Redsm and America's Rise
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Redsm and Sean M.Lynn-Jones America's Rise A Review Essay ~ Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998. Realism is usually regarded as a dominant-and monolithic-approach in the study of interna- tional relations. In the past few years, however, some of the most vigorous and interesting debates in international relations theory have emerged among different types of realism. It has become clear that realism is not a single theory, but a family of theories. One of the most significant divides within realism is between offensive realism and defensive realism.* Offensive realists generally argue that the international system fosters conflict and aggression. Security is scarce, making international competition and war likely. Rational states often are compelled to adopt offensive strategies in their search for security.2Defen- sive realists, on the other hand, argue that the international system does not Sean M. Lynn-Jones is Co-Editor of International Security. I thank Dale Copeland, Michael Desch, Colin Elman, Miriam Fendius Elman, Eugene Gholz, Charles Glaser, Eric Labs, Jack Levy, Dan Lindley, John Mearsheimer, Taylor Seybolt, Jack Snyder, Jeffrey Taliaferro, Brian Taylor, Bradley Thayer, and Stephen Van Evera for their extraordinarily helpful comments on an earlier draft of this essay. I alone am responsible for the opinions expressed here and any errors that remain. 1. For discussions of contemporary debates and differences among realists, especially between offensive and defensive realists, see Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, "Preface," in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., fie Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security (Cambridge, Mass.: MJT Press, 1995), pp. ix-xiii; Benjamin Frankel, "Restating the Realist Case: An Introduction," Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 19961, pp. xiv-xx; and Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," WorZd Politics, Vol. 51, No. 1 (October 1998), which classifies several contemporary realists as "neoclassical" realists. For a different set of distinctions, see Stephen G. Brooks, "Dueling Realisms," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 3 (Summer 1997), pp. 445477. 2. Offensive realism also has been called "aggressive realism." The clearest statements of offensive realism are John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-56; and Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 549. See also Eric J. Labs, "Beyond Vicfory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims," Security Studies, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Summer 1997), pp. 149; and Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). International Security, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Fall 1998), pp. 157-182 0 1998 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 157 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/isec.23.2.157 by guest on 02 October 2021 International Security 23:2 I 158 necessarily generate intense conflict and war, and that defensive strategies are often the best route to ~ecurity.~ Another debate pits classical realists against structural realists, who are also known as neorealists! Classical realists generally argue that power is the most important factor in international politics. States attempt to maximize their power, at least partly because the desire for increased power is rooted in human nature. Structural realists, on the other hand, do not build their theories on the assumption that human nature contains an innate drive for power. Instead, they posit that international politics is shaped by states' desire to survive in the anarchic international ~ystem.~Offensive realism shares classical realism's emphasis on power and pessimism, but follows neorealism's struc- tural 10gic.~ These debates deserve attention for two reasons. First, the prominence of realist theories in the study of international politics makes it important to 3. Important examples of defensive realism include Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War, Vol. 1, The Structure of Power and the Roots of War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, forthcoming 1999); Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987); Walt, Rmolution and War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Comell University Press, 1996); Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the world Wars (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univer- sity Press, 1984); Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire; Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991); and Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 50-90. The theoretical foundations of defensive realism were laid by Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167-214, and Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), although neither Jervis nor Waltz can readily be classified as a defensive realist. 4. Most writers use structural realism and neorealism interchangeably, as I do. Some scholars draw a distinction between Waltz's neorealism and structural realism more generally. See Barry Buzan, Charles Jones, and Richard Little, The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism (New York Columbia University Press, 1993). 5. The seminal example of classical realism is Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nufions: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York Knopf, 1948 and later editions). Structural realism, or neorealism, is developed in Waltz, Theory of International Politics. Waltz discusses the differences between classical realism and neorealism in Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory," in Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb, eds., The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 39-44. For other discussions of the differences between classical realism and neorealism, see Robert 0. Keohane, "Realism, Neorealism, and the Study of World Politics"; Richard Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism"; and Kenneth N. Waltz, "Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics," all in Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 19861, pp. 7-16,255300,322-345. 6. Mearsheimer's explication of offensive realism, for example, rests on his argument that aggres- sive state behavior is a response to the anarchic structure of international politics, not a conse- quence of the flaws inherent in human nature. For a discussion of how both offensive and defensive realism fit into a neorealist framework, see Colin Elman, "Horses for Courses: Why Not Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy?" Security Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Autumn 19961, pp. 27-30 and the diagram on pp. 50-53. Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/isec.23.2.157 by guest on 02 October 2021 Realism and America's Rise 1 159 determine which realist theory is the most powerful. Second, the debate be- tween offensive and defensive realism has implications for foreign policy. If the offensive realists are correct, the prospects for constructing policies to avoid war are limited. On the other hand, defensive realism offers somewhat more optimistic conclusions about the ability of states to remain secure without threatening other^.^ Fareed Zakaria's From Wealth to Power' attempts to contribute to these de- bates in contemporary realist theory in three ways. First, it presents one of the most detailed critiques of defensive realism to date. Second, it argues that a modified version of offensive realism, which Zakaria labels "state-centered realism," can persuasively explain why states expand their territory and their interests. Third, it makes an interesting case for why realist theories should incorporate internal state strength-the capability of a government vis-a-vis society-as a component of national power. Zakaria develops these arguments by examining US. attempts to expand between 1865 and 1908 and offers a fascinating interpretation of how the United States emerged as a world power. Despite these contributions, several of the book's arguments are not convinc- ing. Zakaria neither refutes defensive realism nor advances a compelling alter- native. In this essay, I argue that the overriding weakness of From Wealth to Power is its failure to offer a persuasive critique of defensive realism. There are three reasons why Zakaria does not credibly refute the theory. First, From Wealth to Power ultimately offers a weak critique of defensive realism because the book deduces the wrong hypothesis from the theory-one that virtually guarantees that defensive realism will appear to fail. Zakaria claims that defensive realism predicts that "nations try to expand their political interests abroad when central decision-makers perceive an increase in threats" (p. 42), but defensive realists would not recognize this hypothesis as their owngSecond, From Wealth to Power selects cases that offer weak tests of the relative power of the hypothe- 7. For a discussion of this point and of how contemporary theories of international relations are relevant to the making of foreign