Handhonk of Clinical Neurology, Vol. 3. P.J. Vinken and G. W. BruYI1, ('ds. North-Holland Puhlishing Company, Amsterdam (1969).

CHAPTER 19

Psychophysiological basis ofemotion

KARL H. PRIBRAM AND FREDERICK T. MELGES

Stanford University School a/Medicine, Palo Alto, Calif.

She puzzled over this for some time, but at last a bright thought struck her. 'Why, it's a looking-glass book, of course! And if I hold it up to a glass, the words will all go the right way again.' Lewis Carroll, Through the looking-glass

Marcus Aurelius, Rome's philosopher-emperor, ence and applied to another in haphazard and un­ developed a formula for coping with this troubled critical fashion. In this presentation every effort world. He pointed out that, if one tries to con­ will be made to keep the two universes of dis­ sider problems all-of-a-piece, one is overwhelmed. course clear. The assumption is, however, that His prescription was simple: segment the reach because each of these conceptual universes de­ ofawareness; attend to only one facet ofthe situa­ notes some body ofevents common to both,differ­ tion at anyone time; act upon that facet and then ent aspects of this common body will be illumin­ .. proceed to another. Too-much.too-soon is up­ ated by approaching it from different points of setting. Segmentation reduces the demands upon view. I awareness and thereby produces imperturba­ Although the initial focus of this presentation bility. will be on the neurological realm of discourse, the This bit of wisdom can serve as the kernel for a proposal is not made just in neurological terms, modern neuropsychological theory of emotion. but interdigitates the subjective-behavioral ap­ A theory crystallized from this kernel would look proach with the neural. The neurological aspects considerably different from those presently in of this proposal describe the organized operations vogue, but must account for the popuiarity of in processing inputs and outcomes; the subjective­ these views. Furthermore,current difficulties must behavioral aspects deal with the communicative be met and resolved. signals - termed affects, the 'feelings' and emotion­ Current theories of emotion - in fact, psycho­ al expressions - that reflect the neural processes. logical theories in general - are couched in two It is our view that these communicative signals major modes of discourse, two classes of concep­ are, as it were, optical isomers, mirror-images II tual frames of reference: the social-behavioral, (Pribram 1965) of the ongoing neural mechanisms, which includes the subjective or 'intrapsychic'; and that both'processes are organized to function­ \ and the biological, which includes the physical, in-view-of-the-same-ends (MacKay 1962). Differ­ Or- chemical, and, of course, the neurological. Terms ent universes of discourse are llsed to describe the are all too often taken from one frame of refer- mirror-images - which may therefore display dif-

References p. 339 316 EMOTION 317 ferent characteristics in the two contexts - but the relevant neural apparatus. Characteristic of the events described are identical. More concretely, latter is the hierarchy of self-regulating, equili­ according to this view description of a given neu­ brating mechanisms, each of which controls its ral excitatory pattern does not produce what we subunits, but submits to regulation by a larger call anxiety; rather, the two reflect one another. system. This set of systems provides the organism The distinction is somewhat like that between the with stability, imperturbability. compiler language used to program a computer Stated in another way, the organism's continu­ and the electromagnetic sequencing carried out ing stability depends on neural programs or by the computer: the events are very much the plans which organize the perception and behavior same as is their sequential organization; yet the of the organism (Mil1er et al. 1960). These pro­ language used to describe them differs. In this grams consist of hierarchies of servomechanisms, sense, then, the present proposal will attempt to feedback units which have been diagrammed as describe processes in both neural and subjective­ nests of test-operate-test-exit units or TOTE units behavioral terms. (Fig. I). The essential characteristic of the test mechanism is to sense incongruities, i.e., novel­ ties; the essential characteristic of the operate Preview of the proposal mechanism is to appraise changes effective in de­ creasing the incongruity in the test mechanism. 'Do··' you think it's going to rain?' Tweedledum Sufficiently incongruous input can temporarily spread a large umbrella over himself and his brother, and looked up into it. 'No, I don't think interrupt the ongoing plans; there is a temporary it is,' he said, 'at least - not under here. Nohow.' discontinuity, literally e-motion. The word emo­ 'But it may rain outside?' tion comes from the Latin emovere, which means 'It may - if it chooses,' said Tweedledee. to be 'out of' or 'away from' motion. 'We've no objection. Contrariwise.' Thus, the proposal is concerned with delineat­ Lewis Carroll, Through Ihe looking-glass ing one set ofemotions that reflect the concurrent The proposal delineates what we call emotions as state of order or disruption of the ongoing neural a set ofprocesses which (I) reflect the state of rela­ organization. A second set involves returning the tive disorganization of an ordinarily stable con­ system to control. The steps involved (Fig. 1) are figuration of neural systems, and (2) reflect those as follows: (I) the sensing of incongruity through mechanisms which operate to redress this im­ the process of dishabituation or orienting to the balance not through action but by the regulation of input. Two such mechanisms have been identi­ fied: one achieves stability by mobilizing the al­ ready available subsystems to the exclusion of in­ put; the other reorganizes the system to include input. These 'preparatory' and 'participatory' processes thus achieve control by two routes, an c c (Incongruity) o .Q ~ +' 'internal' and an 'external'. Much of the presenta­ 11I 11I L- a. tion is devoted to setting forth the evidence upon ~ ...~ CIl which the mechanisms of internal and external L­ a. ~ Operate control are based, and to suggesting some of the a. appraisals J implications which this evidence calls forth. '--f- Relevance Neurological theories have, in the past, influ­ '----t-Irrelevance '------enced the general view by emphasizing the rela­ Fig. I. Diagram of the test-operate-test-exit (TOTE) se­ tions between viscera and emotion or by linking quence which shows the two forms (participatory and emotion quantitatively with an amount of neural preparatory) of feedback involved in the emotional process. During participation, feedback influences the excitation. These relationships, though substan­ test phase to allow congruence with input; during tial, take into account neither the complexities of preparation, feedback influences input to facilitate the emotional process nor the intricacies of the congruence with the test.

Re!efcnCe,\' p. 339 318 KARL H. PRIBRAM AND FREDERICK T. MELGES

'novelty'; (2) operating on this incongruity by ap­ fication (internal control) by maintaining past praising its relevance to the ongoing plans. Rele­ organization. vancy is appraised on the basis of past outcomes The proposal is therefore concerned with deli­ of processing similar incongruities. A successful neating two sets of emotions: those which re­ outcome occurs when the system re-equilibrates; flect concurrent order in the neurophysiologicaI an unsuccessful outcome is associated with pre­ system and those which reflect expectation of vious failures to achieve stability. It is by way of order. The affects - the signals of perturbation these two steps - the sensing of incongruity and and its cessation, and of the initiation of pro­ the resolution of incongruity through the apprai­ cesses necessary to re-establish control - can sal of outcomes - that re-equilibration becomes thus be divided into the 'concurrent' and the organized. When fe-equilibration is effected by 'prospective'. The concurrent affects reflect the control over input rather than by action on the degree of congruity or incongruity in the here­ environment, the process is e-motionaI rather than and-now. Incongruity is signalled by arousal; motivational. the achievement of congruity is characterized by What forms does this regulation or control satisfaction and by gratification, depending on take? On the basis of experiments to be presented, whether it is accomplished by a participatory or the suggestion is made that the organization of preparatory process. The prospective affects can emotions centers around two types of feedback be divided into optimistic and pessimistic. ] nputs which deal with the efferent control of input. As appraised as relevant are associated with feelings seen in Fig. I, they are termed participatory and of optimism (e.g., interest, confidence, hope, and preparatory processes. The uncertainty induced zest), since appraisal has tapped memories of SllC­ by incongruous input is appraised in terms of the cessful outcomes associated with these inputs. By risk associated with outcomes: rei iance on exter­ contrast, inputs appraised as irrelevant are accom­ nal control through participation presupposes panied by pessimistic feelings (e.g., annoyance, stabilities in the configuration of the input to apprehension, hopelessness, and depression), exist; reliance on internal control by way of a pre­ since the memory of past outcomes has led to the paratory process runs the risk of perpetuation expectation of failure to achieve control. At any through self-regulation and progressive alienation given moment, of course, the emotional state of from the 'reality' situation. Participatory proces­ the organism is expressed as a composition ofcon­ ses allow for the incorporation of input, and con­ current and prospective affects. gruity is eventually achieved by alterations of the So much for an overview of the proposal to be neural mechanism (or 'model') against which the presented. For substantiation, the presentation input is tested. On the other hand, preparatory will begin with a summary ofcurrent neurophysio­ processes alter input, thereby accomplishing con­ logical theories, proceed to the neurological data gruity by manipulating the input which led to the which allow them to be superseded, and then go incongruity. The system, perturbed by an incon­ into a more detailed view of the proposal as best gruous input, is returned to the status quo ante by it can at present be formulated by us. Finally, we preparatory processes. External control is achiev­ will explore some of the possible applications of ed by the development of new congruities and the proposal to problems posed in subjective­ internal control is accomplished by the return to behavioral terms. previous congruities. Or, in terms of the ongoing plans, external control achieves the development Current neurological theories and ramifications of plans and internal control achieves their conservation. Thus, as a result of 'What a curious plan!' exclaimed Alice. underlying preparatory or participatory processes, 'That's the reason they're called lessons,' the Gryphon remarked, 'because they lessen from day stability can be reached either through the attain­ ment of a higher order of complexity (external to day.' Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonder/mid control) by disposing the system to establish reci­ There are two central themes in practically all of procity with the here-and-now, or through simpli- today's biological approaches to emotion: one

Reft'f('nn-s fJ. 339 EMOTION 319 theme draws out the relationship between visceral­ tral nervous system does not alter emotional be­ glandular reactions and emotion; the other deals havior. with the quantitative relationship between neural (2) The same visceral changes occur in very differ­ excitation and emotion. It is our contention that ent emotional states and in non-emotional states. these relationships, though substantial, do not (3) The viscera are relatively insensitive structures. provide an adequate framework for understand­ (4) Visceral changes are too slow to be a source of ing the complexities ofemotional processes nor of emotional feeling. the intricacies of the relevant neural apparatus. (5) Artificial induction of the visceral changes typical of strong emotions does not produce those emotions. THE VISCERAL THEME

His heart stood still, aghast with fear. CallI/oil-Bard theory Lewis Carroll, Phalllaslllagoria In place of the visceral theory, Cannon proposed The impact of the visceral theme has been great a thalamic theory of emotions: emotional expres­ and is reflected everywhere in our language: 'He sion results from the operation of hypothalamic couldn't be expected to swallow that'; 'she has no structures; emotional feeling results from stimula­ stomach for it'; 'he broke her heart'; 'the bastard tions of the dorsal thalamus. This theory was has no guts'; 'he sure is bilious today', etc. In fact, based on the observation that 'sham', emotion-like until 1800 A. D. the Galenic medical world sub­ behavior, could be elicited in decorticated and scribed to the notion that, whereas thoughts cir­ decerebrated preparations, but not when thalamic culate in the ventricles of the brain, emotions cir­ structures are additionally ablated (Bard and culate in the vascular system. Gradually, medical Rioch 1937). Further, a variety of expressive and and psychological science has become liberated visceral responses were obtained when the thala­ from this view by the accrual of facts showing it mus was electrically stimulated (Von Bechterev to be in error. But the retreat has been a slow and 1911). Finally, patients with unilateral lesions in guarded one, partly because old theories do not the thalamic regions were described as sensing ex­ die and partly because this view has got hold of cessively what were to others ordinary cutaneous an important part of the truth. The most famous stimulations, e.g., a pin prick would elicit excru­ formulations that signal a step-wise retreat and ciating pain, warmth, intense delight, etc. (Head liberation from this view are those of James and 1920). Lange, of Cannon and Bard, and of Papez and Probably more is known about the functions of MacLean. these core portions of the brain than about any other. This stems in part from the fact that these mechanisms are relatively 'peripheral' in the sense James-Lal/ge theory that they are relatively directly connected to the James and Lange faced fully the accumulated organism's receptor mechanisms. In fact, some of knowledge of the functions of the circulatory and these structures contain receptive elements sensi­ nervous systems of the previous century. They tive to a variety of physical and chemical agents, offered the following proposition: when an or­ which circulate in the blood stream and cerebro­ ganism's reaction to a situation involved visceral spinal fluid. In addition, the core mechanisms structures, the sensations aroused by visceral func­ exert considerable direct control over the agent to tion are perceived as emotional feelings. This pro­ which they are sensitive. This control through position provoked a good deal of experimenta­ feedback was termed 'homeostasis' by Cannon tion. A summary taken from Cannon's critical and has proved to be a powerful conception in a examination of the James-Lange theory of emo­ variety of biological and engineering appl ications. tions (1927) is paradigmatic in showing the theo­ But ofequal importance is the fact that the pro­ ry's weaknesses: cesses controlled are highly autonomous, i.e., self­ (I) Total separation of the viscera from the cen- regulating. Visceral and endocrine regulation is

References p. 339 320 KARL H. PRIBRAM AND FREDERICK T. MELGES

performed with a light hand via two distinct por­ ter for expressive movement contributes to the tions of the autunomic nervous system, the sym­ emotional experience'. Clearly, the dissociation pathetic and the parasympathetic, which balance between emotional expression and feeling, which each other. Experimental evidence was accumu­ is such a common clinical and experimental ob­ lated, especially by Hess (1954), to demonstrate servation, can be levelled against both the James­ the existence in the hypothalamic region of a Lange and the Cannon-Bard theories. Unfortu­ trophotrophic, energy-conserving process, work­ nately, Lashley provided no alternative to the ing primarily through the parasympathetic pe- . theories he so effectively deprecates. ripheral division of the autonomic nervous sys­ tem, and an ergotrophic or mobilizing system, Papez-MacLean theory working through the sympathetic division. . The balance between ergo- and trophotrophic Recently the James-Lange and the Cannon-Bard is not static, of course. When tipped in one direc­ views have been superseded by the one proposed tion or the other, a temporary rebound or an 'an­ by Papez and elaborated by MacLean (1950). The swering effect' (Fair 1963) could occur as the bal­ earl ier theories had been firmly based on the evi­ ance was restored. And indeed both processes dence that the hypothalamus and dorsal thalamus could be activated simultaneously so that they were at the apex of the hierarchy of control of would, in effect, work additively. Nor was this all. visceral or autonomic functions. With the devel­ When such activation occurred, somatic, as well opment of modern techniques for electrical brain as visceral, musculature was involved. stimulation, viscera were shown to be under the An assumption that paralleled, if not actually surveillance of the cerebral cortex (Kaada et al. guided, these studies was that an understanding 1949). One portion of this cortex came into focus of the organization of thalamically regulated pro­ for special attention: the limbic portion of the cesses would provide the key to an understanding forebrain. Papez (1937) had suggested that the of the organization of emotional processes. Once anatomical interconnections among limbic struc­ the thalamus and hypothalamus were identified tures were ideally constituted to handle the long­ as the neural substrate of emotions, this assump­ lasting, intense aspects of experience which are tion followed logically. usually associated with emotion. MacLean added But Lashley (1960) tellingly criticized the evi­ to this idea the facts of the relationship between dence upon which this identity was assumed to this part of the brain and viscera, thus suggesting rest. He pointed out that the type of disturbance that here at last is the visceral brain - the seat of on which the theory is based is as often seen to emotions. The persuasive power of this suggestion follow lesions elsewhere in the nervous system. is great: Galen, James and Lange, Cannon and 'Hyperalgesia is not a result only of lesions within Bard, are all saved; visceral processes are the basis the thalamus but may arise from damage any­ of emotion; an identifiable part of the brain is where along the afferent path.' He also raised the responsible for emotional control and experience question whether 'emotional disturbance' in the because of its selective relations with viscera. true sense ever occurs with thalamic lesions: 'In James and Lange were wrong only in leaving outthe no case was the affect referred to the source of brain; Cannon and Bard were wrong only in the emotional stimulation ... but always to sensations part of the brain they had identified with emotion; ofsomatic reaction to the stimulus.' He does agree the limbic forebrain, not the thalamus, is the re­ that 'in the hierarchy of motor centers we may sponsible agent. The path from the 'emotions in recognize the thalamic region, especially the hypo­ the vascular system' to 'emotions in the forebrain' thalamus, as the region within which the complex had finally been completed, and each step along patterns of expressive movements are elaborated. the way freed us from preconceptions popularly It does not follow from this, however, that the current when the step was taken. pathological phenomena of hyperexcitability of Despite its persuasiveness and still-present pop­ emotional reactions are due solely to release from lularity, there are some important criticisms to be cortical inhibition or that the thalamic motor cen- ev ied against the visceral brain theory of emo-

References p. 339 EMOTION 32l tions. Just as the theory gains in power from its sponds to one or another of the varieties of emo­ implicit acceptance of the James-Lange and the tional experience or expression. An activation Cannon-Bard views, so it falls heir to the criti­ theorist states merely that a correlation exists be­ cisms levelled against the earlier theories. Just as tween the amount of hormone, amount of neural the relationship between thalamic structures and excitation and amount ofemotional arousal. Con­ emotion fails to be an exclusive one, so the rela­ siderable evidence can be marshalled in favor of tionship between limbic structures and viscera, or, activation theory. for that matter, limbic structures and emotions, This state of affairs should clearly declare acti­ fails to be exclusive. It has been demonstrated ex­ vation theory 'in' - which, of course, it is. But perimentally (Wall and Pribram 1950) that other again, common observation and introspection, parts of the cerebral mantle, when electrically caution that something may be missing. For ex­ stimulated, also give rise to visceral response. ample, weeping is not just more laughing; fear is Emotional changes are observed to accompany not just more love - although there is some truth lesions in parts of the forebrain other than the to the notion of quantitative continuity in these limbic areas. Further, ablation and stimulation of processes. Once more, the suggestion arises that limbic structures influence problem-solving (cog­ activation theory, while part of the story, is not nitive) behavior in selective ways that cannot be in itself the whole story. attributed to changes in emotions. In man, in fact, a very obvious and specific 'memory' deficiency follows limbic lesions, while obvious changes in A new approach - 'expectation' and the 'emotion' cannot be ascertained. Obviously, the configuration of neural activation Papez-MacLean theory, Iike its predecessors, has only a part of the problem in hand. As one who strives a hill to climb, Who never cI imbed before: Who finds it, in a little time, THE ACTIVATION THEME Grow every moment less sublime, And votes the thing a bore. She was a good deal frightened by this very sudden Lewis Carroll, Dyscomfyture, Phantasmagoria change. Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland A part of the difficulty comes from the view of As one turns from the visceral to the activation 'activation' as an elementary process opposed theories of emotion, one can again distinguish be­ only by another elementary process, 'inhibition'. tween peripheral and central subtheories. Here, True, 'activation' can be viewed as an indicator of however, the argument has not been so sharp. behavioral arousal: a temporary state of dis­ P<:ripheralists have gladly accepted the diffuse equilibrium, a perturbation of patterns of organ­ non-specific reticular activating system as the cen­ ism-~.mvironmentinteractions. Also, disequilibra­ tral locus upon which and from which peripheral tion is often sudden, explosive, and has the feel excitation focuses. And centralists, in turn, have about it of agitation. But this does not necessarily been as concerned with the peripheral as with the mean that neural impulse transmission is facili­ central effects of adrenergic and cholinergic sub­ tated; rather, a different state of organization or stances (e.g., Arnold 1960). Activation theory can disorganization may suddenly have materialized. be said, on the whole, to be less specific, less This difference is expressed as a difference in con­ controversial, and considerably more factually figuration and not necessarily as a difference in oriented than visceral theories (cL e.g., Lindsley the amount of neural activity. For instance, heart 1951). For example, a classical visceral theorist rate may be slowed, cortical rhythms desynchro­ would have to say that a certain amount of adre­ nized, peripheral blood flow diminished, but cere­ nocortical hormonecirculating in the blood stream bral blood flow augmented. Cerebral activation, would be correlated with a specific pattern of in this context, is an indicator of a configurational peripheral and central neural response (in hypo­ incongruity between input arrival patterns and thalamus or visceral brain), which in turn corre- established ongoing neural events.

References p. 339 322 KARL H. PRIIlRAM AND FREDERICK T. MELGES

This view of activation as an indicator of con­ feedback constitutes, by the nature of its receptor figurational change implies that the organism is anatomy and diffuse afferent organization, a ma­ fitted with a mechanism which provides a stable jor source of input to this biasing mechanism; it base-line from which such change can take off. is an input which can do much to determine set­ This base-line is provided by the process of habit­ point. In addition, visceral and autonomic events uation of the orienting reaction. Experimental are repetitiously redundant in the history of the evidence has accumulated in the past several years organism. They vary recurrently, leading to stable (Sokolov 1960) to show that habituation of habituations; this is in contrast to external chan­ orienting is not due to a progressive raising of ges which vary from occasion to occasion. Habit­ threshold to input but to the formation of a 'neu­ uation to visceral and autonomic activity makes ronal model' - a neuronal configuration against up, therefore, a large share, though by no means which subsequent inputs to the organism are all, of the stable base-line from which the organ­ matched. I n essence, such neuronaI configurations ism's reactions can take off. form the sum of an organism's expectancies. The Another major source ofrecurrent input that de­ evidence runs like this: a person is subjected to an termines bias, or sets the Itvel at which change can irregular rep:tition of a sound stimulus of con­ be sensed, is that from the somatic musculature and stant intensity, fr~quency and duration. Initially skin. These somesthetic and proprioceptive inputs the person shows a set of physiological and be­ give rise to base-line configurations which have havioral reactions which together form th~ orient­ been conceptualized in terms such as the 'body im­ ing response. Among these reactions is c:rebral age' and 'perceptual motor organization'. Config­ 'activation' - i.e., a desynchronization of the elec­ urational changes in these inputs can also give rise trical rhythms recorded from the brain. As the to incongruities which disturb the stable base-line. repetition ofthe sound stimulus proceeds, less and Whenever the reaction to incongruous input is less orienting takes place. This lessening of orient­ sufficient to disturb these base-lines, the orienting ing is called habituation. For many years it was reaction will include the dishabituation of visceral thought to be due to a simple rise in threshold to and autonomic activities. Such dishabituation may input. But dishabituation - i.c., a recrudescence be subjectively felt as a mismatch between ex­ of the orienting responses - occurs when the in­ pected and actual heart rate, sweating, 'butter­ tensity of the sound stimulus is decreased or if the flies', etc. The sensing of such discrepancies is the duration ofsound is shortened. In this latter situa­ basis for the visceral theories of emotion. But it tion, the orienting reaction occurs at the offset of is our view that such experiences are only one the stimulation - to the 'unexpected' silence. facet of the emotional processes. The awareness There can thus be no question about the con­ of these visceral and autonomic processes is a figurational nature of activation. But these ex­ concomitant of emotional reactions; the visceral periments - and the many everyday experiences processes are not conceived - as in the James­ which they confirm - also account for the impor­ Lange theory - to produce different types of emo­ tance of visceral and autonomic functions in pro­ tional awareness. The Jamesian mechanism is thus viding the stable base-line from which the organ­ relegated to the developmental stages ofthe organ­ ism's reactions can take off. ism; the mechanism is important for the develop­ Each interaction between environment and ment of a stable neuronal model - an habituated organism involves at least two components: (I) base-l ine against which input is tested - but is discrete interaction by way of the brain's sensory­ not productive of emotional reactions per .I'e. mode specific c1assicaI projection systems and its According to our view, the awareness of visceral­ core homeostats; (2) a 'non-specific', relatively autonomic activities is often an indicator of reac­ diffuse interaction by way of reticular and related tions to incongruous input, but it need not reflect formations. These 'non-specific' systems act as a the organization of the emotional process called bias on the specific reactions; the set point or forth. Support for this conception comes from value toward which a specific interaction tends to the work of Lacey et al. (1963) and of Barrett stabilize is set by the non-specific activity. Visceral (1959a, b) who have distinguished between two

Reji'I'l'IICl'S p. 339 EMOTION 323 classes of variables in their studies of the visceral­ organizations are especially sensitive to the chem­ autonomic system. One class is derived from mea­ ical influences in which they are immersed. A po­ sures of the variability of steady-state autonomic tent set of such chemical influences are the cate­ activity along a stabile-labile dimension; this di­ cholamines and they have been shown selectively mension deals with the organism's responsivity, his present in the diffuse systems (Kety 1966). Further, predisposition to impulsive reaction to input. The these brain amines have been shown to be the im­ other class of variables stems from measures ofthe portant locus of action of the pharmacological response patterns ofvisceral autonomic function. tranquilizers and energizers which have been so This dimension has been shown to affect the or­ successful an adjunct in altering maladaptive ganism's receptivity to input - a dimension about emotional reaction. which the model to be presented has much to say. If cerebral activation is conceived as a change in the state of organization of neural patterns A neurological model and some data related to the configurational incongruity between input and established neural activity, what then is The executioner's argument was, that you couldn't cut otT a head unless there was a body to cut it otT its converse? As already indicated, overall neuro­ from ... nal facilitation or inhibition are not involved. Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland Rather, some indicator of congruity, of unper­ But these are not the only data relevant to the turbed, smoothly progressing neuronal activity problem. As already noted, 'activation' is not to must be sought. This indicator, at present, is found be simply opposed to 'inhibition'. In fact, the in the patterns ofelectrical activity recorded from relationship between these two processes is com­ the central nervous system. There is considerable plex. Perhaps the simplest way in which to draw evidence (Li et al. 1956a, b; Adey et al. 1962) that out this complexity is to present a neuropsycho­ the slow graded activity of neural tissue, rather logical model of these processes, and then turn to than the overall inhibition or facilitation of nerve the experiments which generated the model. impulse transmission per se, is involved in the gen­ The model also concerns habituation and its eration ofsuch electrical patterns. The assumption perturbation, orienting. Both habituation and is that the graded electrical activity recorded from orienting are conceived to be dependent on the brain reflects the relative stability of the neural occurrence of inhibitory processes in the afferent system. Such stability would admit increments of channels of the nervous system. Afferent neural change provided these did not disrupt the system. inhibition is of two sorts: collateral, in which the Nor is it implied that incongruity, and therefore activity of a cell inhibits the activity of its neigh­ activation,are nec~ssarilyinitiated by input. An in­ bors; and self-inhibition, in which the activity of put which may ordinarily be processed smoothly a cell inhibits its own activity through negative may perturb the system if that system is already feedback. Both types of afferent inhibition are unstable; or an internal change in the organism ubiquitous. The model states that orienting is a may initiate incongruity where match had previ­ function of collateral inhibition and habituation ously existed. The configuration of activation of a function of self-inhibition. The basis for this the nervous system thus can predispose the or­ statement is that self-inhibition is a stabilizing ganism toward perturbability or imperturbability. mechanism that tends to return the system to the A considerable body of evidence has recently status quo ante, thus minimizing any perturbation, accrued about the neurophysiological and bio­ and that collateral inhibition functions to enhance chemical mechanisms which regulate these pre­ contrast imposed on the system by input, thus dispositions. As already noted, the non-specific temporarily maximizing perturbation. neural systems are primarily involved in setting The focus ofthe model is on the efferent control the bias toward which more specific organism­ over afferent inhibition which is exerted by cere­ environment interactions tend to stabilize. These bral structures. The intricacies of the model call diffuse systems are largely made up of fairly short, for a four-fold controlling process: enhancement fine fibers with many branches. Such neuronal of both types of afferent inhibition as well as their

R<:(erellCl'S p. 339 324 KARL H. PRIBRAM AND FREDERICK T.MELGES inhibition. For the problem ofemotion the impor­ stimulus times. Tn these experiments, concurrent tant distinction is between control which reinforces stimulations and ablations of various forebrain the status quo ante through increasing the re­ structures showed that recovery functions were dundancy of neural activity, and control which altered by these procedures. Electrical stimulation occurs through redundancy reduction. Redun­ of the sensory-specific intrinsic (so-called 'asso­ dancy is reinforced either by enhancing self-inhi­ ciation') cortex, concurrent with flash and click bition or by inhibiting collateral inhibition; redun­ presentation, depresses recovery, while ablation dancy reduction is accomplished either through of this same tissue enhances it. Electrical stimula­ enhancement of collateral inhibition or through tion of the frontal cortex and of the amygdala inhibition of self-inhibition. For reference the concurrent with sensory stimulation speeds recov­ complete model is diagrammed in Fig. 2. A de­ ery, thus producing an effect opposite to that of tailed presentation for the evidence for this model stimulation of the posterior, sensory-specific in­ has been written up elsewhere (Pribram 1967). trinsic cortex. Some of the neurophysiological data on which These results were interpreted to mean that the model is based were obtained in collaboration stimulation of the posterior intrinsic cortex en­ with Drs. D.N. Spinelli and James Dewson (Spi­ hances, while stimulation of the frontal cortex and nelli and Pribram 1966, 1967; Dewson et al. 1966). amygdala inhibits, collateral inhibition. On the Recovery functions were plotted in awake mon­ assumption that our electrical stimulations mimic keys and cats when visual and auditory stimuli normal function, the posterior cortex is assumed were presented. The speed of recovery of a popu­ to enhance orienting, while the frontal mechanism lation of neurons within an afferent system can be ordinarily speeds the erasure of concurrent input, gauged by presenting the organism with two stim­ thereby returning the system to its prior ongoing uli (flashes or clicks) in rapid succession. The rela­ neural activity. tive amplitude of the response to the second stim­ These opposing processes, though they may on ulus when compared with the response to the ini­ occasion be called into simultaneous operation, tial stimulus is an indication of the proportion of are assumed, as a rule, to balance each other. units in the system that are still 'occupied' in pro­ Evidence of their convergence onto single units in cessing the initial stimulus when the second one the afferent system has been obtained (Spinelli arrives. A recovery function is obtained by plot­ and Pribram 1967). Which process becomes dom­ ting proportional amplitude against varying inter- inant is, of course, dependent on a variety of, as yet, undetermined variables. Putting it another way, and with particular em­ FRONTOT EMPORAL SE NSORY-SPECI FIC/INTRINSIC phasis on its relation to the problem of emotion, this model deals with the manner in which the brain controls its own input. The model recog­ nizes two mechanisms: onedependson internaI, the ~"""'",,/INHIBITION I E other on external control for its stability. Internal N N control is achieved at the neuronal level through H H the process of self-inhibition; external control at I A the neuronal level involves collateral inhibition in B N the afferent mechanism. Self-inhibition stabilizes I 11 C the ongoing neuronal activity and tends to coun­ T SELF E teract change in the configuration of input. Col­ lateral inhibition enhances such change in input configuration and thus assures more rapid equili­ /"""'''"'''' bration with that input. Either mechanism, if left HIPPOCAMPAL POLYSENSORY-MOTOR unrestricted, would become maladaptive. Left Fig.2. Diagram of the model of cortical control over alone, a self-inhibitory mechanism would increase afferent inhibitory processes. redundancy in the afferent system and leave the

Reference's p. 339 EMOTION 325

organism hyperstable and unreactive. Unless PERTURBATION AND THE CONTROL countered, the collateral inhibitory mechanism OF INPUT would, by reducing the redundancy of the activity of the afferent channels, continually enhance con­ '[ g~nerally hit everything] can see - when] get really excited.' trast and make the system so attuned to input 'And I hit everything within reach,' cried Tweedle­ that in the face of continual change no residual dum, 'whether I can see it or not!' (i.e. memory) of experience could remain. Fortu­ Lewis Carroll, Through/he looking-glass nately for the construction of the organism, the two forms of afferent inhibition are bucked one Preparatory and participatory processes lead to against the other, and so a balance between them different types of stability; respectively, they tend is achievable. Further, such balance can be exqui­ to lead the organism toward either internal con­ sitely regulated by controlling devices which en­ trol or toward external control. Preparatory pro­ hance or inhibit each of these two primary afferent cesses tend to achieve relatively lasting, i.e., pro­ processes. The model is developed from data spective, stability by recourse to an earlier, i.e., which show that such efferent control does exist, retrospective, organization; this type of stability and spells out four systems which in the primate is termed internal control. Participatory processes brain appear to function in this fashion. tolerate the temporary instability produced by in­ congruities by achieving reciprocal constancies with aspects of the environment, thus 'realizing' The cybernetics of emotion the here-and-now (external control). Preparatory processes re-establish continuity at the cost of '... one Rule seems to be that, if one Knight hits simplification. Participatory processes tolerate the other, he knocks him ofT his horse, and if he misses, he tumbles ofT himself. ..' transience for the gain of flexibility through a Lewis Carroll, Through/he looking-glass more complex organization. In terms of information measurement theory, The significance of this demonstration of cerebraI thesc emotional processes effect a subtle balance control over its own input is manifold. The fact between maximum redundancy, through prepa­ that this control shows two opposing tendencies ration, and maximum information density, through is of direct relevance to the problem of emotion. participation (Rothstein 1965). In this way envi­ One tendency accentuates orienting reactions and ronmental input (reality) is selectively structured thus the perturbations of the system initiated by according to its relevance (i.e., how useful it is) to input to it. The other tendency reinforces the the ongoing plans of action: irrelevant inputs are habituated base-line, i.e., the prior neural activity, screened out, enhancing redundancy and con­ by de-emphasizing these perturbations. In search­ serving former plans; by contrast, relevant inputs ing for adjectives for these two tendencies, the are taken in, leading to greater complexity and following - mentioned earlier - were deemed ap­ thus uncertainty, which calls for a modification or propriate: preparatory, or better, prerepairatory, ramification of the ongoing plans. and participatory. A preparatory process is one As detailed elsewhere (Pribram 1960b, 1965b), that prepares the organism for further interaction the achievement of external control is conceived by repairing its perturbed system to its previous through the accommodation of past experience to stability. A participatory process utilizes per­ current input, to lead to what is subjectively felt turbation to adapt the system to the current input. as satisfaction. The latter occurs when similarities Both processes are effected through feedbacks, as are identified, when congruities between past ex­ indicated in Fig.I. Preparatory operations are perience and concurrent input develop. On the conservative and even defensive; they serve to other hand, the achievement of internal control, deal with input by de-emphasis and elimination. through the fulfilment of intentions or the resto­ Participatory operations enhance the effect of in­ ration of ongoing plans, is conceived to result in put and so serve to increase the likelihood that the what is subjectively experienced as gratification. system itself will be changed. The organism is gratified when there is congruity

References p. 339 326 KARL H. PRIBRAM AND FREDERICK T.MELGES between present outcomes and past plans - when Cannon's fight-flight reactions are probably the it can do things pretty much as it intended to do best known. In these 'emergency' states, the or­ them. This formulation, derived from neuro­ ganism prepares for the elimination of input. behavioral data, fits the neurophysiological facts; Also, at the behavioral level, is the state of 'vigil­ whereas the process labelled participation is ac­ ance': here the organism becomes prepared or set complished largely through the posterior intrinsic for the rapid elimination of perturbing input. or 'association' mechanism, the process labelled By definition, preparatory processes do not preparation is effected through the functions of accommodate the organism to the input; rather the frontolimbic system, which is conceived as the they are internal stabilizing responses for the era­ 'association cortex' for the limbic forebrain. dication of perturbation. The system is prepared Stated in this fashion, the relevance to emotion to make itself independent of input - in effect, to of the two forms taken by cerebral control over make itself temporarily autonomous of concur­ its stability becomes almost self-evident. Prepara­ rent input. Re-equilibration is directed toward tory and participatory feedbacks, from the cere­ some status quo al/te. As will be detailed later, bral cortex to the input channels, make the cen­ fear, anger, apprehension, disgust (and, to some tral nervous system into a giant servomechanism extent, guilt, shame, and depression) have in com­ which has at its disposal these two modes of oper­ mon the intent, implicit or explicit, to change the ation. The implications of such a 'cybernetic' situation so that the organism can repair to the approach to emotion thus seem well worth ex­ previous equilibrated state out of which it was so ploring. We will first outline some of the charac­ rudely jarred. Tn this way, the ongoing plans of teristics of each feedback process, giving exam­ action are conserved, providing the preparatory ples of their operation, and then focus on what processes are successful in eliminating input. determines the choice between preparation and But attempts to eliminate input are often not participation. After this, the relationship between successful. Fight-flight reactions do not always emotion and motivation will be spelled out. result in their intended outcome; the source of the disturbing input remains and the perturbation may become incessant. Moreover, when prepara­ Preparatory processes tions are directed to the input processing channels, 'Her paw went into your eye? Well, that's your they have the disadvantage of not disposing of the fault, for keeping your eyes open - if you'd shut source of the inputs responsible for disequilibra­ them tight up, it wouldn't have happened.' tion. Under such circumstances, preparations Lewis Carroll, Through the looking-glass may become chronic, for the incongruities arise again and again. Repeated preparations progres­ The clinical and experimental literature is replete sively lead to the hyperstability of complete inter­ with examples ofpreparatory processes. Concepts nal control; the organism becomes divorced from such as 'repression', 'suppression', 'perceptual de­ reality; the plans of action become inflexible. fense mechanisms', etc., can be interpreted as pre­ Thus, more and more, novel inputs become ap­ paratory processes, for they are fOlms of defen­ praised as irrelevant, i.e., infeasible to the ongoing sive 'gating out', i.e., the ignoring or repudiation plans. When this hyperstable, inflexible state is ofaspects ofthe situation which initiated the emo­ finally disrupted by an input which cannot be tional state. There are facets of sleep which also eliminated, then the entire system becomes per­ have this 'shutting out' characteristic, especially turbed. And, as the saying goes, 'all hell breaks the syndromes of cataplexy and narcolepsy which loose'. are often accompanied by affective changes (De­ ment 1965; Kleitman 1963). Whereas the above Participatory processes examples probably refer to the efferent control of 'What is it you want to buy?' ....[ don't quite afferent input at the neural level, there are other know yet,' Aliee said very gently. 'I should like states which represent the preparation for control to look all round me first, if I might.' of input through motivated action. Of the latter, Lewis Carroll, Through tI,e looking-glass

Referel/ces p. 339 EMOTION 327

By contrast, participatory processes deal with in­ relevance of input to this dispositional context. congruity by searching and sampling the input Relevant inputs are those which can be usefully and accommodating the system to it. In this case, incorporated into the concurrent disposition; they re-equilibration does not take the form of achiev­ are inputs which can be acted upon in the sense of ing the status quo ante; rather, the experience be­ making use of them rather than getting rid of comes part ofthe organism and the plans ofaction them. Relevant inputs are not congruous inputs; are appropriately modified. Re-equilibration, by rather, they are inputs which are expected, on the incorporating input, proceeds to alter, restruc­ basis of past experience, to lead to congruity or ture, the organization so that it can again function stability (Fig. I). In this sense, mismatch in the gracefully - i.e. with a minimum of disequilibra­ initial test phase is appraised within the operate tion. Interest, affection, compassion, admiration, phase of the TOTE unit; it is an evaluation of the awe, and wonder - all partake of this participa­ expected consequences; and this evaluation stems tory quality. Such examples of participatory pro­ from the memory of similar input-dispositional cess have in common some kind of involvement, configurations which either did or did not lead to engagement, or commitment to environmental stability. Thus, relevance is established by ex­ events or plans which extend beyond the organ­ perience. ism. Another way of stating this is to say that rele­ In the extreme, participatory reactions can lead vance is established through the process of rein­ to overwhelming external control. Since this forcement. The process of reinforcement has been makes the system highly dependent on environ­ discussed elsewhere (Pribram 1963). Briefly, the mental vicissitudes, with little recourse toacoreor­ suggestion was made that during learning and ganization, the organism's ongoing plansare likely during performance, reinforcing events serve to become fragmented and the continuity of the different functions. During learning reinforcers psychological process and of behavior sacrificed. are informative; during performance reinforcers The system becomes unstable, hyperreactive; the value (i.e., guide) behavior along familiar paths. organism overly distractible. Whenever the outcomes of sequences of actions (including those of looking, listening, and other­

THE APPRAISAL OF OUTCOMES: wise perceiving) become incorporated into the DISPOSITIONS AND RELEVANCE concurrent neural context, reinforcement takes place. Reinforcement is conceived to result from 'Not like cats!' cried the Mouse, in a shrill, pas­ the structuring of con-sequences, i.e., sequences sionate voice. 'Would you like cats if you were me?' of neural operations which fit the dispositional L-::wis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland context, thereby allowing congruity in the test phase to become re-established. Through incorpo­ What influences the direction re-equilibration will ration, relevant inputs lead to reinforcement while take? What accounts for the choice between pre­ learning (i.e., a change in the neuronal configura­ paratory and participatory processes? What deter­ tion, the dispositional plan) is taking place. But mines which process will emerge? So far we have once learning has occurred (i.e., during perform­ suggested only that the choice is made on the basis ance) relevant inputs are already congruous, and of relevance to the ongoing plan. Obviously we evaluation no longer occurs within the organism; mean something more by 'relevance' than con­ rather, its behavior and perceptions proceed auto­ gruity. It is not too difficult to build a model of matically. In this case, reinforcement leads to the the match-mismatch operation which tests for maintenance of the status quo. When viewed at a congruity out of neurons. But how does one mo­ more inclusive level, the process is somewhat del relevance? In brief, the proposed answer is similar to that produced by the mechanism of this: the nature of the control over input is deter­ interrial control. But in this instance the familiar mined by the appraisal of outcomes. The apprai­ input is included rather than an irrelevant input sal of outcomes is based on (a) the concurrent screened out'. disposition or prepotent subplan, and (b) the It is on the basis of the memory of these satis-

RI/I'rC'I/C('S {'. 339 328 KARL H. PRIBRAM AND FREDERICK T. MELGES

factions (stabilizing ,outcomes of learning) and had received adrenalin reported an exaggeration gratifications (stabilizing outcomes of p;:rform­ offeeling; those in the 'dire' situation were fearful ance) that incongruities are appraised as either and depressed, and even felt hatred for the exam­ relevant or irrelevant for a given dispositional iner; those in the 'pleasant' situation felt elated context. Relevant inputs are either familiar or and euphoric. those which indicate that external control can This experiment provides a straightforward probably be achieved. Inputs which are appraised answer to several questions: (I) Is there a connec­ as irrelevant are those which, in terms of past out­ tion between different types ofemotional reactions comes, are not expected to lead to external con­ and the expectation of consequences? The answer trol: preparatory processes set in, attempting to is yes. (2) Does the secretion of a glandular sub­ establish internal control by removing the incon­ stance specify the reaction? The answer is no, at gruous input. least in the case of adrenalin. Reactions were am­ Thus, dispositions determine whether similar plified but not differentiated by the hormone. inputs occurring on different occasions are ap­ (3) What does determinc how we react to a per­ praised as relevant. For example, being stopped turbing situation? The answer is: the appr:lisal of by a parade when rushing to an important engage­ the risk involved in outcomes. (4) How is this ap­ ment makes the parade irrelevant; on the other praisalmade? Through experience with outcomes hand, when out for a Sunday drive with the fam­ in similar situations. (5) Having made the apprai­ ily, a parade may be highly relevant. Or the un­ sal, what determines the nature of the reaction? expected meeting of an old acquaintance can be The criterion of relevance. (6) Finally, how is a relevant input which becomes incorporated into relevance established? Through practice. one's plans for the day; but if this acquaintance With regard to the last statement, it is through had, on a previous occasion, absconded with one's practice and experience that inputs become ap­ wife, the dispositional context would be quite dif­ praised as relevant. The more repertoires avail­ ferent. Preparation, rather than participation, able, the more likely an input will be found rele­ might well take place. Clearly, the sugg~stion here vant. The organization of sequenc,:s of behavior is that the choice between preparatory and parti­ into hierarchically arranged programs gives the cipatory processes depends on the remembered organism flexibility and adaptability. External outcomes of previous appraisals in similar situa­ control becomes possible. These sequences get tions. built up something like this: a hole is to dig; a Support for this suggestion comes from an in­ meal is to cook and then to eat; a luau is to dig, teresting series of ingenious experiments devised to cook, to eat. The behavior sequence 'dig-cook­ by Schachter and Singer (1962). A group of stu­ eat' is not, however, just a chain of activities. Each dent subjects was given an injection of adrenaline; of the activities subsumes many relatively inde­ another control group was injected with saline. pendent subactivities - e.g., cooking involves pro­ All subjects were placed in a perturbing situation curement of produce, Iighting a fire, placing the - an examination - but with this difference: h,lIf produce in the appropriate vessels, etc. And both of each group took the test in a setting which evok­ fire and vessels must be arranged together. It is on ed possibilities of dire consequences; the other the basis of the ability to interdigitate sequences half took the test in a setting which evoked pleas­ through the operation of hierarchies of TOTE units ant or rewarding possibilities. After the comple­ (i.e., plans) that inputs become appraised as rele­ tion of the test, all subjects were asked how they vant, allowing for participation rather than prepa­ felt. For the most part, the subjects who ex­ ration. perienced upset in the situation of 'dire' outcomes As already noted, the details of the neuronal said they felt threatened and uneasy; they labelled mechanism involved in the operation of appraisal the task 'difficult'. Those who experienced per­ are as yet undiscovered. First steps have been turbation in surroundings of 'pleasant' conse­ taken, as we have seen, leading to a reformulation quences said they felt pleased and 'happy; they of the functions of the limbic systems in emotion. labelled the task 'easy'. Also, those subjects who Certain divisions of the limbic system, especially

Rejc:rences p. 339 EMOTION 329

the hippocampus and the amygdaloid complex, tioned in the literature. And when psychologists have been identified to control the registration of are asked to make the relationship explicit, the reinforcement and the evaluation of errors (Bag­ explanations are often muddled: 'both are related shaw et al. 1965; Kimble et al. 1965; Pribram to physiological drives' (how?); 'sometimes an 1966; Douglas and Pribram 1966). And the im­ emotion is motivating' (in what way?); 'there re­ portance of limbic structures to the organization ally isn't any difference' (then why use both of sequences of behavior - to the plans that con­ words?). However, in light of the present theory, trol behavior and perception - is fairly well docu­ once it is clear that emotions are not just viscerally mented (Pribram 1958, 1960a, b). Most of the derived, that they stem primarily from dispositio­ earlier studies, it will be remembered, had cen­ nal contexts, from ongoing plans - the enigma is tered on the control exerted by these structures resolved. Motive implies action; to e-mote implies over behavior. Only recently has their relation­ to be alit ofor away from action. In terms of the ship to input come into focus. Paradoxically, TOTE unit (Fig. I), the emotions are concerned wh~reas an organism has a good deal of control with the regulation of input, i.e., with the feed­ over input, he has much less control over the out­ backs, the preparatory and participatory processes comes of his behavior, except in very restricted effecting efferent control over input. In essence, situations. Input can be ignored if necessary, but then, the emotions are the result of appraisals action always begets risk: one cannot be sure of which aim to regulate input when the result of what will happen in the environment as a conse­ such appraisal involves the temporary interrup­ quence of the action. Risk is countered only by tion of action, literally e-motion. On the other experience in the appraisal of outcomes. And the hand, motives involve the organism in action, in limbic formations appear to be an integral part of the execution of its plans. Emotion and motiva­ the mechanism of appraisal - perhaps they main­ tion, passion and action: these are the two poles tain the balance between participatory and prepa­ of Plan. ratory reactions to incongruity and thus insure The suggestion is that those terms we call 'emo­ the flexibility of the organism's ongoing plans. tions' can also serve as names for 'motives': love Many of these functions of the limbic forebrain as an emotion has its counterpart in love as a are shared by the frontal eugranular isocortex ­ motive. Fear the emotion has its mirror image as the part of the brain so often involved in the psy­ fear the motive. Being moved by music can be chosurgical procedure of leukotomy (lobotomy). apposed to being moved to make music. And so There is much anatomical and neurobehavioral on. Emotions and motives can, of course, be evidence to suggest that the frontal cortex serves gracefully interdigited, i.e. responsive to each as an 'association' area for the limbic systems other. Only when this is accomplished can action (Pribram 1958, 1960a, b). be selective and adaptive. When emotions and motives are not interdigited, i.e., when either the passive or active mode of the Plan becomes pre­ EMOTION AND MOTIVATION potent, maladaptation is likely to occur. Too 'Living backwards!' Alice repeated in great aston­ much emotion leads either to disruption through ishment. 'I've never heard ofsuch a thing!' ... 'But participation or to rigidity through preparation. there's one great advantage to it, that one's memory works both ways.' Furthermore, the emotion may become a dis­ Lewis Carroll, Through the looking-glass equilibrating input in itself, for it begets further incongruities which cannot be acted upon. Too An ongoing preperceptual and prebehavioral or­ much planned action, on the other hand, leads to ganization - some dispositional context or plan ­ a narrowness of purpose and a poverty in values. is thus so fundamentally related to the emotional The dissociation of emotion and motive can processes of preparation and participation that it occur either as a result of preparatory or partici­ clarifies the relationship between motivation and patory processes. When preparatory, a temporary emotion. Just why these two psychological cate­ reorganization of neural patterns takes place in gories are so often juxtaposed is hardly ever men- the event that the perturbing incident will dis-

R(~fer(,flCr.s p. 339 330 KARL H. PRIBRAM AND FREDERICK T. MELGES appear. This does not mean that preparatory reac­ external, control. However, when such external tions can find no expression in behavior. But it control fails to be achieved, disruption results and does mean that such behavior is relatively more this in turn may demand a repairing to the process responsive to feedback, the outcome ofthe expres­ of internal control. sion, than to the input that generated it. Tn other words, behavior in this case is internally control­ TIME SENSE AND EMOTION led and when this control breaks down, behavior is apt to be explosive - or its converse, frozen; 'You see a minute goes by so fearfully quick.' in short, it becomes then 'blind' and 'unreason­ Lewis Carroll, Tllro/lgh the looking-glass ing'. Similarly, participatory reactions can, in the ex­ Thus far, the thesis has been that the emotions are treme, be paralyzing. Puppy love and great pas­ important for the regulation of input such that sions (both 'passive' and 'passion' are derived the opportunities fOI reinforcement are maxim­ from the same Latin roots) can lead to complete ized, thereby safeguarding continuing stability. immobilization: the infatuated adolescent mop­ Since these functions involve precisely timed feed­ ing around the house; the romanticist piningaway, backs, many of the central issues can be rephrased consumed by the flame of the torch he is carrying. in the time domain: rather than asking what in­ Somewhat milder is the rapture with which we puts trigger dishabituation and orienting, the listen to great music, the enjoyment with which question becomes when is an input disequilibrat­ we bask in the sun at the beach, etc. Again, ex­ ing. A change in temporal pattern is just as potent pression of these participatory reactions, to the in producing perturbation as is a change in an­ extent that they are emotional, are relatively other stimulus parameter (Sokolov 1960). The actionless. The watering of eyes, blushing or pal­ question of whether an incongruous input is ap­ lor of the face, aimless pacing, intent or relaxed praised as relevant or irrelevant, reflects, in part, postures: the stimulus bound not-doing of th)s or the estimation of the temporal order in which the that characterizes the emotional expression of input must be processed. Temporal order, in turn, participation. In a social situation, of course, depends on the length of processing time to be these expressions of emotions, the affects, may devoted to each incongruity. serve as signals to other organisms, signals on With regard to duration, if reinforcement is to which their action can be predicated. And in the occur, then the processing of an incongruous in­ fully self-aware organism, these same signals can put must extend until the incongruity is resolved be used as outcomes - the consequences of his re­ through either preparation or participation. Since action to the situation. the incongruity may persist in memory, without However, this 'paralyzing' function of partici­ the external presence of the inciting input, the patory emotions poses an apparent internal incon­ duration of the processing may be quite long; sistency in the theory. Participatory emotions are thus, emotional reactions frequently outlast the said to take place when an input is relevant, i.e., inciting stimulus (Grinker et al. 1956). In this way, when it can be acted upon and made use of. This the emotions may be thought of as a 'carry-over' appraisal is made on the basis of past consequen­ system which temporally apposes changes in in­ ces ofreaction to such an input. Now, how can an put with changes in action and their outcomes. input be relevant and not acted upon? How can a According to this view, the matching of expect­ relevant input become paralyzing? The input can ed consequences with actual outcomes (reinforce­ result in participatory emotions which lead to the ment) is, in large part, dependent on the speed of motive to be temporarily actionless, i.e., as psy­ execution of the sequential acts. By varying the chiatrists would say, to regress in service of the speed of actions, the sequential order of the on­ ego. Thus, participatory emotion per se does not going plan can be maintained intact while the or­ as a rule produce immobilization which goes on ganism adapts to inputs. Monitoring of rates and willy-nilly, without control. Participatory 'paraly. rhythms is thus a key function of the emotional sis' is due to a giving up of internal, in favor of processes, for the emotions both maximize sub-

R(~fl'r(',,('('s p. 339 EMOTION 331

sequent reinforcement and maintain present greater instability and internal 'motion' relative organization. to the previously established base-line. (2) With What evidence is there for this relationship be­ preparation, redundancy is enhanced in the input tween timing mechanisms and emotions? Every­ channels; this speeds information processing, and day experience tells us that, in states of participa­ the amount of information to be processed is cut tion, clock time seems to pass swiftly; on the down. Clock time then seems to 'drag' since not other hand, when defensive, preparatory proces­ much seems to be going on 'outside' compared ses are in effect, clock time seems to 'drag'. Our with the internal motion. On the other hand, by language also portrays this relationship between taking in input, participatory processes produce time sense and emotion, e.g., 'rushing like mad' greater uncertainty within the system. In an un­ and 'happy as a clam'. But the evidence is on firm­ certain situation, each item in a sequence contains er ground than this: objective measures of time more potential information. There is more infor­ perception in psychiatric patients showed a mark­ mation coming from the environment per unit ed speeding up of subjective time with reference time; and yet, since redundancy is reduced, the to geophysical time during 'unpleasant' emotional internal processing of input is slowed. Thus, a disturbances (Melges and Fougerousse 1966). great deal is 'expected' from the environment; This means that clock time seemed to go slowly search actively engages input, and 'the world' ap­ when compared to personal time, making judg­ pears rich compared to the internal state; geo­ ments of elapsed time shorter than the standard physical time then seems to whiz by. asked for. Furthermore, Pearl and Berg (1963) The proposal also helps explain why temporal demonstrated this speeding up of personal time perspective - the orientation in time according to when patients were presented pictures specific to past, present, and future - can become distorted their conflicts. Also, correlative changes of emo­ during extreme emotional distress (Melges and tion and time perception have been induced by Fougerousse 1966). Since preparatory processes posthypnotic suggestion (Fogel and Hoffer 1962), are aimed at the elimination of input, the organ­ psychotomimetics (Aronson et al. 1959), and sen­ ism becomes relatively divorced from the conti­ sory deprivation (Vernon and McGill 1963). nuity of ongoing external events. Internal control Does the 'cybernetic theory' ofemotion account may take over to such a degree that the system for these changes in the perception of personal depends almost exclusively on its past organiza­ tempo in different emotional states? Changes in tion for its present stability. There is then a greater redundancy are known to affect processing time. focus on the present per se rathn than interweav­ Also, since time can be defined as relative motion, ing present experience with past and future out­ such as the movement of the hands of a clock over comes. the stationary dial, subjective time can be con­ Finally, should internal or external control ceived as a relation between events occurring break down completely, disl'upting the person's within the organism and those external to it. plans, the telescoping of past, present, and future While preparatory processes are in operation, may occur; and this state often characterizes the there is an effective decoupling between 'inside' acute, severe psychotic state (Melges and Fouge­ and 'outside' with a good deal of internal process­ rousse 1966). ing going on. Subjective time would therefore be In summary, the emotions are fundamental to perceived as fast when compared to geophysical the adaptive timing of behavior sequences in that time, making clock time seem to go slowly. they provide a mechanism for processing apprai­ What is there about preparatory processes sals of expected outcomes before action is taken. which would give rise to greater relative motion Changes in time perception accompany this anti­ within the system? The answer is essentially two­ cipatory reflection (EI'kin 1965). These changes fold: (I) Incongruous inputs which are appraised depend a good deal on whether a preparatory or as irrelevant must be rapidly eliminated if internal participatory process is called forth. Preparation, control is to be achieved. If they are not speedily by increasing internal redundancy, speeds infor­ eliminated, then dishabituation accrues, entailing mation processing and thus slows the perception

References p. 339 332 KARL H. PRIBRAM AND FREDERICK T. MELGI:S

ofclock time. Participatory processes, by reducing THE DEVELOPMENT OF EMOTIONS redundancy, slow information processing and thus make geophysical time seem to go fast. Alic knew it was the Rabbit coming to look for her, and' she ti"embled till she shook the house, quite fOi'geiting that she was now about a thousand Subjective-communicative applications times as large as the Rabbit and had no reason to be afraid of it. 'Will you, won't you, will you won't you, will you Lewis Cai"roll, Alice in Wonderland join the dance?' Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland There are three key questions which recur in the study of subjective feelings and emotional expres­ Behaviorally oriented experiments consonant with sions: (I) What is the relationship of visceral­ the proposals made here have, over the past few autonomic equilibration to reinforcement? (2) years, been accomplished independmt of, and in Why is it that object relations - the relations be­ parallel with, the neurobehavioral and neuro­ tween members of a group - are so fundamental physiological. These have been effectively pre­ to emotional processes? (3) How do signals of sented by Mandler (1964) and Schachter (1967). diffuse distress and pleasure in the infant become Further, the effects of interpersonal communica­ differentiated into the adult emotional experience tion on control of social systems such as the fam­ of depression, confidence, perplexity, love, etc.? ily, have also been spelled out in detail (e.g., Bate­ These questions intimately involve the develop­ son 1963; Watzlawick et al. 1966). We will here, ment of the organism's psychological structure. therefore, restrict ourselves to pointing out some Psychoanalytic theory has attempted to answer central themes which help to phrase the proposal these questions by using a drive-tension reduc­ in the subjective-communicative realm of dis­ tion model. Since this theory has achieved the course. widest recognition for a model ofemotional devel­ At this point, it should be clear that memory opment, it will be used as a point of departure and plays a fundamental part in this neuropsycholog­ contrast for the present formulation. As system­ ical proposal: (I) it is through the memory of re­ atized by Rapaport (1960), psychoanalytic theory cent input that incongruities are sensed; (2) it is states that, early in development, the caretak­ through the memory of past reinforcements that ing person (the mother or mother substitute) is outcomes are appraised. The arousal of a con­ important for 'drive action on the object' and con­ fluence of memories by a given incongruity, the sequent 'drive gratification'. In the absence of this organism's dispositional context, is reflected in cal'etaking person, 'affect reactions' become the what we call the affects. When such arousal is ac­ "'sally gates" for drive tension' (Freud 1920). companied by a significant loss of control, dis­ Later in development, a 'structuralized delay' be­ pleasure is experienced; re-establishment of con­ comes a 'means' or 'detour activity' by which trol after perturbation has occurred is reflected in 'some action yielding satisfaction is eventually wh:tt we call pleasure. According to this view, achieved' (Engel 1962a). At this later state, ac­ then, affects are idiosyncratically determined by cording to Engel (1962a) the communicative as­ the organism's experience. Tn some respects, this pect of emotion becomes prepotent: the affect is emphasis on memory in the genesis of affect is dif­ no longer purely a 'discharge' which solicits a re­ ferent from currently held views and deserves ex­ sponse from the environment, but 'now serves ploration here. more as an intrapsychic signal to mobilize defense Another an~a where this neurophysiologically and control mechanism of ego in service of the inspired proposal may be pertinent to is psycho­ reality principle'. pathology which, in our, as well as the common Although the psychoanalytic formulation inter­ view, is due primarily to maladaptive emotional weaves object relations, drives, and action - all reactions. In fact, much of psychodynamics, its fundamental to any theory of emotion - there are normative development and its pathology, can be some pertinent difficulties which can be posed by productively reviewed in terms of this proposal. rephrasing the three questions asked at the outset

Rcf('f('w'(',\' p. 339 EMOTION 333 of this section: (1) Are drives fundamentally the a group-living species, continuing stability and only events which provoke affect? (2) Are affects reinforcement often involve the execution of always signals of displeasure? (3) What processes shared plans of action, the affects frequently arise underlie the 'structuralized delay' and how are in connection with object relations - the rela­ affects related to these processes? tionships between members of the group (Ham­ To answer these three questions, let us recast burg 1963; Hall 1966). the classical psychoanalytic formulations, as well Third, in the light of the current formulation, as the extensive observations on which they are the nodal points for development and refinement based, into the terms of the present proposal to of behavior do not reside solely in the psycho­ see if a more comprehensive framework emerges. sexual unfolding of 'instinctual drives', but center The present theory departs from the psychoana­ rather in the whole spectrum of sensorimotor ma­ lytic in three fundamental ways. First, drives are turation (Piaget 1962; see Flavell for review, 1962), de-emphasized. They still playa role but only as of which reactions to drive stimuli form only a one class or set of stimuli which can give rise to part of the total pattern. The child's increasing incongruities. In this sense, they are no different capacity for planned perception and action allows from any other inputs (Estes 1958). The incongru­ him to imitate others, to reinforce himself, to pro­ ities of drive stimuli are imbalances of physical­ duce consequences in his environment, and to chemical substances which are detected by the solicit responses from that environment. In this core homeostats lining the third ventricle (Pri­ way, the child becomes progressively less depen­ bram 1960b). They are processed, like any other dent on the actions of the caretaking person and incongruity, by dishabituation and the appraisal begins to assume a reciprocal (i.e., externally con­ of outcomes. In this way, drives lose their 'push', trolled) relationship with his surroundings, espe­ or a priori directional property, as well as the cially with members of his family. cognate energetic concept of 'drive discharge'. Having outlined this framework, we can now The drives are thus 'need stimuli' or 'imbalance examine in greater detail how the infant's global stimuli'; they are incongruities necessitating cer­ excitement and distress signals become progres­ tain kinds of sequences to take place in order for sively refined into specific communications of matching (congruity) to occur. For example, in affection, fear, elation, etc. We will not go into the context of hunger, one must eat for a mateh the time-table of emotional differentiation de­ to reoccur. But note carefully: it is the stimuli ­ scribed by Bridges (1932), but will focus on the the context - which determine the nature of the mechanism which makes differentiation possible. matching. This context may have genetically According to our theory differentiation results determined constraints which specify the require­ from the development of plans through the ments for a match, but this is different from say­ process of reinforcement, especially the rein­ ing that there are inherited, specific energies with forcements stemming from participatory pro­ built-in goals; rather, the match for an incongru­ cesses. ous drive stimulus is established through expe­ For the infant, stability is maintained in large rience, a posteriori (Birch 1961). part through the cyclic visceral-autonomic func­ Second, according to the present proposal, af­ tions of breathing, heart rate, peristalsis, etc., fects are not just the end result of drives (or even which provide the major sets of inputs to be of'drive stimuli'), but rather they are signals which fashioned into a neuronal model, especially since reflect feedback processes involved in the process­ the large requirement for sleep reduces variegated ing ofany of a variety of incongruities. The feeling input from the peripheral senses (Kleitman 1963). tone can be pleasant or unpleasant, depending on When this highly redundant pattern is interrupted to what degree control is expected or already by an incongruous input, such as a loud noise, achieved. Thus, affects are multidimensional; pain, or drive stimuli (hunger, thirst, etc.), then they pertain to the monitoring of reinforcements disequilibration takes place. The latter is accom­ in relationship to any incongruity in the setting of panied by signs ofdistress(restlessness andcrying), any dispositional context, or plan. But since, for which prompt action on the part of the mother,

Rc:(er(>nces fJ. 339 334 KARL I-I. PRIBRAM AND FREDERICK T. MELGES such as rocking or feeding, thereby returning the child has become motorically capable of acting infant to its redundant, stable base-line. Thus, for himself, i.e., capable of reinforcing himself, reinforcement (or matching) is initially accom­ these emotional signals become progressivcly plished by the caretaking object effecting a return more functional as inner cues which reflect his to internal control. However, even this early pat­ experience in coping with loss of control, thereby tern involves an interindividual plan of reinforce­ enabling him to change his course of action. ment, and as such, forms the nidus for the com­ Hence, the infantile expression of emotions diffcr­ plex interactions demanded later by plans shared entiate into the morc internal ized affects on two among members of a group. accounts: (a) the build-up of a memory structure The energetic aspect of the drive formulation is (from experienced inputs and outcomes) which unnecessary in this view, but there is an important allows morc precise appraisal; and (b) the increas­ feature of drive stimuli which has been pointcd up ing capacity for independent action. Of course, a by psychoanalytic theory: since they come from crucial variablc is the degree ofindcpendent action within the organism, they cannot be escaped encouraged by the mother. (Freud 1915). Tn our framework, this means that The thesis is that progressively morc indivi­ incongruities induced by drive stimuli can only be duated control is maintained by the evocation of eliminated by the incorporation of some othcr in­ participatory operations in the face of changcs in put, calling forth participatory operations. For the internal

/n SUllUnary, a cybernetic model of emotional The concurrent affects development, by redressing the balance among Alice stood looking after it, almost ready to cry the variety of memory-based processes which with vexation at having lost her dear little fellow­ guide affect, meets the limitations of the cur­ traveller so suddenly. 'However, I know my rent psychoanalytic formulation, while deriving name now,' she said; 'that's some comfort.' strength from the problems posed by this formu­ Lewis Carroll, Through/he lookillg-glass lation: what we call emotional signals, affects, are assumed to reflect disequilibration, an appraisal After an incongruous input perturbs the system, of outcomes, and re-equilibration, leading to the restoration of order through the achievement either internal or external control. As signals of congruity is reflected in what we call pleasant which tend to maximize the opportunities for feelings. These pleasant feelings, according to this proposal, are of two types (Pribram 1960): reinforcement, the affects interweave the outcomes of object relations with the processing of incon­ (a) gratification occurs when there is a return to internal control; (b) satisfaction takes place when gruities, including those of drive stimul i, into pro­ gressively more complex, yet specific plans of external control is accomplished. Gratification is action. thus a return to the status quo ante, and the accompanying feelings are relief, calmness, tran­ quility, etc. Satisfaction goes beyond this, signal­ THE DIFFERENTIATED AFFECTS: ing an effective reorganization of plans; the asso­ TOWARD A CLASSIFICATION ciated feelings are those of delight, relish, joy, ex­ They shuddered to think that the chase might fail, hilaration, aesthetic appreciation, etc. In this way, And the Beaver, excited at last, it is possible for a person to be gratified (e.g., Went bounding along on the tip of its tail, calm), but still dissatisfied (e.g., apathetic). For the daylight was nearly past. If incongruity persists~ then this failure to Lewis Carroll, The hUII/illg of Ihe SlIark achieve stability by either internal or external control is signalled by displeasure. Displeasure As repeatedly stated, the differentiation of the may take the form of either distress (i .e., the lack emotions into the adult fe~lings of anxiety, de­ of gratification), during which arousal accrues, or pression, confidence, etc. extends far beyond the dissatisfaction, during which uncertainty and per­ view of emotions as dependent on visceral-auto­ plexity mount. nomic regulation: according to our proposal, the different affects reflect the results of appraisal of occasions for reinforcement in terms of past out­ The prospective affects comes in similar contexts; these results lead to 'Now I can do no more, whatever happens. What feedback processes which either conserve or mod­ will become of meT ify the ongoing plans of action. These plans con­ Lewis Carroll, Aliee ill WOllderlalld trol the organism's stability. But what sort of settings give rise to the differ­ Since the prospective affects arise in connection ent affects? The following suggestions are derived with the expectation oforder (i.e., with the apprai­ from clinical psychiatric experience, psychoanaly­ sal of outcomes), they can be divided into opti­ tic literature (Freud 1920; Engel 1962a), etholog­ mistic and pessimistic affects. Optimistic feelings ical experiments (Kaufman 1960; Scott 1962), and occur when incongruous input is appraised as the results of experimental manipulations of be­ relevant - that is, when it appears that the input havior (Dollard et al. 1959; Mandler 1964). The can be made use of such that control will be central theme is this: The subjective aspects of achieved. Examples of optimistic feelings are in­ emotion reflect both concurrent order in the terest, hope, enthusiasm, affection, etc. It can be system and the expectation of order. Combina­ seen that most of these are affiliative in nature, tions of concurrent and prospective feelings lead indicating the tendency toward external control to different and somewhat specific affective sig­ and the ramification of plans of action shared by nals. members of the group. Confidence and self-

Rej'ere/lces p. 339 336 KARL H. PRIBRAM AND FREDERICK T. MELGES esteem shade into more lasting states, such as person, thing, or process which is important for moods and attitudes, but they are still affects re­ a person's ongoing function - is a frequent pre­ flecting the general feeling of optimism with re­ lude to depression (Stenback 1965). The loss of ference to the efficacy of the ongoing plans to loved ones, the loss of a job, and the loss of men­ effect control (White 1963). These feelings of effi­ tal capabilities are examples of object losses. The cacy reflect the tendency toward successful action. slowing down and restriction of activity seen in This explains why it is 'fun to work', providing depression serves to reduce offending input, to that the outcome of the work is expected to be conserve existing plans, and is akin to the infant's successful, and the work itself offers some chal­ 'giving up' after perturbation in the absence of the lenge which calls forth an emotional appraisal. care-taking object. Rosenberg (1962) has shown that, whereas high Guilt signals the expectation of disapproval for self-esteem is often antithetical to anxiety, low not having met up to the expectations of others, self-esteem is frequently associated with the ex­ for not having achieved the kind of external con­ perience of anxiety. Anxiety occurs when there is trol inculcated by parental and social demands. ambiguity aboutsubsequent reinforcement (Wolpe Whereas guilt reflects pessimism stemming from 1958). Anxiety and apprehension are prospective, the transgression of external (i .e., moral) ru les, pessimistic affects which indicate that, through shame deals more with the failure to achieve inter­ the appraisal of outcomes, there is considerable nal (i.e., ethical) standards set for oneself. Shame risk involved in the situation. The pessimistic af­ is pessimistic in that it portends that the mainte­ fects thus arise when incongruous inputs are ap­ nance of one's own plans may again, in the future, praised as irrelevant, i.e., when past outcomes be inadequate. Both guilt and shame have prepa­ lead to the expectation of failure to achieve con­ ratory aspects, such as expiation and reaction for­ trol. Preparatory, defensive processes are espe­ mation, which attempt to undo the previous trans­ cially prone to be accompanied by pessimistic gressions. affects. Since irrelevant inputs are screened out or avoided, they are thus rarely incorporated for Combinations later appraisals of input when different dispositio­ nal contexts are present. Furthermore, a predomi­ The music of Midsummer-madness Shall sting him with many a bite, nantly internally controlled system may operate Till, in rapture of rollicking madness, on the dictum: once irrelevant, always irrelevant. He shall groan with a gloomy delight. .. It is tempting to speculate that this may account Lewis Carroll, Phantasmagoria for the inflexibility of certain psychopathological states. At any given moment, the subjective feeling state Other proposed pessimistic affects are fear, de­ always represents a composition of concurrent pression, guilt, shame and anger. Some degree of affects (pleasure and displeasure) and prospective anxiety underlies all of these (Freud 1926), indi­ affects (optimism and pessimism). Which affect cating the risk associated with irrelevant inputs. becomes predominant depends on the achieve­ But whereas with anxiety the outcome is ambi­ ment and anticipation of both internal and exter­ guous, fear arises when the risk to continuing nal control with regard to certain dispositions stability is fairly clear-cut, such as with the threat and inputs. As stated above, guilt and shame arc of injury (Cannon 1927). Such a threat portends largely pessimistic, but they also reflect concurrent loss of control, for the ~patial vehicle of the on­ displeasure. Anger is a prime example of a com­ going plans - the body - is jeopardized. posite affect; it has pleasant and unpleasant as Depression, along with the accompanying feel­ well as optimistic and pessimistic aspects. Anger ings of helplessness and hopelessness, is also a occurs when there is an attempt to keep an inter­ pessimistic affect. Depression frequently stems rupted plan operating despite obstacles. Unlike from the interruption of a shared plan of action, depression, where there is a relinquishment of a thereby making the achievement of external con­ plan in the face of an insurmountable loss or bar­ trol seem unlikely. An object loss - the loss of a rier, anger is more optimistic in that there is the

References p. 339 EMOTION 337

expectation that the external blockade can be re­ with reference to the maintenance and develop­ moved. In addition, anger often reflects an admix­ ment of cooperative plans of action. ture of underlying preparatory and participatory

operations; with a 'fine anger', input is taken DISRUPTIVE EMOTIONAL SYNDROMES in to enhance subroutines which are aimed at And sickened with excess of dread, eliminating the blockade. Whereas this type Prone to the dust he bent his head, of anger is primarily participatory, rage is pre­ And lay like one three-quarters dead. dominantly preparatory and pessimistic; rage Lewis Carroll, Phamasmagoria reflects a last-stage attempt to maintain internal • control by destroying the source of offending Without making any attempt to cover the vast inputs. area of psychopathology, we will nevertheless Also, confusion and uncertainty may take place review a few emotional syndromes in light of the even though a person is gratified (i.e., having present proposal. Emotions can become maladap­ achieved internal control), yet at the same time tive when preparatory and participatory processes pessimistic about his possibilities of achieving lead either to extreme internal or external control. relatedness, i.e., external control; this pessimism Hence, novel input might be screened out by pre­ is due to ambiguity with respect to the relevance paratory processes initiated earlier, or irrelevant of inputs. Finally, compassion and sympathy are input taken in by a participatory process dis­ condensations of concurrent dissatisfaction and engaged from any permanent plan. The resulting prospective optimism which revolve around the perceptions and behavior may become either rigid maintenance of shared plans of action; the loss and inflexible, stemming from the hyper-redun­ or illness ofa group member impairs external con­ dancy induced by preparatory processes, or dis­ trol, but the strengthening ofinterindividual bonds tractible, random, and disorganized, reflecting the through participation attempts to restore the uncertainty enhanced by participation. group to harmonious action. We posit that panic occurs when neither prepa­ ratory nor participatory processes are successful in effecting stability. In such instances, the emo­ EMOTIONAL EXPRESSION tions may become disequilibrating inputs them­ To the horror of all who were present that day, selves, for emotion becomes progressively di­ He uprose in full evening dress, vorcedfrom plannedaction. Hence, anxiety spirals, And with senseless grimaces endeavored to say What his tongue could no longer express. and the individual experiences something akin to Lewis Carroll, The hunting ofthe Snark the uncontrolled distress ofthe untended and help­ less infant. Of course, the affects are often more than mere Acute grief occurs when there is 'the sudden internal signals; they are frequently key commu­ cessation of social interaction', often induced by nications in the regulation of group behavior an unexpected loss of a loved one (Lindemann (Hamburg 1963). Emotional expression is often a 1944). According to our view, a shared plan of prelude to the change of a plan of action shared interaction is thus interrupted. The first stage of by members of the group. Signs of distress may grief is shock and disbelief - 'it cannot be true; mobilize others to come and help. Aggression, the I don't believe it' (Engel 1962a). This is obviously emotional expression of anger, may keep others a preparatory process. Aimless restlessness, de­ at a distance, preserving territorial rights (Scott pression, and 'inability to initiate and maintain 1962). Pleasant feelings, with their manifold ex­ organized patterns of activity' take place later pressions of laughter, contact, play, exuberance, (Lindemann 1944). A large component ofthe nor­ etc., are often invitations for others to join in and mal 'grief work' is the 'emancipation from the participate, to become a member of the group and bondage to the deceased' and the 'formation of share its plans. Thus, like the internal affects, the new relationships' (Lindemann 1944). In this sense, expression of emotion has concurrent-prospective restitutive preparatory and participatory processes as well as preparatory-participatory dimensions attempt to restore a modified plan of action.

References p. 339 338 KARL H. PRIBRAM AND FREDERICK T.MELGES

The reaction to disaster can be interpreted as whether preparatory or participatory, must be an overwhelming swing to preparatory processes turned into moderated motivation, paralyzing in order to keep former plans operating. In his passion into graceful action. Conversely, untem­ analysis of the Hiroshima disaster, Lifton (1964) pered action must be appraised in terms of past points out that the survivors, while immersed in and future consequences. The impulsive execution death and horror all around them, exhibited a of plans should be given pause by the emotional 'psychic closing off' - a cessation of emotional appraisal, thereby achieving sensitive control feeling and expression for their fellows. Later an through preparatory and participatory processes. 'identification with the dead' took place, perhaps This meshing of passion and action is the crux of as a means to conserve previous plans of action. the matter; it extends beyond the analysis of the Identity diffusion occurs when an individual, patient's past, and yet - by emphasizing plans ­ operating mainly through external control, is gives continuity beyond the restricted recondition­ faced with a choice among many plans, resulting ing of behavior patterns. Within the framework of intoo much uncertainty. Erikson (1959, page 123) the proposal, present psychotherapeutic techni­ states: 'A state of acute identity diffusion usually ques (including analysis, behavior therapy, family becomes manifest at a time when the young indi­ and social therapies, etc.) can better be brought to vidual finds himself exposed to a combination of bear on the essential problem of the regulation of experiences which demand his simultaneous com­ planned action. Since individual plans and experi­ mitment to physical intimacy . .. , to decisive occu­ ence are always idiosyncratic, no overall psycho­ pational choice, to energetic competition, and to therapeutic prescription can apply to all indivi­ psychosocial self-definition.' Confusion, bewilder­ duals. Yet, leaving aside the content of individual ment, and anxiety result from this plethora ofpos­ experience, the process ofsegmentation, ofprecise sible outcomes. If this state is not countered by a and ordered feedback, ofaction monitored by pas­ strong conservative process which arranges the sion, and passion molded into timely action, can plans in some hierarchical order, panic supervenes. lead to the realization of Marcus Aurelius' dictum Finally, mania also clearly involves overactive for the troubled mind. Having come full circle, participatory processes. The individual is distract­ this is the theory of emotion which emerges from able, and takes everything in. Irrelevancies are today's neurological knowledge. This is the pro­ incorporated into disjointed plans which are often cess which allows for tempered risk, without carried out without regard to outcomes. The un­ which, in the words of Alice (Through the look­ expected matching of fleeting incongruities with ing-glass) '... there'd be an end to all my adven­ rapidly changing plans and contexts makes the tures'. behavior appear humorous. But the attempt to block any - albeit fleeting - plan results in anger. In the course of time, the runaway plans, un­ Conclusion; theorizing on theory modified by preparation, lose all order and con­ tinuity. The organism becomes progressively more 'If there's no meaning in it,' said the King, 'that saves a world of trouble, you know, as we needn't uncertain, ordered action becomes impossible, try to find any.' and his plans are totally disrupted. Lewis Carroll, Alice ill WOllderlalld

A theory systematizes, explains, and predicts. We PSYCHOTHERAPY have proposed a common theme which can be All the time the Guard was looking at her, first viewed from different levels of discourse: we have through a telescope, then through a microscope, focussed on the neural and the neurobehavioral, and then through an opera-glass. At last he said, 'You're travelling the wrong way .. .' and then searched subjective modes for validation. Lewis Carroll, Through the looking-glass The common theme is that ongoing plans organize the perceptions and behaviors of organisms and " In light of this proposal, the task ofpsychotherapy that these plans continually juxtapose emotion comes into sharper focus: excessive emotion, and motivation, affect and anticipation, and pas-

References p. 339 EMOTION 339

sion and action. We have attempted to make the ent control over input. The concept of regression proposal specific enough to be tested - i.e., con­ and of ego development achieves new perspective firmed or refuted by observable determinate con­ in terms of the relationship between the appraisal sequences derived from the hypotheses generated ofreinforcements in terms ofongoing plans which (Nagel 1961). We believe that the hypotheses guide perception and action. Perhaps a rapproche­ formulated within each level ofdiscourse are test­ ment between the neural and subjective-behavior­ able. But whether the 'correspondence rules' be­ al views is finally at hand. As Freud said: 'I have tween the various realms of discourse are capable no inclination at all to keep the domain of the of precise examination remains a question. To psychological floating as it were in the air, with­ some degree, the answer appears to be yes. Sha­ out any organic foundation ... Let the biologists gass' (1963) work on neural recovery functions in go as far as they can and let us go as far as we can. various psychiatric syndromes is an opening lead Some day the two will meet.' in this direction. Also the work of Lacey et al. (1963) and of Stewart and Dean (1965) points up the relationship of autonomic nervous system REFERENCES function to perceptual-cognitive behavior. ADEY, W.R., R.T.KADO and J.DIDIO: Impedance mea­ As noted in the proposal, changing a frame of surements in brain tissue of animals using microvolt reference can provoke a good deal of displeasure signals. Exp. Neurol. 5 (1962) 47-66. and uncertainty, since a former plan which has ARNOLD, M. B.: Emotion and personality, Vol. II. Neu­ given order and thus led to much reinforcement rological and physiological aspects. New York, Columbia University Press (1960). must be relinquished or incorporated into a more ARONSON, H., A.B.SILVERSTEIN and G.D.KLEE: The in­ complex context. Fortunately for our emotions, fluence of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD-25) on theories do not spring up de novo. They are often subjective time sense. Arch. gen. Psychiat. 1 (1959) extensions and reorganizations of data and rela­ 469-472. BAGSHAW, M.H., D.P.KIMBLE and K.tI.PRIBRAM: The tionships collected in other frames of reference GSR of monkeys during orienting and habituation (Bronowski 1956). Following Freud's brilliant and after ablation of the amygdala, hippocampus pioneering efforts, psychoanalysis found it neces­ and inferotemporal cortex. Neuropsychologia (Ox­ sary to employ concepts like 'repression', 'uncon­ ford) 3 (1965) 111-119. scious processes', 'regression', and 'ego develop­ BARD, P. and D. RIOCH: A study offour cats deprived of neocortex and additional portions of the forebrain. ment' to account for the data at hand. In the 'Pro­ Johns Hopk. Hosp. Bull. 60 (1937) 73-147. ject for a scientific psychology', Freud attempted BARRETT, E. S.: Relationship of psychomotor tests and to detail a neurological model which would ac­ EEG variables at three developmental levels. Percept. count for behavioral and subjective relationships, Motor Skills 9 (I 959a) 63-66. BARRETT, E. S.: Anxiety and impulsiveness related to and there are many aspects of this model which psychomotor efficiency. Percept. Motor Skills 9 are still up-to-date (Pribram 1962). But we believe (l959b) 191-198. that present-day psychoanalytic theory, by over­ BATESON, G.: Exchange of information about patterns emphasizing the drive-tension aspects, which were of human behavior. fn: W.S.Fields and W.Abbott, added later, detracts from the universality of the eds.: Information storage and neural control. Spring­ field, Charles C Thomas (1963) pp.1-44. model. Current neurophysiological data not only BERNARD, C.: An introduction to the study of experi­ provide a neural base for some of the analytic mental medicine. New York, The MacMillan Com­ notions, but the theory derived from those data pany (1927). is more consonant with the earlier (ego-based) BIRCH, H.G.: Animal research. 3. The pertinence of animal investigation for a science of human beha­ model, and so redresses the imbalance. Further, vior. Amer. J. Orthopsychiat. 3\ (1961) 267-275. these data and the proposal presented cast the BRIDGER, w. H. and LJ.MANDEL: A comparison of GSR analytic formations into more testable form in a fear response produced by threat and electric shock. variety of levels of inquiry. For example, the rela­ J. psychiat. Res. 2 (1964) 25-30. tion of repression, ofsuppression, and even ofun­ BRIDGES, K. M. B.: Emotional development in early in­ fancy. Child Developm. 3 (1932) 324-341. conscious processes, to anxiety takes on a new BRONOWSKI, J.: Science and human values. New York, dimension in the light of the demonstrated effer- Harper and Row (956). 340 KARL H. PRIBRAM AND FREDERICK T. MELGES

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This research was supported by us Public Health the many revisions by, hopefully, un-e-motional re­ (NIMH) Grant MH-03732 and us Army Contract DA­ typing. Our thanks also go to innumerable others, both 49-193-M D-2328. The authors would like to extend of past and present, whose experimental approaches, especial thanks to Mr. Walter Tubbs, who steadfastly provocative interchanges, or administrative support, helped this paper evolve by editorial and substantive spurred the growth of this proposal. contributions. He and Mrs. Phyllis Ellis tolerated

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