Crisis Group Commentary 14 November 2017

By Piers Pigou, Senior consultant, Southern Africa

Standoff in Zimbabwe as Struggle to Succeed Mugabe Deepens

President Robert Mugabe plunged Zimbabwe During this period, veterans of the libe- into political crisis by firing his long-time ally ration war, a key pillar of Mugabe’s support, and enforcer Vice President Emmerson Mnan- broke ranks and fell behind Mnangagwa. gagwa on 6 November 2017. In this Q&A prior However, Mnangagwa was unable to embrace to an apparent army coup in Mnangagwa’s them, fearful this would be used against him favour on 14-15 November, Crisis Group’s as further evidence of disloyalty. Instead, he Senior Southern Africa Consultant Piers Pigou distanced himself from those who supported gives the background to the struggle to suc- and promoted him, which made him look weak ceed the 93-year-old president. and indecisive. His eventual fall played out in awkward This Q&A on the background to Zimbabwe’s slow motion, with the pendulum of his political political crisis of November 2017 was publi- fortunes swinging back and forth as analysts shed just before an apparent army coup on the feverishly speculated whether or not his ambi- night of 14-15 November. tions to succeed the president would be thwar- ted. Some expected Mnangagwa’s removal to What’s behind the new political crisis in play out at the party’s extraordinary congress Zimbabwe? in December. There is speculation that Mugabe The crisis began on 6 November when Pre- acted ahead of this out of fear that his health sident Mugabe fired Emmerson Mnangagwa might rapidly deteriorate. and expelled him from the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front Where does the army and security sector (ZANU-PF) party. This was not unexpected. stand on Mnangagwa’s firing? The powerful vice president had become a Mnangagwa’s support within the security serious rival and threat to the physically weake- sector, which is crucial to ZANU-PF’s conti- ned but still astute Mugabe. nued rule, supposedly made him too big to Since Vice President Joice Mujuru’s unce- fall. Evidently, this was not the case. But his remonious removal from office in late 2014, removal has lifted the lid on growing dis- there has been a debilitating factional battle content. within ZANU-PF over who would succeed the A public statement on 13 November by the aging president. It pitted Mnangagwa and his commander of the defence forces, General supporters against a group of powerful senior Constantine Chiwenga, sent an unambiguous and vocal party members – dubbed the “G40”. warning that internal dynamics in ZANU-PF, They rallied around First Lady Grace Mugabe including counter-revolutionary infiltration and by mid-2016 it was evident Mugabe tacitly into the party and hostile attitudes toward favoured his wife’s associates, who dominated the security sector from certain politicians, ZANU-PF’s Youth and Women’s Leagues. was destabilising Zimbabwe and generating INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP · 14 NOVEMBER 2017 insecurity. Without mentioning Mnangagwa, Kembo Mohadi and recently fired Finance Chiwenga called for an end to the unfolding Minister Patrick Chinamasa, who has been the purge of party elements with a liberation his- public face of re-engagement with international tory, warning that if the integrity of Zimbabwe’s financial institutions. Some may be expelled revolution was threatened, the army would from the ZANU-PF, but most will be enme- intervene. Although couched in defence of the shed in internal disciplinary processes that will Zimbabwe’s commander in chief, President significantly frustrate any possible organised Mugabe, Chiwenga implicitly was pointing his pushback from within ZANU-PF’s provincial finger at him, the first lady and certain G40 structures. A purge of senior civil servants elements. perceived as aligned to Mnangagwa also is This unprecedented public intervention has expected. sharpened tensions within both ZANU-PF and the security forces. How Mugabe responds to President Mugabe turns 94 in February this will be critical if further tensions are to be and remains the party’s presidential can- avoided. He has allowed senior officers to make didate for the 2018 election. What kind political statements before, but generally when of succession is he planning and will he these were about the opposition. On several support the elevation of his wife, Grace occasions in the last two years, he publicly has Mugabe, to the vice presidency? expressed displeasure at their intervention in Having removed his major rival, Mugabe can internal party affairs. Chiwenga’s statement now stage-manage his own succession, which goes beyond previous interventions, and likely will occur only after he dies in office. Mugabe will have to employ all his guile if he ZANU-PF’s extraordinary congress, scheduled intends to ensure continued accommodation 12 to 17 December, will see a reconfiguration with the armed forces and possible expansion of ZANU-PF’s pre- sidium to include three vice presidents (also What does Mnangagwa’s dismissal mean known as 2nd secretary), most likely the incu- for Zimbabwe’s mutating political lands- mbent, Vice President Phelekezela Mphoko, cape? Grace Mugabe and Defence Minister Sydney Mnangagwa’s networks within the party and Sekeremayi. The latter has been enthusias- state administration insulated him to some tically promoted over the last few months by extent from Mugabe’s machinations and the Grace and the G40 as the man Mugabe trusts clear intent of the first lady to bring him down. most. But, like everyone else, Sekeremayi is a By mid-2017, it was clear that the G40 was in mere appointee and serves at the president’s fact Mugabe’s own project (albeit one he may pleasure. He does not have his own power not have full control over), employed along base, and in late 2014 he had to be rescued by with his wife as a foil to contain Mnangagwa’s Mugabe after being caught in the cross-hairs of ambitions. As the noose tightened, the crude the anti-Mujuru purge. choreography of accusations against him cres- ZANU-PF’s Women and Youth Leagues, cendoed into a series of public humiliations, now supported by Vice President Mphoko, have during which he was accused of disloyalty, called on Mugabe to appoint Grace as vice pre- deceit and tribalism. It all pointed to his ine- sident. She is undoubtedly ambitious and may vitable removal. Yet, inexplicably, he hung on, well have her sights on the top job. Mugabe, the seemingly without a coherent plan and unable final arbiter, has supported his wife’s contro- to convincingly push back. versial foray into the political battlefield, where G40 acolytes in the provinces have drawn she has been effectively promoting his political up a list of Mnangagwa allies they want purged. interests. But he is aware that she is not popu- This includes long-time State Security Minister lar and that such a blatant dynastic move may INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP · 14 NOVEMBER 2017 well galvanise the fragmented opposition, as health problems have fed speculation that well as disgruntled elements within ZANU-PF. he may not be able to lead the major opposi- Her elevation to first vice president would also tion coalition, the MDC Alliance, in national not guarantee that she take over once Mugabe elections expected in April 2018, has rightly dies. Indeed, her political cachet is likely to be warned that the political environment is dange- significantly diminished when her husband is rously unstable. no longer in office. Economic conditions have visibly deterio- rated over the last two months. The volume of Can Mnangagwa stage a comeback? physical money circulating in both the formal When the axe fell last week, Mnangagwa fled to and informal economy has contracted shar- Mozambique, fearing for his own safety. This ply. Inflationary pressures exacerbated by this was an irony not lost on those who welcome liquidity crisis have driven up the cost of living, the downfall of a man nicknamed the Croco- leading to a crash in the purchasing power of dile, with a reputation for brutality and once salaries paid into bank accounts. At the same regarded as untouchable. His first public push- time, the government is continuing along back, a statement from an unknown location, a dangerous path of deficit financing, with attacked the first family for treating ZANU-PF the new Finance Minister Ignatius Chombo as their personal property and promising he announcing the budget deficit will climb to would be back to take control of the situation $1.82 billion this year (the total budget is $5.6 within a matter of weeks. billion). The government has no plan beyond Mnangagwa’s options are certainly now the limited option of domestic borrowing, more constrained. It is unclear whether he which has skyrocketed since 2013. Zimbabwe is will attempt to undermine ZANU-PF’s elec- once again heading back into hyperinflationary tion preparations or if he has the capacity to territory. do so. There is also the question of how he Mnangagwa was held out by many as the should relate to the opposition and especially best hope within ZANU-PF for piloting an eco- its principal leader, Morgan Tsvangirai, who nomic recovery predicated on re-engagement heads the Movement for Democratic Change with international creditors and a package of (MDC-T), with whom he has been accused reform that would instil a measure of much of secretly conspiring. To join the opposition needed confidence. Yet evidence that he would would be used as further “evidence” of his or could deliver on this front is not persuasive. alleged complicity, and may well further divide Those now in the ascendency within the opposition, many of whom want nothing ZANU-PF in any event are unlikely to explore to do with a man accused of an array of gross these options, especially before the elections. human rights violations and of having sought They have demonstrated no intention of doing to disrupt the opposition. But to strike out on so. In theory, Mnangagwa could lay out the his own (as Mujuru did when she formed her re-engagement, reform and recovery plan that National People’s Party) likely would have him he apparently was unable to deliver because he heading only a small and marginal party in a was constrained by internal ZANU-PF factio- fragmented political landscape. nalism. That said, if he does not come up with a coherent strategy that moves beyond efforts What does this development mean in to clawback power within ZANU-PF, few will terms of improving Zimbabwe’s prospects be convinced that he has the vision to pilot for re-engagement with international cre- such a comeback, let alone confront the bigger ditors, reform and recovery? challenge of a national recovery plan. There is widespread uncertainty regarding what will happen next. Tsvangirai, whose own