Gamez Philosophyphd.Pdf
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
i ii Abstract This project examines two problems in philosophy: The problem of a self-reflexive theory which interprets the world in a way which makes theorising impossible (the collapsing hermeneutic circle) and the problem of a multiplicity of incompatible theories (positive scepticism). When we interpret the world we are also interpreting ourselves as well. This hermeneutic circle collapses when our theory about the world cancels out our interpretation of ourselves as interpreters. On the one hand we have a world from which we have become absent; on the other hand this world is a theory which depends upon our existence as interpreters. One solution to this paradox is to keep hold of the idea that we are interpreters of the world, and discard theories about the world which threaten this interpretation. Certain theories become impossible (but not necessarily false). Alternatively, we can keep hold of the theories which make theorising impossible. This preserves theories which are useful to us, but pays the price of a fundamental incoherence. When people interpret the world they come up with a number of different interpretations. Sometimes these conflict with one another. At other times there is not enough similarity between them for anything like conflict to go on at. all. Positive scepticism describes this labyrinth of aspects without mediating between the different claims that each aspect makes. This strategy enables positive scepticism to survey a multiplicity of worldviews, but leads it into problems when the situated nature of its own aspect becomes apparent. This forces positive scepticism either to paradoxically endorse its own aspect or to dismiss itself and embrace one of the aspects around it. These problems are explored in two ways in this project. In the first two chapters they are described analytically. In the third chapter they are demonstrated concretely in a study of madness. iii This is the perfectly pure demonstration of the perfection of wisdom. No one has demonstrated it, no one has received it, no one has realized it. And since no one has realized it, no one has therein gone to final Nirvana. Nor has this demonstration of Dharma ever made anyone worthy of gifts. The Large Sutra on Perfect Wisdom, p. 311. I listen and the voice is of a world collapsing endlessly, a frozen world, under a faint untroubled sky, enough to see by, yes, and frozen too. And I hear it murmur that all wilts and yields, as if loaded down, but here there are no loads, and the ground too, unfit for loads, and the light too, down towards an end it seems can never come. For what possible end to these wastes where true light never was, nor any upright thing, nor any true foundation, but only those leaning things, forever lapsing and crumbling away, beneath a sky without memory of morning or hope of night. These things, what things, come from where, made of what? And it says that here nothing stirs, has ever stirred, will ever stir, except myself, who do not stir either, when I am there, but see and am seen. Yes a world at an end, in spite of appearances, its end brought it forth, ending it began, is it clear enough? And I too am at an end when I am there, my eyes close, my sufferings cease and I end, I wither as the living can not. And if I went on listening to that far whisper, silent long since and which I still hear, I would learn still more about this. Samuel Beckett, Molloy, pp. 41-2. iv Contents Preface: A Few General Points Regarding Style and Content vii Introduction: Limits 1 Chapter 1: Hermeneutic Circles Beginning 4 Hermeneutic Circles 7 Stable Circles 14 Collapsing Circles 17 The Invisible 23 The Return 26 Multiple Circles 29 Chapter 2: Positive Scepticism 30 Aspects 31 Conflicting Aspects 38 Charting the Labyrinth 41 Constructing the Labyrinth 82 Modes of Positive Scepticism 84 Excrescent Doubt 90 An Outline of Pyrrhonism 93 Collapse of Positive Scepticism 103 A Short Summary 111 v Chapter 3: The Homogenous Zone 113 Intimations of the Homogenous Zone 120 Collapse into the Homogenous Zone 139 Problems With the Homogenous Zone 158 The Limit 167 Collapse of the Homogenous Zone 169 Conclusion: ‘Endings ... 173 Appendices 182 Bibliography 190 vi Acknowledgements Redemptive moments: People who love me and people who care about my attempt to do Philosophy Have occasionally cut through the grey traffic days and silence. Above all I would like to acknowledge my father and mother who have supported me both financially and emotionally throughout this PhD. Without them I would never have come to Essex and my work would have lacked all the stimulus and feedback that I have gained from this environment. I would also like to thank my supervisor, Simon Critchley, for finding a way for my work to become a PhD and for suggestions that have improved this project in countless ways. A thank you also to everyone else at Essex for your invaluable feedback and advice; especially Lucia Pizarro for two years of support and encouragement, and Havi Carel for checking through the final draft and making helpful comments. vii A Few General Points Regarding Style and Content Before I embark upon this project and sail off into a dark and stormy sea of theory it will be helpful to clarify a few points about the way in which it is put together. To begin with, few (if any) of the theories within this project are my own. This project is a phenomenology of theory; a description of the multiplicity of ways in which we interpret the world and a study of their collapse. Most of the theories cited here are illustrations for the description that I am undertaking, and for the most part they are taken from our culture and philosophical tradition. Positive scepticism was inspired by Pyrrhonism and the homogenous zone was taken from a strand of thought within psychoanalysis. What is important here is not the theories themselves but the way in which they are pushed hard and torn apart at their limits. In many ways what I am engaged in here is similar to deconstruction – but this is a deconstruction of analytical theories and not continental texts.1 Second, there is my use of quotations. At times I use quotations to illustrate scholarly points. In this context I will either explicitly discuss the content of the quotation, or make the relationship between it and the main text self-evident. At other times I use quotations to illustrate the general direction of what I am saying, but without an explicit discussion of them in the main text. In the this case they are being used both to clarify the point that I am making - by pointing to an author who explains it in greater detail - and also to acknowledge that what I am saying has already been dealt with before. These quotations are intended to be both a distillation and an elaboration of what I am attempting to communicate in the main viii text, and although their explicit content will help to understand the main text, it would be better to look at the texts that they are taken from for a further elaboration of the point being made. Ideally these quotations would be hyperlinks that you could click on to move to the original works.2 Finally, there are two different ways in which I use footnotes. To preserve the flow of the argument I decided to place a lot of the scholarly material in extended footnotes on the right hand side of the page. Here you will find discussions of secondary sources and problems that there was not space for in the main text. At the bottom of the page are the usual footnotes, which provide clarifications and references that are more directly related to the central argument. Now faithful reader, the safety instructions are over; you can sit back, stretch your feet out, and enjoy the ride! 1 Even the theories of relativism and hermeneutic collapse are not my own since they came from the culture that I was thrown into. What I am doing might best be described as Western culture talking about itself. 2 Michel de Montaigne and Walter Benjamin use quotations in a similar way. For Benjamin’s use of quotations see Hannah Arendt’s introduction to Benjamin’s Illuminations (New York: Schocken Books, 1968). 1 Limits Insight into the multiple ambiguity of philosophizing acts as a deterrent [abschrekend] and ultimately betrays the entire fruitlessness of such activity. It would be a misunderstanding if we wished in the slightest to weaken this impression of the hopelessness of philosophizing, or to mediate it belatedly by indicating that in the end things are not so bad after all, that philosophy has achieved many things in the history of mankind, and so on. This is merely idle talk that talks in a direction leading away from philosophy. We must rather uphold and hold out in this terror.1 t a certain point, most philosophical discussions torture themselves with a plurality of self-enclosed and self-justifying theoretical positions. At other junctures, dizzying paradoxes of self-reflexivity bring reflection to a standstill. This project is an investigation into these strange, contradictory, self-undermining limit points. Hyper self-reflexivity will be described using the notion of a stable and collapsing hermeneutic circle. Stable hermeneutic circles can account for the presence of theory in the world. Collapsing hermeneutic circles cannot. These invisible theories claim that theory is impossible. The plurality of worldviews will be described using the notion of an aspect.