Boltzmann's H-theorem, its limitations, and the birth of (fully) statistical mechanics Harvey R. Brown Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford 10 Merton Street, Oxford OX1 4JJ, U.K.
[email protected] and Wayne Myrvold Department of Philosophy, Talbot College University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada N6A 3K7
[email protected] September 8, 2008 I say that if that proof [of the H-theorem] does not somewhere or other intro- duce some assumptions about averages, probability, or irreversibility, it cannot be valid. Culverwell (1894b) So there is a general tendency for H to diminish, although it may conceivably increase in particular cases. Just as in matters political, change for the better is possible, but the tendency is for all change to be from bad to worse. Burbury (1894a) The first man to use a truly statistical approach was Boltzmann [in 1877] and at that point kinetic theory changed into statistical mechanics even though it was another twenty odd years before Gibbs coined the expression. ter Haar (1955), pp. 296-7. Abstract A comparison is made of the traditional Loschmidt (reversibility) and Zermelo (recurrence) objections to Boltzmann's H-theorem, and its sim- plified variant in the Ehrenfests' 1912 wind-tree model. The little-cited 1896 (pre-recurrence) objection of Zermelo (similar to an 1889 argument due to Poincar´e)is also analysed. Significant differences between the objections are highlighted, and several old and modern misconceptions concerning both them and the H-theorem are clarified. We give partic- ular emphasis to the radical nature of Poincar´e'sand Zermelo's attack, and the importance of the shift in Boltzmann's thinking in response to the objections as a whole.