DOCSLIB.ORG

The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Emerging Asia

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Emerging Asia 27 The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Emerging Asia Morris Goldstein and Daniel Xie 1. Introduction Three assumptions helped to guide initial thinking about the impact of the U .S .—now global—credit crisis . Each of those assumptions has had to be revised substantially . The first one was that the crisis could be contained at relatively low cost within the United States . Yet the July 2009 update to the International Mone- tary Fund’s Global Financial Stability Report (IMF 2009b) put global credit losses on U .S . loans and securities at $2 .9 trillion; projected credit losses on loans and securities originated in Europe and Japan bring the global tally to over $4 trillion—a far cry from the early estimates of $50 to $100 billion of credit losses in the U .S . subprime market .1 Support for the financial system coming from governments and central banks in the United States, the euro zone, and the United Kingdom totals nearly $9 trillion (composed of $1 .95 trillion in liquidity support, $2 .52 trillion for asset purchases, and $4 .48 tril- lion in government guarantees) .2 The U .S . fiscal deficit for both 2009 and 2010 is expected to exceed 11 percent of GDP, and the ratio of U .S . gross govern- ment debt to GDP is projected to rise from 62 percent in 2006 to 97 percent by 2010 .3 In April 2008, the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO) fore- cast 2009 U .S . economic growth at 0 .6 percent; the July [2009] update is –2 .6 percent, following real GDP declines of roughly 6 percent in both the fourth quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009 . The unemployment rate is up from 4 .9 percent pre-crisis to 9 7. percent . In terms of duration and cumu- lative output loss, this recession is our worst since the Great Depression . authors’ note: We are grateful to Bill Cline, C. Fred Bergsten, Joe Gagnon, Yusuke Hori- guchi, Nick Lardy, Jong-Wha Lee, Mike Mussa, Marcus Noland, Ted Truman, Philip Turner, and Steve Weisman for helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft. We are likewise indebted to Jon Anderson, Stephan Danninger, Kristin Forbes, and Brad Setser for making available to us some of the charts and data used in Sections 2 and 3 of this paper. 28 ASIA ECONOMIC POLICY CONFERENCE ASIA AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS Reflecting large declines in U .S . equity and housing prices, the household sav- ing rate has risen from nearly zero in 2007 to about 5 percent and could rise to 7 to 8 percent .4 A second assumption, that emerging markets would be able to “decouple” from a U .S . downturn, crumbled after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in Sep- tember 2008 . The IMF’s projection of 2009 growth in the emerging and devel- oping countries went from 6 .6 percent in April 2008 to just 1 .5 percent in July [2009] . In October 2008, the emerging market bond spread hit 850 points— almost six times its pre-crisis level in June 2007 . Industrial production and exports in emerging economies have plummeted . Even after a rise of 42 per- cent in 2009, the cumulative decline in a popular index of emerging market equi- ties (MSCI .EM) is similar (26 percent) to the decline in the Standard & Poor’s 500 index for U .S . equities (29 percent) . The Institute for International Finance (IIF 2009) projects a further decline in net private capital flows to emerging economies in 2009 to one-fifth of their 2007 level . Yet a third flawed assumption was that emerging Asia would be protected by its low exposure to U .S . subprime loans and securities, ample international reserves, current account surpluses, low dependence on commodity exports, high share of interregional trade, improved banking systems, and ability to implement countercyclical macroeconomic policies . This expectation dissolved as real GDP fell between September 2008 and March 2009 by an average annu- alized rate of 13 percent in Hong Kong, Malaysia, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand . The IMF (in the April 2009 WEO) downgraded its 2009 forecast for (wider) developing Asia to 4 .8 percent (versus a forecast of 8 .4 percent in the April 2008 WEO) . Economic growth in China dropped from a peak of nearly 14 percent in the second quarter of 2007 to 6 .8 percent in the fourth quarter of 2008 . India’s growth sank from over 10 percent at the end of 2006 to less than 5½ percent in the final quarter of 2008 . According to the (August 2009) Blue Chip Consensus forecast, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, Korea, and Taiwan are still expected to suffer outright recessions in 2009 . Emerging Asia’s exports fell at an annualized rate of 70 percent between September 2008 and Febru- ary 2009 . In June 2009, China’s exports were still 21 percent below their level of a year earlier . Between year-end 2007 and October 2008, the MSCI emerg- ing market index for Asia fell by 50 percent—versus 34 percent for the United States . Near the end of October 2008, Korea and Singapore entered into $30 bil- lion swap arrangements with the U .S . Federal Reserve . The last six months have brought their own “news,” as financial condi- tions stabilized in the United States and other advanced economies and as economic performance improved sharply in emerging Asia, prompting The GOLDSTEIN & XIE | THE IMPACT OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS ON EMERGING ASIA 29 Economist to proclaim the advent of “Asia’s Astonishing Rebound ”. Cries of “decoupling” are being revived along with an accent on Asia’s superior eco- nomic “fundamentals ”. China’s economic growth accelerated to 7 .8 per- cent in the second quarter (2009) and its (consensus) growth forecast for 2009 as a whole has been raised on the order of 100 to 200 basis points .5 So, too, with India . As highlighted by the The Economist (2009), on a sequen- tial and annualized basis, second quarter (2009) growth increased by 21 per- cent in Singapore, by 10 percent in Korea, and by 5 percent in Indonesia . Goldman Sachs (2009) now sees real GDP growth in emerging Asia reaching 5½ percent in 2009 . Asia’s export decline is slowing, with most of the region’s exports having bottomed out in February [2009] . The region’s sovereign bond spread (over U .S . Treasuries) has declined from 815 basis points in October 2008 to less than 300 basis points in late August 2009 . Stock markets have turned around, with China’s stock market up 58 percent since January and the MSCI non-Japan Asian equity index up 25 percent since the beginning of 2009 . The purpose of this paper is to document more fully how the global financial crisis has affected emerging Asia and to identify some of the key characteris- tics that have made these economies more or less vulnerable to a transmission of crises from the advanced economies . In Section 2 we offer a thumbnail sketch of how key economic variables in emerging Asia have evolved since the crisis began in the summer of 2007, and we review several studies of the effect of financial stress or growth slowdown in advanced economies on emerging Asian economies . Section 3 discusses how emerging Asia is different from other emerging economy regions in ways that matter for the contagion of crises, the emphasis here is on currency and matu- rity mismatches, the nature of the region’s foreign trade links (product composi- tion, the geographic pattern of trade, and the degree of net export-led growth), financial market integration with the advanced economies, and the scope for implementing countercyclical monetary and fiscal stimulus . Finally, Section 4 offers concluding thoughts . We focus mainly on China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malay- sia, the Philip pines, Singapore, and Thailand .6 Japan is excluded because of its size and advanced status . In the charts and tables in Section 2, we often employ (weighted) aggregate figures for “emerging Asia,” or “developing Asia”—con- structed by either the international financial institutions (IFIs) or large financial firms . Because the Chinese economy is so large relative to the other economies in our group, there is a danger that weighted averages may not reveal much about those other economies .7 Consequently, we present both individual econ- omy results as well as results for an unweighted average of Asian economies . 30 ASIA ECONOMIC POLICY CONFERENCE ASIA AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS To clarify how emerging Asia is different, we often present calculations for a group of 12 other emerging markets, or OEMs—namely, Hungary, Poland, Russia, Turkey, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela, and South Africa . 2. Impact of the Global Financial crisis on Asian economies: some mood music 2.1. Before the Crisis to Now: Behavior of Some Key Economic Variables As useful background, we summarize recent developments in economic growth, inflation rates, foreign trade, equity prices, sovereign bond spreads, exchange rates, international reserves, interest rates, credit flows, net capital inflows, financial stress, crisis severity, and headline public support for the financial sector . 2.1.1. Slowdown in Economic Growth Tables 1 and 2 show the decline in economic growth during this crisis for coun- try groups and for individual economies, respectively . We calculate the growth decline as the absolute value of the difference in real GDP growth rates between 2007 and (estimated) 2009, where the IMF’s July 2009 forecasts are employed for estimated 2009 growth .8 TaBlE 1 economic Growth slowdown, 2007–2009, by country Groups 2007– 2009f, Country Group Name 2007 2008 2009f (July) change Developing Asiaa 10 .6 7 .7 5 .5 –5 .1 ASEAN-5b 6 .3 4 .9 –0 .3 –6 .6 Newly industrialized Asian economiesc 5 .7 1 .6 –5 .2 –10 .9 Central and Eastern Europe 5 .4 2 .9 –5 .0 –10 .4 CIS and Mongolia 8 .6 5 .5 –5 .8 –14 .4 Middle East 6 .3 5 .9 2 .0 –4 .3 Western Hemisphere 5 .7 4 .2 –2 .6 –8 .3 Memo: World 5 .2 3 .2 –1 .4 –6 .6 Advanced economies 2 .7 0 .9 –3 .8 –6 .5 Emerging and developing economies 8 .3 6 .1 1 .5 –6 .8 a Developing Asia: Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, China, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Kiribati, Laos, Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tonga, Vanuatu, and Vietnam .
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Early Detection of Public Health Emergencies of International
    DISPATCHES Early Detection of Public Health Emergencies of International Concern through Undiagnosed Disease Reports in ProMED-Mail Camille Rolland, Clément Lazarus, Coralie Giese, Bastien Monate, Anne-Sophie Travert, Jérôme Salomon events for which the diagnosis has not yet been We conducted a retrospective analysis of all reports in ProMED-mail that were initially classified as undiagnosed found or reported by field professionals and cannot diseases during 2007–2018. We identified 371 cases be classified). Events in these reports take place all reported in ProMED-mail; 34% were later diagnosed. around the world, and reports are provided with- ProMED-mail could be used to supplement other undiag- out enough information to formulate a comprehen- nosed disease surveillance systems worldwide. sive risk assessment. Even though an undiagnosed disease report in o preserve human health security, a global sur- ProMED-mail might be an early signal of a major Tveillance system able to rapidly detect, verify, future event (e.g., outbreak), such reports have not and assess burgeoning outbreaks is key. The World been described in the literature. In this study, we Health Organization (WHO) International Health aimed to provide a descriptive analysis of reports of Regulations (2005) (1) provides an international and undiagnosed disease events related to human health legally binding framework for the early detection of, published on ProMED-mail since 2007 to determine reporting of, and response to any public health threat whether these reports should be considered in further (e.g., infectious disease outbreaks) that might be of in- risk assessments. ternational concern using an all-hazards approach (2).
    [Show full text]
  • Email Not Displaying Correctly
    The Euro Area Business Cycle Network would like to invite you to A discussion forum on Rethinking the Link Between Exchange Rates and Inflation: Misperceptions and New Approaches Keynote Speaker Kristin Forbes (Monetary Policy Committee, Bank of England) Discussants Frank Smets (ECB and CEPR) Giancarlo Corsetti (University of Cambridge and CEPR) Gianluca Benigno (London School of Economics and CEPR) Host Venue Bank of England Threadneedle Street London EC2R 8AH Date Monday, 28 September 2015 Presentation and discussions 14.00 – 16.00 Professor Forbes’ presentation will last about 45 minutes, and the guest speakers’ presentations will each be 15 minutes long. This will be followed by a discussion that will be open to the floor. Our aim is to have an informal, off-the-record discussion that will engage and involve all participants in response to the presentations. REGISTRATION Very limited spaces are still available. Please register by contacting Nadine Clarke at CEPR: [email protected] by 8 September. Should you require any further information about this event, please do not hesitate to get in touch. Looking forward to seeing you on 28 September. Yours faithfully Massimiliano Marcellino Scientific Chair, EABCN Kristin Forbes Kristin Forbes joined the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England in July 2014. She is also the Jerome and Dorothy Lemelson Professor of Management and Global Economics at the Sloan School of Management at MIT. She served as a Deputy Assistant Secretary in the U.S. Treasury Department from 2001- 2002, as a Member of the White House’s Council of Economic Advisers from 2003-2005, and a Member of the Governor’s Council of Economic Advisers for Massachusetts from 2009-2014.
    [Show full text]
  • Market Forces Or International Institutions? the Under-Emphasized Role of Ifis in Domestic Bank Regulatory Adoption
    Market Forces or International Institutions? The Under-Emphasized Role of IFIs in Domestic Bank Regulatory Adoption Meredith Wilf∗ January 10, 2017 For discussion at The Political Economy of International Organizations (PEIO) 2017 conference January 12-14, 2017 Abstract The 1988 Basel Capital Accord coordinated an increase in twelve signatory countries’ bank regulatory stringency. By 2001, in the absence of legal obligation to do so, more than 100 non-signatories also adopted the accord’s terms. Why? While existing explanations argue that countries adopted to prevent a reputation as weakly regulated, this is inconsistent with limited public information about adoption status. I argue instead that international organizations played a systematic role in broad adoption. Using an original dataset that codes Basel I status for 167 countries over the period 1988 to 2015, I analyze those factors that correlate with country adoption of Basel I. I find that International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs are robustly correlated and market forces hold little explanatory power. Further, IMF program effects are strongest immediately following 1997, the year that Basel I was embedded in new international best practices that entailed pub- lic reporting by the IMF. For an important bank regulation where adoption can be meaningfully compared across countries, this paper shows that the conventional understanding overstates the role of market forces and understates the role of international organizations. Further, this case illustrates how, even without a strong hegemonic preference for worldwide adoption, international agreements may evolve in unintended ways. ∗Meredith Wilf ([email protected]) is Assistant Professor in the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs (GSPIA) at University of Pittsburgh ([email protected]).
    [Show full text]
  • Heteronomics Boe Preview: Hiking Cycle but Not
    Heteronomics 28 July 2017 BoE preview: hiking cycle but not yet H1 GDP growth has disappointed by enough to leave live concerns about how weak • Philip Rush the economy currently is, which should encourage the MPC to leave Bank rate on +44 (0)7515 730675 hold in August. I expect two dissenters, with the new member joining the majority. +44 (0)2037 534656 • Falling unemployment is indicating a persistent and significant supply shock, [email protected] which is inherently inflationary and hawkish. I continue to expect the MPC to start raising Bank rate in May-18, with risks skewed earlier. • Most members may expect to hike sooner, but there is no need to commit. By clarifying that a rate increase would probably be the start of a slow cycle, the curve could steepen, strengthening Sterling, and easing the policy trade-off. That would buy time without risking a loss of credibility by failing to hike on schedule. At 12:00 BST on 3 August, the BoE will publish its latest Inflation Report along with its decision and minutes to the meeting. Since its last report on 11 May, there have been lots of surprise falls, including in unemployment, wage growth, GDP tracking estimates, Sterling, and the oil price (Figure 1). Naturally, the implications of those things are more varied, especially amid differently dated releases. At the BoE’s 15 June meeting, it turned surprisingly hawkish, with Ian McCafferty and Michael Saunders joining Kristin Forbes in voting for an immediate rate hike. The unemployment rate had fallen below the BoE’s forecast while inflation was overshooting, with the outlook stronger still amid Sterling devaluation.
    [Show full text]
  • Annual Report 2018
    ANNUAL REPORT 2018 CARNEGIE COUNCIL ANNUAL REPORT 2018 TABLE OF CONTENTS Mission 2 President’s Message 3 Activities Summary 4 Program Highlights 5 Special Initiatives by Senior Fellows 16 Additional Special Events and Activities 18 Ethics & International Affairs Quarterly Journal 22 Calendar of Events and Podcasts 25 Financial Summary 35 Thank You to our Supporters 36 Supporters 37 Officers, Trustees, and Committees 38 Staff and Fellows 39 C2G2 Advisory Group 39 Ethics & International Affairs Editorial Board 40 Pacific Delegates 40 Carnegie New Leaders 40 MISSION Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs works to foster a global conversation on major ethical challenges in international politics and in communities around the world. Broadcasting across multiple formats and media channels, Carnegie Council enriches this conversation with informative lectures, interviews, articles, and programs—all available worldwide to anyone, anywhere. We convene: The world’s leading thinkers in the discussion of global issues We communicate: Ethical perspectives to a worldwide audience We connect: Communities through the exploration of shared values CARNEGIE COUNCIL: MAKING ETHICS MATTER PRESIDENT’S MESSAGE Dear Friends, We are living in a time of accelerating climate change, yet the United States’ response is to withdraw from the Paris Climate Agreement and roll back environmental regulations; a time of growing distrust of governments, global organizations, and the very concept of liberal democracy; a time of fake news and misinformation, while professional journalists are persecuted in many countries and labeled “the enemy of the people” here in the United States. This is a time of nuclear threat; a time of increasing inequality, populism, nationalism, and authoritarianism; a time when a record number of people—over 68 million in 2017—have been driven from their homes; a time when artificial intelligence is on the cusp of changing our world forever.
    [Show full text]
  • Towards a New Paradigm in Open Strategic Autonomy?
    Towards a new paradigm in open strategic autonomy? Éric Van den Abeele 3Working Paper 2021.03 Towards a new paradigm in open strategic autonomy? Éric Van den Abeele european trade union institute trade european 3Working Paper 2021.03 ETUI publications are published to elicit comment and to encourage debate. The views expressed are those of the author(s) alone and do not necessarily represent the views of the ETUI nor those of the members of its general assembly. Brussels, 2021 © Publisher: ETUI aisbl, Brussels All rights reserved Print: ETUI Printshop, Brussels D/2021/10.574/16 ISSN 1994-4446 (print version) ISSN 1994-4454 (electronic version) The ETUI receives financial support from the European Union. The European Union is not responsible for any use made of the information contained in this publication. Table of contents Executive summary ........................................................................................................................5 Introduction .....................................................................................................................................6 Part One The EU’s dependence on the great powers ..............................................................................7 1. The United States: a love-hate relationship ...................................................................7 2. China: the systemic rival .....................................................................................................9 3. Russia: an inescapable geopolitical power .................................................................11
    [Show full text]
  • Emerging Markets Finance March 9–11, 2005
    Emerging Markets Finance March 9–11, 2005 Thursday, March 10, 2005 7:00 a.m. Breakfast Abbott Center Dining Room 8:00 a.m. Welcome Classroom 50 Robert S. Harris, Dean, The Darden School Are Emerging Markets Cheap? C. Hayes Miller, Senior Vice President—Global Equities, Baring Asset Management, Inc. Hayes Miller is a member of both the Global Equity Group and the Strategic Policy Group at Baring Asset Management, and is the portfolio manager responsible for North American clients. He has developed quantitative models for Global and EAFE equity products and has been instrumental in creating a successful Active/Passive EAFE Equity product. Miller joined Baring Asset Management in 1994 as a portfolio manager with responsibility for global equities. In 2000 he became a member of the Strategic Policy Group, a five-member team which forms country, sector, asset, and currency strategy for Baring’s global client base. Miller has a B.A. in economics and political science from Vanderbilt University, and received his C.F.A. designation in 1989. He has spoken at numerous conferences, and has written numerous research pieces, including co- authoring a manuscript on the relative importance of country, sector, and company factors for the CFA Institute Research Foundation. 8:45 a.m. Refreshment Break 9:15 a.m. Market Synchronicity Classroom 50 Moderator: Campbell Harvey, Fuqua School of Business, Duke University Campbell Harvey is the J. Paul Sticht Professor of International Business at the Fuqua School of Business, Duke University. He is also a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research in Cambridge, Massachusetts.
    [Show full text]
  • The European Community and Its Archives
    40 American Archivist / Vol. 55 / Winter 1992 European Archives in an Era of Change Downloaded from http://meridian.allenpress.com/american-archivist/article-pdf/55/1/40/2748321/aarc_55_1_504782446h23750x.pdf by guest on 02 October 2021 The European Community and Its Archives ERIC KETELAAR About the author: Eric Ketelaar is National Archivist of the Netherlands. For an expanded introduction see the Gallery of Contributors at the end of the issue. Abstracts in English, French, German, and Spanish follow the article. "ROLL UP THAT MAP; it will not be wanted bourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain— these ten years."1 With these words Wil- with countries like Austria, Malta, Mo- liam Pitt discarded a map of Europe after rocco, Sweden, and Turkey on the waiting hearing the news of the Battle of Austerlitz list for membership.2 Correlated with this (1805) in which Napoleon defeated the em- perors of Russia and Austria. Likewise, a map of today's Europe will be out of date 2After World War II, there was an organized effort shortly, as a result not of military actions to insure Europe's future strength and security through but of political and economic integration. the formation of three international communities within Europe. They are the European Coal and Steel Com- Borders between countries will continue to munity, the European Atomic Energy Community, and show on the map, but their practical im- the European Economic Community (also known as portance is diminishing. Beginning 1 Jan- the Common Market). The three are known collec- tively as the European Community. The European Coal uary 1993, the following twelve countries and Steel Community, founded in 1952, was the first of the European Community (EC) will con- of the European Communities.
    [Show full text]
  • The Labour Market
    The labour market Speech given by Michael Saunders, External MPC Member, Bank of England Resolution Foundation, London 13 January 2017 I would like to thank William Abel, Stuart Berry, Ben Broadbent, Ambrogio Cesa-Bianchi, Vivek Roy-Chowdhury, Matt Corder, Pavandeep Dhami, Kristin Forbes, Andy Haldane, Chris Jackson, Clare Macallan, Jack Marston, Alex Tuckett, Chris Redl, Steve Millard, Minouche Shafik, Bradley Speigner, and Arthur Turrell for their help in preparing this speech. The views expressed are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of the other members of the Monetary Policy Committee 1 All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx This talk focusses on the labour market, and in particular the limited response of wage growth to falling unemployment. At first glance, the labour market now looks very tight. The jobless rate is down to 4.8%, slightly below both the 2000-07 average and the MPC’s estimate of the equilibrium rate, which are about 5%1 (see figure 1). The jobless rate has only been below current levels for a few months in the last 40 years2. The short-term jobless rate is the lowest since data began in 1992. The number of job vacancies is around a record high, and the ratio of unemployment to vacancies matches the 2005 low (see figure 2). However, even with relatively low unemployment, average weekly earnings growth remains modest, at 2-3% YoY3. Unit labour cost growth is perhaps still slightly below the pace consistent with the inflation target over time4. There is little sign of significantly higher pay growth for 2017 (see figure 3).
    [Show full text]
  • On the Persistence of Labor Force Participation Rates by Gender: Evidence from OECD Countries
    On the Persistence of Labor Force Participation Rates by Gender: Evidence from OECD Countries Hervé Queneau* Brooklyn College of the City University of New York and University of Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne/IDHE-CNRS and Amit Sen‡ Xavier University This Version: December 2013 (Preliminary) Abstract We present empirical evidence regarding differences in the time series properties of labour force participation rates across gender for a group of twelve OECD countries. Our results indicate that there are gender differences in the dynamics of labor force participation rates across countries. Specifically, the female labor force participation rates are relatively more persistent in seven countries (Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, The Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain), and the male labour force participation rate is more persistent in four countries (Finland, Norway, Sweden, and the U.S.). Keywords: Labour Force Participation Rates, Gender Gap, Persistence, Unit Root JEL Classification: E24 * Corresponding Author: Brooklyn College of the City University of New York, Department of Finance and Business Management, 2900 Bedford Avenue, Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889. Phone: (718) 951-5000 Ext. 2097, Fax: (718) 951-4867, Email: [email protected]. ‡ Department of Economics, 3800 Victory Parkway, Xavier University, Cincinnati, OH 45208. Phone: (513) 745-2931, Fax: (513) 745-3692, Email: [email protected]. This author acknowledges support of the O’Conor Fellowship at Xavier University. 1. Introduction The use of the unemployment rate to ascertain the strength or state of the labour market has recently been brought into question. Murphy and Topel (1997) and Krugman (2004), for instance, have argued that there has been a decrease in the labour force participation rates in the United States that point to a weakening of its labour market.
    [Show full text]
  • 2016 Annual Report
    FINANCIAL HIGHLIGHTS Revenue and Prot Attributable to 2016 2015 Change Equity Holders of the Company Revenue (Continuing operations) Prot Attributable to Equity Holders of the Company Performance 6,000 Earnings per share HK$1.14 HK$3.04 -62% Dividends per share 5,000 - Interim HK$0.60 HK$0.60 – - Final – HK$2.00 -100% 4,000 HK$0.60 HK$2.60 -77% 3,000 HK$’mil HK$’mil HK$’ million HK$’ Revenue 2,000 - Hong Kong TV broadcasting 2,707 3,105 -13% - Hong Kong digital new media 1,000 business 230 170 35% - Programme licensing and 0 distribution 1,019 951 7% 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 - Overseas pay TV operations 169 186 -9% YEAR - Channel operations 90 105 -14% Earnings & Dividends# Per Share - Other activities 191 129 48% - Inter-segment elimination (196) (191) 2% Earnings per Share Dividends# per Share 4,210 4,455 -5% 4.5 HK$’mil HK$’mil 4 Segment (loss)/profit* 3.5 - Hong Kong TV broadcasting (71) 551 N/A 3 - Hong Kong digital new media business (29) 41 N/A 2.5 - Programme licensing and HK$ 2 distribution 444 410 8% - Overseas pay TV operations (40) (30) 31% 1.5 - Channel operations 2 18 -87% 1 - Other activities 27 11 151% 0.5 - Corporate support (33) – N/A - Inter-segment elimination 1 (1) N/A 0 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 301 1,000 -70% YEAR # excluding special dividend Total expenses∆ 3,888 3,439 13% 2016 Revenue by Operating Segment Profit attributable to equity holders 500 1,331 -62% % relating to 2015 are shown in brackets 31 December 31 December Hong Kong TV 2016 2015 broadcasting HK$’mil HK$’mil 63% (69%) Total assets 12,357 9,113 36%
    [Show full text]
  • K-Pop: South Korea and International Relations S1840797
    Eliana Maria Pia Satriano [email protected] s1840797 Word count: 12534 Title: K-pop: South Korea and International Relations s1840797 Table of Contents: 1. Chapter 1 K-pop and International Relations………………………………..……..…..3-12 1.1 Introduction ……………………………………………………………………..…..3-5 1.2 K-pop: from the National to the International Market: The History of K-pop………5-6 1.3 The Drivers Behind the K-pop Industry..………………………………….….….…6-10 1.4 The Involvement of the South Korean Government with Cultural Industries.…… 10-12 2. Chapter 2 Soft Power and Diplomacy, Music and Politics ……………………………13-17 2.1 The Interaction of Culture and Politics: Soft Power and Diplomacy………………13-15 2.2 Music and Politics - K-pop and Politics……………………………………………15-17 3. Chapter 3 Methodology and the Case Study of BTS……………………………..……18-22 3.1 Methodology………………………………………………………………….……18-19 3.2 K-Pop and BTS……………………………………………………………….……19-20 3.3 Who is BTS?………………………………………………………………….……20-22 3.4 BTS - Beyond Korea……………………………………………………………….…22 4. Chapter 4 Analysis ……………………………………………………….…….…….. 23-38 4.1 One Dream One Korea and Inter-Korea Summit……….…………………..……..23-27 4.2 BTS - Love Myself and Generation Unlimited Campaign…………………….…..27-32 4.3 Korea -France Friendship Concert..………………………………………..….…..33-35 4.4 Award of Cultural Merit…………………………………………….………….…..35-37 4.5 Discussion and Conclusion…………………………………………………….…..37-38 Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………….….39-47 !2 s1840797 CHAPTER 1: K-pop and International Relations (Seventeen 2017) 1.1 Introduction: South Korea, despite its problematic past, has undergone a fast development in the past decades and is now regarded as one of the most developed nations. A large part of its development comes from the growth of Korean popular culture, mostly known as Hallyu (Korean Wave).
    [Show full text]