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Rudolf Carnap, Logical Empiricist Synthese Librar Y RUDOLF CARNAP, LOGICAL EMPIRICIST SYNTHESE LIBRAR Y MONOGRAPHS ON EPISTEMOLOGY, LOGIC, METHODOLOGY, PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE, SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE AND OF KNOWLEDGE, AND ON THE MATHEMATHICAL METHODS OF SOCIAL AND BEHA VIORAL SCIENCES M anaging Editor: J AAKKO HINTIKKA, Academy of Finland and Stanford University Editors: ROBERT S. COHEN, Boston University DONALD DAVIDSON, Rockefeller University and Princeton University GABRIEL NUCHELMANS, University of Ley,den WESLEY C. SALMON, University of Arizona VOLUME 73 Photograph by Adya, 1962 RUDOLF CARNAP, LOGICAL EMPIRICIST M aterials and Perspectives Edited by JAAKKO HINTIKKA SPRINGER-SCIENCE+BUSINESS MEDIA, B.V. Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Main entry under title: Rudolf Carnap, logical empiricist. (Synthese library ; v. 73) Inc1udes bibliographies. CONTENTS: Homage to Rudolf Camap.-Hempel, C. G. Rudolf Camap, logical empiricist.-Wedberg, A. How Carnap built the world in 1928.-Eberle, R. A construction of quality c1asses improved upon the Aufbau. [etc.] 1. Carnap, Rudolf, 1891-1970--Addresses, essays, lectures. 1. Hintikka, Kaarlo Jaakko Juhani, 1929- B945.CI64R8 193 75-12709 ISBN 978-94-010-1809-8 ISBN 978-94-010-1807-4 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-94-010-1807-4 All Rights Reserved Copyright © 1975 by Springer Science+Business Media Oordrecht Originally published by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland Softcover reprint ofthe hardcover Ist edition 1975 No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, inc1uding photocopying, recording or by any informational storage and retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE IX ACKNOWLEDGMENTS XI HOMAGE TO RUDOLF CARNAP XIII CARL G. HEMPEL / Rudolf Camap, Logical Empiricist ANDERS WEDBERG / How Camap Built the World in 1928 15 ROLF A. EBERLE / A Construction of Quality Classes Improved upon the Aufbau 55 RUDOLF CARNAP / Observation Language and Theoretical Language 75 DAVID KAPLAN / Significance and Analyticity: A Comment on Some Recent Proposals of Camap 87 RYSZARD W6JCICKI / The Factual Content of Empirical Theories 95 P. M. WILLIAMS / On the Conservative Extensions of Semantical Systems: A Contribution to the Problem of Analyticity 123 JOHN A. WINNIE / Theoretical Analyticity 143 ANDERS WEDBERG / Decision and Belief in Science. Comments on Rudolf Camap's Views in 'Empiricism, Semantics, and On- tology' 161 HERBERT G. BOHNERT / Camap's Logicism 183 J AAKKO HINTIKKA / Camap's Heritage in Logical Semantics 217 BARBARA HALL PAR TEE / The Semantics of Belief-Sentences 243 VIII TABLE OF CONTENTS ASA KASHER / Pragmatic Representations and Language-Games: Beyond lntensions and Extensions 271 RUDOLF CARNAP / Notes on Probability and lnduction 293 RICHARD C. JEFFREY / Carnap's Inductive Logic 325 RISTO HILPINEN / Carnap's New System of lnductive Logic 333 THEO A. F. KUIPERS / A Generalization of Carnap's lnductive Logic 361 WILHELM K. ESSLER / Hintikka versus Carnap 365 JAAKKO HINTIKKA / Carnap and Essler versus lnductive Gener- alization 371 ABNER SHIMONY / Carnap on Entropy: lntroduction to 'Two Essays on Entropy' by Rudolf Carnap 381 INDEX OF NAMES 397 PREFACE There already exists an impressive survey and evahiation of Camap's thought in the form of the Library of Living Philosophers volume ded­ icated to him. This volume appeared in 1963, but most of the contribu­ tions to it were actually written in the early or middle fifties. So much has happened since in several fields close to Camap's interests - and so much happened in his own mind before his death - that it seems amply motivated to attempt to re-evaluate his philosophy and relate his thought to subsequent developments. The editor's belief in the continued rele­ vance of Camap's ideas has led him to emphasize strongly the latter aim of this volume. This conviction will therefore explain a feature of the present collection which might otherwise seem strange. Several of the papers below deal less with Camapian exegesis than with the later de­ velopments which Camap's work was instrumental in starting. It is my strong belief that these new theories and conceptualizations are the best proofs of the lasting importance of Camap's thought, and also that this recent work helps us to understand and to put into perspective Camap's philosophy even when it does not deal with it in so many words. This serves to explain the inclusion of such largely non-exegetical papers as those by Eberle, W6jcicki, Williams, Winnie, Hall Partee, and Kasher. Another consequence of my belief in the lasting relevance of Camap's thought is that 1 have not felt any obligation to approach it in terms different from those in which one would approach contemporary con­ tributions to philosophical discussion. Hence 1 have not tried to avoid even sharp criticism of Camap in those papers that deal directly with his ideas. How Camap reacted to such serious criticisms as came to his attention is beautifully shown by David Kaplan's reminiscences of his early encounter with Camap (reprinted below in 'Homage to Camap'). I do not think Camap would have felt differently about posthumous discussions and criticisms. In fact, the very criticisms of Camap that Kaplan mentions are those presented in his contribution to the present volume. This short paper x PREFACE has enjoyed a wide informal circulation and bas been discussed in the litera ture but has never before appeared in print. It is complemented here by the able papers by Wedberg, Bohnert, Jeffrey, and HiIpinen. An aspect of Carnap's work which has untiI now remained almost completely unknown is the work he did in the early fifties on entropy and on certain related notions. The bulk of this work is now being pub­ lished by the University of California Press. Professor Abner Shimony's contribution below places Carnap's work in this area firmly into an in­ teresting wider historical and systematic perspective. I feeI especially fortunate in being able to include in this volume Pro­ fessor Hempel's paper 'Rudolf Carnap, Logical Empiricist'. I do not think a better overall characterization of Carnap's thought is possible. It seems to me eminently appropriate to use its title as the heading for this whole volume. Having known Carnap personally, it seemed to me monstrous to edit a book on him without trying to convey some idea of him as a person. For this purpose, I have included in this volume the personal recollec­ tions and statements that were published under the title 'Homage to Carnap' shortly after his death. I hope that they do justice to this heading here, too. JAAKKO HINTIKKA ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The papers by Hempel, Wedberg ('How Carnap Built the World in 1928'), Williams, Hintikka ('Carnap's Heritage'), Jeffrey, Hilpinen, and Kuipers first appeared in the Carnap number of Synthese 25 (1972-73), No. 3--4. Professor Wedberg has revised his paper substantialIy; Hintikka has changed the title of his contribution, which originalIy had the title 'Carnap's Semantics in Retrospect'. Carnap's 'Notes on Probability and Induction' likewise appeared fust in the same number of Synthese. They were edited by Professor Arthur Benson, with the help of Professor Risto Hilpinen. Professor Benson has provided additional corrections for the present version. The 'Notes' re­ appear here with the permission of Mrs Hanneliese Carnap Thost, holder of alI the copyrights to this material. Carnap's 'Observation Language and Theoretical Language' is a translation of 'Beobachtungssprache und theoretische Sprache', Dia­ lectica 12 (1958), 236-248, by Professor Herbert Bohnert. It appears here with the kind permission of the Editor of Dialectica, Professor Henri Lauener, and of the Estate of Rudolf Carnap. I am grateful to Professor Bohnert for suggesting the inclusion of this useful but relatively in acces­ sible paper in this volume. The contributions by Eberle, Kaplan, W 6jcicki, Bohnert, and Kasher appear here for the fust time. Professor Bohnert's paper has grown out of his paper at the 1971 International Congress of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science in Bucharest. A summary of that earlier paper appeared in the Abstracts of the Bucharest Congress. The notes by Essler and Hintikka ('Carnap and Essler versus Inductive Generalization') first appeared in Erkenntnis 9 (1975). They appear here with the permission of the Editor of Erkenntnis, Dr. Wilhelm Essler. The 'Homage to Carnap' and the paper by John A. Winnie, 'Theo­ retical Analyticity' first appeared in Roger C. Buck and Robert S. Cohen (eds.), PSA 1970 in Honor of Rudolf Carnap: Proceedings of the 1970 Biennial M eeting of the Philosophy of Science Association (Boston Studies XII ACKNOWLEDGMENTS in the Philosophy ofScience), D. Reidel Publ. Co., Dordrecht and Boston, 1971, pp. xiii-Ixviii and pp. 289-305. They appear here with the pennis­ sion of the editors of Boston Studies. Anders Wedberg, 'Decision and Belief in Science' appeared in the Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 1 (1964) 139-158. It appears here with the pennission of Professor Wedberg - and with a number of corrections and changes he has made in it for the present printing. Barbara Hall Partee, 'The Semantics of Belief-Sentences' appeared in Hintikka, Moravcsik, and Suppes (eds.), Approaches to Natural Language (Synthese Library), D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht and Boston, 1973, pp. 309-336. It appears here with the pennission of the author and of the editors. Abner Shimony's paper reprinted here is his Introduction to Two Es­ says on Entropy by Rudolf Carnap, edited by himself, the University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1976. All the pennissions are gratefully acknowledged. HOMAGE TO RUDOLF CARNAP At the Boston meeting, October 23rd, 1970, Adolf Grtinbaum, President of the Philosophy of Science Association, introduced the Carnap Memo­ rial meeting. We are assembled here to pay tribute to Rudolf Carnap because his work made an immense contribution to 20th century philosophy of science.
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