sec File No. 34819

IN THE (ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL)

BETWEEN: ELIZABETH BERNARD Appellant and

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA

and

PROFESSIONAL INSTITUTE OF THE OF CANADA

Respondents and

MICHAEL A. FEDER

Amicus Curiae and

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF , ATTORNEY GENERAL OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ALBERTA, PUBLIC SERVICE ALLIANCE OF CANADA, PRIVACY COMMISSIONER OF CANADA, CANADIAN ASSOCIATION OF COUNSEL TO EMPLOYERS, CANADIAN CIVIL LIBERTIES ASSOCIATION, CANADIAN CONSTITUTION FOUNDATION, ALBERTA FEDERATION OF LABOUR, and COALITION OF BRITISH COLUMBIA BUSINESSES AND MERIT CANADA

Interveners

FACTUM OF THE RESPONDENT PROFESSIONAL INSTITUTE OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE OF CANADA (Pursuant to Rule 42 of the Rules ofthe Supreme Court of Canada) SACK GOLDBLATT MITCHELL LLP SACK GOLDBLATT MITCHELL LLP 30 Metcalfe Street, Suite 500 30 Metcalfe Street, Suite 500 , ON KIP 5L4 Ottawa, ON KIP 5L4

Peter Engelmann Fiona J. Campbell Nadine Blum T: 6I3-235-5327 T: 613-235-5327 F: 613-235-3041 F: 613-235-3041 E: [email protected] E: [email protected] Agent for the Respondent, Professional Counsel for the Respondent, Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada Institute of the Public Service of Canada

ELIZABETH BERNARD P.O. Box 34051 Nepean, ON K2J 5B 1

Self-Represented Appellant

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA Department of Justice Bank of Canada Building - East Tower 234 Wellington Street, Room 1148 234 Wellington Street, Room 1212 Ottawa, ON KIA OR5 Ottawa, ON KIA OH8

Anne Turley Christopher M. Rupar T: 613- 94I-2351 T: 613-941-235I F: 613-954-1920 F: 613-954-I920 E: [email protected] E: [email protected]

Counsel for the Respondent, Agent for the Respondent, Attorney General of Canada Attorney General of Canada

McCARTHY TETRAULT BORDEN LADNER GERVAIS LLP Suite 1300, 777 Dunsmuir Street World Exchange Plaza Vancouver, BC V7Y 1K2 100 Queen Street, suite 1100 Ottawa, ON KIP 119

Michael A. Feder Nadia Effendi Angela M. Juba T: 6I3-237-5160 T: 604-643-5983 F: 613-230-8842 F: 604-622-5614 E: [email protected] E: [email protected]

Amicus Curiae Agent for the Amicus Curiae ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ONTARIO BURKE-ROBERTSON 720 Bay Street, 4th Floor 200 - 441 MacLaren Street Toronto, ON M5G 2Kl Ottawa, ON K2P 2H3

Robin K. Basu Robert E. Houston, Q.C. Rochelle Fox T: 613-706-0020 T: 416-326-4476 F: 613-235-4430 F: 416-326-4015 E: [email protected] E. [email protected]

Counsel for the Intervener, Agent for the Intervener, Attorney General of Ontario Attorney General of Ontario

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF BRITISH BURKE-ROBERTSON COLUMBIA 200 - 441 MacLaren Street 1301 865 Horby Street Ottawa, ON K2P 2H3 Vancouver, BC V6Z 203

Karen A. Horsman Robert E. Houston, Q.C. T: 604-660-3093 T: 613-706-0020 F: 604-660-3833 F: 613-235-4430 E: [email protected] E: [email protected]

Counsel for the Intervener, Agent for the Intervener, Attorney General of British Columbia Attorney General of British Columbia

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ALBERTA GOWLING LAFLEUR HENDERSON LLP Constitutional Law 2600 - 160 Elgin Street 4th Floor, Bowker Building Ottawa, ON KIP 1C3 9833-109 Street Edmonton, AB T5K 2E8

Roderick Wiltshire Brian A. Crane, Q.C. T: 780-422-7145 T: 613-233-1781 F: 780-425-0307 F: 613-563-9869 E: [email protected] E: [email protected]

Counsel for the Intervener, Agent for the Intervener, Attorney General of Alberta Attorney General of Alberta RAVEN, CAMERON, BALLANTYNE & YAZBECKLLP 1600 - 220 Laurier Ave West Ottawa, ON KIP 5Z9

Andrew Raven Andrew Astritis T: 613-567-2901 F: 613-567-2921 E: [email protected]

Counsel for the Intervener, Public Service Alliance of Canada

SUPREME ADVOCACY LLP 397 Gladstone Avenue, Suite 100 Ottawa, On K2P OY9

Eugene Meehan, Q.C. T: 613-695-8855 F: 613-695-8580 E: [email protected]

Counsel for the Intervener, Privacy Commissioner of Canada

MCLENNAN ROSS NORTON ROSE CANADA LLP West Chambers 1500-45 O'Connor Street 600 - 12220 Stony Plain Road NW Ottawa, ON KIP 1A4 Edmonton, AB T5N 3 Y4

Hugh J.D. McPhail, Q.C. Sally Gomery T: 780-482-9200 T: 613-780-8604 F: 780-482-9100 F: 613-230-5459 E: [email protected] E: [email protected]

Counsel for the Intervener, Canadian Agent for the Intervener, Canadian Association of Counsel to Employers Association of Counsel to Employers DEWART GLEASON LLP GOWLING LAFLEUR HENDERSON LLP 102-366 Adelaide Street W 2600 - 160 Elgin Street Toronto, ON M5V 1R9 Ottawa, ON KIP 1C3

Sean Dewart Guy Regimbald Tim Gleason T: 613-786-0197 T: 416-971-8000 F: 613-563-9869 F: 416-971-8001 E: [email protected] E: [email protected]

Counsel for the Intervener, Agent for the Intervener, Canadian Civil Liberties Association Canadian Civil Liberties Association

OSLER, HOSKIN & HARCOURT LLP OSLER, HOSKIN & HARCOURT LLP P.O. Box 50 340 Albert Street, Suite 1900 1 First Canadian Place Ottawa, ON KlR 7Y6 Toronto, ON M5Z 1B8

Mark A. Gelowitz Patricia J. Wilson Gerard J. Kennedy T: 613-235-7234 T: 416-862-4743 F: 613-235-2867 F: 416-862-6666 E: [email protected]

Counsel for the Intervener, Agent for the Intervener, Canadian Constitution Foundation Canadian Constitution Foundation

CHIVERS CARPENTER SACK GOLDBLATT MITCHELL LLP Suite 101, 10426-81 Ave. 30 Metcalfe Street, Suite 500 Edmonton, AB T6E 1X5 Ottawa, ON KIP 514

John Carpenter Raija Pulkkinen Kara O'Halloran T: 613-482-2455 T: 780-439-3611 F: 613-235-3041 F: 780-439-8543 E: [email protected] E: [email protected] E: [email protected]

Counsel for the Intervener, Agent for the Intervener Alberta Federation of Labour Alberta Federation of Labour HEENAN BLAIKIE LLP HEENAN BLAIKIE LLP 300 - 55 Metcalfe Street 300 - 55 Metcalfe Street Ottawa, ON KIP 6L5 Ottawa, ON KIP 6L5

Simon Ruel Perri Ravon Andrea L. Zwack T: 613-236-8071 T: 418-649-5491 F: 613-236-9632 F: 866-265-9976 E: [email protected] E: [email protected]

Counsel for the Intervener, Agent for the Intervener, Coalition of British Columbia Businesses Coalition of British Columbia Businesses and Merit Canada and Merit Canada INDEX PAGE NO.

PART I- OVERVIEW AND STATEMENT OF FACTS ...... 1

A. OVERVIEW ...... 1

B. FACTS ...... 2

1) Decisions Below ...... 2 Unfair Labour Practice Complaint at the Board ...... 2 Consent Order of the Board ...... 3 Judicial Review of the Consent Order at the FCA ("Bernard f') ...... 4 Board's Reconsideration Decision ("Board Decision") ...... 5 Judicial Review of the Board's Reconsideration Decision at the FCA ("Bernard If') ...... 8

2) Appellant's Attempt to Re-Introduce Evidence Not Before the Board ...... lO

PART II- RESPONDENT'S POSITIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE APPELLANT'S QUESTIONS ...... 10

PART III STATEMENT OF ARGUMENT ...... ll

A. THE BOARD'S DECISION SHOULD BE UPHELD AS REASONABLE ...... 11

1) The Standard of Review is Reasonableness ...... 11

2) The Board's Decision was Reasonable and in Any Event Correct ...... 15 a) Determination that Contact Information is a "Consistent Use" was Reasonable ...... 15 b) Determination that Disclosure of Contact Information is Required for the Institute to Meet it Statutory and Broader Representational Obligations ...... 18 c) Concerns About Abuse Speculative ...... 24 d) Adequacy of Union Access to the Workplace ...... 26 e) Conclusion on Reasonableness ...... 27

B. Charter Issues ...... 28

1) The Court Should Decline to Consider Charter Issues ...... 28

2) No Charter Infringement ...... 31 a) No Infringement of Freedom of Association ...... 31 b) No Unreasonable Search or Seizure contrary to section 8 of the Charter ...... 34 3) In the Further Alternative, Any Charter Infringement is Justified under s. 1 ...... 35 Pressing and Substantial Objective ...... 36 Rational Connection ...... 3 7 No Reasonable Alternative/Minimal Impairment...... 38 Proportionality ...... 38

PART IV- SUBMISSIONS CONCERNING COSTS ...... 39

PART V ORDERS SOUGHT ...... 39

PART VI- TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...... 40

PART VII- STATUTES, REGULATIONS, RULES, ETC ...... 44 FACTUM OF THE RESPONDENT, PROFESSIONAL INSTITUTE OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE OF CANADA

PART I- OVERVIEW AND STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. OVERVIEW 1. The Appellant has initiated this appeal of the Federal Court of Appeal's (the "FCA") decision, dated March 16, 2012, upholding a March 21, 2011 decision of the Public Service Labour Relations Board (the "Board"). In that decision, which was a reconsideration decision at the direction of the Federal Court of Appeal (February 8, 2010), the Board held that employee home addresses and phone numbers ("contact information") must be provided to a bargaining agent in order for it to be able to discharge its statutory obligations under the Public Service Labour Relations Act, S.C. 2003, c. 22, s. 2 ("PSLRA") and that the terms of a Consent Order, dated July 18,2008, with the addition of three amendments1 providing additional protection for privacy concerns, adequately protected the privacy interests of employees, and did not violate the Privacy Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. P-21. 2. The Respondent, the Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada (the "Institute"), submits that the Board's decision was both reasonable and correct, and that the appeal of the FCA's decision should be dismissed. 3. The Appellant also raises a number of arguments in relation to her rights under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, (the "Charter"), and this Court has stated two Constitutional Questions. The Appellant had attempted to argue Charter issues before the Board and the FCA, below, and at both levels was not allowed to do so on the basis that Charter issues did not form part of the reconsideration ordered by the Federal Court of Appeal. The Appellant has also raised the argument that disclosure of her contact information is a breach of her s. 8 Charter rights, which was never raised before the Board. As a result, there is no Charter record or issue before this Court. The Institute submits that the Court should not consider any of the Charter arguments the Appellant raises in this appeal, and should decline to answer its stated Constitutional Questions, for reasons discussed in detail below.

1 The Board ordered the Consent Order be amended to require the employer to encrypt or password protect the contact information it transmits to the bargaining agent, and to inform new employees that their contact information will be shared with the bargaining agent. It ordered the bargaining agent to appropriately dispose of contact information after it is replaced by current contact information. - 2 -

B. FACTS 4. The Institute is the certified bargaining agent for the Audit, Financial and Scientific ("AFS") Group at the ("CRA"), an agency of the federal . 2 5. The Appellant, Elizabeth Bernard, has been an employee of the CRA since 1991, which at that time was known as Revenue Canada-Taxation, and has been in the AFS bargaining unit, and represented by the Institute, since 1995. As is her legal right, the Appellant has chosen to not become a member of the Institute, although she is an employee within the bargaining unit represented by the Institute, and is required to pay dues to the Institute under what is commonly known as the "Rand formula." As such, the Institute has a statutory obligation to represent her. 3 6. This statutory representational obligation includes, inter alia, the duty to represent employees in collective bargaining, to file and adjudicate grievances, to represent or assist with workforce adjustments (layoffs), to prosecute complaints, to conduct strike votes and to conduct a final-offer vote.4

1) Decisions Below Unfair Labour Practice Complaint at the Board 7. In 2007, the Institute filed complaints against the and the CRA ("the Employer') under paragraphs 190(1 )(b) and (g) of the Public Service Labour Relations Act, S.C. 2003, c. 22, s. 2 ("the PSLRA"), alleging that the failure by both respondents to provide employee names, position titles, telephone numbers, and regular mail and email addresses was a violation of the duty to bargain in good faith under section 106 and an unfair labour practice under section 185. As well, these actions were alleged to constitute interference with the administration and representation of employees by the union, in violation of s. 186 of the PSLRA. The Institute also alleged that the employer's

2 Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada v. Canada Revenue Agency, 2011 PSLRB 34, at para. I [Board Decision].

3 Board Decision, paras. 3, 13 and Bernardv. Canada, 2010 FCA 40 (CanLII) at paras. 4-5 [Bernard lj.

4 Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada v. Treasury Board and Canada Revenue Agency, 2008 PSLRB 13 (CanLII) at para. 60 [PIPSC]. - 3-

failure to disclose the requested information represented a violation of sections 2( d) and (b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, including a claim that the union's capacity to effectively represent all employees in the bargaining unit is protected by s. 2(d) and that this was undermined without access to the requested information. 5 8. In its decision, the Board found that the Employer's failure to provide the Institute with "at least some of the contact information that it requested does comprise interference in the representation of employees by the complainant within the meaning of paragraph 186(1)(a) of the Act." It further directed the parties to begin consultations "with a view to determining whether they can reach a voluntary agreement regarding the contact information." This decision was never challenged by way of an application for judicial review. 6

Consent Order of the Board 9. The employer and the union subsequently reached an agreement with respect to the issue of contact information whereby the Employer would provide the Institute with contact information on a quarterly basis. 10. The employer and the union requested that the terms of that agreement be made an Order of the Board, which was subsequently done on July 18, 2008.7 11. While bargaining agents in the federal are not covered by any privacy legislation, in the Consent Order, the Institute agreed to be bound by the principles of the Privacy Act and regulations and the principles of the Government Security Policy. 8 12. Pursuant to that Order, the Institute agreed to the following terms, which were included to specifically address the privacy concerns of employees: 3. ensure that the disclosed information is used solely for the legitimate purposes of the 9 bargaining agent in accordance with the PSLRA ;

5 Bernard I, supra, at paras. 7, 20; PIPSC, supra, at para. 5; Board Decision, para. 10.

6 PIPSC, supra at paras. 67 and 82. The Board held (at para. 72) that given the finding in favour of the complainant under s. 186(1)(a) of the PSLRA, there was no need to consider the complainant's allegations respecting the Charter.

7 Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada v. Canada Revenue Agency, 2008 PSLRB 58 [Consent Order].

8 Board Decision, para 172. Note that the Government Security Policy was not introduced as an exhibit at the Board hearing. - 4 -

4. ensure that the disclosed information will be securely stored and protected;

5. respect the privacy rights of the employees in the bargaining unit;

6. acknowledge that the employer is bound by the Privacy Act ... it will keep private and confidential any such personal information disclosed by the employer to the bargaining agent under this Memorandum of Agreement;

7. for the sake of clarity, the bargaining agent shall among other things:

a. not disclose the personal information to anyone other than bargaining agent officials that are responsible for fulfilling the bargaining agent's legitimate obligations in accordance with the PSLRA;

b. not use, copy or compile the personal information for any purposes other than those for which it was provided under this agreement;

c. respect the principles of the Government Security Policy ... for the security and disposal of this personal information; and

d. ensure that all bargaining agent officials that have access to the disclosed information comply with all the provisions of this agreement;

8 .... will ensure vigilant management and monitoring controls on this information at all times in light of these potential risks to employees and their families ... 10

The parties also agreed to jointly inform all employees in the bargaining unit of the disclosure of the information in question, which was done by way of an email sent on October 16, 2008. 11

Judicial Review of the Consent Order at the FCA ("Bernard F') 13. On December 17, 2008, the Appellant filed an application for judicial review of the Board's Consent Order in the FCA, arguing that the Consent Order requires employers to violate the provisions of the Privacy Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-5 ("Privacy Act"), that the Board must

9 The first term was that the Institute would withdraw its complaint, and the second was the Institute agreed "this is a full and final settlement" of all claims in respect of home contact information for employees in the bargaining unit.

1° Consent Order, supra, at para. 6. Term 9 states that the bargaining agent will "recognize that the information provided from the employer's database in place at the time of disclosure was provided by employees and that the employer will not be held liable should a strike vote be challenged. The bargaining agent is responsible for updating its own database."

11 Consent Order, supra, at para. 5. - 5 -

defer to the Office of the Privacy Commissioner ("OPC") on privacy matters (which had issued a (non-binding) ruling in favour of the Appellant in 1992 when she complained that her employer had violated her privacy rights by disclosing her home address and social insurance number to her then union without her consent) and violated her constitutional right to freedom of association. 14. On February 8, 2010, the FCA issued its decisionY The Court noted that Ms. Bernard's arguments were "overly broad," since the Board had held that some contact information must be provided, and that decision had not been reviewed, and was not under review. The issue was confined to the "nature of the information to be provided and the circumstances under which it must be provided."13 The FCA allowed the judicial review, finding that the Board had erred in declining to exercise its jurisdiction by "simply adopting, without analysis [of the privacy issues] the agreement between the employers and the union." 14 As a result, the Court remitted the matter back to the Board for redetermination, with the remittance specifically limited to considering the "information which the employer must provide to the union in order to allow the latter to discharge its statutory obligations" under the PSLRA. 15

Board's Reconsideration Decision ("Board Decision'') 15. The Board's decision following the remittance from the FCA was released on March 21, 2011. The evidentiary record before the Board consisted of 14 exhibits filed, two of which the Board found to be inadmissible (1-2 and I-3). 16 16. The Board heard submissions of the parties, and correctly defined the issue to be decided in the reconsideration as follows:

12 Bernard I, supra.

13 At para. 25.

14 At para. 40.

15 Bernard I, supra at paras. I, 24, 25, 40, 42 and 46.

16 Board Decision, at para. 60. - 6 -

As directed by the FCA, what changes, if any, are required to the terms of the consent order in the Board's July 18, 2008 decision (2008 PSLRB 58) to address the privacy rights of employees?17

17. The Appellant attempted to argue before the Board that the disclosure of her personal information violated her "freedom not to associate" under the Charter. The Vice-Chair ruled that her Charter argument would not be considered in the reconsideration as this issue did not fall within the scope of the FCA's direction. 18 18. The Board carefully considered the issue of what information must be provided to a bargaining agent in order for the bargaining agent to be able to discharge its statutory obligations under the PSLRA, taking into consideration the privacy interests of employees who are not members of the union. A number of parties participated in this hearing, including the Appellant, the Respondents, Treasury Board, other Federal Agencies, other Federal Bargaining Agents, and the OPC. 19 19. In its decision, the Board emphasized the extent to which "it is not appropriate for a bargaining agent to use employer facilities (including telephones and email) for its business," and that the "ability of a bargaining agent to communicate with employees at the workplace is clearly constrained," particularly as communications from bargaining agents must be vetted and approved by the employer before posting, and there is no expectation of privacy in electronic communications in the workplace. As a result, the Board held that "work contact information is not sufficient to allow a bargaining agent to meet its obligations to represent all employees in the bargaining unit" and that a bargaining agent must be able to communicate directly with each employee it represents, in a private and unfiltered way, in order to fulfill its duty of fair representation?0 In this regard, the Board held that the bargaining agent is not part of the public but is more akin to the employer as part of a three-way employment relationship?'

17 Board Decision, at para. 7.

18 Board Decision, at para. 9.

19 Board Decision, at paras. 158-160.

20 Board Decision, at para. 162, 167- 168.

21 Board Decision, at para. 165. - 7 -

20. The Board found that employees provide contact information to their employers for the purpose of being contacted about their terms and conditions of employment and this purpose was consistent with the Institute's intended use of the contact information in this case. As such, the Board concluded the disclosure of contact information is permitted by paragraph 8(2)(a) of the Privacy Act. 22 21. Turning to the specific terms of the Consent Order, the Board found that with the addition of three amendments, described below, the privacy interests of employees were adequately protected. In particular, the Board noted the following privacy protections contained in the original Consent Order: • The Institute has agreed to be bound by the principles of the Privacy Act and the Government Security Policy; • Contact information can only be used for legitimate obligations pursuant to the PSLRA and for no other purposes; and • The Institute shall not disclose the information to anyone other than those officials responsible for fulfilling its obligations.23 22. While many of the Appellant's arguments concerned the potential abuse of disclosed information, the Board held that PIPSC had undertaken to protect the information it received from the employer and found that "abuse cannot be presumed." It also noted that the Institute has as much of an interest as the employer in protecting the information and has agreed to be bound by privacy principles, which should prevent any abuse. The Board held that in the unlikely event of abuse, employees have recourse under the Privacy Act.24 23. The Board found that the manner in which contact information was provided to the Institute by the Employer constituted an unacceptable risk factor. It also held that there was a legitimate concern regarding the proper disposal of expired contact information. Accordingly, it ordered the Consent Order be amended to require the employer to encrypt or password protect the contact information it transmits to the bargaining agent, and to inform new employees that their contact information will be shared with the bargaining

22 Board Decision, at paras. 168-169.

23 Board Decision, at paras. 172-175.

24 Board Decision, at para. 174. - 8 -

agent. It ordered the bargaining agent to appropriately dispose of contact information after it is replaced by current contact information.25

Judicial Review of the Board's Reconsideration Decision at the FCA ("Bernard IF') 24. The Appellant brought an application for judicial review to the FCA to set aside the Board's March 21, 2011 decision. On March 16, 2012, the FCA released its decision. The court upheld the Board's decision as reasonable, and therefore dismissed the Appellant's application for judicial review.26 25. On this second judicial review application, the Appellant attempted to introduce new exhibits that had not been before the Board, but the Court refused to admit them.27 The Court also rejected the Appellant's argument that the Board had erred in declining to consider her Charter arguments. In interpreting the scope of its own decision and remittance in Bernard/, the Court ruled that the scope of the Board's decision-making authority in the reconsideration proceeding was defined by its earlier order, and that this had been restricted to determining how much contact information the CRA could disclose to the Institute without infringing the Appellant's rights under the Privacy Act. 28 26. After holding that the appropriate standard of review was reasonableness, the Court then went on to address each of the Appellant's seven arguments as to why the Board's decision was unreasonable: i. The Court rejected the Appellant's argument that the Board failed to afford sufficient weight to the recommendations of the OPC, finding that the OPC had appeared before the Board to provide its perspective, but that the Board's function was not to review the OPC's 1993 recommendation, which had been made without union input. Unlike the Board, the OPC's power is limited to issuing recommendations, not orders;29

25 Board Decision, at paras. 176-181.

26 Bernardv. Canada (Attorney General), 2012 FCA 92 (CanLII), at para. 5 [Bernard II].

27 Bernard II, at para. 27.

28 Bernard II, at paras. 28-31.

29 Bernard II, at paras. 41-42, - 9 -

ii. The Court rejected the Appellant's argument that the Board had failed to appropriately consider alternatives to disclosing her personal information, holding that even assuming the consideration of alternatives was relevant, the Board had met this obligation and was entitled to accept the evidence of witnesses before it on the feasibility of alternatives; iii. The Court refused to consider the Appellant's argument that the Board should have considered the disclosure of home addresses and telephone numbers as separate issues, as these were not raised as part of her memorandum of fact and law and, in any event, no distinction had been made before the Board between home address and telephone number. The Court concluded that in the circumstances, it would be unfair to the CRA, PIPSC, and PSAC to attach much weight to this argument; iv. The Court rejected the argument that the fact that employees had not complained about a lack of communication during a time when the Institute did not have access to home contact information was proof that the arrangement was satisfactory. The Court noted that there was no evidence to rebut the evidence from the official of PIPSC that the union must be able to contact employees at home to provide fair representation; 30 v. The Court also found that the Appellant's arguments respecting the disparities between the purpose for which she had provided the CRA with her contact information and the Institute's proposed uses of the information "misstates the issue." The Court noted that paragraph 8(2)(a) refers to the purpose for which the government institution obtained the information, not the purpose for which the employee provided it. The Court found that there was "substantial overlap" between the employment-related purposes of both employer and union, and thus the Board's conclusion that paragraph 8(2)(a) applied was reasonable;31 vi. The Court rejected the Appellant's argument that she should be able to opt out of receiving timely communications from PIPSC on employment-related matters, if that were even possible. The Court held that she had not waived her right to fair representation by the Institute and, in any event, that a union's ability to directly and

30 Bernard 11, at paras. 43-51.

31 Bernard II, at paras. 51-53. - 10-

quickly contact members of a bargaining unit is integral to the discharge of its duties of fair representation; and vii. In terms of the Appellant's arguments about the potential abuse of her personal information, the Court found that the Board had built in safeguards to ensure employees' privacy rights were minimally impaired, and noted that the Appellant's concerns based on her prior experience were based on her complaint to the OPC about the abuse of her personal information twenty years ago, when privacy rights were less well protected.32

2) Appellant's Attempt to Re-Introduce Evidence Not Before the Board 27. Before the Board, the Appellant attempted to introduce two letters: a letter from the OPC dated Oct 25, 2007,33 and a letter (undated) from Treasury Board to the OPC.34 The other parties objected to the introduction of the two letters as exhibits on the basis that Ms. Bernard was not the recipient, and that there had been no opportunity to cross-examine the authors and of relevance. The Board refused to admit these documents.35 The Appellant attempted again to introduce these exhibits at the FCA in Bernard IL which the FCA did not allow. 36 28. It is submitted that the Appellant should, once again, not be allowed to introduce these exhibits that were not properly before the Board. PART II- RESPONDENT'S POSITIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE APPELLANT'S QUESTIONS 29. The following are the Institute's positions with respect to the Appellant's questions in this case: 37

32 Bernard II, at paras 54-55.

33 Exhibit 1-3 of her SCC record.

34 Exhibit 1-2 of her SCC record.

35 Board Decision, at para. 60.

36 At para. 27.

37 Note, though the Appellant states four questions, her submissions raise a number of additional issues not stated in Part II of her submissions. The Institute has thus attempted to reframe and supplement the Appellant's stated questions in an effort to more accurately capture the issues raised by her in this appeal. - 11 -

a) The FCA did not err in determining that the appropriate standard of review was reasonableness; b) The Board's decision met that standard of reasonableness; c) The Board's determination that the provision of contact information to the union is a consistent use under paragraph 8(2)(a) of the Privacy Act was reasonable; d) No Charter issues should be addressed in this appeal; e) In the alternative, ss. 185 and 186(1 )(a) of the PSLRA do not violate s. 2( d) or s. 8 of the Charter, insofar as they have the effect of requiring an employer to provide a bargaining agent with the contact information of its employees, and, in any event, any infringement is a reasonable limit prescribed by law, which can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society under s. 1 of the Charter.

PART III- STATEMENT OF ARGUMENT A. THE BOARD'S DECISION SHOULD BE UPHELD AS REASONABLE 1) The Standard of Review is Reasonableness 30. The Institute submits that the FCA did not err in its determination that the standard of reasonableness applied to the Board's reconsideration decision. 31. The specific question before the Board on reconsideration was what information the employer must provide to the union in order to allow the latter to discharge its statutory obligations, while still respecting the Privacy Act. The Board issued a decision on this issue, and it was this issue that was subject to review by the FCA in Bernard II 32. The Appellant argues that the Board's decision not to address her Charter arguments was an issue of jurisdiction or "vires," which should be assessed on a standard of correctness. However, in declining to consider the Appellant's Charter arguments, the Board was not making a determination of its statutory 'jurisdiction" to address Charter issues in general, but rather was interpreting the scope of the issue before it. As stated by this Court in Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick,38 '"Jurisdiction' is intended in the narrow sense of whether or not the tribunal had the authority to make the inquiry. In other words, true jurisdiction

38 2008 SCC 9 [Dunsmuir]. - 12-

questions arise where the tribunal must explicitly determine whether its statutory grant of power gives it the authority to decide a particular matter."39 33. While the Board most certainly has the power to decide constitutional issues, it is constrained, by the rules of procedure and natural justice, to the issues that are properly before it. The Board's decision that Charter issues did not form part of the reconsideration direction by the FCA was proper and within its jurisdiction, as confirmed by the FCA on judicial review below. In reaching its decision, the FCA in Bernard II was interpreting its own earlier Order in Bernard L confirming that the scope of its initial referral was limited to the consideration of privacy issues. Separate and apart from all the other factors favouring deference, it is submitted that insofar as the FCA was interpreting the scope of its own Order, its decision should be afforded deference. 34. As noted above, the FCA carefully considered the appropriate standard of review, taking into account the principles articulated in Dunsmuir, 40 and found that the appropriate standard of review was one of reasonableness. It is submitted that this determination was correct. 35. Dunsmuir provides that the standard of review analysis is dependent on the application of a number of factors including: (1) the presence or absence of a privative clause; (2) the purpose of the tribunal as determined by interpretation of enabling legislation; (3) the nature of the question at issue; and (4) the expertise of the tribunal.41 36. In this case, the Board's decision is protected by a strong privative clause ins. 51 of the PSLRA, which provides that "every order or decision of the Board is final and may not be questioned or reviewed in any court, except in accordance with the Federal Courts Act on the grounds referred to in paragraph 18.1(4)(a), (b) or (e) of that Act."42 None of these exceptions is applicable in this case.

39 At para. 59.

40 Supra.

41 At para. 64.

42 The relevant paragraphs of the Federal Courts Act include where the Board a) acted without jurisdiction, acted beyond its jurisdiction or refused to exercise its jurisdiction; (b) failed to observe a principle of natural justice, - 13-

3 7. Both the purpose of the tribunal and its expertise suggest a deferential standard of review. While there are privacy issues implicated, the heart of this case is a labour relations dispute respecting the representational duties of a union. In this regard, the purpose of the PSLRA, which establishes the Board, "is to facilitate the resolution of labour disputes expeditiously, inexpensively and with relatively little formality." 43 The preamble of the Act states that it "promotes mutual respect and harmonious labour-management relations." 38. In terms of the expertise of the Board, the FCA has held that "the Board is an independent tribunal with a specialized jurisdiction in labour relations within the federal public service."44 Decisions of the Board, particularly those that involve determinations regarding labour relations issues, are regularly reviewed on a reasonableness standard. 45 39. In terms of the nature of the question at issue, as noted by the Court of Appeal, the Board was required to make findings of fact respecting CRA's purposes in collecting personal information, and of mixed fact and law in relation to the issue of whether the Institute's proposed use of the information and CRA's purpose in obtaining it are "consistent purposes" and was also required to interpret its home statute to determine the union's representational obligations under the PSLRA. 40. Adjudicators acting under the PSLRA can be presumed to hold relative expertise in the interpretation of the legislation that gives them their mandate.46 Deference usually results where "a tribunal is interpreting its own statute or statutes closely connected to its functions, and such deference has been found particularly relevant in regard to adjudication in labour law."47

procedural fairness or other procedure that it was required by law to observe; and (e) acted, or failed to act, by reason of fraud or peljured evidence.

43 See, e.g., Public Service Alliance of Canada v. Canadian Federal Pilots Association, 2009 FCA 223, at para. 55 [Federal Pilots]; Amos v. Canada (Attorney General), 2011 FCA 38 (CanLII) at paras. 30- 31.

44 Federal Pilots, supra at para. 55.

45 See, e.g., Federal Pilots at para. 54; Public Service Alliance of Canada v. , 2011 FCA 214 at para. 31; Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada v. Canada (Attorney General), 2009 FCA 184 at para. I; Amos v. Canada, supra, at para. 33.

46 Dunsmuir, supra at para. 68.

47 Public Service Alliance of Canada v. Senate ofCanada, 2011 FCA 214 (CanLII) at para. 22. - 14-

41. Thus, as the Board was interpreting the PSLRA to determine the information the Employer needed to provide to the union for the union to be able to discharge its obligations, deference is warranted as such determinations are central to the Board's expertise. Further reviewing courts should generally show deference to lower courts and administrative decision-makers on questions of fact and on questions involving mixed fact and law. 48 42. In this case, the Board was required to interprets. 8(2)(a) of the Privacy Act. As noted by this Court in Dunsmuir, "The case law has moved away considerably from the strict position ... where it was held that an administrative decision maker will always risk having its interpretation of an external statute set aside upon judicial review."49 43. In Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. Canada (Labour Relations Board), [1995] 1 SCR 157 the employer argued that since the Board was required to interpret provisions of the Broadcasting Act and related journalistic policy, external statutes/policies to the Board's mandate, a correctness standard was warranted. The majority of the Court rejected this argument and applied the most deferential standard (which, at the time was "patent unreasonableness") to the Board's decision that the employer had committed an unfair labour practice. Justice Iacobucci noted that where an external statute is linked to the tribunal's mandate and is frequently encountered by it, deference may be appropriate and the fact that as part of its decision a tribunal must interpret an external statute does not move the standard of review of the decision as a whole to correctness. 50

48 Dunsmuir, supra para. 53 and per Dechamps J.'s concurring reasons at paras 161 and 164; Rio Tinto A/can Inc. v. Carrier Sekani Tribal Council, 2010 SCC 43, [2010] 2 SCR 650, at para. 65; Hausen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, [2002] 2 SCR 235 at para. 28.

49 At para. 54. Cory J. for the majority in Toronto (City) Board of Education v. O.S.S. T.F., District 15, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 487, where he said, at para. 39:

It has been held on several occasions that the expert skill and knowledge which an arbitration board exercises in interpreting a collective agreement does not usually extend to the interpretation of "outside" legislation. The findings of a board pertaining to the interpretation of a statute or the common Jaw are generally reviewable on a correctness standard .... An exception to this rule may occur where the external statute is intimately connected with the mandate of the tribunal and is encountered frequently as a result. [Emphasis added.]

See also Toronto Catholic District School Board v. Ontario English Catholic Teachers' Assn. (Toronto Elementary Unit), (2001), 55 O.R. (3d) 737 (C.A.), leave to appeal refused, [2002] 2 S.C.R. ix.

5°Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. Canada (Labour Relations Board), at paras. 48 50. - 15-

44. While the Privacy Act is not the Board's home statute, the Act, including this provision in particular, is regularly considered by the Board and by other administrative tribunals when 1 these bodies are asked to make decisions on production issues. 5 45. Thus, all ofthe factors articulated in Dunsmuir point towards a standard of reasonableness. As noted, the core decision-making function of the Board was one central to its expertise namely, the minimum amount of information that was to be provided to a bargaining agent for it to be able to fulfill its statutory obligations under the PSLRA. That the Court also was required to interpret a provision of the Privacy Act, is not a factor sufficient to shift the standard from one of reasonableness.

2) The Board's Decision was Reasonable and in Any Event Correct 46. Contrary to the submissions of the Appellant: a) The Board's determination that contact information is a "consistent use" was reasonable and in any event correct; b) The Board's finding that the disclosure of contact information is required for the Institute to meet its statutory and broader representational obligations was reasonable and in any event correct; c) The Board's finding that the Appellant's concerns about abuse of her information are speculative was reasonable and in any event correct; and d) The Board's finding that the Institute's access to employees in the workplace is not adequate was reasonable and in any event correct. a) Determination that Contact Information is a "Consistent Use" was Reasonable 47. At paras. 66 71 of her submissions, the Appellant submits that the Board erred when it held that the disclosure of contact information was a "consistent use" under section 8(2)(a) of the Privacy Act. This section provides that "personal information" may be disclosed: for the purpose for which the information was obtained or compiled by the institution or for a use consistent with that purpose.

51 See the section, below, on "Detennination that Contact Infonnation is a 'Consistent Use' was Reasonable." - 16-

48. Contrary to the Appellant's contention at para. 66 of her factum, whether or not she subjectively believed or expected at the time she provided her information to the employer that it would be disclosed to the union is not relevant for determining "consistent use." In response to a similar argument before the FCA, the Court held that the Appellant was "misstat[ing] the issue," since "[p ]aragraph 8(2)( a) refers to the purpose for which the government institution obtained the information, not the purpose for which the employee provided it."52 49. While the Privacy Act does not define the term "consistent use," privacy legislation in other jurisdictions contains a similar exception to allow the disclosure of personal information if the information is disclosed for a use consistent with the purpose for which it was obtained. 50. For example, the British Columbia Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, 53 s. 32(a) permits disclosure of personal information if the information is "disclosed for a purpose for which it was obtained or compiled," or "if the information is disclosed for a use consistent with that purpose." Section 34 of that Act provides that a use will be deemed to have a "consistent purpose" where the new use, inter alia, "has a reasonable and direct connection to the original purpose."54 The same definition can be found in privacy legislation of provinces across Canada. 55 51. As the FCA held below, at para. 53: A proposed use of information may be "consistent" with the purpose for which it was obtained, even if the government institution's purpose and the other person's proposed use are not identical. It is enough that there is a sufficiently direct connection between purpose and use that an employee would reasonably expect that the information could be used in the manner proposed.

52 Bernard II, at para. 52.

53 R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 165.

54 The use must also be "necessary for performing the statutory duty of, or for operating a legally authorized program of, the public body that uses or discloses the information." In Canadian Office and Professional Employees' Union, Local 378, 2005 BCCA 604 (CanLII) at para. 60, the British Columbia Court of Appeal held that a "reasonable and direct connection" is one that is "logically, or rationally, connected to the original purpose."

55 The same definition can be found in section 41 of Alberta's Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, RSA 2000, c F-25; s. 45 of Manitoba's Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, CCSM c F175; s. 40 of Newfoundland and Laborador's Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, SNL 2002, c A-1.1; s. 38 of Prince Edward Island's Freedom oflnformation and Protection ofPrivacy Act, RSPEI 1988, c F-15.01; and s. 28 of Nova Scotia's Freedom of Information and Protection ofPrivacy Act, SNS 1993, c 5. 55 - 17-

52. The FCA, in applying the "reasonable direct connection" standard for consistent use (the statutory standard for "consistent use" in provinces across Canada),, appropriately upheld the Board's determination that disclosure of contact information to the union was a "consistent use." The Court's reference to what an employee would "reasonably expect" is a clear reference to an objective standard of what a reasonable employee, with knowledge of the purposes for which information was obtained by the employer and to be used by the union, would expect. 53. The Board carefully considered the purpose for which the employer collects contact information and determined that this information is collected for the purpose of contacting employees about their terms and conditions of employment, which is consistent with PIPSC's intended use. 56 The Board also cited authorities where disclosure of contact information to the union was held to be permissible under s.8(2)(a).57 Indeed, numerous authorities have determined that information collected for employment purposes can be disclosed to bargaining agents under s. 8(2)(a) of the Privacy Act. 58 54. At paras. 72 77, the Appellant provides a limited and incomplete legislative history of certain provisions in the Canada Labour Code (the "CLC") related to off-site workers. As noted by the Appellant at para. 73 of her factum, the CLC applies to federally regulated public sector employers and unions. It is submitted that these submissions bear no relevance whatsoever to the case at bar, which considers provisions of the PSLRA, a totally separate regime from the CLC (with the exception of certain health and safety provisions not at issue here), which governs federal public sector workers and unions.

56 Board Decision, at para. 168.

57 Board Decision, at para. 168.

58 In Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd, [200 1] CIRB no. I 10 at para. 34 the Canadian Industrial Relations Board held that it was appropriate to disclose individual salary infonnation to the union as its release would be consistent with one of the main purposes for which it was gathered, i.e., the appropriate administration ofthe collective agreement. The Board also noted that "The bargaining agent shares with the employer the need to utilize such infonnation for proper, appropriate and limited purposes, and also must guard its general confidentiality." A similar finding was made in Bank of Canada, 2007 CIRB 387 (CanLII) at para. 47. In Public Service Alliance of Canada and Treasury Board, PSSRB File Nos. 161-02-791 and 169-02-584 (19960426)(1996)[PSAC], the Canada Public Service Staff Relations Board ruled that the provisions of the Privacy Act did not preclude the employer from disclosing to the union names and addresses of employees who might be subject to layoff. See also Public Service of Canada v. Canadian Food Inspection Agency, 2011 PSLRB 131 (CanLII) at para. 11. - 18-

55. It is submitted that the Board's conclusion that disclosure of contact information was permitted under s. 8(2)(a) of the Privacy Act, and the FCA's confirmation of same, was reasonable and in any event correct. b) Determination that Disclosure of Contact Information is Required for the Institute to Meet it Statutory and Broader Representational Obligations

56. In its initial decision in this matter from 2008, the Board unequivocally found that contact information was required by the bargaining agent in order to fulfill its statutory obligations under the PSLRA. The 2008 decision held that, at a minimum, contact information was required for the Institute to meet its obligations under sections 183 and 184 of the PSLRA. As the Federal Court noted, these findings were not challenged by way of judicial review. 59 57. Subsequently, the Board considered the FCA's direction on reconsideration and concluded that the scope of the direction included a reconsideration of "all of the obligations of the bargaining agent that flow from the PSLRA," given the wording of the Consent Order under review. 60 58. The Board considered the significant body of case law, evidence, and the provisions of the PSLRA and concluded that the Institute requires contact information to fulfil both its statutory and broader representational obligations. 59. The Board heard significant, credible evidence about ways in which the Institute requires contact information to discharge its statutory duties 60. Chief Negotiations Officer for the Institute, Walter Belyea, testified that PIPSC requires contact information for the purposes of gathering employee input, verifying information provided by the employer, giving notice of a final-offer vote or strike vote (sections 183 and 184 of the PSLRA) and developing essential service agreements. 61. Section 183(1)(a) provides that: 183. ( 1) If the Minister is of the opinion that it is in the public interest that the employees in a bargaining unit be given the opportunity to accept or reject the offer of the employer last received by the bargaining agent in respect of all matters remaining in dispute between the parties, the Minister may

59 PIPSC, supra at paras. 62-71; Bernard I, supra at paras. 2 and 30.

60 At para. !58 of the Board Decision. - 19-

(a) on any terms and conditions that the Minister considers appropriate, direct that a vote to accept or reject the offer be held by secret ballot as soon as possible among all of the employees in the bargaining unit ... [emphasis added]

62. Section 184(1) provides that: In order to obtain approval to declare or authorize a strike, an employee organization must hold a vote by secret ballot among all of the employees in the bargaining unit conducted in a manner that ensures that the employees are given a reasonable opportunity to participate in the vote and be informed of the results. [emphasis added]

63. Belyea also testified that employee input was required to prepare bargaining positions and that the requirement to consult employees can arise on short notice. In terms of statutory obligations, sections 65 and 95 of the PSLRA also provide that all employees in the bargaining unit have the right to vote on certification and de-certification. 64. Mr. Belyea testified that that individual employees also need to be contacted to explore the implications of pursuing a particular grievance and that when negotiating essential service agreements, PIPSC may need to contact individual employees to understand their duties and working situations (see sections 119 - 134 of the PSLRA, which govern essential services). 65. Outside of the bargaining process, the Institute would need to contact employees directly if downsizing were planned, to ascertain whether some employees were willing to take early retirement. The Institute may also need to contact employees when new legislation is promulgated or when pension, benefit or employment equity issues or complaints arise. 61 66. In recent years, the Federal Public Service has seen a massive wave of surplussing. The Institute's Collective Agreement for the AFS bargaining unit includes "Appendix G," which is the "Work Force Adjustment Appendix to Institute - Audit, Financial, and Scientific Collective Agreement" (the "WFAA"). The objective of the policy is to "maximize employment opportunities for indeterminate employees affected by work force adjustment situations."62 The WFAA sets out extensive duties on the employer to minimize

61 Board Decision, at paras. 20- 26.

62 Cited at para. 2 of PSAC v. Treasury Board ofCanada, 2013 PSLRB 37 [PSAC 2013]. -20-

involuntary departures through multiple methods of identifying alternative positions with the CRA. 67. In Public Service Alliance of Canada v. Canada Customs and Revenue Agency,63 the Public Service Staff Relations Board found that once a workforce adjustment situation had occurred, the employer had a duty to "advise and consult" with the bargaining agent, under the terms of the WF A Policy. In that case, the employer had in fact "met the spirit" of the Policy by involving bargaining agent representatives in the process. Even despite this, the Board found that it had breached its obligation to consult by failing to make all of the relevant information available to the union. 68. It is essential that the bargaining agent have all relevant information because of its representational obligations it must ensure that the employer is taking all steps necessary to ensure the job security, or in other words, to maximize workplace opportunities for its employees. It is submitted that especially during times of work force adjustment, where employees are vulnerable and under stress and may not be easily reachable in the workplace (as, subsequent to their notice of being affected, they may no longer be regularly in the workplace) and given the extensive duties on the employer and the potential need to contact employees on short notice where opportunities arise, it is crucial that the Institute have contact information for employees in the bargaining unit. 64 Note, in PSAC 199t1'5 the PSSRB ordered the disclosure of employee names and addresses and specifically noted the importance of such disclosure in the context of the bargaining agent's responsibilities with respect to workforce adjustments.66 69. A significant body of case law supports the finding that unions require contact information to meet their statutory representational obligations.

63 [2002] C.P.S.S.R.B. No. 14. Article 1.1.9 of the WFAA requires that the CRA "advise and consult" with the Institute regarding any work force adjustment situation and make available to the bargaining agent the name and work location of affected employees.

64 See PSAC 2013, supra where the Board discusses the relatively short timelines involved in the "alternation process," a process by which an employee who has been identified for possible lay-off agrees to change places with a similarly qualified employee who has not been so identified, paras 27-28.

65 Supra.

66 At pp. 9- 10. - 21 -

70. The Ontario Labour Relations Board decision in Millcroft Inn Ltd, 67 has been widely cited across Canadian jurisdictions as a key authority for the proposition that the union is entitled to the names, addresses and telephone numbers of the employees it represents. In Mil/croft, the union brought an unfair labour practice complaint against the employer when it refused to provide this information to the union without employees' consent. 71. In determining whether disclosure was warranted, the OLRB considered the union's statutory duties, including the union's duty to represent all employees in the bargaining in a manner that is not arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith. The Board noted that a union must "diligently pursue the interests of the members of the bargaining unit it represents,"68 and noted that in pursuing grievances on behalf of bargaining unit members it must investigate the grievances and act promptly to achieve their resolution. It must be able to communicate with employees to ensure the collective agreement is being properly administered and to assess the merits and impact of a grievance, may need to speak to several employees in the bargaining unit, including those besides the grievor. 69 In the context of bargaining, the union needs to be able to communicate with employees to assess their objectives and formulate bargaining positions, all of which requires the union to be able to communicate expeditiously with all employees. 70 72. Outside of its statutory obligations, the OLRB noted that the Supreme Court of Canada case in Weber v. Ontario Hydro, 71 significantly expanded the duties of unions in terms of their representational obligations. The effect of Weber was that it expanded the scope of the arbitrability of disputes such that even if a cause of action does not arise expressly from a collective agreement, if it is a dispute between an employer and an employee and the dispute arises inferentially or essentially from the collective agreement, the dispute is arbitrable. The result is that the union has a very wide obligation to protect the legal interests of employees vis-a-vis the employer and, the OLRB concluded, "must be able to

67 [2000] OLRB Rep. July/August 665 (Albertyn) [Millcroft].

68 Mil/croft, at para. 22.

69 At paras. 22-23.

70 At para. 24.

71 [1995] 2 S.C.R. 929. -22-

communicate with the employees. Having their names, addresses and telephone numbers will considerably ease their difficulties in doing so."72 73. Moreover, the representational obligations of federal public sector unions was arguably expanded in the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Vaughan v. Canada,73 where the majority of the Court held that even where workplace issues do not go to an adjudicator, they cannot generally be litigated privately and must go through the union-management grievance process. The effect is increased representational responsibility for the union.

74. In Mil/croft the OLRB noted that the employer and union are equal bargaining partners in their collective relationship:

The employer is in no more preferential position in relation to the employees than is the union in the context of their collective bargaining relationship. In that context, the employer is not entitled to greater rights in relation to the employees than is the union. To the extent that the employer is entitled to know the names, addresses and telephone numbers of the employees, i.e. to the extent that their privacy rights to that information are compromised by the employer sharing it, so too is the union entitled to the information.

A consequence of the union possessing exclusive bargaining status on behalf of the employees is that the union is placed in an equal bargaining position with the employer in its collective bargaining relationship. To the extent that the employer has information which is of value to the union in its capacity to represent the employees (such as their names, addresses and telephone numbers), the union too should have that information. 74

75. The Mil/croft decision has been endorsed in a similar, subsequent OLRB case, Ottawa­ Carleton District School Board, 75 where the Board noted additional reasons why the employer is obliged to disclose the contact information the union sought, including that the union needs this information to conduct strike votes and that under the Occupational Health and Safety Act (OHSA), the union has a wide range of statutory responsibilities to ensure

72 At para. 29.

73 [2005] 1 SCR 146.

74 At paras. 34-35.

75 [2001] OLRB Rep. November/December 1426 (Albertyn). -23-

employee protection at work. 76 Similarly, the Canadian Industrial Relations Board held in Monarch Transport Inc. (Re), that "to be effective, contacts with employees to determine their bargaining concerns and for representations purposes are a legitimate and necessary part of the labour-management relationship." It was held that the union's capacity to represent the employees it represents would be frustrated if access to contact information 77 8 were denied. For its part, the Alberta Labour Relations Board, inAysa Pharm Inc. (Re/ , held, at para. 91 that "the union needs to be able to communicate with members and non­ members alike in order to properly represent them," and held, at para. 99, that without access to employees' private contact information, "the Union is significantly hindered in its ongoing responsibility to represent its membership and to address employee concems."79 76. Furthermore, it is well established that inadequate communication between the union and a bargaining unit member may be a breach of the union's duty of fair representation where the lack of communication prejudices an employee.80 77. Considering the evidence before it, the language of the PSLRA, and the general consensus by labour boards across Canadian jurisdictions, the Board's determination that disclosure of

76 At para. 13.

77 [2003] C.I.R.B.D. No. 42 (QL) at para. 24.

78 Aysa Pharm Inc v United Food and Commercial Workers Canada Union, Local No 40I, 2012 CanLII 31284 (AB LRB).

79 See also: Canadian Niagara Hotels Inc., [2005] OLRB Rep. Nov/Dec 932 (Albertyn) at para. 27; Oaklands Regional Centre, [20 I 0] OLRB Rep. Sept/Oct 658 (Anderson) at paras. 17-27; Ontario (Alcohol and Gaming Commission), [2002] O.L.R.D. No. 120 (OLRB) at paras. 9-11; P. Sun's Enterprises (Vancouver) Ltd. (Hotel Grand Pacific) v. National Automobile, Aerospace, Transportation and General Workers Union of Canada (CA. W.­ Canada), Local 114, [2003] B.C.L.R.B.D. No. 301 (QL) at paras. 23, 32. In Ontario Public Service Employees Union v. Management Board of Cabinet, 2002 CanLII 11028 (ON LRB) at para. 3, the Union sought from the Employer the names, personal identification numbers, home addresses and home telephone numbers of all members of the OPSEU bargaining unit. The Board rejected the Employer's argwnents that disclosure would breach employees' privacy rights and ordered that disclosure was required for the union to fulfil its duties under the Ontario Labour Relations Act. See also PSAC I996, supra.

80 Thompson and Brewery, Winery and Distillery Workers Union, Local 300 (Re), [1997] B.C.L.R.B. No. 8281197 at paras. 32-33. This is particularly true in a situation that prejudices the applicant: L 'Hebreux and USW (Re), 2010 CIRB 515 at paras. 37-38; Canadian National Railway Co. (Re), [2010] C.I.R.B.D. No. 46 (CIRB) at paras. 37-38, 53-54. Failure to consult with a grievor about the withdrawal of his or her grievance will also be a violation of the union's duties: Cuddy Food Products Ltd. And RWDSU (Re)(1988), 1 C.L.R.B.R. (2d) 1 at para 81. Undue delay in making a decision, or informing the grievor of a decision, may be arbitrary conduct: Kooner and USWA, Local 480 (Re), [1997] B.C.L.R.B.D. No. 116 (BCLRB) (QL) at paras. 65 66, 70-72. A union that negotiations a settlement without consulting with a grievor will likely be found to have breached its duty of fair representation: Harke and IBEW, Local 424 (re)(2007), 141 C.L.R.B.R. (2d) 81 (Alta. L.R.B.) at paras. 30-34. -24-

contact information is required for the union to fulfil its statutory obligations was not only reasonable, but was eminently correct. 78. Contrary to paragraph 71 of the Appellant's factum, where the Appellant seeks to distinguish between home phone numbers and addresses, not only did the FCA deny her the right to argue this issue because it had not been raised before the Board or in her memorandum of fact and law, but in addition, it is clear that the Board, after hearing all the evidence, and considering similar precedents, determined that employees provide both their phone number and address to their employers so that they can be contacted about "their terms and conditions of employment."81 It is submitted that the evidence supports, and in no way contradicts, the Board's finding that the employer collects both home phone number and address information for employment-related reasons. This is true whether the information is collected for "compensation purposes" or "in case a manager needs to reach 82 an employee" : in either event, the information is collected, inter alia, so employees can be contacted about their terms and conditions of employment. 79. While, as the Appellant notes at para. 93 of her factum, she has the right not to be a member of the Institute, and has chosen not to be a member -- and so as a result, does not have a member's right to attend union membership meetings or to vote on tentative collective agreements -- the fact remains that the union has a myriad of statutory and representational obligations to her and to all of its bargaining unit members, and that without access to contact information, it cannot meet these obligations and carry out its critical and statutorily mandated representational functions. c) Concerns About Abuse Speculative 80. The Appellant's concerns about the potential for abuse of her personal information are speculative, and the Board was both reasonable and correct in so finding. 83 81. In its decision, the Board held that concerns about potential abuse of the Appellant's information were hypothetical, but nonetheless directed additional safeguards for the

81 At para. I 68, Board Decision.

82 Board Decision, at para. 43.

83 At para. 95 of Appellant's factum. -25-

protection of employee information including providing that contact information be encrypted or password protected when transmitted, that new employees be notified that their contact information would be shared with the bargaining agent, and that contact information be appropriately disposed of after it is replaced by current contact information. 84 85 82. As noted by the FCA , the Board built in safeguards to ensure employees' privacy rights were minimally impaired. The Consent Order itself provides that information is to be used solely for "the legitimate purposes of the bargaining agent in accordance with the PSLRA," and the Consent Order and the amended Board Decision ensure that disclosed information will be securely stored, transmitted and protected. The Court also noted that the Appellant's concerns about the abuse of her personal information occurred twenty years ago, when privacy rights were less well protected. 83. It is submitted that the Appellant's concern that her home address will be disclosed to members for the purpose of picketing outside of her home is totally unfounded, particularly in light of the fact that disclosure of her information to members is prohibited by the Consent Order and such disclosure for picketing purposes would not be for the purpose of fulfilling the "the legitimate purposes of the bargaining agent in accordance with the PSLRA."86 As noted by the Alberta Labour Relations Board in Aysa Pharm Inc. (Re/7 "The employee information is not being disclosed to the public but to the employees' own representative. The union has as much interest as the employer in protecting the employees from harassment." 84. The Appellant's reference88 to the comment by the Institute's Chief Negotiations Officer that PIPSC's network of stewards is "sketchy," was made in the context of his description

84 Board Decision, at paras. 174, 176· 178, 180-181.

85 Bernard II, at paras. 54·55.

86 Consent Order at para. 6.

87 [2012] A.L.R.B.D. No. 38 (Alta. L.R.B.), at para. 91.

88 At para 94 of her factum. -26-

of why stewards may not have sufficient access to the workplace to fulfil the Institute's statutory obligations and was not a comment on the integrity of the stewards themselves.89 85. The Appellant also raised concerns about the frequency of the disclosure of her contact information to the Institute, which was ordered to occur every quarter. It is submitted that this measure is, in fact, privacy enhancing. Assuming an employee's contact information does not change over the course of a year, and safeguards are observed, there is no further diminution in the employee's privacy by quarterly confirmation that this information is current. The ability to maintain current information ensures that the union does not send information to people who are not the intended recipients. 86. The Appellant's unsubstantiated concerns about the potential abuse of her information do not affect the Board's reasonable determination, and the FCA's confirmation of same, that the safeguards in the Consent Order, with the additional measures it imposed, were sufficient to protect the Appellant's privacy rights. d) Adequacy of Union Access to the Workplace 87. Contrary to the Appellant's contention that contact information is not required by the union because it has "virtually unfettered access to employees in the workplace,"90 the Board carefully considered the level of access the Institute has to employees in the workplace and found it to be inadequate noting that the ability of the bargaining agent to communicate with employees at the workplace was "clearly constrained," and that communications from bargaining agents must be vetted and approved by the employer before posting and that there is no expectation of privacy in electronic communications at the workplace. 91 88. Chief Negotiations Officer, Walter Belyea also testified that part-time employees and employees on leaves of absence or secondments do not necessarily receive mail sent to work addresses, that work contact information is not reliable, given the frequency of employee relocations, and that communications related to mandatory votes can only be effected quickly when the Institute has contact information. He also noted that not all work

89 At para. 28, Board Decision.

90 At paras. 100- 102 ofthe Appellant's factum.

91 Board Decision, at para. 162. -27-

sites had stewards and that posting messages on the internet was inadequate due to its lack of privacy, delays due to the need for translation, and the fact that employees have varying levels of access to the internet. This evidence was undisputed.92 89. That an invitation to an information session was sent by the union to employees in no way addresses or contradicts any of the concerns above. Further, that the legal right of union members to meet with employees at the workplace may be broader than what is set out in the collective agreement- for example, that it may include the right of access of negotiators 93 to employer premises to meet with employees to discuss bargaining issues - similarly does not address the general practical impediments noted above, which make relying solely on the Institute's workplace access to employees insufficient. 90. The FCA was correct in finding that there was no evidence to rebut the testimony of the official of PIPSC to the effect that the union must be able to contact employees at home in order to provide fair representation. There is no basis for interfering with or reversing the Board's finding of fact that other means of communication were not adequate to enable PIPSC to discharge its statutory responsibilities.94 e) Conclusion on Reasonableness 91. The reasonableness standard has been articulated by this Court as follows: Reasonableness is a deferential standard animated by the principle that underlies the development of the two previous standards of reasonableness: certain questions that come before administrative tribunals do not lend themselves to one specific, particular result. Instead, they may give rise to a number of possible, reasonable conclusions. Tribunals have a margin of appreciation within the range of acceptable and rational solutions. A court conducting a review for reasonableness inquiries into the qualities that make a decision reasonable, referring both to the process of articulating the reasons and to outcomes. In judicial review, reasonableness is concerned mostly with the existence of justification, transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making process. But it is also concerned with whether the decision falls within a ranfe of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law.9

92 Board Decision, at paras. 27- 28.

93 Public Service Alliance of Canada v. Treasury Board (Canada Border Services Agency), 2012 PSLRB 58 at paras. 43 45.

94 Bernard 11 at para. 50.

95 Dunsmuir, supra at para. 47. -28-

92. In coming to its decision that contact information must be provided to the bargaining agent in order for it to be able to discharge its statutory obligations under the PSLRA, the Board carefully considered the privacy interests and rights of employees who are not members of the bargaining unit, and found that the disclosure fell within the exception in s. 8(2)(a) of the Privacy Act. Noting that contact information was needed by the bargaining agent in order to fulfill its statutory obligations, the Board carefully considered the specific terms of the Consent Order, going so far as to add three additional safeguards to ensure that the privacy interests of employees were adequately protected.96 As set out above, its decision was both reasonable and correct.

B) CHARTER ISSUES 1) The Court Should Decline to Consider Charter Issues 93. It is submitted that the Court should decline to hear any of the Appellant's Charter issues, none of which were heard or determined by the Board or the FCA below. 94. In its decision below, the Board specifically held that "Charter arguments would not be considered in this reconsideration" since, in remitting the matter to the Board, the Court of Appeal's "instructions are limited to assessing the privacy rights of employees."97 Subsequently, the FCA, in Bernard II, interpreting its own earlier reconsideration Order in Bernard I, also declined to hear the Appellant's Charter arguments, holding that these issues were not within the scope of the reconsideration proceeding as defined by Bernard ! 98 As the FCA ruled, the FCA in Bernard I "did not authorize the Board to reconsider its February decision in light ofMs Bernard's Charter rights."99 95. The Board and FCA below correctly decided not to permit the Appellant to raise any Charter issues.

96 Board Decision, at paras. 167-168, 172-178.

97 At para. 9.

98 Bernard I!, at paras. 28-31.

99 At para. 31. -29-

96. Furthermore, this Court should also decline to consider the Appellant's argument that the disclosure violates hers. 8 right to not be subjected to unreasonable seizure. This argument was never raised before the Board. At the Board below, the only Charter argument even raised by the Appellant was that the disclosure of her contact information infringed her s. 2( d) Charter rights. 100 The Appellant should not be permitted to introduce new arguments that were never raised below. 97. As a result of the determinations below, no Charter record was developed and no Charter record is available to or before this Court. In this respect, while the Court has stated Constitutional Questions in this case respecting s. 2( d), stating a question does not oblige the Court to answer it. The Institute submits that the Court should not answer the Constitutional Questions, not only because the Charter issues were not considered by the Board or the FCA below, but also because no adequate or proper Charter record is before this Court. 98. Even where constitutional questions are stated under Rule 32, it may ultimately turn out that the factual record on appeal provides an insufficient basis for their resolution and the "Court is not obliged in such cases to provide answers."101 As this Court noted in Bisaillon 102 v. Keable :

The parties are generally left wide latitude by the Chief Justice or other judges of this Court in formulating the constitutional questions which they submit for approval. However, it does not follow that the Court is bound by these questions, and that it is required to answer them if it may dispose of the appeal without doing so or if it appears that the facts of the case do not provide a basis for such questions. The questions may not be used as a means of transforming an ordinary proceeding into a reference: Vadebonceur v. Landry, 1976 CanLII 182 (SCC), [1977] 2 S.C.R. 179, atpp. 187-88.

99. Thus, in Bell ExpressVu, 103 for instance, while the Court had stated constitutional questions, it determined not to answer them because there because there was no Charter record permitting this Court to address the stated questions.

100 See para. 9 of the Board Decision.

101 Bell ExpressVu, [2002] 2 SCR 559 at para. 59 [Bell ExpressVu]

102 [1983]2 SCR 60, at p. 71.

103 Bell ExpressVu, supra, paras. 60, 68. - 30-

100. As a general rule, this Court does not permit appellants to raise new issues in this Court that would require additional evidence to be adduced at trial, absent exceptional circumstances. 104 The Court has held that the policy of not dealing with abstract questions is of "particular importance in constitutional matters." 105 Given the significance of the questions posed in this case, it would be dangerous to determine these issues in a factual vacuum. 106 101. In order to determine whether there is a Charter breach, and whether it could be upheld under s. 1, the parties would be entitled to lead extensive evidence, including expert evidence, on many issues, including, inter alia, how or whether the provision of contact information interferes with any non-associational freedom the Appellant may have, the potential impact of a failure of the employer to disclose employee contact information on the union and/or bargaining unit members' associational rights protected under section 2(d) of the Charter, and whether there is proportionate connection between the provisions of contact information and the objective of the legislation. 102. The Respondent, in its original 2007 complaint to the Board, alleged that the refusal to provide the requested information violated sections 2( d) and 2(b) of the Charter, but the Board determined that given its finding of a violation of the PSLRA, it was unnecessary to consider the Charter issues. As a result, there is no Charter record with respect to the impact of a potential interference in the union's ability to receive contact information on bargaining unit members' Charter rights. Given that that the s.l analysis in this case could necessarily require a complex balancing of competing Charter rights, it is particularly dangerous for the Court to attempt to consider the Charter issues in the absence of a full Charter record. 103. In the final alternative, even if, despite the reasons of the Board and the FCA below, the Court were of the view that the Board and FCA erred in not considering the Appellant's

104 R.W.C. v. The Queen (March 29, 2005) Doc. 30302 [2004] SCCA No. 171 (motion to state constitutional question dismissed, without reasons); Supreme Court of Canada Practice 2013, Carswell, pp. 421 and 425-426; Bell ExpressVu, supra at para. 58; Perka v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 232, at p. 240; Idziak v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [1992] 3 S.C.R. 631, at pp. 643-44, per Cory J.

105 Moysa v. Alberta (Labour relations board), [1989] I SCR 1572 at pp. 1579-1580. See also Borowski v. Canada (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 342, at pp. 363-65.

106 Danson v. Ontario (Attorney General), [1990] 2 S.C.R. I 086, paras. 26-32. - 31 -

constitutional claims, the Institute submits that the issue should, at most, be sent back to be determined by the Board at first instance, where an appropriate evidentiary record could be adduced, and where the Court would have the benefit of the expert tribunal's assessment and reasons.

2) No Charter Infringement a) No Infringement of Freedom of Association 104. To the extent that the Court determines to examine Charter issues in this appeal, the sole issue would be whether sections 185 and 186(l)(a) of the PSLRA, to the extent they entitle a union to contact information in order to carry out its representational obligations, violate s. 2(d) of the Charter. As reflected in the April 29, 2013 Order of Justice Rothstein granting intervener status to a number of interveners, 107 the issue in this appeal would not extend to whether being required to be a bargaining unit member represented by a union or to pay Rand formula dues is in conformity with the Charter. In the Institute's submission, that sections 185 and 186(1)(a) of the PSLRA may require an employer to provide a bargaining agent with the contact information in no way violates any right not to associate under s. 2( d) of the Charter. I 05. The Court has considered whether or not the freedom to associate includes the right "not to associate" under s.2( d) in two cases: Lavigne v. OPSEU, 108and Advance Cutting and Coring

Ltd. to9

106. In Lavigne, the Court was unanimous in its finding that the payment of dues to the Union relating to the representation of employees in the bargaining unit for collective bargaining purposes, or to the Union's functions as exclusive bargaining representative, does not violates. 2(d) of the Charter. Three members ofthe 7-member Court (LaForest, Sopinka and Gonthier JJ.) held that the requirement to pay dues was not a form of forced association to the extent the dues were used to pay for representational and collective bargaining

107 The Public Service Alliance of Canada, the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, the Canadian Association of Counsel to Employers, the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, the Canadian Constitution Foundation, the Alberta Federation of Labour, the Coalition of British Columbia Businesses and Merit Canada.

108 [1991] 2 S.C.R. 211 [Lavigne].

109 200 I SCC 70, [200 I] 3 SCR 209 [Advance Cutting]. -32-

purposes. 110 Justice McLaughlin also held that the requirement to pay Rarid formula dues was not a form of forced association, on the basis that payment of union dues under the Rand formula could not reasonably be seen as compelling Mr. Lavigne into ideological conformity with the union's causes. 111 For their part, Justices Wilson, Justice Cory and Justice L'Heureux-Dube held that s. 2(d) does not include a freedom not to associate.n 2 107. Justice La Forest adopted the views of Professor Brian Etherington, who identified four primary liberty interests that can be threatened by compelled association: a. governmental establishment of, or support for, particular political parties or causes; b. impairment of the individual's freedom to join or associate with causes of his choice; c. the imposition of ideological conformity; and d. personal identification of an objector with political or ideological causes which the service association supports. 113 108. He also held that the Charter does not entitle a person to artificial isolation from his or her co-workers, and noted: a worker like Lavigne would have no chance of succeeding if his objection to his association with the Union was the extent that it addresses itself to the matters, the terms and conditions of employment for members of his bargaining unit, with respect to which he is "naturally" associated with his fellow employees. 114

109. In Advance Cutting and Coring, the issue before this Court was whether the obligation in 's Construction Act requiring workers to join one of five unions was a violation of s. 2(d). Three judges (LeBel, Gonthier and Arbour JJ.) held that the mere obligation to join a union does not impose "ideological conformity" on an employee and thus there was no breach of s. 2(d). 115 While taking a broader view of the test for ideological conformity,

110 At para. 251, 261.

111 At para. 285, 304.

112 At paras. 85-87, 94.

113 Para. 248.

114 Para. 251.

115 At para. 252. As Justice LeBel J. observed at para 208, "[ d]emocracy is not primarily about withdrawal, but fundamentally about participation in the life and management of democratic institutions like unions," and allowing individuals to withdraw would compromise their "group voice" and deny them "the benefits arising from an association." - 33-

Justice Bastarache (together with McLaughlin, Major and Binnie) accepted it as the core underlying rationale for protecting any negatives. 2(d) freedom not to associate. 116 For his part, Justice Iacobucci, after noting that both Justices LeBel and Bastarache agreed on imposition of ideological conformity as the proper test for determining a breach of any negative freedom of association, decided instead to adopt Justice La Forest's approach in Lavigne, namely, that the negative freedom of association will only be violated where forced association imposes a danger to one of the liberty interests identified above. 117 For her part, L'Heureux-Dube J. maintained that there is no right not to associate under s. 2(d). 118 110. Applying these principles to the case at bar, it is clear that the entitlement of the union to contact information under sections 185 and 186(1)(a) of the PSLRA in no way infringes s. 2(d) of the Charter. To the extent that sections 185 and 186(l)(a) require the disclosure of contact information, it is because the information is required for the union to fulfil its collective bargaining and representational obligations on behalf of bargaining unit members it is statutorily entitled and obligated to represent under the PSLRA. The Board ordered that disclosure could be for no other reason than the furtherance of the union's representational obligations, and there is no reasonable basis, nor any evidence in the record, that this remotely imposes any kind of ideological conformity or threatens any of the liberty interests set out above. 111. Moreover, as a matter of both logic and common sense, the provision of contact information to the bargaining agent in no way interferes with any protected right to "non­ association" of the Appellant with the union. Being provided with an employee's contact information is no more an interference with freedom not to associate than the requirement to provide one's contact information to passport control or to one's credit card company.

116 At para. 3.

117 Paras. 285 288.

118 At para. 79. -34- b) No Unreasonable Search or Seizure contrary to section 8 of the Charter 112. To the extent that the Appellant claims hers. 8 rights are violated where the union obtains her contact information from the Employer, the Institute submits that there is no legal basis for the Appellant's argument. The Appellant has conceded that she voluntarily provided her personal information to the employer. 119 Her contact information has been shared with the Union for employment purposes, consistent with the purposes for which she disclosed it to the employer. As a result, this information has in no way been seized. 113. Justice Wilson in Thomson Newspapers, stated that a seizure is "the taking hold by a public authority of a thing belonging to a person against that person's will."120 To the extent that the Appellant suggests that it is the Institute that has seized her information, the Appellant submits that the union is not a "public authority." Public authorities are agents of the state, like the police or a government Ministry. Therefore, there has been no "seizure" under s. 8. 114. Moreover, "seizure," within the meaning of s. 8, applies only to information obtained for investigatory or evidentiary purposes. 121 Therefore, the Appellant's contact information has in no way been "seized" as the disclosure ordered by the Board in no way relates to these purposes. Therefore, the Appellant's s. 8 rights are not engaged in these circumstances. 115. Even ifs.8 were somehow applicable in these circumstances, on the principles articulated in Smith v. Canada, 122 there would be no violation of the Appellant's rights. Smith was a case concerning the sharing of an individual's personal information (found on a customs form) by the Department of National Revenue with the Unemployment Insurance Commission. The Supreme Court held that the objectives of the Commission in obtaining the information

119 Appellant's factum at para. 86.

120 Thomson newspapers ltd. v. Canada (Director of investigation and research, restrictive trade practices commission), [1990] 1 SCR 425 at para 89 (QL). Mr. Justice La Forest in R. v. Dyment, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 417 (SCC)(QL) at para. 26, stated "As I see it, the essence of a seizure under s. 8 is the taking of a thing from a person by a public authority without that person's consent."

121 1 See Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5 h Ed., (Thomson Carswell: Toronto), looseleaf, para. 48-4: "A seizure is the actual taking away, by the agents of the state, of things that could be used as evidence .... A seizure within the meaning of s. 8 is a seizure of property for investigatory or evidentiary purposes." See also: Meade v. Armstrong (City), 2011 BCSC 1591 (CanLII) at para 27; Gerrard Trueman Tuck, Director of 2024972 Ontario Inc. v. McKeown Estate, 2010 CanLII 62549 (ON LRB) at paras. 34-35; IBM Canada Ltd. v. Canada, 2001 FCT 1175 (CanLII) at para. 39; R c Houle, 2003 CanLII 44810 (QC CA) at paras 92-93.

122 [2001] 3 SCR 902. - 35-

outweighed any reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to the disclosed information, and thus there was no violation of s. 8. Similarly here, the Appellant cannot be said to have held a reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to the disclosed contact information that outweighed the Institute's interests in meeting its representational obligations.

3) In the Further Alternative, Any Charter Infringement is Justified under s. 1 116. In the alternative, if this Court finds that sections 185 and 186(1)(a) of the PSLRA violates. 2(d) or s. 8 of the Charter, any infringement is a reasonable limit justified under s. 1 of the Charter. 117. The Court has articulated a number of contextual factors that it will consider and balance in determining the level of deference to be afforded to impugned legislative measures. These include: 123 (i) the vulnerability of the group protected; (ii) the nature of the harm, including the relative ability to assess or scientifically prove the harm; (iii) subjective fears and apprehension of harm -- this factor relates to the perception of harm which the impugned provisions are intended to prevent on the part of the Canadian public generally, and vulnerable persons more specifically; and (iv) the nature of the infringed activity -- this factor relates to the recognition that where the protected activity is of lesser value, it will be more easily outweighed by the government objective. 118. It is submitted that a deferential approach to the application of s. 1 of the Charter is warranted in this case. First, the impugned provisions are unfair labour practice protections, aimed at protecting vulnerable workers, and designed to constrain the power of the employer and advance the capacity of unions to collectively and effectively represent employees. Second, the harms that the impugned provisions are intended to guard against relate to protecting the collective rights of bargaining unit members. By their very nature, these harms, and the efficacy of the statutory remedy, are difficult, if not impossible, to measure scientifically. Third, there is a reasonable perception or apprehension of harm in

123 Thomson Newspapers, [ 1998] 1 SCR 877 (QL) at paras. 90-92; Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] I S.C.R. 827, at paras. 75-77. - 36-

respect of those employees the legislation is aimed at protecting; the very reason unions exist is to strengthen employee bargaining capacity and to achieve protection against the employer through representation by their union, and as the evidence of the Institute in this case reflects, there are real harms associated with an inability to ensure meaningful capacity to communicate with bargaining unit employees. Further, as noted above, courts have limited the "right" to not associate under s. 2( d), finding that other objectives, including the ability of unions to represent their members, outweigh any right not to associate.

Pressing and Substantial Objective 119. The Appellant has rightly conceded, at para. 103 of her factum, the legislation serves a pressing and substantial objective. The objective of sections 185 and 186(1)(a), insofar as they provide for access to contact information, is to enable unions to meet their representational obligations. 120. It is to the benefit of all bargaining unit members and necessary for workplace democracy that the union and employer have the ability to communicate effectively with all bargaining unit employees, especially given the importance of the union's positions reflecting the needs and wishes of its bargaining unit members. 124 As stated in Health Services and Support: 125 Finally, a constitutional right to collective bargaining is supported by the Charter value of enhancing democracy. Collective bargaining permits workers to achieve a form of workplace democracy and to ensure the rule of law in the workplace. Workers gain a voice to influence the establishment of rules that control a major aspect of their lives

121. Without access to contact information of all employees, there would be significant prejudice to the interests of bargaining unit employees. For example: a. Non-disclosure would undermine the fair operation of the collective bargaining process. For example, in the context of a final-offer vote or strike vote, if the union cannot access all voters, it, and the employees it represents, are put at an unfair

124 See discussion at para. 69 of P!PSC.

125 Health Services and Support- Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia, 2007 SCC 27, [2007] 2 SCR 391 at para. 85. -37-

disadvantage vis-a-vis the employer which has control over workplace communications; b. If the union has reason to suspect that there are problems with respect to the working conditions of certain members, it is crucial to the interests of the bargaining unit as a whole that the union be able to investigate these issues by contacting employees, and proposing changes to the collective agreement as a result, where warranted; c. It is crucial to bargaining unit employees that the union be able to contact them for the purpose of investigating and adjudicating grievances. A grievor' s rights are prejudiced, again to the potential advantage of the employer and disadvantage of other bargaining unit employees, to the extent the union is inhibited from investigating potential breaches of the collective agreement; d. the bargaining agent must be able to gather information from all employees in relation to essential services agreements. Unions can apply to the PSLRB to scrutinize essential services agreements. To the extent that the employer is inhibited from collecting this information, it may prejudice all current and future employees in that position - who may be wrongly included or excluded on the basis of incomplete information; and e. the bargaining agent must be able to effectively communicate with all bargaining unit employees in order not to breach its duty of fair representation to employees and, as discussed above, given the short timelines involved, must have access to contact information to assist employees in the context of workforce adjustments.

Rational Connection 122. The Institute adopts its reasoning at paras. 47-92, above, in support of the rational connection between the objective and the infringement. The Board and the FCA below correctly concluded that the disclosure of contact information is necessary for the union to discharge its representational obligations. While the Board was not specifically considering the Charter, it is the expert tribunal in terms of determining the minimal requirements for the union to meet its representational obligations and, after considering the feasibility of other options, it determined that the disclosure of contact information was required for the - 38-

union to be able to meet its representational obligations. It is submitted that this determination should be entitled to deference.

No Reasonable Alternative/Minimal Impairment 123. The measures are also minimally impairing. For the reasons stated above at paras. 56-79 and 87-90, the Board correctly held that the disclosure of home addresses and phone numbers is the minimum contact information required for the union to be able discharge its representational obligations. 124. Further, the nature of the information at issue here is among the least intrusive type of "personal information" possible. Disclosure does not reveal information that is highly sensitive like medical information, an individual's sexual preferences, or a social insurance number. To the contrary, the information to be disclosed is of a kind that may be found in a public phonebook or in internet directories. To the extent that there is any infringement of the Appellant's s. 2(d) or s. 8 rights occasioned by the disclosure of her contact information to the union, which is denied, such infringement is minimal.

Proportionality 125. To the extent there is any violation of the Appellant's s. 2(d) rights occasioned by the disclosure of her contact information to the union, this infringement is minor and must be balanced against the significant imperative that the union be able to represent all employees in the bargaining unit, discussed above in paras. 56-79. 126. Moreover, in its initial unfair labour practice application before the Board, the Institute argued that the section 2(d) rights of its other members would be violated by the employer's failure to disclose contact information. However, as the Board was able to resolve the Institute's complaint under s. 186(1)(a) of the PSLRA, it held that it was unnecessary to consider the Institute's Charter arguments. 126 Thus, there is no record respecting how disclosure obligations enforceable through the unfair labour practice provisions engage the union's s. 2(d) rights. Nonetheless, it is submitted that without disclosure of contact information, the union's ability to engage in collective bargaining, protected by s. 2(d) of

126 Para 72 of PIPSC, supra. - 39-

the Charter (see Ontario (Attorney General) v. Frase/27 and Health Services and Support 128 -Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia ) would be hampered. 127. Finally, Lavigne upheld the requirement to pay union dues, and Advance Cutting and Coring upheld the requirement to belong to a union. In light of these findings, it can hardly be the case that a requirement of an employer to provide the bargaining agent with contact information for employees it is statutorily charged with representing, constitutes an unjustified violation of s. 2(d), where the effects on individuals are even more limited.

PART IV- SUBMISSIONS CONCERNING COSTS 128. The Institute requests that this appeal be dismissed, with costs to the Respondent.

PARTV-ORDERSSOUGHT 129. The Institute therefore requests: a) an Order dismissing this appeal;

b) its costs of this appeal; and

c) such further and other relief as counsel may advise and to this Honourable Court may seem just.

ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED May 7, 2013 Pefe~ SACK GOLDBLATT MITCHELL LLP 500-30 rue Metcalfe St. Ottawa (Ontario) KIP 5L4

Solicitor for the Respondent Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada

127 2011 sec 20, [2011] 2 scR 3.

128 Supra. - 40 -

PART VI: TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Paragraph(s) Advance Cutting and Coring Ltd, 2001 SCC 70, [2001] 3 SCR 209 104, 109, 127

Amos v. Canada (Attorney General), 2011 FCA 38 37-38

Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd, [2001] CIRB no. 110 53

Aysa Pharm Inc v United Food and Commercial Workers Canada Union, 75 Local No 401, 2012 ALRBD No 38 (Alta LRB), CanLII 31284 (AB LRB) Bank of Canada, 2007 CIRB 387 (CanLII) 51

Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, 2002 SCC 42, [2002] 2 SCR 559 94-95

Bernard v. Canada, 2010 FCA 40 (CanLII) [Bernard I]. 13-14, 25, 27, 31, 33, 95, Bernard v. Canada (Attorney General), 2012 FCA 92 (CanLII) [Bernard II] 24-26, 31-33, 95

Bisaillon v. Keable [1983] 2 SCR 60 98

Borowski v. Canada (Attorney General), [1989] 1 SCR 342 100

Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. Canada (Labour Relations Board), [1995] 1 43 SCR 157

Canadian National Railway Co. (Re), [2010] CIRBD No. 46 (CIRB) 76

Canadian Niagara Hotels Inc., [2005] OLRB Rep Nov/Dec 932 (Albertyn) 75

Canadian Office and Professional Employees’ Union, Local 378 v. Coast 50 Mountain Bus Company Ltd, 2005 BCCA 604 (CanLII) Cuddy Food Products Ltd. And RWDSU (Re)(1988), 1 CLRBR (2d) 1 76

Danson v. Ontario (Attorney General), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1086, [1990] SCJ No 100 92 (QL) Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 SCR 190 30, 32-33, 38, 41- 42, 88 Gerrard Trueman Tuck, Director of 2024972 Ontario Inc. v. McKeown 114 Estate, 2010 CanLII 62549 (ON LRB) Harke and IBEW, Local 424 (re)(2007), 141 CLRBR (2d) 81 (Alta. LRB) 76 - 41 -

Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] 1 SCR 827 117

Health Services and Support - Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British 120, 126 Columbia, 2007 SCC 27, [2007] 2 SCR 391 Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, [2002] 2 SCR 235 41

IBM Canada Ltd. v. Canada, 2001 FCT 1175 (CanLII) 114

Idziak v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [1992] 3 SCR 631 100

Kooner and USWA, Local 480 (Re), [1997] BCLRB No B116/97, [1997] 76 BCLRBD No 116 (QL) Lavigne v. OPSEU, [1991] 2 SCR 211 105-09, 127

L’Hebreux and USW (Re), 2010 CIRB 515; Canadian National Railway Co. 76 (Re), [2010] CIRBD No. 46 (CIRB) Meade v. Armstrong (City), 2011 BCSC 1591 (CanLII) 114

Millcroft Inn Ltd, [2000] OLRB Rep. July/August 665 (Albertyn) [Millcroft] 70-71, 74-75

Monarch Transport Inc. (Re), [2003] CIRBD No. 42 (QL) 75

Moysa v. Alberta (Labour relations board), [1989] 1 SCR 1572 100

Oaklands Regional Centre, [2010] OLRB Rep Sept/Oct 658 (Anderson) 75

Ontario (Alcohol and Gaming Commission), [2002] OLRD No. 120 (OLRB) 75

Ontario (Attorney General) v. Fraser, 2011 SCC 20 [2011] 2 SCR 3 126

Ontario Public Service Employees Union v. Management Board of Cabinet, 75 2002 CanLII 11028 (ON LRB) Ottawa-Carleton District School Board, [2001] OLRB Rep. 75 November/December 1426 (Albertyn) Perka v. The Queen, [1984] 2 SCR 232 100

Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada v. Canada (Attorney 38 General), 2009 FCA 184 Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada v. Canada Revenue 4-5, 7, 11, 15-23, Agency, 2011 PSLRB 34 27, 54, 58, 79, 82- 83, 88-89, 93, 97 Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada v. Canada Revenue 1, 9-12, 21, 83-84 Agency, 2008 PSLRB 58

- 42 -

Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada v. Canadian Food 53 Inspection Agency, 2011 PSLRB 131 (CanLII) Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada v. Treasury Board and 6-8, 57, 121, 127 Canada Revenue Agency, 2008 PSLRB 13 (CanLII) P. Sun’s Enterprises (Vancouver) Ltd. (Hotel Grand Pacific) v. National 75 Automobile, Aerospace, Transportation and General Workers Union of Canada (C.A.W.-Canada), Local 114, [2003] BCLRB No. 301 (QL) Public Service Alliance of Canada v. Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, 67 [2002] CPSSRB No. 14 Public Service Alliance of Canada v. Canadian Federal Pilots Association, 37-39 2009 FCA 223 Public Service Alliance of Canada v. Senate of Canada, 2011 FCA 214 38, 40

Public Service Alliance of Canada and Treasury Board, PSSRB File Nos. 53 161-02-791 and 169-02-584 (19960426) (1996) Public Service Alliance of Canada v. Treasury Board (Canada Border 89 Services Agency), 2012 PSLRB 58 PSAC v. Treasury Board of Canada, 2013 PSLRB 37 66, 68

R v Dyment, [1988] 2 SCR 417, [1988] SCJ No 82 113

R c Houle, 2003 CanLII 44810 (QC CA) 114

Rio Tinto Alcan Inc. v. Carrier Sekani Tribal Council, 2010 SCC 43, [2010] 2 41 SCR 650

R.W.C. v. The Queen (March 29, 2005) Doc. 30302 [2004] SCCA No 171 100 (QL) Smith v Canada (AG) 2001 SCC 88, [2001] 3 SCR 902 115

Thompson and Brewery, Winery and Distillery Workers Union, Local 300 76 (Re), [1997] BCLRBD No. B281/97 Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1998] 1 SCR 877, 117 [1998] SCJ No 44 (QL) Thomson newspapers ltd. v. Canada (Director of investigation and research, 113 restrictive trade practices commission), [1990] 1 SCR 425 [1990] SCJ No 23 (QL) Toronto Catholic District School Board v. Ontario English Catholic 42 Teachers’ Assn. (Toronto Elementary Unit), (2001), 55 OR (3d) 737 (C.A.), leave to appeal refused, [2002] 2 SCR ix Toronto (City) Board of Education v. OSSTF, District 15, [1997] 1 SCR 487 42

Vaughan v. Canada, [2005] 1 SCR 146 73 - 43 -

Weber v. Ontario Hydro, [1995] 2 SCR 929 72

ARTICLES Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th Ed., (Thomson Carswell: 115 Toronto), looseleaf

- 44 -

PART VII: STATUTES, REGULATIONS, RULES, BY-LAWS

Federal Courts Act, RSC 1985, c F-7 Loi sur les Cours fédérales, LRC 1985, c F-7

Grounds of review Motifs

18.1 (4) The Federal Court may grant relief 18.1 (4) Les mesures prévues au paragraphe (3) under subsection (3) if it is satisfied that the sont prises si la Cour fédérale est convaincue federal board, commission or other tribunal que l’office fédéral, selon le cas :

(a) acted without jurisdiction, acted beyond its a) a agi sans compétence, outrepassé celle-ci jurisdiction or refused to exercise its ou refusé de l’exercer; jurisdiction; b) n’a pas observé un principe de justice (b) failed to observe a principle of natural naturelle ou d’équité procédurale ou toute autre justice, procedural fairness or other procedure procédure qu’il était légalement tenu de that it was required by law to observe; respecter;

(e) acted, or failed to act, by reason of fraud or e) a agi ou omis d’agir en raison d’une fraude perjured evidence; or ou de faux témoignages;

Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, SNL 2002, c A-1.1

Definition of consistent purposes

40. A use of personal information is consistent under section 38 or 39 with the purposes for which the information was obtained or compiled where the use

(a) has a reasonable and direct connection to that purpose; and

(b) is necessary for performing the statutory duties of, or for operating a legally authorized program of, the public body that uses or discloses the information.

- 45 -

Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, RSA 2000, c F-25

Consistent purposes

41 For the purposes of sections 39(1)(a) and 40(1)(c), a use or disclosure of personal information is consistent with the purpose for which the information was collected or compiled if the use or disclosure

(a) has a reasonable and direct connection to that purpose, and

(b) is necessary for performing the statutory duties of, or for operating a legally authorized program of, the public body that uses or discloses the information.

The Freedom of Information and Protection Loi sur l'accès à l'information et la protection of Privacy Act, CCSM c F175 de la vie privée, CPLM c F175

Consistent purposes Fins compatibles

45 For the purpose of clauses 43(a) and 45 Pour l'application des alinéas 43a) et 44(1)(a), a use or disclosure of personal 44(1)a), l'utilisation ou la communication des information is consistent with the purpose for renseignements personnels est compatible avec which the information was collected or la fin à laquelle ils ont été recueillis ou compiled if the use or disclosure préparés si cet usage ou cette communication :

(a) has a reasonable and direct connection to a) a un lien suffisant et direct avec cette fin; that purpose; and b) est nécessaire soit à l'exercice des (b) is necessary for performing the statutory obligations légales de l'organisme public qui duties of, or for delivering an authorized les utilise ou les communique, soit à la service or program or carrying out an activity prestation d'un des services ou programmes of, the public body that uses or discloses the autorisés de cet organisme, soit à l'exercice information. d'une de ses activités.

- 46 -

Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, SNS 1993, c 5

Use compatible for purpose information obtained

28 A use of personal information is a use compatible with the purpose for which the information was obtained within the meaning of Section 26 or 27 if the use

(a) has a reasonable and direct connection to that purpose; and

(b) is necessary for performing the statutory duties of, or for operating a legally authorized program of, the public body that uses the information or to which the information is disclosed.

Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, RSPEI 1988, c F-15.01

Consistent purposes

38. For the purposes of clauses 36(1)(a) and 37(1)(b), a use or disclosure of personal information is consistent with the purpose for which the information was collected or compiled if the use or disclosure

(a) has a reasonable and direct connection to that purpose; and

(b) is necessary for performing the statutory duties of, or for operating a legally authorized program of, the public body that uses or discloses the information.

Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, RSBC 1996, c 165

Use of personal information

32 A public body may use personal information in its custody or under its control - 47 - only

(a) for the purpose for which that information was obtained or compiled, or for a use consistent with that purpose (see section 34),

Definition of consistent purpose

34 For the purposes of section 32 (a), 33.1 (1) (r) (iii) or 33.2 (a), or paragraph (b) of the definition of "data linking" in Schedule 1, a use of personal information is consistent with the purpose for which the information was obtained or compiled if the use

(a) has a reasonable and direct connection to that purpose, and

(b) is necessary for performing the statutory duties of, or for operating a program or activity of, the public body that uses or discloses the information.

Privacy Act, RSC 1985, c P-21 Loi sur la protection des renseignements personnels, LRC 1985, c P-21

Where personal information may be disclosed Cas d’autorisation

8. (2) Subject to any other Act of Parliament, (2) Sous réserve d’autres lois fédérales, la personal information under the control of a communication des renseignements personnels government institution may be disclosed qui relèvent d’une institution fédérale est autorisée dans les cas suivants : (a) for the purpose for which the information was obtained or compiled by the institution or a) communication aux fins auxquelles ils ont for a use consistent with that purpose; été recueillis ou préparés par l’institution ou pour les usages qui sont compatibles avec ces fins;

48

CANADA

CONSOLIDATION CODIFICATION

Public Service Labour Loi sur les relations de Relations Act travail dans la fonction publique

S.C.2003,c.22,s.2 L.C.2003,ch.22,art.2

NOTE NOTE [Enacted by section 2 of chapter 22 of the Statutes of [Edictee par !'article 2 du chapitre 22 des Lois du Canada Canada, 2003; preamble, sections 1 to 3 and Part 1, in force (2003); pn\ambule, articles 1 a 3 et partie 1, en vigueur Ie 1" April 1, 2005, see SI/2005-22: Part 2, other than subpara­ avril2005, voir TR/2005-22; partie 2, a!'exception du SOUS· graph 209(1)(c)(ii), paragraph 211(b) and section 231, in alinea 209(1)c)(ii), de I'alinea 211b) et de !'article 231, en force April 1, 2005, see SI/2005-23; Parts 3 and 4 in force vigueur le 1" avril 2005, voir TR/2005-23; parties 3 et 4 en April I, 2005, see Sl/2005-24; subparagraph 209(1)(c)(ii), vigueur le 1" avril 2005, voir TR/2005-24; sous-alinea paragraph 21 1(b) and section 231 in force December 31, 209(1 )c)(ii), aline a 211 b) et article 231, en vigueur le 31 de­ 2005, see Sl/2005-123.] cembre 2005, voir TR/2005-123.]

Current to April 16,2013 A jour au 16 avril2013

Last amended on December 31, 2005 Demiere modification le 31 decembre 2005

Published by the Minister of Justice at the following address: Publie par le ministre de Ia Justice a l'adresse suivante : http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca http://lois-laws.justice.gc.ca 49

Public Service Labour Relations--Apri/16, 2013

NOW, THEREFORE, Her Majesty, by and Sa Majeste, sur !'avis et avec le consentement with the advice and consent of the Senate and du Senat et de Ia Chambre des communes du House of Commons of Canada, enacts as fol­ Canada, edicte: lows:

SHORT TITLE TITRE ABREGE

Short title 1. This Act may be cited as the Public Ser­ 1. Loi sur les relations de travail dans Ia Titre abrege vice Labour Relations Act. fonction publique.

INTERPRETATION DEFINITIONS ET INTERPRETATION

Definitions 2. (1) The following definitions apply in 2. (1) Les definitions qui suivent s'ap­ Definitions this Act. pliquent a Ia presente loi.

"adjudicator" "adjudicator" means a member assigned to hear «administrateur general» S'entend de l'admi­ « administrateur « arbitre de and determine a grievance referred to adjudica­ nistrateur general vise a l'un ou ['autre des ali­ general>> gne(>> "deputy head" tion under subsection 209( 1) or section 216 or neas a) a c) de Ia definition de ce terme au pa­ 221 and includes, if the context permits, a ragraphe 11(1) de Ia Loi sur la gestion des board of adjudication established under para­ finances publiques. graph 223(2)(c), a person named as an adjudi­ «administration publique centrale» S' entend au « administration cator in a collective agreement and a person sens du paragraphe 11(1) de Ia Loi sur Ia ges­ publique otherwise selected as an adjudicator by the par­ centrale>> tion des finances publiques. "core public ties to the grievance. administration"

"arbitral award" "arbitral award" means an award made by an «agent negociateur » Organisation syndicale <> arbitration board in respect of a dispute. a "bargaining ce titre une unite de negociation. agent" "arbitration "arbitration board" means a board established board" under Division 9 of Part I. « arbitre de grief» Commissaire charge d'en­ << arbitre de « C'0/7!1(~1/ grief» d'arbiJraKe » tendre et de regler un grief renvoye a !'arbi­ "adjudicator" trage en vertu du paragraphe 209( 1) ou des ar­ "bargaining "bargaining agent" means an employee organi­ ticles 216 ou 221 ou, selon le contexte, Je agent" zation that is certified by the Board as the bar­ « Of{Cnt conseil d'arbitrage de grief institue en vertu de nej.!OCIO/eur )) gaining agent for the employees in a bargaining l'alinea 223(2)c) ou Ia personne soit ainsi desi­ unit. gnee dans une convention collective, soit choi­ "bargaining "bargaining unit" means a group of two or sie d'une autre fa9on en cette qualite par les unit" more employees that is determined by the parties. <~unite de nigociation )) Board to constitute a unit of employees appro­ «Commissaire» Membre a temps plein ou a « commissaire » priate for collective bargaining. temps partie! de Ia Commission. "member" "Board" "Board" means the Public Service Labour Re­ « « Commission » «Commission» La Commission des relations Conunission » lations Board established by section 12. "'Board' de travail dans Ia fonction publique, creee par "Chairperson" "Chairperson" means the Chairperson of the !'article 12. «president » Board. « conseil d'arbitrage » Conseil etabli en applica­ « conseil d' arbitrage >> "collective "collective agreement" means an agreement in tion de Ia section 9 de Ia partie 1. '"arbitralion agreement" writing, entered into under Part 1 between the board' «convention col/eclive >> employer and a bargaining agent, containing «convention collective» Convention ecrite ~< convention provisions respecting terms and conditions of conclue en application de Ia partie 1 entre l'em­ collective >> '~collective employment and related matters. ployeur et un agent negociateur donne et ren­ agreement" "core public "core " has the same fermant des dispositions relatives aux condi­ administration" meaning as in subsection 11(1) ofthe Financial tions d'emploi eta des questions connexes. «administration puhlique Administration Act. « cotisations syndicales » Somme que I' em­ « cotisations centrale» ployeur des fonctionnaires representes par syndicates >> ~·membership )'agent negociateur est tenu, aux termes de dues')

2 Relations de travail dans lafonction publique -16 avril 2013

"council of "council of employee organizations" means a toute convention collective conclue entre lui et employee organizations'' council formed by two or more employee orga­ !'agent negociateur, de deduire du salaire des « regroupement nizations. fonctionnaires et de remettre a ce demier. d 'organisations syndtcales >> «decision arbitrale » Decision rendue sur un ~> "deputy head" "deputy head" means a deputy head referred to "arbitral award' << administrateur in any of paragraphs (a) to (c) of the definition gfmJral >) «differend» Desaccord qui peut faire !'objet « diff6rend » "deputy head" in subsection 11(1) of the Finan­ d'une demande d'arbitrage ou de conciliation "di!ipule'~ cial Administration Act. aux termes, respectivement, des paragraphes "dispute" "dispute" means a dispute or difference that 136(1) ou 161(1), survenant a !'occasion de Ia « d(f/'erend » arises in connection with the entering into, re­ conclusion, du renouvellement ou de Ia revision newal or revision of a collective agreement and d'une convention collective. in respect of which arbitration may be request­ « employeur» Sa Majeste du chef du Canada, « employeur » ed under subsection 136( I) or conciliation may representee: "employer" be requested under subsection 161 ( 1). a) par le Conseil du Tresor, dans le cas d'un "employee" "employee", except in Part 2, means a person ministere figurant a l'annexe I de Ia Loi sur « employed in the public service, other than .fimctionnaire » Ia gestion des finances publiques ou d'un (a) a person appointed by the Governor in autre secteur de !'administration publique fe­ Council under an Act of Parliament to a derale figurant a l'annexe IV de cette loi; statutory position described in that Act; b) par l'organisme distinct en cause, dans Je (b) a person locally engaged outside cas d'un secteur de !'administration publique Canada; federale figurant a l'annexe V de Ia Loi sur Ia gestion des finances publiques. (c) a person not ordinarily required to work more than one third of the normal period for « fonctionnaire » Sauf a Ia partie 2, personne << fonctiormaire » persons doing similar work; employee dans Ia fonction publique, a !'exclu­ "employee" (d) a person who is a member or special sion de toute personne : constable of the Royal Canadian Mounted a) nommee par le gouverneur en conseil, en Police or who is employed by that force un­ vertu d'une loi federale, a un poste prevu par der terms and conditions substantially the cette loi; same as those of one of its members; b) recrutee sur place a l'etranger; (e) a person employed in the Canadian Se­ c) qui n'est pas ordinairement astreinte a tra­ curity Intelligence Service who does not per­ vailler plus du tiers du temps normalement form duties of a clerical or secretarial nature; exige des personnes executant des taches (j) a person employed on a casual basis; semblables; (g) a person employed on a term basis, un­ d) qui est membre ou gendarme auxiliaire de less the term of employment is for a period Ia Gendarmerie royale du Canada, ou y est of three months or more or the person has employee sensiblement aux memes condi­ been so employed for a period of three tions que ses membres; months or more; e) employee par le Service canadien du ren­ (h) a person employed by the Board; seignement de securite et n'exer9ant pas des (i) a person who occupies a managerial or fonctions de commis ou de secretaire; confidential position; or f) employee a titre occasionnel; (j) a person who is employed under a pro­ g) employee pour une duree determinee de gram designated by the employer as a stu­ moins de trois mois ou ayant travaille a ce dent employment program. titre pendant moins de trois mois;

"employee "employee organization" means an organiza­ h) employee par Ia Commission; organization" tion of employees the purposes of which in- « oJ:_~anisation .\yndicale >>

3 51

Public Service Labour Relations-· April 16, 2013

elude the regulation of relations between the i) occupant un poste de direction ou de employer and its employees for the purposes of confiance; Parts 1 and 2, and includes, unless the context j) employee dans Je cadre d'un programme othetwise requires, a council of employee orga­ designe par l'employeur comme un pro­ nizations. gramme d'embauche des etudiants. "employer" "employer" means Her Majesty in right of « fonction publique » Sauf a Ia partie 3, I' en­ ({ fonction « employetlf » Canada as represented by semble des postes qui sont compris dans les en­ publique » "public service" (a) the Treasury Board, in the case of a de­ tites ci-apres ou qui en rei event: partment named in Schedule I to the Finan­ a) les ministeres figurant a l'annexe I de Ia cial Administration Act or another portion of Loi sur Ia gestion des finances publiques; the federal public administration named in Schedule IV to that Act; and b) Jes autres secteurs de !'administration pu­ blique federate figurant a l'annexe IV de (b) the separate agency,in the case of a por­ cette loi; tion of the federal public administration named in Schedule V to the Financial Ad­ c) Jes organismes distincts figurant a l'an­ ministration Act. nexe V de Ia meme Joi.

"managerial or "managerial or confidential position" means a «greve» Tout arret du travail ou refus de tra­ « grCve » contldential position declared to be a managerial or confi­ vailler, par des personnes employees dans Ia "strike" position" «poste de dential position by an order made by the Board fonction publique agissant conjointement, de direciiOn ou de concert ou de connivence; y sont assimiles Je coiJflance » under subsection 62(1 ), section 63, subsection 74(1) or section 75. ralentissement du travail ou toute autre activite concertee, de Ia part de telles personnes, ayant "member" "member" means a member of the Board, pour objet Ia diminution ou Ia limitation du ren­ « commissaire » whether full-time or part-time. dement. "membership "membership dues", in respect of employees «ministre» Le membre du Conseil prive de Ia « ministre » dues" represented by a bargaining agent, means the « cotisations Reine pour le Canada, a !'exception d'un "Minister"' ,\yndtcales » amount that the employer is required to deduct membre du Conseil du Tresor, charge par Je from the pay of the employees and remit to the gouverneur en conseil de )'application de Ia bargaining agent under any collective agree­ presente loi. ment that is entered into between the employer and the bargaining agent. «organisation syndicate» Organisation regrou­ « organisation pant des fonctionnaires en vue, notamment, de syndicate >> "Minister" "Minister" means the member of the Queen's "employee Ia reglementation des relations entre les fonc­ organization" « ministre )) Privy Council for Canada, other than a member tionnaires et leur employeur pour !'application of the Treasury Board, designated by the Gov­ des parties 1 et 2; s'entend en outre, sauf indi­ ernor in Council as the Minister for the purpos­ cation contraire du contexte, de tout regroupe­ es of this Act. ment d'organisations syndicales. "public service" "public service", except in Part 3, means the « organisme distinct» S 'entend au sens du para­ « orgarusme «fonctwn several positions in or under puhilque » 1) distinct» graphe 11 ( de Ia Loi sur Ia gestion des fi­ "separate (a) the departments named in Schedule I to nances publiques. agency" the Financial Administration Act; « poste de direction ou de confiance » Poste de­ « poste de (b) the other portions of the federal public clare tel par Ia Commission aux termes du para­ direction ou de confiance » administration named in Schedule IV to that graphe 62(1), de !'article 63, du paragraphe umanagerial or Act; and confidential 74(1) ou de l'article 75. position', (c) the separate agencies named in Schedule «president» Le president de Ia Commission. << president >> V to that Act ''Chairperson"

"separate "separate agency" has the same meaning as in agency" « orgamsme subsection 11 (1) of the Financial Administra­ distinct» tion Act.

4 52

Relations de travail dans Ia fonction publique 16 avril 2013

"strike" "strike" includes a cessation of work or a re­ « regroupement d' organisations syndicales » « regroupement « gri:ve ;; fusal to work or to continue to work by persons Regroupement resultant de !'union de plusieurs d' organisations syndicales >> employed in the public service, in combination, organisations syndicales. "council qf employee in concert or in accordance with a common un­ organizations" derstanding, and a slow-down of work or any other concerted activity on the part of such per­ «unite de migociation » Groupe de fonction­ «unite de naires dont Ia Commission a declare qu'il negociation }) sons that is designed to restrict or limit output. "bargaining constitue une unite habile a negocier collective­ un;t" "Vice­ "Vice-Chairperson" means a Vice-Chairperson ment. Chairperson" of the Board. « l'ICe­ «vice-pn\sident» Un vice-president de Ia Com­ «vice· preside/11 >> mission. president» "Vice~ Chairper:wn"

Etnployment (2) A person does not cease to be employed (2) La personne ne cesse pas d'etre em­ Maintien du status preserved in the public service by reason only that the ployee dans Ia fonction publique du seul fait statut person ceases to work as a result of a strike or qu'elle a cesse d'y travailler par suite d'une by reason only of the tennination of the per­ greve ou par suite d'un licenciement contraire a son's employment contrary to this Act or any Ia presente loi ou a toute autre loi federale. other Act of Parliament.

Persons who are (3) For greater certainty, a person is not an (3) II est entendu que n'est pas consideree Exclusion not employees employee if comme un fonctionnaire : (a) the person is engaged under subsection a) Ia personne dont les services sont retenus 50(1 ); or au titre du paragraphe 50( I); (b) the person's compensation for the per­ b) Ia personne dont Ia retribution pour formance of the regular duties of the per­ l'exercice des fonctions nonnales de son son's position or office consists of fees of of­ poste ou de sa charge consiste en honoraires fice or is related to the revenue of the office ou depend des recettes du bureau oil elle est in which the person is employed. employee.

Casual (4) For the purposes of paragraph (j) of the (4) Pour !'application de l'alineaj) de Ia de­ Emploi atitre employment definition "employee" in subsection (I), a per­ finition de « fonctionnaire » au paragraphe (1 ), occasionnel son employed in the part of the public service Ia personne employee dans Ia partie de Ia fonc­ to which the Public Service Commission has tion publique dans laquelle les nominations re­ the exclusive right to make appointments is em­ levent exclusivement de Ia Commission de Ia ployed on a casual basis if the person was ap­ fonction publique est une personne employee a pointed under section 50 of the Public Service titre occasionnel si elle a ete nommee en vertu Employment Act. de !'article 50 de Ia Loi sur I 'emploi dans Ia fonction publique.

References to (5) Every reference to a person who occu­ (5) La mention du titulaire d'un poste Mention des occupants of pies a position, or to the occupant of a position, ainsi que toute mention equivalente - vaut titulaires des positions postes includes a person who is acting in that position egalement mention de l'interimaire ou de toute or who has assumed wholly or substantially the autre personne qui assume Ia totalite ou !'essen­ duties and responsibilities of that position, and tiel des attributions du poste; de meme, Ia men­ a reference to a person's position includes the tion d'un poste vaut mention du poste occupe position of a person who is acting in that posi­ par une telle personne. tion or who has assumed wholly or substantial­ 2003, ch. 22, art. 2 «2» et 243. ly the duties and responsibilities of that posi­ tion. 2003, c. 22, ss. 2 "2", 243.

Descriptive 3. If, in any provision of this Act, a refer­ 3. Les mots entre parentheses qui, dans un Renvois cross· references ence to another provision of this Act is fol­ but purement descriptif d'une matiere donnee, descriptifs lowed by words in parentheses that are descrip- suivent un renvoi a une disposition de Ia pre-

5 53 Public Service Labour Relations- Apri/16, 2013

Supervision of (2) The Director of the Board as­ (2) Le directeur general assiste le president Surveillance des work sists the Chairperson in the exercise of the dans l'exercice de ses fonctions et, sous Ia di­ travaux et du personnel Chairperson's functions and, subject to the rection de celui-ci, dirige et surveille Ia Chairperson's direction, directs and supervises conduite des affaires courantes de Ia Commis­ the day-to-day conduct of the work of the sion, Ia gestion de ses affaires internes et !'exe­ Board, the management of the Board's internal cution des fonctions de son personnel. affairs and the work of persons employed by the Board.

Other persons 49. All other persons that the Board consid­ 49. Le personnel supplementaire que Ia Personae! ers necessary for it to employ are to be appoint­ Commission estime necessaire est nomme sous supplementaire ed under the Public Service Employment Act. le regime de Ia Loi sur I 'emploi dans Ia fonc­ tion publique.

Experts and 50. ( 1) The Chairperson may engage on a 50. ( 1) Le president peut retenir temporaire­ Assistance advisers temporary basis the services of mediators and ment les services de mediateurs et d'autres ex­ technique other experts or persons having technical or perts charges d'assister Ia Commission a titre special knowledge to assist the Board in an ad­ consultatif, et, sous reserve de !'agrement du visory capacity and, subject to the approval of gouverneur en conseil, fixer leur remuneration. the Governor in Council, fix their remunera­ tion.

Non-application (2) A person engaged under subsection (1) (2) Les personnes dont les services sont re­ Non-application of Puh/ic de Ia Loi sur Ia Service is not to be considered as being employed in tenus au titre du paragraphe (1) ne font pas par­ pension de Ia Superannuation the public service for the purposes of the Public tie, de ce seul fait, de Ia fonction publique pour fonction Acl Service Superannuation Act by reason only of !'application de Ia Loi sur Ia pension de Ia publique being so engaged. fonction publique.

Judicial Review and Et?forcement of Orders Revision judiciaire et execution des ordonnances

Orders not to be 51. (I) Subject to this Part, every order or 51. (1) So us reserve des autres dispositions lmpossibilite de reviewed by revision par un court decision of the Board is final and may not be de Ia presente partie, les ordonnances et les de­ tribunal questioned or reviewed in any court, except in cisions de Ia Commission sont definitives et ne accordance with the Federal Courts Act on the sont susceptibles de contestation ou de revision grounds referred to in paragraph 18.1(4}(a), (b) par voie judiciaire qu' en conformite avec Ia Loi or (e) of that Act. sur les Cours federates et pour les motifs vises aux alineas 18.1 ( 4) a), b) ou e) de cette loi.

Standing of (2) The Board has standing to appear in pro­ (2) La Commission a qualite pour compa­ Qualite de Ia Board ceedings referred to in subsection (1) for the raitre dans les procedures visees au paragraphe Commission purpose of making submissions regarding the (I) pour presenter ses observations a I' egard de standard of review to be used with respect to Ia norme de controle judiciaire applicable a ses decisions of the Board and the Board's jurisdic­ decisions ou a I' egard de sa competence, de ses tion, policies and procedures. procedures et de ses lignes directrices.

No review by (3) Except as permitted by subsection (1 ), (3) Sauf exception prevue au paragraphe (I), Interdiction de certiorari. etc. no order, decision or proceeding of the Board !'action- decision, ordonnance ou procedure recours extraordinaire made or carried on under or purporting to be de Ia Commission, dans Ia mesure oil elle made or carried on under this Part may, on any est censee s'exercer dans le cadre de Ia presente ground, including the ground that the order, de­ partie, ne peut, pour quelque motif, notamment cision or proceeding is beyond the jurisdiction celui de l'exces de pouvoir ou de !'incompe­ of the Board to make or carry on or that, in the tence a une etape quelconque de Ia procedure: course of any proceeding, the Board for any a) etre contestee, revisee, empechee ou limi­ reason exceeded or lost its jurisdiction, tee;

18 Relations de travail dans Ia fonction publique -- 16 avril 2013

(a) be questioned, reviewed, prohibited or b) faire !'objet d'un recours judiciaire, no­ restrained; or tamment par voie d'injonction, de certiorari, de prohibition ou de quo warranto. (b) be made the subject of any proceedings in or any process of any court, whether by 2003, ch. 22, art 2 «51» et 274. way of injunction, certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto or otherwise. 2003, c. 22, ss. 2 "51", 274.

Filing of 52. (l) The Board must, on the request in 52. (1) Sur demande ecrite de Ia personne Depot a Ia Cour Board's orders writing of any person or organization affected ou de !'organisation touchee, Ia Commission federale in Federal Court by any order of the Board, file a certified copy depose a Ia Cour federale une copie certifiee of the order, exclusive of the reasons for the or­ con forme du dispositif de I' ordonnance sauf si, der, in the Federal Court, unless, in its opinion, ason avis: (a) there is no indication of failure or likeli- a) soit rien ne laisse croire qu'elle n'a pas hood of failure to comply with the order; or ete executee ou ne le sera pas; (b) there is other good reason why the filing b) soit, pour d'autres motifs valables, le de­ of the order in the Federal Court would serve pot ne serait d'aucune utilite. no useful purpose.

Effect of filing (2) An order of the Board becomes an order (2) En vue de son execution, !'ordonnance Execution des of the Federal Court when a certified copy of rendue par Ia Commission, des le depot a Ia ordonnances the order is filed in that court, and it may subse­ Cour federale de Ia copie certifiee conforme, quently be enforced as such. est assimilee a une ordonnance rendue par celle-ci.

Advisory Board Comite consultatif

Minister to 53. (I) The Minister shall establish an advi­ 53. (1) Le ministre etablit un comite consul­ Etablissement establish sory board to provide advice to the Chairperson tatif charge de conseiller le president sur les par le ministre on the compensation analysis and research ser­ services d'analyse et de recherche en matiere vices provided by the Board. de remuneration offerts par Ia Commission.

Composition (2} The advisory board is to consist of a (2) Le comite est forme d'au plus douze Formation chairperson and no more than II other mem­ membres - dont le president de celui-ci - bers appointed by the Minister. nommes par le ministre.

Qualifications (3) All of the members must have knowl­ (3) Les membres doivent avoir des connais­ Qualifications edge or experience that will assist the advisory sances ou de )'experience susceptibles d'aider board to accomplish its mandate, including le comite consultatif a accomplir sa mission, knowledge of or experience in compensation notamment des connaissances ou de )'expe­ issues or statistics. rience dans le domaine de Ia remuneration ou de Ia statistique.

Representative~ (4) Appointments to the advisory board are (4) Le nombre des membres qui representent Representativite ness to be made such that there is an equal number les fonctionnaires doit etre ega) a celui des of members representative of the employer and membres qui representent l'employeur. of employees.

19 55

Public Service Labour Relations-- April 16, 2013

must certify the applicant employee organiza­ accrediter comme agent negociateur de I 'unite tion as the bargaining agent for the bargaining de negociation !'organisation syndicale sollici­ unit if it is satisfied tant !'accreditation si elle est convaincue, a Ia fois: (a) that a majority of employees in that bar­ gaining unit wish the applicant employee or­ a) que Ia majorite des fonctionnaires de !'u­ ganization to represent them as their bargain­ nite de negociation souhaitent que )'organi­ ing agent; sation syndicale les represente a titre d'agent negociateur; (b) that the persons representing the employ­ ee organization in the making of the applica­ b) que Ies personnes representant !'organisa­ tion have been duly authorized to make the tion syndicate dans Ia procedure de demande application; and ont ete dfiment autorisees a deposer celle-ci; (c) if the applicant is a council of employee c) dans le cas de Ia demande presentee par organizations, that each of the employee or­ un regroupement d'organisations syndicales, ganizations forming the council has vested que chacune des organisations syndicales appropriate authority in the council to enable formant le regroupement a donne a celui-ci it to discharge the duties and responsibilities l'autorite suffisante pour lui permettre de of a bargaining agent. remplir ses fonctions d'agent negociateur.

Where previous (2) If an application for certification of an (2) Lorsque Ia Commission a refuse Ia de­ Refus d'accredi­ application tation dans les denied within employee organization as the bargaining agent maude d'accreditation d'une organisation syn­ six mois qui six months for a proposed bargaining unit has been denied dicale, elle ne peut prendre en consideration au­ suivent le rejet by the Board, the Board may not consider a cune nouvelle demande d'accreditation de Ia d' une demande anterieure new application for certification from that em­ part de celle-ci a l'egard de Ia meme unite, ou ployee organization in respect of the same or d'une unite essentiellement similaire, sauf si au substantially the same proposed bargaining unit moins six mois se sont ecoules depuis Ia date until at least six months have elapsed from the de ce refus ou si elle est convaincue que ce re­ day on which the employee organization was fus a resulte d'une omission ou d'une erreur de last denied certification, unless the Board is sat­ procedure au cours de Ia demande. isfied that the previous application was denied by reason only of a technical error or omission made in connection with the application.

Membership in (3) For the purpose of paragraph (l)(a), (3) Pour )'application de l'alinea (I)a), Adhesion it un council of membership in any employee organization that l'adhesion une organisation syndicale regroupement employee a d'organisations organizations forms part of a council of employee organiza­ membre d'un regroupement d'organisations syndicates tions is deemed to be membership in the coun­ syndicales vaut adhesion au regroupement. cil.

Representation 65. (I) The Board may order that a repre­ 65. ( 1) La Commission peut ordonner Ia te­ Scrutin de vote sentation vote be taken among the employees in nue d'un scrutin afin de verifier si Ia majorite representation the bargaining unit for the purpose of satisfying des fonctionnaires de !'unite de negociation itself that a majority of them wish the applicant souhaitent etre representes par !'organisation employee organization to represent them as qui sollicite !'accreditation. their bargaining agent.

Arrangements (2) When the Board orders that a representa- (2) La Commission doit, lorsqu'elle ordonne Dispositions a for vote tion vote be taken, it must Ia tenue d'un scrutin de representation, prendre prendre les dispositions suivantes : (a) determine the employees who are eligi­ ble to vote; and a) elle precise quels sont les fonctionnaires qui ont le droit de voter; (b) make any arrangements and give any di­ rections that it considers necessary for the b) elle prend les mesures et donne les ins­ proper conduct of the vote, including the tructions qui lui semblent necessaires en vue preparation of ballots, the method of casting de Ia regularite du scrutin de representation,

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and counting ballots and the custody and notamment en ce qui concerne Ia pn\paration sealing of ballot boxes. des bulletins de vote, Ies modes de scrutin et de depouillement, et Ia garde et le scellage des urnes.

Where Certification Prohibited Refus d'accreditation

Employer 66. (I) The Board may not certifY an em­ 66. (1) La Commission n'accorde pas !'ac­ Participation de participation ployee organization as a bargaining agent if it creditation si elle conclut que l'employeur ou I' employeur is of the opinion that the employer, or a person toute personne agissant en son nom a participe acting on behalf of the employer, has partici­ ou participe a Ia formation ou a !'administration pated or is participating in the formation or ad­ de !'organisation syndicale, et qu'elle estime ministration of the employee organization in a que cela compromet !'aptitude de cette organi­ manner that impairs its fitness to represent the sation a defendre les interets des fonctionnaires interests of the employees in the bargaining qui font partie de )'unite de negociation. unit for which it is proposed to be certified.

Discrimination (2) The Board may not certifY an employee (2) La Commission n'accorde pas !'accredi­ Discrimination organization as a bargaining agent if it discrim­ tation a !'organisation syndicale qui fait, a inates against any employee on a prohibited l'egard de tout fonctionnaire, des distinctions ground of discrimination within the meaning of fondees sur un motif illicite au sens de Ia Loi the Canadian Human Rights Act. canadienne sur les droits de la personne.

Effect of Certification Effet de !'accreditation

Effect of 67. Certification of an employee organiza­ 67. L'accreditation de toute organisation Droits de certification tion as the bargaining agent for a bargaining syndicale titre d'agent negociateur emporte: I' organisation a syndicate unit has the following effects: accreditee a) droit exclusif de negocier collectivement (a) the employee organization has exclusive au nom des fonctionnaires de !'unite de ne­ authority to bargain collectively on behalf of gociation qu'elle represente; the employees in the bargaining unit; b) revocation, en ce qui touche les fonction­ (b) the certification of any employee organi­ naires de !'unite de negociation, de !'accredi­ zation that was previously certified as the tation de toute organisation syndicale ante­ bargaining agent for any employees in the rieurement accreditee; bargaining unit is deemed to be revoked to c) substitution de !'organisation syndicale the extent that the certification relates to - en qualite de partie a toute convention those employees; collective ou decision arbitrale s'appliquant a (c) the employee organization is substituted des fonctionnaires de !'unite de negociation, as a party to any collective agreement or ar­ mais a I' egard de ces fonctionnaires seule­ bitral award that affects any employees in the ment - a !'agent negociateur nommement bargaining unit, to the extent that the agree­ designe dans Ia convention collective ou a ment or award relates to those employees, in tout successeur de celui-ci; the place of the bargaining agent named in d) assimilation de I' organisation syndicale a the collective agreement or its successor; !'agent negociateur, pour !'application de (d) the employee organization is deemed to !'article 107; be the bargaining agent for the purposes of e) substitution de !'organisation syndicale section 107; and en qualite de partie a toute entente sur les (e) the employee organization is substituted services essentiels en vigueur a !'agent as a party to any essential services agreement negociateur nommement designe dans !'en­ that is in force, in the place of the bargaining tente ou a tout successeur de celui-ci. agent named in the agreement or its succes­ sor.

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Taking of 95. After the application is made, the Board 95. Saisie de Ia demande, Ia Commission Tenue d"un representation may order that a representation vote be taken in peut, en prenant les dispositions pn!ivues au pa­ scrutin de vote repnSsentation order to determine whether a majority of the ragraphe 65(2), ordonner Ia tenue d'un scrutin employees in the bargaining unit no longer de representation, afin d'etablir si Ia majorite wish to be represented by the employee organi­ des fonctionnaires de !'unite de negociation ne zation that is the bargaining agent for that bar­ souhaitent plus etre representes par !'organisa­ gaining unit. The provisions of subsection tion syndicale qui en est !'agent negociateur. 65(2) apply in relation to the taking of the vote.

Revocation of 96. If, after hearing the application, the 96. Si, apres audition de Ia demande, Ia Revocation de certification Board is satisfied that a majority of the employ­ Commission est convaincue du bien-fonde de I' accreditation ees in the bargaining unit no longer wish to be celle-ci, elle revoque !'accreditation de l'orga­ represented by the employee organization, it nisation syndicale en cause. must revoke the certification of the employee 9rganization as the bargaining agent.

Certification 97. The Board must revoke the certification 97. La Commission revoque !'accreditation Accreditation obtained by of an employee organization if the Board is sat­ de I' organisation syndicale si elle est con vain­ obtenue en fraud frau de isfied that it was obtained by fraud. cue que celle-ci l'a obtenue frauduleusement.

Employer 98. The Board must revoke the certification 98. La Commission revoque !'accreditation Participation de participation or of an employee organization as the bargaining de !'organisation syndicale comme agent nego­ l'employeurou discrimination discrimination agent for a bargaining unit if the Board, on ap­ ciateur representant une unite de negociation si, plication by the employer or any employee, de­ en reponse a une demande a cet effet de l'em­ termines that ployeur ou de tout fonctionnaire, elle decide: (a) the employer, or a person acting on be­ a) que l'employeur, ou toute personne agis­ half of the employer, has participated or is sant en son nom, a participe ou participe a Ia participating in the formation or administra­ formation ou a !'administration de !'organi­ tion of the employee organization in a man­ sation syndicate representant !'unite de nego­ ner that impairs its fitness to represent the in­ ciation en cause et que cela compromet !'ap­ terests of the employees in the bargaining titude de cette organisation a defendre les unit; or interets des fonctionnaires qui font partie de !'unite de negociation; (b) the employee organization discriminates against any employee on a prohibited ground b) que !'organisation fait, a l'egard d'un of discrimination within the meaning of the fonctionnaire, des distinctions fondees sur un Canadian Human Rights Act. motif illicite au sens de Ia Loi canadienne sur les droits de Ia personne.

Abandonment of 99. The Board must revoke the certification 99. La Commission revoque !'accreditation Renonciation il certification of an employee organization if the employee de !'organisation syndicale soit sur avis de re­ I' accreditation organization advises the Board that it wishes to nonciation de celle-ci, soit si elle conclut, sur give up or abandon its certification or if the demande de l'employeur ou de tout fonction­ Board, on application by the employer or any naire, a Ia cessation des fonctions de !'organisa­ employee, determines that the employee orga­ tion comme agent negociateur. nization has ceased to act as bargaining agent.

Council of 100. (I) The Board must revoke the certifi­ 100. (1) A Ia demande de l'employeur ou Accreditation employee cation of a council of employee organizations de toute organisation syndicale faisant ou ayant d'un organizations regroupement that has been certified as a bargaining agent if fait partie d'un regroupement accredite comme the Board is satisfied, on application by the em­ agent negociateur, Ia Commission revoque !'ac­ ployer or an employee organization that forms creditation de celui-ci si elle arrive a Ia conclu­ or has formed part of the council, that the coun­ sion qu'il ne remplit plus les conditions d'ac­ cil no longer meets the condition for certifica­ creditation fixees par l'alinea 64(l)c). tion set out in paragraph 64(l)(c) for a council of employee organizations.

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(b) if no effective date is specified, the first a) a Ia date d'entree en vigueur qui y est day of the month after the month in which fixee, le cas echeant; the agreement is signed. b) le jour du mois qui suit immedia­ tement celui au cours duquel elle a ete si­ gnee, dans les autres cas.

Minimum 116. A collective agreement is deemed to 116. La convention collective est en vigueur Duree minimale duration have effect for one year, unless a longer period pendant un an ou Ia periode plus longue qui y d'un an is specified in the collective agreement. est fixee.

Duty to 117. Subject to the appropriation by or un­ 117. So us reserve de I' affectation par le Par­ Obligation de implement lement, ou sous son autorite, des credits dont mettre en provisions of the der the authority of Parliament of money that application une collective may be required by the employer, the parties l'employeur peut avoir besoin a cette fin, les convention agreement must implement the provisions of a collective parties a une convention collective com­ agreement mencent aappliquer celle-ci : (a) within the period specified in the collec­ a) au cours du delai eventuellement prevu a tive agreement for that purpose; or cette fin dans Ia convention; (b) if no such period is specified in the col­ b) en !'absence de delai de mise en applica­ lective agreement, within 90 days after the tion, dans les quatre-vingt-dix jours suivant date it is signed or any longer period that the Ia date de Ia signature de Ia convention ou parties may agree to or that the Board, on ap­ dans le delai plus long dont peuvent convenir plication by either party, may set. les parties ou que fixe Ia Commission sur de­ mande de l'une ou !'autre des parties.

Amendments Modifications

Parties may 118. Nothing in this Part prohibits parties 118. La presente partie n'a pas pour effet Modifications amend from amending any provision of a collective d'empecher Ia modification, par les parties, des permises agreement, other than a provision relating to its dispositions d'une convention collective, ex­ term. ception faite de celle qui en fixe Ia date d'expi­ ration.

DIVISION 8 SECTION 8

EssENTIAL SERVICES SERVICES ESSENT!ELS

Application of 119. This Division applies to the employer 119. La presente section s'applique a l'em­ Application Division and the bargaining agent for a bargaining unit ployeur et a )'agent negociateur representant when the process for the resolution of a dispute une unite de negociation dans le cas ou le mode applicable to the bargaining unit is conciliation. de reglement des differends applicable a celle­ ci est le renvoi a Ia conciliation.

Employer 120. The employer has the exclusive right to 120. L'employeur ale droit exclusif de fixer Niveau des determines determine the level at which an essential ser­ le niveau auquel un service essentiel doit etre services par levels of service l'employeur vice is to be provided to the public, or a seg­ fourni a tout ou partie du public, notamment ment of the public, at any time, including the dans quelle mesure et selon queUe frequence il extent to which and the frequency with which doit etre fourni. Aucune disposition de Ia pre­ the service is to be provided. Nothing in this sente section ne peut etre interpretee de fa<;on a Division is to be construed as limiting that porter atteinte a ce droit. right.

Proportion of 121. (1) For the purpose of identifying the 121. (1) Pour le calcul du nombre des Accroissement duties may vaty number of positions that are necessary for the postes necessaires Ia fourniture d'un service de certaines during strike a fonctions lors employer to provide an essential service, the essentiel, l'employeur et !'agent negociateur d'une greve employer and the bargaining agent may agree peuvent convenir que l'employeur pourra exi­ that some employees in the bargaining unit will ger de certains fonctionnaires de !'unite de m\-

39 59 Public Service Labour Relations-- Apri/16, 2013

be required by the employer to perform their gociation, lors d'une greve, qu'ils accom­ duties that relate to the provision of the essen­ plissent leurs fonctions liees a Ia foumiture tial service in a greater proportion during a d'un service essentiel dans une proportion plus strike than they do normally. grande qu'a !'habitude.

Determination (2) For the purposes of subsection (1), the (2) Pour !'application du paragraphe (1 ), le Calcul du of number of number of employees in the bargaining unit nombre de fonctionnaires de !'unite de negocia­ nombre de necessary fonctionnaires employees that are necessary to provide the essential ser­ tion necessaires a Ia foumiture d'un service es­ nCcessaires vice is to be determined sentiel est calcule: (a) without regard to the availability of other a) compte non tenu de Ia disponibilite persons to provide the essential service dur­ d'autres personnes pour foumir ce service ing a strike; and essentiel durant une greve; (b) on the basis that the employer is not re­ b) compte tenu du fait que l'employeur n'est quired to change, in order to provide the es­ pas oblige de changer le cours normal de ses sential service during a strike, the manner in operations afin de fournir ce service essentiel which the employer operates normally, in­ pendant une greve, notamment en ce qui cluding the normal hours of work, the extent concerne les heures normales de travail, Ia of the employer's use of overtime and the mesure dans laquelle l'employeur a recours equipment used in the employer's opera­ aux heures supplementaires et le materiel tions. que celui-ci utilise dans le cadre de ses ope­ rations.

Obligation to 122. (1) If the employer has given to the 122. (1) Si l'employeur a avise par ecrit Obligation de negotiate bargaining agent a notice in writing that the !'agent negociateur qu'il estime que des fonc­ negocier employer considers that employees in the bar­ tionnaires de !'unite de negociation occupent gaining unit occupy positions that are necessary des postes necessaires pour lui permettre de for the employer to provide essential services, foumir des services essentiels, !'agent negocia­ the employer and the bargaining agent must teur et lui font tous les efforts raisonnables pour make every reasonable effort to enter into an conclure une entente sur les services essentiels essential services agreement as soon as possi­ dans les meilleurs delais. ble.

Timing (2) The notice may be given at any time but (2) L'avis est donne au plus tard vingt jours Delai not later than 20 days after the day a notice to apres Ia date a laquelle un avis de negociation bargain collectively is given. collective est donne.

Application to 123. (I) If the employer and the bargaining 123. (1) s'ils ne parviennent pas a conclure Requete a Ia the Board agent are unable to enter into an essential ser­ une entente sur les services essentiels, l'em­ Conunission vices agreement, either of them may apply to ployeur ou !'agent negociateur peuvent deman­ the Board to determine any unresolved matter der a Ia Commission de statuer sur toute ques­ that may be included in an essential services tion qu'ils n'ont pas reglee et qui peut figurer agreement. The application may be made at any dans une telle entente. La demande est presen­ time but not later than tee au plus tard: (a) 15 days after the day a request for con-. a) soit quinze jours apres Ia date de presen­ ciliation is made by either party; or tation de Ia demande de conciliation; (b) 15 days after the day the parties are noti­ b) so it quinze jours apres Ia date a laquelle fied by the Chairperson under subsection les parties sont avisees par le president de 163(2) of his or her intention to recommend son intention de recommander l'etablisse­ the establishment of a public interest com­ ment d'une commission de !'interet public en mission. application du paragraphe 163(2).

Delay (2) The Board may delay dealing with the (2) La Commission peut attendre, avant de Report application until it is satisfied that the employer donner suite a Ia demande, d'etre convaincue and the bargaining agent have made every rea- que l'employeur et !'agent negociateur ont fait

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sonable effort to enter into an essential services tous les efforts raisonnables pour conclure une agreement. entente sur les services essentiels.

Powers of Board (3) After considering the application, the (3) Saisie de Ia demande, Ia Commission Pouvoirs de Ia Board may determine any matter that the em­ peut statuer sur toute question en litige pouvant Commission ployer and the bargaining agent have not figurer dans !'entente et, par ordonnance, pre­ agreed on that may be included in an essential voir que: services agreement and make an order a) sa decision est reputee faire partie de (a) deeming the matter determined by it to !'entente; be part of an essential services agreement be­ b) les parties sont reputees avoir conclu une tween the employer and the bargaining entente sur les services essentiels. agent; and (b) deeming that the employer and the bar­ gaining agent have entered into an essential services agreement.

Restriction (4) The order may not require the employer (4) L'ordonnance ne peut obliger l'em­ Reserve to change the level at which an essential service ployeur a modifier le niveau auquel un service is to be provided to the public, or a segment of essentiel doit etre foumi a tout ou partie du pu­ the public, at any time, including the extent to blic, notamment dans quelle mesure et selon which and the frequency with which the service quelle frequence il doit etre foumi. is to be provided.

Proportion of (5) The Board may, for the purpose of iden­ (5) Pour le calcul du nombre des postes ne­ Facteurs a duties may vary tif)ling the number of positions that are neces­ cessaires a Ia foumiture d'un service essentiel, prendre en during strike compte sary for the employer to provide an essential Ia Commission peut prendre en compte le fait service, take into account that some employees que l'employeur pourra exiger de certains fonc­ in the bargaining unit may be required by the tionnaires de !'unite de negociation, lors d'une employer to perform those of their duties that gn!ve, qu'ils accomplissent leurs fonctions Iiees relate to the provision of the essential service in a Ia foumiture d'un service essentiel dans une a greater proportion during a strike than they do proportion plus grande qu'a !'habitude. normally.

Determination (6) For the purposes of subsection (5), the (6) Pour !'application du paragraphe (5), le Calcul du of number of number of employees in the bargaining unit nombre des fonctionnaires de ]'unite de nego­ nombre de necessary fonctionnaires employees that are necessary to provide the essential ser­ ciation necessaires a Ia foumiture du service es­ nCcessaires vice is to be determined sentiel est calcule : (a) without regard to the availability of other a) compte non tenu de Ia disponibilite persons to provide the essential service dur­ d'autres personnes pour foumir ce service ing a strike; and essentiel durant une greve; (b) on the basis that the employer is notre­ b) compte tenu du fait que l'employeur n'est quired to change, in order to provide the es­ pas oblige de changer le cours normal de ses sential service during a strike, the manner in operations afin de foumir ce service essentiel which the employer operates normally, in­ pendant une greve, notamment en ce qui cluding the normal hours of work, the extent conceme les heures normales de travail, Ia of the employer's use of overtime and the mesure dans laquelle l'employeur a recours equipment used in the employer's opera­ aux heures supplementaires et Ie materiel tions. que celui-ci utilise dans le cadre de ses ope­ rations.

Application (7) If the application relates to a specific po­ (7) Si Ia demande porte sur un poste en par­ Demande relating to relative aun specific position sition to be identified in the essential services ticulier a nommer dans !'entente, Ia proposition poste agreement, the employer's proposal in respect de l'employeur a cet egard l'emporte, saufsi Ia of the position is to prevail, unless the position Commission decide que le poste en question

41 Public Service Labour Relations~ Apri/16, 2013

is determined by the Board not to be of the type n'est pas du type de ceux qui sont necessaires necessary for the employer to provide essential pour permettre a l'employeur de fournir lesser­ services. vices essentiels.

Coming into 124. The essential services agreement comes 124. L'entente sur les services essentiels Entree en force of into force on the day it is signed by the parties entre en vigueur Ia date de sa signature par les viguenrde agreement a !'entente or, in the case of an essential services agree­ parties ou, dans le cas oil elle est reputee avoir ment that the employer and the bargaining ete conclue en vertu d'une ordonnance prise au agent are deemed to have entered into by an or­ titre de l'alinea 123(3)b), a Ia date de celle-ci. der made under paragraph 123(3)(b), the day the order was made.

Duration 125. An essential services agreement contin­ 125. L' entente sur les services essentiels de­ Duree de ues in force until the parties jointly determine meure en vigueur jusqu'a ce que Jes parties de­ !'entente that there are no employees in the bargaining cident conjointement qu'aucun des fonction­ unit who occupy positions that are necessary naires de !'unite de negociation n'occupe un for the employer to provide essential services. poste necessaire pour permettre a l'employeur de fournir de tels services.

Notice to 126. (1) If a party to an essential services 126. (1) Si I'une des parties a I' entente sur Avis de negotiate negociation amendment agreement gives a notice in writing to the other les services essentiels avise !'autre par ecrit party that the party giving the notice seeks to qu'elle entend modifier !'entente, chacune amend the essential services agreement, the d'elles fait tous les efforts raisonnables pour Ia parties must make every reasonable effort to modifier dans les meilleurs delais. amend it as soon as possible.

Timing (2) If a collective agreement or arbitral (2) L'avis est donne au cours de Ia periode Delai award is in force, the notice may be given at de validite d'une convention collective entre les any time except that, if a notice to bargain col­ parties ou d'une decision arbitrale ou, si un avis lectively has been given with a view to renew­ de negociation collective en vue du renouvelle­ ing or revising the collective agreement, the no­ ment ou de Ia revision de Ia convention collec­ tice may only be given during the 60 days tive est donne, dans les soixante jours suivant following the day the notice to bargain collec­ celui-ci. tively was given.

Application to 127. ( 1) If the employer and the bargaining 127. (1) S'ils ne parviennent pas a modifier Demande it Ia Board agent are unable to amend the essential services !'entente sur Jes services essentiels, l'em­ Commission agreement, either of them may apply to the ployeur ou !'agent negociateur peuvent deman­ Board to amend the essential services agree­ der a Ia Commission de Ia modifier. La de­ ment. The application may be made at any time maude est presentee au plus tard: but not later than a) soit quinze jours apres Ia date de presen­ (a) 15 days after the day a request for con­ tation de Ia demande de conciliation; ciliation is made by either party; or b) so it quinze jours apres Ia date a laquelle (b) 15 days after the day the parties are noti­ les parties sont avisees par le president de fied by the Chairperson under subsection son intention de recommander l'etablisse­ 163(2) of his or her intention to recommend ment d'une commission de !'interet public en the establishment of a public interest com­ application du paragraphe 163(2). mission.

Delay (2) The Board may delay dealing with the (2) La Commission peut attendre, avant de Report application until it is satisfied that the employer donner suite a Ia demande, d'etre convaincue and the bargaining agent have made every rea­ que l'employeur et !'agent negociateur ont fait sonable effort to amend the essential services tous les efforts raisonnables pour modifier I' en­ agreement. tente.

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Amendment by (3) The Board may, by order, amend the es­ (3) La Commission peut, par ordonnance, Modification de Board sential services agreement if it considers that modifier !'entente si elle l'estime necessaire !'entente the amendment is necessary for the employer to pour permettre a I' employeur de foumir les ser­ provide essential services. vices essentiels.

Restriction (4) The order may not require the employer (4) L'ordonnance ne peut obliger l'em­ Reserve to change the level at which an essential service ployeur a modifier le niveau auquel un service is to be provided to the public, or a segment of essentiel doit etre foumi a tout ou partie du pu­ the public, at any time, including the extent to blic, notamment dans quelle mesure et selon which and the frequency with which the service quelle frequence il doit etre foumi. is to be provided.

Proportion of (5) The Board may, for the purpose of iden­ (5) Pour le calcul du nombre des postes ne­ Facteurs a duties may vary cessaires Ia foumiture d'un service essentiel, prendre en during strike tifying the number of positions that are neces­ a compte sary for the employer to provide an essential Ia Commission peut prendre en compte le fait service, take into account that some employees que l'employeur pourra exiger de certains fonc­ in the bargaining unit may be required by the tionnaires de !'unite de negociation, lors d'une employer to perform their duties that relate to greve, qu'ils accomplissent leurs fonctions liees the provision of the essential service in a a Ia foumiture d'un service essentiel dans une greater proportion during a strike than they do proportion plus grande qu'a !'habitude. normally.

Determination (6) For the purposes of subsection (5), the (6) Pour l'application du paragraphe (5), Ie Calcul du of number of number of employees in the bargaining unit nombre des fonctionnaires de )'unite de nego­ nombre de necessary fonctionnaires employees that are necessary to provide the essential ser­ ciation necessaires a Ia foumiture du service es­ n6cessaires vice is to be determined sentiel est calcule: (a) without regard to the availability of other a) compte non tenu de Ia disponibilite persons to provide the essential service dur­ d'autres personnes pour foumir ce service ing a strike; and essentiel durant une greve; (b) on the basis that the employer is notre­ b) compte tenu du fait que l'employeur n'est quired to change, in order to provide the es­ pas oblige de changer le cours normal de ses sential service during a strike, the manner in operations afin de foumir ce service essentiel which the employer operates normally, in­ pendant une greve, notamment en ce qui cluding the normal hours of work, the extent conceme les heures normales de travail, Ia of the employer's use of overtime and the mesure dans laquelle l'employeur a recours equipment used in the employer's opera­ aux heures supplementaires et le materiel tions. que celui-ci utilise dans le cadre de ses ope­ rations.

Application (7) If the application relates to a specific po­ (7) Si Ia demande porte sur un poste en par­ Deman de relating to sition to be identified in the essential services ticulier a nommer dans !'entente, Ia proposition relative aun specific position poste agreement, the employer's proposal in respect de l'employeur a cet egard l'emporte, sauf si Ia of the position is to prevail, unless the position Commission decide que le poste en question is determined by the Board not to be of the type n'est pas du type de ceux qui sont necessaires necessary for the employer to provide essential pour permettre a l'employeur de fournir Jesser­ services. vices essentiels.

Coming into 128. An amendment to an essential services 128. La modification de ]'entente sur lesser­ Entree en force of vices essentiels entre en vigueur Ia date de Ia vigueur de !a amendment agreement comes into force on the day the a modification agreement containing the amendment is signed signature parIes parties de !'entente Ia compor­ by the parties or, in the case of an amendment tant ou, dans le cas ou elle est faite par une or­ made by order of the Board under subsection donnance prise au titre du paragraphe 127(3), a 127(3), the day the order was made. Ia date de celle-ci.

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Replacement 129. (I) If, at any time while an essential 129. ( 1) Si, pendant Ia peri ode de validite Substitution de positions services agreement is in force, a position identi­ de !'entente sur les services essentiels, un poste postes fied in it becomes vacant, the employer may qui y est nomme devient vacant, l'employeur identify a position of the same type as a re­ peut y substituer un autre poste du meme type. placement position. If the employer does so, the L'employeur envoie alors un avis de substitu­ employer must file a notice of replacement with tion a Ia Commission et une copie de celui-ci a the Board and provide a copy to the bargaining !'agent negociateur. agent.

Effect of notice (2) On the filing of the notice, the replace­ (2) Une fois !'avis donne, le nouveau poste Effet de !"avis ment position is deemed to be a position identi­ est repute etre nomme dans !'entente et celui fied in the essential services agreement and the qu'il remplace ne plus l'y etre. position it replaced is deemed to be no longer identified.

Notification of 130. (1) The employer must provide every 130. (1) L'employeur donne un avis aux Avis aux employees employee who occupies a position that has fonctionnaires qui, aux termes de !'entente sur fonctionnaires been identified in an essential services agree­ les services essentiels, occupent un poste neces­ ment as being a position that is necessary for saire a Ia foumiture par l'employeur de cesser­ the employer to provide essential services with vices. a notice informing the employee that the em­ ployee occupies such a position.

Notification of (2) A notice given under this section re­ (2) L'avis donne au titre du present article Revocation de change mains valid so long as the employee continues demeure en vigueur tant que le fonctionnaire !'avis to occupy the position unless the employer no­ occupe Ie poste, sauf revocation de !'avis par tifies the employee that the position occupied avis subsequent donne a celui-ci par l'em­ by the employee is no longer necessary for the ployeur et precisant que son poste n'est plus employer to provide essential services. necessaire a Ia foumiture par l'employeur des services essentiels.

Emergency 131. Despite any provision in this Division, 131. Malgre les autres dispositions de Ia pre­ Revision application d · urgence de if either the employer or the bargaining agent is sente section, si l'une des parties employeur !'entente of the opinion that a temporary amendment to ou agent negociateur- estime qu'il est neces­ an essential services agreement, or its suspen­ saire, en raison d'une situation d'urgence, de sion, is necessary because of an emergency but modifier temporairement ou de suspendre !'en­ the parties are unable to agree to do so, either tente sur les services essentiels mais qu'il leur of them may, at any time, apply to the Board est impossible de s'entendre ace sujet, l'une ou for an order temporarily amending, or suspend­ !'autre de celles-ci peut a tout moment deman­ ing, the agreement. der a La Commission de modifier temporaire­ ment ou de suspendre !'entente par ordonnance.

Duty to observe 132. Unless the parties otherwise agree, ev­ 132. Sauf entente a l'effet contraire entre les Obligation de terms and ery term and condition of employment applica­ parties, toute condition d'emploi qui peut figu­ respecter les conditions conditions ble to employees in a bargaining unit in respect rer dans une convention collective et qui est en­ d'emploi of which a notice to bargain collectively is giv­ core en vigueur au moment oil !'avis de nego­ en that may be included in a collective agree­ cier a ete donne continue de s'appliquer aux ment and that is in force on the day the notice is fonctionnaires qui occupent un poste neces­ given remains in force in respect of any em­ saire, aux termes de !'entente sur les services ployee who occupies a position that is identi­ essentiels, pour permettre a l'employeur de fied in an essential services agreement and foumir ces services et lie les parties, y compris must be observed by the employer, the bargain­ les fonctionnaires en question, jusqu'a Ia ing agent for the bargaining unit and the em­ conclusion d'une convention collective. ployee until a collective agreement is entered into.

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Extension of 133. The Board may, on the application of 133. La Commission peut, sur demande de Prorogation ttme either party, extend any period referred to in l'une ou !'autre partie, proroger tout delai prevu this Division. par Ia presente section.

Filing of 134. Either party to an essential services 134. L'une ou !'autre partie a !'entente sur Depot de essential agreement may file a copy of it with the Board. les services essentiels peut en deposer une co­ I' entente aupres services dela agreement When filed, it has the same effect as an order of pie aupres de Ia Commission. L'entente, une Commission the Board. fois deposee, est assimitee a une ordonnance de celle-ci.

DIVISION 9 SECTION 9

ARBITRATION ARBITRAGE Application of Division Application de Ia section

Application 135. This Division applies to the employer 135. La presente section s'applique a l'em­ Application and the bargaining agent for a bargaining unit ployeur et a ['agent negociateur representant whenever une unite de negociation dans le cas oil: (a) the process for the resolution of a dispute a) d'une part, le mode de reglement des dif­ applicable to the bargaining unit is arbitra­ ferends applicable a l 'unite de negociation tion; and est le renvoi a !'arbitrage; (b) the parties have bargained in good faith b) d'autre part, les parties ant negocie de with a view to entering into a collective bonne foi en vue de conclure une convention agreement but are unable to reach agreement collective, mais n'ont pu s'entendre sur une on a term or condition of employment that condition d'emploi qui peut figurer dans une may be included in an arbitral award. decision arbitrale.

Request for Arbitration Demande d'arbitrage

Request for 136. (1) Either party may, by notice in writ­ 136. (1) L'une ou ['autre partie peut, par Demande arbitration ing to the Chairperson, request arbitration in re­ avis ecrit adresse au president, demander le spect of any term or condition of employment renvoi a !'arbitrage d'un differend sur une that may be included in an arbitral award. condition d'emploi qui peut figurer dans une decision arbitrale.

When request (2) The request may be made (2) La demande d'arbitrage peut intervenir: Moment de Ia may be made demande (a) at any time, if the parties have not en­ a) a tout moment dans le cas oil aucune tered into a collective agreement and no re­ convention collective n'a ete conclue et au­ quest for arbitration has been made by either cune autre demande d'arbitrage n'a ete pre­ party since the commencement of the bar­ sentee par l'une ou !'autre partie depuis le gaining; or debut des negociations; (b) not later than seven days after a collec­ b) au plus tard sept jours apres Ia conclusion tive agreement is entered into by the parties, d'une convention collective dans les autres in any other case. cas.

Contents of (3) The party requesting arbitration must (3) La partie qui demande !'arbitrage: Avis 3 donner notice (a) specify in the notice every term or condi­ a) precise dans !'avis Ia condition d'emploi tion of employment in respect of which it re­ a l'egard de laquelle elle demande !'arbitrage quests arbitration and its proposals concern­ et ses propositions quant a Ia decision arbi­ ing the award to be made in respect of that trale qui doit etre rendue en l'espece; term or condition; and b) annexe a !'avis une copie de Ia derniere convention collective conclue parIes parties.

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of any employee organization that has an inter­ est in the term or condition referred for final and binding determination.

Vote on Employer's Offer Scrutin sur les offres de l'employeur

Minister may 183. (1) If the Minister is of the opm10n 183. (1) Le ministre peut, s'il estime d'inte­ Scmtin ordonmi order vote to be that it is in the public interest that the employ­ ret public de donner aux fonctionnaires qui font par le ministre held ees in a bargaining unit be given the opportuni­ partie de ]'unite de negociation en cause !'occa­ ty to accept or reject the offer of the employer sion d'accepter ou de rejeter les dernieres offres last received by the bargaining agent in respect que l'employeur a faites a !'agent negociateur of all matters remaining in dispute between the sur toutes les questions faisant toujours !'objet parties, the Minister may d'un differend entre les parties: (a) on any terms and conditions that the a) ordonner Ia tenue sur les offres, dans les Minister considers appropriate, direct that a meilleurs delais et en conformite avec les vote to accept or reject the offer be held by modalites qu'il estime indiquees, d'un vote secret ballot as soon as possible among all of au scrutin secret aupres de tous les fonction­ the employees in the bargaining unit; and naires de !'unite de negociation; (b) designate the Board, or any other person b) charger Ia Commission - ou Ia personne or body, to be in charge of conducting that ou organisme qu'il designe- de Ia tenue du vote. scrutin.

Vote does not (2) The direction that a vote be held, or the (2) Ni l'ordre de tenir un scrutin ni Ia tenue Droits non delay right holding of that vote, does not prevent the decla­ du scrutin n'ont pour effet d'empecher Ia decla­ touches par le scm tin ration or authorization of a strike if the employ­ ration ou l'autorisation d'une greve s'il n'est ee organization that is certified as the bargain­ pas interdit par ailleurs a !'organisation syndi­ ing agent is not otherwise prohibited from cale accreditee comme agent negociateur de Ia making the declaration or authorization, nor declarer ou de l'autoriser, ou d'empecher Ia does it prevent the participation in a strike by participation a une gn!ve s'il n'est pas interdit an employee if the employee is not otherwise par ailleurs au fonctionnaire d'y participer. prohibited from participating in the strike.

Consequences of (3) If a majority of the employees participat- (3) En cas de vote favorable de Ia majorite Consequence favourable vote d'un vote ing in the vote accept the employer's last offer, des fonctionnaires ayant participe au scrutin, favorable les parties sont liees par les dernieres offres de (a) the parties are bound by that offer and l'employeur et sont tenues de conclure sans de­ must, without delay, enter into a collective lai une convention collective incorporant agreement that incorporates the terms of that celles-ci; de plus, toute greve en cours lorsque offer; and Ia Commission - ou Ia personne ou organisme (b) any strike that is in progress when the charge de Ia tenue du scrutin - informe les Board or other person or body in charge of parties par ecrit de )'acceptation des fonction­ conducting the vote notifies the parties in naires se termine immediatement, Ia reprise du writing of the employees' acceptance must travail se faisant sans delai en conformite avec cease immediately, and the employees must les directives de l'employeur. return to work as soon as the employer deter­ mines that it is practicable for them to do so.

Powers ( 4) The Board or other person or body in (4) La Commission- ou Ia personne ou or­ Pouvoirs a respectmg vote ganisme charge de Ia tenue du scrutin l'egard du charge of conducting the vote must determine scrutin any question that arises under this section, in­ tranche toute question qui se pose dans le cadre cluding any question relating to the conduct of du present article, notamment a I' egard de Ia te­ the vote or the determination of its result. nue du scrutin et de Ia determination de son re­ sultat.

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DIVISION 11 SECTION 11

STRIKE VoTES VoTE DE GREVE

Secret ballot 184. (1) In order to obtain approval to de­ 184. (1) L'organisation syndicate doit, pour Scrutin secret vote clare or authorize a strike, an employee organi­ obtenir )'approbation de declarer ou d'autoriser zation must hold a vote by secret ballot among une greve, tenir un vote au scrutin secret aupres all of the employees in the bargaining unit con­ de tous les fonctionnaires de ['unite de negocia­ ducted in a manner that ensures that the em­ tion, de fayon que tous les fonctionnaires aient ployees are given a reasonable opportunity to Ia possibilite d'y participer et d'etre informes participate in the vote and be informed of the des resultats. results.

Application to (2) An employee who is a member of a bar­ (2) Le fonctionnaire de !'unite de negocia­ Den>ande de have vote gaining unit for which a vote referred to in sub­ declaration declared invalid tion visee par un vote de greve qui affirme que d'invalidite du section ( 1) was held and who alleges that there le deroulement du scrutin a ete entache d'irre­ vote were irregularities in the conduct of the vote gularites peut, dans les dix jours suivant Ia date may, no later than 10 days after the day the re­ a laquelle les resultats sont annonces, demander sults of the vote are announced, make an appli­ a Ia Commission de declarer le vote invalide. cation to the Board to have the vote declared invalid.

Dismissal of (3) The Board may summarily dismiss the (3) La Commission peut rejeter de fa9on Rejet de Ia application application if it is satisfied that, even if the al­ sommaire Ia demande de declaration d'invalidi­ demande leged irregularities did occur, the outcome of te du vote si elle est convaincue que les irregu­ the vote would not have been different. larites soulevees n'auraient eu aucune inci­ dence sur le resultat du vote.

New vote ( 4) If the Board declares the vote invalid, it (4) Si elle prononce l'invalidite du vote, Ia Nouveau vote may order that a new vote be held in accor­ Commission peut ordonner Ia tenue d'un nou­ dance with the conditions it specifies in the or­ veau vote en conformite avec les modalites der. qu'elle fixe dans !'ordonnance.

DIVISION 12 SECTION 12

UNFAIR LABOUR PRACTICES PRATIQUES DELOY ALES

Meaning of 185. In this Division, "unfair labour prac­ 185. Dans Ia presente section, « pratiques Definition de "unfair labour tice" means anything that is prohibited by sub­ deloyales» s'entend de tout ce qui est interdit « pratiques practice" deloyales » section 186(1) or (2), section 187 or 188 or par Jes paragraphes 186(1) et (2), les articles subsection 189(1 ). 187 et 188 et le paragraphe 189(1 ).

Unfair labour 186. (1) Neither the employer nor a person 186. (1) II est interdit a l'employeur et au ti­ Pratiques practices­ deloyales par employer who occupies a managerial or confidential po­ tulaire d'un poste de direction ou de confiance, I' employeur sition, whether or not the person is acting on qu'il agisse ou non pour le compte de behalf of the employer, shall l'employeur: (a) participate in or interfere with the forma­ a) de participer a Ia formation ou a !'admi­ tion or administration of an employee orga­ nistration d'une organisation syndicate ou nization or the representation of employees d'intervenir dans l'une ou !'autre ou dans Ia by an employee organization; or representation des fonctionnaires par celle­ ci; (b) discriminate against an employee organi­ zation. b) de faire des distinctions illicites a l'egard de toute organisation syndicate.

Unfair labour (2) Neither the employer nor a person acting (2) II est interdit a l'employeur, a Ia per­ Pratiques practices­ on behalf of the employer, nor a person who sonne qui agit pour le compte de celui-ci et au deloyaies par employer l'employeur occupies a managerial or confidential position, titulaire d'un poste de direction ou de

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Relations de travail dans lafonction publique -- 16 avril 2013 whether or not that person is acting on behalf of confiance, que ce demier agisse ou non pour le the employer, shall compte de l'employeur: (a) refuse to employ or to continue to em­ a) de refuser d'employer ou de continuer a ploy, or suspend, lay off or otherwise dis­ employer une personne donnee, ou encore de criminate against any person with respect to Ia suspendre, de Ia mettre en disponibilite, ou employment, pay or any other term or condi­ de faire a son egard des distinctions illicites tion of employment, or intimidate, threaten en matiere d'emploi, de salaire ou d'autres or otherwise discipline any person, because conditions d'emploi, de l'intimider, de Ia the person menacer ou de prendre d'autres mesures dis­ ciplinaires son egard pour l'un ou !'autre (i) is or proposes to become, or seeks to a des motifs suivants: induce any other person to become, a member, officer or representative of an (i) elle adhere a une organisation syndi­ employee organization, or participates in cate ou en est un dirigeant ou representant the promotion, formation or administration - ou se propose de Ie faire ou de le deve­ of an employee organization, nir, ou incite une autre personne a le faire ou Ie devenir -, ou contribue Ia for­ (ii) has testified or otherwise participated, a a mation, Ia promotion ou !'administration or may testify or otherwise participate, in d'une telle organisation, a proceeding under this Part or Part 2, (ii) elle a participe, titre de temoin ou (iii) has made an application or filed a a autrement, toute procedure prevue par Ia complaint under this Part or presented a a presente partie ou Ia partie 2, ou pourrait grievance under Part 2, or Ie faire, (iv) has exercised any right under this (iii) elle a soit presente une demande ou Part or Part 2; depose une plainte sous le regime de Ia (b) impose, or propose the imposition of, presente partie, soit depose un grief sous any condition on an appointment, or in an le regime de Ia partie 2, employee's terms and conditions of employ­ (iv) elle a exerce tout droit prevu par Ia ment, that seeks to restrain an employee or a presente partie ou Ia partie 2; person seeking employment from becoming a member of an employee organization or b) d'imposer - ou de proposer d'imposer exercising any right under this Part or Part 2; -, a )'occasion d'une nomination ou relati­ or vement aux conditions d'emploi, une condi­ tion visant empikher le fonctionnaire ou Ia (c) seek, by intimidation, threat of dismissal a personne cherchant un emploi d'adherer or any other kind of threat, by the imposition a une organisation syndicate ou d'exercer tout of a financial or other penalty or by any other droit que lui accorde Ia presente partie ou Ia means, to compel a person to refrain from partie 2; becoming or to cease to be a member, officer or representative of an employee organiza­ c) de chercher, notamment par intimidation, tion or to refrain from par menace de congediement ou par !'impo­ sition de sanctions pecuniaires ou autres, (i) testifying or otherwise participating in a obliger une personne soit s'abstenir ou a proceeding under this Part or Part 2, a a cesser d'adherer a une organisation syndicale (ii) making a disclosure that the person ou d'occuper un poste de dirigeant ou de re­ may be required to make in a proceeding presentant syndical, so it a s, abstenir: under this Part or Part 2, or (i) de participer, a titre de temoin ou au­ (iii) making an application or filing a trement, a une procedure prevue par Ia complaint under this Part or presenting a presente partie ou Ia partie 2, grievance under Part 2. (ii) de reveler des renseignements qu'elle peut etre requise de communiquer dans Ie

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cadre d'une procedure prevue par Ia pre­ sente partie ou Ia partie 2, (iii) de presenter une demande ou de de­ poser une plainte sous le regime de Ia pre­ sente partie ou de deposer un grief sous le regime de Ia partie 2.

Exception (3) The employer or a person does not com­ (3) Ne constitue pas une violation de l'ali­ Exception mit an unfair labour practice under paragraph nea (1 )a) le seul fait pour l'employeur ou le ti­ (l)(a) by reason only of tulaire d'un paste de direction ou de confiance de prendre l'une ou !'autre des mesures ci-apres (a) permitting an employee or a representa­ en faveur d'une organisation syndicate qui est tive of an employee organization that is a !'agent negociateur d'une unite de negociation bargaining agent to confer with the employer or person, as the case may be, during hours groupant ou comprenant des fonctionnaires tra- vaillant pour lui: of work or to attend to the business of the employee organization during hours of work a) permettre a un fonctionnaire ou represen­ without any deduction from wages or any de­ tant syndical de conferer avec l'employeur duction of time worked for the employer; or ou Ia personne, selon le cas, ou de s'occuper (b) permitting an employee organization that des affaires de !'organisation syndicate pen­ is a bargaining agent to use the employer's dant les heures de travail, sans retenue sur le salaire ni reduction du temps de travail effec­ premises for the purposes of the employee tue pour lui; organization. b) permettre !'utilisation de ses locaux pour les besoins de !'organisation syndicale.

Exception (4) The employer or a person does not com­ (4) L'employeur ou Ie titulaire d'un poste de Exception mit an unfair labour practice under paragraph direction ou de confiance n'enfreint pas l'alinea (I )(b) (!)b) dans le cas ou: (a) if the employer or person is acting in ac­ a) il agit en conformite avec Ia presente par­ cordance with this Part or a regulation, a col­ tie, un reglement, une convention collective lective agreement or an arbitral award; or ou une decision arbitrale; (b) by reason only of receiving representa­ b) il ne fait que recevoir les observations des tions from, or holding discussions with, rep­ representants d'une organisation syndicate resentatives of an employee organization. ou qu'avoir des discussions avec eux.

Exception (5) The employer or a person does not com­ (5) L'employeur ou le titulaire d'un poste de Exception mit an unfair labour practice under paragraph direction ou de con fiance n 'enfreint pas les ali­ (l)(a) or (b) by reason only that the employer neas (l)a) ou b) du seul fait qu'il exprime son or person expresses their point of view, so long point de vue, pourvu qu'il n'ait pas indument as they do not use coercion, intimidation, use de son influence, fait des promesses ou re­ threats, promises or undue influence. couru a Ia coercition, a !'intimidation ou a Ia menace.

Exception (6) The employer or a person does not com­ (6) Aucune action ou omission ne saurait Exception mit an unfair labour practice under any of para­ constituer un manquement a I'un des alineas graphs (l)(a) or (b) or (2)(a) to (c) by reason (l)a) et b) et (2)a) a c) si elle vise le titulaire only of any act or thing done or omitted in rela­ d'un poste de direction ou de confiance ou Ia tion to a person who occupies, or is proposed to personne proposee pour un tel poste. occupy, a managerial or confidential position.

Unfair 187. No employee organization that is certi­ 187. II est interdit a!'organisation syndicale, Representation representation fied as the bargaining agent for a bargaining ainsi qu'a ses dirigeants et representants, d'agir inequitable par by bargaining I' agent agent unit, and none of its officers and representa- de maniere arbitraire ou discriminatoire ou de negociateur

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Unfair labour 189. (1) Subject to subsection (2), no per­ 189. (1) Sous reserve du paragraphe (2), il Pratiques practices­ son shall seek by intimidation or coercion to est interdit quiconque de chercher, par me­ deloyales par persons a quiconque compel an employee nace ou mesures coercitives, a obliger un fonctionnaire : (a) to become, refrain from becoming or cease to be, or, except as otherwise provided a) a adherer ou a s'abstenir ou cesser in a collective agreement, to continue to be, a d'adherer a une organisation syndicate, ou member of an employee organization; or encore, sauf disposition contraire dans une convention collective, continuer d'y adhe­ (b) to refrain from exercising any other right a rer; under this Part or Part 2. b) a s'abstenir d'exercer tout autre droit qu'accorde Ia presente partie ou Ia partie 2.

Exception (2) A person does not commit an unfair (2) Aucune action ou omission ne saurait Exception labour practice referred to in subsection ( 1) by constituer une pratique deloyale visee au para­ reason of any act or thing done or omitted in re­ graphe (1) si elle vise le titulaire d'un poste de lation to a person who occupies, or is proposed direction ou de confiance ou Ia personne propo­ to occupy, a managerial or confidential posi­ see pour un tel poste. tion.

DIVISION 13 SECTION 13

COMPLAINTS PLAINTES

Complaints 190. (1) The Board must examine and in- 190. (1) La Commission instruit toute Plaintes a Ia quire into any complaint made to it that plainte dont elle est saisie et selon laquelle: Commission (a) the employer has failed to comply with a) l'employeur a contrevenu a !'article 56 section 56 (duty to observe terms and condi­ (obligation de respecter les conditions d'em­ tions); ploi); (b) the employer or a bargaining agent has b) l'employeur ou !'agent negociateur a failed to comply with section 106 (duty to contrevenu a !'article 106 (obligation de ne­ bargain in good faith); gocier de bonne foi); (c) the employer, a bargaining agent or an c) l'employeur, !'agent negociateur ou le employee has failed to comply with section fonctionnaire a contrevenu a I' article 107 107 (duty to observe terms and conditions); (obligation de respecter les conditions d'em­ ploi); (d) the employer, a bargaining agent or a deputy head has failed to comply with sub­ d) l'employeur, !'agent negociateur ou l'ad­ section 110(3) (duty to bargain in good ministrateur general a contrevenu au para­ faith); graphe 11 0(3) (obligation de negocier de bonne foi); (e) the employer or an employee organiza­ tion has failed to comply with section 117 e) l'employeur ou !'organisation syndicate a (duty to implement provisions of the collec­ contrevenu aux articles 117 (obligation de tive agreement) or 157 (duty to implement mettre en application une convention) ou 157 provisions of the arbitral award); (obligation de mettre en reuvre Ia decision arbitrate); (j) the employer, a bargaining agent or an employee has failed to comply with section /) l'employeur, !'agent negociateur ou le 132 (duty to observe terms and conditions); fonctionnaire a contrevenu a !'article 132 or (obligation de respecter les conditions d'em­ ploi); (g) the employer, an employee organization or any person has committed an unfair labour g) l'employeur, !'organisation syndicate ou practice within the meaning of section 185. toute personne s'est livre a une pratique de­ loyale au sens de !'article 185.

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