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Italy in the Entente (1914-1918) 99 A Machiavellian Ally? Italy in the Entente (1914-1918) 99 Chapter 5 A Machiavellian Ally? Italy in the Entente (1914-1918) Stefano Marcuzzi Italy’s Foreign Policy up to the First World War Italy was often considered a recalcitrant ally by the Entente powers during the First World War.1 This idea was based, in part, on deep-rooted stereotypes that depicted the Italians as a faint-hearted and opportunist people; however, it was also influenced by serious disagreements between Italy and its new allies dur- ing the war, which continued during the peace conference. Among these were conflicting views on the conduct of military and naval operations, mutual recriminations about Italy’s role in the Entente’s political and economic strate- gies, and diplomatic disputes over the post-war settlement. Anti-Italian stereo- types made negotiations over these issues very difficult and played a crucial part in the isolation suffered by Italy during and after the war. Liberal Italy’s foreign policy, from unification in 1861 onwards, strengthened these cultural prejudices towards the Italians. Italy had become unified largely thanks to foreign support, and by opportunely changing alliances in 1859 and 1866, so when it sided against its allies of the Triple Alliance (Germany and Austria-Hungary) in 1915, the myth of the ‘treacherous’ Italian became stronger and more widespread than ever. The attitude of the Italian government during the months of neutrality, which were marked by intense, secret negotiations with both the Entente and the Central Powers, following Prime Minister Antonio Salandra’s principle of sacro egoismo, seemed to confirm that Italy was playing its geopolitical game in true Machiavellian fashion. In order to fully appreciate the real reasons for the apparent double-dealing in Italian for- eign policy we need to take into consideration factors that enjoyed little attention outside Italy. The chronic instability of the Italian political system made coherent foreign policy impossible. Between 1861 and 1914 Italy had 49 governments – an aver- age of 1.08 per year – and 21 prime ministers. Because of the complex way in which the process of unification had been carried out, Liberal Italy could not 1 P. Halpern, The Naval War in the Mediterranean 1914-1918 (Annapolis, 1987), p. 374. © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2018 | doi 10.1163/9789004363724_007 100 Marcuzzi call on consolidated traditions of foreign policy to guide it. The Italian ruling class debated at length whether Italy should resign itself to being a second- class power, concentrating only on internal consolidation, or should behave like a great power. The clash between Antonio Di Rudinì and Francesco Crispi during the early phases of Italy’s colonial adventure is illustrative of the funda- mental difference between the principles of concentrazione and ‘active politics.’ The complex power dynamics in the Italian political arena saw a discrep- ancy between the programmes in domestic and foreign affairs promoted by parties belonging to the same block. The Nationalists and Catholics, belonging to the centre-right, for example, might have had similar views about internal reforms, but had different approaches regarding Italy’s ambitions for expan- sion. The former supported Italian irredentist claims for the annexation of the ‘unredeemed lands’ – Trento and Trieste, still under Hapsburg rule – as well as colonial expansion to forge an Italian empire, in emulation of ancient Rome; while the latter welcomed colonial missions of ‘civilisation,’ but opposed any war against Catholic nations. The Radicals, Republicans and Socialists, on the other hand, all belonged to the centre-left, yet the Radicals were in favour of an active role in foreign policy, whilst the others, in particular the Socialists, con- demned any military endeavour. Internal divisions within each party exacerbated this situation further. The split that occurred in the Socialist party at the outbreak of the Great War, between those who sponsored an Italian intervention to complete national unification – like Benito Mussolini and Leonida Bissolati – and those who preached neutrality following the Socialist ‘solidarity between peoples’ – like Filippo Turati, Camillo Prampolini, and Armando Borghi – is emblematic. Minor but significant divisions occurred between some Radicals of the Mazzinian tradition, who supported Italian irredentists, and those of the Giolittian school, who were ready to fight a colonial war but not a European conflict. Finally, some Liberals looked more favourably on Austria and Germany, the ‘block of order,’ others to France, the ‘Latin sister.’ The years between the ‘liberation of Rome’ in 1870 and the outbreak of the Great War were full of traumatic moments for Italy. The precarious construc- tion of the new state was accompanied by severe set-backs in foreign policy: the frustration of the Congress of Berlin, the French seizure of Tunisia, and the colonial defeats at Dogali and Adowa. Serious international crises – the Greek, Bosnian, and Moroccan crises, and the Balkan Wars – made Italy’s position ever more precarious. On one thing, then, Italian statesmen agreed: Rome could not stand alone. Finding a strong continental ally, in the event that an international crisis escalated into war, was imperative..
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