CHRISTIANS AND ROMAN IMPERIAL POLITICS THE CHANGING POSITION OF CHRISTIANS IN THE THIRD CENTURY A.D. LUKAS DE BLOIS* There is no evidence from before the second half of the second century A.D. of any serious, in-depth reflection among Christians on the Roman state and emperorship. They paid their taxes and did not participate in revolts, but no more. Christian communities were still very much governed by eschatological notions and tended to keep to themselves. Right from the start, already in the first generation of Christianity, some Christians thought that the Roman Empire was the katechon, the power that upheld the com- ing of the realm of the antichrist which was to precede the Second Coming of the Lord and the creation of a new earth. Many Christians interpreted a passage in a letter of St. Paul in this way.1 At the end of the first century A.D., after the first persecutions of Christians, some Christian authors began to consider the Roman Empire an evil state, an instrument of the Prince of Darkness.2 Christians did not fight in the armies and preferred not to be involved in local government because they did not want to kill people and were unwill- ing to take part in the imperial cult or the worship of Roman state gods; it was hardly possible to avoid such religious obligations in army camps and council chambers. In practice, this aloofness of the Christians was winked * L. de Blois is professor of Ancient History at the University of Nijmegen. Translations from ancient texts are borrowed from existing editions such as those in The Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass. etc.), Penguin Classics (Harmondsworth) and the series Fathers of the Church. 1 See St. Paul’s second letter to the Christian community in Thessalonica, 2: 3-8. Cf. Ire- naeus, Adversus Haereses, book 5, passim. He refers to the book Daniel, ch. 7, in the Old Testament. I owe thanks to Olivier J. Hekster, who brought this passage to my attention. 2 See P.W. van der Horst, ‘Het christendom in het Romeinse rijk in de eerste eeuw’, Hermeneus, 58 (1986), 2, p. 66. 106 L. DE BLOIS at; there were enough others who were willing to fight and perform admin- istrative duties.3 Towards the end of the second century A.D., however, things started to change. From A.D. 161, the Roman Empire had to wage onerous wars and from A.D. 166 epidemics were reducing the population.4 In 161, war broke out in the East and from 168 new strong enemies appeared at the Northern frontiers. The Roman Empire had to contend with troublesome wars within its own borders, from Pannonia and Noricum to Northern Italy and it had to cope with the inevitable consequences, such as foraging, plunder, devas- tation, famine and plague, which caused people to leave their homesteads and join roving bands of robbers, deserters and barbarians who had stayed behind when the army moved on. In 185, five years after the last major campaigns against the Marcomanni, Quadi and other tribes, war-stricken areas and adjoining regions were infested by wandering bands of deserters 3 See H. von Campenhausen, ‘Der Kriegsdienst der Christen in der Kirche des Alter- tums’, in Tradition und Leben: Kräfte der Kirchengeschichte, ed. idem a.o. (Tübingen, 1960), pp. 203 ff. Cf. K. Aland, ‘Das Verhältnis von Kirche und Staat in der Frühzeit’, Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt [= ANRW], II, 23, 1 (Berlin and New York, 1979), p. 226 ff.; p. 245 f.; L. de Blois and G.H. Kramer, Kerk en vrede in de oudheid (Kampen, 1986), pp. 22- 34; Van der Horst, ‘Het christendom in het Romeinse rijk’ (see n. 1), p. 64 f.; F. Unruh, Das Bild des Imperium Romanum im Spiegel der Literatur an der Wende vom 2. Zum 3. Jh. n. Chr. (Bonn, 1991), pp. 177-186, esp. p. 181. 4 On the so-called Third Century crisis in the Roman Empire and the preceding period of warfare which had started in 161, see G. Alföldy, Die Krise des Römischen Reiches – Geschichte, Geschichtsschreibung und Geschichtsbetrachtung: Ausgewählte Beiträge (Stuttgart, 1989), pp. 319-342 (= ‘The Crisis of the Third Century as Seen by Contem- poraries’, Greek Roman and Byzantine Studies, 15 (1974), pp. 89-111); B. Bleckmann, Die Reichskrise des III. Jahrhunderts in der spätantiken und byzantinischen Geschichtsschrei- bung: Untersuchungen zu den nachdionischen Quellen der Chronik des Johannes Zonaras (Munich, 1992); K. Strobel, Das Imperium Romanum im ‘3. Jahrhundert’ (Stuttgart, 1993); L. de Blois, ‘Emperor and Empire in the Works of Greek-Speaking Authors of the Third Century A.D., ANRW, II, 34, 4 (Berlin and New York, 1998), 3394-3404; P. Cosme, L’état romain entre éclatement et continuité: L’empire romain de 192 à 325 (Paris, 1998), pp. 29-174; J.-M. Carrié and A. Rousselle, L’empire romain en mutation: L’empire romain des Sévères à Constantin (Paris, 1999); Chr. Witschel, Krise-Rezession- Stagnation?: Der Westen des Römischen Reiches im 3. Jahrhundert n.Chr. (Frankfurt am Main, 1999). On the preceding decades, see A.R. Birley, Marcus Aurelius: A Biography (London, 19872); in German: idem, Mark Aurel (Munich, 1977); idem, The African Emperor, Septimius Severus (London, 19882). CHRISTIANS AND ROMAN IMPERIAL POLITICS 107 and bandits. Their leader, Maternus, even besieged the legio VIII Augusta in its camp at Strasbourg and then invaded and plundered Italy5. Unavoidable depopulation in border areas meant less production, smaller food surpluses, less tax income and a weakened logistical basis in the hin- terland of important armies. The plague, which raged all over the Empire from 166, must have diminished the population in many of its parts. The decline in population must have resulted in a more uneven distribution of people: more soldiers, fewer farmers. Marcus Aurelius had to replenish depleted legions and auxilia and created two new legiones Italicae. In his monography on this emperor, Anthony Birley describes his difficulties in finding recruits: Marcus had to enlist all kinds of people, even slaves.6 A sure sign that there were no longer men to be found who could be missed in agrarian and other economic activities. The situation slowly improved after 180 but from 193, after the violent death of the Emperor Commodus, recurring warfare and civil strife contin- ued to cause damage and put imperial finances and logistics under heavy strain. Septimius Severus eliminated his rivals, gained the throne, beat the Parthians and added the province of Mesopotamia to the Empire. At the end of his reign he successfully waged war in Britain. Septimius Severus created three more legions, the legiones Parthicae, he raised the soldiers’ pay from 300 to 450 denarii per annum and improved their bonus payments. From this point onwards soldiers were allowed to marry, they were paid extra allowances in cash and kind and were granted a plot of land in their own frontier region.7 These measures, added to an ambitious building pro- gramme which was to enhance the prestige of the new dynasty, cost Septimius Severus a great deal of money. He acquired a handsome war booty in his wars against Parthia, he confiscated goods of senators who had supported his 5 On Maternus and his army of bandits, see Herodian I, 10; Scriptores Historiae Augus- tae [= SHA], Commodus 16, 2; Niger 3, 4; Année Epigraphique [= AE] (1956), p. 90. See F. Grosso, La lotta politica al tempo di Commodo (Turin, 1964), p. 437 ff.; C.R. Whittaker, Herodian, I (London and Cambridge, Mass., 1969), p. 62 f., n. 1; G. Alföldy, ‘Bellum desertorum’, in Alföldy, Die Krise des Römischen Reiches (see n. 4), pp. 69-80 (first pub- lished in Bonner Jahrbücher, 171 (1971), pp. 367-376). 6 On the recruitment of new legions by Marcus Aurelius and the ensuing increase in expenditure, see A.R. Birley, Mark Aurel (see n. 4), p. 291 ff. 7 On the military reforms of Septimius Severus, see Cosme, L’état romain (see n. 4), p. 75 ff. 108 L. DE BLOIS rivals and raised tax income by adding a new province to the Empire but in spite of this he was compelled to tamper with the silver denarius. He did not have enough plate or tax income to maintain the existing weight and fine- ness of this coin denomination.8 Why did Septimius Severus take upon him- self the heavy burden of a 50% rise of the soldiers’ pay? He was a capable administrator and must have known the risks. Probably he had no choice. Recruits were already scarce and Severus had to make military service more attractive. This may have been a precondition of survival of the Empire, as Cassius Dio also declared. Some authors, like Duncan-Jones and Cosme, think that in this way Severus compensated his soldiers for the slow inflation which had taken place since the beginning of the second century A.D.9 Severus was succeeded by his son, Caracalla, who reigned from A.D. 211 until 217. He bought off the Alamans in order to concentrate his forces in the East, where he lost his life during a rather unsuccessful campaign against the Parthians. If we may interpret remarks and invectives of Cassius Dio and Herodian in a more neutral way, he continued his father’s policy of making military service more attractive by granting large donativa, thus depleting his treasuries even further, which forced him to find new ways to raise his income. According to Cassius Dio, a contemporary senator who wrote a his- tory of Rome in eighty books, Caracalla demanded many gold crowns from the communities in the Empire (Cassius Dio 77.9).