NO. 2019-3

KIDA Brief provides publicly available summaries of research projects and analysis conducted at KIDA.

The People's Liberation Army's Transformation Under Xi Jinping's Military Reform

Lee, Chang Hyung, Military Research Fellow Center for Security and Strategy

Key findings and policy recommendations

□ Since military reform, the PLA Northern Theatre Command has increased in scope, diversified its operational formats, and thus expanded its influence over the Korean Peninsula

Changes to major units

Shenyang Military Region

• 78, 79, 80th Group Army 16, 39, 40th • , Marine Group Army Corps(Brig) • Airborne Corps: Strategic reserve

Changes to operational format

Shenyang Northern Theater Command Military Region

• Ground operations along - border • Ground forces • Amphibious operations • Focus on North Korea-China • Airborne operations border(Yalu, Tumen Rivers) • Naval interdiction operations

KIDA Brief 1 □ Significance to South Korea’a defense reform ○ It is necessary to formulate response strategies to specific forms of Chinese intervention in the Korean Peninsula from a potential threat perspective ○ It is recommended to establish a government-level ‘Ministry of Veterans Affairs’ to utilize retired personnel and support integration into society, by benchmarking follow-up measures □ Policy recommendations ○ Strengthen education on Chinese military at educational institutions subordinate to the Ministry of National Defense(Ranging from Military Academies to National Defense University) - Cultivate specialized instructors and publish updated textbooks (publish annual ‘Report on Chinese military power’ at the MND level) ○ Expand various forms of exchanges with the PLA to create the foundations for mutual understanding and trust building - Select an institution fitting of reformed Chinese military organizations to engage in regular exchanges ○ Engage in efforts to establish crisis management frameworks between South Korea-China and South Korea-China-U.S. in preparation of possible contingencies.

2 KIDA Brief Military reform undertaken during Xi Jinping leadership’s first term contributed greatly to establishing control over the military under Xi Jinping. Xi Jinping solidified his position over the party and military, thus creating momentum for his rule and military reform during his second term. However, China’s military reform is still an ongoing project.

China initiated its military reform with an announcement to reduce its standing military by 300,000 men at the ‘70th anniversary of the war against Japan’ celebrations. Xi Jinping’s ‘military reform’ consists of a transformation from a qualitative military to a professional organization, with the objective of achieving basic mechanization and informationalization by 2020. To this end, China seeks to construct a strong and modernized ground, naval, air, rocket and strategic support forces, establish a strong and efficient theater combined operations command structure, establish a modern operations system with Chinese characteristics, and improve operational capability across all theaters by leveraging network and information capabilities. China plans to devote resources to defense and military modernization by 2035, transforming the PLA into a world-class military by the middle of the 21st century.

The PLA has been undergoing organizational reform for this purpose, and the extent of the changes as of December 2018 are as follows.

KIDA Brief 3 4 KIDA Brief Meanwhile, the Xi Jinping leadership appears to be accelerating its military buildup after the 19th Party Congress in 2017. This is because the 5th generation party leadership must demonstrate visible results in the military sector according to its dual hundred-year plans(2020 and 2050), the first of which falls under Xi Jinping’s term. If this is the case, China may dramatically increase its defense expenditure. China’s defense spending amounted to approximately 1.3% of its GDP in 2018, or 5.3% of its government spending. The percentage ratio may increase to levels similar to the U.S. or Japan in order to further develop its forces. The military development will be utilized to ensure superiority in the Asian region, lifting the national pride of the Chinese people and expanding Chinese influence in the region.

China’s military development will clearly demonstrate the confrontational dynamic between the U.S. and China in the South China Sea and Western Pacific. This may be the case since China’s reformed theater commands, rather than focusing on geographic considerations, could concentrate their forces based on projected threats and expand their operational radii in order to overcome U.S. military advantages in localized confrontations. Meanwhile, if Chinese military power comes to exceed Japanese forces in East Asia, the PLA could enjoy a greater freedom of maneuver in the East China Sea. In terms of cross-strait relations, the PLA could establish military dominance over Taiwan, not only suppressing the Taiwanese independence movement but also limiting the U.S. involvement in the Taiwan issue.

China’s military development is expected to have profound implications for South Korea’s security. First, an increase in China’s power projection range may present threats to the delineation of bilateral maritime boundaries and the operation of air defense identification zones. Excursions of Chinese military aircraft into the air defense identification zone around Ieo-do may become frequent events. Second, improvements in China’s military intervention capabilities may factor into China’s strong willingness to intervene during a contingency on the Korean Peninsula. Especially, as the Northern Theater

KIDA Brief 5 Command’s capabilities and operational range are expanded, the form of intervention is expected to move beyond ground-based operations along the North Korea-China border to interventions involving airborne operations across the Bay of Bohai and the West Sea. Third, improvements in the PLA’s future warfare capabilities will hinder the establishment of South Korea’s MD system, and those future capabilities may be used for soft operations during possible disputes between China and South Korea. For example, should a conflict similar to THAAD arise, South Korea could become the target of cyber attacks, psychological warfare, opinion warfare, and legal warfare.

China’s military buildup has become an unavoidable reality. South Korea must strengthen its alliance with the U.S. while simultaneously engaging in military trust building with China. In this light, South Korea must take the initiative in creating a security dialogue channel between South Korea, the U.S., and China. Militarily, South Korea must develop and prepare ‘small but lethal’ response measures based on a unique offensive military doctrine.

In this perspective, the following policy recommendations should be considered. First, at the Ministry of National Defense level, ① the PLA should be considered a potential threat, and concrete response plans should be formulated accordingly. In particular, intelligence estimates should take into consideration the PLA’s force structure and capabilities after the military reform. Resources should be allocated to analyzing the Northern Theater Command and its training schedule. To this end, ② the Ministry of National Defense and educational institutions should cultivate experts on the Chinese military in the long term. Furthermore, ③ South Korea should publish annual ‘report on Chinese military power’ by referring to similar publications by the U.S. and Japan, continuing to evaluate Chinese military capabilities and formulating response measures. Simultaneously with the above mentioned preparations against possible threats, ④ South Korea should strengthen security and military cooperation with China, establish a bilateral crisis management mechanism for possible contingencies and gradually develop this mechanism into a crisis management framework between South Korea, the U.S., and China.

6 KIDA Brief At each service level, ① Officer training and education courses should include lessons on the Chinese military to increase the level of understanding among the officer corps. For this purpose ② an updated textbook on the ‘People’s Liberation Army’ that reflects the military reforms of the Xi Jinping era should be published and distributed. In the long term, in order to establish a cooperative relationship with the Chinese military and improve mutual understanding, ③ exchanges with the PLA should be expanded. For example, the exchanges between the former TROKA and Military Region could provide a case study. Exchanges with the reformed Northern Theater Command is an absolute necessity.

* The views expressed in this paper are those of the participant (Lee, Chang Hyung) of the research project The People's Liberation Army's Transformation Under Xi Jinping's Military Reform conducted at KIDA in 2018, and do not represent or reflect the official position of Korea Institute for Defense Analyses.

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