Competition Scenario in

Prepared by: Consumer Education Trust (CONSENT)

Supported by

Consumer Unity & Trust Society (CUTS International)

August 2006

1 1.0 OVERVIEW

Ugandaremainsoneofthepoorestcountriesintheworld,withlowpercapitaincomeand highruralpoverty.Aseriesofhouseholdexpendituresurveysduringthe1990sshowthatthe percentageofUgandanslivingbelowthepovertylineofapproximately$1/dayhasdeclined markedly,from56percentin1992to35percentin2000butrecentlyincreasedto38percent. The significant decline in poverty has been linked to considerable economic growth and expansionoftheeconomyformostofthe1990s.

Sovereign trade and investment liberalisation has been a key to Uganda's economic performancesincethemid1980s.Alongthepathof this development was the realisation thatanticipatedtransformationswouldrequireattractionofforeigndonorsandinvestorsand creationofconditionsforrapideconomicrecovery.

Uganda's recent performance testifies to what liberalization and economic reforms can achieveinapoor,devastatedeconomy.Itisvitaltonotethatcontinuationandconsolidation oftheprocessiscrucialintherebuildingoftheeconomicstructure;tradepolicy,inparticular, thecreationofadomestictradingenvironmentdevoidoftraditionalcommandeconomyera biases.

Enhanced international integration, based on commitments under the East African Community (EAC), the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), in spite of several teething and fundamental concerns, are helping to ensure that the momentum of reform, spurs resource efficiency, providesmarketpotentialforemergingindustries,andencourageslongtermdevelopmentof tradeandinvestment.

Virtuallyallrestrictionshavegonesincetheintroductionin1991ofautomaticlicensingunder farreachingtradereformsinboththeexportandimporttradesubsectors.Therestrictions, policy remnants from the pre1987 economic liberalization drive, were largely crafted to protect local industries that were predominantly state owned. Now the private sector dominatesandthereisconsiderablecompetitioninallspheresofeconomicactivities.

Laissezfairepolicydevelopmentslikethosegoverningprivatizationandinvestmentledtoa hugeinfluxofforeigncapitalandrapidexpansionoftheprivatesectoramidstdebateasto therightextentofstateregulationofconductinprivatesectorspheres.

However,sincetheadoptionofmarketorientedeconomic policy entailed the withdrawal of thestatefromtheindustrialandservicesectorssoastomakewayforprivateinitiative,the environment required fresh examination. This was because the customary efficiency of privatecapitaldoesnotnecessarilytranslateintoanimprovedeconomy,asamarketmade upofprivateactorswillnotnecessarilybecompetitive.

Aswaspredictablyestablishedinseveralrecentstudies,including“Thestateofcompetition inUganda,”carriedoutbyCONSENTwithsupportfromCUTSInternational,thelocalmarket is replete with considerable anticompetitive practices. The growth of foreign direct investment,trade,regionalandsubregionaleconomicintegrationandcooperationhaveled to practices such as restrictive business practices including price cartels, market sharing,

2 amongsomeoftheundesirableanddeleteriouspractices.Thesepractices,ifnotchecked, couldadverselyimpactuponcompetitionandthereforeareinimicaltoconsumerwelfare.

Anticompetitive practices may constitute an obstacle to the achievement of optimal economicgrowth,tradeliberalisationandeconomicefficiency withinthecountryandinthe immediateregionorbeyond.

Itiswellestablishedthatevenifallotherstructuresareinplacetosupportamarketoriented system,itcannotbeassumedthattheprivatesectorwilloperateindependentlyofeachother in the marketplace, or that the interaction of market forces will automatically maximize consumerwelfare.Therefore,itispertinentthatthestateintervenestoprotectcompetitionby prohibitingagreementsandactivitiesthatunderminethesame.Thisinterventiontakesthe formofcompetitionpolicy.

However,inUganda,theneedforsuchinterventionhasbeenmetwithconsiderabledebate, andinsomerespect,resistance.Thisispartofbroaderdebateaboutthedesirablebalance to be kept between regulation alongside deregulation under the framework of economic liberalization.Inmanycountries,competitionpolicyandlawexpresslyincorporateseconomic andsocialpoliciesthataredifferentfrom,ifnotantitheticalto,theprotectionofcompetition. Inthisrespect,stakeholdershavespokenatlengthaboutpoliciesthatinclude:promotionof economicefficiency;promotingproductionordistributionofgoods/ortechnicaloreconomic progress; protection of consumers; promotion or strengthening of exports; protection of economicfreedom;andprotectionofthe‘publicinterest’. Against that backdrop, the need for stakeholder awareness, advocacy, and consensus buildingcannotbeoverstated.Thisisunderscoredbydevelopmentslikethetwinprocesses ofdevelopingcompetitionlawswithintheEACandCOMESAthathavereachedanadvanced stage.Thisisbuttressedbysimilardevelopmentsonthelocalscene,involvingthedraftingof alawtoregulatecompetition.

ThisCountryResearchReportisinrespectofatwoyearstudyproject‘CapacityBuildingon Competition Policy in Select Countries of Eastern and Southern Africa’ codenamed 7Up3. The project undertaken under the aegis of Consumer Unity and Trust Society (CUTS) International’sCentreforCompetition,InvestmentandEconomicRegulation(CUTSCCIER), is being implemented in seven countries: Botswana, Ethiopia, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia and Uganda, with support from the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), Norway and the Department for International Development(DFID),UnitedKingdom.

CONSENTistheimplementingpartnerinUganda(forbothResearchandAdvocacy).Aspart ofthestudy,asurveywascarriedoutinUganda;findingsaredetailedinlaterchaptersofthis report.Itisenvisagedthattheaboveandotheractivitiestofollowshouldgoalongwayin enablingtherealizationoftheprojectaim:todevelopthecapacityofnationalstakeholders, including the policy makers, regulators, civil society organisations, academicians and the mediaineachoftheprojectcountries,throughaparticipatory process, to understand and appreciate prevailing competition concerns from the national, regional and international perspectives,andenablethemtoplaytheirrespectiveandexpectedroles.

3 1.1 Vital National Information, Statistics

POLITICS & GEOGRAPHY Geographical location EastAfrica,astridetheEquator,landlocked. Geographical neighbours Kenya,Tanzania,Sudan,DRC,Rwanda Administrative system, structure Decentralised system with central government retaining role of policymaking,supervisionandadmin.Units76districts Area 241,038sqkm(93,072sqmiles) Life expectancy 45years(men),47years(women)–UN Population distribution 82%rural,18%urban System of government ‘No party’ movement system, transiting to multiparty democracy after2006elections. SOCIAL & HISTORICAL POINTERS Historical background Former British protectorate, stable before independence but chaoticafterwards(turmoil,unrest,economicdecline) Major languages English(official),Kiswahili,Ganda Major religions Christianity,Islam Number of phone lines 1,500,127 mobile, 100,056 fixed (5% penetration) – MoFPED, June2006 Access to electricity 5%ofpopulation(250,000connectionsERA) Access to clean water 60%(national),55%rural–2004(DWD) Literacy rate 69.9% Adult HIV prevalence 7%(MoH,2005) No of radio sets (per 1000pple) 130(unicef,2002) No of television sets (per 1000pple) 16(unicef,2002) Prevalence of poverty 38%(MoFPED,2004) Available HEP capacity 315mw(April2005ERA);reducedto200mwatof2005andtoa crisis170mwinJanuary2006 Population / population density 27million/126personsperKm 2(MoFPED,2005) Population growth / fertility rate 3.4%PA/6.8childrenperwoman ECONOMICS & TRADE Main exports Coffee,Fishandfishproducts,tea,tobacco,cotton,maize(corn), beans(MoFPED) Monetary unit Ugandashilling Exchange rate $1=sh1,800;є1=2,200;£1=3,200 GDP per Capita US$240(MoFPED,2005) Integration, trade arrangement MemberofEAC,COMESA,WTO,OIC,ESA,IGAD Major taxes Income tax (including corporate tax), withholding tax and rental income tax; value added tax (VAT); excise duty on certain products and sales tax. Imported goods attract import duty and importcommission.(Source:MoFPED) Total External debt stock US$4.3billion[10%GDP](2003/04–MoFPED) Inflation 7.0%(March2004–MoFPED) Tax revenue 12%ofGDP(MoFPED) Table 1: Vital socio-economic statistics on Uganda

4 2.0 SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC POLICIES AFFECTING COMPETITION

2.1 Development policy: Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP)

It is also the country’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). PEAP provides an overarching frameworktoguide public action to eradicate poverty. It has been prepared through a consultative processinvolvingcentralandlocalGovernment,Parliament,donorsandcivilsociety.Undertheplan, Governmentshouldensuretheprovisionofpublicgoodstosupportbothagricultureandindustry.In ordertoreversetherecentmarkedincreaseininequality,Governmentaimstoincreasetheabilityof thepoorerhouseholdstoparticipateineconomicgrowththroughselfemploymentinsideandoutside agricultureandwageemployment.ThePEAPprovidesthefoundationforavibrantandcompetitive economywithforwardandbackwardlinkagesamongstthecomponentsectors. FourcorechallengesforthePEAPinclude: Therestorationofsecurity,dealingwiththeconsequencesofconflictandimprovingregionalequity; Restoring sustainable growth in the incomes of the poor; Human development and Using public resourcestransparentlyandefficientlytoeradicatepoverty. The PEAP grounded on five ‘pillars’ or components: Economic management; Production, competitiveness and incomes; Security, conflictresolution and disastermanagement; Governance and Human development. Considered together, the five pillars provide a framework for improved distribution of resources, engagement in economic production and improved welfare of citizens (consumers)albeitlacedwithelementsofcompetition. However, the first and second pillars to wit: economic management and improved production, competitiveness and incomes have direct inference andreferencetomarket competition. In theory andpractice,theauthoritieshaveensuredtheadherencetothepillarsthroughliberalisationofthe country’seconomy,regardlessoftheprevailingshortcomings,deficienciesandconsequences. Also,governmenthasformulatedandimplementedtheMediumTermCompetitiveStrategy(MCTC), conceived as a means to remove obstacles to businesses, in a bid to deepen liberalisation and competition in the marketplace. The MCTC is an offshoot of the PEAP, as it is the overarching frameworkforformulationofpublicpolicy.AndunliketheoverallPEAP,itisrelativelyeasiertotrack implementationoftheMCTC,particularlyintheshortrunasbudgetaryallocationsarenormallyset aside for the purpose. Preliminary reports indicate some success in implementation of the MCTC, althoughthereremainsalongwaybeforemostofthemajorobstacles(thatalsoincludelegaland policyreforms),couldbeinplace.

2.2 Industrial Policy Thecountry’sindustrialsectorisstillsmallbutgrowingsteadilyandisnowcompletelydominatedbythe private sector (both local and foreign). The sector is dominated by processing industries using agriculturalproduce(Coffee,textiles,sugar,beer,leatherandtobaccoamongthemajorones).

The sector is steadily transformingfrom importsubstitution to an integral part of the economy with forwardandbackwardlinkagesaimedatcontributiontothecountry’spursuitforimprovedproduction, competitiveness of its products and improvement of incomes for poverty eradication. However, a comprehensivepolicyonindustryisnotyetinplace;onlyscatteredprovisionsexist. Nevertheless, considered together, the scattered provisions provide for a competitive environment withhardlyanyimpediments,saveforprovisionsovertheenvironmentandlandrightsasprovidedfor in environment and land laws. Licensing requirements in place do not constitute barriers to competition but rather are part of regulatory requirements aimed at consumer protection, technical regulation,generally,toensureadherencetorelevantlaws,rulesandregulations. 5 Withdeepprivatisationthatstartedinthe‘90s,therearehardlyanynationalchampionsleft.Evenwith thefewthathavebeeninexistence,protectionhasbeenintheformofshorttermfiscalratherthan directlegalinstrumentsorprovisionsinrelevantpoliciesorlaws.

2.3 Trade policy Ugandadoesnothaveamodern,comprehensivetradepolicybutaseriesofscatteredprovisionsin otherpolicies.Consideredtogether,theyseektofacilitatethefullandeffectiveintegrationofUganda intoregionalandglobalmarkets,andtofacilitatetheeconomicandsocialtransformationofUganda intoacompetitive,flexibleandoutwardorientedeconomyforthebenefitofallUgandans.Thepolicy is anchored in principles of liberalisation and strong elements of competition set on an outward lookingframework. Uganda extends tariff preferences only to countries in the COMESA group and to Kenya and Tanzania under the East African Community Treaty. Nearly 800 products are covered by these preferences.

Trade Agreements: Largely spurred byglobalisation andthe need to reactivate regional integration effortsthatbrokedowninthe1970s,Ugandahassignedseveraltradeagreementsandisplayingan activeroleinmultilateralandregionaltradenegotiations.Thecountryisamemberofthefollowing regionalandmultilateraltradeagreements: I. TheWorldTradeOrganization(WTO); II. TheACPEUCotonouAgreement; III. NewEconomicPartnershipforAfrica’sDevelopment(NEPAD). IV. CommonMarketforEasternandSouthernAfrica(COMESA); V. TheEastAfricanCommunity(EAC); VI. InterGovernmentalAuthorityonDevelopment(IGAD); Inadditiontotheabove,UgandaasaLeastDevelopedCountry(LDC),isabeneficiarytoanumberof marketaccessinitiatives.Prominentamongtheseinitiativesare: • The Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) oftheUSAand • Everything-But-Arms (EBA) oftheEuropeanUnion(EU).

Theneteffectandobjectiveofthecountry’sinvolvementinthevarioustradeandeconomicgroupings isadrivetowardsanoutwardlookingeconomicdispensationinwhichthereisfreeentryandexitof capital;wheremarketforcesdeterminedemandandsupplyofgoodsandservices.Sofar,thecountry hasalaissezfairetradepolicythatguaranteesmorethanminimallevelsofcompetitioninallspheres oftrade(themarket).

2.4 Regulatory Policy Liberalisation and privatisation in the early 1990s led to restructuring of the economy informed by shifting of the means of production and changing roles of the state. Deregulation was instituted in sectorsconsideredcrucialtotheeconomytocheckanticompetitiveactivitiesandtakechargeoffirms andpersonswhoseactionscouldbeinjurioustotheeconomyandtoindividualconsumers.Itwasalso duetotheneedtoputinplacearigorousregulatoryregimefollowingwithdrawalofgovernmentfrom business. Thiswouldbeparticularlyadangerinareaswhereone,twoorthreefirmsmaybeoperatingraisingthe prospect of pricefixing, attempts to run competition out of the market through hostile takeovers, and creation of virtual monopolies etc. Through bodies like the Uganda Communications Commission (UCC),thelawhasprescribedsafeguards.Theframeworkcoverslicensing,supervision,regulationand surveillance.Theagencieshaveinvestigativepowersaswellaspowerstodiscipline,handleconsumer

6 complaintsandtoarbitrateindisputesinvolvingfirms.Thebodiesenjoyalargemeasureofoperational andfinancialautonomy,althoughtheyarestillundertheoversightofaMinisterresponsibletoCabinet andhaveultimatelytoaccounttoParliamentthroughtherelevantMinister. In addition, there are intrasectoral councils and associations like the Pharmaceuticals Council and Association,LawSocietyandCouncil,MedicalandDentalPractitioners’CouncilandtheBroadcasting Council with powers to set or advise on operational and ethical standards and a code of conduct; powers to investigate member (individuals or companies) and either directly take or recommend disciplinaryaction.Inthisrespect,thisvoluntarysectorassociationmayactonitsownorattherequest oforinconcertwiththesectoragencyorgovernment. However, the case of recent action by the Media Council delegating its powers to the Media Centre (including powers to revoke licences of practising journalists), a nonstatutory body created by governmentraisesquestionsofconcernoverindependenceofregulatorybodiesandtheircapacityof oversight as well as limitations over industry players. Therefore, while regulatory policy has had significant success in elimination of structural bottlenecks, remnants from the days of the command economy,andtoensureorderinthemarketplace,shortcomingsremain,underlinedbyseveralcases(at least as reported in the media) where the authority of regulatory bodies has been undermined or interferedwith.

2.5 Investment policy Government created the Uganda Investment Authority (UIA) in 1991 partly to effect emphasis on investment as the engine of growth. The UIA was formed to promote and facilitate investments in Uganda, advise the Government on policies conducive to investment and provide information on investment issues, among others. One of the core functions of the UIA is attracting foreign direct investment(FDI)intothecountry,aswellaspromotinginvestmentsbyUgandans. Followingfailuretorealiseitsoriginalmission,theUIA’srolewaslaterchangedtoaonestopcentre forprospectiveinvestors.AlongwiththecreationoftheUIA,Governmentputinplacealawtogovern foreigninvestments–theInvestmentCodeof1991.However,theCodehasbeenreviewedandthe flagship ‘carrot’, a package of investment incentives, including tax holidays to investors has since been scrapped. All tax benefits under the new incentives regime have been harmonized so that eligibleinvestorsenjoythebenefitsdirectlywithoutneedforacertificateofincentivesaslongasthey makeinvestmentsofacapitalnature. Theabovedevelopment,inaclassicalviewoftheprevailinginvestmentpolicyframework,‘levelled’ the ground for investors, local and foreign. Before the scrapping, it had been observed that the country’s investment sector had suffered a reversal with foreign investors getting a preference package at the expense of their local counterparts, a practice deemed outright anticompetitive. Although elements of ‘anticompetitiveness’ (like insistence on sourcing a portion of raw materials locally,regardlessofcostaswellaslimitationofplayersincertainsectorsliketelecommunications) stillexist,thesectorgenerallyremainsliberalandcompetitive. 2.6 Government procurement policy The need for transparency has resulted into tightening of the regulatory noose around public procurement.It’snowgovernedbyaseparatepolicyandlawinUgandaandisundertheregulatory oversightofanindependentbody;thePublicProcurementandDisposalofAssetsAuthority(PPDA). Consequently, it has had the double effect (benefit) of helping to improve transparency as well as upping competition as new rules explicitly call for ‘competitive bidding’ for services/ goods whose valueexceedsUS$5000.Thishasdealtablowtotendenciesbydepartmentsandpublicservantsto use arbitrary powers, many times unfairly or corruptly, to procuregoods and services ostensibly in publicinterest.

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Before the above reforms, public procurementwas largely a den of corruption with public servants takingbribesbeforeawardingcontractsoroutrightlyawardingcontractstofirmsinwhichtheyhad visibleinterests.Wellassuchcaseshavenotcompletelybeenuprooted;thereisamarkeddecrease ofcorruptioninpublicprocurement(atleastaccordingtoperceptionsandanecdotalevidence).What remainstobedoneistoimprovetheregulatorycapacityoftheauthority,especiallyitsinvestigative capacityinabidtoidentifyandcounteranticompetitivepracticeslikebidriggingthatare‘whitecollar’ innatureandthereforehardtodeal withunder thestatusquo.(Inourview,thelastparagraph,in nutshell, reflects on the “effectiveness” of procurement policy, as requested by the CRR advisor, unlesswewronglyunderstoodhiscomment). 2.7 Labour policy Policy is liberal and conducive, allowing free movement of labour and, in theory, rights of workers must be protected as enshrined in the various international laws, treaties and regulations to which Ugandaissignatory. However, until recently,themain drawback wasfailureto enactmodern labour laws and review of existing ones, a shortcoming blamed for prevalence of abuse of workers by unethical employers. Several media reports have also pointed towards the existence of sweatshops(work places where workers’ rights are abused and/or, are exploited) in the country at the hands of mainly foreign investors. Thelaboursectorreceivedabigshotinthearmwithrevitalisationofthelabourmovementfromthe 1990satatimewhengovernmentwascarryingoutrestructuringoftheeconomylegal/policyreforms. Complementary efforts from private sector bodies like the Federation of Uganda Employers (FUE) have channelled consequential synergies into a push for broader ownership of the policy and law reformprocess. Also, the long awaited modern labour framework was enacted (March 2006), aimed at addressing contemporaryissuesintheincreasinglydynamicmarketplace.Inthisrespectthelawsincluded:the Employment Bill 2005, consolidating and revising the law relating to employment; and the OccupationalSafetyandHealthBill2005,toreformthelawrelatingtosafetyattheworkplace.Others are the Labour Disputes Bill 2005, to address arbitration and disputes settlement and the Labour Unions Bill 2005 to provide for issues pertaining to workers’ rights and the need to consolidate interests. Even withthelawsbeinginplace,localbusinessesissometimesseenbysectionsoftheirforeign counterpartsasemploying‘costcutting’measuresthatviolatelabourrights,forinstancepaymentof comparativelylowwages,longerhoursofwork,anddenialorexclusionofbenefitslikeinsurance,etc. Suchmeasureshelplocalcompaniessaveontheircostofproduction,whichforeigncompaniesclaim give local companies upper hand with regards price competition in similar products. Foreign companies assert that such practices constitute elements of unethical behaviour that hinders competition. It is envisagedthat whenfully implemented,the new frameworkshould makethe country’s labour policysufficientlyflexiblesoastoencourageinvestmentsaslabourrelatedissueswouldn’t constituteanimpedimenttofreeentryandexitfrommarkets. 2.8 SMEs Policy Importance is being attached to Small and Medium Enterprises(SMEs) althoughthere is lack of a comprehensivepolicytoaddresstheenterprisesholistically.

8 SMEsprovideabout12%ofemploymentinruralareasand40%inurbanareas.Governmentplansto develop a cost effective way of delivering services to them, particularly for business development skills,andhasindicatedthatitintendstoreviewthemethodoftaxationusedforthissubsector.Asa gain, bureaucratic obstacles totheir operationsare expectedto bereduced by the systematic and consultativescrutinyofproposednewregulationsandreviewofexistingones.Inpractice,SMEsin Ugandahavebeenfacedwithseveralobstacles(accesstocredit,poorinfrastructure,inaccessibility to utilities etc) that have rendered them uncompetitive, contrary to expectations that they enjoyed privileges–essentiallyonpaper–thatprotectedthemagainstexternalthreats. However, the longterm interests and concerns of SMEs can only be addressed under a relevant policy and institutional framework established through a participatory approach in which industry playersareinvolved.Wellastheprevailingdispensationiswroughtwithrelativedisorganisation,the overallenvironmentguaranteescompetitioninthemarketplacebutfallsshortofpreceptsrequiredto regulateconductwithaviewtocheckingmalpractices(anticompetitivepractices).AffairsofSMEs are not governed by a comprehensive policy and institutional framework; there is sufficient competitionbydefault,owingtothenatureoftheenvironment(manyplayersduetoliberalentryand exit‘rules’).However,this leissez faire dispensationfallsshortofguaranteeingconsumerprotection andeconomicefficiencylikewouldbeexpectedfromasituationwherecompetitionisregulated).

9 2.9 Consumer Policy Scattered provisions on consumer protection and welfare exist in sectoral policies (water, telecommunications,electricity,etc).However,acomprehensiveconsumerprotectionpolicyisnotin placeyet,althoughadrafttotheeffectisexpectedtobeoriginatedbycabinetatthesametimewhen itwouldbeconsideringthedraftproposedConsumerProtectionBill. The absence of consumer protection policy and supportive legislation in the country means that consumerperspectivesareseldomtakenintoaccountinformulationofpublicpolicy.Incasetheyare considered,itishaphazardlydone.Therefore,enactmentofpolicytothiseffectwillgoalongwayin refocusingtheattentionofauthoritiesandstakeholdersonthemarketpracticesthatmaybedetrimental totheinterestsofbothconsumersandbusinessesalike.

However,onthewhole,thestrengthofthecountry’sscatteredconsumerpolicyisintherealitythatit is anchored in principles of liberalisation and freemarket approaches that guarantee more than minimumcompetitioninthemarketplace. 3.0 NATURE OF MARKET COMPETITION

3.1 Overview Themarketeconomyisstillinitsinfancy,characterisedbyabsenceofenablinglaws/institutionsin some sectors (and industries) or the existence of inadequate and/, or archaic policies and laws (Cases:saleofgoods,consumerprotection,foodsafety,Intellectualpropertyetc).Theemergenceof competition in the marketplace has largely been as a result of government direct involvement in attractionofinvestmentsforpurposesofimportsubstitutionorenhancementofcapacityforprovision ofgoodsandserviceswherenoneexistedorwheretheirexistencewasinadequate. Consequently,exceptinretailtrade,thelevelofcompetitionlocallyisrelativelylowgiventheinfant natureofthecountry’sindustrialandservicesectors.Inotherareasoftheservicessector,thereis relativecompetition,althoughhighmarketconcentrationremainsabarriertoattainmentofdesirable levels of competition in the marketplace. In areas involving huge capital investments, a de facto oligopolisticsetuphasemerged.Thisincludestheutilitiessector. There is market concentration in several sectors of the economy, particularly in financial services (insurance),manufacturing(mainlyfoodprocessing)andbeveragesamongothers.Underthissetup, dominantentitiesnormallysetthepaceinformofde facto leadershiponallfundamentalaspectsof theirrespectivesectorstherebyhurtingcompetition. A monopolistic competitive dispensation prevails in several sectors, i.e. very many buyers, many sellers,minimumdifferenceinnatureofproductsandnumberofbarrierstoentryorexit.Theeffectof thisallisthattherearemanycasesofanticompetitivebehaviourinthemarketplacethatis/or,could bedeleterioustobothmarketcompetition(andrelatedconsequences)aswellasconsumerwelfare. Alongsidethis,involvementofthestateinbusinessstillexiststosomeextent(telecom,power,milk processing, etc). Also, policy options that hurt competition like illenforced public procurement and selective and inequitable provision of subsidies to some businesses and industry (Cases: BHS Limited, GBK Limited and generally, urban formal businesses as opposed to rural and small scale businesses)providecasestoexamineandenforcecompetitioninthecountry. However,multinationalsaremakinginroadsintothemajorproductionsectorsoftheeconomyaswell as provision of basic services. With the opening up of borders under the East African Community CustomsUnion,COMESAandtheWTO,theneedforcompetitionregulationhasneverbeentimelier.

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3.2 Institutional Framework Uganda’s economy until very recently has been highly regulated. When competition 1 was not deliberately and negatively interfered with, it was “encouraged” rather haphazardly. Competition was dealtwithusuallyinthecontextofotherlegislationsandnotdirectly.Therefore,onecanhardlyspeakof aninstitutionalframework 2,ratherofaseriesofsectoralarrangements.Inaddition,andperhapstobe fair to the authorities of the day, the majority of firms in Uganda are small family controlled entities, makingtheneedforanenforceablecompetitionregimehardtoimplement. Due to the nature ofthe country’s economy, such phenomena as mergers, takeovers, monopolies and price cartels were either rare or when they did occur, their possible harmful effects were not considered to be serious by the authorities. Following the deregulation of recent years, the governmenthas,mostlybydefault,takenthesectoralapproachbutcuriouslyonlyforthosesectors wherecontrol 3bygovernmentoritsagentsarestillconsideredofparamountimportance.Thisledto formation of authorities and commissions, like the National Drug Authority (NDA), Uganda CommunicationsCommission(UCC)andUgandaInsuranceCommission(UIC)amongothersectoral regulatoryagencies. 3.3 Competition Regulation As far as can be established, there is currently no law or set of laws in Uganda that address the exclusive subject of competition in business. Private monopolies are not normally subjected to any restrictionsorcontrol,butincertainsectorssuchasfinance(insurance)therearecertainrulesatleast onmergersandsimilarphenomena.Ingeneralitwouldbesafetosaythatanyregulationstoprohibitor sanctionrestrictivepracticesandenhancecompetitionarelargely,partofotherlegislations. In Uganda, many basic services like water and electricity are still only available largely from public enterprises with total monopoly positions Although power generation and distribution was recently privatisedbutearlierliberalised,theexistingenterprisesenjoymonopolisticpositionsinthemarketplace. Theseenterprisesareallowedtosettheirpricessubjectonlytoregulatoryauthorityapproval. ThemajorityandbyfarthemostimportantfirmsinUgandaareregisteredundertheCompaniesAct,a complex piece of legislationfirst introduced duringthecolonial era andwhich does not concern itself withcompetitioninanydirectway.

1 Competition may be defined as an effort by two or more parties to ensure the custom of a third party by offering the most favourable terms. A competitive market is one in which a large number of sellers and buyers vie or compete for identical products or commodities, deal with each other freely, and retain the right of entry into and of exit from the market. 2 Under an ongoing law review process in Uganda, an institutional framework has been mooted that would cover business-related laws including competition law in a more comprehensive manner. The Ministry of Tourism, Trade and Industry (MTTI) has drafted a competition law was scheduled to be tabled before Parliament in 2005. However, the term of the 7 th Parliament ended before this and other related laws (commercial) could be debated. The draft has since been sent back to the Ministry responsible for trade for onward transmission (back to Parliament) via cabinet. 3 Sectors like arms manufacturing and importation, trade in drugs and the utilities sectors are still considered a responsibility of the state and therefore should not be left entirely to the private sector. Semi-autonomous publicly funded bodies oversee these sectors.

11 4.0 COMPETITION LAW

4.1 Competition law: Evolution, foundation, legislative history, and philosophy Ugandaneitherhasalawnorapolicyoncompetitionregulation.However,draftsareinplaceand couldbetabledinParliamentforenactmentsoon.Thedraftlaw,tobeknownastheCompetitionAct, seekstocreate,encourageandprotectcompetition,encourageinvestments,strengthentheefficiency of production and distribution of goods and services and protect and promote social welfare of consumersinUganda. Architects of competition law through the existing consultative process were at first attuned to pursuing static and dynamic economic efficiency, which are the principal reasons for introducing competition.However,developmentsintheCOMESAregion(followingenactmentofaregionalpolicy and law on competition), later the East African Community (EAC) as well as from civil society (particularly consumer organizations) led to consideration of consumer welfare in the consultative process. Marketfailurestodealwith“excesses’occasionedbytheinbuiltsafeguardsandassumptionsledto theconvictionthatcompetitionregulationcouldproducesignificantbenefits,andmotivationto,inas many sectors as possible. Authorities and lay stakeholders alike, were not familiar with what constitutes a competitive market and what threatens it and were resigned to reliance on structural remedies which would probably prove to be a better instrument for developing competition than dependenceonasetofbehaviouralprescriptions. Government’sunwrittenpolicywastowinddownbothaccessandeconomicregulationsasandwhen competition becomes sufficiently strong. The point of departure; at which formal and broader (comprehensive)regulationshouldcome,asinstitutedelsewherehasbeentoconsiderthefractionof resources devoted to such regulation of a specific sector. Sectoral regulatory bodies were largely instituted to perform their traditional ‘policing’ roles in a bid to persuade the private sector, i.e. prospectiveinvestors,thatthegovernmentwascommittedtomakingthetransition. Itwasenvisagedthatcompetitionagencies(authorities)haveimportantexpertiseinidentifyingand helping to eradicate market power, which if left unchecked, would greatly reduce the benefits of regulatory reform. This is especially necessary because firms that are used to operating as monopoliesorbeingcoordinatedbyregulatorsmayfindit“normal”andhighlyattractivetocontinuein their preregulatory reform modes of doing business. Uganda was especially a ripe case in the aftermathofthemassiveprivatizationprocessthatsawthedivestitureoftensofformerlystateowned enterprises, some with immense powers in the marketplace and therefore a threat to smaller competitorsaswellasconsumerwelfare. It was borne in mind that in practice, regulatory reform has rarely consisted simply of abolishing regulations and leaving everything up to market forces operating within general framework competitionlaw.Inagreatnumberofsituations,thethinkingentailedpolicymakersadoptingtheview that competition must be fostered by a new kind of regulation, which may or may not be strictly transitory. Some new or existing sectorspecific regulators were being mandated to promote competition and sometimes being charged with formulating and/or applying sectorspecific competitionrules. Whathasbeenincontentionistheoptimallevelofinvolvement;competitionagencieselsewherehave beenassignedtasksthathadpreviouslybeenperformedbygovernmentdepartmentsorbysector specificorgeneralregulators.Inpractice,therearefew,ifany,countrieswherethatdivisioncanbe regardedasfinallysettled,especiallysincethetransitiontogreatercompetitionisfarfromcomplete. Debateofthisandothersubstantiveissuesoncompetitionwithregardtopolicyandlawisexpected tocontinueincabinetandinParliament.Withthedeferraltodebatethedraftlaw,itisexpectedthat

12 therecouldbesomemorestakeholderconsultationsbeforeitisresubmittedtocabinetbeforegoing toParliament.Butatimetableforthesameisnotclear.Nevertheless,thedrafthadbeenconsiderably well discussed by stakeholders while still under the aegis of the Uganda Law Reform Commission (ULRC).GiventheprocedureofParliamentarydebate,still,morestakeholderswouldberequestedto maketheirsubmissions(whenthelawisat‘committeestage’).Thereforestakeholderswhomaystill wishtomaketheirsubmissionswouldbeavailedanopportunitytodosothen. Objectives, scope and coverage of competition policy/law Itisappreciatedlocallythatintroducingcompetitioninsectorspreviouslydominatedbystateownedor heavilyregulatedverticallyintegratedfirmsandprotectingconsumersfromsupracompetitivepricing aredifficulttasksrequiringaverybroadrangeofexpertiseandexperience. Inadditiontodealingwithstructural,strandedcostanduniversalserviceissues,therearefourtasks typicallyneedingcarefulattentionduringandafterthetransitionfromgovernmentownershiporheavy regulation to much greater reliance on market forces. The fifth area, embraced by an increasing numberofcountries,isconsumerprotection: 1. Competitionprotectioncontrollinganticompetitiveconductandmergers; 2. Access regulation ensuring nondiscriminatory access to necessary inputs, especially networkinfrastructures; 3. Economicregulationadoptingcostbasedmeasurestocontrolmonopolypricing;and 4. Technicalregulationsettingandmonitoringstandardssoastoassurecompatibilityandto addressprivacy,safety,andenvironmentalprotectionconcerns. 5. ConsumerProtection–thoughpartlythefocusintechnicalregulation,stakeholdersareofthe view that consumer protection requires special focus. It involves setting and monitoring standards and benchmarks against which consumers would be protected against economic andsafetyfalloutfromunconscionableconductofcompetingbusinesses. Against that background, the Ugandan law, to be referred to as the Competition Act, is aimed at fosteringandsustainingcompetitionintheUgandanmarketsoastoprotectconsumerinterestswhile safeguardingthefreedomofeconomicactionofvariousmarketparticipantsandtopreventpractices which limit access to markets or otherwise unduly restrain competition, affecting domestic or international trade or economic development and to establish regulatory body, the Uganda CompetitionCommission. PowersoftheCommission:Thejurisdiction,powerandauthorityoftheproposedcommissionshall be exercised through benches, whose members shall be appointed by the Chairperson of the Commission.EveryproceedingbeforetheCommissionshallbedeemedtobeajudicialproceeding withinthemeaningoftheCivilProcedureActandtheCommissionshallbedeemedtobeacivilcourt forthepurposesofthatAct. AnypersonaggrievedbyanorderoftheCommissionfromwhichanappealisallowedbythisActbut noappealhasbeenpreferred,maywithinthirtydaysafterthedateoftheorder,applytothebench which made the order for a review of the order and the bench may make such order on the application as it thinks fit. The law provides for establishment of a principle bench, on which the chairpersonsits,aswellassubsidiarybenches.Eachbenchshallhaveajudicialofficerappointedas member.

Dealing with horizontal restraints Part VI of the draft law on the broad area of “Prohibition of certain agreements” deals with the exclusivesubjectofverticalandhorizontalrestraints,specificallyreferredtoinSection43ofthedraft lawasanticompetitiveagreements.Subsection(1)ofthespecifiedsectionstates:“Anenterpriseor associationofenterprisesshallnotenterintoanyagreementortakeanydecisionorengageinany

13 concertedaction,inrespectofproduction,supply,distribution,acquisitionorcontrolofgoods,orthe provision of services, which causes or is likely to cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition.”Subsection(2)furtherstating:“Anagreementreachedordecisiontakenorconcerted actionengagedin,incontraventionofsubsection(1)isvoid.” Subsection(3)dealsexclusivelywithhorizontalrestraintsthus:“Anagreemententeredintobetween enterprises or a decision taken by an association of enterprises, including cartels, or concerted practicesbetweenenterprises,involvedinthesameorsimilarmanufacturingortradingofgoodsor provisionofservices,which: • directlyorindirectlyfixespurchaseorsellingprices; • limitsorcontrolsproduction,supply,markets,technicaldevelopmentorinvestment; • sharesmarketsorsourcesofproductionsupplybyterritory,type,sizeofcustomerorinanyother way; • directlyorindirectlyresultsinbidriggingorcollusivetendering, ispresumedtohaveanadverseeffectoncompetition.” Dealing with vertical restraints Subsection (4) of section 43 of the draft law deals exclusively with vertical restraints thus: ”An agreementorconcertedpracticebetweenenterprisesatdifferentstagesorlevelsoftheproduction chainindifferentmarkets,inrespectofproduction,distribution,saleorpriceofortradeingoodsor provision of services including: tie – in arrangement; exclusive supply agreement; exclusive distribution agreement; refusal to deal; resale price maintenance, is an agreement or practice in contraventionofsubsection(1)iftheagreementorconcertedpracticecausesorislikelytocausean appreciableadverseeffectoncompetition.” However, the law includes more provisions to guide determination of restraints as defined in sub section(4).Thisisforpurposesofdeterminingwhetherthereisanadverseeffectoncompetition.The draft law lists a number of factors that may be taken into account by the Commission. The commissionisexpectedtoconsiderwhethertheagreementsorconcertedpractices • resultincreationofbarrierstonewentry,or, • resultinforcingexistingcompetitorsoutofthemarket,or, • resultinforeclosingcompetitionbyhinderingentryintoamarket; • resultinanyconsumerbenefitorprocompetitiveimpact; • contributetotheimprovementofproductionanddistributionandpromotetechnicalandeconomic progress,whileallowingconsumersafairshareofthebenefits. Nevertheless,PartVIofthedraftlawdoesnotapplytoanyagreement,decisionorconcertedaction leadingtoanycombination(mergersandacquisitions),evenifnonoticeisrequiredtobegiventothe Commissionundersection45(itfocusesoncombinationsormergersandacquisitions). Also, provisions do not restrict the right of any person to restrain any infringement of intellectual propertyrightsgrantedinUgandaortoimposesuchreasonableconditionsasmaybenecessaryfor thepurposesofprotectingorexploitingsuchintellectualpropertyrights;and The provisions of the law in Part VI do not restrict the right of any person to export goods from Uganda,totheextenttowhichtheagreement,decisionorconcertedactionrelatesexclusivelytothe production,supply,distributionorcontrolofgoodsorprovisionofservicesfortheexport.

14 Dealing with dominant market position PartVIIoftheproposeddraftlawcoversthebroadareaof“Prohibitionagainstabuseofdominant position.”Section44,subsection(1)ofthedraftlawprohibitsenterprisesfromabusingtheirdominant positions. In the proposed law, dominant position is defined to mean a position in the market which materiallyrestrainsorreducescompetitioninthemarketforasignificantperiodoftime;and wheresharesbythatpersonorenterpriseoftherelevantmarketexceeds35percent. According to draft law, for the purposes of determining whether an enterprise enjoys a dominant position, or otherwise, one or more of the following factors may be taken into account: • marketshareofover33percent; • sizeandresourcesoftheenterprise; • sizeandimportanceofthecompetitors; • economic power of the enterprise including commercial advantages over competitors, whichmaybemeasuredbyreference,amongotherfactors,toproductrange,established trademarks,customerloyalty,verticalintegrationofthefirm,salesorservicenetwork; • technical advantages enjoyed by the firm, which may be judged with reference, among otherfactors,topatents,knowhowandcopyright; • dependenceofconsumers; • monopolystatusordominanceacquiredasaresultofanyAct,orbyvirtueofbeingan undertakingoftheGovernment,Governmentcompanyorapublicsectorundertaking; • entrybarriersifany,whichmaybejudgedbyreference,amongotherfactors,toregulatory barriers,financialrisk,highcapitalcostofentry,marketingentrybarriers,technicalentry barriers,economiesofscale,highswitchingcostsforcustomers; • countervailingbuyingpower; • marketstructureandsizeofmarket. • anyotherfactorwhichtheCommissionconsidersrelevant. The proposed law states that abuse of a dominant position having an adverse effect on competition,competitorsorconsumersoccurswhenanenterprise: • directly or indirectly imposes unfair or discriminatory purchase or selling prices or conditions,includingpredatoryprices; • limitsproduction,marketsortechnicaldevelopmenttotheprejudiceofconsumers; • indulgesinactionsresultingindenialofmarketaccess; • makestheconclusionofcontractssubjecttoacceptancebyotherpartiesofsupplementary obligationswhich,bytheirnatureoraccordingtocommercialusage,havenoconnection withthesubjectofthosecontracts; • usesdominanceinonemarkettomoveintoorprotectanothermarkets. Dealing with mergers and acquisitions (M&As)

PartVIIIofthedraftlawcoversregulationof“combinations”orMergersandacquisitions.Like competitionlawinotherjurisdictions,theUgandandraftlawprovidesthatitisanobligationsto givenoticeofcombinationsincertaincases. Thelawprovidesthat“Anypersonwhoproposestoenterintoanagreementorcombination …shall give notice to the Commission in the prescribed form, specifying the details of the proposed agreement or combination, within seven days after the occurrence of any of the followingevents

15 • the Board of Directors of respective companies accepting a proposal of merger or amalgamation; • theconclusionofnegotiationsofanagreementforacquisitionoracquiringofcontrol; • the execution of a joint venture agreement, shareholder agreement or technology agreement,inrelationtoanyjointventure. OnlytheCommission(competitionauthority/agency)haspowerstograntanexemptionfrom filingthenoticerequiredunderthelaw.Thisshouldbeinrespectofanacquisitionbyapublic financial institution, foreign institutional investor, bank or venture capital fund under any covenant of a loan, share subscription or investment agreement or financing faulty. The enterprise concerned should apply for exemption in the prescribed form for exemption, specifyingtheextentandtermsofcontrol,thecircumstancesforexerciseofsuchcontrol,the consequencesofdefaultandcontroloftheenterprise. However, a public financial institution, foreign institutional investor, bank or venture capital fund is not exempted from filing a notice under the law, in relation to any interrelated or controlledenterpriseatthetimeofacquisitionorestablishingacombination.

Powers to investigate into acquisitions, mergers and joint ventures Thedraftlawgivesthecompetitionauthoritypowerstoenquireintoeverycombinationreferred toforsatisfyingitselfthatthecombinationdoesnotcauseorisnotlikelytocauseanyadverse effectoncompetitionwithintherelevantmarketinUganda. Thelawsempowerstheauthoritytocarryoutenquiriesintoanyacquisitionswheretheparties to the proposed combination namely, the acquirer and the company whose shares, voting rights or assets are being acquired, jointly would have assets worldwide, exceeding five hundredcurrencypoints(Ush10,000,000/US$5,600)orturnoverworldwide,exceedingone thousandfivehundredcurrencypoints(Ush30,000,000/US$16,800). Alternatively,thegrouptowhichtheentityinwhichtheshares,assetsorvotingrights,asthe casemaybe,wouldhavebeenacquiredwillbelong,wouldhaveassetsinUgandainexcess of two thousand currency points (Ush40,000,000/ US$22,400) or a turnover exceeding six thousandcurrencypoints(Ush120,000,000/US$67,200);orworldwide,assetsinexcessofone billionUnitedStatesdollarsoraturnoverinexcessofhalfabillionUnitedStatesdollars.(In our view, unless otherwise construed, the above would constitute thresholds that the CRR advisorcouldhavereferredtoinhiscomments.However,asregardstotheirpossibleeffects onthebusinesscommunityortheplannedregulatorybody,wecannotascertainthatfornow. Nevertheless,thiscouldbesubjecttofurtherdebateinthemeantimewhileawaitingthetabling ofthedraftlawbeforeParliament).

Alsotobeoverseen,isacombinationinvolvingcontrolbyapersonoveranenterprisewhere that person has already direct or indirect control over another enterprise engaged in production,distributionortradingofthesameorsubstitutablegoodsorprovisionofthesame orsubstitutableservice. Dealing with cross-boarder abuses

The law provides for regulation of acts taking place outside Uganda but having an effect on competition in Uganda. The competition regulatory authority, the Uganda Competition Commissionisgivenpowersunderthedraftlawtoregulatecrossboarderacts.

Where any practice of an enterprise, as provided for under the law, is carried on outside Uganda,buthasandislikelytohaveanappreciableadverseeffectoncompetitioninUganda, 16 the Commission has jurisdiction to make such orders as may be necessary to combat the effectofthepractice.

Also, the commission is given powers to vet combinations (mergers and acquisitions), including in situations when one of the parties is from outside the territory of Uganda. The powersareconferredtothecommissiontocarryoutenquirieswithaviewtosatisfyingitself whether that combination causes or is likely to cause an appreciable adverse effect on competitionwithintherelevantmarketinUganda.

Extra-territorial jurisdiction and its effectiveness Extraterritorialjurisdictionofwouldonlybeeffectivewhenconsideredunderthebroaderbilateralor regionalcooperationarrangementofagreementwithcounterpartagenciesinneighbouringterritories. BecauseUgandadoesn’thaveafunctionalcompetitionframework,theeffectivenessoftheenvisaged arrangementcannotbeascertainedatthisstage.

Checks and balances In Uganda, regulatory reform as well as process of establishment of a framework on competition regulation, has induced important debates about the degree to which sectors being opened up to greater competition should also be subject to general competition laws enforced by the same competitionagencyresponsibleforprotectingcompetitioninothersectorsoftheeconomy. In practice, regulatory reform has rarely consisted simply of abolishing regulations and leaving everything up to market forces that would later be operating within general framework competition law.Itisexpected,likeinanumberofsituationselsewhere,policymakerswouldadopttheviewthat competitionmustbefosteredbyanewkindofregulationwhichmayormaynotbeintendedtobe strictlytransitory. Therearesomeexamplesofnewregulatorsbeinggivenmandatestopromotecompetitionandeven beingchargedwithformulatingofcompetitionrules.Thestatusquo,withregardtodivisionoflabour, is that regulatory agencies by default are supposed to ensure that competition takes place in the sectorsundertheirrespectivejurisdiction.However,thedraftlawgives thecompetitionagencythe ultimateauthoritywithregardtocompetitionregulation.Thelawprovidesthat:“whereinthecourseof aproceedingbeforeanystatutoryauthorityentrustedwiththeresponsibilityofregulatinganyutilityor service, an issue is raised by any party that any decision that the statutory authority has taken or proposestotake,isorwouldbe,asthecasemaybe,contrarytotheprovisionsofthisAct,thenthe statutoryauthorityshallmakeareferencetotheCommission”.

Any other characteristics of the competition law:

Exclusion of jurisdiction of civil courts Thelawprovidesthatnocivilcourtwouldhavejurisdictiontoentertainanysuitorproceeding inrespectofanymatterwhichtheCommissionisempoweredbyorundertheproposedlawto determineandnoinjunctionwouldbegrantedbyanycourtoranyauthorityinrespectofany action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under this law. However, the Constitution of Uganda provides that the High Court has jurisdiction in all matters.Inlightofthis,therefore,theproposedlawwouldhavetoberevisited.Thewouldbe conflict of the law and the constitutional provision should be addressed during debate in Parliament and it is expected that it would be taken care of as several stakeholders have alreadyraisedit.

17 Competition advocacy Mechanismsonadverselyhavebeenbuiltintheproposedlaw.Particularly,informulatinga laworpolicy,theMinisterresponsiblefortradeorwhosedockettheproposedchangesfall, may make a reference to the Commission for its opinion on possible effect of such law or policy on competition and on receipt of such a reference, the Commission is mandated to, withinsixtydays,giveitsopiniontotheMinister. Establishment of competition fund Thelawprovidesthattheministerresponsiblefortradeshouldestablishafundtobecalled theCompetitionFund.Thefund,amongothersources,wouldbecreditedwithfeesreceived fromanypersonforfilingacomplaintoranyapplicationunderthisAct;themoneyreceivedas costs,ifsodirectedbytheCommission,frompartiestoproceedingsbeforetheCommission; grants and donations given to the Fund by the Government, companies or any other institutionsforthepurposesoftheFund;theinterestaccruedonthemoneypaidtothefund; andtheinterestorotherincomereceivedoutoftheinvestmentsmadefromtheFund. TheFundwouldtoutilisedforpromotionofcompetitionadvocacy,creatingawarenessabout competitionissues,andtraining,inaccordancewithsuchrulesasmaybeprescribed. TheFundwouldbeadministeredbyacommitteeofmembersoftheCommissionaswouldbe determinedbytheChairperson.(thedeletedstatementwasinsertedinadvertentlyand,indeed astheCRRadvisorpointedout,itdidnotmakesense).

18 5.0 SECTORAL APPROACHES

InUganda,thederegulationpolicy wasinstitutedaspartofothermeasuresconsideredcrucialtothe economyasameansofcheckinganticompetitiveactivitiesandactionsofunethicalfirmsandpersons thatcouldbeinjurioustotheeconomy(andtosmallextentindividualconsumers).Itwasalsoduetothe needtoputinplacearigorousregulatoryregimefollowingwithdrawalofgovernmentfrombusiness. Itwasenvisagedthatpossibleunrestcouldemergeinareaswhereoneormorefirmsmaybeoperating, raising the prospect of pricefixing, attempts to run competition out of the market through hostile takeovers,andcreationofvirtualmonopoliesetc.ThroughagenciesliketheUgandaCommunications Commission (UCC) the regulatory body in the communications sector, government has prescribed safeguards. The framework covers licensing, supervision, regulation and surveillance. The agencies haveinvestigativepowersaswellaspowerstodiscipline,handleconsumercomplaintsandtoarbitrate indisputesinvolvingfirms.Theagenciesenjoyalargemeasureofoperationalandfinancialautonomy, althoughtheyarestillundertheoversightofaMinisterresponsibletoCabinetandhaveultimatelyto accounttoParliamentthroughtherelevantMinister. In addition, there are intrasectoral councils and associations like the Pharmaceuticals Council and Association,LawSocietyandCouncil,MedicalandDentalPractitioners’CouncilandtheBroadcasting Council with powers to set or advise on operational and ethical standards and a code of conduct; powers to investigate member (individuals or companies) and either directly take or recommend disciplinaryaction.Inthisrespect,thisvoluntarysectorassociationmayactonitsownorattherequest oforinconcertwiththesectoragencyorgovernment.

Nevertheless, while competition regulation has been instituted in some sectors that have recentlybeenrestructured,anticompetitivepractices(ACPs)orunfairtradepracticesarenot broadly defined under the established frameworks and therefore are not per se illegal Nevertheless, a fair level of competition has been encouraged which could act as a foundationforestablishingacultureofcompetitionthatcouldrequireconsiderablylesseffort toenforce.

Utilities Sector: Power Before enactment of the Electricity Act 1999, the Uganda Electricity Board (UEB) a Corporation establishedasabodycorporatebytheUgandaElectricityAct,Cap135wasinchargeofgeneration, transmission,distributionandsupplyofelectricity.UEBwouldinadditionmakeandrecovercharges forelectricity,construct,evictandmaintainpowerlines,acquirelandandsettariffsforelectricity. ThisscenariowaschangedwiththeenactmentoftheElectricityAct,1999.TheActestablishedthe Electricity Regulatory Authority (ERA) whose main functions are to issue licences for generation, transmission, distribution, sale of electricity and consumer complaints handling. The ERA also ensuresthatcompaniesissuedwithlicencesdoabidebytheconditionsoftheirlicences,whichmay berevokedincaseofcontinuednoncompliance. Undersection126oftheAct,theMinisterisempoweredtoformsuccessorcompaniestoassumeall thedutiesandfunctionsoftheUgandaElectricityBoard,whichwouldeventuallybedissolved. Consequently,threecompanieshavebeenformedtotakeoverthefunctionsofUEBandtheseare Uganda Electricity Generation Company Ltd, Uganda Electricity Transmission Company Ltd, and Uganda Electricity Distribution Company Ltd. According to the new power policy, power generation anddistributionaretobeopentocompetitionbuttransmissionwouldbethepreserveofthestate.

19 Accordingly,functionsoftheUEDCLhavebeenconcessionedtoLimitedaconsortiummadeup of South Africabased powerhouse Eskom and Globeleq, a subsidiary of the Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC). UEGCL has gone to Eskom and UETCL remains in the hands of government.UmemeLimitedandEskom,intheory,areopentocompetition,asnewplayershavebeen licensedtostartbusiness.However,thenewlylicensedentitiesareverysmallinnaturethattheycannot beconstruedtoposeanythreattoUmemeandEskom.Itisenvisagedthatthiswouldeventuallycreate competition,whichmayresultintobetterservicesfortheconsumers. Generation – The main power generation facilities in the country (hydroelectric power) are in the handsoftheprivatesector.Thetwopowergenerationfacilities;KiiraandNalubaalePowerStations arecurrentlybeingrunundera20yearconcessiontoSouthAfricabasedEskom.However,thermal generationplantsinNorthernUgandaarebeingrunbygovernmentunderUgandaElectricityBoard (UEB).Anew50mwthermalpowerplanthasbeenestablishedin(Lugogo),underaspecial leasearrangementbetweengovernmentandAggrekoInternationalPowerCompany. West Nile power Limited, another small powerplant currently servingthe major towns of and Nebbi is another player that emergedmost recently. Smaller hydroelectric power generation plants existatKilembeMines(Kasese),Maziba(Kabaale)andUgandaCobaltCompany(Kasese). Transmission – Thefunctionaswellasthepowertransmissionentityareinthehandofthestateand aretoremainthatwayunlessthelawischanged.AccordingtotheElectricityAct1999,thenational power grid (high voltage) and the entire function of electricity transmission shall be overseen and undertakenbythestate.UETCLundertakestheabovefunctions.

Distribution – Restructuringandprivatisationofthecountry’spowersectorreceivednewimpetusin 2005whenUmeme,aconsortiummadeofEskomandGlobeleq,asubsidiaryoftheCommonWealth Development Corporation (CDC) took over UEDCL. Umeme emerged as the first private sector companytodistributepowerinthecountry. Inspiteoftherecentdevelopments,thepowersectorinthecountryisdominatedbySouthAfrica based power giant Eskom by way of its acquisition of a 20year concession to run largest power generationplantsinthecountryanditsstakeintheUmemeConsortium.

20 PHARMACEUTICALS SECTOR Before 1993, trading in drugs was unduly highly restricted for reasons related to public safety and nationalsecurity. In Uganda there is generally no restriction on what one may engage in subject to obtaining the relevantlicences,andfulfillingotherrequirementsonhealth,premisesandtheirlocationandwhere availability of the relevant expertise may be a prerequisite, for example to operate a dispensing pharmacy. Even in some of these cases, lax supervision and application of the law could result in unfaircompetition. Since the 1960s, the External Trade Act was the central regulating statute for import and export operations. Following the enactment of the National Drug Authority (NDA) Statute in 1993, the situationhaschanged.ThelawamongotherthingsgivestheMinisterresponsibleforhealthpowersto require that a licence be obtained to export or import certain goods. However, the powers over licensingimportersofpharmaceuticalproductshavenowbeentransferredtotheautonomousNDA. TheNDAstatutelaysouttheNationaldrugpolicyandcontainsaprovisionfortheauthoritytoensurethe provision and use of essential and efficacious drugs. The statute covers government control on the manufacturing, exportation, marketing and use of drugs. The National drug policy is supposed to cover boththeprivateandpublicsector. Although one of the functions deals with “ensuring that drug needs are met as economically as possible”, the law does not have an explicit provision that empowers the drug authority to enforce competitioninthemarketplace. Accordingtoavailabledata,economicliberalisationinthelast10yearsaswellasestablishmentof theNDAhavenotonlyhelpedbridgethedemandofpharmaceuticalsinthecountry,theyhavelargely precipitatedcompetitioninthesector.Duetotheopenregimerelatedtolicensingandimportationof drugs in the country, competition now prevails relative to the 1980s and early 1990s although by default. For instance, there are concerns that centralised procurement by government through a staterun company,theNationalMedicalStores(NMS)continuestolockoutmanywouldbesuppliersandmay intheprocessmeanconsumersarepayinghigherpricesfordrugstheywouldotherwisegetatlower prices. GovernmenthadindicatedthattheNMSwouldhavebeenprivatisedby2005,adevelopmentthatcould openstateprocurementofpharmaceuticalproductstocompetitionandleadtopricereductionand,it wasanticipated,availabilityofvarietyofcompetingproductsinthemarket.

21 6.0 INTERFACE BETWEEN COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC REGULATION

6.1 Utilities: Communications Sector After years of slow growth and inefficient management, Uganda’s Box1: Case Study: Competition Regime under test communications sector experienced a growth spurt in the late 1990s, a UCC’s rol e as a regulator faced its first test when period in which the sector was competitors emerged in the country’s mobile telephony liberalised and opened to service market leading to price wars with the new competition for the first time. operators reducing call tariffs significantly in a Although in principle the country’s developmentthatborethehallmarksofpredatorypricing. economy was liberalised in 1993, When the privatised staterun UTL started cellular the communications sector did not telephony services in 2001, call rates further dropped. adjust in response until the late MTN Uganda had started the first downward trend in 1990s when a new legal and prices.However,withoutdirectinterventioninthesetting institutional framework was put in of prices, the phone tariffs have rema ined stable since place. mid 2002. The stability is linked to government fiscal policy,whichinvolvedintroductionoftaxesonphonecall ThepassageoftheCommunications credit(airtime)formobilephonethattookeffectin2001. Act1997byUganda’s6 th Parliament Consequently,companieswere,indirectlythroughafiscal set into motion a new era in the policyrestrainedfrommakingfurthercutsinphonetariffs. country’s communications sector withwiderangingimplicationstothe Internet Services wholeeconomy.First,thelawbroke Price wars also broke out among Internet service the monopoly of the staterun providersbetween2001and2002leadingtothecollapse Uganda Posts and ofseveralInternetcafesinKampala.However,thematter Telecommunications Corporation was resolved by the Association of Internet Cafes that (UPTC), hitherto the only player in resolvedthatnettime(perminutecharges)shouldnotbe the local communications sector. reducedbelowUsh25(US$0.013). UPTC was for long the sole telecommunications company, In2002,theUCCwaivedlicencefeestoInternetcafesas courier service provider in addition a way of encouraging proliferation of communication to offering money transfer services services. Howeve r, the waiver had other effects like and banking (savings accounts) increasing the number of businesses offering Internet services. services. The move also removed some financial pressureoffInternetcafes,whichcouldhavecontributed Most importantly, the law put in towardsstabilityofpricesanddumpenthepricewars. place the Uganda Communications Commission (UCC), the sector regulatorybody.UPTCwassplitintotheUgandaTelecommunicationsLimited(UTL),UgandaPosts Limited(UPL)andPostBankUgandaLimited. UCCissueslicencestoprospectiveoperatorsofallservicesinthecommunicationssectorinlinewith regulationslaiddowninthecommunicationsAct1997.TheActalsogivestheCommissionpowersto ensurecompetitionprevailsinthemarket. Several companies have since emerged in the private sector offering services that include: VSAT businessservices,mobiletrunkedradioservices,cellularservicesbutmostlyvaluedaddedservices like:payphones,faxbureau,callboxes,internetcafesamongothers. Thecouriermarkethasexpandedtremendouslytoincludegloballyrenownedcompanieslike:DHL, TNT,FedEx,YellowPagesandSkynet.Localandregionalcompaniesinclude:DaksCouriers,ACME

22 CargoLimited,ElmaExpressDelivery,TransAfricaAirExpressCouriersLimitedinadditiontoUPL’s EMS Speed Post. As a result of liberalisation, the telecommunications sector has since attracted: South African Mobile Telephone Network (MTN) that holds the second national network operator licence.UTLwasprivatisedin2000withacontrollingstake(49percentshares)soldtotheUCOM consortiummadeofEgypt’sOrascom,Germany’sDeteconandTelecel.CelTelUganda,thepioneer mobilephonecompanyinthecountryholdsonlyamobiletelephonylicense. Asaresultofcompetitioninthemarketplace,telephonefixedlineshavejumpedfrom45,000in1997 to71,000in2004;mobilephonelinesshotupfrom3,000in1996tocloseto1,100,000in2005;call officesincreasedfrom992in1997toover5000in2002andinternetsubscriptionsfrom1,000in1996 toover6,000in2000and15,000(2003). ENERGY (ELECTRICITY POWER) SECTOR

Uganda’s electricity grid serves 200,000 households and 5% of the country’s 24 million people. Consumptionisgrowingsteadilyduetotheboomingconstructionandmanufacturingsectors. Thecountry’shydroelectricitypowersubsectordatesbacktothe1950swhentheOwenFallsDam (renamedNalubaalein2000)wasconstructed.Asecondpowerstation,Kiirawascommissionedin 2000.UEGCLownsbothpowerstations. The case for competition in Uganda’s power sector

Until 1999, the stateowned Uganda Electricity Board (UEB) was in charge of power generation, transmissionanddistribution.Ineffect,UEBcomprisedtheentirepowersectorofthecountry. However,followingpassageoftheElectricityAct1999,UEBwassplitintothreecompanies:Uganda Electricity Distribution Company Limited (UEDCL), Uganda Electricity Generation Company Limited (UEGCL)andUgandaElectricityTransmissionCompany(UETCL). The law also provides for the Electricity Regulatory Authority (ERA), the sector regulatory agency. ERAwasestablishedin2001whenitsadministrationwasconstituted.Mostofitsstructureshave sincebeenputinplace. Theresultanteffectisthatthelawputintoforceanewlegalandregulatoryframeworkpremisedon the need for privatisation and liberalisation of the sector leading to competition (at least for power generation,andtosomeextentforconcessionsfordistribution)andtherefore,withtheoutcomesof improvedservicedeliveryandefficiency.

Inlinewiththenewframework,UEGCLwasprivatisedearlyin2003undera20yearconcessionto SouthAfricabasedEskomAfrica,oneoftheleadinghydropowerutilitycompaniesinAfrica.UEDCL wasprivatisedin2005. Earlier,governmentlicensedtwoprivatecompaniestodevelophydroelectricitypowerfacilitiesalong River Nile. The two companies are the American AES Nile Independent Power and Norwegian Norpak. However, due to policy bottlenecks and financial difficulties faced by the Norwegian and American companies respectively, construction of the power plants has not taken off. Instead, governmenthaslicensedanewinvestortodevelopa300mwpowergenerationfacilityatBujagali,the locationformerlytobedevelopedbytheAmericanAESNileIndependentPower. InlinewiththeElectricityAct,severalcompanieshaveappliedandbeengrantedpowergeneration licenses. The companies have subsequently signed supply agreements with the UETCL. The companies include: the stateowned Kilembe Mines Limited that operates a 2mw power station.

23 KaseseCobaltCompanyLimited,aCanadiancobaltminingconcernandKakiraSugarWorksLimited. Twoothersmallhydropowerpowergenerationcompaniesareintheprocessofsettingupfacilities alongtheNileinWestNile,totheNorthwestofUganda. Bo x 2: Case study: Failure of privatisation and liberalisation? Theprevailingdroughtconditionsintheregion,unprecedentedsinceindependenceofUgandain 1962, have exposed the vulnerabilities in the country’s power sector. The water level in Lake Vict oriafromwhichRiverNileoriginates,hassankby3metresasatJanuary2006.Thesituation has been exacerbated by reliance on hydroelectric power that, as the drought has indicated, is vulnerable to the vagaries of nature. Power generation capacity at K iira and Nalubale dams combined, formerly at 340mw, has since dropped to 170mw. A 50mw thermal plant located in Kampalahasdonelittletonothingtoalleviatetheprevailingpowershortages. Secondly,ithasbeenwidelyobservedthatpowergenerationwas notgivensufficientattentionby government,resultinginpowerdemandoutstrippingsupplybyasignificantproportion.Ithadbeen expectedthatatleasttwopowergenerationplantswouldbeoperationalinthecountryshortlyafter 2004. The first one, Bujagali, is expected to come online after 2010. Consequently, the power sectorhasbecomethesinglesectorblamedforunderminingproductioninthecountry,particularly tothelargelyinfantmanufacturingsector. By January 2006, the whole country came under a painful powerrationing regime that almost broughtthe manufacturing sector on itsknees.It isfearedthatthe ongoing power woes could adversely affect the economy of the country, whose growth recently lost some of its previously highprogressionimpetus. Governmentisconsideringsettingupmorethermalgenerationplants,toproduceupto150mwof power,toeaseonthepowercrisis.However,theinterventionsarenotcommercially viableand arenotexpectedtoattractbidderswithalongtermviewinthepowersector.Thehighcostoffuel, inadditiontocompetitionfromthemoreefficienthydropowerfacilities,inthelongterm,meanthat thermalgenerationplantscannotsurviveatallinthepowersectorwithoutstatesupport. Also, the search is on for alternative power sources. However, the options are expensive to exploit,makingmostofthemcommerciallyunviable,unlesstheyaresubsidisedbythestate.Solar facilitiesremainoutofreachtomostUgandans,38%ofwhomlivebelowthe povertyline.Also, thehighcostsofproductioninthecountry,includingpower,makeotherpowersourcesotherthan hydroonlyfeasibleasastopgapalternativeintheshortrun. Alltheabovedevelopmentshavecomeontheheelsofphenomenalincrement sinpowertariffs much to the discomfort of most consumers. The ERA has given notice that the cost of power wouldgouponcemoreduringthefirstquarterof2006.

FINANCIAL SECTOR

Uganda’sfinancial sector is increasingly becoming more competitive following the establishment of new legal and institutional frameworks. Banks and banking services are now regulated under the FinancialInstitutionsStatute1993,whiletheinsuranceindustryisunderanewframeworkfollowing enactmentoftheInsuranceStatute1996.TheFinancialInstitutionsBillthatisintendedtoreplacethe FinancialInstitutionsStatuteisaimedatenhancingprudentialregulationsgoverningbanksandnon bank financial institutions. Another proposed law, governing microcredit institutions has been

24 enacted,expectedtolendsomeordertoasubsectorthathasgrowninbreadthandinfluenceover thelast5years. However, the country’s financial system remains small, in terms of value and the volume of transactionsundertaken,andundiversifiedintermsofthetypeoftransactionsthatitundertakes.By the end of 2000 there were 16 commercial banks, 8 credit institutions, 2 development banks, 15 insurance companies, 28 insurance brokers, 18 microfinance institutions and 62 foreign exchange bureaux. Box 3: Banking: In spite of privatisation, changes are slow Banking TheFinancialInstitutionsStatute1993wasenactedtoputinto Commercial banks dominate placeanewframeworktodealwithfinancialinstitutions the financial sector and extensively,includingcooperativesocieties,creditinstitutions accountforover90percentof andbuildingsocieties.Thelawwasaimedatstrengtheningand the assets of the banking regulationoffinancialinstitutionsbythecentralbankasa system. precursortoopeningupthesectortocompetitionandtherefore moreefficientservicedelivery. Before and after independence, several Enforcementofthenewlawresultedintotheclosureof4local commercial banks operated in banks,partlyfornoncompliancewiththecapitaladequacy thecountry,notablyfromIndia requirementstipulatedinthelaw.Thelawalsosoughttobreak andtheUnitedKingdom(UK). thepracticeoffamilyownershipofbankinginstitutionsblamed However, the nationalisation formismanagementandclosureofatleasttwoofthe4banks driveofthelate1960sresulted whoseoperationswerehalted. in state acquisition of majority shares in the banks. Apart Afterthebankclosures,competitioni ncreasedinthecommercial from the stateowned Uganda bankingsectorleadingtoimprovementinservicedelivery,slight Commercial Bank, the state lowering of interest rates, “exotic” credit schemes and acquired shares in Barclays proliferation of new services like automatic teller machines and Bank, Bank of Baroda and electronicmoneytransferamongothers. Tropical Africa Bank (formerly LibyanArabBank). Thesituation,intermsofcompetitionhaschangedfollowingthe saleofUCBLtoStanbic.ItsobviousthattheacquisitionofUCBL Despite the liberalisation and withitsextensivebranchnetwork,makesStanbicthedominant divestiture of state stake in commercialbankinthecountry.In2002,StandardBank commercial banks in the InternationalofSouthAfricabought80PercentsharesinUCBL country under the privatisation thusemergingthedominantentity.UCBLwasthelargest programme, most local banks commercialbankinthecountryoverall. areweakwithmanystickingto retail banking and generally Thedevelopmenthasonceagainadjustedthemarketshareof shying away from lending. thevariousbanksinthecommercialbankingsubsectoralthough However,twobanksremained it’s not clear yet, what effects the divestiture would have on dominant: the recently competitioninthelongrun. divested former stateowned Uganda Commercial Bank The development banking subsector is under the monopoly of Limited(UCBL)thatdominated thestateownedUgandaDevelopmentbank.Thebankisslated thesocalledindigenousbanks forprivatisationwith3 0 percentstakeofferedtoamultinational and Standard Chartered Bank financialinvestor,30percenttostrategicinvestorswiththerest that tops among the foreign going to the general public through the stock exchange. At ones. UCBL was recently regional level Uganda is host to the East Africa Development bought by Standard Bank Bank. Merchant banking is completely nonexistent in the local International(Stanbic)ofSouth bankingsector. Africa

25 Insurance

Although the local insurance industry was liberalised in 1990 when the stateowned Uganda Insurance Corporation (NIC) was opened to competition to the private sector, the industry is still largely underdeveloped and therefore does not adequately meet the needs of the market. The insuranceindustryislicensed,regulatedandstreamlinedbytheUgandaInsuranceCommission(UIC) inlinewiththeInsuranceStatuteof1996. Theindustry,valuedatUsh40billionin2002,haslimitedcoverage:mostinsurancecompaniesarein general insurance and Life assurance. Engineering and liability insurance is underdeveloped; the insurance market does not provide aviation, marine hull, agriculture, livestock and crop insurance. Socialinsuranceforinstanceeducationandhealthexpensesaretotallylacking.

Elusive competition in insurance sector? By2001,therewere15insuranceoperatorscategorised:11coveringnonlifeinsuranceonlyand4 coveringnonlifeandlifeinsurance.Therewere28licensedinsurancebrokerscategorisedas:4for nonlifeinsuranceonly,19fornonlifeandlifeinsurance,2forlossassessment,and3forinsurance surveyorsandlossassessors.Theindustry’sexpansionislargelystymiedbylowlevelofawareness aboutinsuranceservices,partlycausedbyrelativelyhighilliteracyrates. Asaconsequence,competitioninthesectorremainsrelativelyloworlackingwithregardtocertain products.Accordingtoa2000reportontheindustry,70percentoftheinsurancemarketisunderthe controlof4insurancecompaniesandcloseto60percentofinsurancebrokers’businessisunder controlofonebroker. TheInsuranceStatuteof1993soughttostrengthentheindustryaswellasmakeitmorecompetitive so as to attract new players, particularly foreign investors. The American Insurance Group (AIG) joinedtheindustry,whichtogetherwiththerecentlyprivatisedNationalInsuranceCorporation(NIC) controlthebulkofthebusiness.IthadearlierbeenenvisagedthatprivatisationofNICwouldserveas amajorboonthatwouldspurcompetitionintheindustry. However,lackofcompetitionmainlyarisesfromweaknessesonthepartof“indigenous”companies. WhentheUICenforcedaprovisioninthelawthatsetsminimumcapitalrequirements,over6local companieswerelockedout–somehadlessthanUsh10millionasworkingcapital.ThelawsetsUsh 500mforlocalcompaniesandUsh1billionforforeignonesasminimumworkingcapital.

26

Anti -competitive practices in bus services affecting consumers TobecomeabusoperatorinUgandaallthatisrequiredisavehicleirrespectiveofits con ditions and age. This will cost on averageUS$3,000 and a PSV licence, which is delivered after a basic visual inspection of the vehicle and without reference to any transportplanorstrategy.Thecurrentorganisationoftransportservicesdoesnotallow efficientuseofthevehiclefleet.Thetransportmarketisnotcompetitive,andiscontrolled entirelybyoneAssociation,whichencouragesadmissionofnewmemberswhooperate usedandnonroadworthyvehicles. TheDirectorateofTransportisunderstaff edandnotequippedtocarryouttheplanning, regulationandmonitoringfunctions. TheAssociationthereforenotonlysetsfares,butalsoallocatesroutesandcarriesout selfenforcementontheiroperations,regardlessoftransportneedsandefficienc y.The Associationencouragestheenrolmentofnewmemberssincepaymentofmembership feesisthesoleconditionfortheiradmission.Sincecollectingrevenueforlocalauthorities hasbecomeitsmainactivity,theAssociationhasdivertedfromitsinitia lobjectivesand hasbeenneglectingtheinterestsofitsmembers. Operating bus services that offers obvious prospects for profitability, attract many unskilled operators/drivers to enter the transport business, which has led to an oversupplyofvehicle sofhighaverageage(15years,ormore),highqueuingtimeatbus stations(1hour),whichinturnleadstolowvehicleavailabilityandutilisationand tohigh vehicleoperatingcosts,therebyaffectinglayconsumers/usersoftheservice.

(Source – ‘Urban transport services in Sub-Saharan Africa: Recommendations for reforms in Uganda’, M Benmaamar, 2001)

7.0 REGIONAL INTEGRATION

COMESA competition policy and law Inabidtoensureequityandfairnessthroughapredictableandlevelplayingfield,COMESA has instituted measures to improve the business environment under which economic operatorsintheregionaleconomicblocundertaketheirwork.Inadditiontoelaboratingthe trade remedies and safeguards, COMESA has worked towards raising awareness, understanding and appreciation of competition law and policy at national, regional and multilaterallevelsasmemberstatesintegratemoredeeplyregionallyandmultilaterally. Accordingly,COMESApreparedandratifiedaRegionalPolicytodealwithanticompetitive behaviourandrestrictivebusinesspractices.Article55oftheCOMESAtreatyprovidesfora regional policy on competitionand was used as a starting point for developing a regional competitionpolicy. Also, COMESA has urged member states to enact Competition Laws and to establish competent enforcement authorities. Currently, only 4 countries (Kenya, Zambia, Zimbabwe andTanzania)havealawandanenforcementagency.Onecountry(Malawi)hasalawbut

27 noenforcementagency.Fivecountries(Egypt,Mauritius,Namibia,UgandaandSwaziland) areatdifferentstagesofdevelopmentofnationallaws. Theobjectivesoftheregionalcompetitionlawinclude:Dealingwithanticompetitivepractices of a regional (crossborder) nature; Institute formal cooperation regionally among competitionauthorities;Enhanceinteragencycooperation,aswellasgettingmoreinvolved asaregioninmultilateraldiscussionsandpolicydialogueoncompetitionpolicy.

Thelawcontainsspecificprovisionsonmergercontroltypesofmergers,theneedforpre mergernotification,andimplicationsforinvestmentintheregionaleconomy.Withregardto consumer protection, the proposed law and policy contains provisions on misleading and deceptiveconduct,unconscionableconductandforunsafegoods.Bothpolicyandlawarein theprocessofenforcement. East Africa Community Competition Policy and law Spurredbyinadequaciesincidentaltothepracticethatnationalcompetitionauthoritiesdonot normallyprotectcompetitionoutsidetheirownjurisdictions,theEACmovedtoputinplacea regional competition framework, complete with a competition policy and law. When fully enforceable,thiswouldcreateaframeworkwithpowersofcheckingcrossboarderrestraints tocompetition. EACcompetitionpolicytakesprecedenceoverpartnerstates’nationalcompetitionpolicies. Within,itsjurisdiction,theEACcompetitionpolicywilltakeprecedenceofoverotherregional policies on competition. The policy deals with crossborder restraints of competition and international dimensions of competition, affecting trade and competition between the EAC andthirdcountries.Thelawprovidesforaregionalcompetitionauthorityindependentfrom PartnerStates’governmentsaswellasfromanyotherEACorganorinstitution.However,the decisions of the authority shall be subject to judicial review by the East African Court of Justice.TheEACpolicyandlawcontainspecificprovisionsonmergercontrolmodelledon theCOMESAframework.

28 8.0 CONSUMER PROECTION LAW (MECHANISMS) Scattered provisions on consumer protection and welfare exist in sectoral policies (water, telecommunications,electricity,etc).However,acomprehensiveconsumerprotectionpolicyisnotin placeyet,althoughadrafttotheeffectisexpectedtobeoriginatedbycabinetwhenit’sconsidering thedraftproposedConsumerProtectionBill. The absence of consumer protection policy and supportive legislation in the country means that consumerperspectivesintradearenottakenintoaccount.Incasetheyareconsidered,itishaphazard done. Therefore, enactment of policy to this effect will go a long way in refocusing the attention of authorities and stakeholders on the market practices that may be injurious to the interests of both consumersandbusinessesalike.

Elements of consumer policy exist in other policies, particularly in sectors that have been recently restructured with additional regulatory oversight e.g. power, telecommunications, financial services (insurance).

Envisaged consumer protection policy The Constitution of Uganda seeksto ensurefor its citizens—social, economic and political justice. However,thestatusquoistothecontraryofthatidealsituationenvisagedinthesupremelawofthe land. Consumers face imbalances in economic terms, education/awareness levels and bargaining power. Currently, neither is there an overall consumer protection policy nor a law to protect consumers in Uganda.Adraftproposedbillwasproducedin1997andpresentedtotheULRCduringthereviewof commerciallaws. Withregardtoconsumerissues,itisenvisagedbythelocalconsumermovementthattheNational Consumer Policy should promote and protect consumer rights for just, equitable and sustainable economicandsocialdevelopment. TheMovementhassuggestedthat,takingintoaccounttheneedsofandprioritiesforconsumers,the objectivesoftheNationalConsumerPolicythusshouldbeto: • Strengthenproductionanddistributionpatternswhichareresponsivetotheneedsofconsumers, andwiththegoalofpromotingsustainableconsumptiononanequitablebasis; • Advocateandpromoteethicalconduct,transparency,consumerparticipationandresponsiveness in the choice of appropriate technology and environmental responsibility in providing goods, servicesandtechnologytoconsumersatalllevels; • Promotethedevelopmentofmarketconditionswhichprovideconsumerswithappropriatechoices atfairpricesandrightquality,andlesserburdenontheenvironment; • Promoteassessmentofconsumerimpactineveryareaofgovernancewhereconsumerinterests areaffected; • Promoteparticipationofconsumersineveryareaofgovernance • Promote adoption of Citizens’ Charters for greater accountability and transparency in governance; • Encouragepoliciesandprogrammestoenablesustainableproductionandconsumptionpatterns; and • Promoteregionalandinternationalcooperationinthefieldofconsumerprotection,sustainable consumptionandproductionpatterns.

Thepolicyshouldbedesignedto: • Empowerconsumerstohaveaccesstothebasicneedsoflife;

29 • Protectconsumersfromhazardstotheirlifeandsafety; • Enhancetheaccessofconsumerstoadequateinformationtoenablethemtomakeinformedand environmentallybenignchoicesaccordingtoindividualaswellassocietalneeds; • Promoteconsumereducationthroughformalaswellasnonformaleducationsystemssoastohelp consumersintheirdecisionmaking; • PromoteaccountabilityandtransparencythroughadoptionofCitizens’Charters; • Provideexpeditiousandinexpensivesystemofdeliveryofjustice; • Promoteanindependentconsumermovementinthecountrybyprovidingassistancetoconsumer and other relevant groups to form their organisations and giving them the opportunity to present theirviewsinthedecisionmakingprocess. • Initiate and implement appropriate mechanisms for exchange of information on measures of consumerprotection,nationally,regionallyandinternationally. Draft consumer law: AmajorprocessoflawreformhasbeenunderwayinUgandasince2000whenthestatutoryUganda LawReformCommission(ULRC)wasformed.Thereformisunderwayinthecontextofotherlegal andeconomicreforms.Oneoftheprominentissuesthathavearisensincetheonsetofthelawreform processstartedisconsumerprotection.Spearheadedbythelocalconsumermovement,theprocess ofenactmentofaconsumerprotectionlawhasbeenprotractedbutwithapparentlylowinterestonthe partofgovernment. In addition there is increasing anxiety in the country regarding the impact of trade liberalisation on consumerwelfareandhowitcanbeaddressedinbroadertogovernmentforconsiderationaspartof theorganisation’sbidtoensurethatalawtoprotectconsumerswasenacted.Contentsofthedraft have been considered and are included in the government draft produced by the ULRC. The draft awaitscabinetapprovalbeforeitcommencestoParliament. The proposed draft Consumer Protection Bill recognises the following six rights of consumers: the rightstoSafety,tobeinformed,Choice,Representation,Redressal,Consumereducation. Furthermore,fromtheU.N.GuidelinesforConsumerProtection,1985,twootherrightsofconsumers areinferred:therightto:BasicneedsandtherighttoaHealthyenvironment. Thedraftalsoaddressesthefollowingbroadareas: • Safety requirements: Defines what safe consumer goods are as well as provides for general safety requirements that consumer goods should comply with. It stipulates illegal acts that are punishableunderthelaw. • Advertising:Itcoversanddefineswhatispermissibleandotherwiseintheprocessofadvertising. Itidentifiesactsthatarepunishableintheeventofbreachoflaw. • Guarantees: Sets principles and guidelines for guarantees. Clearly states that its an offence to circumventthelawwithregardtoofferingguaranteestoconsumers. Measures for consumer redress and mechanisms: Gives a broad set of options for defence, promotion, enforcement of consumer rights including individual, collective, mediation, negotiation, arbitrationorlitigation.

30 9.0 COMPETITION PERCEPTION SURVEY IN UGANDA - DECEMBER 2005

Overview: The survey was a followup to the earlier one carried out to gauge the baseline status of Uganda on market competition. The survey took place in NovemberDecember 2005 and coveredpublicprivatesectorandcivilsocietyorganisationsaswellindividualcustomers. A total of 100 institutions (80%) and individual consumers (20%) were sampled and their respective responses logged. From the survey findings, it was established that the vast majority of respondents averred that consumers are moderately affected by the practices, mainlybidrigging,unfairtradingpractices,pricediscriminationandmarketsharing. Identifyingtrade,manufacturingandtheservicessectorsasmostaffected,therespondents alsocontendedthatrulesandregulationstocheckACPswereinexistent.Somecouldn’ttell andwerenotawareoftheexistenceoftherulesandregulations. ThemajoritycalledforenactmentofacomprehensivelawtocheckACPswhoseobjectives wouldfocusoneconomicefficiencyandconsumerwelfare.Detailsofthesurveyfindingsare availablelaterinthischapter. Methodology Thesurveywasbasedonquestionnaireinterviewsconductedunderthedirectionofthe7Up3 Projectteamleader,CONSENT.Thesamplesforthesurveywere,saveforconsumers,pre selectedsamplesofrespondentsselectedfromfivestakeholdercategoriestowit:Consumers (COs); businesses/business support organisations (BUSO); Research and Academic Institutions (RAI); Law, Policymakers and Regulatory bodies (LPR) and Civil Society Organisations(CSOs). Thepreselectionaspectofthesamplewasusedtoavoidrespondentswithoutanyideaof issues at hand. Nonresponse in questionnaire interviews produces some known biases in surveyderivedestimatesbecauseparticipationtendstovaryfordifferentsubgroupsofthe population,andthesesubgroupsarelikelytovaryalsoonquestionsofsubstantiveinterest.

Sample size and survey Sample size / broad categories area Asamplesizeof100was Individuals administered, 80 percent (Consumers) ofwhichweretargetedat 20% institutional respondents. This was aimed at gaugingtheknowledgeof key stakeholders by category in a bid to ascertain their ability to Institutions meaningfully get 80% engaged in the Fig:1 capacity building and advocacyelementsoftheproject. 31 Choice and nature of respondents Giventheselectionofrespondentsaswellaslimitedsample,thegeographicalcoverageof thesurveywaslimited,althoughintermsofrespondentswhowouldbeexpectedtoactively participateinfutureprojectactivities,thesamplesweremeaningfullyrepresentative.

SURVEY FINDINGS Awareness and impact Close to half of the respondents interviewed on average (Consumers40%; businesses/businesssupportorganisatins(BUSO)40%;AcademicandResearchinstitutions (ARI)–50%;Civilsociety(CSOs)42%;Policy/lawmakers&Regulatorybodies(LPRs) 40%)admittedthattheyhadknowledgeabouttheACPsintheUgandanmarket. Level of awareness of ACPs The results reflect that 60 knowledge about competition 50 issues is relatively appallingly low, even among the elite and 40 educated. Given that significant 30 efforts were channelled into sensitising respondents before 20 CSOs ARI LPR the interviews, the responses BUSO Consumers 10 were an indictment of low business and economic literacy 0 1 2 3 4 5 inthecountry. Fig2 Category of respondents Asubstantialproportionoftherespondentsstatedthattheyweresignificantlyaffected.The breakdownwas:Consumers50%;BUSO45%;ARI–50%;CSOs40%;andLPRs35%. Respondents significantly affected The results were consistent withresponsesonawareness 50 about competition. Still, this 45 40 reflectsthatsincefew(half)of 35 the respondents had 30 knowledge about competition 25 issues, a similar figure would 20 CSOs

15 ARI beinpositiontoappreciateits LPR BUSO impact. 10 Consumers 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 Category of respondents Fig3

32 Most prevalent ACPs ThemostprevalentACPsasperceivedbyrespondentsintherespectivecategories,inorder of ranking – from most to least important are: Consumers (collective price fixing, price discrimination and resale pricemaintenance); business/business support organisations (bid rigging, unfair trade practices, Entry barrier) and Academic and Research Institutions (Collectivepricefixing,pricediscrimination,entrybarrier).Otherresponseswere:Civilsociety (Bid rigging, unfair trade practices and entry barrier); and law/policy makers & regulatory bodies(pricediscrimination,unfairtradepracticesandbidrigging). Most prevalent ACPs by category Considered against perceptions on knowledge and LEGEND impact, the CPF BR CPF BR PD Respondent Categories responses on

Ranking 1. Consumers most prevalent of ACPs from 2. BUSO ACPs are a top to reflection of a bottom 3. ARI PD UTP EB UTP UTP common 4. CSOs characteristic in 5. LPR the country – RPM EB PD EB BR behaviour symptomaticofbut 1 2 3 4 5 notnecessarydue Category of respondents Fig:Fig4 to collusion. Also, price discriminationaffectsmanyconsumerslargelyduetoacommonpracticebytraderswhodo notdisplayretailprices.Consequently,buyersarechargedthroughadiscretionaryapproach using often undeclared and unknown criteria as basisforcharges.Alaw(revisedSaleof GoodsAct)hasbeenmootedthatwouldprovideforcompulsorydisplayofpricesbyretailers inthecountry. “Recommended prices,” viewed in the context of RPM, are ubiquitous in the marketplace, pushedbythemanufacturersaspartoftheirbrandwars,inwhatisaclearmanifestationof vertical restraints. Respondents from Academic and research institutions had similar responses… Tobusinesses,thatrankedbidriggingfirst,itwasareflectionofbothcommonsentimentand the reality that public procurement remains contentious. Frequent media reports and commissionsofinquiryinthecountryprovideaperfectbackgroundtothesurveyresponses. Infact,formationofthePublicProcurementandDisposalofAssetsAuthority(PPDA),under thebroaderlegalframeworkofthePPDAAct,wasinresponsetoadireneedaswellasa mechanismtorestoreconfidenceandprotectcompetitioninthepublicprocurementarena. However, concern over UTPs and EBs reflects both frustration and powerlessness over practicesnormallyapreserveofthe‘richclub,’condemningthesmallenterprisestothecold.

33 For instance, misleading advertising that indirectly maligns competing products of smaller enterprisesthatdevoterelativelylessspendonadvertising.Entrybarriersarenotacommon phenomenon (few cases have been reported over time and scope). However, the survey wasn’tqualitativetoinvestigatedetailsofthevariousdimensionsoftheresponses. Civilsocietyhadsimilarresponsesandrankingsto the business community. Perhapsthis reflected the level of awareness (mainly through research) and regular interface with and aboutthebusinesscommunity. Law/policymakersandregulatorybodieswereacrosssectionbetweenbusiness(UTPsand BR) and research and academic institutions (PD). Perhaps given the assumption that the LPRstakeholdercategoryhasmorecustomofbusinessrelated data and information than any other stakeholder group of respondents, their views should be given additional focus, theirlimitedknowledgeofACPs(10%)notwithstanding. Effects on economy Agriculture,TradeandServicessectorswerelistedasthemostaffectedeconomicsectorsby thewholespectrumofrespondents.Theresponses:Consumers(agriculture,trade,services); business/businesssupportorganisations(trade,manufacturingandservices)andAcademic andResearchInstitutions(trade,manufacturingandservices).Otherresponseswere:Civil society (trade, manufacturing and services); and law/policy makers & regulatory bodies (trade,manufacturingandservices). All categories of respondents were of the view that the trade and services sectors were affectedmostbyACPs.Onlyconsumerslistedtheagriculturesectorasaffected.However,it couldhavebeenbasedonthefactthatasfinalconsumers,theyhadadditionalknowledge, particular on trade ingoods (transportmarketing chain)that theother categories eitherdid not have access to or considered anecdotal or inconsequential in the context of market competition. Extent of ACPs

The overwhelming Perceived scope of ACPs percentage of respondents (70%)wasoftheviewthat 60 someoftheACPsoriginate 5 Consumer fromoutsidethecountryas well. The responses were BUSO 65 thus: (Consumers70%; 4 businesses/business supportorganisations80%; 3 ARI 60

Academic and Research category 80 institutions – 60%; Civil 2 CSOs society 65%; and 70 Policy/law makers & 1 LPRs Regulatorybodies60%).

0 20 40 60 80 Fig Thisreflectsthestructureofthecountry’stradeandmanufacturingsectors,activitiesinwhich formedbasisforresponsesgotinthesurvey.Withdominationofthetradeandmanufacturing 34 sectorsbycompaniesofforeignoriginorjointventures with local partners, the responses werethereforepremisedoncurrentrealities.

Rules to check ACPs ThereweremixedreactionsonthequestionofrulestocheckACPswith60%ofconsumers surveyedsayingtheyexistedandanalmostsimilarfigure(50%)ofrespondentsfromtheRAI concurringandLPR(70%)sharingthesameview.Outoftherest,70%oftherespondents fromthebusinesssectorsaidtheydidnotknoworweren’tsure.Themajority(40%)fromcivil societyweren’tsureaswellwiththeresteitherassertingintheaffirmativeorinopposition. Onaverage,themajorityofrespondentsindicatedthatsomerulesexistedtocheckACPs. However, a significant Do rules to check competition exist? number of respondents weren’tsureabouttherules. This question required knowledge about technical LPR BUSO 70% 70% detailontheprevailingpolicy and legal framework, which tothemajoritywasn’tclear. Asked to substantiate their RAI 50% responses, most

CSR respondents couldn’t name 40% any or named laws and Consumers 60% regulations that completely address other business/industry or Fig6 behaviour / practices. However, some responses indicated some knowledge about laws that to some extent address competition in general but not specificallyACPs. Theseinclude: UNBSAct, CMA act,UCCAct,amongothers. PromptedonactiontakenbytheauthoritiestocombatACPs,respondentsweresplitdown themiddle,withhalfsayingsometimesactionistakenandthereststatinginthenegative. Consumer protection and justice Uganda National Bureau of Standards (UNBS) emerged as the most popular institution perceivedtobeofferingprotectiontoconsumersandrequirecompetitioninthemarketplace. The respondents (Consumers50%; businesses/business support organisations45%; Academic and Research institutions – 20%; Civil society 50%; and Policy/law makers & Regulatory bodies50%). This wasn’t surprising given the enduring media coverage of the quality certification body’s activities in enforcement of standards. UNBS doesn’t have mandateinlawtoregulatecompetition.Neitherisconsumerprotectionitsprimaryrole.

35 Competition policy and law framework All categories of respondents Are regulations in place enough to ensure minimum competition? averred that regulations in Percent STAKEHOLDER CANT SAY / placeto check ACPswere not YES NO enough. Less than half of the CATEGORY DON’T KNOW respondents gave their views Consumers 10% 30% 10% on this question, BUSO 5% 15% 10% RAI 10% 60% 30% understandably, if considered CSOs 5% 30% 10% against respondents’ LPR 100% knowledge and impact of CP. Table 2: Views of stakeholders on effectiveness of existing framework Theviewsreflectedtheperceptionsofanunregulatedmarket.Nevertheless,onthequestion thatfollowed,anoverwhelmingmajorityendorsedtheneedtoenactacomprehensivelawon Should competition law be enacted? competition regulation. At Percent least 70% and above across STAKEHOLDER CANT SAY / all stakeholder categories YES NO CATEGORY DON’T KNOW (with 100% apiece for Consumers 90% 10% consumers and law, policy BUSO 100% and regulatory sector) calling RAI 70% 20% 10% CSOs 95% 5% for enactment of a specific LPR 100 policy and law to address Table 3: Views of stakeholders on enactment of general law on competition competitionregulation.

Scope and safeguards Still, the majority of respondents were of the view that the law should not only cover competitionasanavenuetoensureeconomicefficiencybutconsumerwelfareaswell.Asa logicalnextstep,mostrespondentsgavetheirmodetoalawthatshouldcoveralltypesof enterprisesandpersonsandallareasofcommercialactivity.

However,therespectivestakeholdergroupssuggestedactivitiesandsectorsthatoughttobe exemptedfromtheproposedcompetitionregulationframeworkthus:Majorityofconsumers (35%withtheresteithernotgivingresponsesor responding otherwise) and civil society (50%)wantedsmallandmediumenterprises(SMEs)exempted.Sodid90%ofrespondents fromthepolicy/lawandregulatorybodies.Themajorityofbusinesseswantedpublicutilities offthehook,whileresearchandacademicinstitutionswantedstateownedenterprises.The common denominator in the responses was that competition law shouldn’t extend to the public domain as well as to enterprises that benefit the poor (SMEs). Coming from consumers and civil society, the responses were a consequence of individual or group experience(consumers)anddirectinteractionwithaffectedcommunities/groups(civilsociety andlaw/policymakersandregulatorybodies). Forbusinesses,theresponsescouldbelinkedtotherelativelyhighcostofdoingbusinessin Ugandathatiswidelyunderstoodtobeexacerbatedbythecostofutilities.Competition,itis feared by some, could worsen the status quo. When respondents from the research and academic community opted for exemption of stateowned enterprises, perhaps, given the knowledge base of the group, was premised on the philosophy that public resources or interestsshouldbeprotectedfromlaissezfairecompetitionandasfarascanbeestablished, adverse conditions since they are normally not primarily profitmaking but were set up to achievesocialends. 36 Institutional design/structure TheoverwhelmingmajorityofrespondentswereoftheviewthattheproposedCAshouldbe atthecentreofcompetitionregulationinthecountry.Theapparentlyhomogeneousresponse waslinkedtothepracticeinregulatoryreforminthecountry.Reformhasnormallytakenthe formofsettingupspecificsectorregulatory(SSR)bodiestooverseeallaspectsofregulation. EndorsementoftheCAshouldbeseeninthislight. Powers and roles OnthecrucialquestionofpowersoftheproposedCA,consumersweresplitdownmiddlein the proposal of a CA with both investigative and adjudicative, and one with investigative powers only with adjudicative powers vested with a separate authority. Both responses accounted for 35%. The choice of consumers could be appreciated when the prevailing frameworks are considered. Consumers normally prefer services on a ‘onestopcentre’ principle, rather than a stratified institutional setup, a structure that is normally linked to bureaucraticredtape. Respondentsfrombusinessesandbusinesssupportorganisationswerealsosplitdownthe middle:some40%oftheresponsesendorsedaCAwithbothinvestigativeandadjudicative powers, with a smaller percentage opting for one with investigative powers only, while adjudicativepowersarevestedwithcourtsoflaw. Onthe eraofstateowned monopolies, courtsoflawwerethelastresortincasebusinessessoughtjusticeinthemarketplace.The views, therefore, could have been formed in this respect other than out of informed pragmatism.Respondentsfromresearchandacademic bodieswantedaseparatebody,a decision construed as based on the desire for separation of roles (investigative and adjudicative)toensureindependenceintheprocessofhearings. Themajorityofresponsesfromallrespectivestakeholdercategoriesendorsedtheviewthat theCAshoulddealwithUTPsandconsumerprotection issuesas well. This was a logical outcome that corroborated the earlier positions,forinstancethattheCAshouldbeabody whoseroleswouldcovereconomicefficiencyandconsumerwelfareaswellasestablishment ofalawthatwouldcoverallenterprises,personsandbusinessactivities. Also, the majority of respondents from businesses, civil society and research/academic bodies wanted specialised sector regulators (SSRs) given overall powers to handle competitionregulationissues.ConsumerswantedtheCAtoretainacoordinatingrole,while LPRsopinedthatthatwellasSSRsshouldbeinvolved,theCAshouldcoordinatewiththem. ViewsofCS,businessesandRAIwereinlinewiththetraditionalinstitutionaldesignofmost SSRs. Consumers’ and LPRs’ views were tinged with ‘checks and balances’, in a bid to provide a lockedin mechanism that would ensure fairness and separation of roles/responsibilities. Corporate/ personal liability and alternative mechanisms ThemajorityofresponsesfromtheRAI,CSandLPRwereequallysplit.Thoseoftheview that violations of thecompetition law should be criminalized in some cases were equal to those who said, in all cases, contraventions should be criminalized. Consumers endorsed personalcriminalliabilityinsomecases,wellasRAIwentforliabilitylimitedinallcases.In all,itworthynotingthatallstakeholdergroupsoptedpersonalcriminalliability,underscoring theirdesiretoputinplacetoregulateclimatethatdeterspersonalimpunity. 37 Should transgressions in competition law be criminalised? COs, Businesses and Percent civilsocietywereofthe opinion that the Yes in Yes in all Cant say/ STAKEHOLDER CATEGORY No proposed law should some cases Don’t know cases have provisions to Consumers 65% 35% ensure right to private BUSO 35% 50% 15% action. LPRs were RAI 40% 40% 20% equally split with those CSOs 45% 45% 10% for and against right to LPR 40% 40% 20% Table 4: Views of stakeholders on criminal liability personal equal. Only responses from RAI hadamajorityrejectingtherighttoprivateaction.Theviewsreflectthestructureandnature of the traditional commercial justice system that contains flexibilities, including the right to privateaction. Competition advocacy All stakeholder categories were of the view that the proposed CA should involve different stakeholdersinitsfunctioning,especiallyadvocacyandpublicity.Inviewoftheeraofprivate public partnerships, this was expected. Also, all the stakeholder categories were of the opinionthatbusinessesshouldtrytobalancetheirprofitmotiveswithconsumerwelfare. However,ontheimportantquestionofhowrespondentswouldreactoftheyencounteredany ACP, all but consumers were of the view that they would seek help from consumer organisations.Fortheirpart,majorityofconsumerssaidtheywoulddonothingaboutit.The apparent irony is based on the reality that consumers know better that COs do not have powersandmandatetoredressmarketmalpractices, well as others simply assumed that theycouldgetjusticefromCOs. Broken down, the “others” response included amicable settlement with goods / service providerorbyapproachingtherelevantsectoralumbrellabodyorregulator,amongthemain responses. Who would you report to in case you were victim of an ACP? Percent

Consumer Local Police Court Other Nothing STAKEHOLDER CATEGORY organisation Council Consumers 5% 10% 20% 25% 40% BUSO 5% 15% 10% 35% 30% 5% RAI 20% 50% 30% CSOs 5% 40% 30% 25% LPR 25% 30% 20% 25% Table 5: Views of stakeholders on who would be competition ‘police’ under status quo

38 10.0 RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

Recommendations andconclusions have been stratified tomap outthe obligations and challenges that exist, or that need to be addressed in order to have a functional and effective competition regulationregimeinthecountry. General Conclusions: i. Competitionpolicyandlawcanhavearoletoplayinensuringthattradeliberalisationisnot underminedbyanticompetitivebehaviour. Scopedandimplementedappropriately,competitionregulationshouldplayaconsiderablerole in checking adverse effects caused by malpractices and structural weaknesses in the emerging free market in Uganda. In the longrun, such interventions should protect the process of liberalisation from a host of threats, including political backlash by a polarised populaceatvarianceintermsofbenefitsfromtheprevailingsystem.

ii. Ugandan competition law and policy could encounter major challenges when it comes to emerginginternationalphenomenalikecartelsandmergers.Thiscallsforadditionalsafeguard measuresormechanismstochecktheexternalthreats. Foreign investments are increasingly finding their way into the economy through non traditionalchannelslikemergersandacquisitions.Wellasitrepresentsafasterwaytosetup andoperatebusinesses,whenunregulated,itmayhurtcompetitionthroughpossiblecollapse of some of the ‘losing’ competitors, with adverse consequences to the state (loss of taxes, jobs, etc) and consumers (welfare reversals occasioned by reduced options or increased prices).

iii. The crafting and ratification of the COMESA competition framework should provide the necessary linkages and support to address competitionrelated crossborder concerns in Ugandaandtheimmediateregion. WitheverdeepeningeconomicintegrationCOMESA(mainlyKenya)isthecountry’ssecond largesttradingpartner);thispresentschallengesrelatedtoconductofcompaniesthattrade across borders of the 20member states of COMESA. Therefore, linkages across common boardersintheeconomicblocshouldbeestablishedorstrengthenedtoaddresscompetition relatedconcerns.

iv. Uganda has no specific legislation on competition, although there are policies used to influencethelocalmarketse.g.tradepolicy,investmentandlicensingregulations,company andpartnershiplaws,labourandenvironmentlaws. Systematic and effective competition regulation within the country and between the country anditstradingpartnerswouldrequiretheenactmentofacompetitionlaw.Yetwellasmost countries in COMESA have enacted appropriate laws or amended deficient ones, Uganda doesn’thaveoneinplace.Thiswouldundermineefforts,internalorjoint,tocheckACPs. v. Enactment of Competition policy and law and setting up an enabling institutionalframework need to be expedited and implemented to enable the setting up of benchmarks for proper conduct,mechanismsformonitoring,sanctionsandredressmechanisms. Propersequencingandcoherenceincompetitionregulationwouldrequirespecificity,fairness andtransparency,anaspirationpossiblethroughaclearframeworkoncompetitionpolicyand law.

39 Challenges Government Has To Address: i. Low stakeholder awareness . Resultsfrom the survey, shared in above chapter, indicated thatrelatively few stakeholders wereawareofthepracticesbroadlydefinedasanticompetitiveorunfairaswellaspossible effects of the same on the respective category of stakeholders. This portends serious consequencestovictimsandunjustifiablerewardtobusinessesinvolvedinthemalpractices. Inviewoftheforegoingtherefore,theneedforawarenesscreationisparamount. ii. Harmonisation of sectoral and general competition regulation regimes . Sectoralregulation,putinplaceshortlybeforeand,insomesectors,afterprivatisation,was informedbyframeworkswithawidearrayofprovisions,includingthefacilitationofcompetitive markets. However, competition regulation per se is not adequately provided for, for sectors where it was recognised (energy/power, communications etc). Also, with the imminent enactmentofcompetitionpolicyandlaw,aclearmechanismonhowthetworegimes(sectoral regulationandcompetitionregulation)willinterfaceshouldthoroughlyneedtobeexamined. iii. Further adjustment of the economy to attract quality investments . Macroeconomicrealignmentofclosetotwodecadeshasledtoconsiderabletransformation of the country’s economy. However, in ordertodeepen thegains, particularly, to have long lasting impact on the socioeconomic spheres (through increased investment, etc), there is need,wherenecessary,toregulateactivitiesofthedominantprivatesector.Thisshoulddispel fearsandlowerrisksasperceivedbyprospectiveinvestors(mainlyfromoverseas). iv. Absence of or a weak auxiliary policy and legislation . Given the reality that competition policy and law cannot be expected to be a panacea for market imperfections or shortcomings,the need for enactment and enforcement of auxiliary policyandlegislationcannotbeoverstated.Theseshouldincludelawsrelatedto:consumer protection, sale of goods, contracts, customs management, and product standards, among others. v. Harmonising economic and trade policies within the EAC and COMESA region . Withfurthereconomicintegration,Ugandawillincreasinglyneedtoharmoniseherpoliciesand lawswithsistercountriesintheEACandCOMESA.Thisshouldforestallmajordifficulties,and possiblegridlockcrossborderimplementationoflaworhonouringofobligations,orenjoyment ofrightsandotherentitlements. Expected Government Action: To realise effective fair trade regime and consumer welfare, especially since the competition law mightnotbepassedverysooninthecountry,itispertinentthatthefollowingareputintoplace: i. Stakeholder awareness and education programmes should be stepped up throughout the country in a bid to facilitate understanding and subsequently, general support for a market drivencompetitionregulationandconsumerprotectiondispensation. Focus should be directed on supporting stakeholder awareness initiatives, as wellinformed stakeholdersareexpectedtodriveeffectiveimplementationandenforcementofthesoonto beenactedcompetitionpolicyandlawaswellastheestablishmentofacompetitionculturein thecountry. ii. In a bid to enhance competition, developments like mergers and takeovers need to be governedbyenforceablerulessoastoprotectsmallbusinesses,consumersandpromotefair trade in general. At the moment some rules, in the realms of privatisation exist. However, comprehensiverulestogovernallsectorsandenterprisesneedtobeputinplaceaswellas monitoringmechanisms.

40 Casesexistfromtheprivatisationprocessand,generally,liberalisationoftheeconomywhere takeovers and mergers resulted into restructuring of markets (market share) leading to difficulties and, or collapse of small businesses. This, theory and reality, would have a deleteriouseffectonconsumerrightsandwelfare,whichcallsformitigatingmeasurestobe put in place most effectively through competition law, but also by amending some of the existinglaws. iii. Theexpectedcompetitionframeworkshouldbecoherentwithnationaldevelopmentstrategies for poverty eradication, sustainable socioeconomic development, other sectoral regulatory regimesaswellasregionalandmultilateralinitiatives. Thereisevidence,particularlyinthecommoditysectorontowhichthecountrystilldepends significantly, that illregulation of competition could lead to severe consequences. It follows therefore, that competition regulation should be examined beyond the narrow confines of checkingadverseeffectsonfirmstopotentialofruininglivelihoodsofmillionsofpredominantly poorpeople. iv. Functional consumer protection regimes should be established and promoted to ensure efficiency,economicgrowth,bestpractice,qualityassuranceandfairtrade. Thepublicsector(government)shouldbeadvisedthatitwillrequiremorethanenactmentof relevant policy and law but establishment of an effective framework requires professional enforcementbackedbysufficientresources,Thisshouldbeplannedforinadvance. v. It’scommendablethatsignificantgroundhasbeencoveredintheprocessofenactmentofa competitionframework(policyandlaw)fortheEACeconomicbloc.However,thereisneedto expeditiously enact and enforce the framework, particularly in view of real and potential challengesrelatedtotheemergenceoftheEACCustomsUnion. vi. Establishmentofacompetentauthoritymannedbyprofessionalandexperiencedmanpower toaddresstheincreasinglycomplexchallengesintheeconomy. Countries that have recently embarked on regulation (through law and policy) have encountered problems related to manpower gaps as professionals with relevant skills and experiencearehardtocomeby.Institutional,readinessandtraininginterventionsareneeded. vii. Enactment or review of auxiliary policy and legislation to ensure general readiness of the country’s trade sector to anticipated changes. These include trade policy, investment, privatisation,policyonSMEsandlabourandamongothers. viii. Strengthening sectoral regulatory bodies to build their capacity play their expected roles in competitionregulation. Sectoralregulatorybodiesbytheirverynature,willplayapivotalroleincompetitionregulation. However, they require capacity building to elevate their readiness in a bid to play their expectedroles. ix. Governmentshouldlendtherequisitepoliticalsupportfortheanticipatedmarketdispensation bywayofenactmentofsupportivelegislation,followedbytheirenforcement. The public sector (political leadership) will need to use advocacy measures to help support mechanisms aimed at bringing about a competition culture for socioeconomic growth and development. x. Inlightoftheexistenceofsectoralcompetitionregulation(insomesectors),establishmentofa comprehensivecompetitionregimecouldencounterbarriersatimplementationstage.Thereis

41 therefore need for harmonisation of sectoral and general competition regulation regimes to avoidanticipatedconflict. Where specific sector regulators (SSRs) are mandated to enforce competition in the marketplace,careshouldbetaken,throughprovisionsintheproposedcompetitionpolicyand law, that clearly assign roles, responsibilities and obligations but avoid fomenting possible conflictsbetweentheenvisagedcompetitionauthorityandSSRs. *********

42 Annex A: Acronyms and abbreviations

UN UnitedNations ULRC UgandaLawReformCommission EAC EastAfricaCommunity COMESA CommonMarketforEasternandSouthernAfrica MoFPED MinistryofFinance,PlanningandEconomicDevelopment UCC UgandaCommunicationsCommission UNBS UgandaNationalBureauofStandards CMA CapitalMarketsAuthority PPDA PublicProcurementandDisposalofAssetsAuthority PPDAAct LawprovidingforthePPDA OIC OrganisationofIslamicConferences IGADD InterGovernmentalAgencyonDroughtandDevelopment ESA EasternandSouthernAfrica UNICEF UnitedNationsChildrenandEducationalFund PRSP PovertyReductionStrategyPaper PEAP PovertyEradicationActionPlan NEPAD NewPlanforAfricaDevelopment ACPEU AfricaCarribeanPacific–EuropeanUnion EBA EverythingButArms AGOA AfricaGrowthOpportunityAct UIA UgandaInvestmentAuthority MTTI MinistryofTourism,TradeandIndustry UIC UgandaInsuranceCommission NDA NationalDrugAuthority M&A MergersandAcquisitions UEB UgandaElectricityAuthority ERA ElectricityRegulatoryAuthority UEDCL UgandaElectricityDistributionCompanyLimited UEGCL UgandaElectricityGenerationCompanyLimited UETCL UgandaElectricityTransmissionCompanyLimited CDC CommonwealthDevelopmentCorporation UPTC UgandaPostsandTelecommunicationsLimited UTL UgandaTelecommunicationsLimited MTN MobileTelephoneNetwork EMS ExpeditedMailServices AES AppliedEnergyServices UCBL UgandaCommercialBankLimited NIC NationalInsuranceCorporation AIG AmericaInsuranceGroup LPRs Law,PolicymakersandRegulatoryBodies COs ConsumerOrganisations SOEs StateOwnedEnterprises SMEs SmallandMediumEnterprises Pus PublicUtilities WTO WorldTradeOrganisation RAI ResearchandAcademicInstitutions PAC PublicAccountsCommunity 43 IGG InspectorGeneralofGovernment UCPA UgandaConsumersProtectionAssociation CONSENT ConsumerEducationTrust UTP UnfairTradePractices PD PriceDiscrimination BR BidRigging RPM ResalePriceMaintenance CPF CollectivePriceFixing EB EntryBarrier ED ExclusiveDealing ACP AntiCompetitivePractices

44