Copyright (c) Pacific Affairs. All rights reserved. Delivered by Ingenta to IP: 5.10.31.211 on: Tue, 20 Oct 2020 16:10:09 © Pacific Affairs: Volume91,No.2June 2018 India andItsStateCapacity (Yale UniversityPress, 2017). American AcademyofArtsandSciences. Hismostrecentbook,withWilliamR.Thompson,isAscending Chair inIndianCulturesandCivilizations atIndianaUniversity, Bloomington. HeisaFellowofthe Sumit Ganguly isaDistinguishedProfessorofPolitical ScienceandholdstheRabindranathTagore ______I the Chinese decision to construct a road on territory thatBhutandeemed the Chinesedecisiontoconstruct aroadonterritory Plateau at the Bhutan-Tibet-India trijunction. The crisis stemmed from Chinese People’s squared off on the Doklam Liberation Army (PLA) unitsfromtheIndianArmyand n thelatesummerof2017,military DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.5509/2018912231 limited probes,Bhutan Keywords: Sino-Indianborderdispute,quadrilateral,DoklamPlateau, be significantthreatsemanatingfromitsbehemothnorthern neighbour. regime in New Delhi will scale back its efforts tocope with whatit deems to in Asia. Despite Beijing’s adverse reactions it is unlikely that the current as theonlysignificantpotentialhurdletoexpansionofitsinfluence however, haveelicitedhostilereactionsfromBeijing,whichseesNewDelhi assertivenessinAsia.Theseendeavours, growing economicandmilitary inanattempttohedge againstthePRC’sthe UnitedStates,andVietnam South Asia,IndiahasalsosoughttoenhanceitstieswithAustralia,Japan, initiatives throughvariouseffortsofitsownintheneighbourhood. Beyond in thosecountries.TheModiregime,turn,soughttocounterthese strategic inroadsintoIndia’s toreduceIndia’s neighbours,trying influence border, whilethePRC continuedtomakediplomatic,commercial,and in thepast,continuedtoundertakelimitedprobesalongHimalayan efforts didnotprovesuccessful.Instead, the People’s LiberationArmy, as PRC inthehopesofimproving theirbilateralrelationship.However, these in international politics, had initially sought to diplomatically court the which ismorenationalisticandreposesgreaterfaithintheutilityofforce especially sincePrimeMinisterModiassumedofficein2014.Hisregime, the troublesthathavecometocharacterizeSino-Indianrelationship, resiled fromtheirrespectiveterritorialclaims.Thisepisodeexemplified Indian andChineseforceswithdrewfromtheregion.However, neitherside Doklam PlateauneartheIndia-Bhutan-Tibet trijunction.Afterseveralweeks, confrontationonthe adverse turnthissummerwithamilitary-to-military Sino-Indian relations,whichhavelongbeenfraught,tookanespecially On aCollisionCourse? India andChina: PERSPECTIVE Sumit Ganguly Abstract 231 Copyright (c) Pacific Affairs. All rights reserved. Delivered by Ingenta to IP: 5.10.31.211 on: Tue, 20 Oct 2020 16:10:09 South Asiaandtoweakenitstieswithneighbours. of thePeople’s RepublicofChina(PRC) tochallengeIndia’s positionin onthepart the Chineseactionswereactuallyemblematicofalargerstrategy significance of the Chinese actions. The central argument of this essay is that confronting IndiainSouthAsiaanditsimmediateenvirons. demonstrated thatforthelastdecadeorsoPRC hasbeensteadily Indian Armyunitsintotheareatopreventanyroadconstructionactivities. to beitsown.India,whichistreatyboundBhutan,chosequicklymove 232 analyst, havebeencharacterizedasrevolutionary. shift in India’s foreign policy. The changes, in the view of more than one expansion ofstrategictieswiththeUnitedStateshasrepresentedasignificant reached outtotheUnitedStatesbalanceitsgrowingstrength.Indeed to theIndianOceanregionandbeyond. competition forcriticalresources,especiallyhydrocarbons, inareasadjacent states, assomescholarshavealsonoted,areengagedinasignificant pursuing apositionofstrategicdominanceinAsia.Furthermore,thetwo that could potentially challenge the PRC’sis the only Asian country goal of weapons statusanditsrecordofeconomicgrowthsincetheearly 1990s,India sides. willingness towork withtheUnitedStateshasnodoubtpiquedBeijing. regime havebeenmorethanmerelycosmetic. measured view, it is undeniable that the changes under the Narendra Modi ______https://thediplomat.com/2017/07/the-political-geography-of-the-india-china-crisis-at-doklam/. Panda, “ThePolitical Geography of the India-China Crisis at Doklam,” 40, no.2(summer 2017):131–142. HarperCollins, 2015). Ocean andSouthChinaSea,” GlobalChange, Peace andSecurity 25,no.1(2013):5–26. Press, 2008). Secure Nation:Cooperation andConflictInChina’s Territorial Disputes(Princeton:PrincetonUniversity of thesourcesborderdisputeandonset1962warseeM. Taylor Fravel,Strong Borders, Course ontheRoofofWorld (NewDelhi:OxfordUniversityPress,2018);foranalternativeformulation includingitshistoricalbasisseeBertilLintner,discussion oftherivalry China’s IndiaWar: Collision Role ofIndiaandChinainSouthAsia,” Strategic Analysis 40,no.4(2016):307–320;forabroader com, 9August2017,https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2017-08-09/doklam-dispute-context. Cannot BackDownintheDoklam,” ChinaDaily,4August2017. Dig inHeels,StandUpforAlly,” TheHindustanTimes, 29August2017;You Dongxiao,“WhyChina Faced withtheincreasingassertivenessofPRC, Indiahastentatively capabilities,itsdefactonuclear Owing toitssize,conventionalmilitary fromboth commentary standoffoccasionedmuchperfervid The military Apart fromthestrategicpartnershipwithUnitedStates,Beijinghas 6 5 4 3 2 1 7

2 Foradetaileddiscussionofthebackgroundtothiscomplexterritorial disputeseeAnkit SumitGanguly, “HasModiTruly ChangedIndia’s ForeignPolicy?” TheWashington Quarterly SeeforexampleC.RajaMohan,Modi’s World: ExpandingIndia’s Sphere ofInfluence(NewDelhi: “Sino-Indianpowerpreponderance inmaritimeAsia:a(re-)sourceofconflicttheIndian ForadiscussionofrecentChineseinitiativesinthesubcontinentseeChristian Wagner, “The For a brief discussion see Sumit Ganguly, “The Doklam Dispute in Context,” See for exampleSutirthoPatranobis,“Unmistakable Message: Doklam ShowedIndiaCan Lostinmuchofthediscussion,however, wasthelargerstrategic Pacific Affairs: Volume91,No.2–June2018 5 7 Inparticular, India’s increased 6 Evenifonetakesamore The Diplomat, 13 July 2017, 3 Indeeditwillbe 4 ForeignAffairs. 1 Copyright (c) Pacific Affairs. All rights reserved. Delivered by Ingenta to IP: 5.10.31.211 on: Tue, 20 Oct 2020 16:10:09 United Statesproceedapace. for the “quadrilateral” mechanism involving Australia, India, Japan, and the umbrage withtheexpandingsecuritytiesbetweenIndiaandJapan,asplans context it is also reasonable to surmise that the PRC is likely to take further also lookedaskanceatIndia’s burgeoningrelationshipwithJapan. toward thePRC. Early inhisfirstterm, in2005,ChinesePrimeMinister Wen terms in office policies (2004–2009, 2009–2014) adopted a set of conciliatory For themostpart,withmarked exceptions,theUPA regimeduringbothits From theUPA totheNDA be argued,hasledthePRC torespondinanintransigentfashion. PRC. ThewillingnessoftheModiregimeto pursue afirmerapproach,itwill measure explains its readiness to adopt a more forceful stance toward the has amoreassertiveviewofnationalsecurityissues.Thisorientationinsome neighbour. Admittedly, thereislittleornoquestionthattheModiregime compelled to adopt a more assertive stance toward India’s northern continue the policies of the previous regime, the new government felt that afterinitialeffortstoimproverelationswiththePRC andtherebyto Democratic Alliance(NDA) regimeassumedofficeinApril2014.It willargue relations haveevolvedsincePrimeMinisterNarendraModioftheNational government sought to deal with the PRC and then delineate how Sino-Indian “limited probes.” preparedness andresolvealongtheHimalayanborderthroughaseriesof the twostateshasalsoenabledPRC toperiodicallytestIndia’s stance towardIndia.Ofcourse,thelongunresolvedborderdisputebetween part aboutitslong-termgoalsintheregion. seemingly inexorableriseofthePRC andgnawinguncertaintiesontheir becauseofthe four stateshavedeemedthisarrangementtobenecessary of navigationintheIndo-Pacific.However, thereisnogainsayingthatthe consultation amongstthefourstateswithaviewtowardmaintainingfreedom ______Party,’” The Times, 5November2017. ofIndia Partnership?” AsianSecurity6,no.2(2010):95–120. strategic partnershipseeDavidBrewster, “TheIndia-JapanSecurityRelationship:AnEnduring The HindustanTimes, 14September2017;forsomebackgroundtotheevolutionofIndo-Japanese Smoke, Deterrence inAmericanForeign Policy (NewYork: ColumbiaUniversityPress, 1974). and-australia-hold-working-level-quadrilateral-meeting-on-regional-cooperation/. Cooperation,” Panda, “U.S.,Japan,India,andAustralia HoldWorking-Level QuadrilateralMeetingonregional This essay will focus on how the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) These developments,inturn,haveledthePRC toadoptamoreaggressive 11 10 9 8

SaibalDasgupta,“ChinaHopesIndia-US-Australia-Japan QuadrilateralWon’t Damage‘Third SutirthoPatranobis,“ChinahasamessageforIndiaandJapan:Formpartnership, notalliance,” Foradiscussionoftheconcept a“limitedprobe”seeAlexanderGeorgeandRichard Foradiscussionofbothsharedand divergentconcernsamongstthemembersseeAnkit The Diplomat, 13 November 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/us-japan-india- 11 India andChina:AtOddsAgain 9 Thestatedgoalofthisforumistopromote 10 8 Inthis 233 Copyright (c) Pacific Affairs. All rights reserved. Delivered by Ingenta to IP: 5.10.31.211 on: Tue, 20 Oct 2020 16:10:09 The officerwastovisitthe PRC aspartofadelegationIndianbureaucrats. the PRC onthegroundsthathewasfromaregionbelongedtoPRC. northeastern IndianstateofArunachalPradeshdidnotneedavisatovisit officerfrom thecontended thatanIndianAdministrativeService a hiatusofforty-fouryearsprovedtobeshort-lived.InMay2007,thePRC consequence ofWen Jiabao’s visitandtheopeningofNathuLa Passafter Indian consumers. of anarrayChineseconsumergoodshadmadethemquiteattractiveto ofChinesegoodsintoIndia.Thecheapness would greatlyfacilitatetheentry significant developmentandpotentiallyanIndianconcessionbecauseit and . tanks thatcouldbeusedineithertheterrainofnortheast orinJammu within thenextcoupleofyears. It also floated atendertoacquire 300light a new15,000-strongdivisionanddrewupplanstodeploy aseconddivision state of Arunachal Pradesh in its northeast. Specifically, it decided to deploy presence inthedisputed slightly laterintheyearIndiabolstereditsmilitary region ofChina—along-standingChinesedemand. hand, thejointcommuniquémadeclearthatTibet wasanautonomous did not formally state that Sikkim was an integral part of India. On the other as “theSikkimStateoftheRepublicIndia.” Thatsaid,thePRC nevertheless Sikkim, anindependentstatewhichhadbeenmergedwithIndiain1975, communiqué. Indian interlocutors were pleased because it referred to commentators alsodrewmuchcomfortfromthelanguageofjoint on theresolutionoflong-standingborderdispute.SomeIndian Jiabao visitedIndia.Thevisitculminatedinanagreementontradeandalso 234 and other transport facilities on the Indian side. Faced intrusions, theUPA withtheserepeatedPLA decidedtoimproveroad because ofbetterinfrastructureontheChinesesidecontestedborder. and Kashmir. couldundertakethese probes Inlargemeasure,thePLA village ofDemchokinLadakh,thenorthernregionstateJammu a seriesofPeople’s incursionstookplacenearthe LiberationArmy(PLA) which hadbeenclosedsincethe1962Sino-Indianborderwar. relations. Specifically, the twosidesagreed tore-open theNathuLa Pass, ______Times, 12November2009. The ChristianScienceMonitor,9September2009. Cooperation,” 2010):137–158. 52,no.1(February-March Survival July 2006. Whatever goodwill that developed in Sino-Indian relations as a Matters continuedtoworsenduringtheUPA regime. In2009,forexample, nextyearinSino-Indian Some improvementsdidtakeplacethevery 16 15 14 13 12

ArunJoshi,“IndianArmytoDeploy moretroopsalongArunachalborder,” TheHindustan BenArnoldy, change,” “GrowingnumberofChinaincursionsintoIndialeadtoastrategy “IndiaandChina:Conflict ForadiscussionseeDavidMalone and RohanMukherjee, AmbarSinghRoy, “SikkimTraders Gung-HoOverOpeningofNathulaPass,” TheHindu,5 BrahmaChellaney, “SikkiminIndia-ChinaRelations,” TheHindustanTimes , 6June2008. 16 Pacific Affairs: Volume91,No.2–June2018 15 It is also worth noting that 12 13 Thiswasa 14 Copyright (c) Pacific Affairs. All rights reserved. Delivered by Ingenta to IP: 5.10.31.211 on: Tue, 20 Oct 2020 16:10:09 link Tibet with the province of Xinjiang. that Pakistanhadcededtoitin1963.ThehighwayenabledthePRC to near theKarakorumHighwaythatPRC hadconstructedthrough territory deemed to bewithin its territory. This probe was significant asit tookplace crossedoverintoareasnear DauletBegOldiinLadakhthatIndia PLA beefed-up Indianforcesalongtheborder, inMayof2013contingentsthe parts oftheHimalayanborder. continuedtoprobeandprodIndianforcesalongvarious resolve thePLA way totheportofGwadarinBaluchistan. stemmed fromitsongoingeffortstoextendtheKarakorumHighwayall specialists arguedthattheChinesedecisiontodeploytroopsinthisarea disputed stateofJammuandKashmir. Indianpolicyanalystsand China troopsintoaPakistani-controlledGilgit-Baltistanregionofthe ofPLA entry ______defence exchanges. Kashmir. This decisionhadledtheIndiangovernmenttosuspendallbilateral Northern ArmycommanderresponsibleforthesecurityofJammuand and IndianSoldiers WithdrawFromDisputedTerritory,” TheNewYork Times, 6May2013. india-withdraw-troops-daulat-beg-oldie--ending-standoff; alsoseeHeatherTimmons, “Chinese Oldie, EndingStandoff,” GlobalPost , 6May2013,https://www.pri.org/stories/2013-05-06/china-and- also seeTNN,“Chinaatitagain,denies visatoArunachalofficer,” 2012. TheTimes ofIndia,7January 2010 Vietnam, with whomthePRCVietnam, hadlongstrainedrelations. unhappy about India’s growing overtures toward otherstates,mostnotably the border. In their view, it was designed to send a message that Beijing was this incident had a larger significance beyondtesting India’s resolve along Prime MinisterLiKequiangtoNewDelhi.SomeIndian analystsarguedthat occurred barelyamonthorsopriortotheimpendingvisit ofthenewChinese end this standoff. Curiously enough, this incidentforces did the PLA offices ofthetwocountriesineventanincidentalongborder. This accordwasdesignedtofacilitatereal-timecontactbetweentheforeign negotiations withthePRC, Indiasignedaborderagreementinthesamemonth. in itsnortheasternregion.Despitetheseirritants,aspartofongoing was asignalthatthePRC wasdisputingIndia’s claimtowideswathesofterritory Though noreasonwasgiven,Indianinterlocutors assumedthatthe decision grant avisatoseniorIndianAirForceofficerhailingfromthenortheast. 2012,itrefusedto ante onavarietyofotherissues.Forexample,inJanuary deteriorate fortherestofUPA’s yearsinpowerasBeijingchosetoupthe In a move probably designed to test thepreparedness and alertness of The next year saw a renewal of Sino-Indian tensions owing to reports of the The nextyearsawarenewalofSino-Indiantensionsowingtoreportsthe 21 20 19 18 17 Earlier, in2010,ChinahaddeniedavisatoGeneralB.S.Jaswal,the

Freya Petersen “China and India Withdraw Troops and Jason Overdorf, From DauletBeg makeincursionbidsinLadakh,” PTI,ChinesePLA TheIndianExpress, 5April2015. PTI,“ChinadeniesvisatoIAFofficer: Indianputsvisitonhold,” IndiaToday 2012; , 6January For thetextofagreementsee:http://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/17963/ PressTrust ofIndia(PTI),“China’s PresenceinGilgit-Baltistan:NYT,” TheHindu , 29August 19 As the regime in New Delhi appeared to stiffen its India andChina:AtOddsAgain 20 Only when confronted with Indian 17 Bilateral relations continued to Bilateralrelationscontinuedto 21 18 235 Copyright (c) Pacific Affairs. All rights reserved. Delivered by Ingenta to IP: 5.10.31.211 on: Tue, 20 Oct 2020 16:10:09 (CBM) builtuponprioraccords. In effect,thisagreementwasasignificantconfidence-buildingmeasure restraint andwouldnotharasseachother’s patrolsinborderareas. military they wouldavoidprovocativeactions,andexercisemutualself- along the (the de facto border) for offensive purposes, that forces matters, thetwosidesreiteratedthattheywouldnotusetheirmilitary designedtoavoidconflictalongthedisputedborder.(BDCA) Amongother signing ofamajoraccord,theBorderDefenceandCooperationAgreement considerable significance.InBeijing,ManmohanSinghpresidedoverthe Minister ManmohanSinghvisitedBeijinginOctober2013.Thisvisitwasof maintain andfosteraworking relationshipwiththePRC. To thatend,Prime 236 statement, the PRC hit back, saying it had “never waged a war of aggression abandon its“expansionist mindset.” Obviouslypiqued byhispublic During anelectionrallyearlier intheyear, healsowarnedthePRC to to adopt a tougher stance toward India’s long-standing adversary, Pakistan. Janata Party(BJP),madeclearduringtheelectioncampaign thatheintended assumed officein2014.Modi,amemberoftheright-of-centre Bharatiya a morerobustresponsetoChineseprovocationswhen PrimeMinisterModi Amongst India’s attentivepublicitwaswidelyexpected thattherewouldbe MinisterModi The Sino-IndianRelationshipUnderPrime of India.” whohadreferredtothestateasan“integralandimportantpart Mukherjee, from thePRC probablystemmedfromthevisitofIndia’s president,Pranab Arunachal PradeshinIndia’s northeastas“SouthTibet.” reaction The angry crisis. Weeks afterSingh’s visittoBeijingthePRC referredtothestateof the borderdispute,clearly, wasnoclosertoaresolutioninthewakeofthis did the PLA unitsbackoff. did thePLA took placeinLadakh.OnlywhenIndianforcessteadfastlystoodtheirground the UPA incursions regime.Forexample,inMarch2014aseriesoffreshPLA visas forIndiannationalsfromitsnortheasttravellingtothePRC. example, theIndiandelegationmadenoheadwayonissueofstapled important, other extant Indian concerns remained unaddressed. For ______http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/chinas-arunachal-pradesh-fixation/. News andAnalysis,23October2013. com/2014/01/13/india-china-border-agreement-much-ado-about-nothing. Agreement: MuchAdoaboutNothing,” Foreign Policy.com 2013,http://foreignpolicy., 13January Despite thesevarioussetbacks,theUPA regimepersistedinitseffortsto The tacticaldimensionsofthisagreementbecamequicklyapparent,as 25 24 23 22

PNS/Agencies,“ChinaMakesFresh IncursionBidinLadalh,” ThePioneer,19March2014. AakritiBachhawat,“China’s Arunachal PradeshFixation,” TheDiplomat,16December2013, PTI,“India,Chinasignborderagreement; nobreakthroughoverstapledvisaissue,” Daily ForaskepticalaccountofthisagreementseeMonikaChansoria,“India-China Border 24 Mattersdidnotsubstantiallyimproveduringtheremainderof Pacific Affairs: Volume91,No.2–June2018 25 22 Thoughthismeasurewasnodoubt 23 Copyright (c) Pacific Affairs. All rights reserved. Delivered by Ingenta to IP: 5.10.31.211 on: Tue, 20 Oct 2020 16:10:09 billion. education, andtourism,withthePRC promisingtoinvestasmuchUS$20 matters, signedadozenpacts,discussedtheexpansionofculturalexchanges, substantially deepenbilateraleconomicties.XiandModi,amongother note thattheseincidentstookplaceevenasthetwoleadersmovedto state visit. after assumingoffice,heinvitedhiscounterpart,XiJinping,toIndiafora posture towardthePRC, were nodoubtpleasantlysurprisedwhenshortly those circles,whohadfearedModiwouldadoptaneedlesslyprovocative to occupyanyinchoflandothercountries.” ______border, Modicategoricallyemphasized tohisChineseguestthatthese had soughttopaperoverordownplaySino-Indianconfrontations alongthe state ofGujarat,yetanotherincidentmarredSino-Indianrelations. Xi with considerable fanfare, including plans to host him in Modi’s home future oftheSino-Indianrelationship.EvenasNewDelhipreparedtogreet its trooppresenceintheregion,leadingtoathree-weekstandoff. entered the fray. Faced with thePLA’s involvement India moved to bolster quickly Chinese civiliansmountedaprotest.SoonthereafterunitsofthePLA border nearthevillageofDemchok.Aseffortwasunderway, initially precipitant wasanIndianefforttobuildacanalalongtheundemarcated was a border clash that took place in Ladakh. On this occasion, the apparent Swaraj, tolaythegroundwork forXi’s impendingvisit. visited New Delhi and Yi held discussions with his counterpart, Sushma proved necessary before thisstandoff couldbedefused. proved necessary deals,” FinancialTimes, 18September2014. Time Mallet,“China-Indiastand-off overshadowsXiJinping’s, 18September2014;alsoseeVictor to raiseissuewithPresidentXiJinping,” DailyNewsandAnalysis,18September2014. September 2014. visit,” TheGuardian, 16September2014. Hindustan Times, 9September2014. 8 June2014. the Chinese-builttrack. who had dealt with similar incursions, responded with alacrity and destroyed construct aroadwithinwhatIndiadeemedtobeitsterritory. Indianforces, part ofthisregion,precipitatedbyaChineseefforttolevelrivuletand encounter alsotookplaceinLadakh,theChumarsectoreastern 31 30 29 28 27 26 It isimportanttounderscorethatunlikeinthepast,when previousregimes This wouldnotbetheonlyincidentthatraisequestionsabout On theeveofXi’s visit, twoborderincidentscastalongshadow. Thefirst

RishiIyengar, “ABorderStandoffandFree Tibet Protests MarXiJinping’s ArrivalinDelhi,” DNA Web Team, “Chinesearmy makesfreshincursionintoLadakh:PMNarendraModilikely ShishirGupta,“China,Indiainborder SkirmishaheadofXi’s visit,” TheHindustanTimes, 16 JasonBurke andTania Branigan, “India-ChinaborderstandoffhighlightstensionsbeforeXi Sutirtho Patranobis, “China’s President Xi Jinping’s visit to India, focus on first lady,” PTI,“ChineseforeignministerWang holdstalkswithSushmaSwaraj,” Yi The 31 27 To thatend,inJune2014,theChineseForeignMinisterWang India andChina:AtOddsAgain 29 Various flagmeetingsbetweenlocalcommanders 26 Consequently, somewithin 30 Itisintriguingto Times ofIndia, 28 This 237 The Copyright (c) Pacific Affairs. All rights reserved. Delivered by Ingenta to IP: 5.10.31.211 on: Tue, 20 Oct 2020 16:10:09 ______The Times ofIndia,1May2017. Hindustan Times, 1June2015. on-their-border-dispute/. 2015,http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/china-and-india-want-a-breakthrough- Diplomat, 5February 2016. Times, 4February sabotaged-xi-jinpings-india-visit/#2484039070fa. Forbes.com, 23September2014,https://www.forbes.com/sites/ericrmeyer/2014/09/23/who- Books, 2015). Xi Jinping,” TheTimes ofIndia , 20September2014. he toldhisguestthat“alittletoothachecanparalyzetheentirebody.” incidents were a significant issue. Hemade India’s discomfiture clearwhen 238 inJammuandKashmir.territory this projectasitwouldinvolvetheconstructionofaroadthroughdisputed its “one belt,oneroad”initiative.Shortlythereafter, Indiasharplyprotested in mid-May 2015. About a month prior to Modi’s visit the PRC announced headway ontheseeminglyirresolvableborderdispute. the ministerforExternalAffairs,toBeijingexploreopportunitiessome ahead inhiseffortstoengagethePRC. Infact,heevendispatchedSwaraj, apply toXi’s PRC. further theirownparochialinterestsatparticularjuncturessimplydoesnot argument thatsuggeststhepossiblecompetitionamongstorganizationsto experience dealingwiththePRC, theconventional“bureaucraticpolitics” According to a highly regarded, senior Indian official with extensive internal politicalmachinationswithinthePRC. and sanction?Somehavesuggestedthattheincursionswereresultof has significantlyconsolidatedhispowerwithintheChinesepoliticalorder. seemingly plausible, seems rather unlikely. Xi,according to mostaccounts, endeavour. Indian policymakerscontinuetohighlighttheirstaunchoppositionthis border dispute. in movingwithanydispatchtermsofaddressingthevexedissue of theeconomicrelationshipwithIndia.However, ithadlittleornointerest bilateral relationship.ThePRC obviouslywaskeenonexpandingthescope visit andtheincidentsinLadakhunderscoredafundamentaltension 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 The visit,likethatofXitoNewDelhi,involvedconsiderable fanfare. Following hertriptothePRC inFebruary, ModihimselftravelledtoChina Despite theseuntowardandtroublingincidents,Modicontinuedtopress Might theincursionshavetakenplacewithoutXi’s explicitknowledge

IndraniBagchi,“IndiaslamsChina’s OneBelt,RoadInitiativesaysitviolatessovereignty,” Rezaul H. Laskar, “India, Pakistan SparOver Economic Corridor Passing Through PoK,” ShannonTiezzi, “ChinaandIndiaWant aBreakthroughonTheir BorderDispute,” The Personal conductedwith senior, interview retiredIndianofficial,NewDelhi,September 2015. ChrisBuckley, “XiJinping AssumingNewStatusasChina’s “Core”Leader,” TheNewYork SeeforexampleEricMeyer, “WhoSabotagedChinese PresidentXiJinping’s IndiaVisit,” intheTwenty-First (Lanham:Lexington JeffM.Smith,ColdPeace: China-IndiaRivalry Century TNN,“ChineseincursioninLadakh:Alittletoothachecanparalyzeentire body, Moditells 39 33 Pacific Affairs: Volume91,No.2–June2018 36 38 Infact,itneedstobeunderscoredthat 34 Thisargument,though 37 32 The The 35

Copyright (c) Pacific Affairs. All rights reserved. Delivered by Ingenta to IP: 5.10.31.211 on: Tue, 20 Oct 2020 16:10:09 state. and dismissedIndia’s requestonthegroundsthatitwasnotanNPT-compliant India. PRC insteadfocusedonthe possibilitiesofincreasedChineseinvestmentin involved theconstructionofamajorhighwaythroughdisputedterritory, the pursue theChinaPakistanEconomicCorridor, whichamongothermatters the importanceofsettlingextantborderdisputeandPRC’s plansto the bilateral talks were held. It is interesting to note that while Modi stressed Among othermatters,ModivisitedthecityofXi’an,Xi’s birthplace,where ______India membership. Indian officials made a inconcerted Vienna, effort to persuade them to grant block toIndia’s inclusioninthisbody, however, remainedthePRC. Nuclear NonproliferationTreaty (NPT). The mostsignificantstumbling to eschewitsnuclear weapons program and its staunch opposition to the tepid oppositiontoIndia’s intothisorganizationgivenitsunwillingness entry nuclear materials.DespiteAmericansupportsomeotherstateshadexpressed Suppliers Group(NSG),abodythatregulatesinternationalcommercein vehemently opposed,IndiahadbeenseekingmembershipintheNuclear the landmark US-India civilian nuclear agreement, one that the PRC had did nottranslateintoanygainsinotherrelations.Sincetheconclusionof Despite thesestrikingdevelopmentsinthecommercialarena,theysimply Recent Developments June 2016. remains-main-hurdle-to-India-joining-Nuclear-Suppliers.html. liveMint, 10June2016.http://www.livemint.com/Politics/0OOYqyQEJBeRKsJT2bS7oL/China- with formerUSofficial,September 2017. thereby helpingtoovercomethestaunch oppositionofthePRC. Baseduponpersonalcommunication concessions which could have elicited more robust support from the United States and its allies, had adopted a rather unyieldingposition. They had, accordingto him, failedtoofferanymeaningful US DepartmentofDefenseofficialwhohadbeeninvolvedinthesediscussions, Indiancounterparts Times ofIndia,17May2015. 2015. Chinese counterpartsduringthisvisit. amounting toUS$22billionintradeandinvestmentprospectswiththeir Indianconglomeratessignedagreements investments. Anumberofpowerful impediment toIndia’s ambitions. equally futile.Onceagain,itwasthePRC thatremainedtheprincipal 44 43 42 41 40 In June2016,withanimpendingmeetingoftheforty-eight-membergroup

43 PTI,“ChinaopposesIndia’s NSG bid,sayssigningNPTmandatory,” TheEconomicTimes, 24 ElizabethRoche,“KeyNSGmeeting today:Chinaholdsoutdespitehigh-levelIndiaplea,” Apparently, Indiandiplomacyprior to this meeting was less thanadroit. According toakey SaibalDasgupta,“Dealsworth$22billionsignedduringNarendraModi’s Chinavisit,” The NarendraModiStartsTrip toChinaWithaBurstofSightseeing,” TheNewYork Times , 15May 40 Arenewedattempt,in2017,tomakesomeheadwayprovedbe In the event, most of the focus remained on commercial ties and 42 ThePRC, however, provedtobeutterly intransigent India andChina:AtOddsAgain 44 41 239 Copyright (c) Pacific Affairs. All rights reserved. Delivered by Ingenta to IP: 5.10.31.211 on: Tue, 20 Oct 2020 16:10:09 with AlQaeda. the grounds that it needed more information on the organization’s links the headofPakistan-based,Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT),onthelist,based event: inthepastPRC hadrefusedtoplaceHafeezMohammedSaeed, security establishment,ontheterroristlist.Thiswasobviouslynotanisolated Mujahideen (HuM),aKashmiriterroristorganizationwithtiestoPakistan’s “technical hold”onplacingSyedSalahuddin,theleaderofHizb-ul- organizations. However, thePRC yetagaininstitutedwhatwastermedasa Pakistan-based terroristorganizationsonitslistofglobal India, for years, had been imploring the United Nations to place certain India onissuesthathadlittletodowiththelong-standingborderdispute. developments madeclearthatChinaremainedfundamentallyatoddswith 240 reason tosanctionavitalallyinthesubcontinent,which wasforallpractical do withChina’s extensivetiesto Pakistan:thegovernmentsawlittleorno Nations were,bluntlystated,disingenuous.Theunderlying reasonhadto proscribe theseorganizationsandtheirleadersunderthe aegisoftheUnited to meetwithhisChinesecounterpart,Yang Jiechi. was alsothedesignatedspecialrepresentativeforthese negotiations,agreed on thesubject.Accordingly, India’s NationalSecurityAdviserAjitDoval,who border issue.To thatend itwentaheadwiththenineteenthroundoftalks relations. IndiacontinuedtheprotractednegotiationswithPRC onthe ban. agreed tosanctionsthatwouldhaveputinplaceanassetsfreezeandatravel the UNSanctionsCommitteethathadvotedagainstIndia.Theothers committee of this time,thePRC wastheonlymemberof a fifteen-country Force baseinPathankotwhichhisorganizationhadbeenimplicated.At place a ban on the JeM leader following a terror attack on an Indian Air 2001. Earlier in the year, the PRC had already blocked an Indian attempt to on Indiansoil,includingoneagainsttheparliament inDecember in Pakistan,whichhadbeenimplicatedaseriesofmajorterroristattacks aterrorist groupbased Azhar, theleader oftheJaish-e-Mohammed(JeM) its allyPakistanbyplacinga“technicalhold”onlistingMaulanaMasood ______April 2016. continues-to-block-Indias-bid-for-Masood-Azhars-UN-t.html. livemint, 1October2016.http://www.livemint.com/Politics/StSJk5yzKx9BlNrrSOBnHO/China- 2015. Even afterModi’s seeminglysuccessfulvisittothePRC, certainother The PRC’s statedreasonsforitsinabilityandunwillingnessto help This diplomaticsetback,however, didnotleadtoacompleteimpassein Similarly, laterinOctober2016,thePRC againcametotheassistanceof 47 46 45

46 PTI,“India,Chinaholdnewround of talkstoresolveborderdispute,” TheIndianExpress, 20 K.J.M.Varma, “ChinacontinuestoblockIndia’s bidforMasoodAzhar’s UNterrorlisting,” PTI, “China mum on delayingIndia’s call for UN ban on Pak militants,” The Hindu , 1 June 45 Pacific Affairs: Volume91,No.2–June2018 47 Copyright (c) Pacific Affairs. All rights reserved. Delivered by Ingenta to IP: 5.10.31.211 on: Tue, 20 Oct 2020 16:10:09 company wasconstructingforPakistan. Tangdhar region,thesiteofamajorhydroelectricpowerplantthatChinese Pakistan’s control.Earlier troopshadbeendetectedinthe in2015,PLA locations to help in the development of infrastructure in areas under forceswereinparticular According tointerceptedcommunications,thePLA posts along the LineofControl in Kashmir. troops atforward presence of PLA reports emerged in the Indian media that the had detected the unstinted supportforPakistanmountedin2016.InMarchofthatyearnews purposes astrategicsurrogateintheregion. ______in theforeseeablefuture. India facesasignificanttradedeficitwithnoprospectofanyimprovement Worse still,theeconomicrelationshiplargelyremainstiltedinChina’s favour. proposition thatitcanamelioratethecontentiousfeaturesofrelationship. of bilateral economic relations, there is no evidence that supports the Despiteasubstantialexpansion Indian relationshipclearly suggestsotherwise. investment canhelpdiluteintractabledisputes,theevidencefromSino- tothosewhobelievethattradeand the relationship.Indeed,contrary relationship withthePRC, problemscontinuedtodogtheoveralltenorof 1 August2016. Times, 13March2016. and Company, 2015). regimes suchasinthearenasofnonproliferationor counterterrorism. In multilateral forums,anditisunwillingtosupportIndia invariousglobal border issue, it continues to support Pakistan at various bilateral and The foregoinganalysis has shownthat the PRC remains intransigent on the The RelationshipinaGlobalContext worsened, mostlybecauseofBeijing’s intransigence. canpossiblybecontained,given thatithassteadily how thestrategicrivalry counted for little in Beijing. In the wake of the standoff it ishard toenvisage border. The initial efforts oftheModi regimetocourtthePRC obviously capabilities near and along the disputed intent on bolstering its military to bemorecompelling. nationalism withintheranksofBJPitself,thesepressurescouldprove products. Furthermore,giventheexistenceofastreakeconomic have beenadverselyaffectedasaconsequenceoffloodcheapChinese future astheModiregimefacesdemandsfromdomesticmanufacturerswho 50 49 48 Over thepastcoupleofyears,despiteburgeoningtradeandinvestment The lateststandoffatDoklamisastark reminderthatthePRC remains

PTI,“India’s tradedeficitwith China jumpsto$53billionin2015–16,” PTI,“ChineseArmytroopsspottedalong LOCinPakistan-occupiedKashmir,” TheHindustan ForadiscussionofthisnexusseeAndrew Small,TheChina-Pakistan Axis(London:C.Hurst India andChina:AtOddsAgain 50 Thisfactormaybecomemoresignificantinthe 49 48 EvidenceofthePRC’s virtually The EconomicTimes , 241 Copyright (c) Pacific Affairs. All rights reserved. Delivered by Ingenta to IP: 5.10.31.211 on: Tue, 20 Oct 2020 16:10:09 Sino-Indian border war of 1962. the PRC hasposedasignificant securitythreattoIndiasincethedisastrous ensued, thePRC wasrelentlessinitsoppositiontoIndia.Atabilaterallevel, been examinedinconsiderabledetailelsewhere. placed inawiderhistoricalandglobalcontext. considerable part, the problems in the Sino-Indian relationship must be 242 ______requestsforportcalls. rebuff furtherPLAN docked inSriLanka.OnlyaftervigorousIndianprotestsdidtheLankans concerned afterthePeople’s submarines LiberationArmyNavy(PLAN) The acquisitionoftheportaside,in2017Indiaalsohadreasontobe Delhi’s consternation. two submarines—much to New to its shipping, the PRC sold the country Sri Lanka,andNepal.ThoughBangladeshfacesnoextant,sea-bornethreat in SouthAsia.To that end ithasattemptedtomakeinroadsintoBangladesh, terror directedatIndia. Pakistan fromglobalcensuredespitethelatter’s obviousinvolvementwith its conventional capabilities and has, as demonstrated here, routinely shielded To that end it has assisted Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, enhanced capabilitiesofPakistan,oneIndia’sbolstered themilitary keyadversaries. resolve theborderdispute. to border talkshavedemonstrated, it appearstobeinnoparticular hurry and preparednessalongthedisputedborder. Simultaneously, asthedesultory outlined here, because of its willingness to periodically test India’s alertness nuclear andconventionalcapabilitiesingeneralbutalso,ashasbeencarefully News andAnalysis,12May2017. concerned/. 29 July2017.http://thediplomat.com/2017/07/china-buys-hambantota-port-should-india-be- Economic Times, 13July2017. Militancy, National SecurityandthePakistani State(NewYork: OxfordUniversityPress,2015). Thompson (PaloAlto:StanfordUniversityPress,2011). Rivalries: Conflict, Escalation and Limitations on Two-Level Games, eds. Do DomesticPolitics“Instability in Tibet and theSino-Indian Strategic Rivalry: Matter?”in the Twentieth (Seattle:UniversityofWashington Press,2015);alsoseeManjeetS.Pardesi, Century 1910–1962 (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2017). Sri Lanka.To thatend ithasagreedtopurchasetheportofHambantota. The origins of the Sino-Indian border dispute are quite complex and have The originsoftheSino-Indianborderdisputearequitecomplexandhave 56 55 54 53 52 51 Beyond Pakistan,thePRC hasalsosoughttoexpand itsstrategicinfluence The threatfromthePRC isnotmerelybilateralbutregional.Ithaslong

Reuters,“AmidPMModi’s SriLankarejectsChina’s Visit requesttodocksubmarines,” Daily NarayaniBasu,“ChinaBuysHambantota Port: Should IndiaBeConcerned?”TheDiplomat, PTI,“BanglaPMSheikhHasinadefends DecisiontoBuyTwo ChineseSubmarines,” The OnPakistan’s involvementwithterrorseeS.PaulKapur, JihadasGrand Strategy: OneofthebesttreatmentsremainsJohnW. Garver, in Protracted Contest:Sino-IndianRivalry SeeforexampleBereniceGuyot-Rechard,ShadowStates:India,ChinaandtheHimalayas , Pacific Affairs: Volume91,No.2–June2018 54 Ithasalsosoughttoestablishastrategicfootholdin 53 52 This is not only because of its substantial 56 51 However, oncetherivalry Sumit Ganguly and William R. Islamist Asian 55

Copyright (c) Pacific Affairs. All rights reserved. Delivered by Ingenta to IP: 5.10.31.211 on: Tue, 20 Oct 2020 16:10:09 Market,” TheHindustanTimes, 19October2017. ______1980–2004 (PaloAlto:StanfordUniversityPress, 2007). 2017. South ChinaMorningPost , 13January The IndiaReview12,no.2(May2013):51–69. create diplomaticandstrategicproblemsforIndia.Above all,thePRC has thePRCespecially Australia,Japan,andVietnam, willinvariablyattemptto Consequently, asIndiaseekstobuilditstieswithotherAsianpowers, stands inthewayofitsquestfordominancecontinent andbeyond. availableopportunity.at every ItseesIndiaastheonlypower inAsiathat it ismorethanevidentthatthePRC willcontinuetopiqueandtroubleIndia provocative actions along thedisputed border andtoexpand economic ties, regime,theNSG. a vitalglobalregulatory establish itself not only as a de facto nuclear weapons state but also to enter and loansonconcessionalterms. In 2017,itprovidedasmuchUS$8.3billioningrants,interest-freeloans, matters, thePRC replaced IndiaastheprincipalinvestorinNepal2014. state ofNepal.Theseeffortshaveprovenquitesuccessful.Amongother andundermineIndia’slong-term effortstotry positionintheHimalayan nuclear power. nonproliferation it has sought to depict India as a less than responsible efforttoconstrainitsrise.Despiteownabysmalrecordon made every Russian Kilo-classsubmarinesandSukhoi-30jets. personnel to operate BrahMos, andisinthemidstoftrainingVietnamese Akash missile.ItisalsoconsideringthesaleofanIndo-Russianmissile, Earlier thisyear, theindigenouslydesigned IndiaagreedtosellVietnam strategicpartnership. doubt, isleadingtoatighteningoftheIndo-Vietnamese cooperation wassigned.AsharedconcernoverChina’s aggressiveness,no their securitypartnershipsince2007,whenaformalagreementondefence harking backtotheeraofNehruandHo ChiMinh,havebeenbolstering Vietnam, whichhavelonghadacordialrelationship have backfired.Indiaand refused tocaveintothedemandsofPRC. Vietnam. GivenIndia’sgas offthecoastof acuteneedsforenergy, ithas To that end it has vehemently objected to India drilling for oil and natural hobble IndiafrompursuinglegitimateeconomicinterestsinSoutheastAsia. 60 59 58 57 Despite India’s diplomaticeffortstocourtthePRC, itseffortstoavoid These effortstowooSriLanka,ofcourse,arequiteapartfromthePRC’s Finally, andespeciallyasIndiahasenteredtheglobalarena,PRC has China’s bellicosereactiontowardIndia’s may engagementwithVietnam Beyond theimmediatereachesofSouthAsia,PRC hasalsosoughtto

AnilGiri,“ChinalooksatNepalaspotentialgatewaytoSouthAsia,expands footprintsin EvanMederios,ReluctantRestraint: TheEvolutionofChina’s Nonproliferation Policies andPractices, Helen Clark, “Why Is India Risking Chinese Anger By Trying To Sell Missiles To Vietnam?” David Scott, “India’s Role in the South ChinaSea: Geopolitics and Geoeconomics in Play,” 60 This has been more than evident as India has sought to India andChina:AtOddsAgain 57 58 59 243 Copyright (c) Pacific Affairs. All rights reserved. Delivered by Ingenta to IP: 5.10.31.211 on: Tue, 20 Oct 2020 16:10:09 Indiana University, USA,December2017 Bloomington, dealings withthePRC mayatleasthelpprotectIndia’s vitalsecurityinterests. more cooperativebehaviour. Instead,apolicyoffirmnessandresolveinits approachtowardthePRC areunlikelytoelicit pursue amoreconciliatory India withintheconfinesofsubcontinent.AttemptsonIndia’s partto to asetofpatternsandpracticesonthepartPRC, designedtohem vigorous setofresponsesfromthePRC. However, theycanmostlybetraced Modi regime.Theregime’s moreforthrightpoliciesmayhaveevokeda most assuredly, do not primarily stem from the nationalistic features of the seeks tobolsteritsstrategicrelationshipwiththeUnitedStates. been, andwillbecomeevenmoreassertiveifnotoutrightaggressive,asIndia 244 The recentdifficultiesthathavedoggedtheSino-Indianrelationship, Pacific Affairs: Volume91,No.2–June2018 thought thatcounts ubcpress.ca ongoing geopolitical importance. ongoing geopoliticalimportance. forces thathaveshapedanareaof overview oftheclimaticandimperialist environmental historyprovidesan This uniqueanalysisofManchuria’s Edited byNormanSmith Making ofManchuria Environment inthe Empire and AVAILABLE NOW! paperback $34.95 316 pages|22photographs,4maps 978-0-7748-3290-8

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