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Article: How to Read a U.S. Supreme Court Opinion

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Article: How to Read a U.S. Supreme Court Opinion TEACHING LEGAL DOCS How to Read a U.S. Supreme Court Opinion eading a U.S. Supreme Court opinion can be intimidating. The Raverage opinion includes 4,751 words, and is one of approximately 75 issued each year. It might be reassuring, however, to know that opinions contain similar parts and tend to follow a simi- Sometimes decisions are unani- date. Another important element is lar format. There are also useful things mous—all of the justices agree and the case name, which helps deter- to identify amid the pages to help focus offer one rationale for their decision, mine the parties involved in the reading. Here is a basic guide for read- so the Court issues one unanimous case (see sidebar). Finally, there opinion. When more than half of might be an explanation of where ing a U.S. Supreme Court opinion. the justices agree, the Court issues the case came from before reach- a majority opinion. Other times, ing the Court. Often, there is a note 1. Identify the parts there is no majority, but a plurality, about certiorari, an order by which Typically, a U.S. Supreme Court opinion so the Court issues a plurality opin- a higher court reviews the decision is comprised of one or more, or all, of ion. Typically, one justice is identi- of a lower court. For example, an the following parts: fed as the author of the main opin- opinion may reference “Certio- • Syllabus ion. Per curiam opinions, however, rari for the United States Court of The syllabus appears frst, before do not identify any authors, and are Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.” That the main opinion. It is not part of the simply, opinions of the Court. means the Court reviewed the case offcial opinion, but rather, a sum- • Concurring and from the lower court, the U.S. Court mary added by the Court to help the Dissenting Opinions of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit. reader better understand the case Often, there are multiple opinions and the decision. The syllabus out- within the document because the 3. Read purposefully lines the facts of the case and the justices are not in agreement. Jus- When reading an opinion, it is important path that the case has taken to get tices who agree with the result of to focus on a few “big picture” take- to the Supreme Court. The last por- the main opinion, or the resolution aways: tion of the syllabus sometimes sum- of the dispute between the two par- marizes which justice authored the • Facts ties, but base their decision on a Pinpoint the facts of the case, or main opinion, which justices joined different rationale may issue one the “story”—who, what, when, and in the main opinion, and which jus- or more concurring opinion(s). where. Supreme Court cases tend to tices might have issued concurring Likewise, justices who disagree begin with a person, place, thing, or or dissenting opinions. with the main opinion in both result event, often in everyday scenarios. • Main Opinion and legal rationale may issue one or The goal is to be able to tell the sto- Following the syllabus is the main more dissenting opinion(s). ry of the case, including its proce- opinion. This is the Court’s offi- dural history. cial decision in the case. In legal 2. Understand the • Legal Dispute(s) terms, the opinion announces a formal elements What are the legal issues in the decision and provides an explana- Regardless of which, or how many, case? What questions are being pre- tion for the decision by articulating parts comprise the opinion, they sented? Is the Court interpreting the the legal rationale that the justices will share several formal elements. Constitution or a statute—e.g., an relied upon to reach the decision. Headings typically include the act of Congress? Try to identify the The main opinion may take dif- Court term in which the opinion parties’ particular dispute(s) and ferent forms, depending on how was announced, case docket num- their main arguments. the justices decide certain issues. ber, argument dates, and decision 10 Insights on Law & Society 13.1 • Fall 2012 • © 2012 American Bar Association • Disposition Generally, the end of the main opin- What Does That Case Citation Mean? ion includes the disposition, or what action the Court is taking. When Each of the pieces of the case citation mean something, as illustrated below: reviewing decisions from a lower court, the Supreme Court basically Gideon v. Wainwright 372 U.S. 375 (1963) has three options: • Affrm—allow the lower court’s 1 2 3 4 5 ruling to stand; 1 Case name • Reverse, Void, or Vacate—over- 2 Volume of the report series in which the full decision is offcially documented turn the lower court’s ruling; or • Remand—send the case back to 3 Name of the report series in which the decision is documented: “U.S.” stands a lower court for a retrial. for the U.S. Report, which is printed by the Supreme Court. Sometimes a Sometimes the Court combines the case name refers to an independently published series, such as “S. Ct.,” last two of these options—reverse which refers to the Supreme Court Reporter published by West Publishing. and remand—and not only over- 4 Page number in the referenced volume on which the decision begins turns the lower court’s decision, but also orders a retrial. 5 Year the opinion was released • Law A Note on Case Names The main opinion will include a Cases are named according to the parties involved. When there are two parties, section on law, which includes the the frst name is the petitioner, or the party fling the lawsuit against the second Court’s legal reasoning or holding. In some opinions, this will be clear- party, the respondent. er than others, but try to identify at Sometimes case names do not list two parties, such as cases whose names least one principle of law that the include In re or Ex parte. In re is a Latin term meaning “in the matter of” and is Court outlines as a basis for its rul- typically used in cases where there are not two designated adversarial parties. ing. Sometimes, the opinion cites Such cases might involve property disputes, court orders, or situations where the past cases—legal precedent, policy, Court is asked to clarify matters, such as In re Debs. In this example, Debs was or outlines other considerations. challenging an injunction, or court order, issued by the federal government during Finally, were there any concurring a labor strike. The term is also used in certain cases involving juveniles, such or dissenting opinions? If so, try as In re Gault. to determine the differences in Ex parte is also a Latin term, which refers to a case “from one party.” Typically, reasoning. one or more of the parties is absent from the legal proceedings. Ex parte is followed • Signifcance and Scope by the name of the party who initiated the case, as in Ex parte Merryman. One Consider the significance of the individual, Merryman, arrested during the Civil War, challenged the government’s opinion. This may not be readily right to hold him without charges. He sought an order that would require the apparent simply from reading the government to charge him with something, or let him go. text of the opinion. What do you think will be its application beyond the particular facts of the case? Con- sider other possible fact patterns to Locating Supreme Court Opinions which it might apply. What else do • U.S. Supreme Court • Oyez Project you think will be the consequence www.supremecourt.gov/opinions www.oyez.org of the opinion, especially consider- The Court posts opinions for the current Managed by the Illinois ing its holding or legal reasoning? term as well as PDF copies of bound Institute of Technology What precedent might it establish? volumes of opinions from previous terms. Chicago-Kent College of Law and offers opinions, For more information • Legal Information Institute audio of oral argument, about reading U.S. www.law.cornell.edu and summary analysis Supreme Court opinions, Comprehensive site from Cornell University of each opinion. including a document map and Law School that offers opinions and notes explanations of key terms, please visit www.insightsmagazine.org. “signifcant” cases from each term. Insights on Law & Society 13.1 • Fall 2012 • © 2012 American Bar Association 11 .
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