Thompson, P., Pitts, F. H., & Ingold, J. (2020). A Strategic Left? Starmerism, Pluralism and the . Political Quarterly, 92(1), 32- 39. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-923X.12940

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A Strategic Left? Starmerism, Pluralism and the Soft Left

PAUL THOMPSON, FREDERICK HARRY PITTS AND JO INGOLD

Abstract This article places the Labour Party’s present post-Corbyn renewal in the context of previous periods of renewal in the party’s recent history, associating with the new leadership of a potential to rediscover the strategic project of the pluralist soft left as an alternative to the programmatic character of the . After assessing the Corbynist hegemony established in the Labour Party between 2015 and 2019, it considers the current absence of any clearly defined set of principles or values underpinning ‘Starmerism’. It then looks back to the Kinnockite ascendency in the 1980s, and the Blairite ascendency in the 1990s, as possi- ble templates for how the party reassesses its positioning with reference to changing elec- toral, social and economic circumstances. A critique of Corbynism’s left populism culminates in a consideration of the possible grounds for a new pluralist agenda attuned to the policy and electoral challenges Labour faces today. Keywords: Labour Party, British politics, the left, Keir Starmer, pluralism, populism

When Keir Starmer was elected Labour Introduction Party leader and formed his Shadow Cabi- AFTER A LEADERSHIP election where most can- net, it was widely reported as the return of didates carefully crept around the legacy of the ‘soft left’.3 Soft left is generally taken to Corbynism, the first few months with Keir mean the space between Corbynite remnants Starmer at the helm have been charac- on the left, and and on terised by a continued absence of bigger- the right. The soft left’s standard bearer since picture thinking. As Starmer has settled 2015, , is attracting new mem- into the leadership, commentators from bers and the ire of an increasingly irrelevant across the spectrum have issued a series of hard left. Asserting itself online and in inter- ‘whither Starmerism’ missives, searching for nal party elections, through Open Labour a systematic approach underpinning his the soft left is gaining a stronger organisa- politics.1 To query the absence of a distinc- tional profile, underpinned by values of tive ‘Starmerism’ in the wake of a bruising openness and pluralism. But positions and defeat and the worst global crisis since the policies which go beyond appeals to party Second World War does seem somewhat democracy are less well defined. Recent unrealistic. Labour under Starmer has done accusations that Starmer’s new leadership well to claw back quickly a massive poll lacks vision, meanwhile, suggest an absence deficit in difficult circumstances. Setting out of any coherent soft left agenda at the top of ideological coordinates has correctly taken the party.4 If the new leadership represents a back seat to some savvy strategising the return of the soft left, it has arisen largely around the pandemic response. Breaking without ideological trace. Unlike , it free of burdensome ‘pledges’ and immov- draws from no wellspring of intellectual able ‘values’ creates the space to build renewal or factional warfare waged for a slowly something new. There were signs in decade or more previously. Starmer’s recent virtual conference speech In its sudden resurfacing, the soft left in that a substantive vision is gradually coher- this respect resembles Corbynism. As its con- ing.2 tradictions became clear, Corbynism

© 2020 The Authors. The Political Quarterly published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Political Quarterly Publishing Co (PQPC) 1 This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License, which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non-commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made. appeared to be a ‘crest without a wave’.5 An including union bureaucrats, claimed to intellectually moribund hard left emerged speak for the working class even as a major- blinking from the political wilderness, its ity of them backed the Tories.10 accidental leader thrust into the limelight by Where the hard left represents the ‘pro- the nominations of self-described ‘morons’ in grammatic’ left, then, any soft left project the parliamentary Labour Party.6 The leader- worth its salt must instead represent a ship election in 2015 unlocked a latent yearn- ‘strategic’ left attuned to the shifting present. ing for political authenticity and purity, Political strategy, in this sense, has two fun- teamed with a post-crisis populism of the damental objects. The first is a continuing left. ability to analyse and understand core trends Once in command of the party machine, in economic social and cultural structures— Corbynism did produce a new political and in other words, to have a handle on the media ecosystem that stimulated some pas- changing dynamics of capitalism itself. The sionate debate and activism on the more cre- second is to understand changes in the elec- ative shores of . John McDonnell torate—shifts in attachments, institutions led some serious and innovative policy and preferences, and how they interact with work, but intellectually, the usual hard left broader structural changes. In his virtual reflexes backfilled the initial ideas deficit: conference speech, Starmer was right to say outdated anti-austerity politics, inconsistently that all successful Labour leaderships possess applied anti-imperialism, and an often con- a modernising project. The difficulty facing spiracist anti-capitalism.7 Rather than moor- Starmer is that the Labour centre-left has ing the project in a set of underpinning spent little time in the last five years devel- principles, these positions actually left the oping an intellectual agenda independent of party adrift morally and electorally—namely Corbynism. It is dangerous for Labour to in its response to the anti-semitism within its play host to two ascendancies within a dec- ranks and the Russian chemical attack in Sal- ade without any roots or coordinates. In isbury.8 Corbynists saw these principles as defining his modernising project within the projecting integrity, but they in fact substi- space opened up by this absence, Starmer tuted for a coherent strategy. This lack of could look back at the last time the ‘pro- strategy is not something specific to the par- grammatic left’ was influential in Labour— ticular time and place, but foundational to the 1980s—and the struggle of the ‘strategic the hard left: the hard left is in essence pro- left’ to defeat it. grammatic rather than strategic. Its politics flow from a belief in certain fundamental truths and values which, while tweaked to Pluralism in opposition fit the times, imply a strongly maximalist Although ’s famous 1985 con- realisation of every piece of a political and ference speech confronting Militant is gener- policy programme, with little consideration ally considered the catalyst for the defeat of of electoral or economic feasibility, or of the the hard left in the 1980s, the serious work need for trade-offs and compromises. of changing hearts and minds among the There is a massive hole where a strategic membership was actually undertaken by the analysis of the electorate should be, precisely Labour Coordinating Committee (LCC).11 At because the hard left is ideologically pre-dis- the time of the 1983 election defeat, the LCC posed to believe that it is already speaking was the umbrella organisation for the party’s for the working class and sometimes more left, but as the scale of the electorate’s rejec- nebulously ‘the people’.9 Rather than elec- tion became clear, the LCC split. , toral dynamics or economic conditions, the the lodestar of the hard left minority, barriers to the achievement of a maximalist described the defeat as a ‘triumph for social- programme are seen as lack of ‘correct’ lead- ism’, denominated in the 8 million people ership, activists on the ground, and the con- who voted for the party’s radical mani- nivance of the media and other shadowy festo.12 The soft left LCC majority, mean- forces arraigned against the left. The compre- while, went its own, modernising way. hensive defeat of Corbynism in the 2019 While retaining many of the radical elements election was a case in point. Corbynists, on economic policy, there was an acceptance

2PAUL T HOMPSON,FREDERICK H ARRY P ITTS AND J O I NGOLD

The Political Quarterly © 2020 The Authors. The Political Quarterly published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Political Quarterly Publishing Co (PQPC) that the structure and culture of social class resulting in soft left slates winning National had changed, developing new preferences Executive Committee elections.15 and attachments. Policies such as blanket Nevertheless, whatever advances were opposition to tenants’ right to buy their being made, the soft left was not running council homes were no longer viable. the party. Kinnock and his deputy Roy Hat- Beyond particular positions and policies, tersley’s leadership was firmly centrist, and something else was happening: the soft left while modernisation started apace, little pro- was redefining its core values. Drawing les- gress was made in developing credible, radi- sons from the limitations of top-down social- cal policies for the new era. The leadership ism in both its labourist and communist floundered around, wasting considerable form, the central leitmotif of the new politics time and effort developing and debating was pluralism. Powered by interventions by Hattersley’s inquiry into the party’s ‘aims the likes of Mike Rustin, Geoff Hodgson and and values’ and then inaugurating a well-in- Peter Hain, this called for pluralism in forms tentioned but ultimately inconclusive policy of ownership; market conditions and plan- review.16 Preoccupied with principles ulti- ning mechanisms; the social and political mately contingent on changing social and actors central to political change; and the cit- economic conditions, the defeat in the 1992 izenship rights granted employees, con- election indicated the limits of the existing sumers and tenants.13 A ‘mass politics’ modernisation project and the need for strat- perspective focussed on turning the party egy. outwards, beyond the limited activist world- view. As the LCC argued in 1986: Pluralism in power? We must not confuse the necessary alliances Whereas the 1980s are a distant memory to of activists with the central task of building a much of the modern party membership, the new popular majority for . The two lessons learnt from the 1990s still resonate. only partially overlap. Partly because of the The lessons drawn from are not unique and contrasting needs of different groups, Labour must construct a politics and always the right ones, however. One of the programme that not only addresses the abiding myths of the hard left is that New needs of particular interest groups, but Labour under Blair represented a simple and appeals across social boundaries to people as slavish continuity with neoliberalism, but the citizens as well as workers, women or con- New Labour project is best understood in sumers.14 two phases: winning and governing. The for- mer was a brilliantly successful reimagining In contrast, the hard left fought to main- of Labour as a party in touch with the mod- tain continuity with the 1983 maximalist pro- ern world and its electorate, with a popular gramme, unconcerned that the electorate had leader and leadership team. The 1997 mani- rejected it. Positions dominate politics, but festo was minimalist rather than maximalist, adherence to positions marks ideological but component parts like devolution and the purity. Little or no effort was made to anal- minimum wage were radical. In the transi- yse changing economic or cultural condi- tion between winning a popular majority tions. The dominant view was that and developing a strategy for governance, Thatcherism represented business as usual Blair went through a period of experiment- for capitalism. Emphasis fell on engineering ing with the development of a radical, third confrontations between the and way stakeholder approach, drawing on the the few local authorities where the hard left intellectual energies unlocked in the revision- held sway, like Liverpool and Lambeth. In ist left in the late 1980s and early 1990s. the face of its impossible demands and But this transition between ‘winning’ and unwinnable battles, Kinnock’s conference ‘governing’ stalled. Blair promised to both speech challenging the hard left cascaded win and govern as New Labour, without down through the LCC’s relentless campaign accounting for the different strategic require- for democratic renewal, which instigated a ments attached to each. Hamstrung by tacti- decisive shift among the membership, cal commitments to Tory spending plans, a

S TARMERISM,PLURALISM AND THE S OFT L EFT 3

© 2020 The Authors. The Political Quarterly published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of The Political Quarterly Political Quarterly Publishing Co (PQPC) huge opportunity was missed to develop a is often characterised as overly pragmatic by more transformative agenda. Two strategic its opponents, these outcomes were the orientations subsequently underpinned result of active strategies that, crafted less to Labour policy either side of the millennium. govern than to win elections, optimistically The first, inherited from the pages of Marx- misread the direction of contemporary capi- ism Today and pivotal to the Blair project via talism and the electorate. One consequence advisors like Charles Leadbeater, was an was the partial erosion of Labour’s electoral optimistic narrative about capitalism that base. projected information and knowledge as the new sources of wealth, and high-skill cre- ative and professional jobs as the engine of Populism and its discontents growth in the labour market.17 The second The global financial crash finally and fatally was a consumer-driven and market-led undermined the New Labour strategy, given approach to public sector reform, most nota- that it was premised on financialised and bly expressed in the work of Anthony Gid- debt-fuelled economic expansion paying for dens and Julian Le Grand.18 The knowledge investment in public services and labour economy narrative allowed the Chancellor, market support for the low paid. Tory strat- , to use the proceeds of eco- egy under David Cameron and George nomic expansion and financial deregulation Osborne combined liberal social policies with to make a significant boost to public spend- aggressive austerity measures to drive down ing. But, with financialisation the real driver public spending. It worked to the extent that of economic change, deregulation was a dis- the majority of the electorate came to believe aster waiting to happen. Public sector that such measures were a necessary anti- reform, meanwhile, had positive effects in dote to rising debt, and that Labour was terms of waiting times and other outcomes, responsible for there being, as Labour Trea- but led to wasteful reorganisations, exclusion sury Secretary, Liam Byrne, put it in an infa- of employee expertise and a proliferation of mous memo to his Tory successor, ‘no top down targets. money left’.19 Meanwhile, the soft left incli- The correct lesson to learn from New nations of and his strategic Labour is what separates out the soft or advisor, Stewart Wood, were not consoli- ‘strategic’ left from the centre. Unlike cen- dated into any distinctive strategic approach, trists in the mould of Blair and Brown, left and the party defaulted to a dispiriting social democrats are intrinsically more scep- brand of cautious retail politics that failed in tical about capitalism, recognising that its the 2015 election. inbuilt tendencies imply the unequal concen- Two factors changed the political land- tration of wealth and power. This is not the scape and its strategic possibilities. The first blanket anti-capitalism of the hard left, given was the Brexit victory in the 2016 referen- that capitalism can take different forms, dum, setting in motion the inexorable rise of shaped by different strategic choices. But it the populist right and the recasting of elec- does recognise that a transformative political toral blocs around remain and leave posi- agenda requires serious and systematic inter- tions. The second was Corbyn’s victory in vention and regulation. The destruction of Labour’s 2015 leadership contest, which cre- Labour’s electoral advantage in the ‘red wall’ ated the conditions for the emergence of an did not start with the excesses of Corbynism. anti-austerity left populism that, pitted It was also rooted in the mistaken assump- against the ineffectual, unprepared Theresa tions about the benign growth trajectories of May administration in the 2017 general elec- contemporary product and labour markets tion, told the right story at the right time. forged in the incomplete strategic transition But for all the rhetoric Labour advanced, the from ‘winning’ to ‘governing’ under Blair. In Tories still won. More importantly, within a reality, many regions were being left behind, short time the battle lines were redrawn with shrinking opportunities and the around Brexit, and under Corbyn’s leader- replacement of secure, skilled jobs by indus- ship Labour was completely unable to fash- tries with a preponderance of lower skill and ion any substantial or agile strategic often more precarious work. While Blairism response.

4PAUL T HOMPSON,FREDERICK H ARRY P ITTS AND J O I NGOLD

The Political Quarterly © 2020 The Authors. The Political Quarterly published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Political Quarterly Publishing Co (PQPC) In this context, a contest of rival pop- towards a more interven- ulisms was only ever likely to have one win- tionist, post-austerity state. Whether under ner. An unpopular leader and a maximalist Miliband or Corbyn, the political economy programme that few trusted or found credi- guiding recent party policy was defined by ble went up against Boris Johnson’s simple, opposition to austerity and critiques of free- resonant message on Brexit, underpinned by market capitalism struck in the long after- a strategic land grab on Labour heartlands math of the 2008 financial crisis. While this led by his electoral mastermind Dominic was necessary, Labour cannot compete in Cummings. Still programmatically fighting today’s changed landscape by remaining the last war against austerity and neoliberal- wholly in the same posture. ism when a newly interventionist Tory party Starmer’s ‘modernisation’ speech at was changing the ground of politics, Cor- Labour’s virtual party conference in Septem- bynism was not the substantial and signifi- ber showed the first tentative signs of a fresh cant social and political force it had strategic approach. This displays the influ- appeared to have become, but the virtual, ence of his new Director of Policy, Claire disconnected movement many had suspected Ainsley, whose book The New Working Class it to be in the first place.20 This was not least combines a sociology of demographic shifts in the red wall seats where the election was in class relations around work and social won and lost. Simultaneously convinced of and economic life that makes a convincing its capacity to speak for the working class, case for how policies should be developed rapt in pursuit of an imaginary ‘non-voter’, and communicated in light of these and beguiled by the emergence of new pro- changes.23 Ainsley’s strategic approach piv- gressive coalitions in its urban heartlands ots around a ‘values offer’ for the electorate and university towns, Corbynism was to identify with leader and party. This ‘offer’ wholly ill-equipped to deal with the further is, in itself, based on a close reading of erosion of this part of Labour’s traditional changing economic and cultural conditions, support.21 Throw in the party’s decimation framed in terms of the rise of a new service- in Scotland, and Starmer inherits from the based social, working class, with a mixture catastrophe of Corbynism an incredibly diffi- of precarious and more stable jobs and cult political landscape around which to incomes. It suggests that Labour’s communi- develop an electorally successful political cation and policies should articulate and strategy. mobilise the ‘core moral languages’ of voters, including care, fairness, loyalty, decency and family. Some of these themes can certainly Signs of strategy be seen in Starmer’s conference speech. The Today, the response to the Covid-19 pan- leadership clearly feels that it is at the ‘val- demic has meant that party politics on both ues offer’ stage, without the need for sides of the aisle has reverted, at times tenta- detailed policies at the moment. At this stage tively and temporarily, to technocratic type. of the electoral cycle and mid-pandemic, this But even this seemingly favourable post- is the right approach. populist context presents Labour with the Developing a strategic approach that is strategic threat of an agile and ambitious evidence based is welcome, but this is clearly Tory operation often let down by its lack- also the beginning, not the end, of strategy. adaisical leader. As indicated in Michael There are a number of tensions and issues. Gove’s recent Ditchley speech, the Tories are For example, as these values are shared taking advantage of the pandemic to acceler- across much of the electorate, to what extent ate their own pre-existing big-picture agenda do they capture the diverse experiences of for reform, targeted at the voters Labour lost the new working class, the assumed poten- at the last election.22 Taking forward the tial core vote? Many members of this class ‘levelling up’ project resulting from their live in Labour’s urban heartlands, but also in election success across the so-called red wall, the smaller red wall towns, yet their experi- this agenda is underpinned by appeals to ences and preferences often differ sharply on President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal, some issues. A granular analysis should and resonates with a wider shift across the inform the priorities and trade-offs that will

S TARMERISM,PLURALISM AND THE S OFT L EFT 5

© 2020 The Authors. The Political Quarterly published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of The Political Quarterly Political Quarterly Publishing Co (PQPC) be a necessary feature of further strategic and social contestation that introduced new and policy developments and coalition dynamism to work, welfare and the econ- building. The success of the Biden/Harris omy. Jobs programmes devolved power to campaign in winning back key ‘blue wall’ groups and communities to create collec- states in the US may also offer clues as to tively a new world of work in the shadow of electoral coalitions, but the distinctive social the Great Depression. Encouragement of cleavages in the two countries render doubt- trades unions mobilised workers to bargain ful any simple transferability. for better pay and conditions, spurring Labour’s electoral offer in the current con- employers to invest in skills and technolo- text could be sharpened by foregrounding gies, in turn generating productivity gains. the twin principles of the modern soft left The continued Conservative hammering of that emerged in the 1980s—egalitarianism trade unions means that this is completely and pluralism. Admittedly, these terms do absent from current policy responses to the not figure straightforwardly in public lan- productivity puzzle and skills gaps. A plu- guage, but they can be adapted to do so in ralist agenda, meanwhile, would promise to communication and policy. Importantly, the rebuild the world of work post-pandemic pluralist strand within the Labour Party has through channels for worker representation, always seen beyond the horizon of the cen- workplace negotiation and sectoral bargain- tralised state in policy making, seeking to ing, establishing bottom-up means to wield it only to afford other forms of power address economy-wide issues around skills in society. There is a danger that the new and productivity. Through these policies to ‘postliberal’ interventionism on right and left devolve power to workers and communities, re-concentrates power in the hands of a Labour could offer a more convincing and more directly politicised state. This would genuine vision of the government’s own ‘lev- leave unsatisfied the desires for greater con- elling up’ agenda moored in a much more trol over our lives, as expressed in a dis- fundamental redistribution and redirection torted fashion in elements of the Brexit of resources than Tory plans imply. Though campaign. Pluralism should guide policies sharp struggles are likely around the mode that signal to the public a major devolution of exit from the EU, such an egalitarian, plu- of economic and political power. Such devo- ralist approach to economic rebalancing lution resonates with the experiences of would help signal that Labour has become many northern communities during the pan- the party of ‘rebuild’ rather than continuity demic, but could be extended by situating remain, creating potential for the construc- devolution measures within a broader fed- tion of a post-populist electoral coalition. eral agenda for the UK, thus addressing To conclude, in examining some of the his- some of the very tough challenges in Scot- torical and contemporary factors that have land. Despite the devolution agenda through shaped the politics of the soft left, we are mayoral combined authorities and ‘city not suggesting that this article has identified deals’, the reins of Whitehall still pull hard all its distinctive features or differences with in the UK, with the incredibly centralised the hard left. In focussing on issues of strat- Westminster model. The Tories are still slow egy and the limitations of a programmatic to offer full devolution powers and this lim- approach, we have argued that an under- its what regions and locales can do. A com- standing of how to win is as important as an mitment to electoral reform would also be understanding of what to stand for. Some of an important signal about a pluralist political the foundations for a strategic left may be settlement that would appeal to a different emerging under Starmer, informed by the segment of a potential electoral coalition. work of his policy chief, Clare Ainsley. It is Like the Tories, Labour can look to Roo- also the case that strategic calculation does sevelt’s New Deal for inspiration in this. At not in itself signal that the outcomes have a the same time as wielding state power in an distinctive soft left political character. The unprecedented fashion, the New Deal suc- parting shots of disillusioned hard leftists ceeded precisely by giving it away.24 By currently exiting Labour speak predictably of design or by defect, Roosevelt’s reforms saw betrayal, petty nationalism and shifts to the state action enable and stimulate political right. This speaks more to their own

6PAUL T HOMPSON,FREDERICK H ARRY P ITTS AND J O I NGOLD

The Political Quarterly © 2020 The Authors. The Political Quarterly published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Political Quarterly Publishing Co (PQPC) disappointment than to a fair and robust l.org.uk/corbynism-isnt-a-social-movement- assessment of current developments. The and-labour-shouldnt-be-one/ (both accessed 16 issue is more about how Labour moves November 2020). 6 ‘ beyond the necessary, but insufficient, politi- T. Bale, P. Webb and M. Poletti, Minority cal framing of competence in the face of the views? Labour members had been longing for someone like Corbyn before he was even on incompetence of Johnson and his Cabinet. ’ ‘ ’ the ballot paper , British Politics and Policy Alongside the emergent values offer under blog, LSE, 14 March 2016; https://blogs.lse.ac. Starmer, the party needs to give a clearer uk/politicsandpolicy/54068-2/ (accessed 16 sense of what it wants the ‘new normal’ to November 2020). look like. This will not be a re-run of all or 7 M. Bolton and F. H. Pitts, Corbynism: A Critical even most of the pledges from the maximal- Approach, Bingley, Emerald Publishing, 2018. ist programme Labour offered in the 2019 8 P. Thompson and F. H. Pitts, Open Labour and a election. But it will need to demonstrate its Progressive Foreign Policy for New Times, Open Labour, 2020. own distinctive radicalism, because business 9 ‘ as usual will not cut it. F. H. Pitts, Popular delusions: Corbynism con- structs its people’, openDemocracy, 1 August 2016; https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/ Paul Thompson is Emeritus Professor of opendemocracyuk/popular-delusions-corbynism- Employment Studies at the University of constructs-its-people/ (accessed 16 November Stirling. Frederick Harry Pitts is Lecturer in 2020). Work, Employment, Organisation and Public 10 D. Cutts, M. Goodwin, O. Heath and P. Sur- Policy at University of Bristol School of Man- ridge, ‘Brexit, the 2019 general election and the agement. Jo Ingold is Associate Professor of realignment of British politics’, The Political – Human Resource Management at Deakin Quarterly, vol. 91, no. 1, 2020, pp. 7 23; P. Sur- ‘ Business School, Australia. ridge, A mountain to climb: the Labour Together 2019 election review’, The Political Quarterly, vol. 91, no. 3, 2020, pp. 659–663. Notes 11 P. Thompson and B. Lucas, The Forward March of Modernisation : A History of the LCC 1978– 1 A. Finlayson, ‘The era-defining question facing 1999, Labour Co-ordinating Committee pam- Labour: is there such a thing as Starmerism?’, phlet, 1999. , 9 September 2020; https://www. 12 M. van Hattem, ‘The state of the parties in Par- theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/sep/09/ liament II’, The Political Quarterly, vol. 55, no. 4, labour-starmerism-movement (accessed 16 1984, pp. 364–368. November 2020). 13 M. Rustin, For a Pluralist Socialism, London, 2 K. Starmer, ‘Full text of Keir Starmer’s speech Verso, 1979; G. Hodgson, Labour at the Cross- at Labour Connected’, Labour Party, 22 roads, Oxford, Martin Robertson, 1981; P. Hain, September 2020; https://labour.org.uk/press/ The Democratic Alternative: A Socialist Response full-text-of-keir-starmers-speech-at-labour-con to Britain’s Crisis, London, Penguin, 1983. nected/ (accessed 16 November 2020). 14 Labour Co-ordinating Committee, ‘Strategy for 3 T. Fisher and E. Shaw, ‘Labour is a soft-left Labour’s democratic left’, 1986. party—the 2020 leadership elections prove it’, 15 P. Thompson, ‘Hard left, soft left: Corbynism LabourList, 8 April 2020; https://labourlist. and beyond’, Renewal: A Journal of Social Democ- org/2020/04/labour-is-a-soft-left-party-the-2020- racy, vol. 24, no. 2, 2016, pp. 45–54. leadership-elections-prove-it/ (accessed 16 16 K. Pike, ‘Mere theology? Neil Kinnock and the November 2020). Labour Party’s aims and values, 1986–1988’, 4 J. Gilbert, ‘Keir Starmer’s leadership isn’t new Contemporary British History, vol. 34, no. 1, at all’, openDemocracy, 28 September 2020; 2020, pp. 95–117. https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/opende 17 J. Cruddas, ‘The left’s new urbanism’, The Polit- mocracyuk/keir-starmers-leadership-isnt-new- ical Quarterly, vol. 90, no. 1, 2019, pp. 15–22. at-all/ (accessed 16 November 2020). 18 M. Freeden, ‘The ideology of New Labour’, The 5 F. H. Pitts, ‘Can Corbynism claim the centre Political Quarterly, vol. 70, no. 1, 1999, pp. 42–51. ground?’, openDemocracy, 8 August 2016; 19 P. Owen, ‘Ex-Treasury secretary Liam Byrne’s https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/opende note to his successor: there’s no money left’, mocracyuk/can-corbynism-claim-centre- The Guardian, 17 May 2010; https://www. ground/; P. Thompson, ‘Corbynism isn’ta theguardian.com/politics/2010/may/17/liam- social movement, and Labour shouldn’tbe byrne-note-successor (accessed 16 November one’, Renewal, 24 August 2016; https://renewa 2020).

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© 2020 The Authors. The Political Quarterly published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of The Political Quarterly Political Quarterly Publishing Co (PQPC) 20 M. Bolton, ‘The terrifying hubris of Corbynism’, 22 M. Gove, ‘The privilege of public service’, Medium, 14 July 2016; https://medium.com/ given as the Ditchley Annual Lecture, 1 July @matatatatat/the-terrifying-hubris-of-corb 2020; https://www.gov.uk/government/speec ynism-6590054a9b57#.gfpb1xyvg; M. Bolton, hes/the-privilege-of-public-service-given-as-the- ‘Corbynism without Guarantees,’ Medium,10 ditchley-annual-lecture (accessed 16 November August 2016, https://web.archive.org/web/ 2020). 20170119153138/https://medium.com/@mata 23 C. Ainsley, The New Working Class, Bristol, Bris- tatatat/corbynism-without-guarantees-310d tol University Press, 2018. 760ea5a6 (both accessed 16 November 2020). 24 A. M. Schlesinger, The Crisis of the Old Order: 21 J. Ingold, ‘The general election and the elusive 1919–1933, The Age of Roosevelt, Volume I, Bos- working class vote’, Open Labour, 16 Decem- ton MA, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2003; A. ber 2019; https://openlabour.org/the-general- M. Schlesinger, The Coming of the New Deal: election-and-the-elusive-working-class-vote/? 1933–1935, The Age of Roosevelt, Volume II, Bos- fbclid=IwAR3wFrSIIRGIm6xL-nHBmvCHy ton MA, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2003; A. vU5f7OOzp09LjsF3yaNXFReCz7WLICh5t0 (ac- M. Schlesinger, The Politics of Upheaval: 1935– cessed 16 November 2020); J. Cruddas, ‘Beyond 1936, the Age of Roosevelt, Volume III, Boston political binaries: the 2019 general election and MA, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2003. the Dagenham and Rainham constituency’, The Political Quarterly, vol. 91, no. 1, 2020, pp. 74–79.

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The Political Quarterly © 2020 The Authors. The Political Quarterly published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Political Quarterly Publishing Co (PQPC)