. sion, of their life-space being invaded and their way of life being devalued by the spread of »alien« sub- cultures – a phenomenon observed in other Euro- Italy: Reconstituting the Centre-Left within an pean countries as well. Unsustainable Social Model Ironically, the SPÖ does not only have problems with the working-class rejection of post- Italy’s political parties became thoroughly discred- social changes. It is also finding it increasingly difficult ited at the beginning of the 1990s, when both the to appeal to those who are fundamentally non- politically dominant Christian Democrats and the conservative and who espouse societal change in non-Marxist Socialists were revealed to be mired in response to global mega-trends. They consider the a swamp of corruption just at the moment when the Social Democrats to be unimaginatively attached to Communists, in Italy the traditional workers’ party, lost existing societal patterns and to be short-term »real- their ideological anchor with the collapse of the Soviet ists« without a long-term vision, their message irrel- bloc. Since then, the centre-right has quickly found a evant to the great challenges ahead. For these – new and non-traditional way of political articulation mostly intellectual – groups, the SPÖ has ceased to be in the shape of media tycoon Silvio Berlusconi’s highly the force of progress. personalised Forza Italia movement. The centre-left International Policy Analysis 9

has gone through a much longer process of party because the more reckless, populist, he has also been start-ups, coalitions, mergers and spin-offs. Step by helped by his personal control of much of the nation’s step, this process has generated an ever more en- media. compassing centre-left party, the latest step being To be successful with an alternative program that the formation of the Democratic Party (PD), which is attractive to majorities and sustainable at the same merged political groupings with Social Democratic time, a convincing message of profound renewal and Christian Democratic ancestry. would have to be offered. The left has not managed Ideologically, the Democratic Party has adopted a so far to offer the grand anti-populist alternative, but pronounced centrist-pragmatic position, trying to ap- has instead stuck to its moderate, and rather feeble, peal to a broad spectrum of middle-class and work- redistributive, social justice standpoint within the pat- ing-class voters, but shying away from a determined tern of ultimate non-sustainability. In other words, it pursuit of redistributive goals. This has favoured the accepts the confines of endemic populism. formation of more outspoken leftist parties. More Italy needs – more urgently than any other country recently a challenge from the left was mounted with in our sample – a national development policy with more popular resonance by the Italy of Values (Italia special emphasis on the build-up of production- dei Valori) party that started out as a centrist, Chris- related research capacity and on internal competi- tian Democrat-oriented political force. The reconsti- tion. The precondition for this to happen is a pro- tution of political Social Democracy in Italy was and found renewal of the state, an end to the clientelistic continues to be a top-down process, driven by de- structures of the »System Italia«, to which the public bates and negotiations among left-leaning political has got used. If this is not forthcoming it is to be entrepreneurs. In a way, the Democratic Party (like its feared that living standards of large segments of the predecessor parties) constitutes an alliance of differ- population will continue to decline. The real incomes ent factions organised around leader personalities. of many people (some claim, up to two-thirds of the This internal pluralism blends ideological leanings population) are already declining and the low-wage with a career-oriented clientelistic pattern. segment of the labour market is expanding, espe- For its first electoral contest, in April 2008, the PD cially in the services sector. Traditional, mostly inter- formed a coalition with Italia dei Valori. But this generational, family solidarity acts as a buffer but centre-left coalition lost against the coalition led by does not completely compensate for the impact this Silvio Berlusconi. Berlusconi’s own new party, People has on standards of living. of Freedom (itself a merger), won 37 percent of the The fact that the very sources of national prosper- vote and together with its ally, the regional Lega ity are endangered makes for a rather unpropitious Nord, the coalition of the right achieved 47 percent. context for any Social Democratic social justice The PD itself got 33 percent and its coalition 38 per- agenda. It would have to focus on distributing evenly cent. Two years previously, the all-encompassing coa- the costs of economic decline, not on having every- litions of the left and the right (The Union led by body participate in the fruits of productive growth. So Romani Prodi and Berlusconi’s House of Freedoms) far the PD as well as its left-leaning allies (and maybe both came close to 50 percent, with the left very rivals) have limited their social justice message to re- slightly ahead. If one takes into consideration the re- distributive and protective mechanisms that befit a sults of the 2001 and 2003 elections the picture of a growing economy (taxes, welfare-state schemes, slight structural majority of the rightist camp emerges, workers’ rights). However, this is an inappropriate way which the left has not managed to reverse so far. of neutralising the effect of receding employment in The attempt to explain the structural disadvantage the labour market segment where decent wages are of the left must go beyond its tactical mistakes, be- still to be earned. The emphasis of the Social Demo- yond its neglect of homework and its cratic message in the Berlusconi-dominated post- excessive preoccupation with itself. It must also go 1990 period has been in the area of civil liberties, the beyond the binding force of traditional ideological rule of law and European integration (as well as Italy’s milieus that continue to circumscribe the electoral role in the Iraq war, as long as this was relevant). potential of the left. We have to shift our focus in- Looked at from an economic angle, however, the stead to the particular situation of present-day Italian Italian centre-left has been playing along in the na- society. Ultimately, elections are won in Italy these tional game of self-deception, of pretending that days by populist promises to cut taxes, improve the prosperity is more or less ensured and »business as performance of the public administration, be tough usual« will do. This has not cost it votes so far, be- on crime and immigration and reverse the decline of cause the nation as a whole seems to cherish the illu- the economy. Berlusconi has not only been the better, sion, which is comfortable as long as it lasts. The left 10 Alfred Pfaller European Social Democracy – In Need of Renewal

has contributed to increasing future social exclusion, rial country into a modern democracy, strengthening when good jobs will become scarcer and the socially the rule of law, civil liberties and regional autonomy protective function of the family will erode. and pushing back the influence of traditionalist Ca- Paradoxically, Italy’s creeping economic decline has tholicism on public morals. It has also extended wel- played into the hands of super-populist Berlusconi, fare-state protection, but prudently left social inclu- who has been cultivating an image as someone who sion to be led by rapid economic growth and much is above petty party politics and cares about the of the solidarity with those excluded to the family. country and the people. But this is also a chance for Thus, for the time being, the Spanish welfare state is the centre-left. In the recent history of global capital- still in several respects rather underdeveloped. But it ism, such renewal projects have often come along in is – at least from the PSOE point of view – in the proc- a tough anti-social guise, trying to remove what is ess of development. Social exclusion is relatively high, supposedly in the way of market forces. But longer- social polarisation more pronounced than in most term comparative evidence suggests that it is much West European countries, but the perspective is one more important to develop overheads (notably hu- of improvement, not one of retrenchment. The social man, institutional and knowledge capital) and that displacement and discontent associated with the »productivity coalitions« of labour and (productive) »post-industrial« transition have not affected Spanish business can be highly conducive to sustained suc- politics. In Spain the »end of working-class emanci- cess. This implies that a national development project pation« has not arrived yet. Of course, the present for Italy could be an eminently Social Democratic one. economic crisis, which is hitting Spain especially hard, Besides it would be the only way to create the eco- will make for a serious set-back. How temporary this nomic basis for future social inclusion. Such a project will be cannot be foreseen at the present moment. should allow labour to share in the fruits of rising Social Democracy is still the force of progress in productivity. Rising mass purchasing power would Spain. But the swings of the pendulum show that the contribute to ongoing growth, especially as far as the PSOE is not a hegemonic party that would reflect a production of non-tradables is concerned. dominant Social Democratic mood or conviction A project of this kind could enlist the support of within the population. The PSOE’s limits are set by the the small Christian Democrat-oriented Union of the persistent strength of the conservative milieu and by that sided with Berlusconi in the 2006 the highly conditional nature of non-committed vot- and 2008 elections. Of course, it would also imply a ers’ support. decisive good-bye to Italy’s endemic populism. The The erosion of the classical political milieus is not message that there is no easy solution to mounting nearly as advanced in Spain as elsewhere. The Social- discontent can only be »sold« well at elections if it is ist and the Conservative milieus are about equally embedded in a positive message that change is pos- strong, some would say the Socialists have a slight sible. To come up with such a message takes confi- advantage here. The cleavage between the two is dent leaders who have a clear vision of the direction primarily a socio-cultural one; the socio-economic the country must go. dimension is secondary. Both parties have loyal sup- porters among the lower classes and the middle classes. Whereas the unity of the Spanish nation and The Spanish Socialist Labour Party: Still the the Catholic religion are cornerstones of the Con- Force of Progress in a Catching-up Society servative value system, the Socialists not only stand for social justice and solidarity, but equally for civil Post-Franco Spain has exhibited an almost text-book liberties, for emancipation from traditional authori- pendulum pattern of democratic politics. The Spanish tarian patterns and for »progress« and »modernity« Socialist Labour Party (PSOE) governed Spain from in a general sense. Part of the PSOE’s strength is de- 1982 until 1996, its share of the vote declining stead- rived from the fact that the battle for liberal democ- ily from 48 percent in 1982 to 38 percent in 1996, racy is in a way still being fought in Spain and that for when it had to hand over power to its rival, the con- many, the political Conservatives stand for an anti- servative People’s Party (PP). Four years later, the PSOE liberal, anti-modern society. For the conservative mi- polled only 34 percent – its worst electoral result – lieu, in turn, the PSOE stands for atheism, libertinage but it bounced back to power in 2004 with 42.6 per- and lack of patriotism. cent of the vote and was confirmed in office in 2008 As elsewhere, it is the non-committed voters who with 43.6 percent. decide elections. That they are willing to switch their The PSOE has used its mandates to govern Spain allegiance indicates (a) that the PSOE is subject to the for the successive transformation of the post-dictato- wear that comes from being in power and (b) that International Policy Analysis 11

the PP is flexible enough in political practice to appeal sured the people that they would leave the highly to non-traditionalist, open-minded voters as well. developed and widely popular Danish welfare state The swing of the democratic political pendulum intact. However, it also promised cuts and spoke might push the PSOE out of power again, but will re- in general terms about »less state«. All around, it newed conservative rule remain an intermezzo, too? made a major effort to reposition itself as a political The structural basis of the PSOE’s repeated elec- force of the (in many respects social-democratically toral successes is not likely to last. As time goes by, it minded) centre, as a force that responds in a non- is to be expected that political conservatism will be- ideological and competent way to the upcoming come more flexible, less anti-modern, more centrist. challenges, including the environmental one, to Such a tendency is already becoming visible. This which it had for a long time turned a blind eye. Ven- would imply that the PSOE’s claim to be the guaran- stre could count on substantial monetary support tor of a liberal and modern Spain will be weakened. from business, whereas financial trade-union support Moreover, Spain’s economic position in the world to the Social Democrats was reduced significantly. market is highly vulnerable to low-cost foreign com- The issue that contributed more than any other to petition. With the domestic, construction-driven the turn-around in Danish politics was Muslim immi- boom ending, severe social displacement seems una- gration. The issue was given a high national profile by voidable. And the Spanish welfare state has not de- the right-wing populist Danish People’s Party (DF), veloped very effective protection for this type of casu- which was founded only in 1995 and led by the alties of the market economy. High economic growth highly articulate and outspoken Pia Kjaersgaard. The rates have been an essential element in social inclu- DF polled 12 percent of the votes in 2001. It did not sion. If the transition to a high-productivity economy enter a coalition with Fogh Rasmussen’s is not achieved rapidly it is likely that persistent social party, but instead lent crucial parliamentary support exclusion will become a serious problem not only for to the governing Liberal-Conservative coalition – for the country, but also, and especially, for the PSOE. If the price of tough anti-immigration policies. In the »modernisation« no longer goes hand in hand with next two elections (2005 and 2007), the votes for increasing mass prosperity, the party of »modernity« Rasmussen’s party receded, but the DF grew even can only suffer. Spanish politics might then develop a stronger. similar pattern of radicalisation at the fringes as we There are several factors that contributed to the observe in other European countries. relative decline of the centre-left. One was certainly the defection of parts of the »« to the DF. However, their susceptibility to the xenophobic The Danish Social Democrats: message has less to do with a deteriorating socio- in Danger of Losing Their Profile in a economic situation than it does in other countries Social Democratic Country with a heated anti-immigration discourse. The over- whelming majority of the Danish working-class has Social Democracy dominated Danish politics through- so far not faced social and economic decline. Xeno- out most of the 1960s and 1970s and then again in phobic feelings in Denmark have more to do with a the 1990s. In that latter period the Social Democratic sense of cultural provocation by the intrusion of en- government under applied a tirely »non-Danish« ways into a hitherto fairly homo- well-designed package of macroeconomic, industrial geneous and intact community (similar in this respect and labour-market policies that led to the Danish to the situation in the Netherlands). For some, the »employment miracle« and established that famous »provocation« may be coupled with a kind (or fear) »flexicurity« system that has attracted world-wide of material and cultural dispossession, as, for exam- attention and admiration. Yet in 2001, Social Democ- ple, when parts of public housing or entire neigh- racy lost about one fifth of its 1998 votes, without its bourhoods together with their schools go downhill. leftist and centrist coalition partners being able to A related theme that has also tended to curtail make up for the loss. From then until now, Denmark popular adherence to Social Democracy is Denmark’s has had a centre-right government, dominated by deeper integration into the European Union, which the (Venstre, which means left) of An- the Social Democrats have advocated, but which a ders Fogh Rasmussen (since April 2009 Lars Løkke majority of the population tends to fear as a threat to Rasmussen), which has replaced the Social Demo- the Danish community and Danish identity – as a kind crats as the strongest party. of surrender to foreign rule. The Venstre party did not campaign with a pro- The defection of segments of the population that nounced neo-liberal programme, but instead reas- have a stake in the maintenance of Danish »social 12 Alfred Pfaller European Social Democracy – In Need of Renewal

democracy« must be seen against the background of that Social Democracy, together with its centre-left the apparent national consensus on the social demo- allies, has a good chance of replacing the centre-right cratic architecture of Danish society. Like in some in government at the next elections. Whether it suc- other European countries, the welfare state and the ceeds depends, of course, on the usual ingredients of labour-market institutions are not openly a major a successful campaign, on the comparative charisma bone of political contention in Denmark. The popu- of the leaders and on the comparative efforts (dedi- lists of the Danish People’s Party even advocate more cation, resources, professional skill) invested in per- generous benefits for pensioners. This has facilitated suasive communication with crucial target groups. the rise of other issues to political salience. The gen- But also important is that the Social Democrats, who eral view is that the Social Democrats are not needed stand for a proven concept of globalisation-proof that much, because Denmark is a social democracy social inclusion, refocus the political discourse on this anyway. concept and rescue it from the seductive »more- The fact that the democratic left in Denmark has choice« and »less-taxes« line. Voters must be made long been organised in several parties that would aware that there is a trade-off between taxes and elsewhere be united adds to the sense that the Social public services, that the well-functioning public sec- Democratic Party is dispensable as the political force tor that most people enjoy and support has its price. of social inclusion, solidarity and emancipation. It is Equally important is that the Social Democrats believed that these broadly shared values can be in should not leave the agenda-setting advantage in the good hands with other parties as well. What be- immigration issue to the xenophobic populists and comes more important, then, for electoral success are their opportunist centre-right allies. Here they would circumstantial factors such as leadership qualities, need to actively promote a concept of their own, fo- perceived competence to govern and campaigning cusing on positive action-based integration and skills as well as positions on issues that are not easily counteracting, with commitment to results, ghettoi- covered by the core values of Social Democracy. One sation and the degradation of neighbourhoods – should expect that such a pattern of politics, charac- even though this might create conflict with their So- terised by a fundamental »social democratic« con- cial Liberal allies (who polled 5 percent of the vote in sensus, multiple political controversies and a relatively 2007). fragmented structure of competing parties, makes for volatility in election outcomes. It does not give a Social Democratic party a particular advantage de- SAP: the Guardian of the Highly Popular rived from the values it stands for. Rather it induces »Swedish model« but without a Political the Social Democrats to develop a profile on all sorts Monopoly of »post-modern« issues, just like the other parties, and hence to become less discernible in the process. Without winning absolute majorities in elections, the Yet, like in Sweden, the »social democratic con- Swedish Social Democratic Party (SAP) has enjoyed sensus« is treacherous in Denmark. An open assault political hegemony ever since it led the country out of on the welfare-state structure in the name of a neo- the Great Depression of the 1930s. Its policy design liberal lean-state alternative has no political chance. for economic recovery, developed in close coopera- But the Venstre party of Prime Minister Fogh Rasmus- tion with organised labour, blended with an eco- sen has adopted a cunning tack, introducing appar- nomically resilient architecture of social inclusion. ently minor changes – for instance offering more Both together have shaped Swedish society and be- choice and competition – that would create incen- come part of Swedish identity. They have generated tives to opt out of the solidarity structures and to a solid basis of vested interests in the maintenance of develop parallel structures for the well-to-do. It also the »People’s Home« (folkhem), as the country’s wel- used the past years’ boom windfalls to the budget to fare society has been branded. Unlike other European cut taxes in a way that may jeopardise the future fi- welfare states, the Swedish one was the sole result of nancing of the welfare state. Many are convinced Social Democratic governance. And Social Democ- that there is a strategy behind these moves. This racy has been its »guardian« ever since. would make it important to put the issue of what While a point was reached where the »bourgeois« kind of a society the Danish people want, currently opposition did not dare question the architecture of being addressed behind the scenes, back onto the the Swedish welfare society, and indeed periodically table. And then it would be important whether the emphasised their loyalty to it, it was the SAP that re- centre-left or the centre-right governs. financed it after a severe economic slump in the Opinion polls conducted in summer 2009 suggest 1990s. After the major changes introduced by the International Policy Analysis 13

Social Democrats, the Swedish economy, which had fers of more individual choice will clear the road for been virtually stagnating during the 1980s, bounced the emergence of a low- market seg- back to high growth rates based on a combination of ment, which would mean the end of Swedish-style sound macroeconomics and competitiveness in high social inclusion. From this point of view, it would be valued-added production. Significantly, the adjust- essential for the SAP to return to power in 2010. ments made to accommodate the need to stay com- The weaknesses of the »bourgeois« government – petitive under global capitalism were not extended to and a source of remaining Social Democratic the labour market – in the way they were in Germany, strength – is that people suspect its long-term goals for instance. No low-wage sector has been allowed may be at odds with the »conservative« outlook of to emerge so far. most Swedish people. The government tends to lose Instead, the Swedish , govern- support as soon as it goes ahead with anti-welfare ments and the trade unions alike have consistently reforms, and is, moreover, currently gaining from its since the 1930s encouraged rather than resisted in- »social democratic« discourse about the need for dustrial restructuring. By strictly limiting low-wage strong public finances (to motivate non-intervention- competition through a »solidarity wage policy«, low- ist economic policies during the downturn) and criti- productivity work places have been wiped out, forc- cism of excessive risk-taking and greed by financial ing individuals as well as firms to increase productiv- and business leaders. ity. Social Democratic governance from 1994 to 2006 Unlike in other European countries, welfare-state under Prime Minister Persson built on this thinking retrenchment and labour market liberalisation cannot and continued what must be deemed a resounding easily be portrayed as a maybe bitter, yet unavoidable success story. medicine prescribed by the reality of global capital- Nonetheless, the 2006 polls were won by a »bour- ism. For this, the Swedish economy performed too geois« coalition, led by the Moderate Party presenting well under Social Democratic rule. Reforms must be itself from the centre ground as »the new labour introduced as a matter of preference, but it is a pref- party«. The SAP was relegated to the opposition, even erence that is not shared, it seems, by the majority. In though it remained with 35 percent of the votes by far this respect, »bourgeois« politics is locked into the the strongest party (the Moderates won 26 percent). social democratic model of society that has been es- This defeat followed the classical pendulum pat- tablished and developed in the past. The »bourgeois« tern of democratic politics. The Swedes did not vote parties can be politically successful only as long as for a revision of Social Democratic policies, they did they do not question Swedish Social Democracy. not vote for less welfare state and lower taxes. It is Thanks to Social Democratic policies, globalised more appropriate to say that many non-committed »post-industrial« capitalism has not generated many urban middle-class voters considered the SAP’s work losers in Sweden so far and »modernisation« has not as done and the time therefore ripe to give a chance become a major challenge for Social Democracy. But to a new style of governance, to a greater dose, so to the present economic crisis is changing the parame- speak, of individual autonomy and choice. However, ters for both the continuation of Swedish-style social the polls suggest that they are quite ready to switch inclusion and equality and neo-liberal-inspired strate- back to the centre-left if »bourgeois« governance gies. While adjustment to the ways global markets does not prove satisfactory. At present, Swedish poli- work has lost much of its persuasiveness, it remains tics is not about fundamental choices, it is about to be seen whether the economic core institutions of variations in public policy accents on the basis of the the Swedish model – highly centralised productivity- well-established »Swedish model«. oriented wage-setting and large-scale public employ- While it is true that a solid majority of the popula- ment – will be able to buffer the impact of the global tion favours the socially inclusive, relatively egalitarian slump. way the economy and the state are organised and are In the near future, the serious challenge for Social willing to pay with high taxes for the universally ac- Democracy will no longer be the lure of economic cessible high-quality public services, adherents of a radical political forces might emerge if the »adminis- more neo-liberal economy and society, who gained trators of the system« do not come up with convinc- access to political power in 2006, seem to be trying ing responses to large-scale unemployment. In the to undermine the Swedish model in a stealthy way. past, it has been the strength of Swedish Social The Social Democrats fear that their target is the high Democracy to develop radically rational responses to degree of unionisation, which is a pillar of the overall vital challenges. It is to be hoped that it has main- architecture of the folkhem. It is feared that deliber- tained this rare political capacity. Many fear it will be ately weakening organised labour with seductive of- hampered by the novelty of forging a pre-election 14 Alfred Pfaller European Social Democracy – In Need of Renewal

alliance with the Green and the ex-communist left ers’ rights and full employment, have not been able parties for the polls in September 2010. to prevent creeping social exclusion and polarisation. When Social Democracy finally came to accommo- date the new realities programmatically, this did not The social democratic Malaise and its take the form of a reassertion of fundamental social Causes democratic values, but rather amounted to a recogni- tion that more inequality was to be tolerated. In several of the countries investigated the reason for Now that bold new answers are required, Social the electoral decline of Social Democracy seems quite Democracy seems to be paralysed by its newly found obvious: significant parts of its traditional support pragmatism that – in the eyes of many voters – stands base among the less well-to-do social strata have for everything and nothing. It is afraid to be pushed broken away, because they have experienced socio- back into its old ideological corner which it fought so economic deterioration without the Social Democrats hard to get out of. To put it pointedly: in many Euro- being able to do much about it. Middle-class support pean countries, Social Democracy seems to be afraid has shrunk, too, but to a lesser extent. In other words, to become social democratic again. Thus, so far it has the Social Democrats are no longer seen as effective lacked the ideological conviction and power to shape promoters of lower-class interests. These population the future of capitalist development, it runs behind segments have ceased to regard the Social Demo- the new developments instead of providing direction crats as the political force advancing their interests. for them. At the same time the loss of lower-class support has Social Democracy has always been about social not been compensated for by a switch from the inclusion, about making the capitalist economy func- centre-right to Social Democracy by better-off voters. tion in a way that gives people a fair share in the Until not so long ago, it was possible to say that fruits of capitalist productive efficiency. More gener- Social Democratic thinking had been pushed into the ally, it strives to put the economy at the service of corner of outdated »ideology« by the hegemony of human well-being and self-fulfilment, providing the . Today, however, the ideas that pro- material basis for the freedom to shape and live one’s vided the normative direction for how society and the life according to one’s own personal preferences. economy were to be shaped over the past three dec- Turning this vision of a profoundly »human« society ades have lost their seductive power. Nevertheless, into reality was the essence of social democratic political Social Democracy now has less appeal than »progress«. The emancipation of the »working it has had at any time since World War II, while po- class«, the losers of early industrial capitalism, to litical conservatism is »social democratising« itself. At make them members of such a »human« society has the same time, discontent with »mainstream« poli- for a long time been the core element of this kind of tics – centre-right and centre-left – is obviously grow- progress. Yet now it has come to a halt and is being ing, boosting the electoral success of the populist reversed throughout much of Europe, apparently right as well as parties left of Social Democracy. Social without the Social Democrats being able to do much Democracy is simply not seen as the political force about it. that has the most convincing answers to the chal- The mechanisms of social democratic progress to- lenges posed by the deepest economic crisis for more wards a socially inclusive society were (1) the bargain- than seventy years. At the same time, those associ- ing power of labour vis-à-vis employers, (2) the wel- ated with the rise of crisis-prone »post-Keynesian« fare state with its schemes of risk insurance and capitalism are still winning elections. income support and (3) the importance of public goods and services. Beginning in the 1980s, the la- bour-market pillar of social inclusion was successively The End of Social Democratic Progress weakened, resulting in a combination of rising unem- ployment on the one hand and worse paid, more Our hypothesis is that fundamental transformations precarious employment on the other. Consequently, in the working of the capitalist market economy – this put the other two pillars under pressure as well. globalisation, the digital revolution, the »post-indus- The evolution of global capitalism blocked some of trial« knowledge economy as well as a secular decline the once successful roads to social inclusion, because in economic growth in the wealthy countries – have it made certain arrangements of labour-market re- made it increasingly difficult for Social Democracy to gimes and welfare-state protection ineffective, espe- deliver on its core promise of social justice. Recipes of cially with regard to social inclusion, and turned them the past, embracing welfare-state protection, work- into a kind of »socially exclusive corporatism«. International Policy Analysis 15

Losing the vision of progressiveness is the main A Socio-cultural Divide reason for the patterns we find in Germany, France and to a lesser extent (so far) in Italy. The UK is rapidly The fact that political Social Democracy has been heading in this direction, now that the impact of New losing support among the lower classes throughout Labour’s corrections to the preceding radical market much of Europe has more than a purely economic excesses of the Tories has petered out and large-scale dimension. The message Social Democracy has for social exclusion has come to stay. them has lost its power. Nowadays, the future is the We also find a variant of this pattern in Austria and knowledge society, which offers plenty of chances for the Netherlands, where outright socio-economic de- bright, well-educated, enterprising and highly mobile terioration among the lower classes has not become people, while political Social Democracy has ceased a major problem yet, but where the economic per- to espouse the cause of »ordinary« working people. spectives of many less-educated people (and not only It has become part of that »brave new world« of high them) have become delinked from the general value-added production, flexibility, life-long learning growth in prosperity and where the socio-cultural etc., which is the world of the »winners«. When divide between the lower classes and the educated asked to provide real perspectives for the losers of the middle classes has grown more accentuated. »great transformations«, the Social Democrats find In Spain, where the Social Democratic Party con- themselves at a loss. tinues to poll well over 40 percent of the vote, it is still Many people throughout the affluent countries of the force of progress – most of all, of civic progress Europe sense that the central parameters of the soci- vis-à-vis a political conservativism that is associated in etal framework in which their and their children’s several ways with a pre-democratic, authoritarian lives are unfolding have changed. There is a general, past. The contrast presented by a highly »anti-social« vague feeling of unease prompted by insecurities and outmoded conservative competitor also explains about incomes, careers, jobs, skills and social protec- much of British New Labour’s stunning success, which tion, which also extends to how people feel about has now come to an end. their way of life, community and identity. Many peo- In Sweden and Denmark, in turn, social democracy ple fear that the future carries more risks than chances (seen as a way to organise society) is so entrenched for them and their children. They fear for their stand- and so resilient to the economic changes which have ard of living and for their place in society. In a way, swept the world in recent decades that Social Demo- the world that is unfolding around them is no longer cratic parties have become, in a certain way, dispen- theirs. They feel alienated, dispossessed and down- sable. Their »bourgeois« competitors are not per- graded. Many of those who have become pessimistic ceived as a danger to the socially inclusive societies about the future come from those segments of soci- that prevail in these countries. Thus, the political dis- ety that traditionally supported Social Democracy. course and political competition has come to focus Nowadays they consider Social Democracy to be part on other issues, which do not favour the Social Dem- of the »modernisation« that is eroding old comforts ocrats. A growing anti-collectivist preference for and old securities. more individual autonomy has boosted the appeal of »bourgeois« parties in Sweden and Denmark. In Den- mark (as in the Netherlands, Austria and France but Where Is the Enemy? against different socio-economic backgrounds), a growing anti-immigration sentiment has turned into Related to the »end of progress« is that Social Democ- an additional problem for the Social Democrats. racy has lost the »enemy« who was rather essential Altogether, the problems of Social Democracy in for the Social Democratic profile. Throughout most of Scandinavia are on an entirely different level than Western Europe, Social Democracy’s most important they are in the other countries in our sample. In Swe- rivals in the political market place are neither neoliber- den as well as in Denmark it is hard to see what als nor »conservatives« in an anti-progressive mean- additional progress can be achieved under Social ing of the word, even though the basic value-orien- Democratic rule, since practically everything the So- tation of their most faithful voters is conservative. In cial Democrats stand for has been achieved and is not reality (as opposed to the myths propagated by both openly challenged by the »conservative« camp. What sides), Social Democrats and »Conservatives« no could give them renewed relevance is the need to longer compete over fundamentally different direc- defend the institutional architecture of social inclu- tions national development should take. They com- sion against attempts to dismantle it by the back pete over competence to govern. The differences door. which do exist are minor compared with the differ- 16 Alfred Pfaller European Social Democracy – In Need of Renewal

ences cultivated in the parties’ narratives. The political policy of timid »realism« that surrenders to the block- discourse – in its essence rather than in its projection ades that are in the way of a truly progressive policy, into the theatre of partisan debate – is a centrist one, that accepts considerable social polarisation as una- oriented towards the handling of the various national voidable and that tries to outbid the centre-right with problems within relatively narrow constraints circum- regard to general competence to govern. At best, scribed by a broad consensus on what is realistic and they might profit occasionally from their rivals’ politi- what utopian. cal mistakes, prolonged incompetence or ideological In some highly developed European countries, So- blindness. cial Democracy is in the process of losing its relevance Social Democracy does not have the often cited because it has not found ways to live up to the expec- choice between a »leftist« policy stance that caters to tations of many of its erstwhile supporters, nor in- the losers of the »great transformations« and a deed to its own social democratic values. A political »reform« policy of welfare-state retrenchment and a force that reinforces social democracy (here taken to more flexible labour market. If Social Democracy is to mean a desirable way to organise society) is badly reverse its decline it must come up with an encom- needed. But Social Democratic parties have so far not passing project of renewal, a project that is strong been up to this task. In part, because they have em- enough to meet today’s challenges and that appeals phasised policies that are no longer adequate, in part to a heterogeneous majority of the population. It because they have come to adopt »realistic« policy must forge, so to speak, a new coalition for the »tam- stances that amount to an acceptance of high levels ing« of capitalism, once again putting its productive of social polarisation and exclusion. Thus, they have and creative forces at the service of human fulfilment. lost their natural advantage, so to speak, vis-à-vis the As already pointed out, Social Democracy emerged centre-right, which has developed its social discourse as a response to discontent with capitalism, and the well beyond the stereotype of hard-nosed neoliberal- capitalist economic system still represents the all- ism and classic conservativism. pervasive frame of reference for both the struggle for a social democracy (understood as the most desirable way of organising modern society) and for the politi- Towards a Project of social democratic cal fortunes of Social Democracy (understood as the Renewal political force that defines itself as the promoter of a social democracy). The political challenge posed by This analysis has shown that Social Democracy has capitalism derives from and refers to its relations with been successful where and as long as it could fulfil a other modes of organising society, such as the state, progressive function: offering convincing policy pack- the family or traditions. In the recent past, the dynam- ages for a socially more inclusive, freer, more partici- ics of the capitalist economy have imposed its priori- patory and at the same time more prosperous society; ties to such an extent that other human concerns have or else offering convincing ways to strengthen pro- come to suffer. The task is to reassert the values of a gressive structures vis-à-vis the onslaught of globali- truly »human« society: social justice and (individual as sation, the information society etc. Social Democracy well as social) life beyond the market. For this, the has seen its electoral appeal decline where its agenda capitalist economy needs a new regulative frame- is no longer really a progressive one and where it has work. Developing such a framework, and propagating to compete with its political rivals predominantly over and fighting for it, is what a Social Democratic re- general competence to govern and to master the newal project should be about. This might require various challenges confronting modern societies. The profound institutional changes, which might appear review of European countries suggests further that utopian at first glance. But the political task is to turn the Social Democrats’ »progressiveness« is not simply such »utopian« ideas into politically realistic options. a matter of political choice or political consciousness. To a large extent it is a function of the options left by the impact of the »great transformations« on the Seven Policy Proposals for a Renewal welfare-state architecture created in the past. of Social Democracy Social Democracy’s commitment to social justice and human freedom calls for a policy of profound Taking into account the conditions outlined above, corrections to the way most Western European socie- we will propose seven policy options which could ties have been functioning lately. So do the parame- form the basis for a project of renewal of Social De- ters of political competition. European Social Demo- mocracy in Europe. The proposals are by no means crats should not and cannot successfully settle for a all-embracing or complete; rather, they should be International Policy Analysis 17

seen as a starting point for further discussions on a to happen, either average wages must rise or prices European-wide renewal process. must fall at the same pace as productivity increases. Profits can only temporarily be allowed to rise. For the 1) Focus on the Labour Market dynamics of economic growth to be maintained it is better for wages to rise than for prices to fall. The key Third Way-type reforms are no longer viable under for this essential condition to be met is the bargaining the new conditions. They do not control the polaris- power of labour. Labour must be well organised right ing effects of widely available cheap labour. Ulti- across the economy, not only in certain sectors, and mately, they leave people exposed to power relations manpower must remain scarce. A return to the virtu- on the labour market. On the other hand, a pro- ous circle mentioned above would be facilitated by gramme of reasserted social inclusion cannot realisti- strong labour unions, organised so as to struggle for cally be based on large-scale redistribution from the wage increases in line with average productivity in- »well-off classes« to the losers of the great economic creases at high aggregate levels, best of all at EU level transformations. The task is rather to incorporate for each economic sector. Social democrats should these »losers« on more favourable terms into a grow- promote and facilitate this, even though it runs con- ing economy. Social inclusion must be embedded in trary to the neo-liberal wisdom of the past decades, a policy of economic modernisation, competitiveness which has brought us decreasing growth rates and and growth. increasing social polarisation. Theoretically it would be possible to give all those Rising mass incomes and mass demand imply that who do not earn enough in the labour market a top- competitiveness in global markets cannot be the pri- up income in cash and / or kind. To a limited extent, mary or even sole objective of economic policy any this is done in all highly developed countries. But for more. Governments concerned about their country’s the top-up schemes to be a mechanism of social in- competitiveness tend to lay the emphasis on low clusion and not just a bottom-line provision to pro- costs, including low wages, and to neglect demand. tect people against hardship they would have to be In their paradigm national prosperity depends prima- extended and generalised to an extent that is not rily on an advantageous position in global markets. being considered seriously anywhere. A socially inclu- They tend to take these markets as given and implic- sive society based on large-scale fiscal redistribution itly as something to let other countries worry about. is a solution that is clearly inferior to a socially inclu- Moreover, they take low-cost competition based on sive labour market. Therefore, the following condi- lower foreign wages and other countries’ more gen- tions must be met: erous neglect of externalities as a reality to be accom- ࡯ the demand for manpower is high modated rather than as a systemic challenge calling ࡯ the supply of manpower is limited for a systemic response. ࡯ job-seekers are in a position to pick up the well- It would be important to accommodate the global paid jobs (as far as qualifications, knowledge labour surplus with the help of sustained fast eco- about the job offers and geographical mobility are nomic growth in the surplus regions of Asia, Africa, concerned) Latin America and Eastern Europe. Contrary to widely ࡯ labour is sufficiently well organised to strike fa- held views, we need more Chinas and Indias in order vourable bargains with employers (which implies to accelerate the transition from a global labour sur- that limits employers’ ability to exploit plus (that threatens to depress wages all over the their market power). world and to undermine the virtuous circle of rising productivity, rising wages and rising demand) to a 2) Towards a New Economic Policy Paradigm virtuous circle on a global scale. As long as the labour surplus countries are growing rapidly they generate Labour market institutions do much to further social markets for rich countries’ products and are less of a inclusion, but it is an uphill struggle if the overall disturbance to their labour markets (or indeed global economy is not supportive. A new set of regulations stability for that matter) than if they stagnate. and incentives for investment, production and spend- By now it is clear that the ecological renewal of pro- ing would be more conducive to sustained prosperity duction (and consumption) patterns is unavoidable, for all. and it provides an enormous impetus for economic The economy should be driven by (observable and growth. Maximising prosperity must fulfil the criterion anticipated) mass demand and entrepreneurial initia- of ecological sustainability. Social Democrats ought to tives oriented at mass markets. This requires that real embrace the cause of . mass incomes rise with productive capacity. For this 18 Alfred Pfaller European Social Democracy – In Need of Renewal

3) Getting Started: a Focus on Education non-monetary enrichment of human life and should be protected against monetary-utilitarian priorities. Even if a socially inclusive labour market and an eco- However, in today’s political practice, economic »im- nomic order conducive to sustained mass prosperity peratives« have increasingly pushed aside quality-of- are not (yet) in place, qualifying manpower to fit the life considerations. The liberation of human beings requirements of well-paying jobs in itself improves from the »realm of necessity« is being postponed to the chances for social inclusion and at the same time some time in the remote future. for economic growth. Investment in education and Crucial for change is the establishment of the pri- qualification is a no-regret strategy par excellence macy of politics over ill-understood economics. In and yields a multiple dividend. other words, people should be given the opportunity ࡯ It carries the promise of a high-productivity econ- to decide themselves – sometimes individually, some- omy, well positioned in the global market-place. times collectively – about their quality-of-life rather ࡯ With an adequate pre-schooling dimension, it of- than being subjected to absolute economic impera- fers better economic prospects for the children of tives. People should be given the possibility to decide socially marginalised population groups, including individually or collectively what price they are willing ones with an immigration background. to pay for what kind and amount of »quality of life«. ࡯ Public or publicly-financed employment in the ed- Making trade-offs visible and a matter of choice ucation sector creates jobs. With its pre-schooling would involve institutional set-ups which require pur- dimension it is an essential structural precondition poseful political action. It is to be expected that this for overcoming gender discrimination. will (a) show that some trade-offs are not as dramatic ࡯ With its requalification dimension it supports peo- as they might appear behind the curtain of non- ple’s ability to combine non-continuous work ca- transparency, and (b) induce efforts to reduce trade- reers with an acceptable life-time income and offs, i.e. to make quality-of-life preferences and the hence the contingent ability to provide for their generation of monetary value more compatible. retirement. Making family life and work more compatible ࡯ If organised in an integrative rather than a segre- should, for Social Democrats, be a matter of adjusting gative way it contributes to a general feeling of working patterns, limiting demands on people’s avail- social integration, giving the overwhelming major- ability. At least in the western parts of Europe, our ity a feeling of belonging, thus working against level of material prosperity is so high that we do not the formation of subcultures of social »losers«. depend on maximum exploitation of human working The focus on education / qualification is straightfor- capacity at the expense of social externalities. ward. If the political will is there, it can be got moving relatively fast, without any major overhaul of estab- lished institutions with all their vested interests. In 5) Towards a »Citizens’ Society« several European countries it could mark a visible end to the paralysing end-of-progress syndrome. As such is in continuous danger of it could provide momentum and a source of new being distorted and, as a consequence, of losing Social Democratic self-confidence. credibility and support. Distorting forces include the manipulation of public opinion by a highly concen- trated, privately controlled mass media, technocratic 4) Rediscovering Quality of Life as a problem-solving (or non-solving) above the heads of Programmatic Goal citizens, separation of the political agenda from the interests, desires and preferences of citizens (includ- Emancipating workers from the dictates of efficient ing a generalised principal-agent problem between production and protecting the space in which they the democratic sovereign, the people and their can live and enjoy their lives has been one of the core elected representatives). objectives of the labour unions. They succeeded in A significant part of the problem is directly related limiting daily and weekly working hours and getting to people’s perception that Social Democratic politics paid holiday for employees, protection against haz- are detached from their life experience, worries and ards in the work place, maternity and parental leave wishes. Against this background, Social Democratic etc. The introduction of environmental considera- rhetoric about justice, solidarity, human dignity etc. tions into the world of production was not only mo- sounds hollow. Social Democratic parties should tivated by sustainability and security concerns, but practice and further develop methods of listening to also by concern for the beauty of nature, which is a people, registering their concerns and to including International Policy Analysis 19

them in a visible and transparent way in the political populism and in some countries has become a major decision-making process. Seriously involving people ingredient of lower-class alienation from Social De- as much as possible in the shaping of public policy mocracy, which has often tended to play down the programmes would be a way to turn them into allies. whole syndrome. It must, however, develop a policy Therefore the local branches of Social Democratic response that is both politically responsible and faith- parties must be strengthened, links to new social ful to the humanist values of Social Democracy and movements must be established, and people who also focuses on both integration and control. These actively promote social democratic ideas without be- elements should form part of an actively promoted ing partisans should gain the interest and support of Social Democratic message that takes issue with Social Democratic politics. hypocritical alternative positions. Another part of the problem is the success of The integration of foreigners must focus on edu- populist political entrepreneurs, who exploit people’s cation, housing, jobs and the rule of law. The goal of frustration both with technocratic governance and Social Democratic integration policy should be »equal protagonist-centred political theatre without offering chances for immigrants and their children«. It should an alternative. The challenge is to pioneer a demo- discourage the formation of separate, inward-look- cratic renewal that would take the wind out of their ing, spatially concentrated communities and should sails. not tolerate behaviour patterns that contradict the The alternative is citizens’ participation. This is not core values of Western political civilisation. An ar- an easy task as involvement in public issues costs time rangement for the influx of immigrants according to and energy and is often frustrating, but there are criteria must be part of a credible and politically »sell- various known and tried forms of direct citizens’ par- able« Social Democratic position. This might imply ticipation in political decision-making. Social Demo- enhanced efforts to suppress illegal immigration. crats should actively promote these and develop them further. Involving citizens in the shaping of pub- lic policy – beyond the electoral channel – could point 7) The importance of supra-national governance: the way to neutralising the oligarchy-strengthening Europe and beyond effects of decreasing party membership. National governments committed to social democ- racy as a desirable way of organising society can still 6) Addressing the Problems of »Ordinary« People achieve much on the national level of governance. But it is nevertheless important to develop new, su- An important test of the seriousness of what the pranational capacity to shape societal development in Social Democrats have to offer is how much attention line with social democratic values. We are witnessing it pays to key aspects of »ordinary« people’s life ex- ever more clearly what we might call the eclipse of perience that can be addressed by appropriate public the nation-state as the relevant framework for the policies. In several countries a salient aspect of social organisation of society. disintegration is the decay of lower-class neighbour- The EU is the level of governance on which a new hoods. This has less to do with lack of public money economic policy paradigm for the benefit of mass than with the self-reinforcing dynamics of anomie. prosperity can be established. The EU is also becom- What is needed is appropriate intervention to break ing increasingly important for the strengthening of these dynamics and to restore a positive civic spirit. labour and thus for the re-establishment of a benign Positive action to undo some of the spatial segrega- link between economic supply and demand. It ap- tion of neighbourhoods along class and sub-culture pears almost mandatory for European Social Demo- lines might be indicated. It might therefore be impor- crats to strengthen EU decision-making and stand- tant for Social Democracy to develop determined, ard-setting structures in economic and labour-market participatory and widely recognisable amelioration policy, so as to develop counterweights to the supe- programmes wherever deteriorating neighbourhoods rior market power of internationally mobile capital. are a problem. Of course, strengthening European governance alone Another sensitive and at the same time neglected will not do. It will also take appropriate majorities to issue is the effects of large-scale immigration in Eu- use EU power for the benefit of mass prosperity and rope. Insufficient integration of immigrants into Euro- social inclusion. pean societies has given rise to persisting social prob- The EU has created a new reality for the great so- lems. Resentment on the part of the »native« cial democratic project. The Union has become both population has contributed to the rise of right-wing a relevant level of governance, on which important 20 Alfred Pfaller European Social Democracy – In Need of Renewal

decisions for the future of European societies are militants and their civil-society allies must internalise taken, and a relevant target in the struggle for »social »the cause« and the arguments underpinning it. This democracy« (social inclusion, materially underpinned is not something the dynamics of party politics brings freedom, solidarity and participative decision-mak- about easily. Day-to-day politics tends to impose the ing). The united Europe should become a »social de- primacy of tactics. The management of voters’ sensi- mocracy«. This is not just a matter of European soli- bilities is a permanently high priority, which constrains darity: it is also important for the vigour of social programme development. For this reason party pro- democratic ideals and, thus, for the political chances grammes all too easily emphasise the sales talk aspect of Social Democracy. Social Democrats must there- at the expense of coherent content. But tactics and fore improve their European profile. sales talk are inadequate when new policy paradigms The struggle for a society that espouses social are needed to cope with challenges that have accu- democratic values needs to be transferred to the glo- mulated slowly over time. bal level – using diplomacy in the widest sense of the To overcome this structural obstacle to authentic word and developing structures of global govern- renewal, it might help to set up a small and highly ance. Advancing on this front is both a matter of competent task-force to develop key propositions for long-term commitment to social democratic ideals a medium-term strategy – not a classical party pro- and of the survival of our political civilisation. gramme that formulates Social Democratic positions on all politically relevant issues and tends to empha- sise goals rather than strategy. It is equally important Promoting the Project of Renewal for the propositions to be debated openly, widely and seriously within the party and not imposed by lead- This paper has outlined seven policy proposals that ers. Otherwise, the party militants will not make the might form the starting point for the renewal of message they have to propagate their own. Social Democracy in Europe. Taken together they Furthermore, debate should not be confined to form a programme that promises the losers of the the party militants; it should be extended to civil so- profound economic changes a new place in society ciety, above all to the organisations of groups with a and the population at large growing prosperity and direct stake in a Social Democratic renewal. Labour increasing freedom of choice in the context of a par- unions are the first that spring to mind in this context. ticipatory democracy. Obama’s victory was helped significantly by the in- However, such a programme must not only be volvement of organised labour in his campaign. But credible, it must be believed and accepted by people union (and other organisations) support would have who are sceptical about the promises of politicians. to go beyond an official endorsement of Social Dem- This requires a form of political communication that ocratic positions by labour leaders. Within the un- involves as many citizens as possible so that the Social ions, too, open debate on renewal must be carried Democratic agenda becomes their agenda. The task down to shop-floor level, even though this might not is not only to propagate an agenda that aims to re- always be easy. To the extent active unionists (and store social cohesion while increasing general pros- other civil-society activists) make the Social Demo- perity but also to overcome the general mistrust of cratic renewal project their own they will help to the electorate in politicians. It goes without saying propagate it. that this cannot be achieved overnight. Social Democracy as a political force and social Before we conclude it is worth taking a closer look democracy as a model of society needs, almost every- at two outstanding success stories of centre-left cam- where (Sweden and Denmark being conspicuous paigning: New Labour’s triumph in the 1990s and exceptions), a comprehensive renewal project that Barack Obama’s victory in 2008. Even though in both provides robust, new, twenty-first century-proof sub- cases the centre-left benefited from the fact that its stance for the ideals of human emancipation, social rivals had become thoroughly discredited and had justice and solidarity. Campaigning should emphasise candidates with far less charisma than and this project and try to win people’s support for it. The Barack Obama, there is more to it than that. Two party should be – and should be seen to be – at its factors can perhaps be singled out as decisive: (a) a service. Ultimately, it is social democracy that matters, coherent and convincing message of renewal; and (b) not Social Democracy. a »missionary« style of propagating the message. It takes conviction to be convincing and to create this conviction around a concrete and courageous strategy, not just around »eternal« values, the party Ausgewählte Veröffentlichungen des Referats „InternationaleInternationale Politikanalyse“ Politikanalyse International Policy Analysis Unit

Arbeitskreis Europa Thorsten Benner, Stefanie Flechtner (Hrsg.) Chancen für eine nachhaltige Energiepolitik Demokratien und Terrorismus – Erfahrungen mit = mçäáíáâJfåÑçI=^éêáä=OMMT= der Bewältigung und Bekämpfung von Terroran- = schlägen. Fallstudien USA, Spanien, Niederlande AG Europäische Integration und Großbritannien. Plädoyer für ein europäisches Sozialmodell = cêáÉÇÉå=ìåÇ=páÅÜÉêÜÉáí, g~åì~ê=OMMT= = bìêçé®áëÅÜÉ=mçäáíáâI=^éêáä=OMMT= = = Sven Biscop Michael Sommer The International Security Engagement of the Eu- Ein soziales Europa braucht Arbeitnehmer- ropean Union - Courage and Capabilities for a mitbestimmung [also available in English] “More Active” EU. Report from the 1st mçäáíáâJfåÑçI=^éêáä=OMMT= European Strategic Forum, Warsaw 2006. = cêáÉÇÉå=ìåÇ=páÅÜÉêÜÉáíI=g~åì~ê=OMMT Bert Hoffmann Kuba in der Nach-Fidel-Ära Stefanie Flechtner cbpJi®åÇÉê~å~äóëÉI=j®êò=OMMT Demokratie ist die beste Antwort im Kampf = gegen den Terrorismus James K. Galbraith = mçäáíáâJfåÑçI=aÉòÉãÄÉê=OMMS= Maastricht 2042 and the Fate of Europe. Toward Convergence and Full Employment Michael Dauderstädt, Barbara Lippert, = bìêçé®áëÅÜÉ=mçäáíáâI=j®êò=OMMT= Andreas Maurer Die deutsche EU-Ratspräsidentschaft 2007: Daniela Schwarzer Hohe Erwartungen bei engen Spielräumen Spannungen im Club der 13 – Reformbedarf = bìêçé®áëÅÜÉ=mçäáíáâI=kçîÉãÄÉê=OMMS= der Eurozone. bìêçé®áëÅÜÉ=mçäáíáâI=j®êò=OMMT= Jana Zitzler Plädoyer für eine europäische Mindestlohnpolitik Arbeitskreis Europa [also available in English] Gefahr für die nationale Daseinsvorsorge im = mçäáíáâJfåÑçI=kçîÉãÄÉê=OMMS= EU-Binnenmarkt? = mçäáíáâJfåÑçI=j®êò=OMMT= Jo Leinen Die Kosten der Nicht-Verfassung Jonathan Wadsworth = mçäáíáâJfåÑçI=kçîÉãÄÉê=OMMS= Mit flexiblen Arbeitsmärkten aus der Beschäfti- gungskrise? Ein Blick auf britische Erfahrungen = mçäáíáâJfåÑçI=j®êò=OMMT Diese und weitere Texte Svenja Blanke Mexikos junge Demokratie zwischen Stagnation sind online verfügbar: und Krise http://www.fes.de/internationalepolitik = cbpJi®åÇÉê~å~äóëÉI=j®êò=OMMT=

Jürgen Kahl Bestellungen bitte an: Die Mongolei im Reformtief – Dauerkrise oder Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung „zweiter Aufbruch“? Internationale Politikanalyse cbpJi®åÇÉê~å~äóëÉI=g~åì~ê=OMMT z.Hd. Ursula Müller D – 53170 Bonn

E-Mail: [email protected] Tel.: +49 (228) 883-212 Fax: +49 (228) 883-625 Imprint Orders All texts are available online: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung www.fes.de/ipa International Policy Analysis International Policy Analysis The views expressed in this publication Division for International Dialogue Nora Neye are not necessarily those of the D-10785 Berlin D-10785 Berlin Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung or of the www.fes.de/ipa E-Mail: [email protected] organization for which the author E-Mail: [email protected] Fax: +49 (30) 2 69 35-92 48 works. ISBN 978-3-86872-238-3