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Niger), March 2017 Going Further NUMBER 6 MIGREUROP FIRST EDITION BRIEF OIM TRANSIT CENTRE, AgaDEZ (NIGEr), MARCH 2017 Going further PUBLISHED BY MIGREUROP, OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS: OUR MEMBERS AND PARTNERS: European Commission, ARCI, Steps in the process of externalisation of border controls to A European Agenda on Migration, 13/05/2015 Africa, from the Valletta Summit to today, June 2016 goo.gl/vSrC3R goo.gl/uPj7Nz Council of the EU, “Valletta Summit on migration”, Oriol Puig, « Níger: La nueva frontera europea », El País, 5/09/2016 goo.gl/wQ9THA (in Spanish) November 2015 goo.gl/Hx2knE Sara Prestianni, « Parola d’ordine esternalizzare: soldi europei agli Sta- ti africani per fermare il flusso dei migranti », La Stampa, 24/05/2017 European External Action Service, « Common Security goo.gl/eEKjcj (in Italian) and Defence Policy: Mission civile EUCAP Sahel Niger », Andrea De Georgio, « Sequestrati e rapinati dalla polizia del Niger, April 2016 per noi il vero incubo è tornare a casa », La Stampa, 24/05/2017 goo.gl/UMHsK8 goo.gl/5WRktH (in Italian) ECOWAS, Protocol LA/P.1/5/79 relating to Free movement Andrea De Goergio, Sara Prestianni, « Au Niger et au Mali, of persons, residence and establishment, 29/05/1979 avec les migrants de retour de Libye », Mediapart, 25/05/2017 goo.gl/hcZ1Xg goo.gl/ixWHL9 (in Italian) GISTI, « L’Europe et ses voisins : marchandages migratoires », OCTOBER 2017 Plein droit n°114, octobre 2017 goo.gl/AbLV4G (in French) On 10 October 2016, Niamey welcomed IN THE MEDIA: German Chancellor Angela Merkel with pomp and AgaDEZ (NIGEr), MARCH 2017 ceremony. She made no secret of the fact that “se- « Le désert nigérien, l’autre tombeau des migrants africains », curity” and “immigration” were her two main con- Niger: interference Libération, 18/06/2015 goo.gl/wjvM9Q (in French) Migreurop is a network of organisations, activists and researchers in twenty different cerns. Her purpose was to implement the endless- countries in Europe, Africa and the Middle East. Our goal is to publicize and denounce ly repeated “recommendations”: Niger, a “transit and neo-colonialism “EU strategy stems migrant flow from Niger, but at what cost?”, policies which marginalize, in particular through detention in camps, different forms Irin News, 2/02/2017 of deportation, border closures, as well as the externalization of migratory controls carried country” should receive support in order to play its goo.gl/hMoiVq out by the European Union and its member states. We contribute to defending the funda- part as migration filter. Programmes to “reinforce in the name of development « Agadez : Des élus locaux expriment leur ras le bol », mental rights of exiles (including the right to “leave any country, including his own”) local institutions” would make it possible to clearly Actu Niger, 21/03/2017 and to promoting the freedom of movement and settlement. goo.gl/yyYd9V (in French) distinguish between “refugees” – to be protected Sharing borders with Libya, Algeria, Mali, Burkina Faso, « Minniti : le nuove frontere italiane sono nel deserto », in situ – and “migrants” to be “escorted back” to Benin, Nigeria and Chad, Niger has long been a hub of multi-face- Il fatto quotidiano, 19/05/2017 www.migreurop.org their “countries of origin”. In other words, as the ted migration, with zones that have traditionally had high levels of goo.gl/9hJRKK (in Italian) French president recently said, Niger and its neigh- mobility (Niamey, Zinder, Agadez, Tahoua) – often circular – prima- Follow us on and @migreurop Mariangela Paone, « España lidera dos proyectos de control bours (Libya, Chad, etc.) should yield, allow their de fronteras financiados con fondos europeos de cooperación », rily within the sub-region (West and Central Africa) then, in some El diario, 24/05/2017 Migreurop country to become a territory of camps and accept cases on towards Libya and Algeria and, in rare instances, towards goo.gl/viXxfz (in Spanish) CICP — 21ter rue Voltaire 75011 Paris their role as hotspot (see Brief #4). The neo-colo- Europe, where the Nigerien diaspora remains small. Photos: Sara Prestianni nial underpinnings inherent in this view of Euro-Af- Graphic design: La société While the country was for many years eclipsed by ACADEMIC ARTICLES: rican relations has led the highly accommodating Dir. of publication : Emmanuel Blanchard neighbouring Libya – the EU’s special partner in Gaddafi’s era – Hamani, H. et Botianti, A. (2015) « Agadez, un nœud de la migration Niger authorities to remind us that the interests and very much on the periphery of migration control negotiations, internationale au Niger », Cahiers d’Outre-Mer n° 220 of their nationals and their national sovereignty goo.gl/kn7BNZ (in French) Niger is today at the core of European policy. This situation has deserve greater consideration. These intergovern- Berghezan, G. (2016) « Militaires occidentaux au Niger : With the support of : arisen, firstly, through a ricochet effect whereby Niger has taken in présence contestée, utilité à démontrer », Note d’analyse du GRIP mental negotiations are still ongoing, whereas in goo.gl/Kv1QbX (in French) Libya deals are struck directly with the heads of ill-treated African migrants sent back from Libya and, secondly as Boyer, F. et Mounkaïla, H. (2017) « Européanisation des politiques militias who are willing to play jailor, provided they it has become a key transit country following the closure of several migratoires au Sahel : le Niger dans l’imbroglio sécuritaire » (forthcoming, in French) can get their hands on the funds doled out to the routes (through Mauritania and Mali) due to sub-regional conflicts Ce projet a été soutenu par le Programme border guards of the European Union (EU). (the wars in Libya in 2011 and Mali in 2012 and terrorist attacks européen pour l’Intégration et la Migration (EPIM), une initiative collaborative du Réseau in the Sahel); as a result of these closures the people who would des Fondations européennes (NEF) normally travel along these routes have shifted across to Niger. continuation OF THE ARTICLE ON page 2 migreurop BRIEF 4 Niger: interference and neo-colonialism, in the name of development Failure foretold: transforming continuation OF THE ARTICLE OF page 1 the transit economy by force of arms Although the country has substantial natural resources (notably uranium), Niger is ranked as one of the poorest The Sahel is among the priority zones listed in countries on the planet. Considered as stable since 2011, despite the insecurity of the broader region, Niger represents the Trust Fund for Africa, which funds activities in many Niger has also made changes to its legislative framework an area that is easily accessible for the European Union, which already has a presence there and is extending its influence: countries throughout the sub-region. Nearly 140 million and policing practices. The law relating to the “illicit through the “Strategy for the security and development of the Sahel “ (2011), by means of a civil mission to support inter- euros (140M€) have been allocated to Niger through this trafficking of migrants”, adopted in 2015, criminalises nal security forces and the fight against terrorism and organised crime (EUCAP Sahel Niger, 2012), via a special partnership fund in order to “prevent irregular migration”, ensure “better transporting or providing shelter to migrants. The management of migration” (91.9M€) and “develop a global consequences of this reform include refoulements at the between the European Union and the Sahel G5, and sums allocated to Niger from the Trust Fund (see p.3) established at strategy for stability, security and resilience” (48M€, of border, drivers being arrested, so-called “facilitators of the Valleta Summit (Malta, November which 36M€ is for “border management and security”) – a illegal migration” being convicted and the dismantling of 2015). Campaign to raise awareness of how the paltry sum, especially in light of the six billion Euros the EU the “ghettos” where persons in transit find shelter. 2015 law on “the illicit tracking of migrants” LIBYA is applied, Niamey, June 2017 Through shape-shifting mul- Photo credit: Bachir Ayouba Tinni, June 2017 has pledged to give Turkey for the same purpose (see Brief Although migratory movements across the region ti-layer collaboration (political, finan- #5). have dipped only slightly since the entry into force of this cial and military) that incorporates all In concrete terms, 60 % of funds relating directly reform, the “transit economy” has changed radically. The ALGERIA Madama existing frameworks for cooperation to migration is intended for “keeping populations in their city of Agadez sees ever fewer gains from this circulation. (the Cotonou agreement, Rabat Pro- home countries,” stemming and controlling migration, and Those who benefit from the criminalisation of migration cess and Valleta, multi- and bi-lateral sending back migrants. Of the 140 M€, only 28 M€ goes are the traffickers and security forces. approaches) and a large number of directly to Niger (AJUSEN programme and PAIERA action The migrants themselves, driven underground, Dirkou actors (see box), the EU has – since plan). The rest is to be managed by six inter-governmental must circumvent the roads and wells most subject to Assamaka Arlit 2012 but especially since 2015 – or cooperation agencies (see box) and one local NGO. checks. At the border posts, they may be blackmailed by made Niger the lynchpin of its regio- Largely drawn from the budget normally devoted to law enforcement agents and “road blockers”. Now facing “development”, these forms of funding essentially align much greater risks, the numbers of those found dead in MALI NIGER nal approach, continuously providing Agadez with the EU’s own interests and make little contribution to the desert are on the rise. Meanwhile, the local population reinforcements in order to secure improving the lives of the local population. – deprived of income from the “transit economy” and the land borders of West Africa for Labézanga Andéramboukane its own benefit.
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