Setting the Terms of Relief: Explaining State Policy Choices in the Devolution Revolution Author(s): Joe Soss, Sanford F. Schram, Thomas P. Vartanian and Erin O'Brien Source: American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 45, No. 2 (Apr., 2001), pp. 378-395 Published by: Midwest Political Science Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2669347 . Accessed: 08/10/2013 20:46
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This content downloaded from 146.95.253.17 on Tue, 8 Oct 2013 20:46:24 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Settingthe Terms of Relief: Explaining State Policy Choicesin the Devolution Revolution
JoeSoss AmericanUniversity SanfordF. Schram BrynMawr College Thomas P. Vartanian BrynMawr College ErinO'Brien AmericanUniversity
The landmarkwelfare legislation of n 1996, the federalgovernment passed legislationthat transformed 1996 offersstudents of politicsa publicassistance provision in theUnited States. The PersonalRespon- unique opportunityto pinpointthe sibilityand WorkOpportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) determinantsof state-levelpolicy abolishedthe federal entitlement to aid thatgrew out of theSocial Security choices-a case in whichthe fifty Actof 1935 and reachedfruition through legal victories in the 1960s(Mink states responded virtuallysimulta- 1998; Lurie 1997). In its place,the federalgovernment created Temporary neouslyto a single policy mandate. Assistancefor Needy Families (TANF), a systemof block grantsthat gives Takingadvantage of thisopportunity, statesmore freedom to selectamong policy tools but also imposesa force- we investigatethe factorsthat led ful mandate to promote work,reduce welfareusage, and change poor states to make restrictivepolicy people'sbehaviors (Albelda and Tilly1997). choices after1996 and use this In this article,we presenta political analysisof the ways statesre- analysis to evaluate general-theories sponded to thisnew policyenvironment. Specifically, we investigatethe of welfarepolitics. Specifically, we factorsthat shaped state-levelpolicy choices after 1996 and use thisanaly- test six types of explanationsfor why sis as a basis for evaluating general explanations for welfarepolicy some states responded by adopting outcomes.Our studybuilds on a long traditionof quantitativeresearch 'get-tough"program rules: theories thathas attemptedto illuminatestate-level politics by askingwhy states thatidentify welfare policy as a site of adopt differentwelfare policies (Howard 1999; Rom 1999; Brace and ideological conflict,as an outcome of Jewitt1995; Petersonand Rom 1990; Plotnickand Winters1985). The electoral politics,as a domain of analysispresented here, however, departs from prior work in two impor- policyinnovation, as an instrumentof tantrespects. social control,as an outletfor racial First,most state-level research has soughtto explaininterstate differ- resentments,and as an expression of ences in benefitlevels and spendingpatterns (Howard 1999, 424-425; moralvalues. The resultsof our or- dered and binarylogit models sug- gest thatstate policies have been shaped by a varietyof social and JoeSoss is AssociateProfessor of Government,American University, 4400 Massachu- politicalforces, but especially by the settsAve., NW, Washington, D.C. 20016-8130([email protected]). Sanford F. Schram racial compositionof familieswho rely is VisitingProfessor of Social Workand Social Research,Bryn Mawr College,300 AirdaleRd., Bryn Mawr, PA 19010-1697([email protected]). Thomas Vartanian on programbenefits. is AssociateProfessor of Social Workand Social Research,Bryn Mawr College,300 AirdaleRd., Bryn Mawr, PA 19010-1697([email protected]). Erin O'Brien is a Ph.D. candidatein theDepartment of Government, American University, 4400 Massa- chusettsAve., NW, Washington, D.C. 20016-8130([email protected]). We wouldlike to extendour thanksto RobertAlbritton, Jim Baumohl, Nathan Dietz, RichardFording, Heather Girvin, Gary Krueger, Claudia Krugovoy, Julia Littell, Justine McNamara,Frances Fox Piven, Ellen Szabo, Greg Caldeira, and theanonymous review- ersfor suggestions that helped us improveon earlierversions of thisarticle. We also thankGary King, Michael Tomz, and JasonWittenberg for technical help regarding theirClarify program and RobertLieberman and GregShaw for sharing their data. AmericanJournal of Political Science, Vol. 45, No. 2,April 2001, Pp. 378-395 ?2001 bythe Midwest Political Science Association
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This content downloaded from 146.95.253.17 on Tue, 8 Oct 2013 20:46:24 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions SETTING THE TERMS OF RELIEF 379
Petersonand Rom 1990).1By contrast,we analyzevaria- WelfarePolicymaking: tion in the institutionalform of welfareprovision-the A NewDivision of Labor rules and penalties that condition access to resources and structurethe treatmentcitizens receive in govern- Whenthe federal government abolished the Aid to Fami- mentprograms. In the 1990s,public officialsshowed re- lies withDependent Children (AFDC) programin 1996, newedinterest in using programrules as toolsto modify it removed a frameworkof rules that had structured poor people's behaviors (Mead 1997). The federalgov- state-leveladministration of cash aid since the 1960s. ernment's1996 law such aid emphasized requirements, Withits new systemof block grants,the 1996 law ended and as states responded to this directive,their policy the federalguarantee of matchingfunds and allowed changes focused less on the amounts of reliefoffered statesto pursue a wider varietyof policy innovations thanon the termson whichaid is given(Schram 1999). withoutseeking waivers from the federalgovernment. Indeed, preliminary evidence suggeststhat states have Proponentstouted the new TANF systemas a "devolu- differedmarkedly in the policies they have adopted tion revolution"that would liberatethe statesfrom sti- (Mettler2000) and thatthese policy choices have been a flingfederal rules and allowthem to createmore effective majorfactor driving interstate differences in caseload re- povertypolicies. Such claimscontain a grainof truthre- duction(Rector and Youssef1999). gardingshifts in theintergovernmental division of labor, Second,most prior research has been unableto com- but they also conveythe misleading impressionthat parepolicy choices made a time un- during single period statesnow enjoyan unprecedenteddegree of liberty. der roughlysimilar conditions. Most cross-sectional In theAmerican political system defined by federal- for to variationin wel- studies, example,appear analyze ism,localism, and a relativelyweak and fragmentedna- faregrants for a single butthe choicesthat set year, policy tionalgovernment, state-level politics has alwaysplayed a thegrants for any given year were actually made at differ- keyrole in shapingthe amount and formof public aid for ent timesin differentstates. As a result,the analysisin- thepoor (Trattner1999; Noble 1997; Skocpol 1996). Be- a in cludes greatdeal of unobservedvariation thepoliti- ginningin 1911 withmothers' pensions and later,after cal forces on statesas acted to set their impinging they 1935,in the Aid to DependentChildren program, state grantlevels. In addition, historical raise such lags doubts administrationand interstatevariation were defining fea- about how wellindicators for a of ac- givenyear analysis turesof public aid forpoor families(Gordon 1994). In the in the tuallymeasure the conditionsthat existed year wake of insurgentactivism and legal victoriesin the grant levels were established.Our addresses analysis 1960s,the federalgovernment applied a broad set of na- theseproblems by of the cir- takingadvantage unique tionalstandards to state-leveladministrators (Davis 1993; cumstances welfare of 1996. surroundingthe legislation Melnick1994). Interstatevariation, however, remained a Here,we have a case in which states the fifty responded signal characteristicof the AFDC programthat distin- virtually to a mandate. simultaneously single policy guishedit fromthe nationalsystem of social insurance From an analyticstandpoint, it is hard to imagine a coveragein theUnited States (Peterson and Rom 1990). strongeropportunity to the determinantsof pinpoint Withthe passage of PRWORAin 1996,states gained state-level choices.To researchershave policy date, pro- more authorityover eligibility rules and administrative duced some good case studies(Francis 1999) and efforts procedures than they had enjoyed for three decades to classifystate policies but therehave (Mettler2000), (Mettler2000). At the same time,however, the federal been fewsystematic analyses of whystates responded to law also imposed a varietyof new mandatesthat con- thefederal mandate in different ways. strainedthe policyoptions available to statelawmakers In sum,this study presents an empiricalassessment and bureaucrats(Kincaid 1998). For example,the federal of theories to welfare choices purporting explain policy governmentset strictquotas on the percentageof adult in theAmerican states. In additionto on sheddinglight recipientswho mustparticipate in "work-relatedactivi- the of we in- politicaldynamics contemporaryreform, ties"and definedthese activities in a narrowmanner that tendfor this case to illuminate quantitative study long- leftthe states with little room to maneuver.2Likewise, the standingquestions surroundingthe political determi- nantsof welfare policy. 2Stateswere required to have25 percentof thetargeted caseload workingtwenty hours per weekin 1997 and 50 percentof the caseloadworking thirty hours per week by the year 2002. More- over,the law's definition of "work-related activities" limited educa- 'The exceptionshere include several studies that have addressed tionand trainingto no morethan one year.Subsequent legislation state-leveldifferences in eligibilitycriteria (e.g., Hanson 1983, restrictedthe number of recipientsstates could have in education 1984;Grogan 1994) and somemore recent studies of statewaiver and trainingprograms to no more than 20 percentof clients requests(Lieberman and Shaw,2000). countedin thework quota.
This content downloaded from 146.95.253.17 on Tue, 8 Oct 2013 20:46:24 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 380 JOE SOSS, SANFORD F. SCHRAM, THOMAS P. VARTANIAN, AND ERIN O'BRIEN
1996 law prohibitedstates from spending TANF funds demandwork from recipients earlier than the federal re- on nonworkingindividuals who receiveassistance for quirementof twenty-fourmonths. The second goal for morethan two years or on individualswho receiveassis- reformerswas to end long-termprogram dependency. In tancefor more than five years in a lifetime. thisarea, the key choice for states was whetherto adopt a The publicassistance system established in 1996 can lifetimeeligibility cutoff shorter than the federallimit of be describedas one in whichthe statesenjoy increased sixtymonths. The thirddimension of thereform agenda discretionin choosingmeans so long as theytoe theline focusedon socialbehavior, especially the reproductive be- in meetingfederally prescribed ends. In principle,this haviorsof poor women.Here, the mostwidely debated systempermits states to adoptpolicies that make benefits policychoice was whetherto imposea "familycap" deny- more accessibleto poor familiesand thatenable clients ingadditional benefits to childrenconceived by recipients. to pursuenew opportunities.Indeed, a smallnumber of Fourth,reformers called forpenalties tough enough to statesemphasized enabling and opportunity-producing forcecompliance with the new regimeof programrules. policies,and moststates passed at leastsome policiesthat Towardthis end, states could choosea weak,moderate, or fallinto thiscategory (Berlin 2000; Massing2000). Mo- strongsanction policy to punishclient infractions. mentumfor welfare reform in the 1990s,however, was These fourpolicy options received the lion's share of fueledby perceptions that AFDC was too permissive,and attentionin media coverageof welfarereform in 1996 thefederal legislation in 1996 reinforcedthis zeitgeist by and 1997.3Likewise, accounts of the legislativeprocess creatingoutcome-based penalties for states that did not suggestthat these policies consistently took center-stage act quicklyto enforcework and lowercaseloads (Bryner in nationaland state-leveldebates (Bryner 1998). Finally, 1998). The result,as Mettler(2000) has shown,is that we also foundan emphasison thesesame policychoices policyinnovation in the stateshas been skewedin a re- in our reviewof scholarlystudies.4 strictiveand punitivedirection. Many statesstuck close Accordingly,our analysispredicts four types of state to thebasic requirementsset forth by the federal govern- policychoices. First, we analyzethe factors that led states ment.But among thosethat deviated, the vast majority to adopt weak,moderate, or strongsanctions.5 Sanction "used theirnew authorityto limitaccess to social provi- sion and, mostespecially, to shiftthe balance in welfare 3Asa crudemeasure of mediaattention, we searchedLexis/Nexis policydesign from rights to obligations,imposing bur- fornewspaper stories in thefifty states that addressed welfare re- densomesanctions on recipients"(Mettler 2000, 26). form.Between January 1996 and December1997, we found1,308 In whatfollows, we attemptto accountfor this pre- welfarestories on timelimits, 1,094 welfare stories on workre- quirements,682 welfarestories on thefamily cap option,and 909 dominantpattern. Why were some statesmore likely than welfarestories on sanctionspolicy. Attention to thesefour policy othersto pursuea "get-tough"welfare strategy based on choicesdwarfed coverage of otherkey policy changes such as "di- restrictiveand punitivepolicy choices?To answerthis version"policies designed to stanchthe flow of applicants into wel- fareprograms (188 stories)and drug-testingpolicies aimed at question,we beginby identifyingthe policy choices that curbingthe use ofillicit substances (343 stories). best capturethe 1990s movementagainst "welfare per- 4Seccombe(1999, 168),for example, identifies time limits, work missiveness"and thenuse leadingtheories of welfare poli- requirements,and familycaps as thethree most controversial new ticsto derivehypotheses regarding TANF policy choices. programrules under welfare reform. Gilens (1999, 184, 189) notes thatwork requirements "have been a partof everywelfare reform effortsince the Johnson administration" and arguesthat "time limitsrepresent the most radical and potentiallythe most impor- tantelement in the 1996welfare reform legislation." Writing dur- Get-ToughPolicy Choices in the States ingthe midst of the debates that culminated in PRWORA,Handler (1995, 113) concludesthat "the heart of currentwelfare reform proposals...are time limits and work requirements." Summarizing In selectingpolicy choices foranalysis, we emphasized legislativedebates in thestates, Bryner (1998, 249, 260) writesthat twogoals: covering the major domains of get-toughwel- "placingtime limits on welfarerecipients has becomethe most farereform in a thoroughmanner and identifyingthe prominentrestrictive reform in eligibility"and "the family cap has becomethe most popular reform" in thearea of socialbehavior. policychoices that were most salient in publicdebate and Liebermanand Shaw (2000) concludethat the states "seem to be widelyconsidered in thestates. Surveying scholarly books convergingon a smallnumber of policy instruments (of which the and articles,policy reports, legislative materials, and mass familycap, the time limit, and workrequirements are the most im- media,we founda consistentemphasis on fourkey areas portantand well-knownexamples)." in whichlawmakers sought to end permissiveness. 5Our trichotomousmeasure is based on codingfrom an analysis The firstfocused on imposing obligations in ex- byRector and Youssef(1999). Sixteenstates (AK, CA, HI, IN, KY, ME, MN, MO, MT,NY, NC, PA,RI, VT, WA) adoptedweak sanc- changefor assistance, especially the obligationto work. tionsthat permit welfare agencies to sanctiononly the adult por- Here,the centralpolicy choice forstates was whetherto tionof theTANF check,except in unusualcircumstances. Thus,
This content downloaded from 146.95.253.17 on Tue, 8 Oct 2013 20:46:24 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions SETTING THE TERMS OF RELIEF 381 strengthprovides direct evidence of a state'swillingness versityof programrules that may have very different po- to restrictaccess to aid forfamilies who are needybut liticalconstituencies. Because of this greaterreach and deemedto be out of compliancewith new program rules. ambiguity,sanction choices may be subject to a wider In addition,states adopting stronger sanctions have ex- rangeof influences. periencedsignificantly larger declines in theirwelfare Accordingly,we adopt a cautious analyticapproach caseloads since 1996.6Our otherthree dependent vari- that takes no a prioriposition on whetherthe policy ables are dichotomies that measure whether states choicesexamined here should be treatedas separatedi- adopteda workrequirement stricter than the federalre- mensionsof reformor merelyas multipleindicators of quirementof twenty-fourmonths, a timelimit shorter one outcomeshaped by a singleunderlying political pro- than the federallimit of sixtymonths, and a familycap cess.We beginby predicting state placement on a general denyingbenefits to childrenconceived by currentrecipi- indexof policyseverity constructed by givingstates one ents.7As a group,these programrules definethe key point foreach of the fourrestrictive policies it adopted. termsof participation for citizens who seekaid underthe We then presentseparate analyses of each of our four TANF program;they also capturethe most fundamental policychoices. These analysesmake it possibleto directly goalsof 1990swelfare reform. observewhether particular political factors relate to our In analyzingthese new programrules, it is essential fourpolicy outcomes in differentways. to confrontthe possibility that political forces may affect differentpolicy choices in differentways. Family caps, timelimits, and workrequirements are widelyviewed as complementarytools forcombating "permissiveness," ExplainingState Policy Choices: but each is tiedto a unique goal articulatedby reformers: Theoriesand Hypotheses deterringchildbirth among recipients,enforcing work obligations,and endinglong-term dependency. In addi- Theoreticaland empiricalliteratures on welfarepolitics tionto variationacross these three policy areas, we might suggeststates may differsystematically in theirwilling- also expectsanction policies to emergefrom a distinctive nessto adopt stringentwelfare policies. Our analysistests set of political forces.Unlike the otherthree policies, hypothesesderived from six theoreticalapproaches. sanctionsare broad punitivetools used to enforcea di- Theseapproaches offer contrasting (but notmutually ex- clusive) images of welfarepolicy as an arena forpolicy innovation,a siteof ideologicalconflict, an outcomeof recipientsretain the bulk of theirfamily's TANF benefits even if theyfail to performworkfare or otherrequired activities. Twenty- electoralpolitics, a mechanismof social control,an out- one states(AL, AZ, CO, CT,DE, IL, IA,LA, MD, MA,MI, NV,NH, let for racial resentments,and a forumof moralistic NJ,NM, ND, OR, SD, TX,UT, WV) adoptedmoderate sanctions. problem-solving.(See appendix formeasures, sources, imposeda progressivesequence of penal- Nineteenof these states and descriptivestatistics for all variables.) ties,sanctioning the full TANF check only after longer periods of noncomplianceor repeatedperformance infractions. Two adopted policiesthat sanction the full family check only under specific cir- cumstances.Fourteen states (AR, FL, GA, ID, KS, MS, NE, OH, ProblemSolving and MoralityPolitics OK, SC, TN,VA, WI, WY) adoptedstrong sanctions that eliminate aid forthe full family at thefirst instance of noncompliance with a Since the earliestPoor Laws in England,the moralityof programrequirement. thepoor and thepropriety of their behaviors have served 6Examiningcaseload changes from January 1997 to June1999, we as focalpoints for debates over public aid (Handler and findthat states with stronger sanctions had significantlysteeper Hasenfeld 1991). Critics in the 1980s and 90s (e.g., declines(F = 7.745,p = .001).On average,the TANF rolls dropped Murray1984; Mead 1985, 1992) echoed a long tradition by31 percentin stateswith weak sanctions, 41 percentin states withmoderate sanctions, and 53 percentin stateswith strong of observerswho arguedthat permissive welfare policies sanctions.These results are consistent with those reported by Rec- invitedpersonal irresponsibility and thatmore paternal- torand Youssef (1999) forJanuary 1997 to June1998. isticwelfare policies would achievemoral uplift and "im- 7Ourmeasures are based on a reportpublished by the American prove"poor people (Katz 1989, 1995). Scholarstypically PublicWelfare Association (1997). Twenty-sixstates adopted a linksuch uses of welfarepolicy to two typesof political workrequirement stricter than the federal requirement: AR, AZ, goals: theinstrumental goals of punishingand changing CT, FL,GA, IA, ID, IL, MA,MI, MN, MT,NC, ND, NH, NM, NY, OK, OR, SD, TN, TX,UT, VA, WA, WI. Twenty-onestates adopted behaviorsperceived to be deviantand theexpressive goal a timelimit shorter than the federal requirement: AR, AZ, CT,DE, of affirmingmajoritarian values to thebroader citizenry FL, GA,ID, IL, IN, LA,MA, NC, NE, NM, OH, OR, SC, TN, TX, (Gans 1995;Handler 1995). UT,VA. Twenty-one states adopted a familycap: AR, AZ, CA,CT, DE, FL, GA,IL, IN, MA, MD, MS, NC, ND, NE, NJ,SC, TN, VA, From this perspective,recent changes in welfare WI,WY. policymay be viewedas a formof problem solving driven
This content downloaded from 146.95.253.17 on Tue, 8 Oct 2013 20:46:24 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 382 JOE SOSS, SANFORD F. SCHRAM, THOMAS P. VARTANIAN, AND ERIN O'BRIEN by concernover counter-normative behavior among the 1999,357). In the 1990s,some aspectsof thisideological poor (Bryner1998). In the1990s, as in earlierperiods, two splitunderwent change. A significantnumber of liberal suchproblems took center stage. The firstarose from per- public officialsbegan to worryabout dependency,to ceptionsthat poor people werespending too much time warmup to the idea of workrequirements, and to join on the welfarerolls and that caseloads had become calls to "end welfareas we know it" (Handler 1995,28- bloated due to a deepeningproblem of welfaredepen- 32). Nevertheless,there has also been continuityin this dency(Mead 1992, 1997). The second moraldimension policyarea, with conservative officials taking the lead in focusedon women'sreproductive and maritalbehaviors promotingthe toughest new policies (Bryner 1998). (Mink 1998). To manypublic officials,the AFDC pro- Two hypothesesare suggestedby the durable rela- gramseemed to discouragethe formation of two-parent tionshipbetween general welfare liberalism and specific familiesand, perhaps, to encouragechildbirth among un- policypositions. First, one mightexpect states to takean marriedwomen and teens (see Luker1996). Public de- incrementalapproach to changing public assistance bates over welfarereturned repeatedly to what critics policy,producing a patternof continuityrather than called"the illegitimacy problem" (Bryner 1998), and in its backlash (Lindblom 1959). Statesthat adopted a more preamble,the PRWORA identified the promotion of two- liberalapproach under the old AFDC systemmight con- parentfamilies as an importantgoal forTANF programs tinue to pursue a more liberal path after1996. Con- in thestates (PL 104-193). versely,states that worked to keep theircaseloads down To influencepolicy choices,political discoursesof underthe old AFDC systemmight simply deepen their "dependency"and "illegitimacy"need not be grounded effortsto promotecaseload reductionunder TANF. In in actualpatterns of behavior(Gans 1995;Schram 1995; contrastto the dependencyhypothesis, this continuity Fraserand Gordon 1994). But policymakersconcerned hypothesispredicts that states that had highercaseload- about such issues may also respondto real conditions, to-populationratios in 1996 will adopt less restrictive adoptingtougher policies when confrontedwith behav- policiesunder the TANF system. ior patternsthat deviate more sharplyfrom prevailing Second, looking beyond past practices,one might values.Accordingly, our firsttwo hypotheses suggest that also expectstate policy choices under TANF to be shaped tougherwelfare policies should be adoptedin stateswith bythe ideologies of currentelected officials. Previous re- higherrates of "problematic"behavior. The dependency searchindicates that government ideology varies signifi- hypothesispredicts that states with higher caseload-to- cantlyacross the states(Berry et al. 1998) and conserva- populationratios under AFDC in 1996 will adopt more tivestates are morelikely to pass meagerbenefit packages restrictivepolicies under the TANF system.This hypoth- and restrictiveeligibility rules (Rom 1999). Accordingly, esisis generalin scopebut applieswith particular force to our government-ideologyhypothesis predicts that states time-limitpolicies thatexplicitly target dependency by withmore liberal governments (as measuredby Berryet placingabsolute boundaries on programusage. The re- al. 1998) willadopt less restrictiveTANF policies.On the productive-behaviorhypothesis predicts that more restric- viewthat welfare liberalism is a broad policyorientation, tiveTANF policies will be adopted by statesin whicha we expectthe continuityand government-ideologyhy- higherpercentage of all 1996 birthswere to unmarried pothesesto applyto all policychoices analyzed here. mothers.While unmarried birthrates do not havean ob- vious connectionto workrequirements and timelimits, PolicyInnovation we expectthem to have a greaterimpact on the family cap (a policyaimed squarelyat reproductivebehavior) A thirdperspective on welfarepolicy suggests that state and sanctionpolicy (a generalpunitive tool). choices under TANF mightbe best understoodas ex- amplesof policyinnovation. A long traditionof research WelfareLiberalism: Ideology and Practice in politicalscience suggests that states are characterized by generalorientations toward innovation, with some tend- Responsesto thenew TANF systemmay also reflectrela- ing to be leadersand otherslaggards. Most empiricalre- tivelydurable differences in stateorientations toward wel- searchin thisarea has focusedon the question of what fare provision. Differingbeliefs about government's factors predict state tendencies toward innovation properrole in ensuringsocial well-being define an impor- (Walker 1969, 1971; Gray 1973; Berryand Berry1990; tantcleavage in welfarepolitics. Relative to conservatives, Skocpolet al. 1993;Soule and Zylan1997; Lieberman and liberalshave historically favored a largergovernment role Shaw,2000).The keyclaim underlying these analyses has in securingprotection from the market and, hence,have been thatstate responses to particularpolicy choices are supportedmore generous benefits and moreinclusive eli- likelyto reflecta fundamentaland somewhatstable pro- gibilitystandards in public assistanceprograms (Rom pensitytoward innovation (Gray 1973).
This content downloaded from 146.95.253.17 on Tue, 8 Oct 2013 20:46:24 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions SETTING THE TERMS OF RELIEF 383
TANF workrequirements, time limits, family caps, turnoutamong low-incomevoters should push politi- and sanction schedules share a get-toughquality, but cians to be moreresponsive to the grievancesand needs withina constrainedarea definedby the federalgovern- ofthe poor and workingclass (Pivenand Cloward1988). ment,they are also openingsfor policy innovation. States Indeed,previous research suggests that states with stron- thathave adopted stringentpolicies have chosen a path ger participationamong low-income voters tend to thatdeviates more sharply from the policies that charac- adopt more liberalwelfare policies (Hill, Leighley,and terizedthe old AFDC program.Thus, our policy-innova- Hinton-Andersson1995; Hicks and Swank 1992; Hill tionhypothesis, which applies to all fourpolicies consid- and Leighley1992). Thus,in relationto theelectoral sys- eredhere, suggests that states with a strongerpropensity tem,we investigatetwo hypotheses. The lower-classmobi- towardwelfare policy innovation will be more likelyto lizationhypothesis predicts that states with higher turn- adopt restrictiveTANF policies.To measurestate orien- out among low-incomevoters will adopt less restrictive tationstoward welfare policy innovation, we employthe welfarepolicies. The inter-partycompetition hypothesis firstyear in whicheach staterequested a policywaiver of predictsthat states with more evenly matched two-party anykind underthe AFDC program(data are for1977- systemswill adopt less restrictivewelfare policies. Like 1996,from Lieberman and Shaw,2000).8 Our hypothesis welfareliberalism and propensitytoward innovation, is thatstates that acted earlierto requestwaivers under thesefeatures of the electoral context may be seen as gen- AFDC (duringthe two decades leading up to the 1996re- eralinfluences on policychoice that apply to each of our forms)will be more likelyto implementstringent rules fourpolicy domains. and sanctionsunder TANF. Controllingthe Poor ElectoralPolitics Scholarswho analyzewelfare systems as mechanismsof A fourththeoretical tradition suggests that TANF policy social controlsuggest a fifthperspective on TANF policy choicesmight reflect two important features of state elec- choices.Complex societies rely on a rangeof instruments toralsystems. The firstis the degreeof inter-partycom- to maintainsocial orderand, particularly,to regulatethe petition.In his classicanalysis, Southern Politics, V.O. Key behaviorsof marginal populations (Suttles and Zald 1985; (1949) arguedthat the policy process is morelikely to re- Mizruchi,1983). In a well-knownargument, Piven and spond to the needs of the disadvantagedwhen political Cloward(1993) identifywelfare systems as secondaryin- partiesare more evenlymatched and, hence,forced to stitutionsthat functionto meet the broader needs of contendwith one anotherby mobilizingand swaying statesand markets.When hardeconomic times combine voters.Early analyses cast some doubt on thisargument withcivil unrest, relief is readilyextended to mollifythe (Dawson and Robinson1963; Boyne 1985). But timehas poor and maintainlegitimacy for the state.Under stron- been kind to Key'sthesis, as a numberof studieshave gereconomic conditions, access to publicaid is restricted suggestedthat stateswith more competitiveelections in orderto push potentialworkers toward available jobs, tend to produce more liberalsocial policies (Brace and therebyeasing the pressures that tight labor markets exert Jewett1995; Holbrook and Van Dunk 1993). on employers.Given the strongnational economy in the The second featureof the electoralsystem that may late 1990s and the relativescarcity of civilunrest, Piven shape statepolicy choices is the degree to which low- and Cloward'sthesis suggests that states with tighter labor income votersgo to the polls. All else equal, stronger marketsshould be morelikely to enforcework and limit accessto welfarebenefits. In stateswhere the numberof activejob-seekers is small relativeto the numberof job 8Fortwo reasons, we arepersuaded that this measure taps a general orientationtoward welfare innovation and notjust eagernessto openings,employers are likely to desirean expandedlabor "gettough." First, early requests to experimentunder the AFDC pool and policymakersare likelyto see more reasonsto programencompassed a widevariety of different policies, not just makerecipients work. Accordingly, our labor-markethy- restrictiveinitiatives. Second, to testthe validity of thismeasure, we examinedits relationship to Gray's(1973) classicindexes of lib- pothesispredicts that states with lower unemployment eralpolicy innovation during the first half of thetwentieth cen- rateswill adopt more restrictiveTANF policies-espe- tury.Our measureof policy innovation under AFDC has a signifi- ciallyin thearea ofwork requirements.9 cantpositive correlation with Gray's measure of overallpolicy innovation(r = .36,p = .01) and withGray's measure of welfare policyinnovation (r = .37,p = .01). The innovatorsearly in the 9Asan alternativeto theofficial unemployment rate (based on ac- century(as measuredby Gray) were more likely to be theinnova- tivejob seekers),one mightuse thecivilian labor force participa- torsin thelast quarter of thecentury (as measuredby the year of tionrate (which includes discouraged workers) to measurelabor theirfirst waiver request). Consequently, we concludethat our marketconditions. For two reasons, we believethe official unem- measuretaps a generalorientation toward welfare innovation that ploymentrate is moreappropriate for a testof thesocial control is somewhatstable over time at thestate level. hypothesis.First, because the official unemployment rate is more
This content downloaded from 146.95.253.17 on Tue, 8 Oct 2013 20:46:24 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 384 JOE SOSS, SANFORD F. SCHRAM, THOMAS P. VARTANIAN, AND ERIN O'BRIEN
Beyond labor markets,social-control theory also forcewelfare recipients to participatein directiveand su- suggeststhat TANF policy choices may reflectgeneral pervisorywork programs. orientationstoward the use of formalmechanisms to en- forcesocial order. Political communities combat disorder Race and Ethnicity througha mixof informalcontrols in families,neighbor- hoods, and communitiesand formalcontrols deployed Welfarepolitics in the U.S. has alwayshad deep rootsin by the state(Rose and Clear 1998). Greaterreliance on race relations.In debatesover the Social SecurityAct of stronginstitutional tools such as incarcerationis gener- 1935, southernmembers of Congressmanaged to ex- allyviewed as an indicatorof more political will to "crack clude domesticand agriculturalworkers from social in- down" on marginalor deviant social groups (Hunter surancecoverage, effectively channeling people of color 1985;Jacobs and Helms 1996;Rose and Clear 1998). Im- into public assistanceprograms controlled at the state prisonmentis an especiallyimportant state instrument level (Brown 1999; Lieberman1998). Many scholarsar- for controlling the poor (Reiman 1998), and as gue thatstate administration of theseprograms contin- Ehrenreichhas argued,"if there is anyhandy measure of ued to be shaped by race fromthe 1930s to the 1990s, a government'srepressiveness, it is theproportion of its and thatprograms associated with nonwhite clients are citizenrywho are incarcerated"(1997, 14). morelikely to be saddledwith popular hostility and pu- Indeed, researchsuggests that differences in incar- nitiverules (Quadagno 1994). Two streamsof literature cerationrates over time can be tracedto thepolitical ori- lend credenceto thisargument. First, state-level research entationsof public officials (Jacobs and Helms 1996) and offersa small but fairlyconsistent body of evidence thatthe use of criminalsystems to combatsocial prob- pointingto a linkbetween race and welfaregenerosity. lemsrepresents a preferencefor get-tough approaches to Studies in the 1970s showed that,all else equal, AFDC communitypolicy (Goetz 1996). Duringthe 1990s,state benefitswere significantly lower in stateswhere black re- officialsthroughout the U.S. passed stifferpenalties for cipientsmade up a higherpercentage of the caseload criminalbehaviors, increased funding for prison con- (Orr 1976; Wright1976). Similarly,Howard (1999) re- structionand maintenance,and imposed tough new ports thatstates with larger black populations offered work requirementson prisoners(Parenti 1999; Lafer significantlylower AFDC benefitsas recentlyas 1990. 1999). Between 1990 and 1996, the yearsimmediately A secondlink between race and welfarecan be found precedingthe enactmentof PRWORA, incarceration in individual-levelresearch on publicopinion. Although ratessoared throughout the nation (especially among the the theoreticaldebates in thisfield remain heated, most poor), but the rateof thisincrease varied considerably observersagree that racial attitudes have some significant acrossthe states (Lynch and Sabol 1997).10Following the impacton whiteAmericans' orientations toward welfare view thatincarceration rates indicate state dispositions policy (Sears,Sidanius, and Bobo 2000). Broad feelings towardtough formal regulatory mechanisms, our state- of racial resentmentare strongpredictors of whiteatti- controlhypothesis predicts that states with larger increases tudestoward public assistance policy (Kinder and Sand- in incarcerationfrom 1990 to 1996 will make more re- ers 1996) and so are narrowerbeliefs in anti-blackstereo- strictiveTANF policy choices. Such a dispositionmay types(Gilens 1999). Media storiestend to overrepresent promotetougher TANF policies in general,but we would black people in storiesabout poverty;white Americans expectthis factor to be especiallyrelevant for decisions to tendto overestimatethe percentage of welfarerecipients who are black; and partlyas a result,racial stereotypes providea keyfoundation for white Americans' attitudes widelyused as an indicatorof labor market conditions, it is thein- towardwelfare policies (Gilens 1999). Thus,at the indi- dicatormost likely to influencestate policy choices. Second, from vidual level,racial identityand welfarepolitics remain thestandpoint of employers, the tightness of a labormarket is de- finedby the number of people who are actively seeking jobs. Addi- deeplyintertwined. tionalgroups included in thecivilian labor force participation (for All of thisevidence suggests race mayplay a keyrole example,the non-institutionalized elderly population) make this in shapingstate policy choices underthe TANF system. measurea distortedgauge of thereal conditionsconfronted by Most researchfocuses on AfricanAmericans as employers.Thus, while civilian labor force participation is a better existing measureof howmany people are notworking, the official unem- thegroup most likely to be targetedby anti-welfare senti- ploymentrate offers a betterindicator of thelikelihood that em- mentand lessgenerous welfare policies.1l Some observers, ployersand legislatorswill believe that the labor market is tight. '0Between1990 and 1996,state incarceration rates increased by an averageof 44.9 percent.At thehigh end, the number of impris- "Consistentwith this emphasis, Gilens (1999) reportsthat when onedresidents in Texasrose by an astonishing164.5 percent; at the beliefsabout black people are comparedwith beliefs about other low end,the incarceration rate rose by only12.8 percentin Ver- ethnicminorities, negative stereotypes of African Americans are montand actuallyfell by 4.2 percentin Maine. farstronger predictors of opposition to welfare.
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however,have speculatedthat "as the country'sHispanic TABLE I State PolicyChoices Analyzedas a populationcontinues to grow,attitudes toward welfare Single Dimension and povertymay become as stronglyassociated with per- ceptionsof Hispanicsas theyare nowwith perceptions of StringentPolicy Outcomes blacks" (Gilens 1999, 71). Consequently,we investigate Coeff. S.E. two variantsof our racial-disparityhypothesis. The first UnmarriedBirth Rate -.034 .090 predictsthat tougher TANF policies will be adopted in Caseload-to-PopulationRatio -.265 .334 stateswhere African Americans made up a higherper- GovernmentIdeology -.027** .013 centageof theAFDC caseload in 1996. The second pre- Inter-partyCompetition -.951 1.795 Low-IncomeVoter Turnout -7.216 7.121 dictsthat tougher TANF policies will be adoptedin states UnemploymentRate -.336 .386 whereLatinos made up a higherpercentage of theAFDC Change in IncarcerationRate .003 .014 caseloadin 1996.Given the diversity of ways in whichrace PercentLatino .039 .026 has becomeentangled with perceptions of welfare (Gilens PercentAfrican-American .043*** .017 1999;Quadagno 1994),we would expectto findracial ef- WelfareInnovation -.023 .052 fectsin all fourof our policydomains. Intercept1 -10.561 6.237 Intercept2 -8.739 6.148 Intercept3 -7.562 6.117 Intercept4 -6.289 6.130
EmpiricalAnalysis OverallModel LR x2 (1Odf) = 22.02 p = .015 N = 49 We beginour analysisby treating TANF policychoices as PRE = .09 indicatorsof a singleunderlying construct, welfare strin- gency,and measuringthis construct with an additivein- Methodof Analysis OrderedLogit dex.12The ordered-logitanalysis presented in Table 1 as- *p<.05, **p<.025, ***p<.01 sumesthat the political forces shaping choices in each of Notes:The significancetest for caseload-to-population ratio is two-tailed; our fourpolicy areas share a common structureand, significancetests for all othercoefficients are one-tailed.PRE (propor- hence,that we can use a singleequation to ascertainwhat tionalreduction in error) is based on classificationofconcordant and factorsencouraged states to adopt an overallpackage of discordantpairs. All analyses were performed inSTATA 6.0. stringentpolicies. The chi-squaretest for this analysis in- dicatesthat our tenvariables do a significantlybetter job signalsthat bolster this expectation and suggestthat these of explainingthe overallpattern of policychoices than four policy choices do not reflecta single underlying would a null model in whichthese variables are assumed policy shift.Analyzing our additive index of policy to have no explanatorypower. Turning to the resultsfor choices,we findthat the median state adopted only one of individualcoefficients, we see a relativelysimple story thesefour policies and thatonly five states adopted all groundedin race and ideology.States were significantly fourpolicies. In addition,a factoranalysis of the four con- more likelyto make restrictiveTANF policy choices if stituentvariables yields a solutionwith two factors rather they had conservativegovernments and if African than one.13Finally, it is worthnoting that the analysis Americansmade up a higherpercentage of theirAFDC shownin Table 1 yieldsonly a modestproportionate re- recipients.None of the othercoefficient estimates reach ductionin error(PRE) of .09. Forall thesereasons, we see conventionallevels of statisticalsignificance. good cause to be skepticalthat an analysisof a singleor- These preliminaryresults suggest that we can draw dereddimension can adequatelyilluminate the political some insightinto the politicsof welfarepolicy from an underpinningsof TANFpolicy choices. analysisof what factors led statesto movetoward a more Table 2 presentsresults for separate analyses of each or less restrictivepackage of TANF policies.As we noted of our fourpolicies. The overallpattern of resultsindi- earlier,however, the policies grouped together in Table 1 cates thatour hypotheseshave a significantamount of expresssomewhat distinctive political motives and, hence, explanatorypower. The significantchi-square tests for all mayactually be influencedby differentconfigurations of fourmodels suggest that, in each of thepolicy domains, politicalforces. In exploringthe data,we findempirical stringentpolicy choices are systematicallyrelated to
12 The indexis coded0-4. Statesreceived one pointfor adopting a '3Basedon a principalcomponents analysis, the loadings for the familycap, one for adoptinga time limit shorterthan sixty firstfactor are .61 fortime limits and .62 forthe family cap; the months,one for adopting a work requirementshorter than loadingsfor the second factor are .83 forwork requirements and twenty-fourmonths, and one foradopting strong sanctions. This .80 forstrong sanctions. Details regarding this analysis are avail- indexyields a modestChronbach's alpha of .60. ablefrom the authors.
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TABLE 2 State PolicyChoices Analyzedas SeparateDimensions: Sanctions, Time Limits, WorkRequirements, and FamilyCaps
StricterWork DependentVariable: Strengthof Sanctions Requirements StricterTime Limits FamilyCap Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. UnmarriedBirth Rate .188* .109 .040 .124 -.036 .108 -.090 .117 Caseload-to-PopulationRatio -1.319*** .447 .087 .367 -.274 .372 .016 .402 GovernmentIdeology -.055*** .019 -.022 .017 -.008 .018 -.015 .018 Inter-partyCompetition -5.441*** 2.358 -.617 2.315 -1.237 2.229 -.314 2.401 Low-IncomeVoter Turnout -10.094 9.750 -2.975 10.447 -11.571 9.865 -12.453 10.150 UnemploymentRate .333 .452 -1.048* .571 .061 .501 -.854 .655 Changein Incarceration Rate .010 .017 .051* .028 .039 .029 -.035 .021 PercentLatino -.019 .029 -.006 .034 .071** .034 .087** .043 PercentAfrican-American .039** .018 -.017 .022 .049*** .021 .072*** .025 WelfareInnovation -.202*** .073 -.078 .067 .070 .068 .023 .071 Intercept1 -26.026 9.069 11.848 9.003 -2.454 8.200 9.199 8.203 Intercept2 -22.521 8.788 - - - - -
OverallModel LRx2 (1Odf) - 39.75 LRx2 (lOdf) - 21.10 LRx2 (1Odf) - 19.23 LRx2 (lOdf) - 20.13 p=.001 p=.020 p=.036 p= .028 N = 49 N = 49 N = 49 N = 49 PRE = .46 PRE = .63 PRE = .30 PRE = .50 Methodof Analysis OrderedLogit BinaryLogit BinaryLogit BinaryLogit
*p<.05, **p<.025, ***p<.Ol Notes:The significancetest for caseload-to-population ratio is two-tailed;significance tests for all othercoefficients are one-tailed.PRE (proportional reductionin error)estimates are based on classificationof concordant and discordantpairs. All analyses were performed in STATA 6.0.
state-levelcharacteristics. Examining the PRE statistics, Turningto testsof our individualhypotheses, we see we see that,relative to the model based on our additive some strikingpatterns. To begin with,family caps and policyscale, these separate models explain a greaterpro- stricttime limits (policy choices that loaded togetherin portionof policyvariation: .46, .63, .30, and .50, respec- our factoranalysis) emerge here as outcomesthat seem to tively.Taking the results for these four models as a group, arisefrom virtually identical processes: both appear to be we findthat nine of our ten independentvariables yield a directfunction of race.All else equal, familycaps and statisticallysignificant results in at leastone equation.In stricttime limits were significantly more likely in onlytwo addition,it is worthnoting that the resultspresented in kindsof states:those with a higherpercentage of African Table 2 proveto be robustacross a wide rangeof model Americansin theirAFDC caseloadsand thosewith higher specifications.14 percentagesof Latinos in theirAFDC caseloads. Our analysisof work requirements offers parallel results in the 14To testthe robustness of our findings, we employeda numberof sensethat it points to a smallnumber of determiningfac- alternativemeasures for our independent variables and introduced tors.In thisdomain, however, the driving forces are those supplementalcontrols into our models. Our tests for supplemental controlsincluded (1) usingper capita personal income to control relatedto our social-controlhypotheses. States with larger forstate economic conditions, (2) usingAFDC benefitlevels as a increasesin incarcerationfrom 1990 to 1996were signifi- measureof stategenerosity, (3) usingthe proportion of adjacent cantlymore likely to adopt strictwork requirements, as statesadopting a givenpolicy to capturethe effects of interstate competition,and (4) usinga dummyvariable to indicatethe more werestates with tighter labor markets. conservativepolitical culture and lowerlevels of supportfor pub- Finally,in the resultsfor sanction policy, we finda lic aid foundin southernstates. The firstthree of these four vari- more complex set of relationships.Here again, we see ables were not significantlyrelated to any of the statepolicy evidenceof racialeffects. All else equal, stateswith larger choicesconsidered in ouranalysis. The dummyvariable for south- ernstates achieved statistical significance only once, in themodel numbersof AfricanAmericans in theirAFDC caseloads predictingwork requirements. In all cases,introduction of these weresignificantly more likely to adopt strictersanctions. supplementalcontrols produced no discernibledifference in the We also findevidence that strict sanction policies were resultsfor other variables reported here. Our testsof alternative measuresfor independent variables are described in footnotesthat significantlymore likely in stateswith conservative gov- follow. ernments,states with less vigorousparty competition,
This content downloaded from 146.95.253.17 on Tue, 8 Oct 2013 20:46:24 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions SETTING THE TERMS OF RELIEF 387 stateswith higher unmarried birth rates, states that en- risesfrom low to high,the probability of a stateadopting gagedin policyinnovation by making earlier requests for all fourpolicies rises from .03 to .19. The effectsof con- AFDC waivers,and statesthat maintained smaller AFDC servativeideology appear to be comparablebut slightly caseloads. more modest,lifting the probabilitythat a stategovern- Because logitcoefficients do not providea familiar mentwill adopt all fourpolicies from .04 to .13. Standing metricfor interpretation (Kritzer 1996), it is helpfulto out among our collectionof ten predictors,racial com- extendthe analysis presented in Table2 byemploying in- position has a substantialimpact on threeof the four terpretiveprocedures developed by King, Tomz, and policychoices analyzed here. As theblack percentageof Wittenberg(2000). The Clarifyprogram developed by recipientsrises fromlow to high, the probabilityof King,Tomz, and Wittenbergmakes it possibleto predict strongsanctions increases from .05 to .27, theprobability the probabilityof an outcome under specifiedcondi- of stricttime limits shifts from .14 to .66, and the prob- tions,estimate shifts in the probabilityof an outcome abilityof a familycap climbsfrom .09 to .75. The esti- when thevalue foran independentvariable is changed, mated effectsof having more Latinos on the rolls are and obtain standarderrors for these shifts in probabil- similarlylarge, lifting the probability of stricttime limits ity.15Table 3 reportsestimated changes in predicted from.22 to .61 and boostingthe probabilityof a family probabilitiesobtained by fixingall variables at their cap from.19 to .63. means and thenshifting the value of a singlepredictor Effectsassociated with our two social controlmea- fromone standarddeviation below its mean to one stan- suresare concentratedin the area of workrequirement dard deviationabove itsmean (forease of style,we refer policy,but are estimatedto be quite large.With all inde- to thesevalues as "low" and "high").16 pendentvariables set at theirmeans, the estimated prob- The firstthing worth noting about Table 3 is thatthe abilityof a stateadopting strict work requirements is .54. confidenceintervals around our estimatedshifts in prob- All else equal,as theamount of increasein a state'sincar- abilityconfirm the significantrelationships shown in cerationrate rises from low to high,the probabilityof a Table 2 but are generallyquite large.This resultis not stateadopting work requirements climbs from .27 to .78. surprisinggiven the small number of cases in our analy- Similarly,as the unemploymentrate fallsfrom high to sis; it simplyunderscores that while we can have a rea- low, tighteninglabor marketsalong the way,the prob- sonabledegree of confidencein the existenceand direc- abilitythat states will adopt work requirements increases tion of the relationshipswe have found, we are less from.29 to .77. It is worthnoting that the 95 percent certainabout theprecise magnitude of effects.With this confidenceintervals for these estimated shifts of .51 and caveat in mind,the changesin probabilityreported in .48 includezero. Our simulationof first differences, how- Table 3 shouldbe viewedas informative"ballpark" esti- ever,confirms the one-tailedsignificance tests shown in matesof effects-imprecise,but the best we can derive Table 2. Based on one thousandsimulations, a shiftfrom froma cross-sectionalanalysis of forty-ninestates. highto low in theunemployment rate has a 95.4 percent Considerthe effects of racial composition, beginning probabilityof producinga positivechange in the likeli- withthe low-probabilityevent that a statewould adopt hood thata statewill adopt work requirements. Similarly, all fourstrict policies (.07 withall variablesset at their a positivechange was observedin 96.3 percentof the means).All else equal,as theblack percentage of therolls simulationsin whichthe incarcerationrate was shifted fromlow to high. Finally,the lowerhalf of Table 3 presentsestimated "5Weused Monte Carlo analysis to simulatesampling distributions effectsfor the five factors that, in additionto race,have a of coefficientestimates based on our originalforty-nine observa- significantimpact on the likelihood that a state will tions(M = 1000).We thenused thesesimulated distributions to estimatethe predicted probability of observingthe strictest out- adopt a strongsanction policy. As a state'scaseload level come in each policydomain (a valueof 1 forour threedichoto- underthe old AFDC programrises from low to high,its mousoutcomes, 3 forsanction policy, and 4 forour general index estimatedprobability of imposing strong sanctions drops of policyseverity). Finally, for each significant coefficient, we esti- matedoutcome probabilities at specifiedvalues of theindepen- from.43 to .03.17By contrast, as a state'sunmarried birth dentvariable, first differences, and theirconfidence intervals (for a raterises from low to high,the probabilityof adopting fulldiscussion of the method,see King,Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000). 17Asan alternativemeasure for our dependency and continuityhy- 16Low-incomevoter turnout has no entryin Table3 becauseit did potheses,we replacedthe caseload-to-population ratio with the notreach statistical significance in anyof our five models. As alter- percentageof each state's recipients who had spentlonger than 24 nativespecifications, we also testedwhether turnout among low- monthson therolls. The twovariables are positively correlated (r incomevoters might interact with the effects of government ideol- = .63,p = .001),and substitutingone forthe other (or usinga fac- ogy or partycompetition. Neither of these interactionterms torscore based on bothvariables) yields no noteworthychanges in producedsignificant results in anyequation. theresults presented here.
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