Conseil De L'atlantique Nord Non Iii Atlantic Council

CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD NON III ATLANTIC COUNCIL

EXEMPLAIRE ... 342 COPY

ORIGINAL; ENGLISH NATO SECRET 29th September, 19.67 SUMMARY RECORD C-R(6T)38

Summary record of a meeting of the Council held at the Permanent Headguarters, Paris, 16e., on Wednesday, 13th "September, 1967 at 10.15 a.m.

PRESENT

Chairman; Ivlr. Manlio Brosio BELGIUM GREECE NORYfAY Baron J. Papeians de Mr. Jean Pesmazoglu Mr. G. Kristiansen Morchoven

CANADA ICELAND PORTUGAL Mr. Ross Campbell Mr. H. Sy. Bjërnsson Mr. V. da Cunha DENMARK ITALY TURKEY Mr. H. Hjorth-Nielsen Mr. A. Alessandrini Mr. Faik Melek FRANCE LUXEMBOURG UNITED KINGDOM Mr. J. Schricke Mr. P. Reuter Sir Bernard Burrows &EEMANY NETHERLANDS UNITED STATES Mr. W.G-. Grewe Dr. H.N. Boon Mr. Harlan Cleveland INTERNATIONAL STAFF Deputy Secretary General; Mr. J.A. Roberts Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs. Mr. J. Jaenicke Acting Executive Secretary; Mr. P.O. Menne Chairman, Committee of Economic Advisers : Mr. A. Vincent ALSO PRESENT United States Representative to the Geneva Disarmement Mr. Adrian Fisher Conference, ^ (for Items I and II) Military Committee Representative^^ Major General W.W. Stromberg

\ NATO SECRET -2- NATO SECRET CAR(67 )5.8

OOITTENTS Item Subject Paragra/ph Nos. I. United States Proposal for NATO Field Tests of Anns Control Techniques (NAPÏACT) 1 - 4

II. Draft Non-Proliferation Treaty- 5 - 48

III. Economic Situation in Cuba 19 - 57 IV. Exercise for NATO Civil Wartime Agencies 58

V. Central Europe Pipeline System (CEPS) - Annual Report by the Directing Bodies for 1966 59 - 62 71. Date for the Next Meeting of Sub-Group 2 of the Special Group on the Future Tasks of the Alliance (AC/261) 63 - 65 VII. Date of Next Meeting 66

-2- I'JATO SECRET DECLASSIFIED/DECLASSIFIEE - PUBLIC DISCLOSED/MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE morning. make a proposal to the allies go that the experts can takeit can experts the gothat allies the to a proposal make multinational field test. Such a test could draw upon whatever whatever upon draw could atest Such test. field multinational verified. meeting. The United States Delegation will be briefing its briefing bewill StatesDelegation TheUnited meeting. to resources large comparatively devoting been has years ACLA is planning an additional field test in the United Kingdom Kingdom thein United test field additional an isplanning ACLA ofpossible andverification inspection for procedures various o edt dsrb i naydti t te oni this Council the to detail any in it describe toneed not hr efe ta twudb ihyueu o odc a conduct to useful behighly would it that feelwe where h efrac o omtet ne sc ragmns can be arrangements such under commitments of performance the without damaging our security.our damaging without OFARMS TESTS FIELD NATO FOR PROPOSAL STATES UNITED I. nclaoainwt h rts oenet wihte otherthe which Government, British the with collaboration in armaments. of levels the reduce to agreement international no con nte ore fterdlbrtos Wehave deliberations. their of course thein account into is valuable in the experience we have gained on a national basisa national on gained wehave experience thein valuable is into technology and techniques for verification of various typesof various forverification techniques and technology into this item be inscribed on the Agenda of the Disarmement Experts theDisarmement of theAgenda on inscribed beitem this field. disarmament and control armsthe in work research reached the point in the course of this experimental project experimental thisof course thein thepoint reached arms control in Europe, we shall have a common interest in how in how interest common a shall have we in Europe, control arms for arrangements any reaching in successful arewe if Obviously, Gap and have been carried out jointly by the Defense Department Department theDefense jointlyby out carried been and have Gap oftests field of seriesa conducting been we areahave thisIn these tests of interest to our allies. We therefore asked that asked therefore We allies. our to interest of teststhese serious the to disarmament about rhetoric traditional thefrom tomove trying are wethat evidence is tobelieve, Ilike This, and will gain out of the upcoming test in the United Kingdom. theUnited in test theupcoming ofout gain willand liswl eivtdt observe.to invited be allieswill the year Next Agency. andDisarmament Control theandArms Cloud Project codename the under gone testshave Our national future.the into agreed be that might agreement controlarms of colleagues on our experience with Oloud Gap, and I therefore do therefore I and Gap,Oloud with experience our on colleagues statement : study of just how we might do something sensible about it about sensible something do justmight we ofhow study C 1. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE made the following the made STATESREPRESENTATIVE UNITED The 1. l o r t n o syuko, h ntdSae o h at severalthepast for States theUnited know,you As "Mr. Chairman; "One part of our program has been devoted to research toresearch devoted been has ourprogram of"One part "But we did want to take advantage of this meeting to this ofmeeting advantage take to want "Butdid we "We think we have learned at least something from something at least learned "We wehave think

s e u q i n h c e t ' ( kaftacl 5 NT SECRET NATO -5- 3 NT SECRET NATO -3- ~ “ “ ~~ Q T AO CONFIDENTIAL NATO G-R( G-R( 67 ) ^^ 38 DECLASSIFIED/DECLASSIFIEE - PUBLIC DISCLOSED/MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE making this morning to study the feasibility of a multinational a ofmultinational feasibility the study to thismorning making this questions Thekind of group NATO authorities. relevant with consultations through specifics theout towork weprefer would have to consider would include would consider followingsthe towouldhave So wAat allies.interested rvso, fe a prpit nevl o studyby for interval appropriate an after provision, The the with experience our digesting be will Experts Disarmament thismorning. proposal this about said tobe needs theof consideration the for recommendations toformulate and thisproposition study to group adanhocof establishment oenet, o icsinb h Council.theby discussion a for governments, level." substantial onthe Gall to want also would andwe planning; oenet ilhv acac t cnie h rpslw arewe proposal the consider tochance a willhave governments area.geographic abroad covers andwhich forces allied of participation be would SHAPE of exercise and Thehelp intelligence of fields thein especially required delegations. andcapitals from be quite modest if the field test could be conducted as part of aspart conducted becould test field theif quite bemodest test under the auspices of the Alliance. And after an after And theAlliance. of auspices the testunder which, chosen couldbe exercise an a that broad involves Oloud Gap project in the next thenext in Gapproject Oloud prpit nei, e a oebc o h sbet t this at subject theto back come can we interim,appropriate oonnection this In exercise. aregular military aaiiyo h SAETcncl etri xrie analysis.exercise in Center Technical SHAPE theof capability expertsto addition in authorities, themilitary NATO studygroup 2 . The CHAIRMAN noted that this proposal included included thisproposal that noted CHAIRMAN The 2. tedvlpeto otdt n sgetos s to as suggestions and costdata of development the- and ofverification typestheof elaboration an - armsof kind the about tobemade assumptions the- - recommendations on appropriate administrative administrative appropriate on recommendations - suchafield towhether as determination test a- "Our thoughts about this are preliminary and general; and arepreliminary this about "Ourthoughts "Manifestly we would want to draw into the preliminary preliminary theinto draw to want would "Manifestlywe M. himn i ses om ta hsi al that all is this that tome seems it "Mr. Chairman, Orpeiiay xmnto ugss ht costswould that suggests examination "Our preliminary o hs ih e hrd and shared;be might these how one; so, which and, if - exercise military ehnssfrpann h eecs ndti and detail in exercise the planning for mechanisms npcintcnqe t e tested; tobe techniques inspection control arrangements toverified;be arrangements control o arigi out.it carrying for could be made part of an already-projected already-projected NATO an of part couldmade be 4 NT SECRET NATO -4- - 4 - we few propose is simply the simply is propose dy. fe ht the that, After days. AO CONFIDENTIAL NATO C-SXW)3Q AO SECRET NATO we would hope would DECLASSIFIED/DECLASSIFIEE - PUBLIC DISCLOSED/MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE had informed had Kingdom ofUnited in April Council the Kingdom. The United Kingdom officer concerned with the planning theplanning with _ concerned officer Kingdom TheUnited Kingdom. participation forthcoinimg thein the United in test field discuss would Experts Disarmament thethat fact thewelcomed would be available to give any details which delegations might delegations which details any give to available bewould thatbe recalled He project.Gap Cloud the ox experiencethe oet a i h dat umte o theto submitted April. draft last Council more thedid than the to StatesRepresentative United the Fisher, Adrian Mr. finduseful. fti atcpto a a rsn a h AOHaqatr and Headquarters theNATO at present at was ofthisparticipation osbet ablne opoiebtenwa ih stillbe might what between compromise abalanced to possible TREATY NON-PROLIFERATION II.. DRAFT oiinbfr aig xase e oiblte o concerting of posiibilities her exhausted having before position countries. Western and treaty, anon-proliferation on text draft Soviet thenew Conference.Geneva levels. even countries Euratom the of thepreoccupations of accounttake positive the recognise to Belgium inclines weapons of nuclear comments. invited accordingly policy on her side, cannot envisage finally settling her her settling finally envisage cannot side,on her policy theby accepted bealready can what and USSR thefor acceptable treaty non-proliferation the aworld-wide of on conclusion theof elements in the Soviet proposal, which at first sight seems to seems sight atfirst which proposal, Soviet theelementsin statement : cinwt e lisbt nteAlni Cucl n t otherat and Council theAtlantic in both allies actionwith her 3. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE said thathe said REPRESENTATIVE KINGDOM UNITED The 3. . h COUNCIL The : 4. . etogt ht oenet a o a ie o study to time had now had governments that thought He 6. 7. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE made the following following the made REPRESENTATIVE BELGIAN The 7. 5. The CHAIRMAN said that he had pleasure in welcoming welcoming in pleasure thathad he said CHAIRMAN The 5. W ae eoeu atx hc s ehp thenearest which atext perhaps us before is "Wehave l ntd h saeet yteUie Sae and States theUnited by statements the noted (l) "The interest constantly shown by Belgium in favour in Belgium shown by constantly "The interest "Nevertheless Belgium, faithful to an equally constant equally an to faithful Belgium, "Nevertheless United Kingdom Representatives, in particular particular in Representatives, Kingdom United before the Council for consideration anda consideration for Council the before h ntdSae saeetta a te appropriate the at that statement States theUnited time the United States proposal would be broughtbe would Statesproposal theUnited time conclusion. -5- NATCR SECRET NATCR -5- -5- AO CONFIDENTIAL NATO AO SECRET NATO AO SECRET NATO DECLASSIFIED/DECLASSIFIEE - PUBLIC DISCLOSED/MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE i uhrte oe ta te etwudoe h a o ato way the open textwould the that hoped Authorities His uhrte a ie rlmnr osdrto o h Soviet the to consideration preliminary given had Authorities matter in which only very flexible and - so to speak - speakmodest so to and- flexible onlyvery inwhich matter nuclear activities to the verification procedures of theIAEA." of procedures theverification to activities nuclear of confirmation to hear tous, proposed been IIIhas Article rpsdb h SRa efc, vni n amt ta such that admitsone evenif asperfect, the USSR by proposed III ofArticle text the consider cannot country,other anylike interests of the NATO Alliance. NATOthe of interests Kingdom partners to submit voluntarily in due course their civiltheir course duein voluntarily submit to partners Kingdom eevshrrpyutl h etmeigo te Council. theof meeting thenext until reply her reserves would further have the practical result of making it from now fromnow it ofmaking result this practical the have further would treaty; theto a party notis which country non-nuclear a in treaty, theto party country foreign theof verification text, which they thought was a genuine attempt at a compromise a at attempt agenuine was thought they text, which o oe lrfcto. hsi te ae freape with example, for case, theis This clarification.some for of number thelargest to acceptable tobe shown can be formulae complicateda such in particularly isunachievable, perfection accordingly Belgium decision. afinal indicate totoday the on countries member of various theviews comparing of private between the Co-Ohairmen of the Eighteen-Nation theEighteen-Nation of Co-Ohairmen the between private theof aformalisation time suitable a at envisage topossible h atprs o h is aarp, hc t em tous seems it which paragraph,first the of phrase thelast Belgium, expect to belogical hardly would It September.6th successful conclusion of a treaty which would also meet the alsomeet would treatywhich a of conclusion successful position. Soviet theprevious from movement substantiala and treaty.the dangerous be itwould which equilibrium a precarious represents treaty, activity jointanuclear in part a suchmajor taketo treaty vnbfr aighadte pnos fhrale, ob able tobe allies, of her opinions the heard evenhaving before Wednesday, of statement States theUnited by questionposed omte, nte aewy swsdn frAtce adI ofII andI forArticles done aswas sameway the in Committee, in agreed tobe still or perhaps agreed already interpretations further. improveto tryto thetoparty is which country anon-nuclear for illegalonwards h oa cmimn ae yorUie Sae andUnited States our byUnited taken commitment themoral a nyrfrt jitnceratvte, ne h effectivethe under activities, jointnuclear to refer canonly call still terms certain that consider nevertheless subject, we countries. amendment to the text before us, which as far as we know know aswe asfar which us, before text theto amendment theto adhered not has which country a non-nuclear in situated 8. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE said thathis said REPRESENTATIVE KINGDOM UNITED The 8. ’’This opportunity first the is Council the of meeting Ti i epcal h cs sneBlim doubtless sinceBelgium, case the especially "This is "Taking account of these limitations inherent in thein inherent limitations these of "Takingaccount "There is certainly no question of asking for anfor asking of question no certainly "Thereis "However, we think that on the other hand it isit otherhand the on that think "However, we "Similarly we would also hope, now that a new anew that now alsohope, would "Similarlywe - -6- 6 NT SECRET NATO - C-IU C-IU 67) AO SECRET NATO 08 DECLASSIFIED/DECLASSIFIEE - PUBLIC DISCLOSED/MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE more so sinoe the United Kingdom hoped hoped Kingdom the sinoeUnited so more particular in thetext, of interpretations theon depended much member ofEuratom. member a las betdt te eonto fErtm this they that difficulty historical theof Euratom; was There recognition theto objected always bad text. helpful probably explained why there was no specific reference in their in reference specific nowas there why explained probably members were satisfactorily protected. satisfactorily were members the today, members the ofEuratom views the to hear interested perhaps by ad hoc committees of experts, before the entry into entry the before experts, of committees adhoc by perhaps with,discussions preparatory couldbe IAEA, thethere if part require would draft the of part This toEuratom.draft that part affecting the position of Euratom. He would be would He of Euratom. position the affecting partthat on agreeing in substance in difficulty shouldnobe there a u a o e encmltd Temte il eur a require will Thematter completed. been yet not buthas way ofEuratom interests the that ensure toorder in interpretation force of the treaty.theof force might difficulties Practical short.be allowed might time of negotiation the for III Article draft Sovietthe of ihn adtgte ih te prpit ois ofEuratom. bodies appropriate the with, together and within, icsinb h eea Cabinet. theFederal by discussion isunder examination This concerned. Authorities German the thethat believed Kingdom United the IAEA,the with agreements a suggest toeffort an made now had they thatand atreaty oehn ie hstx. oee, hytogtta clearly that thought they However, text. this somethinglike arise, if a large number of negotiations were to take place taketo were ofnegotiations number a large ifarise, statement : in overcome couldbe these that suggested He simultaneously, xmntos tepooa clsfrtefloig commentss following thefor calls theproposal examinations, 11. As regards the period of time envisaged in paragraph 4 paragraph in envisaged timeof period the regards As 11. 10. He thought that the Russians genuinely vâshed tohave vâshed genuinely Russians the that thought He 10. 9. As a preliminary view, his Authorities felt that felt Authorities his view, apreliminary As 9. 12. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE made the following following the made REPRESENTATIVE GERMAN The 12. l Tcia situation: Tactical (l) "Without prejudice to the outcome of the present thepresent of outcome the to "Withoutprejudice Tepooa sol, norve, lob examined be also view, our in should, "The proposal by examined thoroughly beto needs draft "The Soviet eoit. fti nepeto rvdt beto proved interpreation this If negotiate. We see in the Soviet draft a first indication of indication a first draft Soviet the seein We to a more far-reaching Soviet readiness to readiness Soviet far-reaching a tomore point might presentation Soviet theof form The orc twudide e encouraging.be indeed would it correct procedures. safeguards the with connection in arising theproblems of Sovietunderstanding 7 NT SECRET NATO -7- -7- one dyt eoe a to become day 67)58 ( R - O AO SECRET NATO DECLASSIFIED/DECLASSIFIEE - PUBLIC DISCLOSED/MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE ( 2) Principle ( Principle : 2) ( a) My C-overrmicnt( My a)that alwaysmaintained has (b) The latest American draft came - not in not came- draft American latest The (b) c A fra tepeie eti cnend we concerned, is text theasprecise far As (c) seby Dsrmnto ntefed offield the in Discrimination Assembly. No. 2028 of the United Nations General Nations the ofUnited 2028 No. be cannot activities nuclear peaceful eesr o h raiaino h aimstheof realisation thefor necessary with, reconciled ofbalanced principle the ecflue snihr justifiednor isneither uses peaceful in Resolution down laid obligations of field the in discrimination any non-proliferation treaty safeguards through safeguards treaty non-proliferation the which in solution non-discriminating most impressive worid-wide support given to given support worid-wide impressive most This place. a meaningful has verification treaty.theof ula epnsaeFac. o h same the To stateFrance. weapon nuclear connection seenin if true particularly was the in safeguards ofEuratom inclusion inits but itself treaty theof text the o-iciiaig aeursfrte entirethe for safeguards non-discriminating III ofArticle draft Soviet the that note increase. non-discrimination the United of readiness declared the with with the Punerican draft. The main Themain thePunerican with draft. seriously differs draft Soviet the that note the for safeguards Euratom existing the under activities nuclear peaceful of fields -effects field of peaceful nuclear activities. nuclear ofpeaceful field we This the of light thein particular in regret discriminating. clearly stillis of expression cleara for demands our are ofbalance elements which in degree with connection in and safeguards, samethe their place to GreatBritain and States beti h ril cnenn safeguards, concerning theArticle in absent differences seem to be the following:the be seemto differences (1) with respect to the extension of extension theto respect with (1) (2) the draft seems to exclude verification verification exclude to seems draft the (2) emiti u iwta safeguards that ourview maintain we by other existing and proven systems ofsystems andproven existing other by special and source cover theyas far fissionable material; fissionable are necessary and justified only in soin only justified and arenecessary safeguards. facilities, covernuclear tosafeguards 8 NT SECRET NATO -8- - 8 - as na spsil o a to as possible near '-m G AO SECRET NATO 67)38 67)38 We regret toregret . NATO SECRET O-B.V 6^7^)^38

:?In our view, the Soviet formulation that non-nuclear weapons states may conclude agreements with the IAEA either individually or together with other states would not in itself cover the relatione which are to be established between Euratom and the IAEA by the conclusion of a verification agreement. The verification agreement would have to be a bilateral agreement between two international organizations which have their own juridical personality. Euratom acts through, its bodies (the Commiesion and the Ministerial Council) not on behalf of, or for, the member states, but by virtue of a special legal status irrevocably conferred upon it by the parties to the treaty through the transfer of powers. "It appears that these aspects should be once more thoroughly re-examined. 13-. The ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE made the following statement : ‘'The Italian position on the subject of the compromise draft of Article III of the non-proliferation treaty proposed by Mr., Roshohin, which lias been submitted to the Council by the United States Delegation, as also the Italian position with regard to all the other aspects of the treaty, will have to be discussed and defined by Parliament, since the government has undertaken on many occasions to consult Parliament in advance.

"Generally, and with every reservation concerning the position which may result from the Parliamentary debate, I wish to recall here that it has not been possible for Italy to adhere to the formula for Article III, i.e. the most recent United States text, chiefly because this formula limited verification procedures to non-nuclear countries only, and because it envisaged a transition period limited to three years, which we considered too short. ’'As regards the compromise formula proposed by the Soviet Representative at Geneva, one might suppose that it represents an interesting Loginning of an evolution in the Soviet position whioh gives it to he understood that from the Soviet side it is desired to begin a negotiation. If this supposition proved to be correct, it might facilitate tho beginning of a discussion with the aim of meeting our comments and those of other countries concerned in the problem.

''In any case it io obvious that if Italy has not been able to adhere to the moot recent United States formula, a fortiori our oonnonts remain as fully valid regarding the Roshchin proposal, since the Roshcliin draft is much less favourable than that of the United States.

- 9 - NATO SECRET DECLASSIFIED/DECLASSIFIEE - PUBLIC DISCLOSED/MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE Te at ’. s "The i fact (a) the Soviet draft (and also that contained in thein contained (and that also draft Soviet the (a) (b) the draft makes provision in practice for afor practice in provision makes draft the (b) (c) this draft, unlike the most recent United States United recent themost unlike draft, this (c) otrcn ntdSae et i ae onthe based istext) States United recent most may be considered sufficient for the Tlaltalolco the for sufficient considered be may in doesnot it Consequently, responsibilities. confirms and countries non-nuclear and nuclear no kind of regional control systems, and are and systems,control ofregional kind no might give rice - though not necessarily - to- necessarily notthough - rice give might theand treaty theRome between harmonisation yearsfive text,and States United recent requires the time necessary to elaborate long elaborate to necessary time the requires non-proliferation treaty; non-proliferation However, regulations. IAEA the by activities period two-year This ourproposal).to according and obligations theirof inequality the between controls in discrimination of principle ol ii tets fte AAt "checkinguthe to IAEA of thetask the limit would contrary theon Community, which European the for justified nor realistic seems neither proposal this drawn. been probably ithas which from treaty, yearsoftwo ofamaximum period transition solution theto contribution a represent ourview referring to the concept of an agreement which which ofagreement an concept the to referring of possibility the suggesting interprétation an ensuring to aview with procedures international nuclear peaceful their regardsas bound already havecountries theLatin-American that is fact The it contains a somewhat ambiguous formula which which formula ambiguous somewhat a contains it ofproblem;the aspect ofthis fo h cnrr ti o cret al Italy all correct,isnotit contrary theon if desirable be itwould correct,is interpretation and IAEA,theand Euratom between agreements otherhand,the On systems. other and IAEA the between equivalence any for allow not does draft, can do is repeat her lively perplexity and concern;and perplexity lively her repeat isdo can terms; andunambiguous clear in it express to Ifthis system.the of Euratom effectiveness (instead of three years as foreseen in theinmost foreseen asyears ofthree (instead - 0 1 - - 10 - AO SECRET NATO AO SECRET NATO DECLASSIFIED/DECLASSIFIEE - PUBLIC DISCLOSED/MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE Representative has been asked to confirm, that the Roshchin Roshchin the that confirm,toasked been has Representative eoitos Gvnti eteeyfud iuto, t seems it situation,Council fluid present the extremely from resultsthis Given definitive expect to premature negotiations. The proposal. this on position States theUnited is what proposal might rather represent the beginning of a series ofseries a of thebeginning represent rather might proposal officialthe received so-far least at even- not formula has limitation of controls to natural uranium." tonatural controls of limitation settled tobe IAEA,theand Euratom between equivalence of kind know yet donot we Further, proposal. agovernmental represent yaporaevrfcto gemns adfnlyte strictthe andfinally agreements, verification appropriate by which system a guillotine with faced oneself find thus would itself find state would each agreement)an such of allow really reasonable transition period, the unambiguous recognition of aof recognition theunambiguous period, transition reasonable system.IAEA theof application automatic thefor provide reality in would individually, countries by contracted been factin has obligation not does it Thus Government. Soviet theofapproval obligations - i.e. non-discrimination - but also agreement on a on agreement also but - non-discrimination i.e.- obligations As thetreaty.for ofvotes number largest the ensure to them at aimpersuading to delegation Soviet the with discussion in continue to side States United the on desirable beitwould -controls of ofnon-discrimination problem the tackleto trying of themerit has recognised be itmust which draft, Swedish the This controls. IAEA to submit to obliged automatically would draft Soviet thethat supposing (and, naturally, envisaged timethe in and IAEA Euratom between reached not isagreement where casethe in that awhole, asIII thedraftArticle consultation. to introduce into their draft the modifications which are likely which themodifications draft their into tointroduce One ofEuratom. as members quality their of andindependently already said, these modifications concern not only equality of equality only not concern thesemodifications said, already d fnly acrigt te oit draft, Soviet theto according finally, (d) I sol ute entd a teUie States the asUnited benoted, "Itfurther should "Finally, it should be noted that we can deduce from deduce can thatwe noted be should "Finally, it Cneunl e osdrta as o h ai of the basis on also- that consider we "Consequently nuclear installations of every kind which which every ofkind installations nuclear material fissionable specialof field particular theto limited be not would verification aarp fteRsci rf ae t clearit makes draft theRoshchin of 1 paragraph materials. storethese or on, use work produce, prevent diversion of nuclear energy from energy ofnuclear diversion prevent wider a much have therefore would Verification necessary, and therefore does not seem tous seem notdoes therefore and necessary, peaceful uses" the extension envisaged is notis envisaged extension the uses" peaceful "to solely is ofverification object thethat allto extend would but uranium, and natural xet hni h ntd tts rf. Since draft. States the United in than extent justified. 1- AO SECRET NATO -11- - 11 - ” T E a C M AO SECRET NATO DECLASSIFIED/DECLASSIFIEE - PUBLIC DISCLOSED/MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE aeisrce et ae h olwn statement.following the to make me instructed have have arisen out of the Soviet refusal to accept safeguards on safeguards accept torefusal Soviet the ofout arisen have Euratom and IAEA safeguards systems under treaty article.treaty systemsunder safeguards andIAEA Euratom treaty; aof non-proliferation durability and verification statement s between nuclear and non-nuclear signatories. The main problems Themain signatories. andnon-nuclear nuclear between as equitable andreasonably effective both shouldbe it ideally its own nuclear facilities and the question of harmonising the ofharmonising question the and facilities own nuclear its Authorities Canadian clause,safeguards a for formula Soviet negotiable with non-aligned countries and will be regarded by regarded be andwill countries non-aligned with negotiable rcial upssb nbanbe tti jntr. The juncture. atthis unobtainable be purposes practicable allfor may article equitable an intransigence, Sovietof view ownweapons. their ofproducing capable world, non-aligned industrially of greatmajority theby accepted is treaty the provided also that the United States and the United Kingdom will Kingdom the andUnited States theUnited that also provided the from several including countries, non-nuclear developed further prevent to- treaty theof purpose themain that Council proposals they made in the Council on 20th onApril. Councilthe in theymade proposals in that recognise we However, treaty.the under obligations treaty thein equity of theprinciple touphold continues Canada unless achieved beto likely isnot - weapons ofspreadnuclear ae o-rlfrto ray n omk cnesos o the to concessions andtomake treaty a non-proliferation have Such the inpersuading someway go think, wewill, undertakings thereafter. shortly very or theLNDC in III Article give parallel and public undertakings to accept safeguards on safeguards accept to undertakings and public parallel give latest the of aspects discriminatory the to objections their of balance acceptable a mutually towards contribution aas them prefer to see undertakings made at the time of tabling of draftof tabling of time the at made seeundertakings to prefer their non-military nuclear activities along the lines of the of lines the along activities nuclear non-military their reconsider to beprepared therefore would Authorities Canadian oml a e ae s imidcto fterdsr todesire their of indication afirm as taken canbe formula III, Article draft discriminatory a accept topowers non-nuclear gemn nafruagnrlyacpal t orale and allies our toacceptable generally aformula on agreement to contribute to promised this provided light sympathetic ain theformula to view and formula compromise Soviet be more willthey think we because arrangements safeguards norve, h Sve ilnns opooeti safeguards this propose to willingness Soviet the ourview, In system. safeguards international treatynegotiations. non-proliferation facilitating thereby bani. swl e la rmpeiu Canadian previous from clear be will As toit.order in obtain - language Western to even and - viewpoint Western countries. Western other and ofEuratom interests legitimate the appear to have moved some considerable way towards accommodating accommodating towards way considerable some moved to have appear Such action would also contribute to the strengthening of theof strengthening theto contribute alsowould action Such 4 Te AAINRPEETTV aete following the made REPRESENTATIVE CANADIAN The 14. "On the basis ol a preliminary examination of_the examination apreliminary ol"Onthe basis "We "It is scarcely necessary to remind members of the of remindmembers to necessary "It scarcely is "In its proposed compromise formula the USSR would theUSSR formula compromise "Inproposed its rgr h sfgad atce svtl o the to asvital article safeguards the regard 1_ AO SECRET NATO _1?_ 12- f u s e h AO SECRET NATO We would DECLASSIFIED/DECLASSIFIEE - PUBLIC DISCLOSED/MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE sfrtepeet opoie oml, ewloe Soviet welcome we formula, compromise thepresent for As language proposed by the USSR should facilitecteshould theUSSR by proposed language negotiation, of ifrne ewe AAadErtmsses w aefl thatfelt systems, wehave andEuratom IAEA between differences recognition of both the existence of an alternative an of existence the ofboth recognition as established by IAEA. While not uninterested in resolving resolving in uninterested not While IAEA.by established as this is a matter of principal concern to Euratom countries. toEuratom concern ofprincipal ais matter this eoitos US fiil ae adpiaeyta thethat saidprivately have officials USSR negotiations. effective anof theway in USSR thefrom obtain can now we urgency. safeguards for universal been has ourpreference statements, establishing an effective safeguards system under the treaty.the system under safeguards effective an establishing the ourview In systems. andEuratom IAEA the associating of theimportance ofand system safeguards sophisticated SRwudpee ohv o rayta o cet safeguards acceptto than treaty noto have prefer would USSR rvso o eiiainrmis fprmutiprac and importance paramount of remains verification for provision arrangements under which both systems may be associated in associated be systemsmay both which under arrangements have confidence in the system of verification. This would This ofverification. system thein confidence have uncontroversial. were issues basic certain that thought he n epry Ee fi en sm sciie fpicpe in principle, of sacrifice some itmeans if Even bethus treatymay The jeopardy.in recalcitrant. increasingly becoming facilities. own nuclear itsto Euratom, with its own control system should be taken into taken shouldbe system control own its with Euratom, awhole." as treaty the to endorsement their give on its own peaceful activities, and the non-aligned are non-aligned andthe activities, ownpeaceful onits bewill treaty thethat remember should we article safeguards isl, h oaiis hudb sc ht l ate should allparties that such be should themodalities Firstly, what was concentrate, should Council the thought Netherlands The aswas which thisArticle,on position clear a had Netherlands treaty.aof conclusion the to obstacle themajor was and article safeguards a on themselves among agreement final establish toseek couldnow countries Western if ofnegotiations the Canadian view conclusion of the treaty with effective with treaty theof conclusion view Canadian the safeguards applying in co-operate to pressure constant tosubject bewill thethatUSSR and amendment and review tosubject account; therefore there must inevitably be some kind of somekind be inevitably must there therefore account; oughtthere onwhich points basic three were There follows• o ewd areeti h Cucl Frty te treaty thetobe Firstly, itwas ifsystem verification adequate an contain should Council.the in agreement wideto be III Article thatout turned ithad discussions Councilearlier hudb temdlte o sc narneet Hr again Here arrangement.an such of themodalities shouldbe IAEA.and Euratom between arrangement should be the IAEA. Thirdly, the existing co-operation within within co-operation existing the Thirdly, instrument centralverification the Secondly, IAEA. theshouldbe areality. 15. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE recalled that in that recalled REPRESENTATIVE NETHERLANDS The 15. 16. The question which arose, and on which theon which and arose, which question The 16. "While the Soviet formula, Soviet "Whilethe themaximum represent may "We are reaching a very critical stage of theNPT of stage critical a very "We reaching are "We think it would contribute greatly to the progress theto greatly contribute would "Weit think 1- AO SECRET NATO -13- -13- C-ltr%7)38 C-ltr%7)38 AO SECRET NATO ^^ DECLASSIFIED/DECLASSIFIEE - PUBLIC DISCLOSED/MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE provided for within the Euratom treaty. The Euratom TheEuratom treaty. the Euratom within for provided someofthat from differed which view, Netherlands well-known limited to the provision of information by the Commission to the Commission the by information of provision theto limited torefused they which exemptions certain themselves toreserve couldnot countries European Western certain thatimply Representative had said that it obviously did not represent therepresent didnot obviously it that said had Representative would disregard the basic principles of co-operation between co-operation of principles basicthe disregard would which IAEA theand Euratom between arrangement an envisage not andhow. in Euratom applied were controls what concerning IAEA arrangements onthe check areal IAEA the give theIAEA must The Europe. of thoseEastern example for countries,other nla; ewudntnwg no eal. h ntd States TheUnited details.into go now not would he unclear; o er. o xml, ihntefaeoko certain of framework the within example, For for years. fall would arrangement an such that considered TheNetherlands with tomade be arrangement thethat was members,other Euratom possible to propose modifications. propose to possible was imagined, since the present IAEA arrangements had been been had arrangements IAEA thepresent since imagined,was a non-proliferation Since Community.theof area theinwhole freely circulate to allowed were materials nuclear regulations, valid been now whichhad Community theEuropean of the members couldbe arrangement thethat suggested earlier Commission had The Netherlands therefore considered that it should be should itthat considered therefore Netherlands The Moscow.with cleared been not and had proposal Soviet final together. existed systems controlIAEA and theEuratom if complications administrative and duplication treaty; they would therefore have to be adjusted in any case.anyin adjusted tobe have therefore would they treaty; a non-proliferation for andnot purposes other for designed essential was It different.be would them between fortraffic recognised that the Euratom problem existed. The Netherlands The a as acceptable proposal Soviet the considered therefore existed. problem Euratom the that recognised serious aas welcomed Netherlands the which draft,Sovietthe issues.basic three above the foundfor omnt. hs hudb ls ifcl obigaot than difficult less aboutbe should bring to This Community. therefore was it furthered; be should goods of circulation regulations the states, individual asbetween apply treatywould unacceptable. beandwould necessary wasshort ofwhat oto sol o apyt temmes of themembers to apply theEuropean not should control of thepresent 28of system Article thatIAEA essentialalso common theof thefreedom that Market Common to the starting point for further negotiations. further for startingpoint it that in treaty,aof conclusion the towardseffort 7 Te eodbsc su nhsve a htoe couldone that was view in his issue basic second The 17. 8 Tetidbsc su a ta n sol avoid should one that was issue basic third The 18. 19. He thought that with goodwill a solution couldbe solution a goodwill with that thought He 19. 20. A new fact had now arisen i.e. the presentation of thepresentation i.e. arisen now had fact new A 20. 21. The Soviet text was in many respects purposely purposely respects in many was text Soviet The 21. -14- 1- AO SECRET NATO -14- QL T E R C E S O T A N r I67)38 -15- NATO SECRET C ^ R ( 67)38

22. The important new element was that the Russians had now proposed a text on which it seemed negotiations were possible. It was difficult for the Russians to mention Euratom explicitly, but the language of their draft (for example the reference to "either individually or together with other states" in paragraph 4 of Article III) implied that they recognised that difficulties of this nature existed. 23. The Netherlands Authorities wondered whether it would not be possible to work out a procedure where the arrangement between the IAEA and Euratom would be contained in a memorandum of understanding signed by the Co-Chairmen guaranteeing that the interests of Euratom countries would be respected. They thought that the memorandum should also make it clear that the IAEA safeguards would have to be adjusted to the purposes of the non-proliferation treaty, including the requirements of the Euratom treaty. 24. The Netherlands Authorities would make a determined effort to urge the Euratom Commission to engage early negotiations with, a view to obtaining a Euratom position in line with the new requirements. If it could be made clear to the Commission that the new Soviet draft would not impede the work of the Euratom arrangements the Euratom Council of Ministers should, in accordance with Article 101 of the Euratom treaty, instruct the Commission to contact the IAEA with a view to formal discussions.

25. The Netherlands felt that as soon as these negotiations reached fruition the individual Euratom governments could conclude verification agreements with the IAEA which would take account of their individual positions, France, as the other Euratom countries were aware, maintained a special position.

26 . Briefly, his Government considered that one should not lose this opportunity of reaching agreement on a text. 27. The DANISH REPRESENTATIVE said that at the present stage he could only reaffirm his Government's interest in a speedy conclusion of a treaty. The Danish Delegation had already expressed its understanding for the difficulties experienced by various countries of the Alliance, for example with regard to discrimination and to the Euratom problem. At the same time his Authorities had made clear that they attached overriding political importance to the conclusion of a treaty; they hoped that those allied countries which still had doubts would try to reach a compromise. The new Soviet proposal represented an improvement and showed the Soviet interest in concluding a treaty. His Authorities therefore hoped that a turning point had been reached which would make it possible to arrive at a successful conclusion.

-15- NATO SECRET DECLASSIFIED/DECLASSIFIEE - PUBLIC DISCLOSED/MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE edures h ol o g i eal no theproblems into detail in gonot would he Headquarters, Euratom and the IAEA on Article III. onArticle IAEA theand Euratom thealsoand treaty the regarding ofAuthorities his view which remained or which might remain. might orwhich remained which NATO theat meeting atpresent were Experts Disarmament be an early understanding to undertake negotiations between between negotiations undertake to anearlyunderstanding be without continue would Geneva in talks States-Soviet United willing were they that sign apositive was which III,Article being better a acceptto need as III an Article without treaty Representative. Authorities, the text of which ofwhich circulate text might helater to the Authorities, iw eadn sfgad a enepesdi h Councilthe in expressed been had safeguards regarding views bilateral thethat and created, now themomentum loseto not the welcomed therefore Norway effective. tobe was reactions of the Euratom countries, on which he v/ouldhe onwhich countries, theEuratom report of reactions otiuin twrs h cnlso f ray Since the atreaty. of conclusion the towards contributions real providing discussion constructive a very been this had that hoped Authorities His initiative.Soviet new the of view in lessened be now theymight that andhoped countries Euratom draft thenew of delegation Soviet the by presentation ul eadn oa’ icsin H oe ht therewould that hoped He discussion. today’s regarding fully delay. orWsenpwr, rvddta twudesr effective ensure would itthat provided powers, fourWestern could Authorities his that therefore thought He object.its great attached article, safeguards Authorities effective His anof inclusion the to importance occasions.of a on number be would this that most treatythe if thought essential was Norway verification because regrettable, than nothing. aboutthe eventalk was There considerable. to becontinued control. tothe acceptable be would IIIwhich of Article atext toagree order in speededup, be would discussions informal the present delegations. Sovietthe of content ofthethebasis regardedform couldalso it that Norway considered and draftpositively compromise.to hegeneral In known.well was ofverification question since without it a treaty would have no chance of fulfilling of chance nohave would treaty a it sincewithout discussions which could make it possible to reach agreement. reach to itpossible could make which discussions theNetherlands by outlined principles thesupported 34. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE said that he found thathe said STATES REPRESENTATIVE TheUNITED 34. generalthe that said REPRESENTATIVE NORWEGIAN The 28. 33. His Authorities were very much interested in thein interested much very were Authorities His 33. thefor difficulties the understood fully Norway 31. 32. The TURKISH REPRESENTATIVE recalled that the Turkishthe that recalled REPRESENTATIVE TURKISH The 32. 0 H a just received his from instructions had He 30. 29. The difficulties regarding Article III had been and been IIIhad Article regarding difficulties The 29. 1- AO SECRET NATO -16- -16- C-R(67)38 AO SECRETNATO DECLASSIFIED/DECLASSIFIEE - PUBLIC DISCLOSED/MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE if this would be helpful, to permit application of the IAEAthe of application topermit behelpful,this would if interesting to note that the Soviets had not suggested any suggested not Sovietshad the that tonote interesting ncetbe ic tncsiae ul AA aeurs and safeguards, IAEA full necessitated it since unacceptable was which draft, Swedish the of ofthepresence because eoitoswt h IE. ehpdta h Cucl could Council thethat hoped He IAEA.the with negotiations been earlier Stateshad United The text?11.States United itwas Here force. cameinto treaty the IAEAthebefore _ Kingdom the studyUnited should Council the thatthought energy. ofnuclear uses Statespeaceful the United to context, proper the andin time proper atthesafeguards, intention, States United stillthe itwas 20th April on Council itself, his Authorities felt that there was some urgency both someurgency was there that felt Authorities itself, his not available. Here there was a danger that in trying totrying in that adanger was there Here available.not which in debate Assembly General forthcoming the of because period. definiteguillotine arwte usini a o rigt ase o thisto answer to trying now wasit question thenarrow tohave would which negotiations theEuratom-IAEA in position follow. He thought that the United States had protected these protected States had Union. Soviet theUnited the so far thatwith thought He negotiations thein interests follow. theEuratom particularly protect to Councilthe by requested with negotiations beginning of thepossibility onsuggestion oe yteUie States. theUnited by posed Councilmight thethat order in meeting, thenext at possible be much, produce would countries non-aligned unacceptable more the Soviets,the with III ofArticle textaon agree not ofdate early an at a way find could itthat and formulation; The question which now arose was whether the Soviet draft Soviet the whether was arose now questionwhich The language "Does the Counciltheof : hsugny fetdnt nyteUie Sae neet s a as Statesinterest theUnited only not affected Thisurgency dqaeypoetdErtmspsto nis eventual in its position Euratom’s protected adequately constitutional and legal detailed important of alistwhole answer totry one systemsmight IAEA and theEuratom accommodate was draft afinal if developments beundesirable there might Oo-Ohairman of the Geneva Conference, but the interests of all of interests the but Conference, Geneva theof Oo-Ohairman Geneva.in and discussion world-wide for both available treaty Assembly-Generalthe when thatso question this answering simple question raised by the United States at the last meeting meeting last atthe States United the by raised question simple theto replying solvein to necessary not wasit which questions dac a es ago at ftewyt sligte question the solving to way ofthe part agood atleast advance itmight that hoped he but discussion, resume should Council texts. v/ithone, anopen become thewould thatquestion couldtherisk one If countries. Euratom the especially allies,the tde iammn sus twudb osbe ohv afull to have possible be would it issues studieddisarmament thein protect totried we what protect judgement adequately 5 H rpae ta, s ttdb r Fse o h ^ theto Foster statedMr.by as that, repeated He 35» 6 Te usino tmn a a motn oe He one. an important was timing of question The 36. 37. As regards the timing of the negotiation of the treaty theof thenegotiation of timing the regards As 37. 38. He would leave it to the Chairman to decide when the when decide to Chairman theto it leave would He 38. 1- AO SECRET NATO -17- -17- of the Soviet text in in your text Soviet the CTT&7J38 CTT&7J38 AO SECRET NATO ^ -18- NATO SECRET

39. The GREEK REPRESENTATIVE recalled that his Delegation had often stated that Greece was strongly in favour of non-dissemination. Since his Authorities were still studying the new Soviet draft Article III he reserved the possibility of commenting further, especially in the light of today's discussion. 40. The CHAIRMAN, summing up, said that he thought that since some Permanent Representatives had indicated that their governments were still studying the question, it was for them to say when more definite conclusions would be available. Today he noted that there had been a general welcome for the step forward taken by the Soviet delegation. Here there were three different nuances. Firstly, some speakers had said that this was a positive step towards early conclusion of a draft treaty to be accompanied by interpretations to be agreed bilaterally between the United States and the Soviet Union. Secondly, some speakers had considered that the Soviet text represented a starting point for discussion; and thirdly, the more conservative view had been expressed that the text represented simply the beginning of the possibility of moving toward negotiations. 41. The following objections had been expressed: (1) criticism of discrimination (partly met by the United Kingdom and United States willingness to submit to verification of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, even without such Soviet willingness);

(2 ) the extension of verification envisaged in the Soviet text;

(3) some speakers had insisted that the Soviet text regarding safeguards was ambiguous and unsatisfactory, as concerned the problem of Euratom, whereas others found, it satisfactory; (4) the question had been raised of whether there was a guillotine or not for the time to be allowed for negotiations with the IAEA. 42. He thought that the Council should discuss this subject again at its next meeting in order to see what further instructions had been obtained.

43. Finally, he emphasised that the discussion in the Council was a purely consultative one; the responsibility for tabling a draft treaty lay with the United States Government, which was entitled to take appropriate account of the views expressed by the allies in the Council.

-18- NATO SECRET DECLASSIFIED/DECLASSIFIEE - PUBLIC DISCLOSED/MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE Authorities would agree with the United States view Statesview the United with agree would Authorities i uhrte ol ge ihteUie States theUnited with agree would Authorities his o eoe h Cucl adta h Cucl hudnt atthis shouldnot Councilthe that and Council, the now before was which question thenarrower only itwas that Representative maintaining about the same level of output. The Cuban economy Cuban The output. of level same the about maintaining Policy.Soviet Economic on Sub-Committee theby held meeting the General Assembly had begun to meet. He also thought that thought also He to meet. begun had theGeneralAssembly last nine years. On the other hand, she had succeeded in succeeded shehad other hand,the On years.lastnine With Council.inthe discussion further for waiting without and on the increasing difficulty of reaching a solution after solution a ofreaching difficulty theincreasing andon h ftr, osbya smtiglk t rsn ee, but level, present its like something at possibly future,the of form the in assistance Communist on dependent washeavily aof question wasnothere that emphasised Chairman, he the this oould change rapidly with circumstances. with rapidly change oould this in assistance onitsceiling a place to intended the thatUSSR III. waswho Fisher ofMr. thismeeting at thepresence welcomed immediately,elements new these discuss Conference might Geneva theof Co-Chairmen thetoday discussion theelementsin appeared to have made no significant economic progress over the over progress economic significant no to made have appeared States. theUnited to Council mandate IAEA.theand Euratom between arrangements precise stage discuss sugar subsidies and trade credits. There were indications indications were There credits. trade and subsidies sugar speciala of results theon based Cuba,in situation economic Foster.oftheMr. place as discussion animmediate to have wish Co-Ohairmenwould Soviet delegation urgently and in the most appropriate way. appropriate the inand most urgently Sovietdelegation the with contacts continue would the United that atGeneva and StatesDelegation meeting; next itsat continuediscussion in Co-Chairman, States theasUnited toGeneva shortlygoing he connection this In Representative. German thesuggestedby short report by the Committee of Economic Advisers about the about Advisers ofEconomic Committee theshortby report 4 TeGRA ERSNAIE adta e thought_his that saidhe REPRESENTATIVE GERMAN The 44. ouet C-M(67)51 Document; CUBA IN SITUATION ECONOMIC 45. He suggested that in view of the important new new theimportant of inview that suggested He 45. 46. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE thought that thethat thought STATESREPRESENTATIVE TheUNITED 46. 9 Te HIJA adta h Cuclhdbfr t a CHAIRJMANit The before Councilhad the that said 49» 0 I h ih o te idnso hsrpr, Cuba report,thisof findings the of thelight In 50. would Council thethat accordingly noted CHAIRMAN Lhe 47. 8 Te COUNCIL The : 48. approved the conclusion by the Ohairman above. Ohairman the by conclusion the approved 1- SECRET O T A N -19- -19- C^ AO CONFIDENTIAL NATO AO SECRET NATO r T^6TT38 011 timing -20- NATO SECRET

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

51. To political uncertainty was added that of an economic policy which aimed at a substantial increase in sugar production and counted on finding outlets for this sugar in non-Oommunist countries. Such a policy involved an element of gamble. 52. In view of these uncertainties and the special interest which many nations of the free world had in Cuba, the Economics Committee and its Sub-Committee on Soviet Economic Policy proposed to continue to follow closely the evolution of the Cuban economy. 53. He invited comments. 54. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE recalled that the propinquity of his country to Cuba and the well-known political background had given rise to a number of United States comments on this subject in the Council.

55. He made the following statements "The International Staff has done an excellent job in highlighting the main aspects of the Cuban economy. The report shows that under Castro the Cuban economy has had its ups and downs, with some sectors progressing while others have fallen behind, but that, overall, gross domestic product has made no progress - despite large-scale Soviet aid - in nine years, while per capita GDP has fallen.

"With respect to Cuba's recent international activities, we believe the following report will be of interest to the Council.

"In early August the Latin American Solidarity Organization (LASOla an off-shoot of the 1966 Havana Tri-Gontinental Conference, met in Havana. With strong encouragement from the Cuban organizers of the Conference the delegates - members of Communist groups and Communist-affiliated groups throughout the hemisphere - adopted a resolution proclaiming Castro`s thesis that 'armed struggle’ should be the fundamental line in the majority of countries of Latin America." And demonstrating his disagreements with the more moderate politices sometimes followed by the USSR in the Western hemisphere, Castro, in his closing speech, denounced Soviet aid to other countries in the hemisphere.

"A committee of the Organization of American States noted in an August report that 'Since the beginning of this year, there has been an increase in guerrilla activity in various countries - particularly in Colombia, Guatemala and Venezuela, and new centers have been opened in Bolivia and Brazil.’

-20- NATO SECRET _21- NATO SECRET C^R(67 ).38 NATO CONFIDENTIAL

The report added; "In Cuba, several s c h o o ls continue to train guerrillas, who are then 'exported* accompanied by Cubans. Such is the case in Panama and recently in Venezuela,, where in early May. the Venezuelan Government intercepted a mixed group of armed Cubans and Venezuelans who were landing on a remote Venezuelan beach. A meeting of Foreign Ministers will be held in Washington 22nd to 24th September to consider what action should be taken to counter Cuban-supported subversion in Latin America. "It is because of Cuba's continuing, indeed., increasing, subversive activities that the OAS nations attach importance to the isolation of Cuba and to the 1964 OÀS resolution suspending shipping and trade, except in foodstuffs and medical supplies., between the OAS nations and Cuba and calling upon other friendly countries to do the same. And it is because of Cuba's subversive activities that vie are concerned about the rise in NATO government-backed credits to Cuba. (The latest NATO Report - 0-M(67)24 - showed an increase from S36.5 million to $44.9 million from June to December; 1966.) We recognise that there are different views on the question of Cuban trade, and that governments often lack legal means to stop such trade, but we do hope that they will exercise great restraint in guaranteeing credits, which facilitate commerce, for the OastiIO regime.”

56. The CH/lIEMAN noted that this was a substantive statement of fact.

57. The COUNCIL; (1) took note of the note by the Chairman of the Committee of Economic Advisers on the economic situation in Cuba (C-M(67)5l); (2) noted the statement by the United States Representative. NATO UNCLASSIFIED IV. EXERCISE FOR NATO CIVIL WARTIME AGENCIES

Document: C-M( 67)4-7 58. The COUNCIL:

agreed to defer discussion to a later meeting.

-21- NitTO SECRET -22- NATO SECRET C ^ T g T ) ^ 5 8

NATO PlESTRIOTED

V. CENTRAL EUROPE PIPELINE SYSTEM (CEPS) - ANNUAL REPORT BY Tîffi 'DIRECTING" BODIES FÔR 19'g'g ~ ~ ~

I) ocunien 1 0 C-M ( 6 7 ) 3 7 59. TLe CHAIRMAN said that document C-M(67)37 contained at Annex was the third Annual Report to be submitted by the two directing bodies of the OEPS covering its activities in 1966. This report was accompanied by a letter of transmittal from the Chairman of one of those bodies, the Central Europe Pipeline Policy Committee.

60. The Council would observe that this pipeline system used by eight nations for the support of forces in Central Europe, continued to operate efficiently and to earn sufficient income from military and civilian fuel movements to cover the greater part of its operating expenses. The system provided an excellent example of international co-operation on a practical basis.

61. He invited the Council to take note of this Annual Report. 62. The COUNCIL:

noted the report to the Council on activities of the CEPS in 1966 , annexed to C-M(67)d7. NATO UNCLASSIFIED VI. DATE FOR TPIE NEXT MEETING OF SUB-GROUP 2 OF THE SPECIAL GROUP ON THE FUTURE TASKS OF THF IS lIa ICE (AC/261)

63. The CHAIRMAN said that Mr. Spaak had suggested that Sub-Group 2 should meet on 2nd and 3rd October; but that this unfortunately was not possible for some delegations. Mr. Spaak had then suggested the dates of 25th and 26th September, saying that since his report would be circulated early next week delegations would have time to study it before that date. He asked the Belgian Representative whether he had any information as to Mr. Spaak's latest intentions.

64. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that he thought the dates of 25th and 26th September would suit Mr. Spaak, and that he would let the Chairman know as soon as he had final instructions.

-22- NATO SECRET -23- NATO SECRET ^ r T67T38 NATO UNCLASSIFIED

65. The COUNCILS subject to the convenience of Mr. Spaak, agreed that Sub-Group 2 should meet on 25th and. 26th September. NATO UNCLASSIFIED VII. DATE OF NEXT MEETING

66 . Wednesday, 20th September, 1907.

OTAN/NATO, Paris, (l6e) .

NATO SECRET