Celebration and Suppression: the Strategic Uses of Identity by the Lesbian and Gay Movement Author(S): Mary Bernstein Source: the American Journal of Sociology, Vol

Celebration and Suppression: The Strategic Uses of Identity by the Lesbian and Gay Movement Author(s): Mary Bernstein Source: The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 103, No. 3 (Nov., 1997), pp. 531-565 Published by: The University of Chicago Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2782888 Accessed: 25/10/2010 14:28

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http://www.jstor.org Celebration and Suppression: The Strategic Uses of Identityby the Lesbian and Gay Movementi

Mary Bernstein ArizonaState University

Criticsof identitypolitics decry the celebrationof differencewithin identitymovements, yet many activists underscore their similarities to, ratherthan differencesfrom, the majority.This articledevelops the idea of "identitydeployment" as a formof strategiccollective action.Thus one can ask underwhat politicalconditions are identities that celebrateor suppressdifferences deployed strategically. A comparisonof strategiesused in fourlesbian and gay rightscampaigns shows thatinteractions between social movementorganizations,state actors, and the oppositiondetermine the typesof identities deployed.The authorsuggests the model's applicationto the Civil Rightsand feministmovements.

[Theorganizers of the 1993 lesbian and gay march on Washing- ton]face a dilemma:how to put forwarda set of unsettling demandsfor unconventional people in ways that will not make enemiesof potentialallies. They do so by playingdown their differencesbefore the media and the countrywhile celebrating it in private.(Tarrow 1994,p. 10)

Sidney Tarrow's portrayal of the 1993 lesbian and gay march on Wash- ington highlightsa central irony about identitypolitics and the decline of the Left: Critics of identity politics decry the celebration of difference

'I thank Edwin Amenta, Ellen Benoit, Nancy Cauthen, Kelly Moore, Gilda Zwer- man, Yvonne Zylan, and the members of the New York UniversityPolitics, Power, and Protest Workshop for comments on earlier drafts of this paper, as well as the AJS reviewers forhelpful suggestions.I greatlybenefited from both discussions with and comments fromDavid Greenberg and Francesca Polletta. I would also like to thank Elizabeth Franqui for her crucial assistance on this paper. This research was supported by a National Science Foundation Dissertation grant (9623937) and by a New York UniversityJune Frier Esserman DissertationFellowship. Direct correspon- dence to Mary Bernstein, School of Justice Studies, Arizona State University,P.O. Box 870403, Tempe, Arizona 85287-0403.

? 1997 by The Universityof Chicago. All rightsreserved. 0002-9602/98/10303-0001$02.50

AJS Volume 103 Number 3 (November1997): 531-65 531 AmericanJournal of Sociology withincontemporary identity movements, charging them with limiting the potentialfor a "politicsof commonality"between oppressed peoples thatcould have potentialfor radical social change (Gitlin 1995). On the otherhand, the lesbian and gay movementseems largelyto have aban- doned its emphasison differencefrom the straightmajority in favorof a moderatepolitics that highlightssimilarities to the straightmajority (Seidman 1993). Over time,"identity" movements shift their emphasis between celebrating and suppressingdifferences from the majority. For example,the Civil Rights movementunderscored similarities to the majorityin order to achieve concretepolicy reforms. At othertimes, movements that assert radical racial identitiesto build communitiesand challengehegemonic Americanculture take centerstage. The Americanfeminist movement has alternatelyemphasized innate genderdifferences between men and women and denied that such differencesexist or that theyare socially relevant.Under what politicalconditions do activistscelebrate or suppressdifferences from the majority?Why does the stresson differenceor similaritychange over time? To answerthese questions, this article draws on evidencefrom several campaignsfor lesbian and gay rightsordinances.2 The lesbian and gay movementwas chosenbecause it is consideredthe quintessential identity movement(Melucci 1989; Duyvendak 1995; Duyvendak and Giugni 1995).The culturalbarriers to acceptanceof homosexuality and thechal- lengeof self-acceptance for lesbians and gaymen require cultural struggle. However,the lesbian and gay movementhas been alteredfrom a movement for culturaltransformation through sexual liberationto one that seeks achievementof politicalrights through a narrow,ethnic-like (Seid- man 1993) interest-grouppolitics. This well-documentedtransition (Alt- man 1982; Paul 1982; Escoffier1985; Epstein 1987; Seidman 1993; Gam- son 1995; Vaid 1995) has yet to be explained. This researchwill show that celebrationor suppressionof differences withinpolitical campaigns depends on the structureof social movement organizations,access to thepolity (Tilly 1978),and thetype of opposition. By specifyingthe politicalconditions that explain variationin strategies withinmovements, one can betterunderstand differences in formsof collectiveaction across movements.

2 Human rightsordinances typically provide protection from discrimination in hous- ing,employment, and publicaccommodations on thebasis of characteristicssuch as sex,race, and nationalorigin; "lesbian and gayrights bills" typically add "sexualorien- tation"to thislist of protectedcategories.

532 Celebrationand Suppression

IDENTITY AND MOVEMENT TYPES

Attemptsto classifysocial movementshave typicallycentered around the distinctionbetween "strategy-oriented"and "identity-oriented"movements(Touraine 1981).Abandoning this distinction, Duyvendak and Gi- ugni argueinstead that "the real differenceis, however,the one between movementspursuing goals in the outsideworld, for which the action is instrumentalfor goal realization,and identity-orientedmovements that realize theirgoals, at least partly,in theiractivities" (1995, pp. 277-78). Social movements,then, are classifiedon "theirlogic of action,"whether theyemploy an identityor instrumentallogic of action,and whetherthey are internallyor externallyoriented. Movements such as the lesbian and gay movementare internallyoriented and followan identitylogic of action.Instrumental movements, by contrast,engage in instrumentalaction and are externallyoriented (Duyvendak and Giugni 1995,pp. 84-85). This mechanicalbifurcation of movementtypes, reflected in the division betweenidentity theory on the one hand and resourcemobilization and politicalprocess theory on theother, has leftthe literature on conten- tiouspolitics unable to explainchanges in formsof collective action. First, thecasual use of theterm "identity" obscures fundamental distinctions in meaning(e.g., Gitlin1995). Second,I argue thattheorists must abandon the essentialist characterizationof social movementsas expressiveor in- strumentalbecause it impairsthe studyof all social movements.This es- sentialistcharacterization stems from the conflation of goals and strategies (i.e., thatinstrumental strategies are irrelevantto culturalchange, while expressionsof identity cannot be externallydirected) apparent in resource mobilization,political process, and new social movementtheories. Finally, attemptsto integratethese theories have been unsuccessful. Subsumed underthe rubricof new social movements,"identity movements"have been definedas muchby the goals theyseek, and the strategies theyuse, as by thefact that they are based on a sharedcharacteristic suchas ethnicityor sex.According to new social movementtheorists, identitymovements seek to transformdominant cultural patterns, or gain recognitionfor new social identities,by employingexpressive strategies (Touraine 1981; Cohen 1985; Melucci 1985, 1989). New social movementtheory suggests that movements choose political strategiesin orderto facilitatethe creationof organizationalforms that encourageparticipation and empowerment.Thus strategiesthat privilege thecreation of democratic, nonhierarchical organizations would be chosen over strategiesnarrowly tailored to producepolicy change. For resourcemobilization and politicalprocess theorists, identity may play a role in mobilizationthrough solidary incentives (Klandermans

533 AmericanJournal of Sociology

1984, 1988),but once the "freerider" problem is overcome(Olson 1965; Hardin 1982),all othercollective action is deemedinstrumental, targeted solelyat achievingconcrete (i.e., measurable) goals. Resource mobilization and politicalprocess theorists have neglectedthe studyof identitymove- mentswith their seemingly "nonpolitical," cultural goals. Even when cul- tureis recognizedas an integralpart of sustainingactivist communities, changingor challengingmainstream culture is rarelyconsidered a goal of activism.Strategies are seen as rationallychosen to optimizethe likelihood of policy success. Outcomes are measured as a combinationof policy change ("new advantages")and access to the structureof politicalbar- gaining(Jenkins and Perrow 1977; Tilly 1978; McAdam 1982; Gamson 1990).Such a narrowframing of social movementgoals can lead to errone- ous assumptionsabout the reasonsfor collective action and forstrategy choice (Turnerand Killian 1972;Jenkins 1983). Wheregoals are cultural and thereforeharder to operationalize,theorists assume collectiveaction has no externaldimension but is aimed simplyat reproducingthe identity on whichthe movementis based (see Duyvendak 1995; Duyvendak and Giugni 1995). This leaves theoristsunable to explain social movement action that seems to be workingat cross purposes to achievingpolicy change. Furthermore,it relegates"prefigurative" (Breines 1988; Polletta 1994) politics-a politicsthat seeks to transformobservers through the embodimentof alternative values and organizationalforms-to therealm of the irrational. Althoughpolitical opportunityor political process (McAdam 1982) modelsshare resourcemobilization's assumptions about the relationship betweenstrategies and goals, theyprovide a more usefulstarting point forunderstanding how politicalstrategies are chosen.According to Tilly (1978), formsof collectiveaction will be affectedby "politicalcoalitions and . . . themeans of actionsbuilt into the existing political organization" (p. 167). These short-and medium-term"volatile" (Gamson and Meyer 1996) elementsof "politicalopportunity" (Kitschelt 1986; Tarrow 1996; Kriesi and Giugni 1995) include the openingof access to participation, shiftsin rulingalignments, the availabilityof influentialallies, and cleav- ages amongelites (Tarrow 1988; Kriesiand Giugni1995). As thepolitical contextchanges, strategies should also change.Yet politicalopportunity modelslack specificityin analyzingwhy or underwhat political conditions movementschoose particularforms of collectiveaction. Attemptsto reconcilethe disjuncturebetween new social movement and resourcemobilization or politicalprocess theory center on the relationshipbetween forms of collective action and themovement's life cycle. The emergent"new social movements"of the 1960sand 1970s seemedso strikingbecause theyutilized innovative, direct action tactics. According to Calhoun (1995):

534 Celebrationand Suppression

As Tarrow(1989) has remarked, this description confuses two senses of new: thecharacteristics ofall movementswhen they are new, and the characteris- ticsof a putativelynew sort of movement. It is indeedgenerally true that any movement of or on behalfof those excludedfrom conventional politics starts out with a needto attractatten- tion;movement activity is notjust an instrumentalattempt to achieve movementgoals, but a meansof recruitment and continuingmobilization ofparticipants. (P. 193) In thisview, a lack ofhistorical perspective has mistakenlyled new social movementtheorists to label behavior"distinctive" when it is simplybe- havior indicativeof an emergentsocial movement. This criticismof new social movement theory glosses over important em- piricaland theoreticaldistinctions. First, not every emergent social move- mentemploys novel or dramatictactics in orderto gainnew recruits.Reli- giousright organizations that arose in the1970s drew on thedense network ofconservative churches as wellas directmail lists to mobilize;they did not employinnovative or novel tactics (Diamond 1989).Rather than misattrib- utingcertain forms of collective action to thenewness of social movements, one shouldask whataccounts for different forms of mobilization. Further- more,attributing certain forms of collective action to thenewness of social movementsprecludes an understandingof why such formsof collective actionmay emerge at laterpoints in a movement'sprotest cycle. Second, the glib dismissalof the sortsof politicalaction attributedto new social movements(Duyvendak 1995; Duyvendak and Giugni 1995) as simplyexpressive, or unrelatedto politicalstructure, ignores the external or instrumentaldimensions of seeminglyexpressive action. If putativelynew social movementsdo challengedominant cultural patterns, then theoristsmust take seriouslythe politicalnature of such collective action. Social movementtheory must examine the challengesall social movementspresent to dominantcultural patterns. This researchseeks to providea morecomplete understanding of the role of identityin collectiveaction. I build in part on politicalprocess theory,while incorporatingnew social movementtheory's emphasis on theimportance of cultural change to movementactivism. I arguethat the conceptof "identity" has at leastthree distinct analytic levels, the first two of whichhave been developedin the social movementliterature. First, a sharedcollective identity is necessaryfor mobilization of any social movement(Morris 1992), including the classic labor movement(Calhoun 1995). Second,identity can be a goal of social movementactivism, either gaining acceptance for a hithertostigmatized identity (Calhoun 1994) or deconstructingcategories of identitiessuch as "man," "woman,""gay," "straight"(Gamson 1995),"black," or "white."Finally, this researchar- gues thatexpressions of identitycan be deployedat thecollective level as a politicalstrategy, which can be aimed at culturalor instrumentalgoals.

535 AmericanJournal of Sociology

Once the conceptof identityis brokendown intothese three analytic dimensions,then one can explorethe politicalconditions that produce certain identitystrategies. The nextsection examines analytic uses of theconcept "identity" in the social movementliterature. Then I presenta generalmodel to explain identitystrategies. The followingsections elaborate the generalmodel by drawingon historicalresearch and interviewdata to explaindiverse identitystrategies used in campaignsfor lesbian and gay rightsordinances. The essentialistassumptions embedded in new social movement,resource mobilization,and politicalprocess perspectives limit their ability to ac- countfor these variations. The case studieswill show thatforms of collectiveaction are theresult of specific features of social movementorganizations,the type of opposition,and concreteinteractions with the state. Finally,I suggestthe model's applicationto theCivil Rightsand feminist movements.

THREE ANALYTIC DIMENSIONS OF IDENTITY The creationof communitiesand movementsolidarity, which the bulk of researchon collectiveidentity examines (Williams 1995), is necessaryfor mobilization.I defineidentity for empowermentto mean the creationof collectiveidentity and thefeeling that political action is feasible(see table 1). In otherwords, some sort of identity is necessaryto translateindividual to groupinterests and individualto collectiveaction. All social movements requiresuch a "politicalconsciousness" (Morris 1992) to createand mobilize a constituency(Taylor and Whittier1992; Calhoun 1995). Identityfor empowerment is notnecessarily a consciouslychosen strategy,although it is a precursorto collectiveaction. If a movementconstitu- encyhas a sharedcollective identity and theinstitutions or social networks thatprovide a culturalspace fromwhich to act,then community building and empowermentwill be forfeitedto "instrumental"goals of policyat- tainment.In the absence of visibilityor movementorganizations, more work mustbe done to build organizationsand recruitactivists. Collectiveidentity can also have an externaldimension in mobilization. Beckwith(1995) argues that an actor can use her or his identityto gain "politicalstanding" (i.e., to legitimateparticipation) in a social movement in which she or he is not directlyimplicated. So, forexample, women involvedin coal miningstrikes who are not minerscan justifyparticipa- tionbased on theirrelations to the miners,such as mother,sister, or wife. The choice of identity(e.g., wifeof minervs. working-classwoman) can have implicationsfor future activism. Identitycan also be a goal of collectiveaction (identity as goal). Activ- istsmay challengestigmatized identities, seek recognitionfor new identi-

536 Celebrationand Suppression

TABLE 1 THE THREE ANALYTICDIMENSIONS OF "IDENTITY"

Dimension Description Identityfor empowerment .... Activistsmust draw on an existingidentity or construct a new collectiveidentity in orderto createand mobilize a constituency.The particularidentity chosen will have implicationsfor future activism. Identityas goal ...... Activistsmay challengestigmatized identities, seek recognitionfor new identities,or deconstructrestrictive social categoriesas goals of collectiveaction. Identityas strategy...... Identitiesmay be deployedstrategically as a formof collectiveaction. Identity deployment is definedas expressingidentity such that the terrainof conflictbecomes the individualperson so that the values, categories,and practicesof individualsbecome subject to debate. Identityfor critiqueconfronts the values, categories,and practiceof the dominantculture. Identityfor education challengesthe dominantculture's perceptionof the minorityor is used strategically to gain legitimacyby playingon uncontroversial themes.

ties,or deconstructrestrictive social categories.New Left organizations of the 1960s, for example,sought not only concretepolicy reform,but thoughtthat the creationof alternativecultural forms could fosterstruc- tural change. Polletta(1994) assertsthat "student-organizers of the Stu- dent NonviolentCoordinating Committee (SNCC) saw theirtask as to mobilizeand securerecognition for a new collectiveidentity-poor, 'un- qualified'southern blacks-in a way thatwould transformnational and local politicsby refashioningcriteria of political leadership" (p. 85). Femi- nists influencedAmerican culture by challengingand alteringconven- tionalusage ofsexist terms in theEnglish language. Gamson (1995) argues thatsocial movementtheory must take seriouslythe goal ofcontemporary "queer politics" to deconstructsocial categories, including "man," "woman,""gay," and "straight."Without a broaderunderstanding of the goals of collectiveaction and theirrelationship to the structurallocation of the actors,social movementtheory cannot adequately explain strategy choicesmade by activists. In additionto influencingmotivations and goals of collectiveaction, "culturalresources also have an external,strategic dimension" (Williams 1995, p. 125). I defineidentity deployment to mean expressingidentity such that the terrainof conflictbecomes the individual person so that the values, categories,and practicesof individuals become subject to

537 AmericanJournal of Sociology debate. What does it mean to "deployidentity" strategically? Taylor and Raeburn(1995) view identitydeployment as a way to conteststigmatized social identitiesfor the purposesof institutionalchange. Yet contesting stigmato change institutionsis not the only reason foridentity deployment.The goal of identitydeployment can be to transformmainstream culture,its categoriesand values (and perhaps by extensionits policies and structures),by providingalternative organizational forms. Identity deploymentcan also transformparticipants or simplyeducate legislators or the public. Identitydeployment can be examinedat boththe individual and collective level along a continuumfrom education to critique.3Activists either dressand act consistentlywith mainstream culture or behave in a critical way. Identityforcritique confronts the values, categories,and practices of the dominantculture. Identityfor education challenges the dominant culture'sperception of the minorityor is used strategicallyto gain legiti- macy by playingon uncontroversialthemes.4 Although the goals associ- ated witheither identity strategy can be moderateor radical,identity for educationgenerally limits the scope of conflictby not problematizingthe moralityor normsof the dominantculture. Identitydeployment should be understooddramaturgically (Goffman 1959) as the collectiveportrayal of the group's identityin the political realm,whether that be in citycouncil hearings or at sit-insin segregated restaurants.The strategicdeployment of identitymay differfrom the group's (or individuals') privateunderstanding of that identity.In this research,I examineidentity deployment at the collectivelevel. It is importantnot to conflatethe goals of identitydeployment with its form(i.e., critical or educational).Both can be partof a projectof cultural challengeor a strategyto achieve policyreform. Whether these strategies are associatedwith organizational forms that encourage participation and empowermentby privilegingthe creationof democratic,nonhierarchical organizations,as new social movementtheory would suggest,or withnar- row interestgroup strategiesdesigned to achieve policy change, as resourcemobilization and politicalprocess perspectives would suggest,then becomes an empiricalquestion, not an essentialistassumption based on movementtypes.

I Individual-level identity-for-critiquestrategies rooted in oppositional culturesmight include feministsnot wearing bras or shaving their legs to challenge gender-based appearance norms.

4 Of course justificationfor political participation can have subversive effects.For example, women in the late 19th centuryjustified their incursions into politics as a natural extensionof theirrole as men's moral caretakers(e.g., Kraditor 1981). Political activism then changed views about women's appropriate roles.

538 Celebrationand Suppression

Understandingidentity as a tool formobilization, as a goal, and as a strategywill lead to a morecomprehensive understanding of social movements.Instead of askingwhether identity plays a role in a given movement,we can ask severalquestions: What role does identityplay in mobilization? To what extentis identitya goal of collectiveaction? Why or underwhat politicalconditions are identitiesthat celebrateor suppress differencesdeployed strategically?

GENERAL MODEL I arguethat identity strategies will be determinedby the configurationof politicalaccess, the structureof social movementorganizations, and the typeand extentof opposition.In additionto affectingpolitical outcomes (Zald and Ash 1966;Gamson 1990),the characteristics of movement orga- nizationsshould also influencepolitical strategies. I defineinclusive movementorganizations to be thosegroups whose strategies, in practice,seek to educateand mobilizea constituencyor maximizeinvolvement in political campaigns.Exclusive organizationsactively discourage popular participation,choosing strategies unlikely to mobilizea movementconstituency. Changes in the politicalcontext should also influencepolitical strategies (Tilly 1978). I considerthat a movementhas access to the polityif candidates respondto movementinquiries, if electedofficials or stateagencies supportand worktoward the movement'sgoals, or if movementleaders have access to politymembers (e.g., through business affiliations, personal contacts,or officialpositions in politicalparties). Organized opposition is also an importantpart of the politicalcontext (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996). Most contemporaryAmerican social movementseventually face organizedopposition to theirgoals, and thisshould influence the typesof identitiesdeployed. Routine oppositionwill referto polityinsiders (Tilly 1978); thatis, thosewho by virtueof theirinstitutional position (such as a cardinalof the Catholic Church) have theear ofpolicy makers. Opposing movementswill referto groupsoutside the politymobilized around the issues of contention(Bernstein 1995; Meyerand Staggenborg1996). The role of identityin mobilizationwill differacross movements,but not because of some abstractessentialism of movementtypes. For example, identityfor empowermentmay play a smaller role in mobilizing movementssparked by a "moralshock"-such as theantiwar movement, theantinuclear movement, or the animal rights movement-than in mobi- lizingmovements based on a sharedcharacteristic or identity.But once a movementhas emerged,I suggestthat the same conditionsthat determine identitydeployment should also apply to movementsstarted by moral shocks. In orderto emerge,a social movementrequires a base fromwhich to

539 AmericanJournal of Sociology

*HomophileMovement

StrongOrganizational WeakOrganizational Infrastructure Infrastructure or and Accessto the Polity NoAccess

Inclusive Exclusive Inclusive Exclusive Movement Movement Movement Movement Organizations Organizations Organizations Organizations

Routine or Routine Organized Routine or Routine Organized Organized Opposition Opposition Organized Oppositon Oppositon Opposition Opposition 1. Identity 2a. Identity 2b.Mixed 3. Identity 4a. Identity 4b. Mixed for Education for Education Model for Critique for Education Model Vermont, Oregon, Oregon, New York City, Homophile, Colorado, Oregon, 1992- 1970s 1980-1992 1970s 1940s- 1960s 1990s

* This pathrepresents the pre-mobilization stage ofactivism

FIG. 1.-Identity deploymentin thelesbian and gaymovement

organizeand some sortof collectiveidentity to translateindividual into groupinterests. Movements with access to the structureof politicalbar- gaining or strongorganizational infrastructures that have fostereda sharedidentity will tendto seek policychange, emphasize sameness rather thandifference, and willuse identityfor education rather than identity for critique(see fig.1, paths 1,2 a).5 However, if the movement faces organized oppositionfrom outside the politicalestablishment, and if the movement

5Before a movementhas emergedpublicly, opposition will be routine,because the embryonicmovement poses no threat(the apex offig. 1). Scapegoatingwould be one exceptionto thisgeneralization. Movements in thispremobilization stage, by defini- tion,lack politicalaccess, and if organizationalactors exist at all, theyare likelyto be exclusive,placing little emphasis on mobilization.

540 Celebrationand Suppression is led by exclusive,narrowly focused groups uninterested in movement building,the movementmay split,with some groupsemphasizing differences and communitybuilding, while the exclusivegroups continueto emphasizesameness and narrowlyfocused policy change (a mixedmodel; see fig. 1, path 2b). In such cases, criticalidentities may be deployedas much in reactionto movementleadership as to the opposition. Whenan emergentmovement lacks bothpolitical access and an organizational infrastructureor collectiveidentity, then an emphasison difference will be needed to build solidarityand mobilizea constituency(fig. 1,path 3). Such movementswill tendto focuson buildingcommunity and celebratingdifference, as will thosesectors of a movementmarginalized by exclusivegroups encountering nonroutine opposition (fig. 1, path 4b). Once a movementhas been established-withconstituency and organizational actors-then movementbetween the cells in figure1 may take place as organizedopposition emerges or declines,political coalitions shift, and the structuresof movementorganizations change over time. Aftera movement'semergence, the typesof identitydeployment will be relatedto thestructure of social movementorganizations, access to the polityand whetheropposition is routine,deriving from polity insiders, or external,arising from organized opposing movements. Changes in short- or medium-termelements of the political context should have a determin- ing effecton formsof collectiveaction such thatgreater access produces moremoderate forms of collective action and identityfor education strategies,while closingopportunities will lead to an emphasison identityfor critique.When the polityis relativelyopen and diversesegments of the activistcommunity are representedin movementorganizations or are included in politicalcampaigns, there will be less emphasison criticizing normativevalues. Because identityis deployedin the contextof concrete interactions,the baseline against which activistsdefine themselves will be influencedby opposingmovements. Exclusive social movementorganizations,the presence of a strongopposition, and negativeinteractions with the state will likelyresult in greaterdissension within the community. That dissensionwill lead to factionalizationand will producemoderates who will focus more on educationand traditionallobbying tactics and radicalswho will focuson criticizingdominant values (a "mixedmodel"). Radicalizationin themovement can stemas muchfrom reaction to movementleaders as fromreactions to the politicalcontext. In short,identity deploymentin thepolitical realm will dependon thestructure of and rela- tionsamong movementorganizations, the extentof politicalaccess, and the typeof opposition.The nextsection draws on evidencefrom the lesbian and gay movementto suggestmore concretely the causal processes thatlead to certaintypes of identitydeployment.

541 AmericanJournal of Sociology

THE LESBIAN AND GAY MOVEMENT

Detailed historicaland qualitativeresearch was employedto understand how politicalstrategies were chosen by activistsunder distinctpolitical conditions.I conductedfield research on cityand statecampaigns for lesbian and gay rightsordinances in New York City,Vermont, and Oregon. The cases were chosen to vary on the independentvariables. Through archivalresearch, I examinedmovement documents such as pressreleases and position papers, newspaper accounts fromboth lesbian and gay and mainstreampresses, and transcriptsfrom public hearings. Interviews with selectedinformants were used to supplementthe writtenmaterial. For each case, I tracedthe developmentof state-orientedlesbian and gay organizations,including foundational and positionpapers thatdelineate goals, strategies,and guidingprinciples. For illustrativepurposes, I also brieflydiscuss gay and lesbianresponses to antilesbianand antigaylegisla- tion in Colorado. The oppositionwas investigatedthrough secondary sources. When lesbiansand gay men deploytheir identity strategically, debates may centeraround whether sexual orientationis immutable,what consti- tutes"homosexual practices," or whetherpedophilia is the same as homosexuality.Lesbian and gay lives become the subject of conflict.Nothing about thelesbian and gay movementdictates the strategicuse of identity at the collectivelevel. For example,activists could draw attentionto dis- criminatoryemployment practices, with a universalappeal to everyone's rightto a job based on theirskills. That is differentthan disclosing one's sexual orientationto legislatorsor neighbors,saying "Here I am, know me." In the case of the lesbian and gay movement,identity for education challengesnegative stereotypes about lesbiansand gay men,such as hav- ing hundredsof sexual partnersa year or strugglingwith uncontrollable sexual urges(Herman 1994),while identityfor critique challenges dominant culturalassumptions about the religiousor biological"naturalness" ofgender roles and theheterosexual nuclear family. Arguably the greatest success of the women's movementhas been to break down the division between public and private throughchallenging traditional notions of gender(Gitlin 1994). Both identityfor critique and identityfor education can be part of broaderprojects seeking cultural change or policyreform. Althoughmany have looked at the relationshipbetween lesbian and gay cultureand individual-levelidentity strategies (Taylor and Whittier 1992; Whittier1995), few have examinedthis phenomena empirically, as a collective,consciously chosen political strategy. The restof thisarticle exploresidentity strategies along the continuum from critique to education at the collectivelevel. As Seidman (1993, pp. 135-36) argues,we must

542 Celebrationand Suppression

"relatethe politics of representation to institutionaldynamics" rather than reducingcultural codes to textualpractices abstracted from institutional contexts.The lesbianand gaymovement has challengeda varietyof insti- tutionsin Americansociety, but I will restrictmy analysis to interactions with the state because, with the onslaughtby the Religious Right,the state has become one of the centralloci of identitydeployment. Future researchwill have to determinethe ways diverseinstitutional dynamics (e.g.,the churchor psychiatry)influence the creationand deploymentof identities.

THE HOMOPHILE MOVEMENT A collectiveidentity among lesbians and gay men emergedprior to the strategicrecruitment of a constituencyby organizationalactors, as long- termstructural changes brought increasing numbers of gay men and lesbians togetherin urbansettings (D'Emilio 1983).The secretivenature of the earlyhomophile organizations (Licata 1980/81;D'Emilio 1983),however, precludedmass mobilization.The onlypublic meetingplaces forlesbians and gaymen-cruising places and Mafia-runbars (Nestle1987; Chauncey 1994)-were ill-suitedfor mobilization. Cherry Grove, Fire Island, a visi- ble lesbianand gaysummer community, may have provideda morehospi- table avenue for mobilization(Newton 1993) but was not linked to a broaderorganizational infrastructure. The predominantlyunderground homophile movement of the 1940s and 1950s has been well documented(Licata 1980/81;D'Emilio 1983). Groups such as the Daughtersof Bilitisand the MattachineSociety had exclusiveorganizational structures,6 lacked access to thepolity, and faced routineopposition from the state (see fig. 1, path 4a). The goals of the homophilemovement varied over the years as some soughtassimilation while othersthought homosexuality was a distinctiveand positivetrait thatshould not be subsumedby mainstream culture. Yet bothsides agreed on strategies:homophile activists would educateprofessionals (in particu- lar medicalprofessionals) about the realitiesof homosexuality;those pro- fessionalswould in turnadvocate forchanges in state policieson behalf of homosexuals. As thesocial stricturesagainst homosexuality loosened, the lesbian and gay movementbecame more public throughthe 1960s (Weeks 1989). Much of the emergentmovement's activism appeared to be "expressive," aimed for and at lesbians and gay men. In part, that perceptionwas

6 The homophile organizations did not publicize their meetings for fear of exposing their members as homosexuals (Marotta 1981; D'Emilio 1983).

543 AmericanJournal of Sociology strengthenedby the connectionof manyactivists in post-Stonewallorga- nizationsto the New Left(e.g., RadicaLesbians, the Furies,and the Gay LiberationFront [Teal 1971; Marotta 1981; Cruikshank1992])7 who felt thatalternative cultural forms would lead to a revolutionaryrestructuring of society.The visibleand outspokennature of 1960s and 1970s activists accountsfor the perception by scholars that the lesbian and gaymovement was fundamentallydifferent from other social movements. But thisperception is misguidedbecause it ignoresthe diversitywithin the lesbian and gay movement,even around the timeof Stonewall.The developmentof theselocal movementsand the strategiesthey chose de- pendedon theiraccess to thepolity, on theirorganizational structure, and on thetype of opposition they faced. For example,where movement leaders had access to thepolity, usually in smallercities where gay whitebusi- nessmenhad contactsin government(Gay WritersGroup 1983) or where earliermovement activities had createdpolitical access, as in Washington, D.C. (Johnson1994-95), expressiveaction was minimal.In most cases, local movementslacked access to the polityand had to createa constituency. To do so, theyhad to locate otherslike themselves.The lack of lesbianand gayinstitutions, such as churchesor bookstores,forced leaders to constructthose spaces as well as to launch politicalcampaigns. When groupslack theirown institutionsand a politicalconsciousness, they will concentrateon identityfor empowermentand community growth.Over time,as institutionsand opportunitiesto act develop,what was once seen as an expressivemovement will come to be seen as instru- mentalas politicalrepresentation increases and the emphasison empow- ermentdecreases. Once a movementhas been established,forms of collective action will depend on access to decision makers,the extentof opposition,and the degreeof inclusivenessof movementorganizations.

NEW YORK CITY AND OREGON In 1971,New York City's Gay ActivistsAlliance (GAA) launcheda campaign to add "sexual orientation"to the listof protectedcategories in the city'shuman rights ordinance.8 Although GAA engagedpolitical authori-

7 "Stonewall" refersto the 1969 riots that took place in New York City when patrons of the gay afterhoursclub, the Stonewall Inn, foughtback during a police raid. The weekend of rioting that ensued sparked national publicity for the movement, and dozens of new gay liberationistorganizations formed (Teal 1971; Marotta 1981; Dub- erman 1993), accelerating the trend toward radicalism that had begun earlier in the 1960s. 8In addition to secondary sources, I examined the papers of the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, from 1973 to 1993, and the collection of veteran gay activist Bruce Voeller, housed at the Cornell UniversityHuman Sexuality Collection.

544 Celebrationand Suppression ties in the public realm,it emphasizedidentity for critique,seeking to increase publicityand refusingto compromisefor the sake of policy change(fig. 1, path 3). Activistsborrowed freely from the tacticsof other contemporarymovements, turning sit-ins into "kiss-ins"at straightbars to protestbans on same-sexdisplays of affection(Advocate 1970a). They held peacefuldemonstrations protesting police brutality(Rosen 1980/81) and infiltratedlocal politicalclubs to "zap" public officialswith questions about police raids on gay bars,entrapment, and supportfor antidiscrimi- nationpolicies (Martello 1970b; Gay Activist 1972a). Activists consistently refusedto dressin accordancewith mainstream culture, using their identityto criticizegender roles and heterosexualnorms. In short,they used theatricaltactics that increased the scope of the conflict,demanding publicity,regardless of its potentiallydilatory effect on achieving policy change.For example,Eleanor Holmes Norton,chair of New York City's Commissionon Human Rights,offered GAA membersthe option of hold- ing private hearingson the ordinance.GAA refused,declaring that it would onlyparticipate in open hearings,although that was less likelyto achievepolicy change. GAA finallysecured public hearings after a demon- stration-intendedto be peaceful-outside General WelfareCommittee chair Saul Sharison's apartmentbuilding turned bloody when Tactical PoliceForce officerstaunted and thenbeat demonstratorswith their clubs. Despite dissensionwithin GAA, drag queens were ultimatelyallowed to participatein thehearings. City council members would subsequentlyex- ploitthe confusion between transvestism and homosexualityto defeatthe ordinance(Marotta 1981). The fightfor antidiscriminationlegislation in Oregon contrasted sharplywith the battle in New York City. Activistsin Portland and Eugene in the 1970s-primarilygay whitemen-had easy access to the politybecause of theirstatus as business persons.The PortlandTown Council(PTC), an informalcoalition of gay-orientedbusinesses and organizations,was foundedin 1970.Due largelyto the lack of oppositionand thesemi-insider status of its members,the PTC won a seriesof incremen- tal victoriesculminating in Portland'spassage of a law to prohibitdis- criminationagainst city employees on thebasis ofsexual orientation(Gay Blade 1975; PTC 1976). In Eugene, activistsalso capitalizedon theirin- sider status by choosingstrategies that discouragedmass participation, includingsecret meetings with council members. In 1977,Eugene passed a lesbian and gay rightsordinance (Gay WritersGroup 1983). The PTC also spearheaded effortsto add sexual orientationto the state's humanrights statute. Despite agonizinglynarrow defeats of state- wide antidiscriminationbills (by one vote in 1975),activists continued to workwith state officials. In 1976,at thePTC's request,Oregon Governor Straub createdthe Ad Hoc Task Force on Sexual Preferenceto conduct

545 AmericanJournal of Sociology factualresearch and to make policyrecommendations to theOregon legislature.The PTC served as an advisoryboard, recommendedareas for research,and facilitatedinteractions between lesbian and gay communities and the task force(PTC 1976; Coleman 1977). The strategiesemployed in New York City and Oregon contrasted sharply.When given the choice, New York City activistsconsistently privilegedstrategies that challenged dominant cultural values over those thatwould maximizethe likelihoodof policysuccess. By refusingto hold privatehearings with the Human RightsCommission, activists increased the scope of conflict.Rather than allayingthe fearsof legislatorsand the publicby reassuringthem of the incrementalnature of thepolicy reform, activistsexacerbated those fears by havingtransvestites testify at public hearings.In Oregon,activists were contentto hold secretmeetings with lawmakersin orderto gain legal change. What accountsfor these diverseapproaches to politicalchange? The earlystage of New York City's lesbian and gay liberationmovement appears to be consistentwith a new social movementinterpretation. At the time,movement theorists stated explicitly that the battle was overending oppressivegender roles and the restrictivecategories of heterosexuality and homosexualitythat inhibitedeveryone's true bisexual nature(Witt- man 1972; Altman 1993; Seidman 1993). Thus activistschose strategies thathighlighted differences from the straight majority, seeing themselves as theembodiment of the liberation potential. Uncompromising strategies thatreproduced the identityon whichthe movementwas based and created participatoryorganizations took priority over goals of achievingpolicy reform.Creating a sense that gay was good and should be expressed publicly,with pride, would notcome throughsecretive meetings with city officialsor concealingdrag queens. In Oregon,on the otherhand, littleemphasis was placed on creating democraticorganizations. The goals in Eugene,Portland, and at thestate levelwere to obtainnarrow legal protections. Rather than focus on mobilization,the PTC hireda lobbyistto advocate forthe new antidiscriminationlegislation (PTC 1976).The comparisonof Oregonto New York City suggeststhat newly emerging social movementswill onlyemphasize dif- ferencesthrough expressive tactics to the extentthat they lack access to the polityand a strongorganizational infrastructure. Politicalaccess and differingresources explain in partthe differentori- entationsof the Oregon and New York Cityactivists to culturaland legal change.In New York City,activists faced a closedpolity. New York State retainedan antisodomystatute, which effectively criminalized the status of beinglesbian or gay (Copelon 1990;Cain 1993) and was used to justify police entrapmentand bar raids. The New York City police routinely used violenceto quell peacefullesbian and gay demonstrationsand were

546 Celebrationand Suppression

unresponsiveto lesbians and gay men who were the victimsof violence (Advocate1970b, 1970c; Gay Activist1972b). Lesbians and gay menneeded to becomea politicalminority. To do so, theyhad to increasevisibility at the expense of losingshort-term policy battles.Influenced as well by othercontemporary movements (e.g., the Civil Rights,New Left,and feministmovements) activists had littleto lose and muchto gainby radical political action. Although deploying identityfor critique may have had long-termpolitical benefits, many saw the goal ofa politicalbattle in termsof empowering the lesbian and gay communities.In short,the politicalbattle was an opportunityto createa cul- turalshift in sensibilitiesamong lesbians and gay men (Marotta 1981). Despite the importanceof the politicalcontext, it was in interactions withthe statethat identities were formedand deployed.Although activists' analysis of the relationshipbetween political and culturalchange (Marotta1981)-either thatpolitical campaigns served the purpose of empowering activists or that political reformswould enable cultural change-produced and reinforcedcritical identities, negative interactions withthe stateentrenched an oppositionaldynamic. The New York City Council's initialrefusal to hold public hearings,in additionto the police repression(Rosen 1980/81) thatincluded the attack on demonstratorsout- side Sharison'sbuilding, cemented the antagonisticrelationship between activistsand the state.Because organizationswere inclusiveand the lesbian and gay social movementsector was relativelyundifferentiated, a culturalcritique could onlybe expressedin thepolitical realm. There was nothingabout the movementper se thatdictated the deploymentof critical identities.Activists' interpretations of the relationship between culture and politicsand thetypes of identities deployed were contingent on interactionswith the state. A second partof the formationof a criticalidentity was the absence of an organizedopposition. Because oppositionwas routine,lesbians and gay menhad onlyto definethemselves against mainstream cultural views in order to criticizethe dominantculture. Identities were constructed throughinteractions with the state, in theabsence of organizedthird par- ties.In short,inclusive movement organizations, lack of access to thepolity,negative interactions with the state,and routineopposition produced criticalidentities. Activistsin Oregon had greaterresources than did activistsin New York City,due in partto class and genderdifferences. The unique access to governmentofficials facilitated by businessconnections enabled quick passage of local legislationand almostwon passage of statewidelegisla- tion.Unlike GAA, the PTC had had mostlypositive relations with state authoritiesin Portland,Eugene, and the state capitol. So afternarrow lossesin thestate legislature, rather than respond in a criticalway through

547 AmericanJournal of Sociology

dramaticdemonstrations, the PTC approachedGovernor Robert Straub forredress (PTC 1976).Had GovernorStraub not been responsiveto lesbian and gaydemands, or, similarly, had theEugene CityCouncil initially rebuffedthe gay activists,critical identities would have been deployed, as much in reactionto the elite gay leadershipas to the state (whichis what happenedin Oregonmore than a decade later). Criticalidentities, however, were not deployedin Eugene, and success came easily as a resultof politicalaccess and the low-keytactics of the gay activists.The elitistattitude and nonparticipatorystance of the gay leadership,however, created antagonisms between different lesbian and gay communities.But because interactionswith the statehad been posi- tive, as shown by the bill's relativelyquick passage, these tensionslay dormant.When newlyorganized religious right groups placed a referen- dum to repeal Eugene's lesbian and gay rightsordinance on the ballot, the dissensionwithin the lesbian and gay communitiesmade it difficult forthem to presenta unitedfront, and theantilesbian and antigayreferen- dum ultimatelypassed (Gay Writers'Group 1983). By theend ofthe 1970s,the lesbian and gay movementhad undergone profoundinternal change.9 Activists no longerplaced the same emphasis on challenginggender roles and the constructionof heterosexualityin state-orientedlesbian and gay rightscampaigns. As manyhave observed, an ethnic-or interest-groupmodel thatsought achievement of rightsre- placed theliberation model that sought freedom from constraining gender rolesand sexual categories(Altman 1982; Paul 1982; Escoffier1985; Ep- stein1987; Seidman 1993;Gamson 1995).Institutionalized, professionally led organizationsoften supplanted the grassroots groups of the early 1970s in leadingcampaigns directed at the state.The gay liberationfronts and thegay activists'alliances had all but disappeared.In additionto internal changeswithin the lesbian and gay movement,by the end of the 1970s thereligious right emerged and workedto opposeall ofthe changes sought by lesbian and gay activists(Adam 1987). The nextsection explains why these changes within the lesbian and gay movementoccurred and what accounts for the continuedvariation in formsof collective action across the United States. Access to politicaldeci- sion makersproduced identity for education, as in Vermont(fig. 1, path 1). However, where exclusivegroups faced organizedopposition, as in

'I am referringhere to the lesbian and gay movementthat sought policy change from the state. Much lesbian and gay activism was not orientedtoward the state. For example, during the 1970s, lesbian feministssplit offfrom the feministand gay movements to formseparatist institutionsand communities(Cruikshank 1992). The political na- tureof the radical feministcommunity has been described by others(Taylor and Whit- tier 1992). Here I referonly to those lesbian or gay organizations that targeted the state.

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Colorado,a mixedmodel of identity deployment was producedas margin- alized groupswithin the lesbian and gay movementreacted to thelesbian and gay leadershipand to the opposition(path 4b). In Oregon,exclusive leadershipand intenseopposition would later produce a mixed model (path 2b). But as activistsrealized that sustaining a prolongedcampaign againstthe religiousopposition required cooperation among diverseles- bian and gay communities,organizations became moreinclusive and an educationalmodel prevailed(path 1).

VERMONT Vermont'slesbian and gay communitybegan organizingmore than a decade afterthe Stonewallriots.10 Although Vermont had a stronglesbian- feministcommunity with developed organizationaland personal networks,it had nottargeted the state about specificallylesbian or gayissues. Motivatedby the religiousright's attack on lesbian and gay rights,activists decided to work forpassage of a statewidebill that would protect lesbians and gay men fromdiscrimination. Activistsquickly obtained official recognition from the governor's office of community-appointedmale and femaleliaisons to the lesbian and gay communities.The liaisons fosteredcontact with elected officialsas well as withthe attorney general's office and theVermont Human RightsCom- mission.Close collaborationwith both officesresulted in the inclusion of protectionbased on sexual orientationin the state's Hate CrimesBill

10Data forthis section come frompersonal interviewswith both lesbian and gay activists and state officialsas well as an analysis of Out in the Mountains (monthlyissues, 1986-92), Vermont's only lesbian and gay newspaper. Interviewees included Keith E. Goslant, liaison to the Vermontgovernor's officefrom the lesbian and gay community and member of the Vermont Coalition for Lesbian and Gay Rights (hereafter VermontCoalition) (personal interview,February 25, 1995); Linda Hollingdale, activist with the Vermont Coalition (personal interview,February 22, 1995); Mary Hurlie, cochair of the VermontCoalition (personal interview,February 23, 1995); Bill Lippert, activist,and openly gay memberof the VermontState Legislature (personal interview, February 22, 1995); Peggy A. Luhrs, organizer of Vermont's firstlesbian and gay pride march, board member of the Vermont Coalition, and directorof the Burlington Women's Council (personal interview,February 25, 1995); Paul Olsen, activist; M. Holly Perdue, liaison to the Vermontgovernor's officefrom the lesbian and gay communityand memberof the VermontCoalition (personal interview,February 24, 1995); Howard Russell, organizer of Vermont's firstlesbian and gay pride march and of Vermontersfor Lesbian and Gay Rights,first openly gay candidate for the Vermont State Senate, member Vermont Coalition (personal interview, February 23, 1995); Susan Sussman, directorof the Vermont Human Rights Commission (personal interview, February 24, 1995). It should be noted that lesbian publications existed prior to the publication of Out in the Mountains, but the lesbian feministmovement did not targetthe state about specificallylesbian and/or gay issues (Luhrs, personal communication), so those publications are excluded fromthis analysis.

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(Sussman,see n. 10 above). The Vermontlegislature also passed important legislationsought by the AIDS communities(Goslant 1991). UnlikeNew York Cityactivists of the early1970s, the Vermontactiv- ists whom I intervieweddid not see policy campaignsas a vehicle for staginga culturalcritique. In fact,many claimed not to see the issue of gayrights as a culturalbattle at all, butas simplya matterof social justice. They took a laissez-faireapproach to organizing,and theyencouraged participation.They made no attemptsto constraintestimony in thepublic hearingson the lesbian and gay rightsbill. Ironically,lesbians and gay men showed up forthe hearingsconservatively dressed, in clothesmany had probablynot worn since theirfirst job interviews,choosing in this way not to challengedominant gender norms. One of the liaisons re- countedthat she would dress in her "Republicandrag" when attending hearingsat the statehouse(Perdue, see n. 10). In the finalpush forthe lesbian and gay rightsbill, Vermontactivists chose to "put a face on lesbianand gay rights,"by fosteringpersonal contact betweenconstituents and theirlegislators. In additionto telephone campaigns,they activated friendship,organizational, and professional networksto arrangemeetings between legislators and theirgay and lesbian constituentsand othersupporters of the bill-what theycalled "coffee klatches"(Hurlie, see n. 10 above). Duringthese meetings, traditional educationalwork and identityfor education activities took place. Legisla- torswere educated about the scope of the bill, emphasizingthat the bill did not endorsea lesbian and gay "lifestyle"but was simplya question of justice. Activistsused the meetingsto dispel the myththat passing a nondiscriminationlaw would lead to affirmativeaction for "queers" (Hur- lie, see n. 10) or to certaindefeat for legislators who supportedthe bill. Althoughfact sheets dispelling myths about, for example, gay men as child molesters,were distributedto each state senatorand representative,the meetingscapitalized on personalrelations (rather than social sciencestud- ies) to dispel mythsabout homosexuality(Olsen, see n. 10). By fostering personalcontact, activists themselves became the contested terrain. Activ- ists initiallytargeted the swingvotes on the judiciarycommittee so that thebill could reachthe floor, successfully swaying several votes; they then targetedother key legislators.Politicizing the personal also took place amonglegislators as one closetedgay legislatorcame out to his colleagues (Hurlie,see n. 10).11 New social movementapproaches are clearlyunable to explainthe con- servativetactics, the narrow focus on policyreform, and thelack of attentionto creatinga lesbian and gay constituencyin Vermont.The activists

11At the time of my interviews,this legislator had still refusedto come out publicly (Hurlie, see n. 10 above).

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I interviewedstated that if a lesbian and gay movementcame out of the gay rightscampaign, that would be fine,but theirgoal was to pass the bill. Part of the problemwith new social movementtheory is its failure to specifythe conditionsunder which collective action is aimed eitherat strengtheningcommunities and organizationsor at changingperceptions of the public and institutionalauthorities. Activists in Vermontdeployed identityfor education, but did not seek culturalchange through influenc- ing public opinionor creatingdemocratic organizations. In fact,the cre- ation of an ongoingorganization was an unintendedconsequence of the grassrootsstyle of organizingused by activists.The positiveinteractions withthe state and thefeeling that victory was possiblevalidated activists' choice of strategies. The structureof the lesbian and gay organizationsrunning the political campaignsin New York City in the 1970s and in Vermontin the 1980s weresimilar, yet the two groupsadopted vastly different strategies. While New York Cityactivists deployed identity for critique, Vermont activists used identityfor education. No formalorganizational structure existed in Vermontuntil after the passage of the statewidelesbian and gay rights bill. Attemptsto createa formalstructure in Vermontresulted in the de- miseof the first lesbian and gay politicalorganization, later to be replaced by the VermontCoalition (see Russell,no. 10 above). In factNew York City's groupsmay have been somewhatmore hierarchicallystructured, withthe Gay ActivistsAlliance followingRobert's Rules of Order(Mar- tello 1970a). Duringthe Vermontlesbian and gay rightscampaign, there wereno officialtitles (with the exception of the two community-appointed liaisons)or paid positionsin theVermont Coalition. Everyone was encouraged to attendorganizational meetings and publichearings and to partici- pate in communityevents such as theannual pridemarches. For example, Holly Perdue(see n. 10),one of theliaisons, recounts that members of the male leathercommunity would be encouragedto servedonuts and coffee at a gay pride rallyin an effortto maintaindiversity within the movement. Lesbian and gay activistswere able to fostercooperative relationships withpolity members in partbecause of long-termshifts in Vermontpoli- tics.Considered a one-partyRepublican state since the 1950s (Jacob and Vine 1965),by the early 1980s Vermont had a liberalDemocratic governor (Madeline Kunin) and a Democraticmajority in bothhouses. Burlington, one of the state's largestcities, elected self-proclaimedsocialist Bernie Sanders mayor. The insiderstatus of Terje Anderson,an openlygay stateand national DemocraticParty activist and movementleader, also facilitatedaccess to the polity.Because of his partywork, Anderson had access to Governor Kunin who, in 1985, largelyat Anderson'srequest, officially recognized

551 AmericanJournal of Sociology the two liaisons (Hurlie, see n. 10). In 1986, Andersonbecame chair of the platformcommittee of the state DemocraticParty. Partly as a resultof Anderson'sefforts, support for lesbian and gay rightswas in- cludedin theofficial platform of Vermont's Democratic Party (Out in the Mountains 1986). But unlikethe earlygay rightscampaigns of Oregon, wheregay men withaccess to the polityexcluded community participation(Gay Writers'Group 1983),Vermont activists encouraged participation in the politicalprocess. Furthermore,several state agencies had a traditionof activism,which created more political leverage (Sussman, see n. 10). A lack of organizedopposition also influencedthe typesof identities deployed.All of the activistsI interviewedfelt that the emotionalout- burstsand the lack of decorumcharacteristic of themostly church-based religiousopposition helped the case forlesbians and gaymen. Once again, identitiesare deployedin the contextof real-lifeinteractions in specific social settings.The presenceof a religiousopposition (no formal,conservative social movementorganizations were in evidence)that relied on emotionaland religiousappeals gave lesbianand gay activistsa visibleoppo- nent against whom to definethemselves. Given that context,it makes sense that activists,of theirown accord, would distinguishthemselves fromthe oppositionthrough conservative appearance and professional demeanor. The interactionsbetween activistsand membersof the polity and amonggroups within the activist community produced strategies that em- phasized similaritiesto the straightpublic and the incrementalnature of policyreform. The inclusivenature of the campaign,access to the polity, and thepresence of a church-basedopposition effectively severed the culturalchallenge from the political battle over rights. The nextsection looks at movementsthat faced organizedopposition.

OREGON Eugene, Oregon,was amongthe first cities whose antidiscrimination statute was targetedfor repeal. After the repeal, the lesbian and gay commu- nitymaintained good relationswith the stateDemocratic Party (Journal 1977), despite repeateddefeats of the statewideantidiscrimination bill. Activistsalso workedto fosterrelations with the state's Republican Party. In October 1987,following another defeat of Oregon's statewidelesbian and gayrights bill, Oregon governor Neil Goldschmidtissued an executive order prohibitingdiscrimination based on sexual orientationby state agencies.The orderwas payback forlesbian and gay supportduring his electioncampaign (Towslee 1987). During thatsame year,the conservative Oregon CitizensAlliance (OCA) was founded.Early the following

552 Celebrationand Suppression year,OCA announcedthat it would begina driveto overturnthe gover- nor's executiveorder through a ballotinitiative (Towslee 1988b).By No- vember,OCA had achieved its firstmajor victoryas Measure 8 was passed and the executiveorder was repealed(Towslee 1988a). Bolsteredby its success,OCA wenton the offensive,seeking to pass a statewideinitiative that would condemnhomosexuality, nullify existing local ordinances,and prohibitthe enactmentof futurelegislation to provide protectionfrom discrimination based on sexual orientation.In 1992 and 1994,OCA gatheredenough signatures to place antilesbianand antigay initiatives(Measure 9 and Measure 13, respectively)on the statebal- lot. OCA also campaignedfor a series of local antilesbianand antigay measures,passing such laws in 20 localitiesby March 1994 (Lesbian/Gay Law Notes 1994a). As the OCA campaignsgained momentum,reported incidents of anti- lesbian and antigayhate crimesskyrocketed (Egan 1992a). Althoughnei- therside was immunefrom the violence-churches on both sides of the debate were vandalized and OCA leaders receivedverbal threats(Egan 1992b)-lesbians and gay men experiencedthe bulk of actual physical assaults (Bull and Gallagher 1996).12 What strategieswere available to Oregon's lesbians and gay men in the face of such virulentopposition? Activists could have respondedto the oppositionin a numberof ways. They could have used identityfor critiqueto challengethe values and practicesof thesex-phobic society by portrayingtheir own sexualityas liberated,free from the debilitatingim- pact of strictgender roles. Additionally, they could have challengedthe idea that sexualityis static,fixed throughout a person's entirelifetime, thusdecentering heterosexuality as a normfrom which homosexuals de- viate. Alternatively,activists could have used identityfor education to show that theywere just like everyoneelse. In Vermont,this had taken the formof comingout to legislators,by constituentsand by otherlegislators, as a way to countermyths that homosexuals were sex-obsessedcreatures who preyedon innocentchildren. Identitystrategies were not the only tactics available to lesbianand gay activistsin Oregon. Strategiesthat did not make lesbians and gay men the contestedterrain could have been used. Activistscould have formed coalitionswith ethnicand racial minoritygroups. They could have focused attentionon abstractprinciples of discriminationand foundevi- dence to supporttheir claims. The "No on 9" campaign,like Oregoniansfor Fairness, the groupthat

12 Articles appearing between 1988 and 1995, found in an extensive search on Nexis, support this conclusion.

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(unsuccessfully)fought the repeal of GovernorGoldschmidt's executive orderin 1988 (UPI 1988a), refusedto refutethe OCA chargespoint by point (Johnston1994). Both embarkedon slick media campaignswith commercialsthat never mentioned the words"gay," "lesbian," or "homosexual" (e.g., Richardson1992). Activistsfeared making the campaigna referendumon homosexuality.They were afraidthat, given a choice,the population might genuinelyprefer to discriminateagainst a minority manydespised. There was also concernthat addressing OCA's allegations would lend credenceto the charges(Johnston 1994). No on 9's philosophywas to wage and to win a limitedcampaign. Its goal was not to disruptdominant notions about homosexualsor to challenge the sex/gendersystem (Johnston 1994). Nor was its goal to create a long-termorganizational infrastructure that could continueto fightOCA initiativesor advocate proactivelyfor legislation.According to Holly Pruettand Julie Davis (1995, p. 7),13"The unofficialslogans of CHFO [Campaign fora Hate Free Oregon,which became No on 9] could have been 'campaigns are about getting50% + 1 on electionday-nothing else' and 'a campaignis not a movement.'" The No on 9 leadershipwanted to avoid any typeof culturalchallenge. Those who deviatedmost from conservative, heterosexual appearances- thatis, those who seemedto fitlesbian and gaystereotypes as "bull dykes" or effeminatemen and grassrootsactivists who wantedto disruptdomi- niantnotions of sexuality-were increasinglydistanced from the campaign.According to Bull and Gallagher(1996, p. 53), forexample, Metro- politanCommunity Church pastor Gary Wilson "was asked to pass the word to directaction groupslike Queer Nation to keep theiractivities low-keyduring the campaign so as notto cause any embarrassment."Fis- suresin thelesbian and gay communitiesbecame morepronounced as the campaigndrew on. Accordingto movementleader Julie Davis, Kathleen Saadat, an African-Americanwoman snubbed by theNo on 9 leadership, formedthe group African-Americansfor Human Rightsto pursue her own styleof organizing(personal communication 1996). Unlikethe New York Cityactivists who embracedthe unconventional or the Vermontactivists who let each individualpresent their own case, the No on 9 activistsdodged the issue of morality,preferring to focuson abstractprinciples of discrimination(Johnston 1994). The directaction groupsreacted as muchto the elitistefforts of the No on 9 leadershipas to the opposition.These grassroots,direct action organizations employed moreradical tactics,increasing publicity through public demonstrations and civildisobedience (Bull and Gallagher1996). Spurred by the exclusive

13 Davis and Pruett were the campaign managers in the 1994 "No on 13" campaign.

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leadershipand (lack of)response to theorganized opposition, the ideologi- cal schismembodied in separateorganizations became about therelation- ship between political campaigns and culturalchange. The grassroots groupssaw the bill as an opportunityto strengthenthe lesbian and gay communitiesand to combat homophobicstereotypes, whereas No on 9 saw the bill as a crucialpolitical goal. By avoiding identitystrategies, specifically by avoiding a defenseof homosexuality,Oregon activists exacerbated existing tensions in the lesbian and gay communities.By 1992,the lesbian and gay movementwas split,with one factionfocusing on abstractprinciples of discrimination, underscoringsameness ratherthan difference(No on 9), while another side became more militantand deployedidentity for critique (ACT UP, Queer Nation,Bigot Busters; see Bull and Gallagher1996). Many lesbians and gay men,including Johnston (1994), resented the fact that homosexuality,itself was avoided bythe No on 9 leadership.Avoiding identity strategies necessarilyentails a focus on similaritiesto the majority,and the Oregoncampaign was no exception.Had educationalstrategies been com- bined withinclusive movement strategies, as in Vermont,the movement would have been strengthened.But by focusingonly on winningthe im- mediatecampaign, other issues, such as combatingnegative stereotypes, buildinga movement,and empoweringcommunities were neglectedso the communitywas divided. What explainsthe mixedmodel of identitydeployment that we see in Oregonin thelate 1980sand early1990s? New social movementperspec- tives help explainthe tacticsof the radical organizationsinvolved in the rightscampaign. The frustrationwithin the lesbian and gay communities over No on 9's failureto dispel mythsabout homosexuality,and the lack ofdemocratic participation within both the organization and the political campaign,fit with the view thatnew social movementsare about cultural production.However, they are unhelpfulin explainingNo on 9's strategies. Activistsin Oregon,as in Vermont,brought political experience and professionalskills to therights campaign, yet the structure of the organiza- tionsin thetwo statesdiffered. Although neither stressed public education or communityempowerment as a goal, Vermontactivists relied on inter- personalnetworks and grassrootsparticipation, whereas No on 9 limited participation.Unlike the exclusiveorganizations in Oregonin the 1970s, Oregonactivists in the 1980s and early 1990sfaced an organizedopposition,a circumstancethat fostereddissension within the communityand led to the deploymentof botheducational and criticalidentities (a mixed model,see fig.1, path 2b). Politicalcoalitions partly explain No on 9's avoidanceof identity strategies and emphasison samenessin pursuitof instrumentalgains, despite

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the potentiallyalienating effect on lesbian and gay communities.Those who opposedMeasure 9 read like a Who's Whoof politicalnotables. Cur- rentand past Democraticgovernors as well as Republicangubernatorial hopefulsopposed OCA's measures(UPI 1987, 1988b;Raric 1990, 1991). OCA leader Lon Mabon's hard line on an arrayof social issues,and the hatredhis organizationseemed to promote,led to a split in the Oregon Republican Party,so that in the end the partystood firmlyagainst the OCA's antilesbianand antigayrights initiatives.'4 In fact,Oregon's entire congressionaldelegation, including Republican Senators Hatfield and Packwood opposedMeasure 9 (Richardson1992). Community support for lesbian and gay activistsalso came fromnewspapers and civil liberterian and religiousorganizations, including the Oregon Catholic Conference (Baker 1992; AtlantaJournal and Constitution1992; Quindlen 1992). Measure 9's defeatwas a Pyrrhicvictory for Oregon's lesbian and gay movement.It became immediatelyclear that the enemywas not going anywhere.After their loss, the indefatigable OCA membersdusted them- selvesoff, got out their clipboards, and begangathering signatures to place Measure 13, a new antilesbianand antigaystatewide initiative, on the 1994 ballot.To consolidateits local victoriesOCA placed numerousanti- lesbian and antigay charterinitiatives on city ballots across Oregon (Lesbian/GayLaw Notes 1994a, 1994b).Lesbian and gay activistsneeded to recoverfrom the internecine fighting that had worsenedschisms within the movement. In directresponse to the exclusivestrategies of the No on 9 campaign, which leftthe lesbian and gay communitiesbadly divided,the "No on 13" leadershipsought to build an inclusivecampaign that would embark on long-termeducational projects and was designedto fosterorganiza- tionsthat would last beyondelection day (Pruettand Davis 1995) (Path 2b to Path 1). Anothergroup launched a "Speak Out" campaign.In this, quintessentialidentity for education strategy, 60 people wroteto every radio station,TV network,and chamberof commercein Oregon,to say thatthey would presenttheir side of the story.They called to followup, sentletters to theeditors of local newspapers,and spokeat KiwanisClubs, Lions Clubs, and othercivic, business, and communitygroups. In neighboringColorado, similarsplits handicapped the campaignto defeatAmendment 2, thatstate's antilesbianand antigayinitiative. The main differencebetween Colorado and Oregon was the extentof state

14 It shouldbe notedthat after the 1992 defeat of Measure 9, activistsfrom OCA began a concertedeffort to take controlof the OregonRepublican Party. At one pointthe party'sleader threatened to createa secondRepublican Party, in responseto theco- verttakeover mounted by OCA members(Feeney 1993).

556 Celebrationand Suppression support.Whereas in Oregon the politicalestablishment lined up firmly againstthe OCA measures,important members of Colorado's Republican Party and key state agencies supportedAmendment 2. The Catholic Churchremained silent, which was probablyconstrued as tacitendorse- mentof the measure(Bull and Gallagher1996, p. 118). Unlikein Oregon where both Measure 9 and Measure 13 were defeated,Amendment 2 passed. Regardlessof politicalaccess, exclusivemovement leadership in the face of organizedopposition in both Oregonand Colorado createda mixed model of identitydeployment, as diversesegments of the activist communitiesreacted to boththe opposingmovement and the lesbianand gay leadership.

IMPLICATIONS This approachto understandingthe strategicdeployment of identityhas potentialapplications to othermovements based on a sharedcharacteristic.For example,the Southern Civil Rightsmovement that emerged in the 1950s followedpath 1 as shown in figure2. The complexorganizational infrastructureofthe South, which included black colleges,black churches, and even beautyparlors, provided a locus fromwhich to organize(Morris 1984). Thus when federalpolicies began to change,leaders were able to mobilizefrom an existingbase (McAdam 1982; Morris 1984). Emergent, inclusivecivil rightsorganizations underscored sameness rather than dif- ferenceand soughtconcrete policy goals. Over time,the focus on identityfor education often gave way to identity forcritique as theblack powermovement gained momentum (fig. 2, path 3). Accordingto RobertScheer (1970, p. 202),black power,or "blackrevo- lution[is] the statementof an alternativesystem of values, the move to acquire power to assertthose values, and the expresswillingness to respond withrevolutionary violence to the violenceinherent in established power."By fosteringan identitybased on differencesfrom the majority, black nationalismwas a way to challengedominant cultural values, to build communities,and to create revolutionarychange. Leaders hoped that deployingcritical identities based on perceivedcultural differences would be a crucial step toward economic independenceand political power. I suggestthat local variationsin politicalaccess and organizationalin- frastructures,as well as the degree of exclusivityof African-American leadershipwould also account,in part,for the relativestress placed on deployingcritical or educationalidentities. In short,local conditions(political access and the typeof opposition)as well as the relationshipsamong African-Americanpolitical organizations should help explainthe vicissi-

557 AmericanJournal of Sociology

SouthernCivil Rights Movem ent

C Black Nationalism

OlderWing of the < FeministMovement

< YoungerWing of the FeministMovement X.X

StrongOrganizational Weak Organizational Infrastructure Infrastructure or and Access to the Polity No Access

Inclusive Exclusive Inclusive Exclusive Movement Movement Movement Movement Organizations Organizations Organizations Organizations

Routineor R or Routone n Organized Organized Rpouitione Organizedn Organized Rpouitione Organizedn Opsto OpoiinOpposition Opposition Opoion postn 1. Identity 2a. Identity 2b.Mixed 3. Identity 4a. Identity 4b.Mixed forEducation forEducation Model forCritique forEducation Model

This pathrepresents the pre-mobilization stage ofactivism

FIG. 2.-General modelof identity deployment

tudes in the deploymentof radical racial identitieson the one hand and educationalidentities on the other. Whenthe feminist movement began to emergein the 1960s,two activist factionswere identified. Older professional women appointed to stategov- ernmentalcommissions on the statusof womencreated formal organizationsand began to lobby(Evans 1979; Freeman 1984).What came to be knownas theliberal wing of feminism(Eisenstein 1983) stressed similarities to the majority,deployed identity for education (i.e., thatthere were

558 Celebrationand Suppression no sociallysignificant differences between men and women),and focused attentionon gainingformal policy reforms (fig. 2, path 1; see Evans 1979; Freeman 1984). Because of theirpolitical access, olderfeminists stressed similaritiesto men. The otherwing of the emergentfeminist movement was dominatedby college-agewomen. Lacking the politicalaccess of the olderwing, and of courseinfluenced by the New Left,these women stressed identity for critique and theiractivism followed a dramaticallydifferent path fromthat of the olderwing (fig. 2, path 3; see also Evans 1979).The youngerwing, whicheventually became identified with radical feminism, drew attention to "women'svalues" deriving from motherhood (Eisenstein 1983) as a pos- itiveand distinctcharacteristic that set womenapart from men in socially meaningfulways. Ratherthan devaluing these traits, critical female iden- titieswere deployedto criticizeproblematic manifestations of male domi- nance (such as violence[Brownmiller 1975] and nucleararms [Caldicott 1986]). Reformingpolicy and challengingculture was a goal of bothstrategies. Suppressingdifferences to denaturalizecategories such as "family"challengedthe culturalunderpinnings of existingpolicies based on an alleg- edly natural, gender-basedpublic/private distinction. Stressing differences was also a partof a broaderproject of normativechallenge.15 Over time,the relative emphasis on stressingsimilarities or differenceschanged as local conditionsvaried. This briefoverview of the feminist and Civil Rightsmovements broadly suggestshow the differingstructural locations of the actors,the extentof politicalaccess, and the strengthof the organizationalbase fromwhich these movementscould mobilize influencedthe types of identitiesdeployed.This cursoryoverview of the movements cannot (and is notmeant to) capturetheir complexity, but onlyto suggestthe importance of understandingidentity deployment and why certainmovements appear to be internallyor externally directed, and whythey seem to seek"instrumental" or "identity"goals.

15 Even movementsnot based on a shared characteristic-particularlythose mobilized around a moral shock-must decide whetheror not to deploy identitiesstrategically. For example, animal rightsactivists criticize the instrumentalrationality of science that privileges human life over animal life to justifyanimal research. Animal rights activists oftendeploy critical female identitiesas moral caretakers to underscore the inhumanityof scientificexperiments on animals. At othertimes, animal rightsactivists criticizeanimal experimentationon "rational" scientificgrounds as redundant,waste- ful, and unneccessaryresearch. In turn,scientists deploy identitiesby bringingforth pictures of adorable children whose lives were saved as a result of animal research (Jasper and Nelkin 1992; Jasperand Poulsen 1993). In short,scientists combat identity with identityto refutethe cultural critique of instrumentalrationality.

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CONCLUSION

Essentialistcharacterizations of social movementsas eithercultural and expressiveor instrumentaland politicalmiss the realitythat goals and strategies,including identity for education or critique,are relatedto con- creteinstitutional dynamics and to the structurallocation of the actors. Collectivecelebration or suppressionof differences in politicalcampaigns is the result of political access, movementinteractions with opposing movementsand with the state,as well as of interactionsamong groups withinactivist communities. Activists' interpretation of the relationship betweenculture and politicswill dependon whomthey are beingdefined against,on priorsuccesses and failures,and on theirinteractions with politymembers. In New York Cityduring the 1970s,grassroots organizations that em- phasized culturalgoals faced a closed and hostilepolity. Opposition was routine,leaving activists to definetheir identities in responseto stateau- thorities.Negative interactionswith the state and the lack of political access led to the deploymentof ever morecritical identities. By contrast, in Oregonin the 1970s,gay men with insider status by virtueof their race, gender,and class had access to the polity,and local antidiscrimination legislationpassed. In Vermont,democratic movement organizations with easy politicalaccess deployedidentity for education. The presenceof a church-basedfoe, but lack oforganized opposing movements, left activists to constructiden- titiesin oppositionto the emotionaland unprofessionalreligious opposition.In Oregonin the 1980s,exclusive leadership faced with hostile oppo- sitioncreated dissension among lesbian and gay communities,leading to a mixed model of identitydeployment. Responding to the factionalism, new leadershipemerged to pursuean inclusiveeducational strategy. Colo- rado's lesbian and gay movementalso splitas a resultof infighting,lack of politicalaccess, and the exclusivelesbian and gay leadership.Unlike Oregon,however, Amendment 2's passage leftthe futureof Colorado's lesbians and gay men up to the courts. The tensionbetween political and culturalgoals will always be an issue for social movements,not just forthe lesbian and gay movement.For example,battles rage overthe wisdomof pursuingcultural as opposed to structuraland economicchange to end povertyamong African-Americans in innercities (West 1993).The interactionalframework developed in this paper can be used to explainthese tensions. By understandingthe role of identity in social movements,we can move beyond narrowconceptualizations of movementsas entitieswith static goals and strategiesin orderto understandthe relationship between struc-

560 Celebrationand Suppression turallocation and culturaland politicalchange. Movements employ inno- vativedirect action tactics at variouspoints throughout their life cycle, not just when theyare emerging.Such actioncan be internallyor externally directed,depending on thetype of movement organizations, level of political access, and the extentof opposition.Instead of askingwhat is "new" about "new social movements,"we should focuson explainingthe struc- tural relationshipbetween identity and mobilization,when identityis a goal of collectiveaction, and underwhat politicalconditions activists ei- therdeploy educational or criticalidentities or avoid identitystrategies altogether.

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