Practitioner Guide 3: the Logic of Forensic Proof
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Communicating and Interpreting Statistical Evidence in the Administration of Criminal Justice 3. The Logic of Forensic Proof: Inferential Reasoning in Criminal Evidence and Forensic Science Guidance for Judges, Lawyers, Forensic Scientists and Expert Witnesses Paul Roberts and Colin Aitken PRACTITIONER GUIDE NO 3 The Logic of Forensic Proof: Inferential Reasoning in Criminal Evidence and Forensic Science Guidance for Judges, Lawyers, Forensic Scientists and Expert Witnesses By Paul Roberts Professor of Criminal Jurisprudence, University of Nottingham and Colin Aitken Professor of Forensic Statistics, University of Edinburgh Prepared under the auspices of the Royal Statistical Society’s Working Group on Statistics and the Law (Chairman: Colin Aitken) Contents 0 Introduction 2 Membership of the RSS Working Group on Statistics and the Law 11 1 The Inferential Logic of Judicial Evidence and Proof 12 1.1 Inferential reasoning and rational adjudication 12 1.4 Common sense inference and common law evidence 15 1.12 Inferential tasks in criminal adjudication 22 1.15 Unpacking and unpicking common sense inference 24 1.17 Narrative – what’s the story? 25 1.19 Analytical models of inferential reasoning 27 2 Propositions and Logical Inferences 30 2.1 Varieties of proposition 30 2.5 Formulating propositions (with the utmost care) 34 2.9 Ultimate and penultimate probanda 39 2.11 Three forms of logical inference 41 2.19 Mapping ‘simple’ inferences 47 2.25 Symbolic notation 50 2.31 Summary 58 3 Neo-Wigmorean Analysis 61 3.1 Wigmore’s original insight 61 3.4 The neo-Wigmoreans 64 3.6 Wigmorean method 66 3.13 The practical utility of charting 74 3.15 Charting – in seven easy steps 76 3.35 Summary and critical appraisal 97 4 Bayesian Networks 103 4.1 Why Bayes Nets? 103 4.3 Bayesianism and English law 105 4.6 Bayesian networks as forensic decision aids 109 4.10 Terminology and constitutive elements 114 4.17 Trace evidence logic – Bayes nets in contemporary forensic practice 121 4.26 Extended illustration – Bayesian network analysis of shoe-mark evidence 131 5 Summary – Appreciating the Logic of Forensic Proof 144 5.1 Scope and objectives of the Guide 144 5.5 Propositions 146 5.7 Forensic logic and probanda 147 5.9 Symbolic representation 148 5.11 Wigmore charts 149 5.14 Bayesian networks 151 5.16 Logic, in the end and in the beginning… 153 Bibliography 154 1 Introduction to Communicating and Interpreting Statistical Evidence in the Administration of Criminal Justice 0.1 Context, Motivation and Objectives Statistical evidence and probabilistic reasoning today play an important and expanding role in criminal investigations, prosecutions and trials, not least in relation to forensic scientific evidence (including DNA) produced by expert witnesses. It is vital that everybody involved in criminal adjudication is able to comprehend and deal with probability and statistics appropriately. There is a long history and ample recent experience of misunderstandings relating to statistical information and probabilities which have contributed towards serious miscarriages of justice. 0.2 Criminal adjudication in the UK’s legal jurisdictions is strongly wedded to the principle of lay fact-finding by juries and magistrates employing their ordinary common sense reasoning. Notwithstanding the unquestionable merits of lay involvement in criminal trials, it cannot be assumed that jurors or lay magistrates will have been equipped by their general education to cope with the forensic demands of statistics or probabilistic reasoning. This predictable deficit underscores the responsibilities of judges and lawyers, within the broader framework of adversarial litigation, to ensure that statistical evidence and probabilities are presented to fact-finders in as clear and comprehensible a fashion as possible. Yet legal professionals’ grasp of statistics and probability may in reality be little better than the average juror’s. Perhaps somewhat more surprisingly, even forensic scientists and expert witnesses, whose evidence is typically the immediate source of statistics and probabilities presented in court, may also lack familiarity with relevant terminology, concepts and methods. Expert witnesses must satisfy the threshold legal test of competency before being allowed to testify or submit an expert report in legal proceedings.1 However, it does not follow from the fact that the witness is a properly qualified expert in say, fingerprinting or 1 R v Atkins [2010] 1 Cr App R 8, [2009] EWCA Crim 1876; R v Stockwell (1993) 97 Cr App R 260, CA; R v Silverlock [1894] 2 QB 766, CCR. 2 ballistics or paediatric medicine, that the witness also has expert – or even rudimentary – knowledge of statistics and probability. Indeed, some of the most notorious recent miscarriages of justice involving statistical evidence have exposed errors by experts. There is, in short, no group of professionals working today in the criminal courts that can afford to be complacent about their existing levels of knowledge and competence in using statistical methods and probabilistic reasoning. 0.3. Well-informed observers have for many decades been arguing the case for making basic training in probability and statistics an integral component of legal education (e.g. Kaye, 1984). But little tangible progress has been made. It is sometimes claimed that lawyers and the public at large fear anything connected with probability, statistics or mathematics in general, but irrational fears are plainly no excuse for ignorance in matters of such great practical importance. More likely, busy practitioners lack the time and opportunities to fill in persistent gaps in their professional training. Others may be unaware of their lack of knowledge, or believe that they understand enough already, but do so only imperfectly (‘a little learning is a dang’rous thing’2). 0.4. If a broad programme of education for lawyers and other forensic practitioners is needed, what is required and how should it be delivered? It would surely be misguided and a wasted effort to attempt to turn every lawyer, judge and expert witness (let alone every juror) into a professor of statistics. Rather, the objective should be to equip forensic practitioners to become responsible producers and discerning consumers of statistics and confident exponents of elementary probabilistic reasoning. Every participant in criminal proceedings should be able to grasp at least enough to perform their respective allotted roles effectively and to discharge their professional responsibilities in the interests of justice. For the few legal cases demanding advanced statistical expertise, appropriately qualified statisticians can be instructed as expert witnesses in the normal way. For the rest, lawyers 2 Alexander Pope, An Essay on Criticism (1711). 3 need to understand enough to be able to question the use made of statistics or probabilities and to probe the strengths and expose any weaknesses in the evidence presented to the court; judges need to understand enough to direct jurors clearly and effectively on the statistical or probabilistic aspects of the case; and expert witnesses need to understand enough to be able to satisfy themselves that the content and quality of their evidence is commensurate with their professional status and, no less importantly, with an expert witness’s duties to the court and to justice.3 0.5 There are doubtless many ways in which these pressing educational needs might be met, possibly through a package of measures and programmes. Of course, design and regulation of professional education are primarily matters to be determined by the relevant professional bodies and regulatory authorities. However, in specialist matters requiring expertise beyond the traditional legal curriculum it would seem sensible for authoritative practitioner guidance to form a central plank of any proposed educational package. This would ideally be developed in conjunction with, if not directly under the auspices of, the relevant professional bodies and education providers. The US Federal Judicial Center’s Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence (Third Edition, 2011) provides a valuable and instructive template.4 Written with the needs of a legal (primarily, judicial) audience in mind, it covers a range of related topics, including: data collection, data presentation, base rates, comparisons, inference, association and causation, multiple regression, survey research, epidemiology and DNA evidence. There is currently no remotely comparable UK publication specifically addressing statistical evidence and probabilistic reasoning in criminal proceedings in England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. 3 R v B(T) [2006] 2 Cr App R 3, [2006] EWCA Crim 417, [176]. And see Rule 33.2 of the Criminal Procedure Rules: ‘Expert’s duty to the court’. 4 The recently-revised third edition of the Reference Manual is published jointly by the National Academy of Sciences and the Federal Judicial Center, and can be accessed at www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf/autoframe?openform&url_l=/public/home.nsf/inavgeneral?openpa ge&url_r=/public/home.nsf/pages/1448. 4 0.6 In association with the Royal Statistical Society (RSS) and with the support of the Nuffield Foundation, we aim to fill this apparent gap in UK forensic practitioner guidance by producing a themed set of four Practitioner Guides on different aspects of statistical evidence and probabilistic reasoning, to assist judges, lawyers, forensic scientists and other expert witnesses in coping with the demands of modern criminal litigation.